Labour
Labour
to Labour Law
Eighth Edition
A Practical Guide
to Labour Law
Eighth Edition
Authors
JV du Plessis
BA LLB LLD (Unisa)
Advocate of the High Court
Emeritus Professor of Mercantile Law
MA Fouché
BIuris LLB NHD PSE
Advocate of the High Court
Professor of Labour Law
Senior Commissioner of the CCMA and bargaining councils
Editor
MA Fouché
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© 2015
ISBN 978 0 409 12057 8
E-Book ISBN 978 0 409 12058 5
First Edition 1994, Reprinted 1996
Second Edition 1996, Reprinted 1997, 1998, Supplement 1998
Third Edition 1998, Reprinted 1999, 2000, 2001
Fourth Edition 2001
Fifth Edition 2002, Reprinted 2003, 2004, 2005
Sixth Edition 2006, Reprinted 2007, 2011
Seventh Edition 2012
Eighth Edition 2014
Copyright subsists in this work. No part of this work may be reproduced in any form or by any means without
the publisher’s written permission. Any unauthorised reproduction of this work will constitute a copyright
infringement and render the doer liable under both civil and criminal law.
Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that the information published in this work is accurate, the
authors, editors, publishers and printers take no responsibility for any loss or damage suffered by any person
as a result of the reliance upon the information contained therein.
The main objective of this book is to simplify the study of Labour Law, yet at the same time
to encourage independent thinking and greater understanding of the subject.
The first edition of A Practical Guide to Labour Law was welcomed and very well received
at academic institutions and in practice. The second edition was necessitated by the intro-
duction of the new Labour Relations Act of 1995. Subsequent editions followed to include
new legislation, such as the Employment Equity Act, the Skills Development Act, the Skills
Development Levies Act, the new Unemployment Insurance Act and the Unemployment
Insurance Contributions Act. The amendments to the Labour Relations Act and the Basic
Conditions of Employment Act in 2002 were incorporated in the fifth edition. The sixth
and seventh editions included amendments to all the Acts, as well as an overview of other
relevant legislation that a labour practitioner should be aware of.
Labour legislation received considerable attention over the past few years and significant
changes were made to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, the Employment Equity
Act and the Labour Relations Act in 2013 and 2014. The amendments to the EEA came
into operation on 1 August 2014, the amendments to the BCEA came into operation on 1
September 2014 and the amendments to the LRA will come into operation on 1 January
2015. All these amendments have been included in this, the eighth, edition.
A Practical Guide to Labour Law is aimed at and can fruitfully be used by all involved in the
study and practice of Labour Law. For non-legal students this book should suffice as a
primary source for their studies; the studying of decided cases will not only be interesting,
but will also improve their insight. Law students will find this book an indispensable aid in
their study of Labour Law. It will complement their study material and the inclusion of case
studies and appendices will elevate their studies to a more advanced level.
Labour Law and industrial relations practitioners may also find the book useful for the
purpose of revising or referring to the most recent principles applicable to a particular
aspect. Decided cases, prescribed forms and Codes of Good Practice have been included.
Each chapter covers specific but salient aspects which are encountered daily in the study
and practice of Labour Law. A chapter starts off by giving the most important current prin-
ciples applicable to the topic under discussion and this is followed by questions and case
studies to aid in the application of the legal principles in question. Some of the case studies
are based on actual court and CCMA cases and, where applicable, reference is made to
those cases. Forms prescribed by the various Acts which are required in all labour
connected procedures are also included, such as referring a dispute to the CCMA or
applying for unemployment benefits.
The authors would like to extend their sincere gratitude to the management and staff of
LexisNexis for their assistance in the preparation and publication of the new edition of this
publication.
Editor
December 2014
v
vi A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Page
Preface...................................................................................................................................... v
Page
2.10.3 By agreement ............................................................................................ 25
2.10.4 By the death of the parties....................................................................... 26
2.10.5 By the insolvency of the parties............................................................... 26
2.10.6 By the illness of the employee ................................................................. 26
2.10.7 By impossibility of performance.............................................................. 27
2.10.8 By cancellation (summary termination) ................................................ 27
2.10.9 Redundancy of post .................................................................................. 27
2.10.10 Completing a specific task ....................................................................... 27
2.11 The employer’s delictual liability .......................................................................... 27
2.11.1 Employer/employee relationship........................................................... 27
2.11.2 The delict must have been committed by the employee in the
course of the performance of his duties ................................................ 27
2.11.3 The employer’s liability for the delicts of an independent
contractor .................................................................................................. 29
2.12 Restraint of trade .................................................................................................... 29
2.13 The employer and third parties ............................................................................ 30
Questions .......................................................................................................................... 31
Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 35
Page
4.2.3 The anti-discrimination clause ................................................................ 88
4.2.4 Proof of discrimination ............................................................................ 89
4.3 The objectives of the Employment Equity Act .................................................... 89
4.4 Application of the Employment Equity Act ......................................................... 90
4.5 Chapter II – Prohibition of unfair discrimination .............................................. 91
4.5.1 Meaning of “unfair discrimination” ....................................................... 91
4.5.2 Provisions of Chapter II ........................................................................... 91
4.5.3 Dispute resolution .................................................................................... 92
4.6 Chapter III – Affirmative action ............................................................................ 93
4.6.1 Affirmative action measures .................................................................... 93
4.6.2 Duties of designated employers .............................................................. 94
4.7 Commission for Employment Equity .................................................................... 96
4.8 Monitoring, enforcement and legal proceedings ............................................... 96
4.8.1 Labour inspectors ..................................................................................... 96
4.8.2 The Director-General............................................................................... 97
4.8.3 The Labour Court .................................................................................... 97
4.9 Protection of employee rights ............................................................................... 98
4.10 General provisions .................................................................................................. 98
Questions .......................................................................................................................... 99
Appendices........................................................................................................................ 105
5 Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 ..................................................................... 125
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 125
5.2 Definitions ............................................................................................................... 125
5.3 Application of the Unemployment Insurance Act .............................................. 126
5.4 Framework of the Unemployment Insurance Act .............................................. 126
5.4.1 Unemployment Insurance Fund............................................................. 126
5.4.2 Unemployment Insurance Board ........................................................... 126
5.4.3 Unemployment Insurance Commissioner ............................................. 127
5.4.4 Claims officers ........................................................................................... 127
5.4.5 Director-General....................................................................................... 127
5.5 Benefits .................................................................................................................... 127
5.5.1 Right to benefits........................................................................................ 127
5.5.2 Calculation of benefits ............................................................................. 128
5.5.3 Unemployment benefits .......................................................................... 129
5.5.4 Illness benefits ........................................................................................... 131
5.5.5 Maternity benefits..................................................................................... 132
5.5.6 Adoption benefits ..................................................................................... 132
5.5.7 Dependants’ benefits ............................................................................... 133
5.5.8 General provisions relating to benefits .................................................. 134
5.5.9 Dispute resolution .................................................................................... 134
5.6 Enforcement............................................................................................................ 134
5.7 Duties of employer.................................................................................................. 134
5.8 Miscellaneous .......................................................................................................... 135
5.9 Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act 4 of 2002 .................................... 136
5.9.1 Contributions ............................................................................................ 136
5.9.2 Interest, penalties and offences .............................................................. 138
5.9.3 Application of the Income Tax Act ........................................................ 138
Questions .......................................................................................................................... 139
Appendices........................................................................................................................ 141
6 Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 .................. 161
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 161
6.2 Application of the Act ............................................................................................ 162
6.3 Duties of employer.................................................................................................. 162
6.4 Procedure to claim compensation ........................................................................ 163
x A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Page
6.5 The right to compensation .................................................................................... 163
6.6 Compensation ......................................................................................................... 164
6.6.1 Temporary total disablement .................................................................. 164
6.6.2 Permanent disablement ........................................................................... 165
6.6.3 In the event of the death of an employee .............................................. 165
6.6.4 Compensation for occupational diseases ............................................... 166
6.6.5 Increased compensation .......................................................................... 166
6.7 Claiming compensation from the employer or a third party............................. 166
6.8 Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of 1973............................... 167
Questions .......................................................................................................................... 167
Appendices........................................................................................................................ 172
7 Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993........................................................... 183
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 183
7.2 Application of the Act ............................................................................................ 183
7.3 Advisory Council for Occupational Health and Safety ....................................... 184
7.4 Duties of employers ................................................................................................ 184
7.5 Duties of employees ................................................................................................ 185
7.6 Health and safety representatives ......................................................................... 185
7.7 Health and safety committees ............................................................................... 186
7.8 Inspectors................................................................................................................. 187
7.9 Miscellaneous .......................................................................................................... 188
7.10 Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996 ................................................................ 189
Questions .......................................................................................................................... 189
Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 193
8 Skills development ........................................................................................................... 195
8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 195
8.2 Skills development strategy.................................................................................... 196
8.3 The skills development strategy in the context of legislation and other
policy proposals ....................................................................................................... 196
8.4 Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 ....................................................................... 197
8.4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 197
8.4.2 Purposes of the Act ................................................................................... 197
8.4.3 Structures of learning .............................................................................. 198
8.4.4 National Skills Authority (NSA) .............................................................. 199
8.4.5 Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs)........................... 199
8.4.6 Learnerships.............................................................................................. 201
8.4.7 Artisans....................................................................................................... 201
8.4.8 Skills programmes .................................................................................... 202
8.4.9 Labour centres .......................................................................................... 202
8.4.10 Skills development institutes ................................................................... 203
8.4.11 Quality Council for Trades and Occupations ........................................ 203
8.4.12 Productivity South Africa ......................................................................... 203
8.4.13 Department of Labour ............................................................................. 203
8.4.14 Financing of skills development ............................................................. 204
8.4.15 General provisions .................................................................................... 204
8.5 Skills Development Levies Act 9 of 1999 .............................................................. 204
8.5.1 Registration for payment ......................................................................... 205
8.5.2 Employers liable to pay ............................................................................ 205
8.5.3 Payment of levies ...................................................................................... 205
8.5.4 General provisions .................................................................................... 206
8.6 Payment of grants ................................................................................................... 206
Questions .......................................................................................................................... 207
Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 208
Contents xi
Page
9 Employment Services Act 4 of 2014............................................................................... 213
9.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................... 213
9.2 Purpose of the Act ............................................................................................................ 213
9.3 Definitions......................................................................................................................... 214
9.4 Framework of the Act ...................................................................................................... 214
9.4.1 Public employment services..................................................................... 215
9.4.2 Private employment agencies .................................................................. 215
9.4.3 Productivity South Africa ......................................................................... 216
9.4.4 Supported Employment Enterprises ...................................................... 216
9.4.5 Employment Services Board.................................................................... 216
9.5 Work schemes ................................................................................................................... 216
9.6 Employment of foreigners .............................................................................................. 217
9.7 Monitoring and enforcement ......................................................................................... 217
Page
13 Collective bargaining ....................................................................................................... 249
13.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 249
13.2 Recognition and the duty to bargain.................................................................... 250
13.3 Organisational rights .............................................................................................. 250
13.3.1 Right of access to workplace .................................................................... 254
13.3.2 Deduction of trade union subscriptions or levies ................................. 255
13.3.3 Leave for trade union activities ............................................................... 255
13.3.4 Trade union representatives ................................................................... 255
13.3.5 Disclosure of information ........................................................................ 256
13.3.6 Exercise of organisational rights ............................................................. 257
13.3.7 Resolution of disputes about organisational rights............................... 257
13.4 Collective bargaining structures............................................................................ 259
13.4.1 Bargaining councils .................................................................................. 259
13.4.2 Statutory councils ..................................................................................... 260
13.4.3 Workplace forums .................................................................................... 260
13.5 The bargaining process .......................................................................................... 260
13.5.1 Bargaining unit ......................................................................................... 260
13.5.2 Bargaining levels ....................................................................................... 261
13.5.3 Bargaining agenda ................................................................................... 261
13.5.4 Bargaining conduct .................................................................................. 261
13.6 Collective agreements ............................................................................................ 262
13.6.1 Legal effect of collective agreements ..................................................... 262
13.6.2 Agency shop agreements ......................................................................... 263
13.6.3 Closed shop agreements .......................................................................... 264
13.6.4 Resolution of disputes about collective agreements ............................. 265
Questions .......................................................................................................................... 266
Appendices........................................................................................................................ 270
Page
Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 313
16 Dismissals .......................................................................................................................... 317
16.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 317
16.2 Definition of dismissal.......................................................................................... 317
16.3 Automatically unfair dismissals ........................................................................... 320
16.4 Date of dismissal ................................................................................................... 322
16.5 Requirements for a fair dismissal ........................................................................ 322
16.5.1 Substantive fairness ............................................................................... 322
16.5.2 Procedural fairness................................................................................ 323
16.6 Dismissal for misconduct ..................................................................................... 324
16.7 Dismissal for incapacity ........................................................................................ 326
16.8 Dismissal for operational requirements ............................................................. 328
16.9 Disputes about unfair dismissals ......................................................................... 330
16.10 Remedies for unfair dismissal ............................................................................. 334
16.11 Transfer of the contract of employment ........................................................... 335
Questions .......................................................................................................................... 336
Appendices........................................................................................................................ 345
17 Unfair labour practices .................................................................................................... 355
17.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 355
17.2 Definition of “unfair labour practice” ................................................................ 356
17.3 Promotions ............................................................................................................ 357
17.4 Demotions ............................................................................................................. 360
17.5 Benefits and training ........................................................................................... 361
17.6 Unfair suspension and other disciplinary action .............................................. 362
17.7 Refusal to reinstate or re-employ ........................................................................ 364
17.8 Probation ............................................................................................................... 365
17.9 Protected Disclosures Act of 2000 ...................................................................... 366
17.10 Job applicants ........................................................................................................ 369
17.11 Dispute resolution ................................................................................................ 369
Questions .......................................................................................................................... 370
18 Dispute resolution ............................................................................................................ 377
18.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 377
18.2 Structures for dispute resolution .......................................................................... 377
18.3 Dispute resolution by councils .............................................................................. 379
18.3.1 Accreditation ............................................................................................. 379
18.3.2 Jurisdiction of councils............................................................................. 379
18.3.3 Referral of dispute to council .................................................................. 379
18.3.4 Subsidies, fees and confidentiality .......................................................... 379
18.4 Dispute resolution by the CCMA .......................................................................... 381
18.4.1 CCMA jurisdiction .................................................................................... 381
18.4.2 Conciliation ............................................................................................... 383
18.4.3 Arbitration ................................................................................................. 384
18.4.4 The arbitration award .............................................................................. 385
18.4.5 Powers of CCMA commissioners ............................................................. 387
18.5 Con-arb .................................................................................................................... 387
18.6 Inquiry by arbitrator ............................................................................................... 387
18.7 Dispute resolution of specific disputes ................................................................. 389
Questions .......................................................................................................................... 397
Appendices........................................................................................................................ 401
19 Other relevant legislation ................................................................................................ 419
19.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 419
19.2 Other labour legislation ......................................................................................... 419
19.2.1 Public Service Act ..................................................................................... 419
xiv A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Page
19.2.2 Employment of Educators Act ................................................................ 420
19.2.3 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act ........................................... 421
19.3 Other legislation ..................................................................................................... 422
19.3.1 Extension of Security of Tenure Act ...................................................... 423
19.3.2 Promotion of Access to Information Act ................................................ 424
19.3.3 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act ................................................ 426
19.3.4 Intercepting and Monitoring Prohibition Act ...................................... 428
19.3.5 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act............................... 429
19.3.6 Regulation of Interception of Communications and provision of
Communication-related Information Act .............................................. 429
19.3.7 ILO Convention and new legislation ..................................................... 430
19.3.8 Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act ................................ 431
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 435
Table of cases .......................................................................................................................... 437
PART
1
COMMON LAW
1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Labour Law is divided into individual and collective Labour Law. Historically the employ-
ment contract was regarded as a form of lease (see Chapter 2) and, in keeping with the
individualistic nature of Roman-Dutch law, dealt with only the individual aspects of the em-
ployment relationship. This relationship fell squarely within the private domain and, with
the exception of employment in the civil service, was regulated by the common-law rules
governing contracts. Collective Labour Law, on the other hand, does not have its roots in
Roman-Dutch law, but is regulated largely by the provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66
1
of 1995. Collective Labour Law concerns itself with the relationships between employers
and trade unions, between employers inter se and between trade unions inter se. Where the
Act so prescribes, the product of collective labour law, that is, collective agreements, take
precedence over the provisions contained in individual contracts of employment.
The individualistic and voluntary rights-based regulation of the employment relationship
has changed dramatically since the emergence of trade unionism and the increased inter-
vention of the State in the sphere of employment by means of legislation. Although the
port of entry into the employment relationship remains the common law contract of em-
ployment, regulated mostly by principles derived from Private Law, it may well be argued
that the conduct of the parties is regulated largely by statute law and rules created in terms
of those statutes, such as the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and collective agreements
in terms of the Labour Relations Act. It is for this reason that some authors question the
nature of the modern employment relationship: is it a purely contractual (that is, a consen-
sual) relationship or should it be viewed as one of status? A contractual relationship is one
in which the parties enjoy great freedom to reach agreement on the content of the rules
that are to govern their respective rights and obligations in terms of the contract entered
into. Drawing on the analogy of marriage, the status view holds that, once the parties have
voluntarily entered into the relationship, the law automatically imposes rights and duties on
them without their having much say in formulating the rules that will govern their relation-
ship. To a large extent the regulation of the employment relationship has moved into the
public law domain, although its origins were and remain in Private Law.
Common law places the individual employee in a weak position vis-à-vis his employer and
offers little or no protection to the employee. Common law, for example, does not provide
for maximum working hours and paid leave. The common law rule of “no work, no pay”
prevails. In terms of common law a job applicant, having the freedom to contract, has the
choice to commit himself contractually to work for, for example, seven days a week, 15
________________________
1 The LRA was significantly amended in 2002 and again in 2014 (apart from other minor changes). The
LRA Amendment Act 6 of 2014 was preceded by Bills in 2012 and 2013 and was finally approved in
August 2014. The LRA Amendment Act of 2014 will come into operation on 1 January 2015.
3
4 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
hours per day and with no provision for paid holiday or sick leave. Labour legislation is thus
necessary to provide better protection to an employee and to counter this kind of asym-
metry in employment contracts by creating, inter alia, minimum conditions of employment
which the parties may not ignore even if both are perfectly willing to do so.
It is thus necessary, in every situation where a multiplicity of laws governs the employment
relationship, to determine which of those laws take precedence. An overview of the hierarchy
of the various labour laws is provided here to facilitate an understanding of which rules
apply.
Bill of Rights
2
Core rights in terms of the BCEA
Collective agreements
(other than council agreements)
BCEA
Individual agreements
(contracts of employment)
Common law
________________________
2 The core rights are the following: the arrangement of working time with due regard to health, safety
and family responsibilities (s 7 of the BCEA); the maximum of 45 hours ordinary working time per week
(s 9); the protection afforded to employees who perform regular night work (s 17(3) and (4)); the
entitlement to sick leave (ss 22–24) and maternity leave (s 25); the entitlement to annual leave (s 20),
although annual leave may by collective agreement be reduced to two weeks per year; and the pro-
visions contained in Ch 6 of the BCEA relating to the prohibition of child labour and forced labour.
6 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
• collective agreements concluded in a bargaining council take precedence over all pre-
ceding provisions. A council collective agreement may, of course, not vary the core rights
contained in the BCEA, except that annual leave may be reduced to two weeks per year;
• the core rights in the BCEA are subject only to constitutional norms.
The above hierarchy of laws can be found in sections 49 and 50 of the BCEA.
It is not always easy to determine which rules apply. The following guidelines may prove
useful:
Step 1: Determine the agreed terms and conditions of employment, that is, the employment
conditions the employer and employee agreed upon in their contract of employ-
ment (whether verbal or written).
Step 2: Determine whether the provisions of the BCEA apply. In the majority of instances
the BCEA will apply, but in a few exceptional cases all or some of the provisions of
the BCEA may not be applicable, such as in the case of a person who earns in ex-
cess of the prescribed threshold amount or a senior managerial employee, who is
excluded from Chapter 2 of the BCEA.
Step 3: If the BCEA or some of its provisions are applicable, compare the relevant provisions
with those contained in the contract of employment. The most favourable provision
takes precedence. For example, if the employment contract provides for 22 days’
annual leave, it will prevail because it is more favourable than the 21 days provided
for in the BCEA. Conversely, if the contract provides for 18 days’ leave, the BCEA
takes precedence because its provision of 21 days’ leave is more favourable.
Step 4: Determine whether a ministerial or sectoral determination is applicable. If it is, the
relevant provisions of the BCEA and contract of employment can be ignored because
a determination takes precedence, regardless of whether it is more or less favour-
able. A determination may, of course, not vary the core rights of an employee. If it
does, the provision in the determination varying a core right is null and void and
the provisions of the BCEA in this regard will apply.
Step 5: Determine whether a collective agreement regulates the issue in question. If so, the
collective agreement takes precedence over all the preceding provisions, regardless
of whether the provision in the collective agreement is more or less favourable than
any of the other provisions. A collective agreement may, of course, not vary the
core rights of an employee, except that a collective agreement concluded in a bar-
gaining council may reduce annual leave to two weeks per year. Any provision in a
collective agreement that varies a core right in contravention of the BCEA may be
ignored. The BCEA will prevail in this regard.
Step 6: If a collective agreement is in existence, determine whether the agreement was con-
cluded in a bargaining council or at plant level. A council collective agreement
always takes precedence over a collective agreement concluded outside a bargain-
ing council.
Step 7: If none of the above applies, refer to the common law rules.
The above diagram does not reflect legislation applicable to specific sectors, such as the
Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951 and various statutes regulating employment in the
public sector (e.g. nursing, education, SAPS and correctional services). As a general rule,
the sources in the diagram apply only if one of the sector-specific Acts does not cater for a
particular situation. The sector-specific Acts take precedence over the illustrated sources,
but remain subordinate to the Bill of Rights, which remains the supreme law of the land.
Furthermore, if a provision in a sector-specific Act (or any other employment law) is in con-
flict with the relevant provisions in the Labour Relations Act, the latter will, in terms of sec-
tion 210 of the LRA, prevail.
Introduction 7
Finally, the fact that common law appears at the bottom of the hierarchy must not lead
to the conclusion that it is irrelevant. The continued relevance of the common law, despite
the existence of so many other sources of Labour Law, can be ascribed to the fact that the
Constitution requires the courts to interpret common law principles in accordance with con-
stitutional values, thereby ensuring that the common law retains its dynamic ability to adapt
to a changing society. Furthermore, common law remains relevant because it provides the
basis for the modern day contract of employment. It is in terms of common law that the
contract is concluded and that the parties derive a number of rights and obligations. Com-
mon law still regulates breach of contract and, to a large extent, remedies for breach, as
well as termination of the contract and a variety of other issues. The next chapter deals with
the common law contract of employment and, because the common law cannot be ignored,
it should be studied with care.
Questions
Question 1
Distinguish between individual and collective Labour Law. (4)
Question 2
Give an exposition of the main sources of Labour Law. (10)
Question 3
Briefly explain which of the following applies in the event of a conflict between their provi-
sions:
3.1 the contract of employment and a collective agreement;
3.2 the contract of employment and common law;
3.3 a collective agreement and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. (6)
Question 4
Briefly explain how the Bill of Rights may affect the employment relationship. (5)
Question 5
When Billy was employed as a factory worker at Unisex Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd
he and his employer concluded a contract of employment in terms of which Billy would,
inter alia, be entitled to 21 consecutive days’ annual leave. (This provision is in accordance
with the provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.) Approximately two years
after Billy’s appointment he joined the Leather and Textiles Workers’ Union. Both the
union and the company (via the employers’ organisation it belonged to) were parties to the
bargaining council for the textile industry. The parties to the council then negotiated a col-
lective agreement which provided for 25 consecutive days’ annual leave. Explain whether
Billy would be entitled to 21 or 25 consecutive days’ annual leave. (4)
Question 6
Jonas is an employee at Castro’s Steak Ranch and works six days per week. In terms of his
contract of employment he is required to work eight-and-a-half hours per day. The Basic
Conditions of Employment Act limits normal working hours to a maximum of 45 hours per
week and 8 hours per day. Assume that a sectoral determination, promulgated in terms of
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and applicable to Castro’s, provides for a maximum
of 40 hours per week and 7 hours per day. Which of these provisions are applicable to
Jonas? Motivate your answer. (4)
8 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Question 7
John’s contract of employment provided for better motor vehicle benefits than those pro-
vided for in a collective agreement entered into between his employer and the union. When
John insists on the benefits as per his contract, the employer refuses to grant those benefits,
relying on the collective agreement. John feels that this is unfair because nothing prevents
an employee and an employer from entering into a contract that provides better benefits
than those provided for in a collective agreement. The agreement in question provides for
actual benefits and other conditions of employment rather than just minima. Explain, with
reference to case law, which provisions should take precedence. (10)
Hint: See Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality Germiston and Van Rooyen (2002) 23 ILJ 1104
(ARB); The National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight Industry & Another v Carlbank
Mining Contract (Pty) Ltd & Another unreported, JA 52/10, 20 March 2012 (LAC).
