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BURMA CAMPAIGN

Introduction

1. The Burma Campaign during World War II (WWII) is often known as the forgotten
war due to the major focus of the war in Europe. Fought by a combination of nationalities on
the allied side, the British Commonwealth, consisting of the Indian, British, Canadian, the
Chinese troops and the US soldiers, it provided a common rallying point against the Imperial
Japanese Army (IJA). Burma campaign was one of the longest campaigns in World War II
due to the intermittent weather and inhospitable terrain and began with the invasion of Burma
by the15th Japanese Army in 1942 and ended with its defeat in 1945.

2. War in Burma necessitated the fighting formations to acquire skills, both military and
survival, due to a myriad combination of terrain, climate and thick forests and a formidable
enemy. This necessitated momentous changes in restructuring of units and formations,
training methods and a tactical reorientation to achieve victory. A large theatre of war, with a
primitive communication network made conduct of large scale operations exceptionally
difficult. Given the scarcity of resources due to the dedication of major effort towards the war
in Europe, detailed logistics planning and resolute leadership were the key to success while
fighting a highly trained and ruthless opposition.

Aim

3. This chapter aims at carrying out an analytical study of the Burma Campaign with a
view in drawing pertinent lessons, with particular reference to the following: -
(a) Turning the tide
(b) Battle of Irrawaddy Shore
(c) Race to Rangoon

Background

4. On 8 December 1941, after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States
declared war on Japan and became an active participant in World War II. For some months
prior to that attack, the United States had been supporting China's war against Japan with
money and materiel. Pearl Harbor formally brought America into World War II, but it was an

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earlier American commitment to China that drew the United States Army into the Burma
Campaign of 1942.

5. Japan had invaded China in 1937, gradually isolating it from the rest of the world
except for two tenuous supply lines: a narrow-gauge railway originating in Haiphong, French
Indochina; and the Burma Road, an improved gravel highway linking Lashio in British
Burma to Kunming in China. Along these routes travelled the materiel that made it possible
for Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese government to resist the Japanese offensives into
the interior.

6. In 1940, Japan took advantage of the German invasion of France to cut both supply
lines to China. In June, with France focused on the war in Europe, Japanese warships moved
into French Indo-China and closed the railroad from Haiphong. A month later, threatening
war if its demands were not met, Japan secured an agreement from the hard-pressed British
government to close the Burma Road to war materiel temporarily. The Burma Road reopened
in October 1940, literally the sole lifeline to China. Over this narrow highway, trucks carried
munitions and materiel to supply the Chinese Army, whose continuing strength in turn forced
the Japanese to keep considerable numbers of ground forces stationed in China.
Consequently, Japanese strategists decided to cut the Burma lifeline, gain complete control of
China, and free their forces for use elsewhere in the Pacific.

Causes of War

7. The campaign in which Allied forces defeated the Japanese in Burma was unique as
neither side wished to wage war. Allied strategy in Southeast Asia had been subject to a
frustrating and often acrimonious debate between the American and the British high
commands, reflecting clearly divergent strategic objectives. The various reasons for the war
from both warring sides are as follows:
(a) Japanese Perspective
(1) To cut overland access to China from Burma which could deprive
Chiang Kai Shek's Kuomintang (Nationalist Chinese) armies of their life-
blood, permitting the Japanese to conquer all China.

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(2) To acquire raw materials, particularly oil, rubber and tin and through
expansion of the so-called greater co-prosperity sphere, to create space for the
home islands.
(3) Possession of Burma would place the Japanese at the gate of India,
where they could support Bengali politician Subash Chandra Bose, who
recruited thousands of Indian troops captured in Singapore into his Indian
National Army to fight the British.

(b) Allied Perspective. To keep supply route open to China. China was fully
dependent on US supply for war material. War between Japan and China held almost
one-third of total Japanese land forces that would otherwise be turned against the
Americans in their march across the Pacific engaged.
(1) To secure the Hump Route. Opening an overland supply route
through India to China was a long term project important for the immediate
supply and replenishment.
(2) To recapture lost British colonial territories and re- conquest SE Asia.
(3) Defending Burma was key for the British as it was the largest British
Empire in Indian subcontinent.
(4) To enjoy the geo-strategic importance of Burma. Burma was an
important link in the imperial route from Britain to Australia and else where.
(5) To draw Japanese forces from the Pacific to facilitate rapid US
success in the Pacific. War in Burma and also keeping China in war against
Japan would have drawn more Japanese forces and their war material towards
those theatres. This would have weakened the Japanese forces in the Pacific
and facilitated rapid U.S. success in other theatres.

Turning the Tide

8. Operation U-Go, also known as the U-Go Sakusen was the Japanese offensive
launched in March 1944 against forces of the British Empire in the North-East Indian regions
of Manipur and the Naga Hills. The offensive along with the overlapping Ha-Go offensive
was one of the last major Japanese offensives during the Second World War. Japanese
intended to capture the British supply bases on the Imphal Plain and cut the road linking

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Dimapur and Imphal at Kohima. With Imphal in their hands, the Japanese would be able to
interrupt air supplies to China. It would also give them a base from where air attacks against
India could be conducted. The offensive culminated at the battles of Imphal and Kohima,
where the Japanese and their allies were first held and then pushed back. This battle ended
with the Allied victory.

Strategic Importance of Imphal

9. Imphal plain is in the Manipur state of India, which has divided India from Burma. It
is a plateau about 3,000 ft above sea level covering about 600 sq miles and surrounded by
jungle-covered hills. It was considered as a natural halfway staging ground for any
subsequent military operation, which would work as “Spring Board” for both the forces.
Only two all-weather air fields of central Burma was located in Imphal area. These were of
immense importance from logistical point of view, especially during monsoon season. Imphal
connects all the important places of NW parts of Burma and NE parts of India like Dimapur-
Kohima-Imphal, Khrul – Imphal, Shilchar - Bishenpur – Imphal andTammu – Imphal.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF BURMA

ORBAT

10. The ORBAT of both the forces are appended below:

(a) Allied Force (IV Corps). Comd Lt Gen Geoffry Scoones.

