Shuley Mine, Inc. v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources G.R. No.

214923 |
August 28, 2019 | J.C. Reyes, Jr., J

Fundamental powers of the State; Police Power National Economy and Patrimony;
Regalian Doctrine

Although Section 10, Article III of the present Constitution prohibits Congress from enacting
laws that impair the obligation of contracts, such provision is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State — in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.
Police power is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three
fundamental powers of the State. Mineral production sharing agreements as well as their
offshoots partake the nature of both a permit and a contract, it may be validly regulated by virtue
of the State's police power. Mineral resources are part of national wealth and patrimony. Any
issue involving the exploration, development, utilization and disposition of mineral resources is
imbued with public interest. Regalian Doctrine - In the context of mining related undertakings,
the same doctrine declares that all minerals and mineral lands are owned by the State, unless
there are private persons or entities holding mining patents issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and existing prior to November 15, 1935. However, the State may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements.

Maynilad Water Services, Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources G.R. No. 202897 | August 6, 2019 | Hernando, J

Public Trust Doctrine

Water is a vital part of human existence. The Public Trust Doctrine aims to put an additional
strain upon the duty of the water industry to comply with the laws and regulations of the land.
The doctrine speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its representative of continuing
supervision over the taking and use of appropriated water. The doctrine further holds that certain
natural resources belong to all and cannot be privately owned or controlled because of their
inherent importance to each individual and to society as a whole. A clear declaration of public
ownership, the doctrine reaffirms the superiority of public rights over private rights for critical
resources. It impresses upon states the affirmative duties of a trustee to manage these natural
resources for the benefit of present and future generations and embodies key principles of
environmental protection: stewardship, communal responsibility, and sustainability.

Madrilejos v. Gatdula G.R. No. 184389 | September 24, 2019 | Jardeleza, J.

Mootness; Capable of repetition; yet evading review

The “capable of repetition yet evading review" exception was limited to the situation where two
elements must concur: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated
prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.

PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines G.R.
No. 224936 | September 4, 2019 | Caguioa, J.

Eminent Domain

The power of eminent domain, which is also called the power of expropriation, is the inherent
right of the State to condemn private property for public use upon payment of just compensation.
As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate pertains primarily to the
legislature. However, the power to expropriate is not exclusive to Congress. The latter may
delegate the exercise of the power to government agencies, public officials and quasi-public
entities. With the right of eminent domain not being an inherent power for private corporations,
whose right to expropriate is granted by mere legislative fiat, the delegate's exercise of the right
of eminent domain is restrictively limited to the confines of the delegating law. Under Section 4
of Rule 67 of ROC, the proper remedy of a defendant in an expropriation case who wishes to
contest an order of expropriation is not to file a certiorari petition and allege that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of expropriation. The remedy is to file
an appeal of the order of expropriation.

Marquez v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 244274 | September 3, 2019 | Jardeleza, J

Mootness

As a general rule, this Court will not decide moot questions, or abstract propositions, or declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before
it. Such rule, however, admits of exceptions. A court will decide a case which is otherwise moot
and academic if it finds that: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case
involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues
raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the
public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.

Maunlad Homes, Inc. v. Union Bank of the Philippines G.R. No. 228898 | December 4, 2019
| Inting, J.

Mootness

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. There are two concepts
that affect the existence of an actual case or controversy for the courts to exercise the power of
judicial review: the first is the concept of ripeness which relates to the premature filing of a case,
while the second is the concept of mootness which pertains to a belated or unnecessary judgment
on the issues. Thus, "an issue that was once ripe for resolution but whose resolution, since then,
has been rendered unnecessary, needs no resolution from the Court, as it presents no actual case
or controversy and likewise merely presents a hypothetical problem." In other words, a case,
though once ripe for adjudication, becomes moot and academic "when an event supervenes to
render a judgment over the issues unnecessary and superfluous.”

ABS-CBN v. NTC G.R. No. 252119 | August 25, 2020 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Mootness

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration
on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial
relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical
legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.

Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation G.R.
No. 203754 | October 15, 2019 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Doctrine of Operative Fact

The operative fact doctrine recognizes the existence and validity of a legal provision prior to its
being declared as unconstitutional and hence, legitimizes otherwise invalid acts done pursuant
thereto because of considerations of practicality and fairness. In this regard, certain acts done
pursuant to a legal provision which was just recently declared as unconstitutional by the Court
cannot be anymore undone because not only would it be highly impractical to do so, but more so,
unfair to those who have relied on the said legal provision prior to the time it was struck down.

Philippine Textile Research Institute v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 223319 | October 9, 2019
| Caguioa, J.

State immunity; Immunity from suit

Under Article XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the State may not be sued without its
consent. However, the rule on State immunity is not absolute because the State may be sued with
its consent. Such consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through a general law or a special law. The general law waiving the immunity of the State
from suit is found in Act No. 3083 where the Philippine government consents and submits to be
sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which
could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties. On the other hand, there is implied
consent on the part of the State to be subjected to suit when the State enters into a contract. In
this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. However, not all contracts entered
into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made
between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign functions and another which is
done in its proprietary capacity.
National Power Corp. v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 242342 | March 10, 2020 | J.C.
Reyes, Jr., J

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

The doctrine of political agency provides that department secretaries are alter egos of the
President and that their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless disapproved or
reprobated by him. In short, acts of department secretaries are deemed acts of the President.