2
COMMON LAW CONTRACT
OF EMPLOYMENT
2.1 Introduction
The contract of employment (or service) is traditionally considered to be a sub-species of
the common law contract of lease, with its origins in the Roman law. Roman law distin-
guishes three types of lease agreements:
• locatio conductio rei or the rental of a thing;
• locatio conductio operarum or the hiring of services – the so-called ordinary contract of em-
ployment (service);
• locatio conductio operis or the hiring of a piece of work.
In this chapter locatio conductio operarum or the ordinary contract of employment will be con-
sidered as it forms the basis of the “modern” employment contract – the foundation upon
which more complicated relationships are constructed.
The ordinary contract of employment involves the rendering of labour or services by the
employee to his employer for remuneration, while the employee subjects himself to the
supervision and control of the employer. The employee consequently sacrifices his freedom
to some extent by subjecting himself to the authority of his employer. The employer
decides how his labour is to be applied and utilised.
The common law principles applicable to contracts of employment form part of indi-
vidual Labour Law, which means that the parties to the agreement, the employer and
employee, negotiate the terms of their contract individually and freely. In contrast is collec-
tive Labour Law, provided for in the Labour Relations Act and in terms of which a group of
employees (a trade union) negotiates with a single employer or a group of employers
(employers’ organisation) on matters of mutual interest, such as employment conditions.
The common law principles are still applicable, although they have been greatly aug-
mented by legal provisions. In instances where labour legislation is silent on a particular
issue, the common law applies.
9
10 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
undertakes to build, manufacture, repair or alter a corporeal thing within a certain period
and in return the employer undertakes to pay the contractor a reward.
The contractor is an independent third party and does not form part of the employer’s
enterprise. The contractor undertakes to do a certain piece of work against payment but, as
opposed to the employee in terms of the ordinary contract of employment, he is not subject
to the control of the employer. He decides how and when the work will be done within the
broader parameters of the contract. This means that, although he has discretion as to how
and when to perform, he is obliged to produce the required results within the stipulated
time or within a reasonable time if no time has been stipulated. Upon proper completion of
the work by the contractor, the contract is terminated. Examples of contractors who accept
work on this basis are building contractors and contractors who undertake the building of
dams, bridges, roads, etc.
A third type of contract in terms of which one person renders services to another is the
rendering of professional services. This includes services rendered by an attorney, advocate,
auditor or doctor. In this instance a contract of mandate is concluded between the parties. It
differs from the ordinary contract of employment in that the person who is rendering the
services is not subjecting himself to the authority of the other person and he is performing
professional services, whereas the ordinary employee normally performs tasks of a more
general nature.
A contract of mandate may be defined as follows: a contract of mandate is a contract in
terms of which the mandatory undertakes to perform a mandate for the mandator, for
example, a mandate given to a doctor to treat the mandator or a mandate to an attorney to
act on behalf of the mandator in a court case.
In the contract of mandate the mandatory therefore performs a specific mandate given
to him by the mandator. He must perform the mandated acts, but is not subject to the
authority of the mandator.
It is not always easy to distinguish between an employee, an independent contractor and
a mandatory. The employment relationship is sometimes even confused with agency. It is,
however, necessary to determine whether a person who performs a task for another is an
employee because only an employee enjoys legislative protection and has access to the dispute
resolution mechanisms created under the Labour Relations Act, such as the CCMA (Com-
mission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration) and the Labour Court. Only employees
enjoy the freedom of association to join trade unions and the protection afforded by the
Basic Conditions of Employment Act. Furthermore, only employees are entitled to social
security benefits in terms of the Unemployment Insurance Act and the Compensation for
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act.
An important feature of the ordinary contract of employment is that the employee is sub-
ject to the authority and supervision of the employer. This element of control – referred to
as the control test – is distinctive of the ordinary contract of employment and has been used
to distinguish between the ordinary contract of employment and other contracts in terms of
which work is performed. In terms of the control test the employer does not need to have
absolute authority over the employee, but some degree of control is required. Control in this
context refers to the fact that an employer may issue instructions which have to be obeyed,
while also prescribing the manner and time in which a task has to be completed. The Court,
in R v Feun 1954 (1) SA 58 (T), observed as follows:
Complete control in every respect is . . . not essential . . . and some degree of freedom from con-
trol is not incompatible with the relationship . . . Whether the control exercised is such as to lead
to the inference that the engaged person is a servant (employee) is therefore a question of degree.
In terms of the control test the distinction between an employee and an independent con-
tractor is thus to be found in the fact that the employer has some degree of control,
enabling him to decide how the labour of the employee is to be utilised. The element of
control is to a large degree absent in the case of an independent contractor.
The control test proved inadequate to distinguish conclusively between employees and
independent contractors. The courts adopted other tests in the quest to determine the
Common law contract of employment 11
existence of an ordinary employment relationship. The test that finally found favour with
both the courts and academics is the “dominant impression” or “mixed” test. The dominant-
impression test requires a consideration of all the facts as they appear from the agreement
between the parties, their practices and customs and the evidence led in court. The result-
ant impression will enable one to decide whether or not the relationship between the par-
ties is an ordinary contract of employment. While no list can be exhaustive, the following
factors tend to indicate the existence of an employment relationship:
• that the person who alleges to be an employee is obliged to render his services personally
and is not allowed to delegate this obligation;
• that he has to keep fixed hours and is paid a regular wage or salary;
• that he is subject to the alleged employer’s disciplinary code;
• that he is entitled to benefits, such as membership of a pension fund or medical aid
scheme; and
• that he is subject to a degree of control by the employer.
None of these factors is conclusive in itself, but collectively they assist in determining
whether a person is, in fact, an employee. It may thus happen that a person who does not
keep fixed hours and who earns a commission is an employee.
The following cases offer interesting examples.
In Leon-Cachet v De Jager 1994 3 LCD 47 (IC) the “employee” did not receive a salary and
had a claim only for remuneration for a specific task done; thus, he was paid for production
rather than service time. No PAYE had been deducted. The Court held that this person was
not an employee, but an independent contractor.
The judgment of the Labour Appeal Court in Borchards v Pearce & Sheward t/a Lubrite Dis-
tributors 1993 2 LCD 28 (LAC) is significant:
an employee was a person who made over his or her capacity to produce to another, whereas an
independent contractor, by contrast, was a person whose commitment was the production of a
given result by his or her labour. In the first case what was transacted was the capacity to work,
whereas in the second case what was transacted was the product of it. This meant that the surren-
der of the capacity to work was what lay at the heart of the relationship between employee and
employer. The terms of the contract would determine the relationship, although the parties’ own
perception of their relationship and the manner in which the contract was carried out in practice
might, in areas not covered by the strict terms of the contract, assist in determining the nature of
the relationship.
In this case the “employee” had been offered a position as an independent agent to pro-
mote the products of the employer in a particular area. The Court was satisfied that the
object of the contract was not the rendering of personal services; neither was the intention
that the “employee” would “make over” or “surrender” his capacity to work. He was required
to produce a specified result. He was thus an independent contractor and not an employee.
Other factors considered by the Court in deciding that he was an independent contractor
included the following: he earned commission only; he was remunerated only when he pro-
duced results; he was not registered as an employee with the Department of Labour; no
deductions for tax purposes had been made; the control exercised over him was minimal;
he could take leave whenever he wanted; and he received no leave or sick leave pay.
See also Callanan v Tee-Kee Borehole Casings (Pty) Ltd & Another 1993 2 LCD 43 (IC); Liberty
Life Association of Africa Ltd v Niselow [1996] 7 BLLR 825 (LAC); Niselow v Liberty Life Associa-
tion of Africa Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 752 (SCA); SABC v McKenzie [1999] 1 BLLR 1 (LAC); Gordon
v St John’s Ambulance Foundation [1997] 3 BLLR 313 (CCMA), [1997] 6 BLLR 785 (CCMA);
CMS Support Services v Briggs [1997] 5 BLLR 533 (LAC); Medical Association of SA v Minister of
Health & Another [1997] 5 BLLR 562 (LC); Opperman v Research Surveys (Pty) Ltd [1997] 6
BLLR 807 (CCMA); SATDU v Marine Taxi’s CC [1997] 6 BLLR 823 (CCMA); Board of Execu-
tors Ltd v McCafferty [1997] 7 BLLR 835 (LAC); LAD Brokers v Mandla [2001] 9 BLLR 993
(LAC); Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber [2005] 9 BLLR 849 (LAC); State Information Technology Agency
12 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
(Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others (2008) 29 ILJ 2234 (LAC); Discovery Health Ltd v CCMA & Others
(2008) 29 ILJ 1480 (LC); “Kylie” v CCMA & Others (2010) 31 ILJ 1600 (LAC); Sanlam Life
Insurance Ltd v CCMA & Others (2009) 30 ILJ 2903 (LAC); De Lange v ABSA Makelaars (Edms)
Bpk (2010) 31 ILJ 885 (SCA); Pam Golding Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus & Others (2010) 31
ILJ 1460 (LC); St Clair v CFS Aviation CC t/a Corporate Flight Services (2010) 31 ILJ 486
(CCMA); J & J Freeze Trust v Statutory Council for the Squid & Related Fisheries of SA & Others
(2011) 32 ILJ 2966 (LC); Workforce Group (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 738 (LC).
Although the dominant impression test is generally accepted and applied nowadays, it
remains difficult to determine whether a person is in fact an employee. To aggravate the
situation employers have increasingly started to appoint persons as “independent contract-
ors” rather than employees in an attempt to escape the onerous liabilities brought about by
the various labour laws. If a person is an independent contractor and not an employee the
employer saves, for example, the contributions towards unemployment, injuries on duty
and skills development. Moreover, the employer is then not compelled to comply with the
Basic Conditions of Employment Act or similar legal provisions and does not have to regis-
ter the person as an employee with the Department of Labour and SARS. In consequence,
the independent contractor does not enjoy legislative protection, as legislation applies to
employees only.
The ulterior motives of employers to appoint persons as independent contractors and
the resultant lack of legislative protection in such instances have been curbed in two ways:
• by court decisions in terms of which the true nature of the relationship between the par-
ties needs to be determined; and
• by section 83A of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (mirrored in section 200A of
the Labour Relations Act).
Even if a person is described as an independent contractor in a contract, it remains neces-
sary to determine the true nature of the relationship between the parties. On numerous
occasions the courts have held that the label of “independent contractor” is not conclusive;
the realities of the relationship – and not the label – will determine whether the contract is
one of operarum or operis. See in this regard McKenzie v SABC [1996] 5 BLLR 635 (IC),
[1999] 1 BLLR 1 (LAC) and Building Bargaining Council (Southern & Eastern Cape) v Melmons
Cabinets CC & Another [2001] 3 BLLR 329 (LC).
Section 83A of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (and section 200A of the Labour
Relations Act), which took effect in August 2002, introduced a rebuttable presumption of
who an employee is. Section 83A provides as follows:
83A. Presumption as to who is employee
(1) A person who works for, or renders services to, any other person is presumed, until the con-
trary is proved, to be an employee, regardless of the form of the contract, if any one or more
of the following factors is present:
(a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another
person;
(b) the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person;
(c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person is a part of that organ-
isation;
(d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per
month over the last three months;
(e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom that person works
or renders services;
(f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person; or
(g) the person only works for or renders services to one person.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to any person who earns in excess of the amount determined
by the Minister in terms of section 6(3).
Common law contract of employment 13
(3) If a proposed or existing work arrangement involves persons who earn amounts equal to or
below the amounts determined by the Minister in terms of section 6(3), any of the contract-
ing parties may approach the CCMA for an advisory award about whether the persons in-
volved in the arrangement are employees.
The effect of this section is that a person who earns less than the threshold (determined
by the Minister from time to time, currently R205 433-30 per annum) is presumed to be an
employee if any of the above indicators is present. The onus is on the employer to prove the
contrary. The net result of section 83A is that, if an employer fails to prove that a person is
an independent contractor, that person is deemed to be an employee. This ultimately
defeats the employer’s ulterior motive of circumventing the law and thereby depriving the
other person, who is in fact an employee, of the legislative rights and protection accorded
employees.
Either party to the work arrangement may, in terms of section 83A(3), approach the
CCMA for an advisory award about whether the person is an employee, but only if the
alleged employee earns less than the threshold amount.
In 2006 a code was promulgated to assist with determining whether a person is an em-
ployee. The Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee (GN 1774 of 1 December 2006) is
based, in the main, on the control and dominant impression tests, the section 83A presump-
tion and case law (see the Appendix to this chapter).
In summary, then, to determine whether a person who is doing work for another is an
“employee” or an independent contractor, the following must be considered:
• the definition of “employee” in the applicable statute;
• the dominant impression test;
• the Code of Good Practice; and
• if the alleged employee earns less than the determined threshold, section 83A of the
BCEA (or section 200A of the LRA).
It has already been mentioned that only employees enjoy legislative protection and have
access to labour dispute resolution forums such as the CCMA and the Labour Court. For a
person to be an employee a valid employment contract must exist and one of the require-
ments for a valid contract is lawfulness. This particular requirement received some atten-
tion in recent years because of constitutional prerequisites, the definition of “employee” in
the LRA and the concept of fairness which is the cornerstone of Labour Law. It was always
accepted that a valid employment contract entails the rendering of lawful services – until a
prostitute decided to take the law head-on.
In “Kylie” v Van Zyl t/a Brigittes [2007] 4 BALR 338 (CCMA) Kylie, a sex worker, was em-
ployed by a massage parlour to perform sexual services for reward. She was dismissed for
alleged infractions of a strict regime of rules in the workplace. She referred a dismissal
dispute to the CCMA. The CCMA Commissioner ruled that the CCMA lacked jurisdiction
to arbitrate the dispute because her work was prohibited by the Sexual Offences Act and
that, for the same reason, her contract of employment was invalid. According to the Com-
missioner section 23 of the Constitution and the LRA did not apply to workers who did not
have a valid and enforceable contract. Kylie took the CCMA ruling on review.
In “Kylie” v CCMA & Others [2008] 9 BLLR 870 (LC) the Labour Court accepted that
Kylie was an employee as envisaged in section 213 of the LRA. It was held that the defin-
ition of “employee” in section 213 is sufficiently wide to include workers without valid con-
tracts of employment. Although she performed illegal work, the relationship between Kylie
and her employer was undoubtedly an employment relationship. The Court, however, was
of the view that the real question was whether, as a matter of public policy, courts and other
tribunals should sanction illegal contracts by upholding the rights of the parties under
statutes and the Constitution. The issue was not the consequences of the lack of a valid con-
tract, but the effect this lack had on the powers of the tribunal or court called on to enforce
the parties’ claims. It was held that the fundamental principle was that courts would
14 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
not sanction or encourage illegal activities. The Court observed that a contract for the
performance of illegal activities was contra bonos mores (against the good morals) and, there-
fore, unenforceable under common law or labour legislation. It held that even though the
person performing illegal work may be an employee in terms of the statutory definition,
protection afforded employees by the LRA and the Constitution did not apply and to grant
relief would encourage illegal activities. The decision of the Labour Court was taken on
appeal.
In “Kylie” v CCMA & Others [2010] 7 BLLR 705 (LAC) the Labour Appeal Court agreed
with the Labour Court that Kylie was an employee, but disagreed with the Labour Court’s
view that the Constitution and the LRA did not apply to sex workers. The Labour Appeal
Court confirmed that courts should generally desist from recognising illegal contracts, but
observed that flexibility was permitted. The Labour Appeal Court continued as follows:
The express purpose of the LRA is ‘to advance economic development, social justice, labour, peace and
the democratisation of the work place’. That set of principles can be traced to section 23 of the Consti-
tution. This was designed to ensure that the dignity of all workers is respected and that the workplace is
predicated on the principles of social justice, fairness and respect for all. If the purpose of the LRA is to
achieve these goals, courts must safeguard those employees who are particularly vulnerable to exploit-
ation because they are economically and socially weaker than their employers. Many sex workers in this
country are particularly vulnerable and are exposed to exploitation and abuse . . . There was, accord-
1
ingly, no reason why she [Kylie] should not be entitled to the constitutional protection of her dignity.
Having concluded that Kylie was an employee and entitled to legal protection, the LAC
expressed the view that sex workers like Kylie would not be entitled to the full range of rem-
edies afforded unfairly dismissed employees. To order the reinstatement of a sex worker
would, according to the Court, be manifestly against public policy. The Court did, however,
believe that an order for compensation would be appropriate for procedural unfairness.
It is not only sex workers who enjoy legislative protection; illegal immigrants do too. In
Discovery Health Ltd v CCMA & Others [2008] 7 BLLR 633 (LC) the Labour Court upheld a
CCMA commissioner’s ruling that the CCMA had jurisdiction to determine the fairness of
the dismissal of an Argentine national who was dismissed when his employer discovered
that his valid work permit had expired. In arriving at its decision the Court considered the
provisions of the Immigration Act that sanction the employment of illegal immigrants in
conjunction with section 39(2) of the Constitution and held that foreigners need to be pro-
tected because
an unscrupulous employer, prepared to risk criminal sanction [under the Immigration Act] . . . might
employ a foreign national and at the end of the payment period, simply refuse to pay her the remuner-
ation due, on the basis of the invalidity of the contract. In these circumstances, the worker would be
2
deprived of a remedy in contract, and [be] . . . without a remedy in terms of labour legislation.
In Ndikumdavyi v Valkenberg Hospital & Others [2012] 8 BLLR 795 (LC) a foreign national
was afforded the protection of the LRA. The employer offered a Burundian national with
refugee status a permanent position in contravention of legislation, but withdrew the offer
when the employee’s refugee status was about to expire. The Court held that a contract
concluded in contravention of a statute but involving lawful work gave rise to an employ-
3
ment relationship and that the termination of that relationship constituted a dismissal.
________________________
1 “Kylie” v CCMA & Others [2010] 7 BLLR 705 (LAC) par 40.
2 Discovery Health Ltd v CCMA & Others [2008] 7 BLLR 633 (LC) par 30.
3 The new Employment Services Act 4 of 2014 (not yet in operation as at the time of going to print) will
regulate the employment of foreigners.
Common law contract of employment 15
2.4.2 Remuneration
The parties must agree on the remuneration to be paid to the employee at conclusion of
the contract. Remuneration may be payable in cash and/or in kind (in natura). If remuner-
ation is payable in money, the amount thereof need not be fixed, such as R5 000 per
month, but it must at least be reasonably ascertainable. It may, for example, be determined
by recourse to trade usage; that is, the going rate payable for that job in that trade and area.
Remuneration may also consist of a share in the profits of the organisation. Where remuner-
ation is paid in kind, a value must be attached thereto.
Common law does not prescribe minimum wages and the parties are at liberty to agree
on any amount and the intervals at which it will be payable (i.e. daily, weekly or monthly).
Legislation, on the other hand, prescribes minimum wages, usually in the form of a sectoral
determination. Where legislation does not prescribe minimum wages, employers and trade
unions often determine minimum wages through collective bargaining.
• where the failure to provide work brings about a reduction in the status of the employee;
• where the employer has undertaken to train the employee in a certain profession or
trade;
• where a person’s earning capacity is linked to the publicity which he receives from the
work he does, for example an actor. This person’s employer must provide him with work
in order to ensure his professional success.
It should be noted that in certain instances the employer may withhold work from his em-
ployees in the form of a lock-out, which is the employer’s counterpart of employees’ right
to strike in terms of the Labour Relations Act of 1995.
The employer must take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of its employees. Should
failure to do so lead to the injury of the employee, the employer may be held delictually
liable. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria must be borne in mind in this regard. If an em-
ployee has knowledge of a hazardous state of affairs and realises the nature thereof, yet sub-
jects himself voluntarily to this hazard and it leads to his injury or death, the liability of the
employer will be excluded. This is equal to the employee’s consenting to the harm which
might befall him.
Before the employee may claim compensation from his employer, the following will have
to be proved: that the act or omission which caused the employee’s injury was due to the
fault of the employer or a person for whose actions the employer assumes responsibility;
that the act or omission was unlawful; and that the employee sustained damages and/or
personal injuries.
At present the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 pro-
vides for the payment of compensation to the employee should he be injured in the course
of his duties. If this Act is applicable to an employer and his employees, claims are not insti-
tuted against the employer personally. However, if the employer does not contribute to the
Compensation Fund, he is likely to be sued personally.
2.7.1 Cancellation
Material breach of contract by the employer allows the employee to resile from the contract.
Examples of such breach of contract that have already appeared in the text include a reduc-
tion in status and the non-payment of the agreed remuneration. When the employee claims
cancellation of the contract, it amounts to summary termination of the contract, as opposed
to where the employee gives due notice of termination in the proper fashion. If the breach
is less serious the employee may cancel the contract by giving the required notice of his
intention to cancel.
20 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
2.7.3 Damages
If an employee suffers damages as a result of the breach of contract by the employer, he
may claim damages. The amount of damages is calculated in accordance with the remuner-
ation which he would have received if the breach of contract had not taken place. The em-
ployee must, however, take reasonable steps to mitigate his losses.
from terminating the contract on or before expiry of the probationary period by simply
giving notice of termination. In terms of the Labour Relations Act, however, the probation-
ary employee whose performance is unsatisfactory may not be given notice and have his con-
tract terminated, unless a fair procedure has been followed. The employer is required to
evaluate the employee’s performance regularly and give assistance, guidance and training.
If these measures do not aid in improving the employee’s performance, the employee must
be afforded an opportunity to state why he should not be dismissed, in other words, the em-
ployee must have an opportunity to defend himself.
• dishonesty in the scope of his duties, for example fraud and theft. Dishonesty must be
proved;
• putting the employer’s property to private use;
• misconduct, for example drunkenness or assaulting co-workers or customers; and
• insubordination, rebelliousness and conduct undermining discipline.
At common law only a valid reason for dismissal, like those mentioned above, is required.
The employer is not obliged to hold an investigation or enquiry before dismissing an em-
ployee. Dismissal can be effected with or without notice. Dismissal without notice is referred
to as summary dismissal. However, section 188 of the LRA requires both a valid reason for
dismissal and that the employer follow a “fair procedure” before dismissing an employee. A
fair procedure invariably involves some kind of disciplinary enquiry.
When dismissal has taken place the employer is entitled to ask the employee to leave the
work premises. Should the employee refuse, the employer may not take the law into his own
hands and eject the dismissed employee – he will have to obtain a court order to achieve
the ejectment of the employee.
When an employee is dismissed he is, in terms of common law, entitled to any remuner-
ation still due to him for work done (unless his work is so wanting in quality that it can
validly be rejected by the employer). In terms of legislation a dismissed employee is entitled
to outstanding remuneration for time served and payment for all annual leave days to his
credit. If an employee is summarily dismissed he is not entitled to notice pay. If he is dis-
missed on notice, he may be required to work during the notice period; alternatively, the
employer may exempt him from working the notice period, but must then pay him in lieu
of notice.
2.9.3 Damages
Whether the contract is cancelled or specific performance is demanded, the employer is
entitled to claim damages from the employee if the behaviour or negligence of the latter
causes him damages or losses. On the same basis the employer can claim damages from the
employee if he should abandon his employment in a way which causes the employer dam-
age. If the employee abandons the work and thereby does not complete his tasks, he will
not be entitled to any remuneration – not even for the work completed – unless the remain-
ing portion of the period of service is so slight that damages will sufficiently compensate the
employer. The employer is then entitled to compensation based on enrichment. The onus
is on the employer to prove that the damages flowed from the breach of contract and he
must also present evidence to substantiate the amount claimed.
Common law contract of employment 25
• by notice
• by effluxion of time
• by agreement
• by the death of the parties
TERMINATION • by the insolvency of the parties
OF THE
CONTRACT • by the illness of the employee
• by impossibility of performance
• by cancellation (summary termination)
• redundancy of a post
• by completing a specific task
2.10.1 By notice
If the contract of service was concluded for an unlimited period, it may be terminated by
the giving of due notice. Common law does not prescribe minimum periods of notice and
thus reasonable notice must be given. In order to determine what a reasonable notice
period is, the courts are guided by the circumstances, such as whether the employee is paid
on a weekly or a monthly basis. It has been held that in these cases a week’s or a month’s
notice respectively must be given. This is, however, not an inflexible rule and the courts will
consider surrounding circumstances to determine what constitutes a reasonable period of
notice.
Notice may, of course, be given by either party. In other words, the employee may give
notice that he intends to terminate his services, that is, to resign, or the employer may give
notice to the employee to terminate his services. Common law does not require notice to be
writing, although it is advisable to put it in writing.
Section 37 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act prescribes notice periods and re-
quires notice to be in writing, unless the employee is illiterate. It is interesting to note that,
in terms of section 186(a) of the Labour Relations Act, notice of termination of services
given by an employer to his employee is considered to be a dismissal, unless the employer
has cause to terminate the employee’s services by virtue of the latter’s misconduct or in-
capacity or the employer’s operational requirements.
2.10.3 By agreement
The parties may terminate the contract between them by mutual agreement.
26 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
2.11.2 The delict must have been committed by the employee in the course of
the performance of his duties
The employer is not liable to third parties for all delicts committed by his employee, but
only for those committed in the scope of employment. It follows then that the employer’s
liability is dependent upon the employee having committed the delict in the course of the
performance of his duties.
Whether an act falls within the scope of an employee’s duties is a question of fact and
depends on the particular circumstances of each case. The following are examples of cir-
cumstances the courts have held as falling within the scope of an employee’s employment,
thereby rendering the employer liable.
