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Chapter 4 • Aristotle 71

Aristotle assumed that the ways in which we think about reality represent the way
reality is, there is tight linkage between Aristotle’s logic and his metaphysics—but
Aristotelian logic is a subject for another book.

SELECTION 4.1
Metaphysics* Aristotle

[This selection will enable you to understand why, for of the perceived object, is not “made.” It does not
Aristotle, metaphysics is the examination of the most “become,” nor does it have an origin. Nor is there any
general features of being. In the selection, Aristotle is not for the essential conception of a thing. For this is what
trying to prove some overall thesis but, rather, is only is implanted in another entity, either by training or by
describing various important and interesting aspects of nature or by force. But one does cause the “bronze
the process of change. Included are the relation of form sphere” to be. For one makes it out of bronze and the
to matter, the nature of forms, and the types of form of “sphere.” One puts the form into this matter,
generation (i.e., the ways things come into existence).] and it is then a bronze sphere. But if there is an origin
for “the idea of sphere in general” it will be something
generated from something else. That which is gener-
The Process of Change
ated will have to be analyzed again in turn, and each
Everything which comes into being is brought about
reduced to something further, then that to something
by something, that is, by a source from which its gen-
else; I mean in one aspect into matter, in another into
eration comes. And it is composed of something.
form. A sphere is a figure whose surface is every-
Now this latter is best described not as the absence of
where equally distant from a center. One aspect of it
the thing but as the matter from which it comes.
is the material into which the form is to be put; the
And it becomes a particular thing, as a sphere or a cir-
other the form which is to be put into it. The whole
cle or some other thing. Now one does not “make”
is what results, namely, the bronze sphere.
the material—as the bronze—of which a thing is
It is evident from what we have said that the part
composed; so one does not make the sphere, except
which is spoken of as the form or the essence does
in a secondary sense, in so far as the bronze circle is a
not originate; but the combination which derives its
circle and one makes it. For the act of making a par-
name from this does; and in everything which orig-
ticular thing is a process of making it out of some ma-
inates there is matter, and it is now this thing, now
terial in general. I mean that to make the bronze
that. Is there then a “sphere” beside the particular
round is not to make the “round” or the “sphere,” but
spheres? Or is there a “house” beside the houses
quite a different thing—that of putting this form into
of brick? Or would there never be any particular
what did not have it previously. If one made the
things if this were so? The genus gives the general
“form,” one would make it out of something else,
character, but is not a definite particular thing. But
for this would underlie it, as when one makes a
one makes and produces such and such a thing
sphere out of bronze. This is done by making of a
out of “this” particular substance. And when it has
particular kind of substance, namely bronze, a special
been produced it is “this thing of such and such
sort of thing, namely a sphere. And if one makes this
a kind.” This concrete existing thing is “Kallias” or
“sphere” also in the same way, it is evident that he will
“Socrates,” just as the other was “this bronze
make it in the same manner, and the process of orig-
sphere,” but it is man and animal in general just as
ination will go on to infinity. It is evident therefore
the other was a bronze sphere in general. It is evi-
that the form, or whatever one ought to call the shape
dent then that the formal principle, as some are ac-
customed to speak of forms, if they are something
aside from the particulars and beside the acts of
* From Treasury of Philosophy, edited by Dagobert D. Runes.
Copyright © 1955 (renewed 1983) by Philosophical Library. generation and the essences, is of no use. For not by
Reprinted by permission of Philosophical Library, New York. virtue of them would there be particular instances
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72 Part One • Metaphysics and Epistemology: Existence and Knowledge

of them. In some cases indeed it is evident that that something and from something and as some partic-
which causes is the same sort of thing as that which ular thing. Some particular thing, I mean with re-
is caused, yet not identically the same, nor one spect to each category, such as substance, quantity,
numerically, but in form— as in the case of the quality or place. Origination by nature occurs in the
products of nature. Man begets man, (and so it is), case of those things whose origin is through the
except where something arises of different nature, processes of nature. The substance of which they are
as when a horse begets a mule. Yet these cases also formed we call matter; the source from which they
are really similar to the others; but what is common arise is some thing in nature; the kind of thing which
to a horse and an ass has not been given a name as they become is “man” or “plant” or some other
a “proximate genus”; perhaps it would be “mule.” thing of the kind which we are especially accus-
So it is evident that it is not at all necessary to tomed to call “substances.” All things which have an
supply forms as patterns, (for they would have to be origin, whether by nature or by art, have a material
found in these cases especially, since these are cer- part. Each of them might exist or not exist; and the
tainly substances). The begetter is adequate to the seat of this double possibility is the material part of
production of the effect and to the embodiment of them. In general that out of which and in accor-
the form in the matter. And the compound—such dance with which they arise is some natural thing.
and such a form in this flesh and these bones — is For that which comes into being has some natural
Kallias or Socrates. They differ because of their character as that of a plant or an animal. And that
matter, for it is different, but they are the same in under the influence of which it arises is a natural ob-
form. For the form is indivisible. ject which with reference to its form may be said to
Of things which come into existence some are be homogeneous. And this form is found in another
generated by nature, some by art, some by chance. individual; as one man begets another man. In this
And all things which are generated are generated by way arise the things which come about by nature.