Franco y Mangaoang v. Director of Prisons (Resolution) G.R. No. 235483 | June 8, 2020 |
J.C. Reyes, Jr., J.

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

The Court elucidated that the reduction of a prisoner's sentence is a form of partial pardon, which
entails the exercise of the President's constitutionally vested authority. Contrary to petitioner's
assertion, the Constitution requires the President to act on such matter personally; thus, he may
not delegate the same in the guise of doctrine of qualified political agency.

Joint Ship Manning Group v. SSS G.R. No. 247471 | July 7, 2020 | Gesmundo, J.

Equal protection of laws

The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class. The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights
are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be
established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as
the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as
experience may demonstrate the necessity. And under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are
explicitly subject to the police power of the State because they are not ordinary contracts but are
impressed with public interest.

More Electric and Power Corp. v. Panay Electric Co. G.R. No. 248016/ 249406 | September
14, 2020 | Reyes, Jr., J.

Eminent domain; Expropriation; Due process; Equal protection

The power of eminent domain is inherent in a sovereign State whose mandate is to promote
public welfare, and to which end private property might be condemned to serve. Though
inherent, the power is not absolute, but subject to limitations set out in the Constitution, notably
in Section 3, Article III, that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law,
and Section 9, that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
When the power of eminent domain is exercised by an agent of the State and by means of
expropriation of real property, further limitations are imposed by law, the rules of court and
jurisprudence. In essence, these requirements are: 1. A valid delegation to a public utility to
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property; 2. An identified public use, purpose or welfare for which eminent domain or
expropriation is exercised; 3. Previous tender of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but which offer is not accepted; and 4. Payment of just
compensation

FCBPFAI v. Secretary of DENR and DAR G.R. No. 247866 | September 15, 2020 |
Gesmundo, J.

Regalian Doctrine

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. Public
lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons. The only exception is native title to land, or
ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of a claim of ownership since time immemorial and
independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown.

COMELEC v. AKMAPTM G.R. No. 246816 | September 15, 2020 |

Legislative branch; House of Representatives; Partylist

The system of counting pertains to two (2) different rounds and for two (2) different purposes:
the first round is for purposes of applying the 2% threshold and ensuring that only party-lists
with sufficient constituencies shall be represented in Congress, while the second round is for the
purpose of ensuring compliance with the constitutional fiat that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall be elected via a party-list system, thus, seats are computed in
proportion to a party-list's, total number of votes. Elections are won by hurdling thresholds, not
by sheer plurality of votes. Congress deemed it wise to set two (2) thresholds for the two (2)
rounds of seat allocation. Each partylist earns a seat each time they hurdle the threshold· in each
round. But to clarify, each vote is counted. only once for both rounds. In the first round,
partylists receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system are entitled to one
seat. In determining whether a party-list has met the proportional threshold, its percentage
number of votes is computed, as follows: Number of votes obtained by a Party-list / Total
number of votes cast under the party-list system The "total number of votes cast under the party-
list system", the very divisor of the formula, the very index of proportionality, requires that all
votes cast under the party-list system be counted and considered in allocating seats in the first
round, be it in favor of a two-percenter or a non-two-percenter. This only goes to show that all
votes were counted and considered in the first round.

Bautista, Mamigo, and Manila-Terceco v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 238579-80 | July 24,
2019 | PerlasBernabe, J.
Right to speedy disposition of cases

A person's right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III
of the Constitution. However, it should be understood to be a relative or flexible concept such
that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. It is deemed
violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried. 4 factors should be considered: 1. Length of delay 2. Reason for delay 3.
Assertion or failure to assert such right by accused 4. Prejudice caused by the delay.

People v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (First Division) G.R. No. 229656 | August 19, 2019 | Reyes,
Jr., J.

Right to speedy disposition of cases

The speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies is a
right constitutionallyguaranteed to all persons. A violation of this right results to the grant of the
"radical relief" of immediate dismissal of the case. To determine whether there has been a
violation of the said right, the Court adopted the balancing test using the 4-fold factors: (1) the
length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of the
right; and (4) prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay. Neither the Constitution nor the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 provide for a specific period within which the Ombudsman is
mandated to conduct its fact-finding investigations or to act on complaints, other than to do so
“promptly”. What is considered “prompt” or “inordinate delay” is to be determined on a case-
tocase basis. The large number of respondents involved from different LGUs and congressional
districts, as well as the delay on the part of some of the respondents in filing their motions
justified the delay. A definitive ruling on the concept of inordinate delay was laid down by the
Court in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan as follows: 1. The right to speedy disposition of cases is
different from the right to speedy trial. The former may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions
against courts of law while the latter may be invoked before any tribunal as long as the
respondent may already be prejudiced by the proceeding. 2. For purposes of determining
inordinate delay, a case is deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint
and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman should set
reasonable periods for preliminary investigation and delays beyond this period will be taken
against the prosecution. 3. Courts must determine which party carries the burden of proof. If it
has been alleged that there was delay within the time periods, the burden is on the defense to
show that there has been violation of their rights to speedy disposition of case or to speedy trial.
The defense must prove: (a) that the case took much longer than was reasonably necessary to
resolve (b) that efforts were exerted to protect their constitutional rights If the delay occurs
beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of
justifying the delay. The prosecution must prove: (a) that it followed the prescribed procedure in
the conduct of preliminary investigation and case prosecution (b) the delay was inevitable due to
the complexity of the issues and volume of evidence (c) accused was not prejudiced by the delay
4. Determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire
context of the case, the amount of evidence and the complexity of issues involved. An
examination of the delay is no longer necessary to justify the dismissal of the case if the
prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice. 5. The right to speedy disposition of
cases (or the right to speedy trial) must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file
the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods, otherwise, they are
deemed to have waived their right.