(1) 17th Indian Div.

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(2) 20th Indian Div.

(3) 23rd Indian Div.
(4) 50th Para Bde.
(5) 254th Tk Bde.
(6) 221st Gp Royal Air Force (RAF).

(b) Japanese Force (15thArmy). Comd Lt Gen Mutaguchi.

(1) 15th Div.
(2) 31st Div.
(3) 33rd Div.
(4) 1x Indian National Army Div.
(5) 1x Tk Reg.
(c) The Japanese dispositions after regrouping were as under:
(1) 28th Army (54th, 55th Div) - Commanded by Sakurai on Arakan front.
(2) 33rd Army (18th, 56th Div) - Commanded by Honda on the Northern
front.
(3) 15th Army (15th, 31st, 33rd Div) - Commanded by Mutaguchi on the
Central front.

(d) Air.
(1) Allied. The allied enjoyed air superiority in this sector.
(i) 21X sqn of RIAF and RAF (Daily aval not more than 7 x sqn).

(ii) Supplemented by Tac Air Force (TAF).

(iii) Supplemented by USAF.

(2) Japanese. 5th Air Div (Provided very ltd air sp).

Prelude to the Battle.

11. The prelude to the battle was as follows:

(a) Japanese Considerations. In the face of defeats in the Pacific theatre,

gradual loss of ships and supply vessels, and the change of allied priority to Burma,

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the Japanese realized that their defense East of Chindwin would be easily over run if
the Allies decided to launch a counter offensive to recapture Burma. They decided
that the best way to defend Burma would be to advance into Assam and seize Imphal,
the base from which large scale Allied offensive against Burma would have to be
launched. The considerations were as follows:
(1) Destruction of British forces in India and exploiting the Indians against British
occupations.
(2) Isolation of China by cutting the famous Hump Route after the capture of the
Imphal Plain.
(3) Capture of Imphal and Kohima would open the gate for further offensive
towards Brahmaputra valley.
(4) American expeditionary forces under Stillwell would be cut off.
(5) Indian sub-continent would supply enough raw materials and food for any
future commitments.
(6) In order to pin down British formations in Arakan, an advance on that front
was to begin 2/3 weeks before the Imphal offensive.

(b) British Considerations. With the war getting tougher in the Arakan
front, the British had to take the followings into consideration:
(1) The Japanese were expected for a passage to India in the central front.
(2) The Japanese were expected to materialize this from Northern Burma
through Assam.
(3) The British had to keep this area free from the Japanese with a view to
keeping the Hump Route open for Stillwell's operation in China.
(4) Imphal and Kohima had to be used for any further British offensive in
North and Central Burma.
(5) Move of reserve by air from Arakan to the central front before the
Japanese could reach the Imphal plain.
12. Final Allied Plan. The British forces confronting 15th Army on the Imphal front
were depl as under:
(a) 17th Indian Div Commanded by Maj Gen Cowan, located at Tiddin to
withdraw rapidly once the Japanese attack developed and formed corps reserve at

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Imphal, leaving behind a Bde gp some forty miles south of Imphal to block the
Japanese adv.
(b) 20th Indian Div was to withdraw from its fwd posn in Kawba valley and hold
the Shenam pass, dominating the Imphal-Sittaung rd.
(c) 23rd Indian Div was to form the Corps reserve at Imphal with 17th Indian Div,
50th Indian Para Bde and 254th Indian leaving one at Ukhrul area.

13. Final Japanese Plan (The U-Go offensive). Keeping in view the detail
considerations, Lt Gen Mutaguchi planned the Japanese offensive as under:

(a) 31st Japanese Div (Lt Gen Sato) was to cross the Chindwin River at Homalin
on 15/16 March 1944. They were to overrun Ukhrul and seize Kohima. In the 2nd
phase was to send a column to help in attack on Imphal from the North.
(b) 15th Japanese Div (Lt Gen Yamaguchi) was to cross the Chindwin River near
Thaungdut on 15/16 March 1944. They were to lead an advance via Ukhrul to cut the
Imphal-Kohimard at Kanglatongbi. The main body of this Div was to seize the high
ground north of the Imphal plain and attack Imphal from North in conjunction with an
assault from South by 33rd Div.
(c) 33rd Japanese Div (Lt Gen Yanagida) was to cross the Chindwin River at
Kalewa one week earlier than the other two Div in order to draw Allied reserve away
from Imphal. The main force of 33rd Div was to cut the Tiddim rd behind 17th Indian
Div at Tongzang, destroy it and then attack Imphal from the South.
(d) A detached column of 33rd Div together with INA Div was to drive 20th Indian
Div from the Tamu area and attack Palel and Imphal from the South-East.

Conduct of Battle.

14. Japanese Offensive.

(a) The Japanese 33rd Div started the offensive on 9th Mar 1944 with thrust aimed
at cutting off Cowan’s 17th Div. The withdrawal order was given to 17th Div on 13
March 1944. Before 17th Indian Div could withdraw, the Japanese had set up number
of rd blocks in the rear of the div near Tongang. Two Bde of 23 rd Indian Div (Reserve

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Div of the Corps) supported by RAF fighter were sent as rft. After fighting a series of
Battles 17th Div managed to wdr to Imphal on 5th April 1944.