CHECKLIST 4. Can there be essences without existence?

5. What are the two kinds of substance?
Key Terms and Concepts 6. How can human beings have three souls,
definition by genus nous 68 vegetable, animal, and rational (nous)?
and species-specific psyche 68 7. Explain what Aristotle means by “intuition.”
difference 70 substance (ousia) 66 Do humans have intuition?
existence and Third Man 8. Do you agree with Aristotle that every change
essence 66 argument 68 is directed toward some end?
formal, material, universals 69 9. Explain why pure actuality is the ultimate
efficient, and final source of change, for Aristotle.
causes 65
10. Why is god the unmoved mover, according to
Aristotle?
11. Review Aristotle’s ten categories of being.
Could alien intelligences think about things in
QUESTIONS FOR terms of different categories?
DISCUSSION AND REVIEW
1. What are the four Aristotelian causes of a
baseball?
SUGGESTED FURTHER READINGS
2. Aristotle believed that if individual horses did Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction
not exist, there would be no such thing as the (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2000). Only
Form horse. Is this correct? 110 pages, this introduction by a capable writer is
3. Are universals real? In what sense? very suitable for beginners.
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Chapter 7 • The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries 143

SELECTION 7.1
An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding* David Hume

[In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, examination, that it is really confined within very
David Hume argued that the contents of the mind fall narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the
into only two categories: thoughts or ideas, and mind amounts to no more than the faculty of com-
“impressions”—the material given to us by our senses pounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing
and experience. The difference between ideas and the materials afforded us by the senses and experi-
impressions, he says, is solely that ideas are less vivid or ence.When we think of a golden mountain, we only
forceful than impressions. In this passage Hume argued join two consistent ideas, gold and mountain, with
that the creative power of the mind is nothing more than which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous
the power to compound and transpose the material horse we can conceive; because, from our own feel-
given to us by the senses and experience. Hence, he ing, we can conceive virtue; and this we may unite
wrote, when we suspect a word is employed without to the figure and shape of a horse, which is an ani-
any meaning or idea, we only have to ask from what mal familiar to us. In short, all the materials of
impressions the supposed idea comes. If we cannot thinking are derived either from our outward or in-
discover any impressions, that confirms our suspicions. ward sentiment: the mixture and composition of
Contrast these views with those of Kant in the following these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to
selection.] express myself in philosophical language, all our
ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our
impressions or more lively ones.
Section II. Of the Origin of Ideas To prove this, the two following arguments will, I
. . . Nothing, at first view, may seem more un- hope, be sufficient. First, when we analyze our
bounded than the thought of man, which not only thoughts or ideas, however compounded or sublime,
escapes all human power and authority, but is not we always find that they resolve themselves into such
even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling
To form monsters, and join incongruous shapes and or sentiment. Even those ideas, which, at first view,
appearances, costs the imagination no more trouble seem the most wide of this origin, are found, upon a
than to conceive the most natural and familiar ob- nearer scrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of
jects. And while the body is confined to one planet, God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and
along which it creeps with pain and difficulty; the good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations
thought can in an instant transport us into the most of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit,
distant regions of the universe; or even beyond the those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may
universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is prosecute this enquiry to what length we please;
supposed to lie in total confusion. What never was where we shall always find, that every idea which we
seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is any examine is copied from a similar impression. Those
thing beyond the power of thought, except what im- who would assert that this position is not universally
plies an absolute contradiction. true nor without exception, have only one, and that
But though our thought seems to possess this an easy method of refuting it; by producing that idea,
unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer which, in their opinion, is not derived from this
source. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would
maintain our doctrine, to produce the impression, or
* David Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning Human Under- lively perception, which corresponds to it.
standing,” in Philosophic Classics: From Plato to Nietzsche,
Walter Kaufmann and Forrest E. Baird, eds. (Englewood Secondly, if it happens, from a defect of the organ,
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1994). We have omitted one of that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensa-
Hume’s footnotes. tion, we always find that he is as little susceptible of
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144 Part One • Metaphysics and Epistemology: Existence and Knowledge