28 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
• If the delict is committed while the employee is actually working – that is, while he is
occupied with the execution of his duties – he is obeying the orders of his employer and
doing his work. Should the employee in the process of doing so commit a delict which
causes damage to a third party, the employer is liable. In Hendrickz v Cutting 1937 CPD
417 the employee was a lorry driver. While performing his duties, he stopped at a filling
station for fuel. He lit a cigarette, causing a fire in which the pump attendant was in-
jured. The employer was held liable. In Minister of Justice v Khoza 1966 (1) SA 410 (A) two
police constables were going about their work, inter alia, guarding prisoners. One of the
constables aimed a pistol at the other in jest. The pistol went off accidently and the sec-
ond constable was injured. The employer was held liable.
• If a delict is committed while the employee is acting within the scope of his employment,
whether during or after working hours, his employer is liable. In Sauer NO v Duursema
1951 (2) SA 222 (D) a postman was driving a vehicle belonging to the Post Office without
the necessary authority. As a result of his negligence an accident occurred and another
vehicle was damaged. The employer was held liable because the trip undertaken was con-
nected with the delivery of mail – the work for which the postman had been employed.
In K v Minister of Safety and Security [2005] 8 BLLR 749 (CC) three policemen in full uni-
form, on duty and driving an official South African Police Service vehicle offered a woman
a lift home. On the way they stopped, raped her and left her at the roadside. The Court
held that the employer was liable for the damages suffered by the woman. See also F v
Minister of Safety and Security [2012] 3 BLLR 244 (CC).
• When an employee performs an illegal act while acting in the course of his duties, the
employer is liable for the delict committed. Therefore, the employer is liable when the
employee commits an illegal act, if compliance with the employer’s orders requires that
act. In Mkize v Martens 1914 AD 382 the employer supplied his two employees with food.
The employees made a fire to cook the food, but the fire caused damage to a third party.
The court decided that the making of the fire was essential for the execution by the em-
ployees of their duties and the employer was held liable.
• If an employee performs an act which has been prohibited by the employer, but which
nevertheless promotes the employer’s interests, the employer is liable for the delict com-
mitted by the employee. In General Tyre & Rubber Co (SA) Ltd v Kleynhans & Another 1963
(1) SA 533 (N) the employee drove a tractor on a public road, contrary to the orders of
his employer. As a result of his negligence an accident occurred. The employer was held
liable for the damages caused to a third party. In Moghamat v Centre Guards CC [2004] 1
All SA 221 (C) the employee, a security guard, was not allowed to carry a firearm while
on duty. One night, while on duty, he had his personal firearm in his possession and
failed to put to it away. M was accidentally shot and suffered severe injuries. The Court
concluded that the security guard had been negligent and, because he was on duty when
the delict was committed, his employer was liable.
• When an employee commits a delict while partly promoting the interests of his employer
and partly his own, the employer will be liable. In Feldman v Mall 1945 AD 743 the em-
ployee had to deliver goods and then immediately return to his place of work. On the
way back he deviated from the route to partake of drink with his friends. Later, on his
way back to his workplace, he knocked down and killed a pedestrian. The Court decided
that he had abandoned his work only partially to promote his own interests. He was, how-
ever, still promoting the interests of the employer because he had retained control of the
vehicle and was taking it back to work. The employer was held liable. The same viewpoint
was held in Minister of Safety and Security v Jordaan t/a Andre Jordaan Transport 2000 (4) SA
21 (SCA) and Roux v Evkom [2002] 2 All SA 462 (T).
• When the employee totally abandons his work in order to promote his own interests, he
is acting outside the scope of his employment – he is “on a frolic of his own” – and his
employer will not be held liable for any delict committed by him; the employee is person-
ally liable. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that the delict is not committed
Common law contract of employment 29
in the course of the employee’s duties. In Rossouw v Central News Agency 1948 (2) SA 267
(W) the employee gave a lift to a hitch-hiker. As a result of the employee’s negligence
the hitch-hiker was injured. The Court decided that the giving of a lift had nothing to do
with the work of the employee. The employer was not held liable. In Carter & Co (Pty) Ltd
v McDonald 1955 (1) SA 202 (A) the employee used his employer’s bicycle to go to the
market for private reasons. He knocked down and injured a pedestrian. The Court
decided that the employee was promoting only his own interests when the accident
occurred. The employer was not held liable. In Ess Kay Electronics (Pty) Ltd & Another v
First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd [2001] 1 All SA 315 (A) an employee of the bank
issued fraudulent bank drafts, causing the appellants some damage. The appellants ar-
gued that the employee had been acting within the scope of his employment and wanted
to hold the bank (as employer) liable. The Court observed that the test was whether or
not the actions of the employee had been authorised. On the evidence the Court con-
cluded that the employee had failed to follow the bank’s stipulated procedures in issuing
bank drafts. Consequently, everything the employee did relative to the drafts was outside
the scope of his actual authority and the course of his employment. The employer was
not held liable. See also Energy Measurements (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of South Africa
Ltd [2000] 2 All SA 396 (W). In Absa Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd [2001]
1 All SA 1 (A) the Court held that the theft of cheques by an employee from his employ-
er cannot be said to be an act carried out in the course and scope of employment. Theft
is committed solely for an employee’s own interest and, therefore, falls outside the scope
of his authority and employment. The employer cannot be held vicariously liable for the
actions of such an employee.
Before the employer will be held liable, the commission of a delict by the employee must be
proven. This means that the employee must have caused harm to another by his unlawful
act or omission. The employer will be liable only for a delict which could be claimed from
the employee. The employer and his employee are liable as co-defendants in solidum. Should
the employer pay the full amount of the damages of the third party, he will be able to claim
this amount from the employee.
Questions
Question 1
Distinguish between locatio conductio operarum, locatio conductio operis and a mandate. (6)
Question 2
Discuss in detail, with reference to decided cases, how you will determine whether a person
is an “employee” or an independent contractor. (20)
Question 3
Discuss the common law duty of an employee to maintain bona fides (good faith). (10)
Question 4
Discuss, with reference to decided cases, the employee’s remedies in the event of a reduc-
tion in status. (15)
Question 5
Ben was an assistant manager in the storeroom of Cytex (Pty) Ltd for ten years. One Mon-
day morning he was informed by the general manager that an assistant manager was no
longer required in the storeroom and that he would be transferred to the factory plant as a
supervisor. He would, however, retain his present salary.
Discuss Ben’s legal position in detail with reference to case law. (10)
Question 6
Distinguish between termination by notice and summary termination of a contract of em-
ployment. (5)
Question 7
Regarding summary termination of employment, give the following:
7.1 three grounds for such termination by the employer; (3)
7.2 three grounds for such termination by the employee; (3)
7.3 explain how summary dismissal of an employee at common law differs from such dis-
missal in terms of South African labour legislation and the requirements laid down by
the courts. (5)
Question 8
Mr Adonis Smith engages ten people to work in his factory as labourers. He tells them that
he cannot afford to pay them the minimum wage stipulated by the bargaining council. They
are, however, only too pleased to have a job and are willing to work for less than the pre-
scribed minimum. They sign contracts of employment reflecting the lower wage. Is such a
provision valid? Explain. (4)
Hint: A contract of employment must comply with the minimum terms of the applicable
legislation, sectoral determination or collective agreement.
32 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Question 9
An administrative assistant, Sebastian Stroud, is asked by a director of the company Stroud
works for to take a client to the airport in one of the company’s luxury German cars. On the
way back from the airport Stroud causes an accident due to his own negligence and both the
company car and the other person’s car are damaged. Assume that it will cost R20 000 to
repair the company car and R10 000 to repair the other car.
9.1 Can the other person claim R10 000 from the company to have his car repaired?
Give reasons for your answer. (5)
9.2 Assume that Stroud has to compensate the company for the damages to the company
car. Can this amount be deducted from his wages? Give reasons for your answer. (2)
Question 10
A factory is hit by a strike, involving the vast majority of employees. A number of employees
are, however, willing to continue working and tender their services accordingly. The em-
ployer is unable to utilise their services and instructs them to stay at home until the strike
has ended.
10.1 Is the employer obliged to pay the strikers? Give reasons for your answer. (2)
Hint: “No work, no pay.”
10.2 Is the employer obliged to pay the non-strikers? Give reasons for your answer. (4)
Hint: The non-strikers have tendered their services.
Question 11
Employees report to their employer’s pay office on a Friday afternoon to collect their
wages. They are informed that they will be paid on the following Monday because the em-
ployer is experiencing cash-flow problems. They arrive back at work on the Monday, but
still receive no payment. They refuse to commence work until they have been paid. Do they
commit a breach of their contracts of employment? Explain. (4)
Hint: “No pay, no work.” See Coin Security v Vukani Guards (1989) 10 ILJ 239 (C).
Question 12
Annie, a domestic worker, was in the employment of Mr and Mrs Reynolds. Upon her
appointment they agreed that two weeks’ notice would be required for termination of her
services. While Annie was working for the Reynolds family one of Mrs Reynolds’ diamond
rings disappeared. Mrs Reynolds immediately accused Annie of theft and summarily dis-
missed her.
12.1 Can Annie be dismissed under these circumstances? Explain by referring to the
common law position and comparing it with the position as under the Labour
Relations Act. (4)
12.2 Could Mrs Reynolds dismiss Annie summarily or is she supposed to give Annie
two weeks’ notice? Briefly explain. (4)
Question 13
An employer can be held vicariously liable for delicts committed by his employee. Discuss,
with reference to case law, the employer’s liability for the delicts of his employee. (20)
Hint: See Hendrickz v Cutting 1937 CPD 417; Sauer NO v Duursema 1951 (2) SA 222 (D); Mkize
v Martens 1914 AD 382; General Tyre & Rubber Co (SA) Ltd v Kleynhans & Another 1963 (1) SA
533 (N); Feldman v Mall 1945 AD 743; Carter & Co (Pty) Ltd v McDonald 1955 (1) SA 202 (A);
Moghamat v Centre Guards CC [2004] 1 All SA 221 (C); Minister of Safety and Security v Jordaan
Common law contract of employment 33
t/a Andre Jordaan Transport 2000 (4) SA 21 (SCA); Roux v Evkom [2002] 2 All SA 462 (T); Ess
Kay Electronics (Pty) Ltd & Another v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd [2001] 1 All SA
315 (A); Energy Measurements (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd [2000] 2 All SA
396 (W); Absa Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd [2001] 1 All SA 1 (A); K v Minister
of Safety and Security [2005] 8 BLLR 749 (CC); F v Minister of Safety and Security [2012] 3
BLLR 244 (CC).
Question 14
Andrew is working at XYZ Co as a representative, selling farming implements. His remuner-
ation consists of commission amounting to 12% of the selling price of every item sold. He
does not have to go to the office every day and he arranges his appointments to suit him.
He has to submit a monthly report on all sales at the end of each month. His job description
gives him a free hand as to the manner in which an item is sold, provided that if he sold
same for cash and the selling price exceeds R100 000, he has to get the written permission
of his general manager. One Saturday morning Andrew meets with a farmer with whom he
has an appointment. The farmer buys irrigation equipment to the value of R120 000 cash.
Andrew concludes the transaction without contacting his manager for permission. On his
way back home he causes an accident in which a Mr Nel’s car is damaged and he (Nel) is
seriously injured.
14.1 Is Andrew an employee in terms of locatio conductio operarum? Explain your answer and
consider the presumption created in section 83A of the Basic Conditions of Employ-
ment Act and section 200A of the Labour Relations Act and the Code of Good Prac-
tice: Who is an employee? (20)
14.2 Would your answer differ if Andrew worked for a basic salary plus commission and his
job description compelled him to report every appointment he had arranged and
every sale he had concluded to his manager? Explain. (4)
14.3 Assume that Andrew is an employee. Mr Nel wishes to sue for medical expenses and
repair costs to his car. He approaches you for advice. Advise him. (5)
14.4 Assume that Andrew had gone to this farm for a personal visit (not for business) and
the accident (as described above) took place. Mr Nel wishes to sue for medical ex-
penses and repair costs to his car. Advise him. (5)
Question 15
Mr Fisherman was a skipper of a squid vessel for Nemo Fisheries. When he accepted the
appointment as skipper, he signed a written contract with Nemo Fisheries in terms of which
he was, inter alia, entitled to family responsibility leave and sick leave and required to give
three months’ notice of termination of service. The contract furthermore provided that Mr
Fisherman would be responsible for Nemo’s vessel at sea and that he would earn commis-
sion (calculated on the weight of squid caught) and be responsible for hiring, managing
and paying the crew. He had to undertake 21 trips to sea per month and was not allowed to
return to shore early without the permission of Nemo Fisheries. After serving Nemo for
almost a year, his services were terminated.
Advise Mr Fisherman whether he was an employee or an independent contractor and
whether, in consequence, he would be in a position to refer an alleged unfair dismissal dis-
pute to the Statutory Council for the Squid and Related Fisheries of SA. (20)
Hint: See J & J Freeze Trust v Statutory Council for the Squid & Related Fisheries of SA & Others
(2011) 32 ILJ 2966 (LC).
Question 16
Miss Sunshine works as a sex worker for Adult World CC. It is not in dispute that she per-
forms sex deeds for reward, works 12 hours a day, 7 days a week and lives in accommoda-
tion provided by the employer (as payment in kind). She is dismissed without a hearing and
for allegedly breaching rules relating to entertaining customers privately and not in the
name of the business. She wants to refer a dismissal dispute to the CCMA.
34 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Advise Miss Sunshine of her prospects of success, giving reasons for your advice and con-
sidering the latest case law in this regard. (20)
Hint: See “Kylie” v Van Zyl t/a Brigittes [2007] 4 BALR 338 (CCMA); “Kylie” v CCMA & Others
[2008] 9 BLLR 870 (LC); “Kylie” v CCMA & Others [2010] 7 BLLR 705 (LAC).
Question 17
Ms Disco visited a nightclub with her boyfriend. In the early hours of the morning she
needed a lift home because she and her boyfriend had had a fight. A policeman on standby
duty, Mr Stalker, in casual clothes and in an unmarked police vehicle, saw Ms Disco walking
along the road. He stopped and offered her a lift home. Because she believed he was a
policeman, she trusted him and accepted his offer. On their way to her home Mr Stalker
assaulted and raped her. Can SAPS, Mr Stalker’s employer, be held vicariously liable for
what he did to Ms Disco? (10)
Hint: See F v Minister of Safety and Security [2012] 3 BLLR 244 (CC).
Question 18
Breathe Easy (Pty) Ltd is a respiratory home care company which imports, rents, sells, mar-
kets and distributes respiratory equipment in a highly competitive industry. It distributes
equipment to patients who suffer from respiratory problems and has established long-term
relationships with many of them. Mpho used to be an employee of Breathe Easy. Her con-
tract of employment with the company contained both a confidentiality clause and a restraint
of trade. In terms of the contract she agreed not to disclose any confidential information,
including trade secrets and clients’ names acquired during the course of her employment.
She further agreed not to approach or entice away any of Breathe Easy’s customers or em-
ployees or to work for a competitor company for a period of 12 months after leaving
Breathe Easy. Mpho resigned and joined Air For All (Pty) Ltd, a company competing with
Breathe Easy for market share in the same industry.
Would Breathe Easy, in your opinion, be successful in relying on the restraint of trade to
which Mpho had agreed? What are Breathe Easy’s prospects of success in interdicting
Mpho from working for Air For All and possibly disclosing confidential Breathe Easy infor-
mation? (10)
Hint: See Continuous Oxygen Suppliers (Pty) Ltd t/a Vital Aire v Meintjes & Another (2012) 33 ILJ
629 (LC).
Question 19
John Vikuluzi, a Burundian national, obtained refugee status in South Africa. While in the
country he obtained a degree in nursing and was officially informed that he could work as a
health professional. After obtaining endorsement of his right to work whilst retaining his
refugee status, he applied for a permanent position as a professional nurse at the Valentina
Hospital. The post was offered to him and he accepted it. After three weeks’ service in the
new position, he was informed that he could only be employed on a fixed-term contract
because his refugee status was about to expire and it would be in contravention of the
applicable legislation to retain him on a permanent basis. Valentina Hospital accordingly
withdrew the offer of permanent employment, relying on a revised policy of the National
Health Care Council in terms of which only South African citizens who were “fit and proper
persons” could be appointed. John contended that the policy discriminated against foreign
nationals and sought reinstatement to the full-time position he had occupied.
Discuss John’s prospects of success. (10)
Hint: See Ndikumdavyi v Valkenberg Hospital & Others [2012] 8 BLLR 795 (LC); Discovery
Health Ltd v CCMA & Others [2008] 7 BLLR 633 (LC).
Common law contract of employment 35
Appendix
GN 1774 of 1 December 2006
Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee
PART 1
1. This Code of Good Practice is issued by NEDLAC in terms of section 200A(4), read with
section 203, of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA).
2. This Code sets out guidelines for determining whether persons are employees. Its purpose
is –
(a) to promote clarity and certainty as to who is an employee for the purposes of the
Labour Relations Act and other labour legislation;
(b) to set out the interpretive principles contained in the Constitution, labour legislation
and binding international standards that apply to the interpretation of labour legis-
lation, including the determination of who is an employee;
(c) to ensure that a proper distinction is maintained between employment relationships
which are regulated by labour legislation and independent contracting;
(d) to ensure that employees – who are in an unequal bargaining position in relation to
their employer – are protected through labour law and are not deprived of these pro-
tections by contracting arrangements;
(e) to assist persons applying and interpreting labour law to understand and interpret the
variety of employment relationships present in the labour market including disguised
employment, ambiguous employment relationships, atypical (or non-standard) em-
ployment and triangular employment relationships.
Application
3. In terms of section 203(3) and (4) of the LRA, any person interpreting or applying one of
the following Acts must take this Code into account for the purpose of determining whether
a particular person is an employee in terms of –
(a) Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA);
(b) Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA);
(c) Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA); or
(d) Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 (SDA).
4. The Code should also be taken into account in determining whether persons are employees
in terms of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993, the Compensation for Oc-
cupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 and the Unemployment Insurance Act 63
of 2001. In applying these Acts, it must be borne in mind that the definitions of an employ-
ee in those statutes differ from that contained in the LRA. However, there are sufficient
similarities for the Code to be of considerable assistance in determining who is covered by
these statutes. These statutes are discussed further in Part 6 of the Code.
5. Part 1 of this Code deals with the application of the Code and issues of interpretation.
6. Part 2 of this Code deals with the rebuttable presumption as to who is an employee in terms
of section 200A of the LRA and section 83A of the BCEA. Any person applying or interpret-
ing those sections must take this Code into account.
7. Part 3 of this Code, deals with the interpretation of the definition of “employee” contained
in the LRA, the BCEA, the EEA and the SDA.
8. Part 4 of the Code deals with determining the employment status of persons employed by
temporary employment services.
9. Part 5 of the Code deals with the principles of interpretation that are applicable to inter-
preting the statutory presumptions of employment and the statutory definitions of an em-
ployee.
36 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
10. Part 6 deals with the extent to which the Code is of assistance in determining employment
status for purposes of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993, the Compensa-
tion for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 and the Unemployment Insur-
ance Act 63 of 2001.
11. While every person applying or interpreting one of these statutes must take the Code into
account, the Code is not a substitute for applying binding decisions of the courts. The Code
therefore refers to many of the most important and helpful decisions of the courts on these
issues. (A table of cases cited together with their references is attached to the Code.)
PART 2
THE PRESUMPTION AS TO WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE
12. The 2002 amendments to the LRA and BCEA introduce a provision into each Act creating a
rebuttable presumption as to whether a person is an employee and therefore covered by
the Act. These provisions are found in section 200A of the LRA and section 83A of the
BCEA. These sections only apply to employees who earn less than a threshold amount de-
termined from time to time by the Minister of Labour in terms of section 6(3) of the BCEA.
13. A person is presumed to be an employee if they are able to establish that one of seven listed
factors is present in their relationship with a person for whom they work or to whom they
render services. Before examining the seven factors, it is necessary to describe the general
operation of the presumption.
14. Subject to the earnings threshold, the presumption applies in any proceedings in terms of
either the BCEA or LRA in which a party (“the applicant”) alleges that they are an employ-
ee and one or more of the other parties to the proceedings disputes this allegation.
15. In order to be presumed to be an employee, an applicant must demonstrate that –
(a) they work for or render services to the person or entity cited in the proceedings as
their employer; and
(b) any one of the seven listed factors is present in their relationship with that person or
entity. (These factors are discussed in paragraph 18 of the Code.)
16. The presumption applies regardless of the form of the contract. Accordingly, a person
applying the presumption must evaluate evidence concerning the actual nature of the em-
ployment relationship. The issue of the applicant’s employment status cannot be deter-
mined merely by reference to either the applicant’s obligations as stipulated in the contract
or a “label” attached to the relationship in a contract. Therefore a statement in a contract
that the applicant is not an employee or is an independent contractor must not be taken as
conclusive proof of the status of the applicant.
17. The fact that an applicant satisfies the requirements of the presumption by establishing that
one of the listed factors is present in the relationship does not establish that the applicant is
an employee. However, the onus then falls on the “employer” to lead evidence to prove that
the applicant is not an employee and that the relationship is in fact one of independent
contracting. If the respondent fails to lead satisfactory evidence, the applicant must be held
to be an employee.
18. The presumption comes into operation if the applicant establishes that one of the following
seven factors is present –
(a) “the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another person”
The factor of control or direction will generally be present if the applicant is required
to obey the lawful and reasonable commands, orders or instructions of the employer
or the employer’s personnel (for example, managers or supervisors) as to the manner
in which they are to work. It is present in a relationship in which a person supplies on-
ly labour and the other party directs the manner in which he or she works. In con-
trast, control and direction are not present if a person is hired to perform a particular
task or produce a particular product and is entitled to determine the manner in
which the task is to be performed or the product produced. It is an indication of an
employment relationship that the “employer” retains the right to choose which tools,
Common law contract of employment 37
staff, raw materials, routines, patents or technology are used. Likewise, the fact that an
employer is entitled to take disciplinary action against the person as a result of the
manner in which the person works is a strong indication of an employment relation-
ship.
(b) “the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person”
This factor will be present if the person’s hours of work are a term of the contract and
the contract permits the employer or person providing the work to determine at what
times work is to be performed. However, the fact that the contract does not determine
the exact times of commencing and ending work does not entail that it is not a con-
tract of employment. Sufficient control or direction may be present if the contract be-
tween the parties determines the total number of hours that the person is required to
work within a specified period. Flexible working time arrangements are not incom-
patible with an employment relationship.
(c) “in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms part of that organi-
sation”
This factor may apply in respect of any employer that constitutes a corporate entity. It
does not apply to individuals employing, for instance, domestic workers. The factor
will be present if the applicant’s services form an integrated part of the employer’s
organisation or operations.
A person who works for or supplies services to an employer as part of conducting
their own business does not form part of the employer’s organisation. Factors indicat-
ing that a person operates their own business are that they bear risks such as bad
workmanship, poor performance, price hikes and time over-runs. In the case of em-
ployment, an employer will typically bear these types of risks.
(d) “the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per month
over the last three months”
If the applicant is still in the employment of the employer, this should be measured
over the three months prior to the case commencing. If the relationship has termi-
nated, it should be measured with reference to the three-month period preceding its
termination.
(e) “the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she works or ren-
ders services”
Economic dependence will generally be present if the applicant depends upon the
person for whom they work for the supply of work. An employee’s remuneration will
generally be his or her sole or principal source of income. On the other hand, eco-
nomic dependence will not be present if the applicant is genuinely self-employed or is
running their own business. A self-employed person generally assumes the financial
risk attached to performing work. An important indicator that a person is genuinely
self-employed is that he or she retains the capacity to contract with others to work or
provide services. In other words, an independent contractor is generally free to build
a multiple concurrent client base while an employee is bound to a more exclusive re-
lationship with the employer.
An exception to this is the position of part-time employees. The fact that a part-time
employee is able to work for another employer in the periods in which he or she is
not working does not affect his or her status as an employee. Likewise, the fact that a
full-time employee may be able to take on other employment that does not conflict
with the interests of their employer in their spare time is not an indication of self-
employment.
(f) “the person is provided with the tools of trade or work equipment by the other person”
This provision applies regardless of whether the tools or equipment are supplied free of
cost or their cost is deducted from the applicant’s earnings or the applicant is required
to re-pay the cost. The term “tools of trade” is not limited to tools in the narrow sense
and includes items required for work such as books or computer equipment.
38 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
(g) “the person only works for or renders services to one person”
This factor will not be present if the person works for or supplies services to any other
person. It is not relevant whether that work is permitted in terms of the relationship
or whether it involves “moonlighting” contrary to the terms of the relationship.
19. If any one of the factors listed in the preceding paragraph is established, the applicant is
presumed to be an employee. An “employer” that disputes that an applicant is an employee
must be given the opportunity to rebut the presumption by leading evidence concerning
the nature of the working relationship. After hearing this evidence, and any additional evi-
dence provided by the applicant or any other party, the presiding officer must rule on
whether the applicant is an employee or not.
20. In cases in which the presumption is not applicable, because the person earns above the
threshold amount, the factors listed in the presumption (and discussed above) may be used
as a guide for the purpose of determining whether a person is in reality in an employment
relationship or is self-employed.