(b) On the night of 15/16 March 1944, INA Div and column of 33rd Div advanced
from the South towards Tannu Palel. Despite fierce fighting, 20th Indian Div
conducted much more orderly wdr than 17th Indian Div to Shenam by 2nd April 1944.
On 1st April 1944, 32nd Bde of this Div was pulled out as Corps res to Palel.

(c) Meanwhile Japanese 31st Div crossed Chindwin in three columns from
Homalin and attack on Ukhrul on 19 March which was captured by 26th March 1944.
(d) Anticipating the situation, Slim brought 5th Indian Div by air from Arakan to
Imphal as rft during 19-29 March 1944.
(e) 15th Japanese Div crossed Chindwin on 15/16 March at Tharungdut on 29
March 1944, succeeded in cutting the Ukhurul-Imphalrd South of Ukhrul itself. It
then turned South-West against Imphal. At the same time 31st Japanese Div estb rd
block on the Imphal-Kohima rd. Thus, except for the Bishenpur-Silchar track to the
West, Imphal was cut off.
(f) 31st Japanese Div by now had created a more dangerous situation at Kohima.
Appreciating the situation Slim ordered to bring 33rd Corps (Lt Gen Stopford) from
India to take command of the Dimapur-Kohima area with 2nd British Div, 268th Inf
Bde and 2  tk rft.
(g) On 26 March 1944, 161st Bde of 5th Indian Div was flown to Dimapur to plug
the gap until 33rd Corps could get into posn.
(h) To further strengthen the Central front, Slim also ordered the move of 7th
Indian Div from Arakan and distributed two Bdes to join 33rd Corps at Dimapur and
third Bde to 4th Corps at Imphal. Slim also pulled Wingate’s 23rd Bde from India to
Jorhat to cover the Ledo Railway to support Dimapur.
(i) On 4th April 1944, Japanese attack on Kohima started and Gar was completely
cut off. Gen Stopford ordered fwd 161st Bde to relief besieged Gar and sent fwd 2nd
British Div to join 161st Bde. On 24 April 1944, seizure of Kohima Gar was over. The
Gar sustained for 16 days mainly on 221 Group's pin point close sp and supply
dropped by para.

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(j) On 9th April 1944, the Bishenpur-Silcharthe last remaining overland

communication track to Imphal had been cut by 33rd Japanese Div. On 27th April
1944, the Japanese seized Naga Hill. Only six miles west to Imphal air fd, the Corps
was air supplied as it was possible due to complete air superiority. During April 1944,
4th Corps received an average 500 tons of supply by air daily.

15. Allied Counter Offensive. At the end of May, Slim prepared to take the offensive
as per following plans:
(a) The Plan.
(1) 5th Indian Div to engage 15th Japanese Div on Imphal Kohima rd.
(2) 17th Indian Div to resist growing pressure on the Bishenpur-Silchertr.
(3) 20th Indian Div to attack 15th Japanese Div on Imphal –Ukhrul rd.
(4) 23rd Indian Div to hold the Yamameto force on Palel Tamu rd.
(5) 3rd Commando Bde to defend the railway line from Dimapur to Silchar.
(6) Lushai Bde to carry out harassing op in the rear of en to the SE of
Tiddim.

(b) On 20th April, 6 Brigade of 2nd British Div of 33rd Corps broke through the
Japanese and reached Kohima. The Japanese conducted two strong counter attacks but
failed.

(c) By the end of April, the Japanese offn came to a standstill/ stalemate while the
Allied, being able to stabilize the situation at both Imphal and Kohima prepared for
the planned counter offn.

(d) The Counter attack. The fierce attk on all the sectors combined with the air
attacks on the Japanese line of communication cost Japanese heavy cas and big gap in
replacement program. By the middle of the June the battle of Imphal plain resulted in
a defeat of the 15th Japanese Army, withdrew in a disorderly manner under monsoon
condition a contingency for which they were least prepared.

(e) The Pursuit. As the Japanese Army was routed, the Allied moved up from
fixed def op to mobile offn in order to secure two vital approaches Imphal -Tiddim

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and Imphal - Tamu. The pursuit of these two axes resulted Japanese to fall back from
the Chindwin River and British were able to push back Japanese from Tamu town.

(f) Turning the Tide. The following actions and activities carried out by Gen
Slim helped in turning the tide against Japanese:
(1) Selection of Ground. Imphal plain was the most suitable place to stop
and fight against the Japanese and conc of Allied forces in this plain
compelled the Japanese to fight at the end of a very tenacious line of
communication
(2) Superior Leadership/ Generalship.
(3) Skillful Use of Air Power. Allied air dominance was the key to
Slim's rft and resupply plan. Despite interruption by Japanese air force, allied
air rft and air supply went as planned.
(4) Sound Admin and log plan.
(5) Smooth planning and exec of plan.
(6) Emp of Res and Rft. Slim had kept adequate res to sustain a
prolonged defensive battle at Imphal and air lifted 5th Indian Div from Arakan
to rft Imphal and Kohima at the right time.

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(7) Exploiting opportunity of monsoon

and terrain.

(8) Uplifting the Morale of the troops.

Before the battle at Imphal plain,
efforts were made to rebuild the morale.
Slim maintained it throughout the battle.
Allied air supply to the besieged Gar of
Imphal and Kohima boosted up morale of
allied tps to fight and achieve decisive
victory in the battle of Imphal.

(9) Exploitation of Japanese

Weakness. The Japanese were
surrounded by rigid and ambitious plan, lack of flexibility, insecure and long
line of communication, lack of foresightness, poor log and air sp.