the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no resembling ideas; and when we have often employed
notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore ei- any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are
ther of them that sense in which he is deficient; by apt to imagine it has a determinate idea annexed
opening this new inlet for his sensations, you also to it. On the contrary, all impressions, that is, all
open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty sensations, either outward or inward, are strong
in conceiving these objects. The case is the same, if and vivid: the limits between them are more exactly
the object, proper for exciting any sensation, has determined: nor is it easy to fall into any error or
never been applied to the organ. . . . mistake with regard to them. When we entertain,
. . . Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is
only seems, in itself, simple and intelligible; but, if a employed without any meaning or idea (as is but
proper use were made of it, might render every dis- too frequent), we need but enquire, from what
pute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, impressions is that supposed idea derived? And if it be
which has so long taken possession of metaphysi- impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm
cal reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon them. All our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light
ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute,
and obscure; the mind has but a slender hold of which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.
them: they are apt to be confounded with other

SELECTION 7.2
Critique of Pure Reason* Immanuel Kant

[In the previous selection, you saw that Hume thought 2. Time is a necessary representation that un-
all concepts are derived from sensory “impressions.” To derlies all intuitions.We cannot, in respect of appear-
put this point in Kant’s language, Hume thought that ances in general, remove time itself, though we can
all concepts are “empirical” and none are “a priori” quite well think time as void of appearances. Time
(“empirical” and “not a priori” mean the same thing). is, therefore, given a priori. In it alone is actuality of
In this difficult selection, Kant argues that time is not appearances possible at all. Appearances may, one
empirical (i.e., that time is a priori). In other words, and all, vanish; but time (as the universal condition
according to Kant, time is not derived from sensory of their possibility) cannot itself be removed.
impressions or what Kant calls “intuitions.” He also
explains what time is.] 3. . . . Time has only one dimension; different
times are not simultaneous but successive (just as
different spaces are not successive but simultane-
Transcendental Aesthetic Section II, Time ous). These principles cannot be derived from ex-
perience, for experience would give neither strict
§4, Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Time
universality nor apodeictic certainty. We should
only be able to say that common experience teaches
1. Time is not an empirical concept that has
us that it is so; not that it must be so. These prin-
been derived from any experience. For neither co-
ciples are valid as rules under which alone experi-
existence nor succession would ever come without
ences are possible; and they instruct us in regard to
our perception, if the representation of time were
the experiences, not by means of them.
not presupposed as underlying them a priori. . . .
4. Time is not a discursive, or what is called a
* From Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, translated general concept, but a pure form of sensible in-
by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Company, tuition. Different times are but parts of one and
1929). Reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. the same time. . . . Moreover, the proposition that
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Chapter 7 • The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries 145

different times cannot be simultaneous is not to be objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as
derived from a general concept. . . . determinations of the mind, to our inner state; and
since this inner state stands under the formal condi-
§6, Conclusions from These Concepts tion of inner intuition, and so belongs to time, time
is an a priori condition of all appearance whatso-
(a) Time is not something which exists of itself, ever. It is the immediate condition of inner ap-
or which inheres in things as an objective determi- pearances (of our souls), and thereby the mediate
nation, and it does not, therefore, remain when ab- condition of outer appearances. Just as I can say a
straction is made of all subjective conditions of its priori that all outer appearances are in space, and
intuition. Were it self-subsistent, it would be some- are determined a priori in conformity with the rela-
thing which would be actual and yet not an actual tions of space, I can also say, from the principle of
object. Were it a determination or order inhering in inner sense, that all appearances whatsoever, that is,
things themselves, it could not precede the objects all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily
as their condition. . . . stand in time-relations.
If we abstract from our mode of inwardly intuit-
(b) Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, ing ourselves — the mode of intuition in terms of
that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner which we likewise take up into our faculty of repre-
state. It cannot be a determination of outer appear- sentation all outer intuitions—and so take objects
ances; it has to do neither with shape nor position, as they may be in themselves, then time is nothing.
but with the relation of representations in our inner It has objective validity only in respect of appear-
state. . . . ances, these being things which we take as objects of
our senses. . . .
(c) Time is the formal a priori condition of all Time is therefore a purely subjective condition
appearances whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of of our (human) intuition (which is always sensible,
all outer intuition, is so far limited; it serves as the a that is, so far as we are affected by objects), and in
priori condition only of outer appearances. But itself, apart from the subject, is nothing.
since all representations, whether they have for their