PART 3
INTERPRETING THE DEFINITION OF AN EMPLOYEE
21. The LRA defines an employee as –
“(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person
or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and
(b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the
business of an employer,
and ‘employed’ and ‘employment’ have meanings corresponding to that of ‘employee’”.
22. The interpretation given to the term “employee” by the courts prior to the insertion into
the LRA of the presumption as to who is an employee, remains relevant. This is so be-
cause –
(a) the presumption only applies to employees who earn less than the earnings threshold
determined by the Minister;
(b) in the case of employees who earn less than the threshold amount, the employer may
lead evidence to rebut the presumption, and establish that they are not an “employee”.
For example, if the person who claims to be an employee establishes that he or she
has worked for the other person for an average of at least 40 hours over the last three
months, he or she must be presumed to be an employee. The “employer” may, how-
ever, lead evidence that that person is an independent contractor engaged to perform
a particular task. The court or tribunal will then have to determine whether that per-
son is an employee.
23. Sub-paragraph (a) of the definition of an “employee” in the LRA includes any person who
works for another person and who receives, or is entitled to receive, remuneration, unless
that person is an independent contractor. In general terms, this reflects the common law
distinction between employees and independent contractors.
24. Sub-paragraph (b) contemplates that other categories of persons who assist in carrying on
or conducting businesses also fall within the statutory definition of an “employee”. Sub-
paragraph (b) has the consequence that persons who are not engaged in terms of a con-
tract of employment may nevertheless be statutory employees. The courts have not yet
delineated the precise ambit of persons who should be classified as employees because they
fall within the terms of sub-paragraph (b).
25. In 1970 the then Appellate Division4 interpreted wording similar to that contained in sub-
paragraph (b) and concluded that it did not include persons who work for another as an
independent contractor. While the courts have not delineated the precise categories of
employees who will be covered, it has been held that this part of the definition contem-
plates the assistance that a person may render to a person other than their employer. A cate-
gory of persons who clearly fall within the terms of sub-paragraph (b) are unpaid workers
who work for an employer.
Common law contract of employment 39
Factors
32. In the initial decision adopting the “dominant impression” test, the then Appellate Division
listed six factors to distinguish a contract of employment from a contract for services con-
cluded by an independent contractor. These factors, which are frequently cited in judg-
ments, are tabulated below and discussed in turn. These six factors are not a definitive listing
of the differences between the two types of contract.
by the courts as the employee being “at the beck and call” of the employer. An independent
contractor need not perform the service personally and may use the services of other people,
unless the contract expressly provides otherwise. Accordingly, a contractual provision re-
quiring a contractor to perform personally does not always mean that the relationship is
one of employment. Similarly, the fact that an employee may be permitted or required to
arrange a substitute during absences does not in itself imply he or she is an independent
contractor.
37. The fact that a person employs, or is entitled to employ, other people to assist in perform-
ing the allocated tasks will not always be inconsistent with an employment relationship,
although it is an indication that the relationship is one of independent contracting. In
some sectors of the economy, it is a practice for sub-contractors to be engaged to work and
required to recruit other workers to assist them. This requirement does not in itself exclude
the sub-contractors from the possibility of being classified as employees. It will still be neces-
sary to examine the relationship between the principal and sub-contractor, as well as the
relationship between the principal and the persons engaged by the sub-contractor, to ascer-
tain if the relationship is one of employment. Depending upon an examination of all the
factors, including, for instance, the extent of control exercised by the principal sub-
contractor, it is feasible that both the sub-contractor and the workers that he or she has en-
gaged may be employees of the principal contractor. A relevant factor would be the extent
to which the employer exercises control over a decision to terminate the services of persons
engaged by the sub-contractor.
Provision of training
49. The provision by an employer of training in the employer’s methods or other aspects of its
business is generally an indication of an employment relationship. Usually, a genuinely self-
employed person would be responsible for ensuring their own training. However, provision
of training as part of a contractual arrangement is not necessarily inconsistent with a rela-
tionship of independent contracting.
Place of work
50. The place at which work takes place may sometimes be taken into account as a factor deter-
mining the nature of an employment relationship. However, great caution needs to be taken
in using this factor. The fact that a person works regularly at the employer’s premises and
Common law contract of employment 43
Conclusion
51. The determination by a court or tribunal as to whether a person is an employee or an in-
dependent contractor has important consequences. In particular, independent contractors
are not afforded the protection of labour legislation.
52. Courts, tribunals and officials must determine whether a person is an employee or inde-
pendent contractor based on the dominant impression gained from considering all relevant
factors that emerge from an examination of the realities of the parties’ relationship.
PART 4
EMPLOYEES OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
53. The LRA and the BCEA specifically regulate the employment of persons who are procured
for, or provided to, a client by temporary employment services. Temporary employment
services are one type of the wider category of triangular employment relationships. A tem-
porary employment service is a person or business who –
(a) procures or provides employees to perform work or render services for a client; and
(b) remunerates those employees.
54. Both of these elements must be present for the person providing or procuring the employ-
ees to fall within the definition of a temporary employment service.
55. An arbitrator or court which is required to determine whether section 198 of the LRA or
section 83 of the BCEA is applicable must be satisfied that the relationship between the
client and the temporary employment service is a genuine arrangement and not a subter-
fuge entered into for the purpose of avoiding any aspect of labour legislation.
56. Whether or not an individual supplied to a client by a temporary employment service is an
employee of the client or an independent contractor must be determined by reference to
the actual working relationship between the worker and the “client” for whom the worker
provides services or works. The relationship between the worker and the temporary employ-
ment service is relevant to the extent that it may give some indication of the relationship
between the worker and the client. The relationship between the worker and the client must
be assessed in the light of the normal criteria used to determine the existence of an employ-
ment relationship. Therefore, for example, it would be appropriate to examine factors such
as the extent to which the client issues instructions to the worker or any other relevant fac-
tor. The presumption of employment is applicable to cases involving persons engaged by
temporary employment services, if the employees earn less than the prescribed earnings
threshold.
57. If it is found that the individual has an employment relationship with the client, then for
the purposes of the LRA and the BCEA –
(a) the individual is an employee of the temporary employment service;
(b) the temporary employment service is the individual’s employer.
58. However, the client is jointly and severally liable for any contravention by a temporary em-
ployment service of any terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining council col-
lective agreement, an arbitration award, or any sectoral determination or provision of the
BCEA. In addition, in terms of section 57(2) of the Employment Equity Act, the client and
the temporary employment service are jointly and severally liable for any act of discrimina-
tion committed by the temporary employment service on the express or implied instruc-
tions of the client.
44 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
PART 5
INTERPRETATION OF LABOUR LEGISLATION
59. Any person who is considering the application of either the presumption of employment or
the definition of an employee in a particular statute is engaged in the interpretation of that
statute. Accordingly, they must be mindful of the approach that must be adopted to the in-
terpretation of labour legislation.
60. Section 3 of the LRA provides that any person applying the Act must interpret its provi-
sions –
(a) to give effect to its primary objects;
(b) in compliance with the Constitution; and
(c) in compliance with the public international law obligations of the Republic.
61. The Constitutional Court has stated that section 3 of the LRA is an express injunction to
interpret the provisions of the LRA purposively. A “purposive” approach to interpretation
considers a statutory provision broadly so as to give effect to the Constitution and to the
underlying purpose of the statute. This may result in a generous interpretation of the rele-
vant provision.
62. In order to interpret labour legislation in compliance with the Constitution, a commissioner,
arbitrator or judge must interpret its provisions in a way that ensures the protection, pro-
motion and fulfilment of constitutional rights, in particular the labour rights contained in
section 23 of the Constitution. If more than one interpretation can be given to a provision,
the decision-maker must choose the interpretation that best gives effect to the Constitution,
provided this does not unduly strain the language of the statute or infringe any protected
right. The Labour Appeal Court extended the literal construction of the definition of an
employee to include persons who have concluded contracts of employment to commence
at a future date because a literal translation resulted in gross hardship, ambiguity and
absurdity. The Constitutional Court has noted that security of employment is a core value of
the LRA and this should be taken into account in determining whether a person is an em-
ployee and therefore entitled to protection against unfair dismissal.
63. Section 39(2) of the Constitution requires that “when interpreting any legislation, and
when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. The Constitutional Court has
confirmed that the common law must be interpreted in a way that develops the common
law and ensures that it is consistent with constitutional principles.
64. Section 23 of the Constitution establishes the fundamental rights in respect of labour
relations. In particular, section 23(1) and (2) provide that –
“(1) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices
(2) Every worker has the right –
(a) to form and join a trade union;
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union; and
(c) to strike.”
65. The Constitutional Court has confirmed that the major source of South Africa’s public
international law obligations in respect of labour law, is the Conventions and Recommend-
ations of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Two supervisory bodies ensure the
application and observation of these Conventions: the Committee of Experts on the Appli-
cation of Conventions and Recommendations, and the Freedom of Association Committee
of the Governing Body of the ILO.
66. In certain instances, these bodies have expressed views on the categories of workers covered
by particular Conventions. Article 2 of the Convention concerning Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organise 87 of 1948 guarantees the right of “workers and
employers without distinction whatsoever, to establish and join organisations of their own
choosing, without prior state authorisation.” The Freedom of Association Committee has
held that the criteria for determining whether persons are covered by Convention 87 is not
Common law contract of employment 45
PART 6
INTERPRETATION OF THE DEFINITION OF AN EMPLOYEE IN OTHER LEGISLATION
ADMINISTERED BY THE MINISTER OF LABOUR
70. The central issue that will be raised when interpreting this definition is whether a person
is employed in terms of a contract of service and has not been specifically excluded in terms
of the definition. Again, persons interpreting and applying this definition should take
Parts 2 and 3 of this Code into account.
Occupational Health and Safety Act, 85 of 1993
71. For the purposes of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 (OHSA), an em-
ployee is —
“any person who is employed by or works for an employer and who receives or is en-
titled to receive any remuneration or who works under the direction or supervision of
an employer or any other person”;
The definition differs substantially from that in other labour legislation. A person is an em-
ployee and therefore covered by OHSA, if they –
(a) are employed by, or work for, an employer and are entitled to receive remuneration;
or
(b) work under the direction or supervision of an employer or any other person.
Nevertheless, a person applying or interpreting the definition should take Parts 2 and 3 of
this Code into account when determining whether a person is “employed by or works for an
employer” or whether they “work under the direction or supervision of an employer”.
72. Unlike the position under the LRA and BCEA, a temporary employment service is not the
employer for the purposes of compliance with OHSA. The definition of an employer in
OHSA provides that a labour broker as defined in the LRA is not the employer of employ-
ees that it provides to a client. This provision must now be read as excluding temporary em-
ployment service (as contemplated under the LRA and BCEA) from being the employer for
the purposes of OHSA. Accordingly, the client to whom a worker is supplied by a temporary
employment services must meet the obligation of an employer under OHSA.
PART
2
SOCIAL LEGISLATION
3
BASIC CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ACT
75 OF 1997
3.1 Introduction
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA) is of considerable importance
for the day-to-day administration of personnel matters since it sets minimum standards for
the protection of employees in the absence of other protective measures, such as collective
agreements or sectoral determinations. Unfortunately, in most Labour Law courses so
much emphasis is placed on the Labour Relations Act that the importance of the BCEA is
often overlooked.
As seen in Chapter 2, at common law the employment contract is viewed as an ordinary
commercial contract voluntarily entered into by two parties. Disregard for the weaker posi-
tion of the individual employee relative to the employer gives rise to a situation where the
common law gives little (or no) protection to the individual regarding sick leave, annual
leave, maximum working hours and other conditions of employment. At common law the
individual job applicant enjoys freedom to contract and if he wishes to commit himself con-
tractually to work for, for example, seven days a week and 10 hours a day, while no pro-
vision is made for holidays or sick leave, it is his choice. The BCEA guards against this kind
of asymmetry in employment contracts by creating minimum conditions of employment the
parties may not ignore even if both are perfectly willing to do so.
49
50 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
The Act further seeks to establish, enforce and regulate the variation of basic conditions of
employment. It creates a national set of minimum standards, but permits them to be varied.
There are four mechanisms for variation: collective bargaining, sectoral determinations,
contracts of employment and determinations made by the Minister of Labour.
3.3 Application (s 3)
Like the Labour Relations Act of 1995, the BCEA applies to both the public and private
sectors and it covers all employees, except members of the State Security Agency and
unpaid volunteers working for an organisation serving a charitable purpose. These employ-
ees are totally excluded from the BCEA.
Other categories of employees are excluded from some of the provisions of the BCEA.
They are the following:
Category Exclusion
Persons undergoing vocational training The BCEA applies to them except to the
extent that their employment is regulated by
the provisions of any other law (s 3(2))
Persons employed on vessels at sea in respect Excluded from the entire BCEA, except s 41
of which the Merchant Shipping Act 57 of (which deals with severance pay) and except
1951 applies to the extent provided for in a sectoral deter-
mination (s 3(3))
Senior managerial employees, employees en- Excluded from ss 8–18 (overtime, compressed
gaged as sales staff who travel to the premises working week, averaging of working hours,
of customers and who regulate their own maximum hours prescribed by Minister, meal
hours of work and employees who work fewer intervals, rest periods, Sunday work, night
than 24 hours per month for an employer work, public holidays)
Employees who work less than 24 hours per Excluded from Chapter 3, dealing with all
month for an employer types of leave; Chapter 4, dealing with par-
ticulars of employment and remuneration;
Chapter 5, dealing with termination of em-
ployment, payments on termination and cer-
tificate of service
Employers who employ fewer than five em- Excluded from s 29(1)(n), (o) and (p) and
ployees ss 30, 31 and 33, dealing with some written
particulars of employment, the duty to inform
employees of their rights and the keeping of
records
Employees engaged in unexpected work Excluded from ss 9, 10(1), 14(1), 15(1), 17(2)
which must be done without delay and which and 18(1), dealing with ordinary hours of
cannot be performed during ordinary work- work, overtime, meal intervals, daily and week-
ing hours ly rest periods, night work and work on public
holidays
Employees whose employment is subject to a Employees to whom a council or other col-
bargaining council collective agreement or lective agreement is applicable are subject to
other collective agreement or to a sectoral that agreement, and the BCEA is not appli-
determination or individual agreement cable to them. If a sectoral determination is
applicable the BCEA does not apply. A con-
tract of employment is applicable only if it is
more favourable than the BCEA
continued
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 51
Category Exclusion
Employees who earn more than R205 433-30 Excluded from the provisions relating to
1
per annum working time, averaging of hours, hours pre-
scribed by the Minister, meal intervals, daily
and weekly rest periods, Sunday work, night
work and work on public holidays. Working
time is to be arranged with due regard to
health, safety and family responsibilities
3.4 Definitions (s 1)
Some of the more important definitions are provided here:
basic condition of employment means a provision of the Act or sectoral determination that stipulates
a minimum term or condition of employment;
domestic worker means an employee who performs domestic work in the home of his or her em-
ployer and includes a gardener, a person employed by a household as a driver of a motor vehicle
and a person who takes care of the children, the aged, the sick, the frail or the disabled, but does
not include a farm worker;
employee means:
(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the
State and who receives or is entitled to receive any remuneration; and
(b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an
employer, and “employed” and “employment” have a corresponding meaning.
This definition mirrors the definition of “employee” in the Labour Relations Act (see the
discussion in Chapter 11 par 11.2). In summary, to determine the existence of the common-
law contract of employment, the locatio conduction operarum, the dominant-impression test is
used (see Chapter 2 par 2.2). To this test must be added the presumption created in section
83A of the BCEA (and in s 200A of the LRA) about who can be considered an employee
and the Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee (see the Appendix to Chapter 2).
Section 83A creates a rebuttable presumption of who is an employee. This means that if
any of the following factors exists, the person who renders a service is presumed to be an
employee and the onus is on the employer to prove the contrary. Section 83A(1) provides
as follows:
83A. Presumption as to who is employee
(1) A person who works for, or renders services to, any other person is presumed, until the con-
trary is proved, to be an employee, regardless of the form of the contract, if any one or more
of the following factors is present:
(a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another
person;
(b) the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person;
(c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person is a part of that organ-
isation;
(d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per
month over the last three months;
________________________
1 This amount is amended by the Minister of Labour from time to time. This amount refers to gross pay
before deductions (such as income tax, pension, medical and similar contributions), but excludes pay-
ments (contributions) made by the employer in respect of the employee.
52 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
(e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom that person works
or renders services;
(f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person; or
(g) the person only works for or renders services to one person.
The presumption created in section 83A does not apply to persons who earn more than the
threshold amount determined by the Minister in terms of section 6(3) of the BCEA (cur-
rently R205 433-30 pa). A person who earns less than the threshold amount or his alleged
employer may approach the CCMA for an advisory award as to whether he is in fact an
employee or not.
In terms of section 79(1), which deals with the protection of employees against discrimin-
ation, an “employee” includes a former employee and an applicant for employment.
Section 82(1) specifies that a person whose services have been procured for or provided
to a client by a temporary employment service (labour broker) is the employee of that tem-
porary employment service and the temporary employment service is that person’s employer.
farm worker means an employee who is employed mainly in or in connection with farming activi-
ties and includes an employee who wholly or mainly performs domestic work in a home on a
farm;
remuneration means any payment in money and/or in kind, made or owing to any person in re-
turn for that person working for any other person, including the State. “Remuneration” is given a
specific meaning in section 35(5);
senior managerial employee means an employee who has the authority to hire, discipline and dismiss
employees and to represent the employer internally and externally;
temporary employment service means any person who, for reward, procures for or provides to a client
other persons who render services or performs work for that client and who are remunerated by
the temporary employment service. A temporary employment service is in common parlance
known as a labour broker.
One of the goals of the Act is ultimately to reach a 40-hour working week. Schedule 1 to the
Act establishes procedures for the progressive reduction of the maximum ordinary working
hours to a maximum of 40 hours per week and eight hours per day. Such a reduction will
be secured by collective bargaining, sectoral determinations and recommendations made
by the Employment Conditions Commission (ECC) or Department of Labour.
The BCEA does not place any limit on overtime hours per day. However, the Act stipulates
than an employee may not work for more than 12 hours on any day. The 12 hours include
ordinary working hours and overtime.
A collective agreement may allow for ordinary working hours and overtime to be aver-
aged over a period of four months (see par 3.8).
The Minister may, on grounds of health and safety, prescribe maximum ordinary and
overtime hours for any category of employees. Such a determination is issued on the advice
of the Chief Inspector (appointed under the Occupational Health and Safety Act or the
Mine Health and Safety Act) and after consultation with the ECC (s 13).
Sunday work is considered as overtime if an employee does not ordinarily work on Sun-
days. Thus, when the maximum weekly overtime hours are calculated, the hours worked on
a Sunday must be included.
Work performed on a Sunday by an employee who does not normally work on Sundays is
considered overtime and the hours so worked form part of the overtime hours.
If a shift worked by an employee falls on a Sunday and another day, the whole shift is
deemed to have been worked on the Sunday, unless the greater portion of the shift was
worked on the other day, in which case the whole shift is deemed to have been worked on
the other day. The same provision is applicable to work on public holidays.
Remuneration in respect of leave must be paid to the employee on the last day of work
before the leave period commences or, by agreement, on the usual pay day.
Annual leave must be granted to the employee within the first six months of completion
of the leave cycle or in accordance with an agreement between the parties. Leave must be
taken and may not be “traded” for money, but if an employee has leave to his credit upon
termination of employment, such leave must be paid out.
Annual leave may not run concurrently with a period of notice to terminate services or
any period of leave the employee is entitled to, except during a period of unpaid leave. This
means annual leave may not run concurrently with a period of paid sick leave, maternity
leave or family responsibility leave that the employee is entitled to.
Sick leave is paid leave, in other words the employee is entitled to his normal daily rate of
pay for every day he takes sick leave, provided he does not exceed his leave entitlement.
The employer and employee may, however, agree to reduce sick leave pay to not less than
75% of the employee’s normal pay, but then the number of days leave must be increased
proportionately. Payment for sick leave must take place on the usual pay day.
A medical certificate is required after two days of absence. If an employee is absent on
more than two occasions in an eight-week period a medical certificate is required for any
number of days’ absence, even for one day. If no proof of illness is submitted, the employer
is not obliged to pay the employee. An employer is required to assist an employee who lives
on the employer’s premises to obtain a medical certificate.
The provisions relating to sick leave are not applicable to an employee whose inability to
work was caused by an accident or occupational disease as defined in the Compensation for
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act or the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works
Act, unless compensation is not paid to the employee in terms of these Acts.
Unless unable to do so, the employee is required to notify her employer four weeks in
advance and in writing of the intended date of commencement of maternity leave and the
return date to work.
The BCEA does not prescribe payment for maternity leave. In other words maternity
leave is unpaid leave. However, an employee is entitled to claim maternity benefits in terms
of the Unemployment Insurance Act. It is possible, though, that she may conclude an
agreement with her employer to provide for payment or a union can, through collective
bargaining, conclude a collective agreement that provides for paid maternity leave.
An employer may not require or permit a pregnant employee or one who is nursing a
baby to perform work hazardous to her health or that of her child. Where practicable, alter-
native employment is to be offered to the employee during her pregnancy and for six
months thereafter at conditions not less favourable than her normal conditions of employ-
ment.
________________________
• the employer has followed a fair procedure and has given the employee a reasonable
opportunity to show why the deduction should not be made;
• the total amount of the debt does not exceed the actual amount of the loss or damage;
• the total deductions from the employee’s remuneration do not exceed one-quarter of
the employee’s remuneration in money.
If the deduction is in respect of any goods purchased by the employee, the nature and
quantity of the goods are to be specified.
An employer may not require or permit an employee to repay any remuneration re-
ceived, except for overpayments made as a result of an error in calculating his remunera-
tion. The employer may also not require or permit an employee to acknowledge receipt of
an amount greater than the remuneration actually received.
The new section 33A prohibits certain payments by employees. An employer may not
require or accept any payment by or on behalf of an employee or potential employee in
respect of the employment of, or the allocation of work to, any employee and may further
not require an employee or potential employee to purchase goods, products or services
from the employer or a business or person nominated by the employer, unless the contract
of employment or a collective agreement requires participation in a scheme involving the
purchase of specific goods or services at a fair and reasonable price and the employee
receives a financial benefit from participating in the scheme.
A “benefit fund” is a pension, provident, retirement, medical aid or similar fund. Where
an employer deducts an amount from the employee’s remuneration for payment to a
benefit fund, such an amount must be paid to the fund within seven days from the date the
deduction was made, unless the rules of the fund prescribe a shorter period. Any contribu-
tion by the employer to the fund for the benefit of the employee must also be paid within
the seven days or shorter period referred to.
Termination of employment
• One week’s notice if the employee has been employed for six months or less
• Two weeks’ notice if the employee has been employed for more than six months, but less
than one year
• Four weeks’ notice if the employee has been employed for one year or more
• Notice to or by farm and domestic workers may not be shorter than four weeks once they
have completed six months of employment
A collective agreement may permit a notice period shorter than the prescribed four weeks’
notice period in respect of employees who have been employed for a year or more (other
than domestic and farm workers, who must receive at least four weeks’ notice once they
have completed six months of employment), in which case the notice period may not be
reduced to less than two weeks.
Notice must be given in writing, except when it is given by an illiterate employee. If an
employee is unable to understand the notice, it must be explained in an official language
he reasonably understands.
60 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
The provisions of Chapter 5 do not affect the right of a dismissed employee to dispute
the lawfulness or fairness of the dismissal in terms of the Labour Relations Act or any other
law. Neither is the right of an employer or an employee to terminate a contract of employ-
ment without notice for any cause recognised by law affected. Employers have the right to
offer payment in lieu of notice (s 38), although this right is somewhat curtailed in respect
of an employee who resides in accommodation on the premises of the employer or on
premises supplied by him. Where the services of an employee who receives accommodation
from his employer are terminated without the required notice period or where payment in
lieu of notice is given, the employer is required to provide the employee with accommoda-
tion for a period of one month or until the contract of employment could lawfully have
been terminated (whichever is the longer period). If an employee elects to remain in
accommodation after the employer has terminated his or her contract of employment by
payment in lieu of notice, the remuneration that the employer is required to pay instead of
notice is reduced by that portion of the remuneration that represents the agreed value of the
accommodation for the period that the employee remains in the accommodation (s 39).
Upon termination of employment an employer must pay an employee (s 40):
• for overtime not yet paid or any paid time off that the employee is entitled to in respect
of overtime or Sunday work not yet taken;
• remuneration for any period of annual leave due that the employee has not taken;
• in respect of the employee’s annual leave entitlement during an incomplete annual leave
cycle, either one day’s remuneration in respect of every 17 days on which the employee
worked or was entitled to be paid or remuneration calculated on any other basis, which-
ever is the more favourable to the employee. This provision is applicable only if the em-
ployee has been in employment longer than four months;
• notice pay if the notice period is not worked;
• any outstanding wages/salary; and
• if an employee is dismissed for the operational requirements of his employer (re-
trenched) or if the employee loses his job because of the employer’s insolvency, severance
pay must also be paid to the employee in terms of section 41.