16. Principles of War Applied

(a) Selection and Maint of Aim. Holding the en on the line of river
Chindwin and destroying them while crossing and drawing the en around Imphal
plain to fight was a great selection of area.
(b) Maint of Morale. Morale was the single battle wining factor. Slim
maintained it by complete air dominance and air supply to the besieged Imphal and
Kohima.
(c) Offn Action. After the battle of attrition when 15th Army routed, Slim moved
up his force from static def op to mob offn.
(d) Conc of Force. Slim ensured conc by pulling back 17th and 20th Indian
Div from Tiddim and Tamu respectively and conc them at Imphal. Airlifting 5th Div
and 7th Div from Arakan - Imphal to Dimapur - Kohima to counter the Japanese offn.
(e) Flexibility. Allied plan was flexible enough to adjust with the changing
need of the battlefield.

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(f) Cooperation. A high degree of inter svc coop was maintained by allied
forces. All possible air sp was provided to the land forces in the form of CAS,
interdiction, log sp and rft of tps.
(g) Admin. Speedy replenishment of amn, clothings and med supplies were
possible due to the effective maintenance both by land and air line of communication.

17. Causes of Japanese Defeat. Japanese 15th Army achieved some brilliant successes
initially but suffered a decisive defeat because of over ambitious plan. The reasons of 15 th
Army's defeat were as follows:

(a) Lack of Reserve. Mutaguchi committed all his forces to the opening
moves of his offensive keeping no reserve for exploitation of his success.
(b) Lack of Co-ordination. The Japanese did not synchronize their offensive
in Arakan and Imphal plain. They started the Arakan offensive in the first week of
Feb and by third week of Feb the offensive had fizzled out.
(c) Rigidity of Plan. After isolating Kohima, the Japanese could have taken
Dimapur railhead where there was no major opposition at that time which could have
denied 33rd Corps move into Dimapur-Kohima area.
(d) Poor Logistic Support. Due to difficult terrain and poor line of
communication the Japanese forces carried only 3 weeks of supply.
(e) Numerical Inferiority.
(f) Lack of Air Power. The Japanese failed to cope up with the increased Allied
air superiority.
(g) Inferior Arms and Equipment.

18. Lessons Learnt. This particular battle brought out many important lessons
which proved useful to subsequent Allied operations in Burma and also found useful for
planning future warfare. The main lessons brought out are as under:

(a) Supremacy in the air is an important factor in modern war.

(b) Efficient administrative set up is a pre-requisite for decisive success in the
battle.
(c) Flexibility in the plan and execution is one of the requirements for meeting
unexpected difficult situation and exploiting success.

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(d) Cutting off or encirclement by opposing troops does not mean defeat or
surrender.
(e) Training troops as per the terrain forms formidable base for victory. Morale is
one of the battle winning factors.
(f) Maintenance and security of line of communication can help in operating over
extended territory.
(g) Co-operation between services and different forces is essential for success in
the modern battle.
(h) Initiative at all levels pays great dividends in changing the course of any
battle.
(i) Unity of command was achieved by creation of SEAC and appointment of
Admiral Lord Mountbatten as supreme commander who had the final say in the
overall Burma campaign.

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BATTLE OF IRRAWADDY SHORE

19. The Japanese who believed themselves as invincible in jungles were defeated in
Imphal-Kohima which led to further offensives. The battle of Pakokku and Irrawaddy river
operations were a series of battles fought between the imperial Japanese army and allied
forces on the China-Burma-India theatreduring World War II.

20. Admiral Mountbatten ordered the planning staff of South-East Asia command to
submit plans for further operations for the re-conquest of Northern Burma, as a result of
which two alternatives were produced. Firstly, joint advance by Northern Combat Area
Command from the Mogaung-Myitankyina area to Katha and Bhamo, and 4th and 33rd Corps
from Imphal to the Chindwin, the ultimate object being the occupation of Northern Burma as
far as the line Kalewa-Lashio. The other being offensive ‘Operation Capital’ to be conducted
by 4th and 33rd Corps across the Chindwin to the area of Ye-U-Shwebo and subsequent
exploitation to Mandalaya and Meiktila simultaneously.

21. Operation Capital was more concentrated towards Meiktila. In doing so the Allied
forces, 33rd Corps would drive down the east bank of the Irrawaddy to Mandalay and pin
Japanese forces in the Central Irrawaddy River area which was just a feint attack. The real
thrust—the “vital thrust”, was towards south at Pakokku. 4th Corps would cross the Irrawaddy
and then dash 50 miles east to Meiktila which was the main hub. By doing so the Japanese
would be compelled to detach large forces to clear his vital communications.

ORDER OF BATTLE AND PLANS

22. Japanese Force. After Kohima and Imphal’s defeat, lot of Japanese commanders
were changed including C-in-C Kawabe and Gen Kimura was transferred straight from
Imperial General HQ in Tokyo to take over as C-in-C. After Kimura's takeover, force in
Burma had been organized in three armies. Each of these armies was equal to one Corps. The
order of battle of Japanese force in Burma was as follows:
(a) 28th Army. Under Lieutenant General Sakuri, responsible for Arakan front,
the Irrwaddy valley upto Yenang - Yaung oil field.
(1) 54th Division.
(2) 55th Division.

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(3) 72nd Independent Mobile Brigade.

(b) 15th Army. Under Lieutenant General Katamura, who had released
Mutaguchi, 15th Army responsible for controlling the railway corridor had the
following formations:
(1) 15th Division.
(2) 31st Division.
(3) 33rd Division.
(4) 4th Independent Mobile Brigade.

(c) 33rd Army. Under Lieutenant General Honda held the North-Eastern front
facing Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) and the Yunnan Chinese. The 33rd
Army consisted of following formations:
(1) 18th Division.
(2) 56th Division.
(3) 53rd Division (some units).
(4) 2nd Division (some units).

(d) Burma Army Area Reserve. 49th Division in South Burma near Pegu.