SELECTION 7.3
The Philosophy of History* Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

[In the previous selection, Kant said that time is a the World; that the history of the world, therefore,
construct of the mind. In this selection, Hegel goes Kant presents us with a rational process. This conviction
one further: everything, Hegel says, is a construct of and intuition is a hypothesis in the domain of his-
Reason. Hegel doesn’t argue for this thesis in this tory as such. In that of Philosophy it is no hypothe-
selection but only asserts that it has been “proved.” ] sis. It is there provided by speculative cognition,
that Reason—and this term may here suffice us,
The only Thought which Philosophy brings with it without investigation the relation sustained by the
to the contemplation of History, is the simple con- Universe to the Divine Being— is Substance, as well
ception of Reason; that Reason is the Sovereign of as Infinite Power; its own Infinite Material underly-
ing all the natural and spiritual life which it origi-
nates, as also the Infinite Form —that which sets this
* From Georg Hegel, The Philosophy of History, translated by Material in motion. On the one hand, Reason is the
J. Sibree (New York: The Colonial Press, 1900). substance of the Universe; viz., that by which and in
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Chapter 9 • The Pragmatic and Analytic Traditions 243

SELECTION 9.4
The Problem of Objectivity* Donald Davidson

[Descartes tried to show that knowledge could be derived Here is another way — a familiar way — to view
from the fact that he thinks. Here, Donald Davidson the problem. We would never know anything about
begins descussing how thought or “propositional atti- the world around us if it were not for the stimulation
tudes” could be possible in the first place.] of our sensory organs. (There may be exceptions,
but they are not important here.) Why should, or
. . . We should be astonished that there is such a
how can, such stimulations generate thoughts of
thing as thought. . . .
anything beyond? And if beliefs of something be-
I am not concerned with the scientific explana-
yond were prompted, what conceivable test could
tion of the existence of thought; my interest is in
there be that such beliefs were true, since the test
what makes it possible. Let me state the problem a
could only involve more sensory stimulations? (It is
little more carefully. A thought is defined, at least in
as if all we know of the outside world is brought to
part, by the fact that it has a content that can be true
us by messengers. If we doubt the veracity of what
or false. The most basic form of thought is belief.
they tell us, how can it help to ask further messen-
But one cannot have a belief without understanding
gers? If the first messengers are untrustworthy, why
that beliefs may be false—their truth is not in gen-
should the later ones be any more truthful?) The
eral guaranteed by anything in us. Someone who be-
idea that since we do not will the stimulations of our
lieves there is a dragon in the closet opens the door
sensory organs we must suppose they have an ex-
and sees there is no dragon. He is surprised; this is
ternal cause is no help, for at what distance must the
not what he expected. Awareness of the possibility
posited cause lie? Why not at the surface of the skin,
of surprise, the entertainment of expectations—
or even in the brain? Without an answer to this
these are essential concomitants of belief.
question, there is no answer to the question what
To recognize the chance that we may be wrong
our beliefs are about; and without an answer to this
is to recognize that beliefs can be tested—belief is
question, it makes no sense to talk of belief—or
personal, and in this sense subjective; truth is objec-
thought in general.
tive. The problem is to account for our having the
There are many people, including philosophers,
concept of objectivity—of a truth that is indepen-
psychologists, and particularly those who admire
dent of our will and our attitudes. Where can we
the amazing cleverness of speechless animals, who
have acquired such a concept? We cannot occupy a
identify the ability to discriminate items having a
position outside our own minds; there is no vantage
certain property with having a concept—with hav-
point from which to compare our beliefs with what
ing the concept of being such an item. But I shall
we take our beliefs to be about. Surprise—the frus-
not use the word “concept” in this way. My reason
tration of expectation—cannot explain our having
for resisting this usage is that if we were to accept it
the concept of objective truth, because we cannot be
we would be committed to holding that the simplest
surprised, or have an expectation, unless we already
animals have concepts: even an earthworm, which
command the concept. To be surprised is to recog-
has so little brain that, if cut in two, each part be-
nize the distinction between what we thought and
haves as the undivided whole did, would have the
what is the case. To have an expectation is to admit
concepts of dry and moist, of the edible and inedi-
that it may be faulted.
ble. Indeed, we should have to credit tomato plants
or sunflowers with the concepts of day and night.
* From Donald Davidson, Problems of Rationality (Oxford: I should therefore like to reserve the word “con-
Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 6–11, 12, 15–16.This ar- cept” for cases where it makes clear sense to speak
ticle first appeared in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 57 (June of a mistake, a mistake not only as seen from an in-
1995). Reprinted by permission of Marcia Cavell, Literary telligent observer’s point of view, but as seen from
Executor for the Estate of Donald Davidson.
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244 Part One • Metaphysics and Epistemology: Existence and Knowledge