In terms of section 41 of the BCEA an employee must receive severance pay (in addition to
other payments due) if his services are terminated because of the operational requirements
of the employer or the insolvency of the employer in terms of section 38 of the Insolvency
Act 24 of 1936. Severance pay is at least one week’s remuneration for each completed year
of continuous service with the employer. An employee who unreasonably refuses to accept
the employer’s offer of alternative employment with that employer or any other employer is
not entitled to any severance pay. The payment of severance pay does not affect an employ-
ee’s right to any other amount payable according to law.
If there is a dispute about the entitlement to severance pay only, the employee may in writ-
ing refer the dispute to a bargaining council with jurisdiction or to the CCMA if no council
has jurisdiction. The council or the CCMA must conciliate and arbitrate the dispute. If the
Labour Court is adjudicating a dispute about a dismissal based on the employer’s oper-
ational requirements, it may determine the amount of severance pay. (Originally the pro-
visions relating to severance pay were contained in section 196 of the Labour Relations Act.
Section 196 has since been repealed and those provisions have been included in section 41
of the BCEA.)
Upon termination of employment an employee must be given a certificate of service con-
taining the following information:
• the employee’s full name;
• the name and address of the employer;
• a description of any council or sectoral employment standard by which the employer’s
business is covered;
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 61
The Director-General conducts the investigation by questioning any person who may be
able to provide relevant information and requiring any employer or employee in the sector
and area to furnish any information, book, document or object that is material to the in-
vestigation. On completion of an investigation and after considering representations made
by members of the public, the Director-General must prepare a report. A copy of the report
is submitted to the ECC for its consideration.
The ECC considers aspects such as the cost of living, alleviation of poverty, conditions of
employment, wage differentials and inequality and prepares a report. The ECC must in-
clude in its report recommendations on matters which should be included in a sectoral
determination. After considering the ECC’s report and recommendations the Minister may
make a sectoral determination or refer it back to the ECC for reconsideration.
When the Minister makes a sectoral determination it is published in the Government
Gazette and binds employers and employees in that sector and area. Every employer must
keep a copy of the determination at the workplace. A sectoral determination takes prece-
dence over the BCEA and remains binding until it is amended or superseded by a new
sectoral determination.
A sectoral determination generally includes the following:
• minimum wages and the manner and timing of the payment of wages;
• the adjustment of remuneration by way of providing for minimum rates or minimum
increases;
• conditions of employment, such as hours of work, overtime, work on Sundays and public
holidays, night work, leave and so forth, although a sectoral determination may not reduce
maternity leave or the protection afforded employees who perform regular night work;
• regulation of payment of remuneration in kind;
• regulation of task-based work, piecework, homework, sub-contracting and contract work;
• minimum standards for housing and sanitation for employees who reside on their em-
ployers’ premises;
• travelling and other work-related allowances;
• minimum conditions of employment for trainees;
• regulation of pension, provident, medical aid, sick pay, holiday and unemployment
schemes or funds;
• minimum conditions of employment for persons other than employees;
• the threshold of representativeness for a registered trade union to have the organisa-
tional right of access to employers’ premises and the right to deduction of trade union
subscriptions in respect of workplaces covered by the sectoral determination; and
• a sectoral determination for the agricultural sector may, for the purposes of the Land Re-
form (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, specify methods for determining the value of a
labour tenant’s right to occupy or use part of a farm.
The Minister has already promulgated a number of sectoral determinations:
• Sectoral Determination 1: Contract Cleaning Sector, South Africa (GN 622 of 14 May 1999);
• Sectoral Determination 2: Civil Engineering Sector, South Africa (GNR.204 of 2 March 2001);
• Sectoral Determination 3 (repealed by Sectoral Determination 6);
• Sectoral Determination 4: Clothing and Knitting Sector, South Africa (GNR.1007 of 13 Octo-
ber 2000);
• Sectoral Determination 5: Learnership (GN 519 of 15 June 2001);
64 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
One of the most radical departures from the previous system is that the monitoring and
enforcement of employment conditions are transferred from the criminal justice system to
the administrative system and the Labour Court. Administrative enforcement is promoted
by investing labour inspectors with wide powers of entry and investigation and empowering
them to issue compliance orders against employers who fail to comply with the Act. A
labour inspector may enter a private home only with the consent of the owner or occupier
or if so authorised by the Labour Court. Evidence given by a person to an inspector may not
be used against that person in any criminal proceedings, except proceedings in respect of a
charge of perjury.
Labour inspectors and accredited bargaining council agents may promote, monitor and
enforce compliance with employment laws by advising employers and employees of their
rights and obligations in terms of any employment law. They may further conduct inspec-
tions, investigate complaints and endeavour to secure compliance with employment laws by
securing undertakings from employers or issuing compliance orders.
An inspector may not issue a compliance order in respect of an amount payable to an em-
ployee:
• if the employee is subject to a collective agreement in terms of which a dispute about
outstanding amounts must be arbitrated;
66 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
3.20 General
Protection against discrimination (ss 78 and 79): Every employee has the right to lodge a
complaint with his union or a labour inspector about his employer’s alleged failure or
refusal to comply with the Act, discuss his conditions of employment with fellow employees,
refuse to comply with an unlawful instruction, refuse to agree to a conditions of employ-
ment that is contrary to the BCEA or an applicable sectoral determination, inspect any
record in terms of his employment or request a trade union representative or labour in-
spector to inspect such a record and to participate in proceedings in terms of the Act.
Employees, which in this context include former employees and job applicants, are pro-
tected against discrimination for exercising their rights in terms of the Act. No person may
require an employee not to exercise a right or prevent him from exercising a right. An em-
ployee may not be prejudiced because of his past, present or anticipated failure or refusal
to perform an unlawful act, the disclosure of information that he is lawfully entitled to
disclose or the exercise of any right. Nor may any person favour or promise to favour an
employee in exchange for that employee not exercising his rights. This, however, does not
preclude parties to a dispute from concluding an agreement to settle the dispute.
Temporary employment services (s 82): A temporary employment service is also known as a
labour broker. A labour broker is a person who provides, for reward, to its clients persons
who will render services for the client. This means that the labour broker employs people
and then deploys those people to work for its clients. The labour broker is the employer
and the person who is employed, is the employee of the labour broker. Independent con-
tractors are, of course, excluded because they are not employees. The temporary employ-
ment service and the client are jointly and severally liable if the temporary employment
service does not comply with the BCEA or an applicable sectoral determination.
Duration of employment (s 84): For the purposes of determining the duration of an em-
ployee’s employment with an employer, previous employment with the same employer must
be taken into account if the break between the periods of employment was less than one
year.
Codes of Good Practice (s 87): The Minister must, after consulting NEDLAC, issue a Code
of Good Practice on the Arrangement of Working Time and a Code of Good Practice on
the Protection of Employees during Pregnancy and after the Birth of a Child. Any other
codes of good practice may also be issued and the Minister may change or replace any such
code. Any person interpreting or applying the Act must take the relevant codes of good
practice into account.
Confidentiality (s 90): It is an offence for any person to disclose information which he has
acquired in the performance of his powers or duties and which relates to the financial or
business affairs of another person, except if the information is disclosed in terms of an
employment law, for the purposes of the proper administration of the Act or for the pur-
poses of the administration of justice.
Questions
Question 1
Give an exposition of which employees are covered by the Basic Conditions of Employment
Act. Include in your answer the persons who are totally and partially excluded from the
Act. (10)
68 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Question 2
An office worker is employed by a chocolate manufacturing company, works five days per
week (Monday to Friday) and earns R6 000 per month. Briefly explain the following con-
ditions of employment of this employee in accordance with the BCEA:
2.1 ordinary working hours per day and per week; (2)
2.2 overtime and the remuneration therefor; (4)
2.3 annual leave; (1)
2.4 payment for work on Sundays; (3)
2.5 payment for work on public holidays; (3)
2.6 sick leave; (3)
2.7 maternity leave; (3)
2.8` family responsibility leave; (5)
2.9 lunch intervals; (2)
2.10 notice to terminate services. (4)
Question 3
Refer to question 2 and assume the employee is a sales representative, visiting café’s and
supermarkets to sell his company’s products. Will the conditions of employment in ques-
tion 2 be the same as for the office worker? Explain. (6)
Question 4
4.1 A factory worker works from Monday to Friday for eight hours per day, earning R10
per hour. Calculate the payment he must receive if he worked the following hours on
a Sunday:
(a) 3 hours; (3)
(b) 6 hours; (3)
(c) 10 hours. (3)
4.2 Assume that this employee worked in a hospital (not a factory). He was required to
work any five days of every week, which included Sundays. Will his Sunday pay be cal-
culated in the same manner as for the factory worker? (2)
Question 5
You are the personnel manager of a hotel. You have just interviewed and appointed a young
man as a bar tender. You want him to sign a contract of employment before he assumes
duties on the first day of next month. He will be earning R8 000 per month and work day
and night shifts of eight hours each on five days every week. Draw up a contract of employ-
ment for him in accordance with the BCEA. Any other relevant information and additional
benefits may be included. (20)
Question 6
Xolile started his employment with ABC Printers on 1 February 2010. He works from
Monday to Friday every week.
6.1 Briefly explain his entitlement to paid sick leave. (3)
6.2 On 24 March 2010 he fell ill and his doctor booked him off for ten working days.
Explain whether he is entitled to ten days’ paid sick leave. (3)
6.3 Would your answer be any different if he fell ill and was booked off for ten days on
24 October 2010? Briefly explain. (2)
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 69
Question 7
Thandi works at Beauty Wise, a health and beauty shop, together with 11 other employees.
7.1 Thandi wants to resign because she can get a job at another company. Advise her as
to what notice she is required to give and the manner in which she has to give
notice. (3)
7.2 Advise her employer what payments should be made to Thandi upon her departure
from Beauty Wise. (5)
7.3 Assume Thandi was retrenched (dismissed for operational requirements), in other
words she did not resign. Advise her employer what payments should be made to her
when she is retrenched. (6)
7.4 Assume Beauty Wise became insolvent.
(a) Explain what the effect of the employer’s insolvency is on Thandi’s contract of
employment. (5)
Hint: See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.10 and s 38 of the Insolvency Act.
(b) Explain what payments should be made to Thandi if her services are terminated
because of the employer’s insolvency. (6)
Hint: See s 41 of the BCEA.
Question 8
John is retrenched from B&M Fisheries after 10 years of service. His monthly salary is
R10 000 at the time of retrenchment.
8.1 Calculate the amount of severance pay that must be paid to him. (2)
8.2 Assume that John worked for B&M for three years, resigned and nine months later
returned to B&M to take up another position at the company. Thus, at the time of
his retrenchment he had had two periods of service with B&M with a nine month
break in between. Explain how his severance pay must be calculated. (3)
Hint: See s 84 of the BCEA.
8.3 Assume that, when John was retrenched, his employer informed him that a position
was available for him at B&M’s sister company at a slight reduction in salary (some
R200 per month less than what he earned at B&M) and that, after consultation, the
sister company was willing to employ him.
(a) Because of the reduction in salary John rejects the offer of employment at the
sister company. Is John entitled to severance pay? (3)
(b) Because John refuses the alternative position that was offered to him, B&M re-
trenches him, but pays no severance pay. John is of the opinion that he is entitled
to severance pay. Explain the procedures he must follow to have his dispute
about entitlement to severance pay be resolved. (4)
Question 9
A farmer decides to terminate the services of one of his weekly paid workers after this
worker was absent from work for five days.
9.1 Before he absented himself the worker in question requested the farmer to take him
to a doctor because he was ill. The farmer refused. As a result the worker was unable
to produce a medical certificate and in consequence was not paid for the days he was
absent. Discuss the legal ramifications of the farmer’s conduct. (5)
9.2 Assume that the dismissed worker lived in a house on the farm owned by his em-
ployer. Explain what effect the termination of his services has on his accommoda-
tion. (10)
Hint: See s 39 of the BCEA and s 8 of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act of
1998.
70 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Question 10
While on annual leave an employee receives a letter informing him that his services have
been terminated. Discuss the legal consequences of this action by the employer. (6)
Question 11
Ten employees work in a bookstore. For the past two years their normal working hours have
been from 08:00 to 16:00. At the manager’s request these employees now have to report for
duty at 07:30 and the manager undertakes to remunerate them for the additional half an
hour. After working the additional half an hour for five weeks, and having received re-
muneration in respect thereof, the employees are told that a mistake has been made, that
they need not work the additional half an hour any longer and that the remuneration which
was paid in respect of the additional hours would be deducted from their next salary cheque.
Discuss the legal position of these employees and explain whether the employer is
allowed to make such a deduction. (5)
Question 12
12.1 The conditions of employment contained in the BCEA can be varied. List the means
by which variation can be effected. (5)
12.2 Lindiwe is employed as a cashier at a supermarket. When she assumes duties she
signs a contract of employment which provides for pay, hours of work, leave and a
number of other employment conditions. A sectoral determination has been issued
for the retail sector. The union which Lindiwe joined some seven months after she
started her employment concludes a collective agreement with the employer, provid-
ing for conditions of employment and minimum wages. Considering this situation,
there are obviously different sets of employment conditions in existence. How will
Lindiwe and her employer know which set of employment conditions applies to
them? Explain and motivate your answer. (10)
12.3 Explain what a sectoral determination is and how such a determination is made. (8)
12.4 List six issues that are normally included in a sectoral determination. (6)
12.5 Several sectoral determinations have been promulgated by the Minister of Labour.
Name five sectors which are currently covered by sectoral determinations. (5)
Question 13
13.1 Explain how compliance with the provisions of the BCEA can be enforced. (10)
13.2 Employees working for a bank often work overtime and during their lunch breaks
without receiving any additional remuneration. Explain what the employees can do
to secure payment for the long hours that they work. (6)
Question 14
Does the Labour Court have jurisdiction to hear disputes concerning a contract of employ-
ment? Motivate your answer by reference to case law. (6)
Hint: See Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd [1997] 10 BLLR 1364 (LC).
Question 15
An employee often works overtime, but his employer never remunerates him for the over-
time hours.
15.1 Can the employee refer a dispute about non-payment of overtime to the CCMA?
Explain. (3)
15.2 Assume this employee was dismissed. He believes his dismissal was unfair and he
wants payment for the overtime he worked. He approaches the CCMA. Explain
whether the CCMA can entertain both his dismissal dispute and his claim for pay-
ment of overtime. (5)
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 71
Appendix 1
• It is advisable that a written contract, signed by both parties, be drawn up. This form may be
used for the purpose.
• It is further advisable that both the employer and the employee should have a copy of the
contract.
• Any changes to the terms and conditions should be in writing.
• Any reference to the Act refers to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997.
1. Job title
Duties
Starting date
Bonus(if any)
3. Meal intervals are as follows.....................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................
subject to the following conditions:
• the interval must be one hour after five hours’ work;
• it may be reduced by agreement to 30 minutes;
• it may be dispensed with if the employee works less than six hours per day;
• it does not form part of the hours of work and is, therefore, unpaid, but if the employee is
required to work during meal intervals he must be remunerated;
• any portion of a meal interval in excess of 75 minutes must be remunerated, unless the
employee lives on the work premises.
4. Overtime
The employee hereby agrees to work the following overtime:
........................................................................................................................................................
On condition that:
• the weekly overtime will not exceed ten hours;
• overtime will be paid at not less than 1½ times the employee’s hourly rate; OR
• the parties agree to no pay for overtime but to time off instead.
5. Work on Sundays
........................................................................................................................................................
(stipulate here whether the employee will be required to work on Sundays)
subject to the following conditions:
• payment must be not less than the rate for an ordinary day’s work or 1½ times the hourly
rate if the employee normally works on a Sunday, whichever is the larger amount;
• if the employee does not normally work on Sundays payment is double the hourly rate or a
day’s wage, whichever is the larger amount;
• parties may agree to the ordinary rate of pay plus time off equivalent to additional pay the
employee would have received.
continued
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 73
6. Public holidays
The parties agree to not fewer than the following public holidays:
New Year’s Day, Human Rights Day, Good Friday, Family Day, Freedom Day, Workers’ Day,
Youth Day, National Women’s Day, Heritage Day, Day of Reconciliation, Christmas Day and
Day of Goodwill.
If an employee works on a public holiday which falls on what would have been an ordinary
working day he must be paid:
• at least double his daily rate; or
• his normal daily rate plus the amount for actual time worked whichever is the larger
amount.
7. Annual leave
• Leave is a minimum of 21 consecutive days per annum with full pay; or
• parties may agree on one day for every 17 days worked or one hour for every 17 hours
worked.
• Leave must be granted not later than six months after completion of the annual leave cycle
(every 12 consecutive months of employment); and
• may not run concurrently with sick leave or a period of notice.
8. Sick leave
The employee is entitled to ....... working days’ sick leave per 36-month cycle with full pay,
provided the first six months of employment have been completed. During the first six
months of employment the employee is entitled to one day for every 26 days worked. Once
the first six months of employment have been completed, the employee is entitled to take any
or all of the leave days to his credit at any time during the cycle.
(An employee is entitled to a number of sick leave days per cycle equivalent to the number of
days he normally works in a six-week period. Therefore, if he works six days per week he is
entitled to 36 days’ leave per cycle; if he works five days per week he is entitled to 30 days’
leave per cycle; if he works four days per week he is entitled to 24 working days per cycle and
so forth.)
The employer and employee may agree to reduce sick leave pay to not less than 75% of the
employee’s normal pay, provided the number of sick leave days is increased proportionately.
Maternity leave
• The employee is entitled to four months’ maternity leave, which will commence four weeks
before the expected date of confinement.
• Maternity leave is paid/unpaid.
continued
74 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
12. Miscellaneous
The parties may further agree to the following:
probationary period(s), time off, pension and/or medical aid schemes, training, funeral
benefits and other allowances, such as housing, school fees etc.
........................................................ ..........................................................
Employer Employee
It is advisable that a witness also sign the contract.
........................................................ ..........................................................
Witness Witness
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 75
Appendix 2
SCHEDULE
CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE ON THE ARRANGEMENT OF WORKING TIME
1. Objectives
The objective of this Code is to provide information and guidelines to employers and employees
concerning the arrangement of working time and the impact of working time on the health,
safety and family responsibilities of employees.
2. Application
2.1 This Code is issued in terms of section 87(1)(a) of the Basic Conditions of Employment
Act, 1997 (Act No. 75 of 1997), (BCEA) and must be read in conjunction with the BCEA, partic-
ularly Chapter Two, which governs the regulation of working time.
2.2 Section 7 of the BCEA requires employers to regulate the working time of each employee:
2.2.1 in accordance with the provisions of any Act governing occupational health and safety;
2.2.2 with due regard to the health and safety of employees;
2.2.3 with due regard to this Code of Good Practice;
2.2.4 with due regard to the family responsibilities of employees.
2.3 This Code applies to all employers and employees covered by the BCEA. This Code of
Good Practice is of particular significance for employees who perform shift work or regular night
work and to their employers.
2.4 The norms established by this Code are general and may not be appropriate for all work-
places. A departure from the Code may be justified in proper circumstances. For example, the
number of employees employed in an establishment may warrant a different approach.
5. Arrangement of shifts
The following recommendations apply to the arrangement of shift work:
5.1 Overtime should be avoided, especially in occupations involving special hazards or heavy
physical or mental strain.
5.2 The changeover from one shift to another during the working day should, where appro-
priate, include a brief period of overlap of the two crews in order to pass on any information that
is needed by the subsequent crew.
5.3 If appropriate and if it is possible within legal requirements, workers whose skills are inter-
changeable should be allowed to exchange a shift with another worker.
5.4 The shift schedule should be displayed or distributed for easy access by all workers, and
should be presented in a readily understandable form.
5.5 Workers should receive reasonable notice in advance of scheduled hours of work and of
any foreseeable changes to the schedule.
5.6 Arrangements should be considered to accommodate the special needs of workers such as
pregnant and breast-feeding workers, workers with family responsibilities, older workers, disabled
workers or workers with health problems, and also workers with personal preferences for the
scheduling of their own free time.
6.5 Rest periods for shift workers should be scheduled to fall on weekends a certain minimum
number of times during a given period.
9. Working environment
Employers should regularly assess whether the work environment, in particular the lighting and
heating, are adequate for the health, safety and physical comfort of employees, particularly night
workers.
________________________
3 Among the health conditions that should be investigated are mild asthma; non-insulin-dependent dia-
betes mellitus; cardiac risk factors like hypertension, elevated cholesterol; depression; seizures; frequent
indigestion; mild irritable bowel syndrome; Crohn’s disease; peptic ulcer; weight loss and general nutri-
tional status.
78 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Glossary
Continuous shift work: the employer operates 24 hours per day, seven days per week, all year
round.
Semi-continuous shift work: the employer operates 24 hours per day without a daily break, but with
a break at the weekend.
Discontinuous shift work the employer operates fewer than 24 hours per day with at least one daily
break. A “two-shift” system is the most common discontinuous shift system.
Short or part-time shifts: daily scheduled working hours that are substantially shorter than eight
hours.
Long shifts: daily scheduled working hours that are substantially longer than eight hours.
Rotating (or alternating) shifts: workers alternate between different shifts. There are three key ele-
ments to rotation:
(i) the direction of rotation: rotation can either be forward (clockwise, for instance, morning to
afternoon to night) or backward (counter-clockwise). In forward or advancing shifts, the
starting time of one shift in a shift worker’s schedule is always later on the 24-hour clock
than the previous shift. In a continuous shift system workers will work a morning shift. In
backward or delaying rosters, one shift always begins at an earlier time than the previous
shift;
(ii) the frequency: employees may change shifts every week or at shorter or longer intervals;
(iii) the length of the cycle: the period required for a complete schedule of rotation, after which
the cycle is repeated.
Fixed (or permanent) shifts: employees work permanently on a single shift.
80 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Appendix 3
SCHEDULE
CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE ON THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES
DURING PREGNANCY AND AFTER THE BIRTH OF A CHILD
1. Introduction
1.1 Many women work during pregnancy and many return to work while they are still breast-
feeding.
1.2 The objective of this Code is to provide guidelines for employers and employees concern-
ing the protection of the health of women against potential hazards in their work environment
during pregnancy, after the birth of a child and while breast-feeding.
2. Application of the Code
2.1 This Code is issued in terms of section 87(1)(b) of the Basic Conditions of Employment
Act (BCEA) 75 of 1997.
2.2 It is intended to guide all employers and employees concerning the application of sec-
tion 26(1) of the BCEA which prohibits employers from requiring or permitting pregnant or
breast-feeding employees to perform work that is hazardous to the health of the employee or
that of her child.
2.3 Workplaces may be affected differently depending upon the type of business and sector
they are engaged in and the physical, chemical and biological hazards to which employees may
be exposed in the workplace.
2.4 The norms established by this code are general and may not be appropriate for all work-
places. A departure from the code may be justified in the proper circumstances. For example,
the number of employees employed in an establishment may warrant a different approach.
3. Contents
This Code:
3.1 sets out the legal requirements relevant to the protection of the health and safety of preg-
nant and breast-feeding employees;
3.2 sets out a method for assessing and controlling the risks to the health and safety of preg-
nant and breast-feeding employees;
3.3 lists the principal physical, ergonomic, chemical and biological hazards to the health and
safety of pregnant and breast-feeding employees and recommends steps to prevent or control
these risks. These are listed in Schedules One to Four, which are included for guidance and are
not exhaustive.
4. Legal requirements
4.1 The Constitution protects the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes
the right to make decisions concerning reproduction [section 12(2)] and gives every person the
right to health services, including reproductive health care [section 27(1)(a)].
4.2 No person may be discriminated against or dismissed on account of pregnancy.4
4.3 Employers are required to provide and maintain a work environment that is safe and
without risk to the health of employees. This includes risks to the reproductive health of em-
ployees. These duties are established in terms of both the Occupational Health and Safety Act
(OHASA) 85 of 1993 and the Mine Health and Safety Act (MHSA) 27 of 1996. Key aspects of
these Acts are:
4.3.1 employers must conduct a risk assessment, which involves identifying hazards, as-
sessing the risk that they pose to the health and safety of employees. and recording the results of
the risk assessment.
________________________
4 The relevant provisions establishing this right are section 9(3) and (4) of the Constitution; sec-
tion 187(1) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and section 6 of the Employment Equity Act of 1998.
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 81
________________________
5 In terms of section 26(2) of the BCEA an employer must offer suitable alternative employment to an
employee during pregnancy if her work poses a danger to her health or safety or that of her child or if
the employee is engaged in night work (between 18:00 and 06:00, unless it is not practicable to do so.
Alternative employment must be on terms that are no less favourable than the employee’s ordinary terms
and conditions of employment.
82 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
5.11 Employers must keep the risk assessment for expectant or new mothers under regular
review. The possibility of damage to the health of the foetus may vary during the different stages
of pregnancy. There are also different risks to consider for workers who are breast-feeding.
5.12 Arrangements should be made for pregnant and breast-feeding employees to be able to
attend antenatal and postnatal clinics as required during pregnancy and after birth.
5.13 Arrangements should be made for employees who are breast-feeding to have breaks of 30
minutes twice per day for breast-feeding or expressing milk each working day for the first six
months of the child’s life.
5.14 Where there is an occupational health service at a workplace, appropriate records should
be kept of pregnancies and the outcome of pregnancies, including any complications in the
condition of the employee or child.