23. Kimura’s Plan. Visualizing the present state of the Central front, Kimura
decided a gradual withdrawal of his 3rd Division from Imphal (Shwebo plain) to the
Irrawaddy leaving only light Covering Troops to delay the allied advance, in order to be
prepared for what they called “The Battle of Irrawaddy Shore”. His plan was to concentrate
his main focus against the 14th Army, and by doing so Gen Kimura hoped to cripple the
Allied force making them struggle to cross the river and then, with the help of monsoon,
destroy them as they pull back to Chindwin.

24. Allied Force. By the middle of December, phase one of Operation ‘Capital’ was over
which started in June/July during which Slim’s Army allowed no respite to retreating
Japanese and prevented them from reorganization. Second phase of Operation ‘Capital’ was
about to begin with Allied force across Chindwin at Sitting, Mawaik and Kalewa. Allied

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Forces were now ready to fight the Japanese in Central Burma and reorganized/regrouped his
Corps as under:
(a) 4th Corps. Under Lieutenant General Frank W Meservey.
(1) 7th British Division- Under Major General G.C Evans.
(2) 255th Tank Brigade (Sherman).
(3) Leshai Brigade.
(4) 28th East African Brigade.
(5) 17th Indian Division- Under Major General T.W Cowan.
(6) 33th Indian Brigade.
(7) 114th Brigade.

(b) 33rd Corps. General Stopford.

(1) 19th Indian Division (Initially to 4th Corps, changed for 33rd Corps)-
Under Major General T.W Rees.
(2) 245th Tank Brigade.
(3) 2nd British Division- Under Major General C.C.G Nicolson.
(4) 20th Indian Division- Under Major General D.D Gracey.

(c) Army Reserve. 5th Indian Division.

(d) Air Support. Royal Air Force 221st Group.

25. General Slim’s Plan. General Slim’s original plan (Operation Capital) was to fight
the main strength of General Kimura on the Shwebo plain, a dry and flat area between the
loops of the river Chindwin and the Irrawaddy Rivers. Slim intended to destroy the main
Japanese force using superior mobility and air power. Realizing that he may be trapped,
Kimura showing considerable flexibility and moral courage, ordered 15th Army to withdraw
behind the Irrawaddy in general area Mandalay. Kimura’s regrouping for a battle along the
line of the Irrawaddy naturally forced General Slim to alter his plan, code named ‘Operation
Extended Capital’. His new plan contained a strong flavor of the ‘Hammer and Anvil’ tactics.
The salient aspects of the plan popularly known as the “Hammer-Anvil plan” were:

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(a) The plan had its intention for the destruction of the main Japanese force in
Central Burma between Mandalay and Meiktila-Thazi. It was based on 33rd Corps,
with 19th Division transferred to it, forcing crossing of the Irrawaddy in the North and
West of Mandalay, thus drawing towards itself the greatest possible thrust of General
Kimura’s divisions and give every indication that Manadalay was 14th Army’s sole
objective. Meanwhile 4th Corps, moving secretly South down the Gangaw Valley,
would suddenly appear at Pokokku, seize a crossing site and without pause, strike
violently with armour and airborne force at Meiktila.

(b) Meiktla with Thazi 12 miles to the East was the main administrative centre of
Japanese 15th and 33rd Armies. If Allied force would be able to capture Meiktila,
while Kimura was deeply engaged along the Irrawaddy and Mandalay, he would be
compelled to detach large force to clear his vital communication centre. This would
set the stage for a major battle to crush the Japanese by the hammer let loose by 33 rd
Corps from the North of Mandalay against the anvil established by 4th Corps at
Meiktila.

26. Deception Plan. For the success of the ‘Hammer-Anvil Plan’, it was essential
that, the operation was to be launched from Pokokku maintaining great surprise from the
enemy until the last moment. 4th Corps was to move in full strength into the Shwebo plain on
the left of 33rd Corps in the Gangaw Valley to distract Japanese attention from Allied attack
on Mandalay from the North. To achieve this, following deceptive measures were taken:
(a) A dummy 4th Corps Headquarters using the same wireless channels was
substituted at Tamu for the real one, when it moved out towards South.
(b) 19th Division was transferred from 4th Corps to 33rd Corps. All signals from
33rd Corps to 19th Division were passed through the dummy 4th Corps Headquarters,
so that Japanese would be deceived.
(c) The real 4th Corps was to keep wireless silence till the last moment at Gangaw
Valley.
(d) Sherman tanks of 255th Tank Brigade were camouflaged to depict the Lee
tanks of 254th Tank Brigade (belonged to 33rd Corps) to make the Japanese feel the
presence of 33rd Corps in the South.

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(e) Volume of traffic was synchronized in such a way that it seems both the Corps
concentration was in the Shwebo plain.
(f) Move of Lushai Brigade through Gangaw Valley, to create illusion that only
diversionary force to distract their attention from the North.
(g) Two feint crossing were launched at Chauk and Pagaun to confuse the
Japanese force about real crossing point.
(h) Indiscreet conversations between staff officers and wireless operators were
arranged, inaccurate state were given over radio and newspaper and many indigenous
devices were employed to mislead the Japanese.
(i) Vincent’s 221st Group RAF was responsible to ensure that no enemy aircraft
could get close to observe the move of 4th Corps in the South.