Madrilejos v. Gatdula G.R. No. 184389 | September 24, 2019 | Jardeleza, J.

Freedom of expression

Obscenity is not protected speech. No court has recognized a fundamental right to create, sell, or
distribute obscene material. Thus, a facial overbreadth challenge is improper as against an anti-
obscenity statute. Criminal statutes have general “in terrorem” effect (intimidating) resulting
from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt (not suitable) for
testing the validity of penal statutes.

Re: News Report of Mr. Jomar Canlas in the Manila Times Issue of 8 March 2016 A.M.
No. 16- 03-10-SC | October 15, 2019 | Carpio, J.

Freedom of speech; Types of regulation

The freedom of speech and of the press is not absolute. The Court cited two formulas that are
used to balance the constitutional guarantee of free speech and of the press, and judicial
independence. 1. Clear and present danger rule. The evil consequence of the comment or
utterance “must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high” before the
utterance can be punished. (What is the substantive evil sought to be prevented?). Good faith or
absence of intent to harm is a valid defense. 2. Dangerous tendency rule. “If the words uttered
created a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are
punishable.” However, the SC disagreed with Canlas’ claim that his article was written in good
faith. The article created a doubt in the minds of the readers, against some of the Justices, and in
the process, the Court as a whole. While it is the duty of the press to expose all government
agencies and officials and to hold them responsible for their actions, the press cannot just throw
accusations without verifying the truthfulness of their reports. The article, directly or indirectly,
tends to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. False reports about a public
official or other person are not shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech
enshrined in the Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced
the publication of falsehoods, specially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent
lies.

Soliva v. Tanggol G.R. No. 223429 | January 29, 2020 | Carandang, J.

Due process; Administrative due process

In administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend oneself. In such proceedings, the filing
of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations
against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or
trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied. The essence of due process, therefore, as applied to administrative proceedings, is an
opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Thus, a violation of that right occurs when a court or tribunal rules against
a party without giving the person the opportunity to be heard.

Tumabini v. People G.R. No. 224495 | February 19, 2020 | Gesmundo, J.

Searches and seizures

Under the law, the presence of the accused, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and
any elected public official is mandatory because the law requires them to sign the copies of the
inventory and to be given a copy thereof. Second, the seized items were not photographed by the
police officers. Third, the prosecution failed to give any justifiable ground for the noncompliance
with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165. The Court also found that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items were not preserved.

A search warrant may be served at dawn. • Sec. 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that the
warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the affidavit asserts that the property
is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted
that it be served at any time of the day or night.

• People v. CA (400 Phil 1247): The general rule is that search warrants must be served during
the daytime. However, the rule allows an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour of
the day or night, when the application asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered
to be searched. Section 7, Rule 126 states the rule on the right to break door or window to effect
search.

• The Officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his
purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part
of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully
aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. The chain of custody rule must be applied
regardless of whether the drugs were seized in a buy-bust operation or pursuant to a search
warrant.

Roy III v. Ombudsman G.R. No. 225718 | March 4, 2020 | A.B. Reyes, Jr., J.

Administrative due process; Quantum of evidence required

The Supreme Court ruled the burden of proof of substantial evidence in the administrative case
was not met. The elements of the offense in Sec. 3(a) RA 3019 were absent. There is no evidence
that petitioner acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence
in signing the Purchase Order. There was also no showing that any party incurred actual injury in
the purchase of the vehicle.

Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings.

Administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus,
an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa.
One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act.
The burden of proof for administrative cases is only substantial evidence. It is more difficult to
prove the guilt of the petitioner in a criminal case against him involving the same set of facts.
Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same
evidence to be presented in the criminal cases.

People v. Moreno y Tazon G.R. No. 191759 | March 2, 2020 | Hernando, J.

Rights of the accused; Positive identification of the accused

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA Decision. It held that positive testimony, despite minor
inconsistencies, prevails over the defenses of denial and alibi. Further, the Court held that a
police line-up is not indispensable for the proper and fair identification of offenders. The
important consideration is for the victim to positively declare that the persons charged were the
malefactors.

In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts

have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors: (1) the
witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the
crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. There
was no violation of appellant's right to counsel during custodial investigation. The records show
that appellant was informed of his constitutional rights when he was arrested. Since he chose to
remain silent, he was not interrogated and no statement or evidence was extracted from him;
neither was any evidence presented in court that was supposedly obtained from him during
custodial investigation.

De Leon v. Duterte G.R. No. 252118 | May 8, 2020

Right to information

The SC dismissed outright the petition since on its face, the petition failed to set forth
petitioner’s material allegations to establish a prima facie case for mandamus that the reliefs
sought constitute ministerial duties on the part of respondents, and that there is a clear legal right
on petitioner's part to demand the performance of these ministerial duties.

Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
required to be done when it or he/she: (1) unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; or (2) unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law. It is an
extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of
procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right
to the performance of the act compelled. It bears stressing that for a petition for mandamus to
sufficiently allege a cause of action, petitioner must satisfy the following elements: (1) the legal
right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right; and
(3) an act or omission of the defendant that violates such right. The cause of action does not
accrue until the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with the duty. It must
be noted also that the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on Section 12, Article VII
wherein the proponent thereof, Commissioner Blas F. Ople, stated that: "We are called upon to
be more trusting with respect to the Office of the President that they will know what appropriate
means to take in order to release this information to the public in satisfaction of the public's right
to know of the presidency."

Pancho v. Sandiganbayan (6th Division) G.R. Nos. 234886-911 & 235410 | June 17, 2020 |
Inting, J

Right to a speedy disposition of cases

The Court ruled that there was no inordinate delay on the part of the OMB and that the
petitioner’s right to the speedy disposition of cases was not violated.

Sec. 16, Art. III of the 1987 Const. Guarantees all persons the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The OMB is also tasked to
promptly resolve any complaints lodged before it under Sec. 12, Art. XI, of the 1987 Const and
under RA 6770 (OMB Act). Although the law and the Const do not provide for a definite period
with which to measure “promptness”, the Court in Magante v. Sandiganbayan, listed factors to
consider in treating petitions invoking the right to speedy disposition of cases These factors are:
(1) length of the delay, (2) reasons for the delay, (3) assertion of right by the accused, and (4)
prejudice to the respondent. Here, the Court takes into account the complexity and number of
charges filed against the petitioner, the number of persons involved and the nature of their
participation, the amount of money involved, the number of years covered in the PI, the
voluminous records subject of examination and verification. The period of delay attributed to the
OMB and OSP were properly justified. Also, the period of delay attributed to the accused in
seeking an extension of time to submit his counter-affidavit should be excluded from the time
spent by the OMB to terminate its PI and for the OSP to file the information with the Court.
Subtracting the periods attributable to petitioner and those beyond the control of the OMB, the
total period spent by the OMB to finish its PI, and for the OSP to file the corresponding
information is only 3yrs and 28 days. Such a period is justified, acceptable, and not capricious,
oppressive, and vexatious. Moreover, despite the pendency of the case since 2013, the petitioner
only invoked his right to the speedy disposition of cases in 2017. It must be emphasized that the
accused must invoke his or her constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases in a timely
manner and failure to do so constitutes a waiver of such right even when he or she has already
suffered or will suffer the consequences of delay
Cagasca-Evangelista v. Bantag (Resolution) G.R. No. 251954 | June 10, 2020 | Zalameda, J.

Writ of habeas corpus

The Court dismissed the petition because the Court finds that the writ of habeas corpus without
merit. The PDLs were restrained of his liberty by virtue of a valid judgement which was affirmed
by the Court. The Court also held that there are no exceptional circumstances attendant to the
case as the petitioner invoking that the imposed penalty has been excessive has no merit. The
Court ruled that despite the passage of RA 7659 abolishing death penalty, the law indicates that
the same shall be replaced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
whichever is applicable. Furthermore, since the crime committed is a heinous crime, the PDLs
are excluded from availing GCTA.

Writ of habeas corpus is a remedy for those restrained of their liberty. The essential object and
purpose of writ of habeas corpus is: 1. To inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint 2. To
relieve a person if such restraint is illegal. Writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy is
allowed only under the following exceptional circumstances: 1. There has been a deprivation of
a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person. 2. The Court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence. 3. The imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence to
such excess. However, writ of habeas corpus is not allowed when (1) the person is in custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge or (2) by virtue of a judgement or order of a
court of record.

Javier v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 237997 | June 10, 2020 | Caguioa, J.

Right to speedy disposition of cases

The Supreme Court reversed the Sandiganbayan’s Decision. It held that there was a violation of
the right to speedy disposition of cases of the petitioners. The Ombudsman failed to explain the
delay in the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the Court held that the petitioners timely
asserted their rights because they filed the Motion to Quash at the earliest opportunity.

There was violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases because the Ombudsman failed to
explain the delay in the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the petitioners timely asserted
their rights because they filed the Motion to Quash at the earliest opportunity.

Court citing Cagang: First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to
speedy trial. The right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against
courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any
tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a
formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman should set
reasonable periods for preliminary investigation. Delays beyond this period will be taken against
the prosecution. The period taken for factfinding investigations prior to the filing of the formal
complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked
within the given time periods, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably
invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the
prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay. If the defense has the burden of proof, it must
prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is
attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove that it followed
the prescribed procedure, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the
delay inevitable, and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire
context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity
of the issues raised. An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the
case was solely motivated by malice. Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to
the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the
accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked. Fifth, the right
to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent
or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural
periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.

Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) v. Miranda G.R. No. 216574 | July 10, 2019 |
Lazaro-Javier, J.

Public office as a public trust

The Supreme Court reversed the CA Decision. It held that it was not respondent’s act of signing
the disbursement vouchers that gave rise to his liability. Rather, it was his act of entrusting a
large amount of public funds to an officer who did not have the authority to receive, let alone,
disburse the funds. As it turned out, said funds entrusted were not disbursed to their supposed
beneficiaries. It was this act of the respondent which caused first the release, then the
misappropriation, and finally the total loss of the funds which to date, have remained
unaccounted for.