6 The identification and assessment of hazards
6.1 Physical hazards
The control of physical hazards in the workplace includes the recognition, evaluation and con-
trol of:
6.1.1 exposure to noise, vibration, radiation, electric and electromagnetic fields and radioact-
ive substances;
6.1.2 work in extreme environments;
6.1.3 control of the thermal environment (heating and air conditioning).
Schedule One describes the extent to which certain of these physical agents may constitute a
hazard to the health and safety of pregnant and breast-feeding employees and suggests methods
to prevent or control these hazards.
information on any potential detrimental effect on the reproductive ability of male or female
employees.
Regulation 7(1) of the General Administrative Regulations, 1996, under OHASA requires
manufacturers, importers, sellers and suppliers of hazardous chemical substances used at work to
supply a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) which must include information on any reproduct-
ive hazards. Every employer who uses a hazardous chemical substance must be in possession of
the relevant MSDS and must make it available on request to affected persons.
With the exception of the Lead Regulations, there are no regulations, which set maximum
6
exposure levels of specific applications for women of childbearing age or pregnant women. In
view of the absence of occupational health standards for the exposure of pregnant or breast-
feeding women to chemical substances, care should be taken to minimise exposure to chemicals,
which can be inhaled, swallowed or absorbed through the skin. Where this cannot be achieved,
employees should be transferred to other work in accordance with section 26(2) of the BCEA.
6.4 Biological hazards
Many biological agents, such as bacteria and viruses, can affect the unborn child if the mother is
infected during pregnancy. Biological agents may also be transferred through breast-feeding or
by direct physical contact between mother and baby. Health workers, including service workers
in health-care facilities and workers looking after animals or dealing with animal products are
more likely to be exposed to infection than other workers. Employees who have close contact
with young children, such as teachers and edu-care workers, are at increased risk of exposure to
rubella (German measles) and varicella (chicken pox).
Universal hygiene precautions are required to prevent disease. These include high standards of
personal hygiene, surveillance of staff in high-risk areas, appropriate sterilisation and disinfecting
procedures, designation of persons to be responsible for health and safety, the use of protective
clothing and gloves and the avoidance of eating or smoking in laboratories or other risk areas.
Some of the biological agents that are known to constitute a hazard to the health of breast-
feeding or pregnant women are listed in Schedule Four.
7 Aspects of pregnancy that may affect work
Employers and employees should be aware of the following common aspects of pregnancy that
may affect work:
7.1 As a result of morning sickness employees may be unable to perform early shift work. Ex-
posure to nauseating smells may also aggravate morning sickness.
7.2 Backache and varicose veins may result from work involving prolonged standing or sitting.
Backache may also result from work involving manual handling.
7.3 More frequent visits to the toilet will require reasonable access to toilet facilities and consid-
eration of the employee’s position if leaving the work she performs unattended poses difficulties.
7.4 The employee’s increasing size and discomfort may require changes of protective clothing,
changes to work in confined spaces and changes to her work where manual handling is involved.
Her increasing size may also impair dexterity, agility, co-ordination, speed of movement and
reach.
7.5 The employee’s balance may be affected making work on slippery or wet surfaces difficult.
7.6 Tiredness associated with pregnancy may affect the employee’s ability to work overtime
and to perform evening work. The employer may have to consider granting rest periods.
________________________
6 European Council Directive 92/321EEC classifies some 200 substances and preparations as falling into
one of the following categories: possible risks of irreversible effects (R40), may cause cancer (R45), may
cause heritable genetic damage (R46), may cause harm to the unborn child (R61), possible risk of harm
to the unborn child (R63), may cause harm to breastfed babies (R64). The actual risk to health of these
substances can only be determined after a risk assessment of a substance at a place of work. In other
words, although the substances listed may have the potential to endanger health or safety, there may be
no risk in practice: for example, when exposure is below the level that might cause harm.
84 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Appendix 4
Ð
ADDRESS: .....................................................................................................
........................................................................................................
........................................................................................................
NAME OF EMPLOYEE:.................................................................................
ID NO: ........................................ EMPLOYEE NUMBER: ...........................
OCCUPATION/GRADE: ..............................................................................
PAY PERIOD: FROM .................. TO ...........................................................
WHAT IS THE PUR- BASIC WAGE:................................................................................................
POSE OF THIS FORM? MANNER OF PAYMENT: m PER HOUR m PER DAY m PER WEEK
This form is a record of informa- m PER FORTNIGHT m PER MONTH
tion about remuneration.
Rate No. of Rand
hours earned
WHO FILLS IN
THIS FORM? Ordinary hours worked ......... ............... ..................
Overtime worked ......... ............... ..................
The employer.
Sundays time worked ......... ............... ..................
Public holidays time worked ......... ............... ..................
WHERE DOES THIS
FORM GO? Payment in kind ......... ............... ..................
Allowances (specify) ......... ............... ..................
To the employee.
............................................. ......... ............... ..................
INSTRUCTIONS ............................................. ......... ............... ..................
Appendix 5
Ð
(name and designation of person)
of
..........................................................................................................
(full name of employer)
address: ............................................................................................
..........................................................................................................
WHAT IS THE PUR-
POSE OF THIS FORM? in the .................................................................................... (trade)
This form is proof of employ- declare that
ment with an employer.
..........................................................................................................
(full name of employee)
WHO FILLS IN
THIS FORM? ..........................................................................................................
(I.D. no.)
The employer.
was in employment
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we discuss a field of our law that has undergone dramatic changes over the
last two decades. When the first edition of this book was published the Industrial Court,
armed with its equitable jurisdiction, developed this branch of the law on a case-by-case basis
as a sub-species of the jurisprudence on unfair labour practice under the Labour Relations
Act of 1956. Since 1994 we have seen far-reaching constitutional changes and statutory
initiatives, such as the adoption of the final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of
1996, the new Labour Relations Act of 1995, implemented on 11 November 1996, a new
Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. Chapter
II of the Equity Act, dealing with unfair discrimination, came into operation on 9 August
1999. The rest of the Act took effect on 1 December 1999. Some significant amendments to
the Act were enacted on 1 August 2014 when the Employment Equity Amendment Act 47
of 2013 took effect.
Constitutional equality, as formulated in section 9 of the Constitution, forms the back-
drop of the Employment Equity Act and should always be considered when studying em-
ployment equity. The relevant provisions in the Constitution will be discussed briefly before
consideration is given to the Employment Equity Act.
87
88 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
for the position. In the context of section 9(3) and (4) see Langemaat v Minister of Safety and
Security & Others 1998 (4) BCLR 444 (T); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality &
Others v Minister of Home Affairs & Others 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC); Hoffmann v South African Air-
ways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC).
In City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) it was held that conduct which
may appear to be neutral and non-discriminatory may nonetheless result in discrimination.
For this reason the legislature included both direct and indirect unfair discrimination in
section 9, thereby demonstrating its concern about not only discriminatory conduct as such,
but also the consequences of conduct that may appear non-discriminatory. Proof of an
intention to discriminate is not required. What is required, is that differentiation must be
proved and also that the differentiation was unfair. Both elements must be determined
objectively.
differentials and must report to the Department of Labour on their implementation and
progress of employment equity. Employers who fail to comply with their employment equity
obligations will not be able to contract with the State.
It is important to distinguish between the aim of employment equity and the manner in
which one goes about achieving it. Whereas the ends of employment equity legislation is
largely uncontroversial, the means of achieving it are not and one can expect constitutional
challenges to certain aspects of the Act, as well as to employers’ interpretation and im-
plementation thereof. For example, an affirmative-action plan that simply amounts to the
promotion of blacks and females without regard to the operational needs of the organisa-
tion and without affording non-beneficiaries any chance whatsoever of competing, may well
not pass constitutional muster. See Public Servants’ Association of South Africa & Another v
Minister of Justice & Others 1997 (5) BCLR 577 (T).
The ends of employment equity can broadly be described as a situation where all people
truly have an equal chance in the workplace. The means to achieve this is by implementing
anti-discrimination measures as well as affirmative-action measures and are covered in
Chapter II (the prohibition of unfair discrimination) and Chapter III (affirmative-action
measures) of the Act.
1 Chinese people have been declared part of the designated groups following the decision in Chinese Asso-
ciation of South Africa & Others v The Minister of Labour & Others, case no. 59251/2007.
92 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Dispute unresolved
Conciliation
Conciliation Conciliation
When determining whether a person is suitably qualified for a job, an employer must review
all the above factors and determine whether that person has the ability to do the job. In the
process the employer may not unfairly discriminate against a person solely on the grounds
of a lack of relevant experience (s 20(4) and (5)).
Affirmative action measures must include:
• measures to identify and eliminate employment barriers, including unfair discrimin-
ation, which adversely affect people from designated groups;
• measures designed to further diversity in the workplace based on equal dignity and
respect of all people;
• making reasonable accommodation for people from designated groups in order to en-
sure that they enjoy equal opportunities and are equitably represented in the workplace.
“Reasonable accommodation” means any modification or adjustment to a job or to the
working environment that will enable a person from a designated group to have access to
or to participate or advance in employment;
• measures to ensure the equitable representation of suitably qualified people from desig-
nated groups at all occupational levels; and
• measures to retain and develop people from designated groups and to implement appro-
priate training measures.
The latter two measures include preferential treatment and numerical goals, but exclude
quotas.
A designated employer is not required to adapt its employment policies and practices in
such a way that the employment, continued employment or advancement of people who
are not from designated groups is no longer possible.
* Where disproportionate income differentials are reflected, the employer must take measures
to progressively reduce such differentials. These measures may include collective bargaining,
compliance with sectoral determinations, applying the norms and benchmarks set by the
96 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
apply to the Labour Court to have the compliance order made an order of the Labour
Court.
A labour inspector may not issue a compliance order if the employer is under review by
the Director-General or if the Director-General has referred an employer’s failure to com-
ply to the Labour Court.
If the employer notifies the Director-General that it does not accept the request or recom-
mendation, the Director-General must institute proceedings in the Labour Court. If pro-
ceedings are not instituted within the prescribed period (90 days in the case of a request
and 180 days in the case of a recommendation) the request or recommendation lapses
(s 45(2)).
The Labour Court has wide powers to determine disputes under the EEA. The Court
may, inter alia, award compensation or damages, impose a fine for contravention of certain
provisions of the Act, make a compliance order an order of court, order compliance with
the Act, direct the CCMA to conduct an investigation, entertain an appeal submitted by an
employer against an order of the Director-General and review any administrative action
provided for in the Act (s 50(1)).
If the Court finds that an employer has unfairly discriminated against an employee, it
may make any appropriate order that is just and equitable in the circumstances, including
98 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
payment of compensation or damages by the employer to the employee. The Court may
direct the employer to take steps to prevent the same unfair discrimination or a similar
practice from occurring in respect of other employees. It may also direct an employer
(other than a designated employer) to comply with Chapter III as if it were a designated
employer (s 50(2)).
If the Court finds the medical testing of an employee justifiable, any appropriate order
may be made and the Court may impose conditions relating to the provision of counselling,
the maintenance of confidentiality, the period during which the authorisation for any test-
ing applies and the category or categories of jobs or employees in respect of which the
authorisation for testing applies.
If a dispute has been referred to the CCMA in terms of Chapter II and the issue to which
the dispute relates also forms the subject of a referral to the Labour Court by the Director-
General, the CCMA proceedings must be stayed until the Labour Court determines the
Director-General’s referral. If a dispute has been referred to the CCMA in terms of Chapter
II against an employer who is being reviewed by the Director-General, the dispute may not
be conciliated or adjudicated until the review has been completed and the employer has
been informed of the outcome (s 46).
to comply with the relevant provisions of the Act is sufficient ground for a rejection of any
offer to conclude an agreement or for cancellation of an agreement (s 53).
Sanctions: Schedule 1 sets out the maximum fines that may be imposed for the contraven-
tion of certain provisions of the Act.
Questions
Question 1
John applies for a job with XYZ Company and is invited to a selection interview. At the
conclusion of the interview the interviewer tells him that, although he is the best candidate,
he will not be appointed as the company has a policy of not employing people of colour.
The interviewer is very apologetic and points out that if John did not have an English
surname he would not have been invited for an interview in the first place. Describe the
appropriate dispute resolution procedure for this dispute and compare it with the appro-
priate procedure applicable if: (a) John was dismissed; and (b) if John was refused promo-
tion because of his race. (20)
Question 2
A hospital superintendent is informed by a female radiologist that she is pregnant.
2.1 May the hospital terminate her services on the grounds that her work exposes her to
radiation which may endanger the life of her unborn child? (3)
2.2 May the hospital refuse to re-employ her after her confinement? (3)
Question 3
Many employment contracts provide for a retirement age of 65 for males and 60 for
females. Discuss the implications of such provisions in light of section 9 of the Constitution
and section 187 of the LRA. (10)
Question 4
Some employers have separate medical aid funds and group life assurance schemes for its
white and black employees. The economic rationale of this is that the illness and life expec-
tancy profiles of the two groups differ significantly and as such have a differential impact on
the costs of maintaining these benefits. Could this practice be open to attack on the
grounds that it is unfair discrimination? (15)
Hint: See Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council & Others v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd &
Others [1997] 11 BLLR 1438 (LC).
Question 5
Assume that the Department of Correctional Services has a minimum job specification that
all prison guards should weigh not less than 70 kilograms and be at least 1,7 metres tall.
Assume further that national statistics from the Department of Central Statistical Services
show that these requirements exclude 33,3% of women compared to 1,3% of men. An
application by a female for a job at a high security prison for the criminally insane is reject-
ed on the grounds that she does not meet the minimum height and weight requirements.
5.1 Discuss whether the Correctional Services regulation amounts to unfair discrimin-
ation. (10)
5.2 Discuss why, if it does amount to unfair discrimination, the employer would not be
able to rely on the “business necessity” justification. (10)
100 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Hint: Discuss indirect discrimination and the difference between providing a rational basis
for discrimination and adducing empirical proof of the relationship between a job specifi-
cation and the inherent requirements of a particular job.
Question 6
John, a homosexual employee working for XYZ Company, wishes to challenge his employer’s
refusal to have the rules of its medical aid fund amended to allow the admission of John’s
life partner as a dependant to the fund. Give your comments on the chances of John suc-
ceeding in his claim based on unfair discrimination. (10)
Hint: See Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security & Others 1998 (4) BCLR 444 (T).
Question 7
Andy wishes to join a newly established private airline company, Highrise Airlines (Pty) Ltd,
as a cabin crew member. His application is turned down because Highrise Airlines caters
for a niche market of young executives (predominantly male) whom they contend prefer to
be served their on-board drinks and snacks by scantily clad female stewardesses. Hence, so
their argument goes, their policy of employing only females as cabin attendants is a busi-
ness necessity. Discuss Andy’s prospects of being successful in claiming unfair discrimin-
ation and the airline’s defence. (10)
Question 8
Mary applied for a job with a small advertising agency. She was by far the best-qualified
applicant for the job, but she was also eight months pregnant (and very obviously so)
when she presented herself for the selection interview. Her application was unsuccessful
and she referred a dispute about her non-appointment to the CCMA for conciliation and
then to the Labour Court for adjudication. Will she succeed in claiming unfair
discrimination? (10)
Hint: See Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 2133 (LC); Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v
Beverley Whitehead [2000] 6 BLLR 640 (LAC); Wallace v Du Toit (2006) 27 ILJ 1754 (LC).
Question 9
A forty-year old male applies for a position as chief engineer with a large construction
company. The job specifications state that a job applicant should hold at least a degree in
civil engineering, be registered as a professional engineer and have 10 years’ appropriate
experience, four in a managerial capacity. The applicant has a national diploma in civil
engineering from a technikon and has 10 years’ experience as a site engineer. Assume that,
in recognition of his prior learning and experience, he can obtain a degree in civil engin-
eering within one year and register as a professional engineer one year later.
9.1 Assume that this applicant is not appointed. Write a brief in support of his appli-
cation to the Labour Court, challenging the employer’s failure to appoint him by ref-
erence to appropriate provisions of the Employment Equity Act. Also formulate the
employer’s replying affidavit. (15)
9.2 Assume that the applicant is a coloured man and he is appointed. Assume further
that one of the company’s white male employees, an assistant chief engineer with 10
years’ experience, also applied for the position which, had he been successful, would
have been a promotion for him. The unsuccessful white male applicant approaches
you to challenge the appointment of the external applicant on the basis that it
amounts to unfair discrimination or, alternatively, that it constitutes an unfair labour
practice. Evaluate both bases of your client’s claim and describe the applicable pro-
cedures to be followed in each case. (20)
Hint: See George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd [1996] 8 BLLR 985 (IC).
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 101
Question 10
A company advertises the position of an administrative department head. The advertise-
ment requires a candidate to be in possession of a code 8 driver’s licence in order to be
considered. In terms of the company’s employment policies preference must be given to
internal applicants. Two female employees of the company, one white and one black, apply
for the position. Both are able to do the job in question. The black applicant is invited to an
interview and is appointed despite the fact that she does not have a driver’s licence. The
white woman, who has a driver’s licence, claims that the failure to appoint her is unfair.
Advise her on the validity of her claim. (10)
Hint: See NUTESA v Technikon Northern Transvaal [1997] 4 BLLR 467 (CCMA).
Question 11
In comparison with other job applicants Thabo is clearly the best qualified and experienced
person for the job. However, he is not appointed because of his obesity. The recruitment
officer informs him that the company does not have a place for a 300 kg freak. Thabo’s
obesity does not have any known medical cause; he is simply very fat.
11.1 Can Thabo challenge his non-appointment on the basis of unfair discrimination
against obese people? If so, how will a claim of unfair discrimination based on obesity
rather than on race or gender influence legal proceedings? (5)
11.2 Assume that Thabo applied for a position as a flight attendant with SA Airlink. He
was not appointed because the employer argued that it was an inherent requirement
of the job that flight attendants are small and thin in order to fit into the small cabin
of the aeroplanes. Will Thabo succeed in his claim of unfair discrimination? (5)
Question 12
Tom applied to SAA for employment as a cabin attendant. He went through a four-stage
selection process and was found, together with eleven other applicants, to be a suitable
candidate for employment. This decision was subject to a pre-employment medical examin-
ation which included a blood test for HIV/AIDS. He was found to be clinically fit. However,
his blood test showed that he was HIV-positive. He was, therefore, regarded as unsuitable
for employment as a cabin attendant and was not employed. Explain whether Tom’s non-
appointment amounts to discrimination. (10)
Hint: See Hoffmann v SA Airways (2000) 21 ILJ 2357 (CC); Joy Mining Machinery (A division of
Harnischfeger (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v NUMSA & Others (2002) 11 LC 6.12.1; Allpass v Mooikloof Estates
(Pty) Ltd t/a Mooikloof Equestrian Centre (2011) 32 ILJ 1637 (LC).
Question 13
Rooster Chickens is a franchise business with numerous fast food outlets around the country.
In terms of the franchise agreement every franchise holder is required to own at least three
outlets. Mr Khumalo owns three outlets in the Durban area and employs some 15 employ-
ees at each outlet. The annual turnover of each of the three outlets ranges between R2m and
R3m every year. (The prescribed minimum turnover for this type of business is R2m p.a.)
13.1 Briefly explain whether the outlets owned by Mr Khumalo are “designated em-
ployers”. (2)
13.2 Assume that the outlets are designated employers. Name and briefly explain the duties
of a designated employer as regards the implementation of affirmative action. (8)
13.3 Mr Khumalo decides to renovate the outlet in Umlazi. The building is painted in the
colours of the South African flag, the flag serves as the logo of the business and a new
slogan is adopted: “Chicken for the rainbow nation”. He advertises for a manager of
the revamped outlet. Several candidates apply and eventually Ms Zuma is appointed.
She has no experience as manager of a food outlet (or of any other business whatso-
ever) and she has a diploma in medical technology. When they hear about Ms Zuma’s
102 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
appointment, Ms Van der Merwe and Mr Naidoo, who both applied for the position,
claim that they have been unfairly discriminated against. Ms Van der Merwe has a
diploma in marketing and 12 years’ experience as a manager at various outlets of
Kentucky Fried Chicken. Mr Naidoo has a BComm degree and has managerial experi-
ence in a large company and in the head office of Spur Steak Ranches, totalling seven
years. When Mr Naidoo and Ms Van der Merwe raise the issue of unfair discrimin-
ation, Mr Khumalo claims that he had to appoint a Zulu-speaking person because his
customers at the Umlazi outlet are predominantly Zulu people.
(a) Did Mr Khumalo unfairly discriminate against Ms Van der Merwe and
Mr Naidoo? Explain. (5)
(b) Is Mr Khumalo’s claim that he had to appoint a Zulu speaking person valid?
Briefly explain. (2)
(c) Do Mr Naidoo and Ms Van der Merwe as job applicants have access to the
dispute resolution mechanisms established under the EEA? (2)
(d) Assume that they do have such access. Explain the procedures they must follow
to have their dispute resolved. (5)
Question 14
Ms Van der Merwe, a white female, was appointed on a fixed-term contract at Coega Water
Board. The fixed-term contract was initially for two months, but was then renewed, again for
two months and thereafter for another eight months. Ms Van der Merwe was an exception-
ally good worker and developed a programme for water purification that saved the Water
Board many thousands of rands. Towards the end of her fixed-term contract the Water
Board decided to make her position a permanent one and advertised it as such. Ms Van der
Merwe unsuccessfully applied for the position. A black female employee, working for the
Water Board in another department, was appointed to the position. Ms Van der Merwe
claimed that she had been discriminated against.
Discuss the validity or otherwise of her claim. Include in your answer the dispute resolu-
tion procedure that she can follow to have her dispute resolved. (10)
Hint: Biggs v Rand Water (2003) 24 ILJ 1957 (LC).
Question 15
Mr B Marley is employed by the Department of Correctional Services. He is a Rastafarian
and wears his long hair in dreadlocks. The Department has a strict dress code and expects
all employees to adhere to this code. In terms of the dress code male employees must wear
their hair “short back and sides” and female employees must tie up their hair. Mr Marley
has been instructed on numerous occasions to cut his hair, but he refuses to do so. He
maintains that his religion requires this type of hairstyle. The Department disagrees with
him and insists that he cut his hair as other Rastafarians have done. If he continues to
refuse, he will face dismissal. Mr Marley argues that the Department is discriminating
against him because of his religion and maintains that he will not cut his hair because his
hairstyle is part of him and it will infringe his dignity if he were to spoil his appearance.
15.1 Consider both the employer’s and Mr Marley’s arguments and explain whether the
employer is unfairly discriminating against Mr Marley. (10)
15.2 Mr Marley is convinced that the Department is discriminating against him and wishes to
have the dispute resolved. Explain the dispute resolution procedures that he will have
to follow to have the dispute resolved. Include any prescribed time frames that may
be applicable. Keep in mind that the majority of disputes arising in the Department
have to be referred to the General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council. (7)
15.3 Assume that Mr Marley was dismissed because of his refusal to cut his hair. He main-
tains his claim of unfair discrimination. How will the dispute resolution procedures in
this case differ from your answer in 17.2? Explain. (5)
Hint: See Department of Correctional Services & Another v Police & Prisons Civil Rights Union &
Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2629 (LAC).
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 103
Question 16
Three highly qualified white inspectors at the Explosives Unit of the SAPS approach you for
advice. The SAPS Employment Equity Plan classified them as members of a non-designated
group. The inspectors applied for vacant positions reserved for people from designated
groups. Although there were no applications from anyone from the designated groups, the
inspectors were still refused promotions. The SAPS contends that their non-appointment
was not unfair because it took place according to the affirmative-action plan as contained in
the employment plan of the SAPS. The inspectors, however, are of the opinion that their
non-appointment amounted to unfair discrimination. Advise your clients by referring to
applicable provisions and case law. (6)
Hint: See Coetzer & Others v Minister of Safety and Security & Another (2003) 24 ILJ 163 (LC);
Solidarity obo Barnard v SA Police Service (2010) 31 ILJ 742 (LC); SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard
[2014] ZACC 23 (CC).
Question 17
Study the advertisement below and then answer the question that follows.
Ruska Radiv approaches you for advice. He claims that he is being unfairly discriminated
against because he is a Muslim, 32 years old, in his final year as apprentice, fluent in English
only and on the blacklist because of debt.
Advise Ruska on the possibility that he is being unfairly discriminated against. (10)
Question 18
Three Muslim butchers were employed by Saski Butchery because of their “religiosity”: they
were all Muslims who slaughtered chickens according to the halal standards required by the
Muslim Judicial Council. All three declined to work on the Muslim religious holiday Eid ul
Fitr. The collective agreement between the company and the union entitled workers to
gazetted public holidays only; Eid was not such a holiday. Alternative arrangements were
not acceptable to the employer because the rest of the workforce would be affected. After
the three butchers failed to work on Eid, they were found guilty of refusing to work and
consequently dismissed. Did the employer unfairly discriminate against them? (4)
Hint: See Food & Allied Workers Union & Others v Rainbow Chicken Farmers (2000) 21 ILJ 615
(LC).