Conduct of the Battle

27. “Battle of Irrawaddy Shore” was a battle of wits, a battle of deception and also widely
known as 'The Battle of Stealth’. In Nov and Dec 1944, William Slim's British 14th Army
secured two bridgeheads across the Chindwin River in Burma. Slim imagined that the
Japanese would expect the Anglo-Indian troops to march for the historic city of Mandalay
next, thus he devised a plan to attack Meiktila instead. Located 150 kilometers to the South,
Meiktila represented a main stop on the supply route for food and ammunition for Japanese
troops in Central and Northern Burma, thus by capturing Meiktila, Slim believed that he
would be able to isolate the entire Northern Burma with ease for a quick victory. To hide the
fact that he wished to capture Meiktila before Mandalay, a number of deceptions were
planned. By mid-Jan 1945, Anglo-Indian troops had reached the region where the Chindwin
River joined the Irrawaddy River. As the Indian 33rd Corps feinted toward Mandalay, the
Indian 4th Corps began its secret march in the Gangaw Valley along the Myittha River
towards Meiktila on 19th Jan with Indian 7th Division at the spearhead. The Japanese mounted
counterattacks almost nightly against the entire Allied front, not realizing Meiktila was the
main objective and not able to make significant advances against any of the Anglo-Indian
offensives. On 23rd Feb 1945, the British 2nd Division crossed the Irrawaddy River 10 miles
West of Mandalay. Allied air superiority during this phase of the campaign in Burma played
a decisive role, knocking out field guns and the few remaining Japanese tanks. The few
Japanese aircraft remaining in the region could offer only little resistance.

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28. On 29th Feb 1945, the attack on the Meiktila region began by the troops of Major
General David Cowan's Indian 17th Division, quickly taking the airfield 20 miles West at
Thabutkon. The Indian 99th Brigade and fuel supplies were called in by air immediately.
Meiktila was defended for the most part by men of the 168th Regiment of the Japanese 49th
Division, with additional manpower from various support units such as communications
personnel; the Japanese totaled about 4,000. On 1st March, Meiktila itself came under attack,
and Cowan soon realized that the Japanese were well-entrenched in the city; snipers,
mutually-reinforcing bunkers, machine gun nests, and anti-tank gun positions were
practically everywhere. After hard fighting, Anglo-Indian troops captured the city by 3rd
March, and by 5th March all Japanese resistance in the region were eliminated. The allies
captured 47 Japanese prisoners; a majority of the remainder was killed or committed suicide.

29. While the battle for Meiktila was being developed and fought, 33rd Corps was
crossing the Irrawaddy and preparing for a drive on Mandalay. The British 19th Division was
40 miles to the North, with the town of Madaya lying between it and Mandalay. The river
turned west below Mandalay, and 20 miles away was the British 2nd Division. A further 20
miles west was the British 20th Division, which would cross the Irrawaddy and fight east to
Kyasuke. Two British brigades pushed toward Mandalay “like a rush of waters over a broken
dam” and completely defeated the Japanese Force.

30. The Japanese were not ready to give up on Meiktila, The Japanese 18 th and 49th
Divisions, along with composite units, mounted an attack at strength of 12,000 men. The
15,000-strong Indian 17th Division first attempted to attack out of the newly occupied town to
clear out Japanese concentrations, but soon was pressured to fall back. The first attack on
Meiktila by the Japanese failed with heavy losses, however. Lieutenant General Eitaro Naka
changed his strategy on 13th March by attacking the airfields nearby to deprive the defending
forces of their supplies. The Japanese efforts around Meiktila were a bust, hampered by
exhausted units and aggressive British tactics toward the end of March 1945, with the
attacking Japanese units not in good communications with each other, the siege of Meiktila
gradually fell apart. The defeat of the Japanese forces at Meiktila and Mandalay was decisive,
with the Japanese suffering heavy casualties and losing valuable heavy equipment necessary
to carry on the war. Politically, the defeat also dealt the Japanese great damage. The fall of
Mandalay, a cultural center of Burma, turned Burmese national opinion against the Japanese,

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while losing the river and road network North of Meiktila meant that the Japanese forces in
Northern Burma were now effectively cut off from the sources of supply generally flowing in
from the Rangoon area.

31. Causes of Defeat of Japanese. The main causes of Japanese defeat in this front
were:

(a) Japanese Inferiority in Strength. The Japanese high commands, facing the
greater and near approaching menace of the American sea borne advance to the
Philippines, could spare on reinforcement for central Burma. Kimura had only 4 under
strength divisions of the Japanese 15th Army, amounting to total of merely 21,000
troops facing almost allied division with bright reinforcement prospect.
(b) Poor Intelligence. The Japanese continued to believe that both the Corps
of 14th army was operating in Shwebo plains, General Kimura therefore concentrated
all his troops opposite Manadalay. Thus, while the 4th Corps captured Meiktila the
Japanese were thrown off balance, and was defeated in the area.

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(c) Use of Reserve. The Japanese continued to employ the reserve force in
piecemeal, which could be easily defeated by the allied troops.
(d) Formation Boundary Overlooked. The Japanese left inter formation gaps
unattended due to which allied crossing succeeded without much opposition.
(e) Inferiority of Air. The Japanese did not have any permanent of air cover
where the allied enjoyed complete air superiority.
(f) Natural Obstacle Not Considered. The Japanese failed to exploit the great
river Irrawaddy as an obstacle.
(g) Poor Tactics. The Japanese inferiority in tactical handling of troops was
another cause for their defeat. They fought with pre-conceived ideas. The Japanese
did not have the flexibility to conform to the changes in tactical situation.
(h) Allied Strategy. The three pronged advanced of the Allies in Burma i.e.
in Central Burma, in Arakan and in the North from China front bewildered the
Japanese as they could not appreciate as to which of these three was the main threat.
(i) Allied Deception Plan. The Allied deception measures for crossing of
river Irrawaddy was complete and successful.
(j) Lack of Confidence in Command. After the Imphal– Kohima debacle of the
Japanese, the gradual distrust among division and army command led to gradual
degeneration of the staff officers and young leader’s faith in the leadership of the
senior commanders.
(k) The Seizing of Meiktila. The seizing of Meiktila, the nodal point of
Burma, completely disintegrated the Japanese command system.