Doctrine:

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. As an administrative offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and
duties of a public officer. It is considered grave where the elements of corruption and clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are present. In administrative
cases, the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence. It is such relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine differently. Public office is a public trust and public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives. This Constitutional standard of conduct is not intended to be a mere rhetoric, and should
not be taken lightly. For those in the public service are enjoined to fully comply with this
standard or run the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service.
Ombudsman v. Chipoco and Buganutan G.R. No. 231345 | August 19, 2019 | Peralta, J.

Ombudsman

In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body," the Office of the Ombudsman correctly
summed up its legal interest in the matter in controversy. In support of its claim, it invoked its
role as a constitutionally mandated "protector of the people," a disciplinary authority vested with
quasi-judicial function to resolve administrative disciplinary cases against public officials. To
hold otherwise would have been tantamount to abdicating its salutary functions as the guardian
of public trust and accountability. Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal
interest in the inquiry into whether respondent committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an
offense punishable under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was
in keeping with its duty to act as a champion of the people and preserve the integrity of public
service that petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its
authority. Consolidation, in the context of legal proceedings, is a procedural tool that permits
individual cases that involve common questions of fact or law to be jointly heard and resolved by
a court or tribunal. The consolidation of several similar cases is not mandatory or automatic, but
merely discretionary (in this case, on the part of the Ombudsman).

Civil Service Commission v. Beray G.R. No. 191946 | December 10, 2019 | Hernando, J.

The Supreme Court ruled that Beray is guilty of gross neglect of duty as he miserably failed to
efficiently and effectively discharge his functions and obligations. His acts of heavily depending
on his subordinates without carefully examining the documents presented to him for
disbursement of funds clearly exhibit his flagrant and culpable unwillingness to perform his
official duties with the exactitude required of him. As for Espina and Tadeo, the Court holds
them liable for inefficiency and incompetence. Their acts of summarizing various disbursement
vouchers into a single ROA coupled with the absence of supporting documents, and the failure to
secure the approval of the higher authority in charging the reimbursement of the emergency
repairs show that they were inefficient and incompetent in the performance of their functions as
Accountant III. They failed to exercise the required extraordinary care in handling the accounting
of public funds.

Doctrine

It is inscribed in the Constitution that a public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees have the mandate to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency at all times. They must act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence pertains to "negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences,
insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive
and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property." In cases involving public officials,
there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. On the other hand,
simple neglect of duty is "the failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a task
expected of him or her, signifying a 'disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference.'

Herrera v. Mago G.R. No. 231120 | January 15, 2020 | Lazaro-Javier, J.

Condonation doctrine

The Court held that petitioner cannot anymore avail of the condonation doctrine. The Court
discussed that the said doctrine is no longer good law when the Court promulgated Carpio-
Morales v CA in 2015. However, as discussed in Crebello v. Ombudsman, the abandonment of
the doctrine should be prospectively applied and reckoned from April 12, 2016 because that was
the date on which this Court had acted upon and denied with finality the motion for
clarification/motion for partial reconsideration in the case of Carpio-Morales v. CA. Thus,
petitioner can no longer avail of the condonation doctrine because although the complaint below
was instituted on January 9, 2015, he got reelected only on May 9, 2016, well within the
prospective application of Carpio-Morales. The Court also held that the Office of the
Ombudsman's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner undoubtedly
committed grave misconduct when he facilitated the release of the RATA differential despite the
absence of the mandatory requisites prescribed by Section 344 of the LGC that "no money shall
be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the existence of appropriation that has
been legally made for the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the
local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose."

Doctrine

Abandonment of condonation doctrine in Carpio-Morales v. CA: In political law, election

pertains to the process by which a particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public
office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically
implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican
state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's
administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have
been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. xxx Many of the cases holding that
re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of office
are reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because
condonation, implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the absence of
knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive something of which one has no
knowledge.

Prospective application of abandonment: It should, however, be clarified that this Court's

abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines. Grave misconduct is defined as the transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer coupled with the elements of corruption, willful intent to violate
the law or to disregard established rule.
CSC v. Rodriguez G.R. No. 248255 | August 27, 2020 | Lazaro-Javier, J.

Accountability of public officers

The Court reversed the CA and held that there was substantial evidence to find respondent guilty
of serious dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. It found that respondent's claim of good faith must fail. It found that her excuses and
defenses were mere fiction also, it held that the presumption of good faith did not apply when the
employee's Certificate of Eligibility conflicts with the CSC's Masterlist of Eligibles which
applies in this case. After receiving the PRC Identification Card allegedly sent her by one Evelyn
Sapon, respondent did not even take steps to verify its authenticity. Per PRC Masterlist, the PRC
Identification Card which respondent claimed as hers actually belonged to one Ella S. Estopo. It
also found that respondent's act of using her fake 79.6% rating in the NLE constitutes serious
dishonesty, her act of practicing nursing without a valid certificate of registration constitutes
grave misconduct, and her acts of misrepresentation, possession of a fake PRC identification,
falsification of her personal data sheet to acquire employment constitute conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.