the creature’s point of view. If an earthworm eats proposition—of belief, doubt, wonder, hope, or
poison, it has not in this sense made a mistake—it fear—determines how, if at all, I regard its truth.
has not mistaken one thing for another: it has sim- But if I have any attitude towards it, even one of
ply done what it was programmed to do. It did not total indifference, I must know its truth conditions.
mistakenly classify the poison as edible: the poison Indeed, there is a clear sense in which I know the
simply provided the stimulus that caused it to eat. truth conditions of every proposition I am capable
Even a creature capable of learning to avoid certain of expressing or considering.
foods cannot, for that reason alone, be said to have To know the truth conditions of a proposition,
the concepts of edibility and inedibility. A creature one must have the concept of truth. There is no
could construct a “map” of its world without hav- more central concept than that of truth, since hav-
ing the idea that it was a map of anything— that it ing any concept requires that we know what it
was a map—and so might be wrong. would be for that concept to apply to something—
To apply a concept is to make a judgment, to clas- to apply truly, of course. The same holds for the
sify or characterize an object or event or situation in concept of truth itself. To have the concept of truth
a certain way, and this requires application of the is to have the concept of objectivity, the notion of a
concept of truth, since it is always possible to classify proposition being true or false independent of one’s
or characterize something wrongly. To have a con- beliefs or interests. In particular, then, someone
cept, in the sense I am giving this word, is, then, to be who has a belief, who holds some proposition to be
able to entertain propositional contents: a creature true or false, knows that that belief may be true or
has a concept only if it is able to employ that concept false. In order to be right or wrong, one must know
in the context of a judgment. It may seem that one that it is possible to be right or wrong.
could have the concept of, say, a tree, without being Entertaining any proposition, whatever one’s
able to think that, or wonder whether, something is a attitude toward the proposition may be, entails be-
tree, or desire that there be a tree. Such conceptual- lieving many other propositions. If you wonder
ization would, however, amount to no more than whether you are seeing a black snake, you must
being able to discriminate trees—to act in some spe- have an idea of what a snake is. You must believe
cific way in the presence of trees—and this, as I said, things such as: a snake is an animal, it has no feet, it
is not what I would call having a concept. . . . moves with sinuous movement, it is smaller than a
These mental attributes are, then, equivalent: to mountain. If it is a black snake, then it is a snake and
have a concept, to entertain propositions, to be able it is black. If it is black, it is not green. Since you
to form judgments, to have command of the con- wonder what you are seeing, you must know what
cept of truth. If a creature has one of these attrib- seeing is: that it requires the use of the eyes, that you
utes, it has them all. To accept this thesis is to take can see something without touching it, and so on. I
the first step toward recognizing the holism—that do not wish to give the impression that there is a
is, the essential interdependence— of various as- fixed list of things you must believe in order to won-
pects of the mental. der whether you are seeing a black snake.The size of
Let me dwell briefly on the centrality of the con- the list is very large, if not infinite, but membership
cept of truth. It is not possible to grasp or entertain in the list is indefinite. What is clear is that without
a proposition without knowing what it would be for many of the sort of beliefs I have mentioned, you
it to be true; without this knowledge there would be cannot entertain the proposition that you are seeing
no answer to the question what proposition was a black snake; you cannot believe or disbelieve that
being grasped or entertained. . . . proposition, wish it were false, ask whether it is true,
In order to understand a proposition, one must or demand that someone make it false. . . .
know what its truth conditions are, but one may or We must conclude, I think, that it is not possible
may not be concerned with the question whether it for a creature to have a single, isolated, thought. . . .
is true. I understand what would have to be the case It follows from what I have said that many of our
for it to have rained in Perth, Australia, on May 1st, beliefs must be true. The reason, put briefly if mis-
1912, but I do not care whether or not it did rain leadingly, is that a belief owes its character in part to
there on that date. I neither believe nor disbelieve its relations to other, true, beliefs. Suppose most of
that it rained in Perth on May 1st, 1912; I don’t my beliefs about what I call snakes were false; then
even wonder about it. The attitude I have towards a my belief that I am seeing what I call a “snake” would
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Chapter 9 • The Pragmatic and Analytic Traditions 245

not be correctly described as being about a snake. most beliefs can be false. This last remark is danger-
Thus my belief, if it is to be about a snake, whether it ously ambiguous. It means: with respect to most of
is a true belief or a false one, depends on a back- our beliefs, any particular one may be false. It does
ground of true beliefs, true beliefs about the nature not mean: with respect to the totality of our beliefs,
of snakes, of animals, of physical objects of the world. most may be false, for the possibility of a false belief
But though many beliefs must therefore be true, depends on an environment of truths.