104 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Question 19
After a successful interview John was offered employment with Easy PC as an information
technology technician. He accepted the position in writing and thereafter advised Easy PC
that he was in the process of undergoing gender reassignment from male to female. Easy
PC regarded his failure to divulge this information at his interview as a serious case of
misrepresentation amounting to dishonesty. In the company’s view his actions amounted to
a repudiation of his contract of employment, which repudiation it accepted and conse-
quently terminated his employment. Do the actions of Easy PC amount to unfair discrimin-
ation? (5)
Hint: See Atkins v Datacentrix (Pty) Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 1130 (LC).
Question 20
Sandra and her husband worked for a small security company which was run by its owner,
Mr Dandy Man. Sandra resigned and claimed constructive dismissal because, according to
her, Mr Dandy Man had sexually harassed her. His constant harassment had made her work-
ing life intolerable. He continually tried to kiss her and had sent her electronic messages of
a sexual nature. During the subsequent CCMA arbitration of her constructive-dismissal dis-
pute the following evidence was led. Sandra voluntarily and regularly worked overtime to
assist Mr Dandy Man. The two often went on business trips together, sent each other as
many as 100 SMSs per week and jogged together almost daily. Mr Dandy Man’s wife at some
stage confronted Sandra and accused her of having an affair with her husband. Sandra
denied the accusation. She then started receiving abusive and sexual e-mails and Facebook
messages which threatened to reveal the “affair” to her husband. She was convinced that Mr
Dandy Man was responsible for these messages and, because she had told him on numerous
occasions to stop his attentions towards her, without success, she resigned. Mr Dandy Man
denied the allegations of sexual harassment because, according to him, they had had a con-
sensual affair. The affair came to an end when Sandra gave birth to a baby boy. Subsequent
paternity tests showed that her husband was the father of the child. Sandra vehemently
denied the affair, but added that she had had the paternity tests done “to be certain”.
Decide, on the evidence, whether Sandra’s claim of sexual harassment has any substance.
In determining the issue, have regard to the Code of Good Practice on the Handling of
Sexual Harassment Cases. (10)
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 105
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
1. Introduction
1.1 The objective of this code is to eliminate sexual harassment in the workplace.
1.2 This code provides appropriate procedures to deal with sexual harassment and prevent its
recurrence.
1.3 This code encourages and promotes the development and implementation of policies and
procedures that will lead to the creation of workplaces that are free of sexual harassment,
where employers and employees respect one another’s integrity and dignity, their privacy,
and their right to equity in the workplace.
________________________
6. Guiding principles
Employers should create and maintain a working environment in which the dignity of employees
is respected. A climate in the workplace should also be created and maintained in which com-
plainants of sexual harassment will not feel that their grievances are ignored or trivialised, or
fear reprisals. Implementing the following guidelines can assist in achieving these ends:
6.1 Employers/management and employees are required to refrain from committing acts of
sexual harassment.
6.2 All employers/management and employees have a role to play in contributing towards cre-
ating and maintaining a working environment in which sexual harassment is unacceptable.
They should ensure that their standards of conduct do not cause offence and they should
discourage unacceptable behaviour on the part of others.
6.3 Employers/management should attempt to ensure that persons such as customers, suppliers,
job applicants and others who have dealings with the business are not subjected to sexual
harassment by the employer or its employees.
6.4 Employers/management should take appropriate action in accordance with this code where
instances of sexual harassment occur in the working environment.
8. Procedures
Employers should develop clear procedures to deal with sexual harassment. These procedures
should enable the resolution of problems in a sensitive, efficient and effective way.
8.1 Reporting sexual harassment
8.1.1 Section 60(1) of the EEA provides that conduct in contravention of the EEA must
immediately be brought to the attention of the employer.
8.1.2 In instances of sexual harassment, the word “immediately” shall mean as soon as
is reasonably possible in the circumstances and without undue delay, taking into
account the nature of sexual harassment, including that it is a sensitive issue, that
the complainant may fear reprisals and the relative positions of the complainant
and the alleged perpetrator in the workplace.
8.1.2 Sexual harassment may be brought to the attention of the employer by the com-
plainant or any other person aware of the sexual harassment, for example a friend,
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 109
9. Confidentiality
9.1 Employers and employees must ensure that grievances about sexual harassment are investi-
gated and handled in a manner that ensures that the identities of the persons involved are
kept confidential.
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 111
9.2 In cases of sexual harassment, management, employees and the parties concerned must
endeavour to ensure confidentiality in the disciplinary inquiry. Only appropriate members
of management as well as the aggrieved person, representatives, alleged perpetrator, wit-
nesses and interpreter if required should be present in the disciplinary inquiry.
9.3 Employers are required to disclose to the complainant, the perpetrator and/or their
representatives, such information as may be reasonably necessary to enable the parties to
prepare for any proceedings in terms of this code.
Appendix 3
Code of Good Practice on HIV and AIDS and the world of work
GN 451 – Government Gazette 35435 – 15 June 2012
PREAMBLE
HIV and AIDS continue to negatively impact on the livelihoods of millions of persons living with
or affected by the epidemic in South Africa. Within the world of work, HIV and AIDS impact
severely on productivity as a consequence of ill health resulting in increased absenteeism, low
morale, and increased staff turnover due to early deaths and possibly a change in markets and
demands for services.
In 2000 South Africa published a Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects of HIV and AIDS and
Employment (the Code) in line with the Employment Equity Act. The Code’s primary objective
was to guide employers, workers and trade unions to develop and implement HIV and AIDS
workplace policies and programmes. The Code was intended to protect and promote mutual
respect, dignity and the workers’ rights through the elimination of unfair discrimination against
people living with or affected by HIV and AIDS.
This Code has been utilised and referred to extensively in the development and implementation
of HIV and AIDS workplace Policies and Programmes. It has also been taken into account in
some of the judgments by the Courts in cases of unfair discrimination in relation to HIV.
Subsequent to the adoption of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Recommendation
concerning HIV and AIDS and the World of Work, 2010 (No. 200), South Africa as a member
state took a decision to review its Code and align it to the ILO Recommendation. The revised
Code seeks to assist employers, workers and their organisations in developing appropriate re-
sponses in order to manage HIV and AIDS, TB and STIs in the world of work within the frame-
work of decent work in both the formal and informal sectors and in the public and the private
sectors.
In line with the ILO Recommendation No. 200, this Code provides for further emphasis on the
fundamental human rights of all workers, including the principle of gender equality and the
broadening of the scope to cover all those involved in the world of work.
1. DEFINITIONS
In this Code, unless the context indicates otherwise:
“Affected Persons” : means persons whose lives are changed by HIV and AIDS
owing to the broader impact of the pandemic;
“AIDS” : means Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome which results
from advanced stages of HIV infection and is characterised by
opportunistic infections or HIV-related cancers, or both;
“CCMA” : means the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration;
“Confidentiality” : means the right of every person, worker, job applicant,
jobseekers, interns, apprentices, volunteers and laid-off and
suspended workers to have their information, including
medical records and HIV status kept private;
“Counselling” : means a confidential interactive session between a professional
and a client aimed to explore and identify the risks of the
client to HIV and AIDS;
“EAP” : means Employee Assistance Programme offered by many
employers which is intended to help workers deal with person-
al problems that might adversely impact their work perfor-
mance, health, and well-being;
“the Act” : means the Employment Equity Act, 1998 (Act No. 55 of 1998);
“HIV” : means the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, a virus that
weakens the human immune system;
continued
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 113
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 HIV and AIDS are a serious public health challenge which has socio economic, employ-
ment and human rights implications.
2.2 HIV poses a significant obstacle to the attainment of decent work and sustainable
development. It has led to the loss of the livelihoods of millions of persons living with or
affected by HIV and AIDS. Its effects are concentrated among the most productive age
groups and it imposes huge costs on enterprises through falling productivity, increased
labour costs and the loss of skills and experience.
2.3 HIV and AIDS affect every workplace, with prolonged staff illness, absenteeism, and
death, which impacts on productivity, employee benefits, occupational health and
safety, production costs, workplace morale and escalating HIV associated with TB and
STIs.
114 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
2.4 HIV thrives in an environment of poverty, rapid urbanisation, violence and destabilisa-
tion. Transmission is exacerbated by disparities in resources and patterns of migration
from rural to urban areas. Women are particularly more vulnerable to infection in cul-
tures and economic circumstances where they have limited sexual reproductive choices
and rights.
2.5 Through this Code, the country commits to mitigate the impact of the epidemic in the
world of work taking into account all relevant Conventions of the International Labour
Organization, including Recommendation No. 200.
2.6 One of the most effective ways of reducing and managing the impact of HIV and AIDS
in the workplace is through the implementation of workplace HIV and AIDS policies
and programmes. Addressing aspects of HIV and AIDS in the workplace will enable em-
ployers, workers and their organisations and government to actively contribute towards
local, national and international efforts to prevent and control HIV and AIDS.
2.7 Every person should take personal responsibility in relation to HIV and AIDS to educate
themselves, prevent transmission, seek available treatment and treat others with dignity
and respect. All persons have the responsibility to support the achievement of the objec-
tives of this Code.
2.8 Partnerships between government, employers, workers and their organisations and
other relevant stakeholders are encouraged to ensure effective delivery of services and
increased coverage.
5. KEY PRINCIPLES
The guiding principles in this Code are based on International Conventions and Recom-
mendations, The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and national laws, which in-
clude:
5.1 Respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and equality
The response to HIV and AIDS must be recognised as a contributing factor to the
realisation of human rights, dignity, fundamental freedoms, responsibility and equality
for all, including workers and their dependants.
5.2 HIV and AIDS is a workplace issue
HIV and AIDS is a workplace issue and must be treated like any other serious illness or
condition in the workplace. HIV and AIDS must be included among the essential ele-
ments of the national, provincial, local and sectoral response to the pandemic with full
participation of all stakeholders.
5.3 Reduce HIV-related stigma and unfair discrimination and promote equality of oppor-
tunity and fair treatment
Elimination of unfair discrimination remains a key principle for protection of the
rights of individuals. There must be no unfair discrimination against or stigmatisation
of workers on the grounds of real or perceived HIV status. It is the responsibility of eve-
ry worker and employer to eliminate unfair discrimination in the workplace.
5.4 Gender Equality
Women and girls are at greater risk and more vulnerable to HIV infection and are dis-
proportionately affected by HIV compared to men as a result of gender inequality.
Women’s empowerment is a key factor in responding to HIV and AIDS and the world
of work. Measures must be taken in the world of work to ensure gender equality, pre-
vent violence and harassment, protect sexual and reproductive health and rights and
involve men and women workers, regardless of their sexual orientation, in the HIV re-
sponse.
5.5 The right to access and continue in employment
Real or perceived HIV status is not a valid cause for termination of employment. Work-
ers with HIV-related illness must not be denied the possibility of continuing to carry out
their work unless proven medically unfit to do so. As with many other conditions,
workers with HIV and AIDS must be reasonably accommodated and be able to work for
as long as medically fit. Medical examination should be limited to the capacity of a
worker to perform the task(s) of a particular job.
5.6 Prevention
Prevention of all modes of HIV transmission and TB is a fundamental priority for the
country. In keeping with this principle the workplace must facilitate access to compre-
hensive information and education to reduce the risk of HIV transmission and HIV-TB
co-infection and STIs.
5.7 Treatment, Care and Support
Treatment, care and support services on HIV and AIDS must be accessible to all work-
ers and their dependants. All workers must have access to affordable health services,
social security, insurance schemes or other employment-related benefits either through
the employer, the State or non-governmental organisations. Programmes of care and
support must include measures of reasonable accommodation in the workplace for
persons living with HIV or HIV-related illnesses.
5.8 Social Dialogue/Consultations
Implementation of policies and programmes on HIV and AIDS should be based on co-
operation and trust amongst government, employers and workers and their represen-
tatives. Employers and workers should engage in the design, implementation and
evaluation of national and workplace programmes, with the active involvement of per-
sons living with HIV and AIDS.
116 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
6. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
6.1 This Code must be read in conjunction with The Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996) and all relevant legislation as amended, which in-
cludes –
(a) Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 1997 (Act No. 75 of 1997);
(b) Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, 1993 (Act No. 130 of
1993);
(c) Employment Equity Act, 1998 (Act No. 55 of 1998);
(d) Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995);
(e) Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1993 (Act No. 85 of 1993);
(f) Unemployment Insurance Act, 2001 (Act No. 63 of 2001);
(g) Children’s Act, 2005 (Act No. 38 of 2005);
(h) Medical Schemes Act, 1998 (Act No. 131 of 1998);
(i) Mine Health and Safety Act, 1996 (Act No. 29 of 1996);
(j) National Health Act, 2003 (Act No. 61 of 2003);
(k) Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act, 1973 (Act No. 78 of 1973);
(l) Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No. 2 of 2000); and
(m) Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000 (Act
No. 4 of 2000).
6.2 The contents of this Code must be taken into account when developing, implementing
or reviewing any workplace policies or programmes and must be read in conjunction
with the following legislative provisions as amended –
6.2.1 In accordance with both the common law and Section 14 of The Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, all persons with HIV and AIDS have a right to priv-
acy, including privacy concerning their HIV status. Accordingly, there is no
general legal duty on a worker to disclose his or her HIV status to his or her
employer or to other workers;
6.2.2 This Code is issued in terms of section 54(1)(a) of the Employment Equity Act
and is based on the principle that no person may be unfairly discriminated
against on the basis of real or perceived HIV status;
6.2.3 Section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act provides that no person may unfairly
discriminate against a worker or an applicant for employment, in any employ-
ment policy or practice, on the basis of his or her HIV status;
6.2.4 Section 6(3) of the Employment Equity Act prohibits harassment of a worker
based on his or her HIV status. Measures must be adopted at the workplace to
reduce the transmission of HIV and AIDS to alleviate its impact by ensuring
actions to prevent and prohibit violence and harassment in the workplace;
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 117
6.2.5 Section 7(2) of the Employment Equity Act prohibits testing of a worker to
determine that worker’s HIV status unless such testing is determined to be justi-
fiable by the Labour Court in terms of section 50(4) of the Employment Equity
Act;
6.2.6 In accordance with section 187(1)(f) of the Labour Relations Act, a worker with
HIV and AIDS must not be dismissed based on his or her HIV and AIDS status;
6.2.7 In terms of section 8(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, an employer
is obliged to provide a safe workplace;
6.2.8 Sections 2(1) and 5(1) of the Mine Health and Safety Act provide that an em-
ployer is required to create a safe workplace;
6.2.9 A worker who is infected with HIV as a result of an occupational exposure to
infected blood or bodily fluids must apply for benefits in terms of section 22(1)
of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act;
6.2.10 In accordance with the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, every employer is
obliged to ensure that all workers receive certain basic standards of employ-
ment, including the minimum number of sick leave days (section 22(2));
6.2.11 In accordance with section 24(2)(e) of the Medical Schemes Act, a registered
medical aid scheme must not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
its members on the basis of their “state of health”;
6.2.12 In accordance with section 20 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, every
employer is obliged to ensure that all workers are able to exercise their right to
illness benefits;
6.2.13 Section 20(1) of the National Health Act states that Health Care personnel must
not be unfairly discriminated against on account of their health status. However,
the head of the health establishment concerned, subject to any applicable law
and in accordance with any guidelines determined by the Minister, may impose
conditions on the service that may be referred by a health care provider or
health care worker on the basis of his or her health status;
6.2.14 In terms of section 13(1)(b) of the Children’s Act, every child has the right to
have access to information regarding his or her HIV Status;
6.2.15 In accordance with section 16(5) of the Labour Relations Act an employer is not
required to disclose the HIV status of a worker unless that worker consents to
the disclosure of his or her HIV status;
6.2.16 Sections 37(1) and 63(1) of the Promotion of Access to Information Act provide
that employers must not disclose the HIV status of a worker unless that worker
agrees to or consents to the disclosure of his or her HIV status;
6.2.17 In terms of section 1(c) of the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act,
TB is a compensable disease where it is found, in the opinion of the certification
committee, that a person contracted such disease while the person was perform-
ing risk work or where such person was already affected at any time within the
twelve month period immediately following the date on which that person per-
formed such work for the last time; and
6.2.18 According to section 99(3) of the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works
Act, where the certification committee has found that a person is suffering from
TB which is attributable partly to HIV but not mainly to work at a mine or works
and where such person is not in receipt of full benefits for the TB in terms of
the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, or any other law,
such person may receive benefits not exceeding one half of the benefits provid-
ed for in terms of the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act.
7.4.3 Employers must also accommodate workers when the work or the work environ-
ment changes or impairment varies which affects the worker’s ability to perform
the essential functions of the job.
7.4.4 Reasonable accommodation includes but is not limited to –
(a) adapting existing facilities to make them accessible;
(b) adapting existing equipment or acquiring new equipment including com-
puter hardware and software;
(c) re-organising workstations;
(d) changing training and assessment materials and systems;
(e) restructuring jobs so that non-essential functions are re-assigned;
(f) adjusting working time and leave; and
(g) providing specialised supervision, training and support in the workplace.
7.5 Employee Benefits
7.5.1 Workers with HIV and AIDS must not be unfairly discriminated against in the
allocation of employee benefits.
7.5.2 Where an employer offers a medical benefit, that employer must ensure that
this benefit does not unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against any
worker on the basis of his or her real or perceived HIV status.
7.5.2.1 There should be no unfair discrimination against workers or their de-
pendants based on real or perceived HIV status to access social security
systems and occupational insurance schemes or in relation to benefits
under such schemes, including health care and disability, death and
survivor’s benefits.
7.6 Grievance Procedures
7.6.1 Grievance mechanisms and procedures must be easily accessible to ensure
effective redress in cases of violation.
7.6.2 Employers must make workers aware of the grievance procedures, particularly
to address unfair discrimination relating to HIV in the workplace.
7.6.3 Employers should ensure that the rights of workers with regard to HIV and
AIDS, TB and other illnesses and the remedies available to them in the event of
a breach of such rights become integrated into existing grievance procedures.
7.6.4 Where all internal dispute resolution process has been exhausted and the
grievance remains unresolved, any party to the dispute may refer the dispute to
the CCMA for the unfair discrimination within six months in terms of sec-
tion 10(2) of the Employment Equity Act.
7.7 Termination of Employment
7.7.1 Real or perceived HIV status in itself is not a valid cause for termination of em-
ployment. Workers with HIV-related illness must not be denied the opportunity
of continuing to carry out their work.
7.7.2 Where a worker has become too ill to perform his or her current work, an em-
ployer is obliged to explore alternatives, including reasonable accommodation
and redeployment.
7.7.3 Where a worker has become too ill to perform his or her current work, an em-
ployer is obliged to follow accepted guidelines regarding dismissal for incapacity
before terminating a worker’s services, as set out in the Code of Good Practice
on Dismissal contained in Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act.
7.7.4 The employer must ensure that as far as possible, the worker’s right to confiden-
tiality regarding his or her HIV status is maintained during any incapacity pro-
ceedings. A worker must not be compelled to undergo an HIV test or to disclose
his or her HIV status as part of such proceedings unless the Labour Court has
authorised such a test.
120 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
7.7.5 Where a worker alleges unfair dismissal for HIV and AIDS, he or she should
refer the matter to the CCMA for unfair dismissal in terms of section 185 or 187
of the Labour Relations Act within 30 days of the dismissal.
8.2.6 Workplaces must endeavour to provide counselling and other forms of social
support to workers infected and affected by HIV and AIDS. Where health-care
services exist at the workplace, appropriate treatment must be provided. Where
these services are not possible, workers must be informed about the location of
available outside services.
8.2.7 Workers with HIV and AIDS must be treated no less favourably than workers with
other serious illnesses in terms of benefits, workers’ compensation and reason-
able accommodation.
8.2.8 Workers with HIV and AIDS should be encouraged to use expertise and assis-
tance from within the organisation for counselling. Where this is not available,
employers may then acquire the necessary assistance and expertise from the out-
side.
8.3 Occupational Health and Safety
8.3.1 An employer is obligated to provide and maintain a workplace that is safe and
without risk to the health of its workers.
8.3.2 HIV and AIDS must form an integral part of any workplace Occupational Health
and Safety strategy.
8.3.3 The working environment must be safe and healthy in order to prevent transmis-
sion of HIV and TB in the workplace.
8.3.4 Every workplace must ensure that it complies with the provisions of the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act, including the Regulations on Hazardous Biological
Agents and the Mine Health and Safety Act. Every workplace must also ensure
that its policy deals with, amongst others, the risk of transmission, appropriate
training, awareness, education on the use of universal infection control measures
so as to identify, deal with and reduce the risk of HIV transmission in the work-
place.
8.3.5 All workers must be made aware of the procedures to be followed in applying for
compensation for occupational infections and diseases and the reporting of all
occupational accidents.
8.3.6 Health and safety measures adopted at the workplace to prevent workers’ expo-
sure to HIV and TB and to minimise the risk of such workers contracting HIV
and TB, must include universal precautions, accident and hazard prevention
strategies, work practice control, personal protective equipment, environmental
control measures and post exposure prophylaxis.
8.3.7 Employers, workers and their organisations must take responsibility for contrib-
uting towards a safe and healthy working environment as per the Occupational
Health and Safety Act.
8.4 Children and Young Persons
8.4.1 Government, employers and workers, including their organisations, must adopt
appropriate measures to combat child labour and child trafficking that may re-
sult from the death or illness of family members or caregivers due to HIV and
AIDS and to reduce the vulnerability of children to HIV and AIDS and TB. This
is considered in view of the relevant International, Regional and National stand-
ards on Fundamental Principles and Rights of children and young persons.
Special measures must be taken to protect these children from sexual abuse and
sexual exploitation.
8.4.2 Measures must be taken to protect children and young workers against HIV and
TB infection. Such measures must include the special needs of children and
young persons in the response to HIV and AIDS in national, provincial, local,
sectoral and workplace policies and programmes. These should include objective
sexual and reproductive health education, in particular the dissemination of in-
formation on HIV and AIDS through vocational training and in youth employ-
ment programmes and services.
122 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
5.1 Introduction
The Unemployment Insurance Act of 1966 was repealed and replaced by the new Unem-
ployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 and the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act 4
of 2002, both of which came into operation on 1 April 2002.
Like its predecessor, the new Act provides for the payment of benefits in instances of
unemployment, illness, maternity and adoption. Dependants of a deceased contributor can
also become entitled to benefits.
The purpose of the Unemployment Insurance Act of 2001 (UIA) is set out in section 2:
The purpose of this Act is to establish an unemployment insurance fund to which employers and
employees contribute and from which employees who become unemployed or their beneficiar-
ies, as the case may be, are entitled to benefits and in doing so to alleviate the harmful economic
and social effects of unemployment.
The purpose of the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act (UICA) is to provide for
the payment of contributions for the benefit of the Unemployment Insurance Fund and
procedures for the collection of such contributions.
The Unemployment Insurance Fund and Unemployment Insurance Board, established
under the old Act, have been abolished and a new Fund and Board have been established
under the new Act. The income of the Fund is derived mainly from contributions made by
employers and employees in terms of the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act.
The Unemployment Insurance Commissioner and claims officers are appointed to pro-
cess claims for benefits.
The Unemployment Insurance Act will receive some detailed attention below, after
which an exposition of the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act will be given.
5.2 Definitions (s 1)
Some of the more important definitions in the Unemployment Insurance Act are:
“contributor” means a natural person –
(a) who is or was employed;
(b) to whom this Act, in terms of section 3, applies; and
(c) who can satisfy the Commissioner that he or she has made contributions for purposes of
this Act;
“child” means a person as contemplated in section 30(2) who is under the age of 21 years and in-
cludes any person under the age of 25 who is a learner and who is wholly or mainly dependent
on the deceased;
“domestic worker” means an employee who performs domestic work in the home of his or her em-
ployer, and includes a –
(a) gardener;
125
126 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
5.4.5 Director-General
The Director-General has varied powers and functions to oversee the administration of the
Act and the activities of the Unemployment Insurance Fund.
Unlike the repealed Act, a person who earns in excess of the threshold or “ceiling”
amount determined by the Minister from time to time is, in terms of the 2001 Act, entitled
to benefits (and must contribute to the fund), but benefits will be calculated as if the con-
tributor earned the threshold amount. Currently that amount is R178 464 per annum,
R14 872 per month or R3 432 per week.
The scale of benefits to which a contributor is entitled, is contained in Schedule 3 of the
Act and is calculated in accordance with the provisions of Schedule 2. Benefits are paid on a
sliding scale, with lower income contributors receiving a larger percentage of benefits than
higher income contributors.
In terms of section 14 a contributor is not entitled to benefits for any period that he or
she:
• was in receipt of:
– any benefit in terms of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act
as a result of an occupational injury or disease, which injury or disease caused the total
or temporary unemployment of the contributor;
– benefits from any unemployment fund or scheme established by a bargaining or statu-
tory council under the LRA of 1995;
• fails to comply with any provision of the UIA or any other law relating to unemployment;
or
• is suspended from receiving benefits.
The Commissioner may suspend a contributor or a dependant for a period of up to five
years from receiving benefits if he or she submitted a false or fraudulent claim, failed to
inform a claims officer of the resumption of work or failed to repay, on demand, any bene-
fits that were paid in error to him or her (s 36). The decision to suspend a contributor from
receiving payments does not absolve an employer from his duty to contribute to the Fund.
Step 3: Subtract from this number any days (excluding maternity benefits) received in
the four-year period immediately preceding the date of application for benefits.
Step 4: The resultant figure determines the days of benefits that a contributor is entitled
to.