Race to Rangoon

32. In 1945, when the 14th Army pushed the Japanese out of Central Burma, could they
have reached the Burmese capital in the south before the summer monsoon washed away the
roads and flooded the fields? It was a race against nature, a race against time - it was the race
to Rangoon. After the allied success at Kohima and Imphal in 1944, General ‘Bill’ Slim’s
desire was to get to Rangoon as soon as was feasible. Rangoon was the major port that Slim
believed the Allies needed if they were to defeat the supply problems that had dogged
the Burma campaign. Such was the nature of Burma that much of what the Allies needed had

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to be flown in and aerial supplies were notoriously difficult to predict. Therefore, an

established port such as Rangoon would have been of an immense help to Slim and his men.

33. In March 1945, the Allies had captured Mandalay and Meiktila. This brought to an
end the campaign in Central Burma. However, Rangoon was further south and the Japanese
commander in the field, General Kimura, believed that if his forces could hold up the
14th Army until mid-May, this would seriously hinder Slim. Mid-May was the time when the
monsoon was expected and this would severely hampered transport, as roads could be
washed away and the general living conditions for the men of the 14th Army miserable.
However, Slim was also aware of the problems that the monsoon would bring him and he
resolved to get to Rangoon before mid-May.

34. In early April, Slim ordered the 14th Army to move south. The 268th Indian Infantry
Brigade, commanded by Brigadier G M Dyer, and the 5th Brigade from the 2nd Division
advanced through the Irrawaddy Valley. Their task was to divide in two the Japanese forces
that were expected to defend Rangoon with vigor. Slim’s main force advanced along a
separate route – the Toungoo/Pegu railway route, which followed a route almost exactly
south from Meiktila. Both forces were expected to encounter strong Japanese opposition but
Kimura was faced with the choice of splitting his army and therefore weakening it or
concentrating all his men on one of Slim’s forces and leaving the other to advance before
confronting it. Kimura decided on the former.

35. As the Allies moved south along the Irrawaddy Valley, they found that the Japanese
had withdrawn from many of their positions. Left behind were guards who were expected to
fight to the last. These guards acted as a delay but could not hold up for long units equipped
with Lee-Grant tanks. However, Slim’s main force, the 4th Corps, moving directly south from
Meiktila, met with stiff resistance around the town of Pyawbwe, some 30 miles from
Meiktila. In the fighting for Pyawbwe over 1,100 Japanese soldiers were killed and 9
Japanese tanks were destroyed. The fighting at Pyawbwe was to prove crucial. The Japanese
force in Burma simply could not sustain such losses. On paper the Japanese 33rd Army had
three Divisions of men but in April 1945, it barely constituted a single Division.

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36. The next target after Pyawbwe was Toungoo, some 100 miles south, where there was
an airfield. By April 22nd, the Allies had reached Yedashe, only 184 miles from Rangoon.
Their task was made easier by the work of the Karen Levies – groups of ex-Burmese Army
men – who were organized by Force 136, Asia’s equivalent of the Special Operations
Executive. The Karen Levies blew up the bridges and roads that the Japanese tried to use
when moving their men and equipment. The work they did was of great importance as it
meant that the Japanese were fighting two forces – one advancing at great speed towards
Rangoon and the other unseen. On April 23rd, 4th Corps reached the town of Toungoo, three
days ahead of schedule.
37. On May 1st, men from the 2/3rd Gurkha Parachute Battalion had been dropped at
Elephant Point, an area that commanded the entrance to Rangoon harbour. After a fierce
fight, they took Elephant Point and by the time the Allies reached Rangoon itself, they found
no Japanese there.

Military Lessons of the Campaign

38. The Burma Campaign, due to a multi-national troop composition, inhospitable terrain
and weather conditions provided a multitude of military lessons, at strategic, operational and
tactical levels. The terrain and enemy dictated modification of tactics and led to the
development of many new concepts; a majority of them are even relevant today and are part
of the operational philosophy.

(a) Lessons at Strategic Level

(1) Strategic Aim. The Burma theatre was characterized by the
conflicting aims of the participant countries. For the Japanese, Burma was the
Western edge, securing which was essential to guard against any allied attack.
It was also the only land supply route to China. Once Burma was occupied,
China would be isolated and its defeat would be easier.

The allied forces had conflicting aims which led to a clash of priorities for the
liberation of Burma after the Japanese invasion. For the British planners,
Burma’s liberation was a low priority as defence of England was paramount.
Hence, availability of resources to the Burma theatre was the last priority. On
the other hand, the Americans were providing material support to China with

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an aim to tie down Japanese troops within Asia, thereby reducing the chances
of their deployment in other theatres. The US considered Burma as a vital area
for the air and land supply route to China in its war against the IJA. The
Chinese intentions were not discernable at times which led to piecemeal
distribution of resources, thus, diluting the war effort.

(i) Intent of higher Commander. Defeat of the Japanese

Army in Burma was the center of gravity for Fd Marshal Slim. It was
conveyed to all the commanders, giving them freedom in the execution
of plans, ultimately leading to the defeat of the Japanese troops.
Evolution of land-air cooperation was one of the important lessons of
the campaign in jointmanship. The third tactical air force was co-
located with 14th Army headquarters which enabled integration of the
air effort from the inception stage of operations. Air supply became a
cornerstone of jungle warfare.
(ii) Successfully attacking the enemy's critical vulnerabilities can
bring about decisive results. The main effort should be aimed towards
exploiting critical vulnerabilities of the enemy.

(b) Lessons at Operational Level

(1) Campaign Planning Principles. Fd Marshal Slim had assumed

command of the 14th Army in 1942. The formation had been forced to
withdraw to India and Slim had to undertake major changes in training, raising
the morale of the men, and carry out planning for a counter-offensive at a later
stage. Basically four basic principles wereadvocated for the operations:

(i) The ultimate intention must be an offensive.