SELECTION 9.5
What Is Social Construction?* Paul A. Boghossian

[Are the entities postulated by science mere social allow ourselves some slightly florid language, we
constructions? Are the beliefs in those things, or the could say that in our world dinosaurs and quarks
justifications of those beliefs, social constructions? Here exist, in much the way as we could say that in the
philosopher of science Paul A. Boghossian argues they world of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Ophelia drowns. So,
are not.] still speaking in this vein, we could say that science
made it true that in our world there are dinosaurs
Socially Constructed Things and quarks. But all we could coherently mean by
Money, citizenship and newspapers are transparent this is that science made it true that we came to
social constructions because they obviously could believe that dinosaurs and quarks exist. And that no
not have existed without societies. Just as obviously, one disputes. Despite all the evidence in their favor,
it would seem, anything that could have—or that these beliefs may still be false and the only thing
did—exist independently of societies could not have that will make them true is whether, out there, there
been socially constructed: dinosaurs, for example, really were dinosaurs and there really are quarks.
or giraffes, or the elementary particles that are sup- Surely, science cannot construct those things; at
posed to be the building blocks of all matter and best, it can discover them. . . .
that physicists call “quarks.” How could they have
been socially constructed if they existed before soci- Socially Constructed Belief
eties did? If the preceding considerations are correct, social
Yet when we turn to some of the most prominent construction talk does not cogently apply to the
texts in the social construction literature, we find an facts studied by the natural sciences; does it fare any
avalanche of claims to the effect that it is precisely better when applied to the beliefs about those facts
such seemingly mind- and society-independent items produced by those sciences?
that are socially constructed. . . . The issue is not whether science is a social enter-
But it is not easy to make sense of the thought prise. Of course, it is. Science is conducted collec-
that facts about elementary particles or dinosaurs tively by human beings who come equipped with
are a consequence of scientific theorizing. How could values, needs, interests and prejudices. And these
scientific theorizing have caused it to be true that may influence their behavior in a variety of poten-
there were dinosaurs or that there are quarks? Of tially profound ways: they may determine what
course, science made it true that we came to believe questions they show an interest in, what research
that dinosaurs and quarks exist. Since we believe it, strategy they place their bets on, what they are will-
we act as though dinosaurs and quarks exist. If we ing to fund, and so forth.
The usual view, however, is that none of this mat-
* From Paul Boghossian, “What is Social Construction?” ters to the believability of a particular claim produced
Times Literary Supplement, February 23, 2001, p. 6–8. by science, if that claim is adequately supported by the
Reprinted by permission of Paul Boghossian. factual evidence. Kepler may have become interested
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246 Part One • Metaphysics and Epistemology: Existence and Knowledge