Doctrine:

In Bacsasar v. Civil Service Commission the Court discussed the concept of good faith in
administrative cases, viz.: "Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting
honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or
benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious. In short, good faith is actually
a question of intention. Although this is something internal, we can ascertain a person's intention
not from his own protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his
conduct and outward acts." A person is considered in good faith not only when he or she has
shown an honest intention. A person who acted in good faith must also be free from knowledge
of circumstances which ought to put him or her on inquiry

Dishonesty is defined as "intentionally making a false statement on any material fact, or

practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination,
appointment, or registration. " It is a serious offense which reflects a person's character and
exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys his honor, virtue, and integrity.

Grave misconduct is defined as the intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of

law or standard of behavior attended with corruption or a clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule. While there is no concrete definition under civil service
laws of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, the following acts or omissions
have been treated as such: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to
report back to work without prior notice; failure to safekeep public records and property; malting
false entries in public documents (i.e. PDS); falsification of court orders; a judge's act of
brandishing a gun, and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation, among others.
Madera v. COA G.R. No. 244128 | September 8, 2020 | Caguioa, J.

Public office; Public service; Mandate of COA

The Supreme Court upheld the NDs, holding that the municipality’s compensation-setting power
cannot prevail over the SSL. No law or administrative issuance, much less the SSL, authorize the
grant of the subject benefits. Petitioners disbursed the subject allowances in the honest belief that
the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude,
confident that they richly deserve such reward. There was no showing of some dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some
motive or intent, or ill will in the grant of these benefits. There was no fraud nor was there a state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for
ulterior purposes. Thus, petitioners-approving and certifying officers are shielded from civil
liability for the disallowance under Section 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Doctrine

The Constitution vests the broadest latitude in the COA in discharging its role as the guardian of
public funds and properties. The Court has generally sustained the COA' s decisions or
resolutions in deference to its expertise in the implementation of the laws it has been entrusted to
enforce. Thus, the Constitution and the Rules of Court provide the remedy of a petition for
certiorari in order to restrict the scope of inquiry to errors of jurisdiction or to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the COA.

1. If a Notice of Disallowance is set aside by the Court, no return shall be required from any of
the persons held liable therein.

2. If a Notice of Disallowance is upheld, the rules on return are as follows: a. Approving and
certifying officers who acted in good faith, in regular performance of official functions, and with
the diligence of a good father of the family are not civilly liable to return. b. Approving and
certifying officers who are clearly shown to have acted in bad faith, malice, or gross negligence
are, pursuant to Section 43 of the Administrative Code of 1987, solidarily liable to return only
the net disallowed amount which, as discussed herein, excludes amounts excused under the
following sections 2c and 2d. c. Recipients - whether approving or certifying officers or mere
passive recipients - are liable to return the disallowed amounts respectively received by them,
unless they are able to show that the amounts they received were genuinely given in
consideration of services rendered. d. The Court may likewise excuse the return of recipients
based on undue prejudice, social justice considerations, and other bona fide exceptions as it may
determine on a case to case basis.

Re: Investigation report on the alleged extortion activities of Presiding Judge Abul, Jr.
A.M. No. RTJ-17- 2486 | September 8, 2020 | Hernando, J.

Effect of death of respondent public official

The Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration reversing its earlier decision. It granted the
Motion first on the ground of presumption of innocence. Considering that only substantial
evidence is required in administrative cases, a respondent therein should likewise be presumed
innocent if his/her death preceded the finality of a judgment, as in the case of Judge Abul who
can no longer submit additional evidence to support his position due to his passing. The
presumption of innocence in his favor should stand precisely because his death preceded the
promulgation of final judgment. Second it cited jurisprudence wherein upon the death or
retirement of the respondents while their administrative cases were pending, only the penalty of
fine or deduction from their benefits was eventually imposed upon them. The third ground relied
upon is due process in that Judge Abul can no longer file any motion to question the ruling due
to his death thus he can no longer exercise his right to due process, nor can he exhaust other
possible remedies available to him. The spirit of due process encompasses all stages of the case,
that is, from the investigation phase until the finality of the decision. In other words, a
respondent public officer should be given the opportunity to be heard throughout the whole
proceedings. Finally, the Court reversed its decision on the ground of equitable and humanitarian
reasons. Based on this ground, death and survivorship benefits should be released to Judge
Abul's heirs, as his passing preceded the rendition of a judgment on his administrative case.

Doctrine

In criminal cases, the rule is that the death of an accused after conviction but during the
pendency of his/her appeal shall result in the dismissal of the criminal case. This dismissal is
triggered by the presumption of innocence accorded every accused as well as by his/her right to
due process under the Constitution. As the said principles are instrumental to criminal as well as
to civil cases, these should likewise be applied to administrative proceedings such as the one at
bench. "Since death of an accused extinguishes personal criminal liability as well as pecuniary
penalties arising from the felony when the death occurs before final judgment in criminal cases,
the standard for an administrative case should be similar or less punitive." Thus, the Court so
now holds that the death of a respondent in an administrative case before its final resolution is a
cause for its dismissal. Otherwise stated, the non-dismissal of a pending administrative case in
view of the death of the respondent public servant is a transgression of his or her Constitutional
rights to due process and presumption of innocence.