(ii) The main idea of the plan must be simple.

(iii) The idea must be held in view throughout and everything else
must give way to it.

(iv) The plan must have an element of surprise.

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The operational orders were kept short to avoid information overload and
ruthless training mechanism were enforced to raise the standards of training.

(2) Reorganization and Training. The defeat and subsequent retreat

to Assam after the first Burma campaign led to reorganization of formations
and refocus on basic training, with emphasis on specialist training in jungle
warfare. The harsh terrain of Burma with its formidable rainforests and lack of
roads required troops to have high levels of physical fitness and also be
acclimatized to ward off the threat of diseases.

(i) The major reorganization was the restructuring of the highest

controlling headquarters with the creation of the Southeast Asia
command (SEAC), with the 14th Army as the land component.

(ii) A mixed transport structure along the mechanical and animal

transport lines was adopted at the division level to improve mobility
and tactical effectiveness.

(iii) Collective training was practiced from company upwards up to

division level to assimilate the new training philosophy and gain on the
job expertise.

(iv) The high wastage rate of men due to terrain and diseases
necessitated that soldiers of all the services, including the non-
combatant category, needed to learn infantry tactics and be able to
fight as infantry in jungles. This action provided inbuilt reserves within
the unit and led to higher availability of fighting hands.

(3) Logistics. Terrain in Burma indicated that the axis of movement

ran from North to South. The Irrawaddy River and its tributaries flow from
North to South. Hence, the principal roads and railway lines were constructed
along the rivers with culmination at Rangoon which was also the access point
to the sea. The most feasible direction to invade Burma was from the South as
the Japanese did in 1942. The counter offensive from India would be over
mountain ranges covered with thick jungles, and supplies had to move along

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low capacity lines of communication in the form of meter gauge rail link and a
single road link, Imphal-Tiddim into Burma. The second deciding factor for
logistics planning was the monsoon, which extended from April to September.
Heavy rains obliterated tracks and made movement through the jungles almost
impossible and also led to a high sickness rate. The major lessons learnt were:

(i) Integrating Logistics Advisers at the Planning Stage

(aa) The Burma theatre was a low priority area and the
planners had to conduct operations with meagre resources.
Limitations were placed on the scope of the operation. This
necessitated a dedicated logistics team working in close
coordination with the operational planners.

(ab) The road network in Burma was prone to frequent

disruptions due to weather and Japanese action. A boat building
yard was constructed on the banks of the Chindwin River to
construct small barges to augment the supply capacity before
the allied counter-offensive in 1944.

(ii) Invention by Necessity or Improvisation. Scarcity of

resources led to a number of improvisations for execution of
operations. The concept of improvisation is in vogue even today. Two
notable improvisations were use of jute parachutes for sustaining
troops of the second Chindits operation, as silk parachutes were not
available and jute was in abundant supply in Bengal and Assam. The
second was modification of jeeps and fitting them with rail wheels to
enable their use on rail lines for movement and resupply.

(4) Location of Medical Units. Poor lines of communications

necessitated location of medical units close to forward defenses. It reduced the
evacuation chain besides providing medical facilities as forward as possible. It
also ensured that the soldier was away from his unit for a shorter duration.

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(c) Tactical Lessons

(1) The expansion of the British Indian Army in 1940-41 had led to a
poorly trained and ill-equipped army with a large percentage of inexperienced
officers and soldiers. Their employment in internal security duties in Bengal
had resulted in limited or negligible peace-time training.
(2) After the retreat to Assam in 1942, Brig RT Cameron, commander of
48th Indian Brigade, wrote a report on the failings of the first Burma campaign
and possible solutions. This formed the basis for retraining of 17th Indian
Division. The emphasis was on “back to basics” and involved relearning battle
drills as suited to the jungle environment. Patrolling emerged as the chief
element of success in the jungles.
(3) The terrain layout, with heavy forest cover, meant that there was no
distinct line of defence and there were large stretches of no-man’s land.
Proficiency in routine area patrols, connecting patrols within the defended area
and prolonged observation patrols became essential. The concept of long
range patrols (LRP) by Orde Wingate, designed to operate deep behind enemy
lines, to disrupt supply chains and harass enemy troops, was a novel idea
which met with limited success.
(4) Reconnaissance troops was another concept practiced with a battalion
level force, which would operate ahead of the advancing division and maintain
contact with the enemy as well as provide information on enemy dispositions.
(5) Establishment of a commando platoon was planned at the battalion
level. The platoon provided the battalion commander with a highly trained and
physically fit entity to be employed in any eventuality.

Conclusion

39. The Burma campaign during World War II (WWII) is often known as the forgotten
war due to the major focus on the war in Europe. The campaign was one of the longest in
World War II due to the intermittent weather and inhospitable terrain and began with the
invasion of Burma by the 15th Japanese Army in 1942 and ended with its defeat in 1945. The
14th Army's Burma campaign comprised of superlative events as the British Army's longest
retreat, the longest opposed river crossing, the largest airborne operation of the war, the

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longest lines of communication, the largest volunteer army and the biggest air supply
operation of the war. A large theatre of war, with a primitive communication network made
conduct of large scale operations exceptionally difficult. The terrain and enemy dictated
modification of tactics and led to the development of many new concepts.

40. The Burma campaign was an ‘economy of force’ theatre where competition of scare
resources presented unique challenges to the operational planners. The campaign
demonstrated the charismatic and exceptional military leadership, the courage and endurance
of the troops which turned the consequence of the entire campaign, need for well-organized
theatre command structure and limitations imposed on operations by insufficient logistical
resources.

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