in planetary motion as a result of his religious and oc- and the second of our four options, would be to
cult preoccupations, and for all I know, he may have argue that, although social values do not justify our
been strongly invested in getting a certain outcome. beliefs, we are not actually moved to belief by things
But so long as his eventual claim that the planets that justify; we are only moved by our social interests.
move in elliptical orbits could be justified by the evi- This view, which is practically orthodoxy among
dence he presented for it, it does not matter how he practitioners of what has come to be known as
came to be interested in the question, nor what prior “science studies,” has the advantage of not saying
investment he may have had. The view is now there, something absurd about justification; but it is
with a claim on our attention, and the only way to re- scarcely any more plausible. On the most charitable
ject it is to refute the evidence adduced in its favor. It reading, it stems from an innocent confusion about
is irrelevant that Kepler would not have engaged in what is required by the enterprise of treating scien-
his research had it not been for preoccupations that tific knowledge sociologically. . . .
we do not share or that he may have had extra- . . . Absent an argument for being skeptical about
evidential motives for hoping for a certain outcome. the very idea of a good reason for a belief—and how
To put this point another way, we commonly dis- could there be such an argument that did not im-
tinguish between what philosophers of science call mediately undermine itself?—one of the possible
the “context of discovery” and what they call the causes for my believing what I do is that I have good
“context of justification.” And while it’s plausible evidence for it. Any explanatory framework that in-
that social values play a role in the context of dis- sisted on treating not only true and false beliefs
covery, it’s not plausible that they play a role in the symmetrically, but justified and unjustified ones as
context of justification. Social constructionists well, would owe us an explanation for why evidence
about knowledge deny this; for them it is naïve to for belief is being excluded as one of its potential
suppose that while social values may enter into the causes. And it would have to do so without under-
one context, they need not enter into the other. mining its own standing as a view that is being put
Well, how could social values enter into the con- forward because justified.
text of justification? There are four distinct ways of This is not, of course, to say that scientific belief
articulating the thought a constructionist may have must always be explained in terms of the compelling
in mind here; while all four may be found in the lit- evidence assembled for it; the history of science is
erature, they are not always sufficiently distin- replete with examples of views—phrenology, for
guished from one other. example—for which there never was any good evi-
To begin with, a constructionist may hold that dence. It is simply to insist that scientific belief is
it is not the factual evidence that does the justify- sometimes to be explained in terms of compelling
ing, but precisely the background social values. And evidence and that the history and sociology of sci-
while it may seem incredible that anyone could ence, properly conceived, need have no stake in
have seriously thought anything like this, but there denying that.
are certainly assertions out there that seem to de- This brings us to a third, milder conception of
mand just such a reading. . . . However, anyone how social values might be indispensable for the
who really thought that, say, Maxwell’s Equations justification of scientific belief. On this view, al-
could be justified by appeal to Maxwell’s, or anyone though evidence can enter into the explanation for
else’s, social or political beliefs would betray a com- why a particular view is believed, it can never be
plete incomprehension of the notion of justification. enough to explain it. Any evidence we might pos-
An item of information justifies a given belief by sess always underdetermines the specific belief that
raising the likelihood that it is true. Admittedly, this we arrive at on its basis. Something else must close
is not an unproblematic notion. But unless we are the gap between what we have evidence for and
to throw it out altogether, it is perfectly clear that what we actually believe, and that something else is
one cannot hope to justify the fundamental laws provided by the thinker’s background values and
of electromagnetism by appeal to one’s political interests.
convictions or career interests or anything else of a This idea, that the evidence in science always
similar ilk. underdetermines the theories that we believe on its
If one were absolutely determined to pursue basis, has exerted considerable influence in the
something along these lines, a slightly better avenue, philosophy of science, even in non-constructionist
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Chapter 9 • The Pragmatic and Analytic Traditions 247

circles. In its modern form, it originated in the This is currently perhaps the single most influ-
thought of the turn of the century French physicist ential construal of the relation between the rational
and philosopher, Pierre Duhem. . . . and the social in constructionist circles. What it
Duhem argued that reason alone could never de- amounts to is a relativization of good reasons to
cide which revisions are called for and, hence, that variable social circumstance, so that the same item
belief revision in science could not be a purely ratio- of information may correctly be said justify a given
nal matter: something else had to be at work as well. belief under some social circumstances, in some
What the social constructionist adds is that this cultures, but not in others. . . .
extra element is something social. But this is an impossible construal of reasons for
This is a clever argument that does not long con- belief, as Plato understood some time ago (see his
ceal its difficulties. Is it really true that we could never Theatetus). We cannot coherently think of ourselves
have more reason to revise one of our theories rather as believing and asserting anything, if all reasons for
than another in response to recalcitrant experience? belief and assertion are held to be inexorably tied to
Consider Duhem’s example of an astronomer peer- variable background perspective in the manner
ing through his telescope at the heavens and being being proposed. There are many ways to show this,
surprised at what he finds there, perhaps a hitherto but perhaps the most telling is this: not even the rel-
undetected star in a galaxy he has been charting. ativist would be able to adopt such an attitude to-
Upon this discovery, according to Duhem, the as- wards his own view. For, surely, the relativist does
tronomer may revise his theory of the heavens or he not think that a relativism about reasons is justified
may revise his theory of how the telescope works. only relative to his own perspective? If he did, why
And rational principles of belief fixation do not tell is he recommending it to us who do not share his
him which to do. perspective?
The idea, however, that in peering at the heavens When we believe something we believe it be-
through a telescope we are testing our theory of the cause we think there are reasons to think it is true,
telescope just as much as we are testing our astro- reasons that we think are general enough to get a
nomical views is absurd. The theory of the tele- grip even on people who do not share our perspec-
scope has been established by numerous terrestrial tive.That is why we feel entitled to recommend it to
experiments and fits in with an enormous number them. It’s hard to imagine a way of thinking about
of other things that we know about lenses, light and belief and assertion that precluded the possibility of
mirrors. It is simply not plausible that, in coming that sort of generality. . . .
across an unexpected observation of the heavens, a
rational response might be to revise what we know Conclusion
about telescopes! The point is not that we might At its best—as in the work of de Beauvoir and
never have occasion to revise our theory of tele- Appiah—social constructionist thought exposes the
scopes; one can certainly imagine circumstances contingency of those of our social practices that we
under which that is precisely what would be called had wrongly come to regard as inevitable. It does so
for. The point is that not every circumstance in by relying on the standard canons of good scientific
which something about telescopes is presupposed reasoning. It goes astray when it aspires to become
is a circumstance in which our theory of telescopes either a general metaphysics or a general theory of
is being tested, and so the conclusion that rational knowledge. As the former, it quickly degenerates
considerations alone cannot decide how to respond into an impossible form of idealism. As the latter, it
to recalcitrant experience is blocked. assumes its place in a long history of problematic
Perhaps, however—to come to the fourth and attempts to relativize the notion of rationality. It has
final way in which belief and social values might be nothing new to add to these historically discredited
intertwined—the correct thought is not that the views; if anything, social constructionist versions
social must be brought in to fill a gap left by the ra- tend to be murkier and more confused than their
tional, but simply that the rational itself is constitu- traditional counterparts. The difficulty lies in un-
tively social. A good reason for believing something, derstanding why such generalized applications of
according to this line of thought, only has that sta- social construction have come to tempt so many.
tus relative to variable social factors—a sharp sepa- One source of their appeal is no doubt their effi-
ration between the rational and the social is illusory. ciency. If we can be said to know up front that any
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248 Part One • Metaphysics and Epistemology: Existence and Knowledge