Bote v. San Pedro Ciniplex Properties G.R. No. 203471 | September 14, 2020 | Caguioa, J

Disciplinary action against public officers

The Court ruled that Bote may no longer be held administrative liable for violation of 444(b)(2)
(iv) of R.A. 7160 and abuse of authority by reason of his re-election. Bote, at the time of the
incident, was a municipal mayor— a government official but at the time of the incident, he was
NOT acting as such, or on behalf of or upon authority of the State. He was acting as private
individual or in his personal capacity, and the incident arose from a private dispute between Bote
and SPCPI involving a private property While his wrongful acts may give rise to criminal, civil,
and administrative liabilities at the same time, each must be determined in accordance with
applicable law. Due to this, the Bill of Rights is inapplicable. SPCPI cannot invoke Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution to sustain an administrative case against Bote. SCPCI may
find redress through a civil or criminal suit, but not through an administrative one.

Doctrine

The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the state's powers are found in Article III of the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life,
property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the state's
powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect
ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private
individuals or entities. In the latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such
private acts apply. The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the
state into the fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies
involving private parties.

FFIB-MOLEO v. Jandayan G.R. No. 218155 | September 22, 2020 | Caguioa, J.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence. It is such relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine differently.

As defined, "misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. As an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer. It is considered grave where the elements of corruption
and clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are present.

" Dishonesty has been defined as "x x x disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a 'public office is a public trust
and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.'"

CSC v. Cutao G.R. No. 225151 | September 30, 2020 | Inting, J.

CSC; Appointment powers

The CSC's authority to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel actions
includes the power to recall an appointment initially approved, if later on found to be in
disregard of applicable provisions of the Civil Service law and regulations. The recall or
invalidation of an appointment does not require a full-blown, trial-type proceeding. In approving
or disapproving an appointment, the CSC only examines the conformity of the appointment with
applicable provisions of law and whether the appointee possesses all the minimum qualifications
and none of the disqualifications." Thus, in contrast to administrative disciplinary actions, a
recall does not require notice and hearing. The essence of due process is the right to be heard.
Thus, a party can be accorded due process through means other than a notice or hearing.

Sto. Tomas, et al and Vermont Royale Home-owners Association, Inc. (VRHAI) v. Del
Valle G.R. No. 223637 | August 28, 2019 | Inting, J.

The Court held that HLURB had jurisdiction. The present case is an intra-association dispute,
since the complaint was filed by respondents as homeowners' association members against
VRHAI, its officers and board members. Thus, the proper construction of RA 9904 (Magna
Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations) must be resolved. RA 9904 provides that
HLURB has the power to hear and decide intra-association controversies without prejudice to
filing civil and criminal cases before regular courts. These cases refer to actions cognizable by
regular courts which arise from the same act complained of, but not incidental to, the main case
brought before HLURB. In this case, the claim for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees is purely an incident to the principal relief sought. Thus, respondents need not file a separate
civil action for damages.
Elements of Quasi Delict -
DFC - ( Domestic & Foreign Corp)
Damage incurred of the plaintiff
Fault by the defendant
Connection of the damage and fault.

DAMAGES (MENTAL)

MORAL - sleepless nights

EXEMPLARY - Punitive
NOMINAL - for violation of rights
TEMPERATE – for unsubstantiated pecuniary loss suffered
ACTUAL - substantiated damages or loss
LIQUIDATED - parties agreed to pay in case of breach

*NO RECOVERY FOR BOTH ACTUAL AND TEMPERATE.

Grounds for Annulment of Marriage

[LUFFIS]
- Lack of parental consent
- Unsound mind
- Fraud
- Force or intimidation or undue influence
- Incapability to consummate
- Sexually transmissible disease

Circumstances that constitute FRAUD:

[CPSD]
- non-disclosure of a previous CONVICTION
- concealment of PREGNANCY
- concealment of STD
- concealment of DRUG ADDICTION, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism

Grounds for Legal Separation

[RAFPALCASA]
- Repeated physical violence
- Attempt to corrupt or induce to prostitution
- Final judgment sentencing to imprisonment of more than 6 years
- Physical violence to change religious or political affiliation
- drug Addiction or habitual alcoholism
- Lesbianism or homosexuality
- Contracting subsequent bigamous marriage
- Attempt against the life
- Sexual infidelity or perversion
- Abandonment without justifiable cause for more than 1 year
(Prohibited practices under Art. 34, Labor Code)
(Also acts of illegal recruitment for overseas employment)
[SOBIGGAWIFE]
•Substituting or altering contracts approved and verified by DOLE/POEA
•Obstructing the Labor Secretary’s inspection
•Becoming an officer or Director of any travel agency
•Inducing worker who is already employed and offer him another job
•Giving false information or misrepresentation in securing license or
authority
•Giving or publishing any false notice or information or document in relation
to recruitment or employment;
•Accepting or charging excess fees
•Withholding or denying travel documents for financial consideration
•Influencing any employer not to employ any worker who has not applied
through his agency
•Failing to submit reports to POEA on recruitment performance data
•Engaging in recruitment or placement of jobs harmful to public health or
morality
AFaFa is added by RA 8042 and 10022:
[AFaFa]
•Allowing a non-Filipino citizen to head or manage a licensed
recruitment/manning agency.
•Failing to actually deploy a contractual worker without valid reason
•Failing to reimburse expenses of an OFW who was not actually deployed
without his fault

AUSSEER are prohibited acts for overseas employment which do not

constitute illegal recruitment but are nonetheless crimes but with lower
penalties. Added in R.A. No. 10022.