item of knowledge only has that status because it gets are capable of arriving at belief about how things
a nod from contingent social values, then any claim are that is objectively reasonable, binding on anyone
to knowledge can be dispatched if we happen not to capable of appreciating the relevant evidence
share the values on which it allegedly depends. There regardless of their ideological perspective. Difficult
is no need to get into the often complex details. . . . as these notions may be, it is a mistake to think that
The intuitive view is that there is a way things are recent philosophy has disclosed any good reasons
that is independent of human opinion, and that we for rejecting them.

CHECKLIST might conceivably result by necessity from the

truth of that conception, and the sum of these
To help you review, here is a checklist of the consequences will constitute the entire meaning
key philosophers and terms and concepts of this of the conception.” 206
chapter. The brief descriptive sentences summarize • Willard Van Orman Quine rejected
the philosophers’ leading ideas. Keep in mind that empiricist reductionism and the idea that
some of these summary statements are oversim- there is a clear distinction between analytic
plifications of complex positions. and synthetic statements. Also was famous
for “ontological relativism,” “inscrutability
of reference,” and “indeterminacy of
Philosophers translation.” 231
• Donald Davidson developed a theory of • Bertrand Russell held that analysis is the
meaning for natural languages derived from key to metaphysical truth. He sought connec-
logician Alfred Tarski’s theory of truth for tion between “hard” data given in sensory
formal languages. 231 experience and supposedly external physical
• John Dewey was an instrumentalist who objects. 209
claimed thinking is not a search for “truth” but • Ludwig Wittgenstein derived a metaphysics
rather is aimed at solving practical problems. of logical atomism from a consideration of the
He thought of metaphysics as escapism. 206 relationship of language and the world. He
• Gottlob Frege, a German mathematician and advanced the picture theory of meaning, then
founder of modern mathematical logic, under- later rejected it. 216
took to establish logicism independently of Key Terms and Concepts
Russell. 211
• William James said that “the whole func- a priori/ interactionist
tion of philosophy ought to be to find out a posteriori 234 dualism 226
what definite differences it will make to you analysis 208 language game 224
and me, at definite instants of our life, if this analytic/synthetic 231 logical atomism 216
world-formula or that world-formula be the antirepresentationalism logical positivism 212
true one.” 206 222 logicism 210
behaviorism 226 mereological sum 236
• Saul Kripke rejected the theory of naming foundationalism 220 naturalized
known as descriptivism; held that not all neces- functionalism 229 epistemology 221
sary truths are a priori truths, that there are no identity theory 228 necessary/
contingent identity statements, and that names incorrigible 218 contingent 234
for mental states cannot possibly denote brain indeterminancy of nihilism 205
states. 231 translation 232 ontological
• C. S. Peirce stated that “in order to ascertain inscrutability of anti-realism 236
the meaning of an intellectual conception one reference 232 ontological realism 236
should consider what practical consequences instrumentalism 206 ontology 235