[AUSSEER]

•Arranging a compulsory and exclusive loan scheme with a specific lending

firm or institution
•Usurious interest exceeding 8% per annum for loan granted
•Suspended agency still doing recruitment
•Shifting to the OFW the burden of paying premium for insurance
•Exclusive and compulsory arrangement to undergo health examinations in
specified clinics
•Exclusive and compulsory arrangement to undergo training or seminar in
specified training centers or schools
•Refusal to condone or renegotiate loan incurred by OFW who is dismissed
before the end of his contract without his fault (example: a war broke out)
(edited)

Crimes involved in habitual delinquency

FRETSEL
F-alsification
R-obbery
E-stafa
T-heft
SE-rious physical injuries
L-ess serious physical injuries
Civil interdiction

PAGUMAMADI

Deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights to:

PArental authority
GUardianship
MArital authority
MAnage his property
DIspose of such property by act inter vivos
Modes of Acquisition of Ownership

OLDTIPS:
Occupation
Law
Donation
Tradition
Intellectual creation
Prescription
Succession
(Rabuya, Pre-Bar Reviewer in Civil Law)
Marriages Exempt from License Requirement:
[ARMML]
- Articulo Mortis
- Remote
- Muslims
- Marital cohabitation
- Lex Loci Celebrationis
[8:03 AM]
Void Marriages:
[LABLIS]
- w/o LEGAL CAPACITY
- solemnizing w/o AUTHORITY
- BIGAMOUS or polygamous marriages
- w/o LICENSE
- mistake to the IDENTITY
- SUBSEQUENT marriages that are void under Art. 53

RA 3326 Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for
its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against

the guilty person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

RA 3326 – Prescriptive periods for offenses defined and punished under special
laws that do not set their own prescriptive periods.
 OFFENSES PRESCRIPTION
Violations penalized by municipal ordinances Shall prescribe after two months.
Punished only by a fine or by imprisonment not Shall prescribe after one (1) year
more than one (1) month or both;
Imprisonment for more than one (1) month but Shall prescribe after four (4) years
less than two (2) years;
Imprisonment for two (2) years or more but less Shall prescribe after eight (8) years
than six (6) years;
Imprisonment for more than six (6) years or Shall prescribe after twelve (12) years
more;
Except: treason Shall prescribe after twenty (20) years

UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE

CRIMES PRESCRIPTION

Light offenses Prescribes in two months.

The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed Prescribes in six months.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses Prescribes in one year.

shall prescribe in ten years; except those

punishable by arresto mayor, which shall
Those punishable by a correctional penalty prescribe in five years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties Prescribes in fifteen years

Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua Prescribes in twenty years.

or reclusion temporal

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be
made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and
third paragraphs of this article.
Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or
are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago.

RPC Article 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties. - The period of

prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit
should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the
defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country
with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another
crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.

TABULATION OF PENALTIES

Penalty to be
Penalty to be Penalty to be
imposed upon the
imposed upon imposed upon Penalty to be
principal in an
Penalty the principal in a the accessory imposed upon
attempted crime,
Prescribe frustrated crime, in a frustrated the accessory
the accessory in
for the and accomplice crime, and the in an
the consummated
crime in a accomplices in attempted
crime and the
consummated an attempted crime
accomplices in a
crime crime
frustrated crime.
First Reclusion Reclusion Prision
Death Prision Mayor
Case Perpetua Temporal Correccional
Reclusion
Second Reclusion Prision
Perpetua to Prision Mayor Arresto Mayor
Case Temporal Correccional
Death
Third Reclusion Prision Mayor in Prision Arresto Mayor Fine and
Case Temporal in its maximum correccional in its in it's maximum Arresto Mayor
its period to maximum period period to in its minimum
maximum reclusion to prision mayor in prision and medium
period to temporal in its its medium period correccional in periods
death medium period its medium
 period
Prision
Mayor in its Prision
Arresto mayor in Fine and
maximum correccional in
its maximum Arresto Mayor
Fourth period to its maximum
period to prision in its minimum Fine.
Case reclusion period to prision
correccional in its and medium
temporal in mayor in its
medium period. periods
its medium medium period.
period.

TABLE SHOWING THE DURATION OF DIVISIBLE PENALTIES AND THE TIME INCLUDED IN EACH
OF THEIR PERIODS

Penalties Time Time Time Time

included in the
included in its included in its included in its
penalty in its
minimum period medium period maximum
entirety

From 14 years, 8
From 12 years and From 17 years, 4
From 12 years and months and 1 day
Reclusion temporal 1 day to 14 years months and 1 day
1 day to 20 years. to 17 years and 4
and 8 months. to 20 years.
months.

Prision mayor,
absolute
From 6 years and 1 From 6 years and 1 From 8 years and 1 From 10 years and
disqualification and
day to 12 years. day to 8 years. day to 10 years. 1 day to 12 years.
special temporary
disqualification

Prision From 2 years, 4

From 6 months and From 4 years, 2
correccional, From 6 months and months and 1 day
1 day to 2 years and months and 1 day
suspension and 1 day to 6 years. to 4 years and 2
4 months. to 6 years.
destierro months.

From 1 month and From 1 to 2 From 2 months and From 4 months and
Arresto mayor
1 day to months. months. 1 day to 4 months. 1 day to 6 months.

Arresto menor From 1 to 30 days. From 1 to 10 days. From 11 to 20 days. From 21 to 30 days.