GN 98 of 5 February 2007, “Calculation of benefits in terms of section 13 of the Unem-
ployment Insurance Act”, was promulgated to illustrate the calculation of days that accrue
as a benefit to a contributor. The following illustration is of a contributor who has been
continuously employed for 4 years and is eligible to claim the maximum benefits (i.e.
1 day’s benefit for every 6 completed days of employment up to a maximum of 238 days
(34 weeks)).
If a contributor is employed for a period of 4 years then the total days worked will be
equal to 1 460 days. Dividing 1 460 days by 6 to calculate the total credits gives us 243.33
days which is 5 days more than the 238 days prescribed in section 13(3). To calculate
correctly the number of days of benefit in terms of section 13(3) and Schedule 2 of the Act,
apply the following practical steps:
Total weeks of benefit to be provided = 34 weeks
Period to which the calculation applies = 4 years
Unique weeks per year (34 weeks ÷ 4 years) = 8.5 weeks per year
Unique number of days allocated per year = 8.5 × 7 = 59.5 days
Total credits to be allocated in 4 years = 59.5 × 4 = 238 days
The following method is followed in allocating credits:
Application of maximum
4-year cycle Days worked
prescribed credits
Year 1 365 59.5
Year 2 365 59.5
Year 3 365 59.5
Year 4 365 59.5
238
For purposes of calculating the benefits payable to a contributor, his daily rate of remuner-
ation, subject to the prescribed maximum, must be determined:
• if paid monthly, by multiplying the monthly remuneration by 12 and dividing it by 365;
• if paid weekly, by multiplying the weekly remuneration by 52 and dividing it by 365.
If the contributor’s remuneration fluctuates significantly from period to period, the calcula-
tion must be based on his or her average remuneration over the previous six months.
Application for unemployment benefits must be made in the prescribed form and within
six months of the termination of the contract of employment. The Commissioner may
condone a late application on just cause shown (s 17(1) and (2)).
The claims officer must investigate the application and, if it complies with the provisions
of the Act, the claims officer must approve the application, determine the amount of the
benefits, authorise the payment of the benefits and stipulate when the applicant must re-
port to the employment office for purposes of confirming that he is capable and available
for work and has been unemployed for the period in respect of which the unemployment
benefit has been claimed (s 17(3) and (4)).
Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 131
If the application does not comply with the provisions of the Act, the claims officer must
advise the applicant accordingly in writing and state the reasons why the application is
defective (s 17(5)).
The unemployment benefits must be paid to the contributor at the employment office at
which the application was made or any other employment office determined by the appli-
cant at the time of application (s 18).
When considering any sick leave paid in terms of any law, collective agreement or contract
of employment, the illness benefit may not be more than the remuneration the contributor
would have received if he or she had not been ill (s 21). This, again, refers to a “top-up”, in
other words, any remuneration received by the employee together with the illness benefits
may not amount to more than 100% of the employee’s ordinary income.
Application for illness benefits must be made personally in the prescribed form. If the
contributor cannot lodge the application personally, the claims officer may authorise any
other person to lodge the application on behalf of the applicant (s 22(1)).
The application for illness benefits must be made within six months of the commence-
ment of the period of illness, but the Commissioner may condone a late application on
good cause shown (s 22(2)).
The claims officer must investigate the application and, if it complies with the provisions
of the Act, the claims officer must approve the application, determine the amount of bene-
fits, authorise the payment of the benefits and stipulate how the benefits are to be paid
(s 22(3) and (4)).
If the application does not comply with the provisions of the Act, the claims officer must
advise the applicant thereof in writing and advance reasons for the defectiveness of the
application (s 22(5)).
When payment of illness benefits has been authorised, the benefits must be paid at the
employment office at which the application was made or any other employment office
determined by the applicant at the time of application. Payment is made to the contributor
or to any other person authorised by the contributor who is accepted by the claims officer
to be so authorised (s 23).
132 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
When considering maternity leave that is paid in terms of any law, collective agreement or
contract of employment, the maternity benefit may not be more than the remuneration the
contributor would have received if she had not been on maternity leave (s 24). Again, the
maternity benefits are a “top-up” so that any remuneration earned together with the mater-
nity benefits do not give the employee an income of more than 100% of her normal
income.
An application for maternity benefits must be made in the prescribed form at least eight
weeks before childbirth. The Commissioner may, on good cause shown, condone a late
application or extend the period of submission of the application up to a period of six
months after the date of childbirth (s 25(1) and (2)).
The claims officer must investigate the application and, if it complies with the provisions
of the Act, the claims officer must approve the application, determine the amount of the
benefits and stipulate how the benefits are to be paid (s 25(3) and (4)).
If the application does not comply with the provisions of the Act, the claims officer must
advise the applicant in writing that the application is defective and advance reasons why it is
defective (s 25(5)).
Once payment of maternity benefits has been authorised, the benefits must be paid to
the contributor at the employment office at which the application was made or any other
employment office determined by the applicant at the time of application (s 26).
The entitlement to adoption benefits commences on the date that a competent court grants
an order for adoption in terms of the Child Care Act of 1983 (s 27(2)).
Having regard to any leave paid to the contributor in terms of any law, collective agree-
ment or contract of employment, the benefit may not be more than the remuneration the
employee would have earned had he or she been at work. The “top-up” principle is again
applicable (s 27(3) and (4)).
An application for adoption benefits must be made in the prescribed form within six
months after the date of the order for adoption, but the Commissioner may condone a late
application on good cause shown (s 28(1) and (2)).
The claims officer must investigate the application and, if it complies with the provisions
of the Act, the claims officer must approve the application, determine the amount of the
benefits, authorise the payment of the benefits and stipulate how the benefits are to be paid
(s 28(3) and (4)).
If the application does not comply with the provisions of the Act, the claims officer must
advise the applicant in writing that the application is defective and provide reasons why it is
defective (s 28(5)).
The adoption benefits must be paid to the contributor at the employment office at which
the application was made or any other employment office determined by the applicant at
the time of application (s 29).
The benefit payable to a dependant is the amount of the unemployment benefit that would
have been payable to the deceased contributor if he or she had been alive (s 30(3)).
An application for dependant’s benefits must be made in the prescribed form and within
six months after the contributor’s death or, where a dependent child applies for benefits,
within 14 days after the expiration of the six-month period in which the spouse or life part-
ner could have applied (s 31(1) and (2)).
The claims officer must investigate the application and, if it complies with the provisions
of the Act, the claims officer must approve the application, determine the amount of the
benefits and to whom it must be paid, authorise the payment of the benefits and stipulate
how the benefits are to be paid (s 31(3) and (4)).
If the application does not comply with the provisions of the Act, the claims officer must
advise the applicant in writing that the application is defective and provide reasons for its
defectiveness (s 31(5)).
Once the payment of benefits has been authorised, the benefits must be paid to the de-
pendant at the employment office at which the application was made or any other employ-
ment office determined by the applicant at the time of application (s 32).
134 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
5.6 Enforcement
The provisions relating to the enforcement of the Unemployment Insurance Act, contained
in Chapter 4, closely resemble the corresponding provisions in the Basic Conditions of Em-
ployment Act of 1997.
Labour inspectors may call for a written undertaking (s 38) from an employer or issue a
compliance order (s 39). An employer is entitled to object to a compliance order by refer-
ring a dispute to the Director-General (s 40). Where an employer fails to comply with a
compliance order, the Director-General may approach the Labour Court to have the order
made an order of court (s 41).
5.8 Miscellaneous
Recovery of losses: if an employee of the Fund causes any loss or damage to the Fund, the
Director-General may institute an enquiry into the loss or damage, determine whether the
employee is liable for the loss or damage and if so, determine the amount of the loss or
damage and how and when the amount is to be paid by the employee. The employee must
be notified in writing of such a determination. Such an amount may be deducted from the
employee’s salary upon termination of services. Any employee who is aggrieved by a deter-
mination made by the Director-General may, within 30 days of the date of notification,
appeal to the Minister in accordance with the grievance procedure applicable to state em-
ployees (s 60).
Any person who causes any loss or damage to the Fund is guilty of an offence. Upon con-
viction, the court may determine the amount of the loss or damage caused to the Fund and
the convicted person must refund the loss to the Fund on such terms and conditions as the
Director-General may determine. Payment in instalments may be permitted. If the loss to
the Fund is due to a fraudulent claim, it may be recovered from any outstanding benefit
payments due to the contributor or dependant (s 61).
Evidence (s 62): if any of the following documents are produced in a court of law, they are
presumed to be certified by their author without proof of the author’s signature, unless evi-
dence is led to the contrary: a record of a decision made by the Director-General, the Board
or any committee; a copy of or extract from an entry in any book or record kept by the
Director-General, the Board or any committee or any document filed with the Director-
General, the Board or any committee.
In any proceedings under the Act an affidavit purporting to be made by the Director-
General is evidence of any of the following facts stated in the affidavit: that any person
or body of persons is an employer or a contributor under the Act; that any person is or
was lawfully required under the Act to pay an amount to the Director-General or that any
such amount or any portion thereof had or had not been paid on a date specified in the
affidavit.
The presiding officer at proceedings in which such an affidavit is presented may, of his
or her own accord, or must at the request of any party to the proceedings require the de-
ponent under subpoena to give oral evidence or to answer any written question submitted
to the presiding officer under oath. Any question and answer from that deponent is admis-
sible as evidence in the proceedings.
A contributor is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to remain in the employ of an
employer until that employer has notified the Director-General that the contributor is no
longer employed.
In any proceedings under the Act any of the following documents are admissible in evi-
dence against an employer and constitute an admission of the facts contained therein,
unless it is proved that the statement was not made by the employer: a statement or entry
contained in any book, record or document kept by any employer; any such statement or
entry found on any premises occupied by the employer; any such statement or entry found
on any vehicle used in the business of the employer and any copy or reproduction of any
136 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
5.9.1 Contributions
Chapter 2 of the UICA deals with the duty to contribute to the Unemployment Insurance
Fund and the collection or recovery of contributions.
Every employer and every employee to whom this Act applies must, on a monthly basis,
make contributions for the benefit of the Unemployment Insurance Fund. The contribu-
tions must be paid by the employer to the Commissioner for the South African Revenue
Service or to the Unemployment Insurance Commissioner, depending on whether sec-
tion 8 or section 9 is applicable to the employer (s 5).
The amount of the contribution payable by the employee is 1% of his or her monthly
remuneration and that payable by the employer is 1% of the employee’s monthly remuner-
ation (s 6). This provision is not applicable to the portion of the employee’s monthly
remuneration that exceeds the threshold amount determined from time to time by the
Minister of Finance by notice in the Gazette after consultation with the Minister of Labour
and the Unemployment Insurance Commissioner. Currently this amount is R14 872 per
month.
The employer must deduct the 1% payable by the employee from the employee’s re-
muneration every month (or week or other interval at which remuneration is paid) (s 7(1)
and (2)). An employer who fails to deduct the contribution as aforesaid is liable for the
contributions (s 7(4)). Where the contribution of an employee which is a company (other
than a listed company) has not been paid over to SARS or the Unemployment Insurance
Commissioner, the employer and all its directors and shareholders who control or are
regularly involved in the management of the company’s overall financial affairs, will be
personally liable for the payment of that amount, as well as for the penalty which may be
imposed in respect of the late payment (s 7(4A)).
Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 137
When the employer effects the deductions, he is not allowed to deduct amounts that are
in excess of what the employee’s contribution is supposed to be, seek or receive a fee from
the employee for complying with the Act or deduct arrear contributions from the employee
after the end of the financial year during which it was payable (s 7(3)).
Where an employer deducts a contribution from the employee’s remuneration and sub-
sequently becomes aware that the amount was not due or payable or was in excess of the
required amount, the employer must refund such amount to the employee, despite the fact
that the employer was not refunded by the Commissioner (s 7(5)).
Where an employer on reasonable grounds believes that the total amount of contribu-
tions payable in respect of all its employees during any financial year will not exceed such
amount as the Commissioner may from time to time determine by notice in the Gazette, the
employer may elect to effect payment of the full amount in respect of that financial year in
a single payment within seven days after the beginning of that financial year (i.e. March of
every year). If the employer discovers that the amount paid, is less than the required
amount, he must pay the outstanding amount to the Unemployment Insurance Commis-
sioner as soon as possible, but before the end of the financial year in question.
Questions
Question 1
Define the following:
1.1 domestic worker; (4)
1.2 employer; and (4)
1.3 contributor. (4)
Question 2
Discuss the application of the Unemployment Insurance Act. (8)
Question 3
Name the categories of benefits provided for by the Unemployment Insurance Act. (5)
Question 4
Discuss the conditions or requirements which must be met in terms of the Unemployment
Insurance Act in order for a contributor to qualify for the following:
4.1 unemployment benefits; (10)
4.2 illness benefits; (8)
4.3 maternity benefits; (8)
4.4 adoption benefits; and (8)
4.5 benefits paid to dependants of a deceased contributor. (6)
Question 5
Discuss the liability of making contributions for the benefit of the UIF, the amount of such
contributions and how the contributions must be made in terms of the Unemployment
Insurance Contributions Act. (15)
Question 6
Lorraine is employed by R & B Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd, a manufacturer of women’s
clothing. She works as a dressmaker in the factory and earns R8 000 per month.
6.1 Is Lorraine liable to contribute to UIF? Briefly explain. (4)
6.2 Assume Lorraine is a contributor in terms of the Act. Two weeks ago she was re-
trenched and is now unemployed. She applies for unemployment benefits. Two days
after submitting her application to a claims officer she discovers, when visiting her
doctor, that she is suffering from a terminal illness, that her health will rapidly deteri-
orate and that she only has eight months to live. Does she qualify for unemployment
benefits under these circumstances? Explain. (4)
6.3 Assume Lorraine is a contributor in terms of the Act. She has been employed at
R & B Manufacturers for the past five years. She is pregnant and the expected date of
birth of her baby is 12 October. No provision has been made for paid maternity leave,
either in her contract of employment or any agreement applicable in the workplace.
(a) Briefly explain whether Lorraine is entitled to work during her term of preg-
nancy. (2)
(b) Her employer grants her four months’ unpaid maternity leave. Explain whether
she qualifies for benefits in terms of the Act. (4)
140 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
(c) Lorraine has always been considered a good worker. When her employer finds
out about her pregnancy, he dismisses her because, according to him, he can-
not afford to keep her job for her.
(i) Does she qualify for benefits under these circumstances? Explain. (4)
(ii) Can her employer dismiss her in these circumstances? Discuss with ref-
erence to case law. (10)
Hint: See Swart v Greenmachine Horticultural Services (A Division of Sterikleen (Pty) Ltd)
(2010) 31 ILJ 180 (LC); Wallace v Du Toit (2006) 27 ILJ 1754 (LC); Mashava v Cuzen
& Woods Attorneys [2000] 6 BLLR 691 (LC); Victor v Finro Cash & Carry (2000) 21 ILJ
2489 (LC); Solidarity obo McCabe v SA Institute for Medical Research [2003] 9 BLLR 927
(LC); Mnguni v Gumbi [2004] 6 BLLR 558 (LC); Lukie v Rural Alliance CC t/a Rural
Development Specialist [2004] 8 BLLR 769 (LC); and ss 186(1)(c) & 187 of the Labour
Relations Act.
6.4 Assume that Lorraine is a contributor in terms of the Act. She adopts a baby of three
months. As a result of the adoption she resigns because she wants to take care of her
baby. Does she qualify for benefits in terms of the Act? Explain. (10)
6.5 Assume that Lorraine is a contributor in terms of the Act. She is dismissed because
she has been found guilty of theft. After her dismissal she fails to find other employ-
ment. Does she qualify for benefits in terms of the Act? Explain. (8)
6.6 Assume that Lorraine is a contributor in terms of the Act. She is unemployed because
of retrenchments in her factory. She applies for unemployment benefits and is
informed that she qualifies for benefits and will receive these benefits shortly. A week
later she is informed of suitable employment, but refuses to accept it. Does she
qualify for benefits in terms of the Act? Explain. (4)
6.7 Assume Lorraine is a contributor in terms of the Act. She is unemployed because of
retrenchments in her factory. She applies for unemployment benefits and is in-
formed that she does not qualify for any benefits in terms of the Act. Explain the pro-
cedure Lorraine can follow to have her dispute resolved. (4)
Question 7
Catherine was a contributor in terms of the Unemployment Insurance Act. She was em-
ployed as a domestic worker for 5 years until the sudden death of her employer and is now
unemployed. She is 50 years of age and is of the view that she can no longer perform the
duties of a domestic worker. Therefore, she is not prepared to work as a domestic worker
in future. Does she qualify for benefits in terms of the Unemployment Insurance Act?
Explain. (5)
Question 8
Fred is a gardener. He works for Anton on Mondays, Bennie on Tuesdays, Carl on Thurs-
days, Danny, also on Thursdays, and Ewan on Fridays. Danny dismisses Fred. Is Fred eligible
for unemployment benefits from the Fund? (4)
Question 9
John is employed at Viva Enterprises. He develops pneumonia and becomes too ill to
perform any work. He stays at home for 12 days. Does he qualify for sick benefits in terms of
the Unemployment Insurance Act? Explain. (6)
Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 141
Appendix 1
Unemployment Insurance Act
Schedule 2
MATHEMATICAL CALCULATION OF CONTRIBUTOR’S ENTITLEMENT
The benefit to which a contributor is entitled is calculated in one of two ways, depending on a
contributor’s income prior to becoming unemployed:
1. Contributors who earned less than a particular amount (known as the “benefit transition
income level”) are entitled to a percentage of their previous pay.
2. Contributors who earned more than a benefit transition income level are entitled to a
flat benefit, equal to the entitled of a contributor who was previously paid at the benefit
transition income level.
Contributors who previously earned less than the benefit transition income level
For contributors who earned less than the benefit transition income level, entitlement to benefit
is earnings-related. The contributor’s entitlement is calculated according to the following for-
mula:
Benefit = Daily Income * IRR
where IRR is the Income Replacement Rate corresponding to the contributor’s daily income.
Daily Income
If a contributor was paid weekly, daily income is the weekly rate of pay divided by 7.
If the contributor was paid fortnightly, daily income is the fortnightly rate of pay divided by 14.
If a contributor was paid monthly, daily income is the monthly rate of pay multiplied by 12,
then divided by 365.
Income Replacement Rate
The Income Replacement Rate (IRR) determines the percentage of a contributor’s previous
income to which the contributor is entitled in the form of benefits. The IRR is a variable, so it
defines a sliding scale. A contributor who previously earned a low wage is entitled to receive
benefits representing a larger portion of her or his previous income than a contributor who
previously earned a higher wage.
The IRR is at its maximum when income equals zero, and it reaches its minimum where in-
come is equal to the benefit transition income level. The maximum IRR is fixed at 60%. The
minimum IRR is currently set at 38%. However, the Minister may vary the minimum IRR in
terms of section 12(3)(b).
Using current values, the IRR can be calculated according to the following formula:
IRR = 29.2 + (99779.68 / (3239.6 + Yi))
where Yi represents a contributor’s normal monthly rate of income. (Consistency of units is
essential. To calculate IRR from daily or weekly rates of pay, please refer to the more detailed ex-
planation of the IRR formula in the technical note below.)
142 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Contributors who previously earned more than the benefit transition income level
Contributors who earned more than the benefit transition income level are entitled to a flat
benefit equal to the benefit transition income level multiplied by the minimum IRR.
At the current benefit transition income level of R14 872 per month, this works out to R185.80
per day:
Daily Income = (14872 * 12)/365) = 488.94
IRR = 38% or 0.38
Benefit = 488.94 * 0.38 = 185.80
Duration of benefits
In terms of section 13(3), a contributor is eligible to receive one day’s benefit for every six com-
pleted days of employment, up to a maximum of 238 days (34 weeks). A contributor will there-
fore be eligible to claim benefits for the maximum duration after being continuously employed
for four years. If a contributor has already drawn benefits (other than maternity benefits) in
terms of this Act in the preceding four years, the number of days for which the contributor is
eligible to claim benefits will be reduced accordingly.
To calculate the number of days of benefits to which a contributor is entitled:
1. Determine the total number of days that the contributor was employed (and contribu-
ting) in the four-year period immediately preceding the date of application for benefits.
2. Divide the total number of days by 6, disregarding any remainder or fractional portion of
the result.
3. Subtract the number of days (if any) for which the contributor claimed benefits (other
than maternity benefits) in terms of this Act during the preceding four years.
2. The y values corresponding to the x values are calculated using the general formula:
y = 1 / x (2)
thus:
y1 = l / x1
y2 = 1 / x2
yi = 1 / x i
3. The yi value is then converted to the corresponding IRR. The formula for this is:
IRR = LRR + (yi – y2)(URR – LRR) / (y1 – y2) (3)
where:
IRR is the income replacement rate;
LRR is the lower (minimum) income replacement rate; and
URR is the upper (maximum) income replacement rate.
The current values of the parameters LRR, URR, y1 and y2 are:
LRR = 38%
URR = 60%
y1 = 1 / 2
y2 = 1 / 7
Using these values, expression (3) can be simplified to:
IRR = 61.6yi + 29.2 (3a)
144 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Appendix 2
SCHEDULE 3
SCALE OF CONTRIBUTOR’S ENTITLEMENT TO BENEFITS
(Section 12(2))
(1) Table One is the scale of benefits to which a contributor may be entitled. A contributor’s
monthly rate of remuneration is set out in column 1. The percentage of the contributor’s monthly
income that will be paid as a benefit is set out in column 2. The actual benefit payable in Rand
terms is set out in column 3.
(2) Benefits below the transitional income level are earnings-related and fall as a proportion
of income as income rises.
(3) Contributors and employers of contributors earning above the income threshold of
1
R97 188 per annum shall contribute 1% of the threshold and such income contributors shall
receive benefits payable at this threshold level.
Tables to illustrate benefits at various earnings levels
Based on a transition income of R97 188 per annum.
The various amounts on [sic] these tables are calculated in terms of the equation in Schedule 2.
IRR = Income replacement rate
Approximate benefits payable on monthly basis:
Income IRR = UI benefit
150.00 58.64 87.96
300.00 57.39 172.17
500.00 55.88 279.41
700.00 54.53 381.69
1 000.00 52.74 527.35
1 500.00 50.25 753.79
2 000.00 48.24 964.87
3 000.00 45.19 1 355.74
3 075.57 45.00 1 384.01
4 000.00 42.98 1 719.30
5 000.00 41.31 2 065.49
6 000.00 40.00 2 399.95
7 410.00 38.57 2 857.99
8 099.00 38.00 3 077.62
10 000.00 30.78 3 077.62
continued
________________________
1 Sch 3 has not yet been amended to reflect the new threshold amount.
Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 145
Appendix 3
UI-2.1
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS IN TERMS OF SECTION 17(1) –
Read with Regulation 3(1)
1. PERSONAL DETAILS
1.1 Identity document ..........................................................................................................
1.2 Passport number ............................................................................................................
1.3 Other Identity/Reference number ...............................................................................
1.4 Date of birth ...................................................................................................................
1.5 Gender Male 5 Female 0
1.6 First names .....................................................................................................................
1.7 Surname .........................................................................................................................
1.8 Previous surname ...........................................................................................................
1.9 Postal address .................................................................................................................
........................................................................................ Code .....................................
1.10 Residential address .........................................................................................................
........................................................................................ Code .....................................
1.11 Telephone number ....................................................... Code .....................................
1.12 Cell. no. ..........................................................................................................................
1.13 E-mail address ................................................................................................................
1.14 SARS number .................................................................................................................
2. PAYMENT DETAILS
2.1 Name of bank or post office ..........................................................................................
2.2 Branch code ...................................................................................................................
2.3 Account number ............................................................................................................
2.4 Account type ..................................................................................................................
3. METHOD OF PAYMENT (Use the UI-2.7 form for Banking Details)
CHEQUE CASH BANK TRANSFER OTHER
4. EDUCATION BACKGROUND (tick the box) ......................................................................
SPECIAL SCHOOL CERT. 26 BELOW GRADE 8 29
GRADE 8–9 30 GRADE 10–11 31
GRADE 12 32 TERTIARY 33
5. EMPLOYER DETAILS
5.1 Name of employer/company ........................................................................................
5.2 UIF ref. number .............................................................................................................
5.3 Business address of employer ........................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................
5.4 Postal address .................................................................................................................
5.5 E-mail ..............................................................................................................................
5.6 Telephone number ....................................................... Code .....................................
5.7 Fax number ....................................................................................................................
6. EMPLOYMENT DETAILS
6.1 Occupation .....................................................................................................................
6.2 Occ. code ........................................................................................................................
Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 147
7. PERIOD OF SERVICE
7.1 Commencement of employment with employer ..........................................................
7.2 Termination of service ...................................................................................................
8. REMUNERATION/SALARY
8.1 Gross pay (before deductions) ......................................................................................
8.2 Salary payment (PW or PM) ..........................................................................................
9. SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME
During this period of unemployment have you received income from any of these sources?
(Tick the box)
9.1 Monthly pension from State (excluding disability grant) ........................................
9.2 Benefit from Compensation Fund for temporary or total disablement ..................
9.3 Benefits from an Unemployment Fund established by bargaining or statutory
council .......................................................................................................................
9.4 None ..........................................................................................................................
When did you begin to receive this benefit? .................................................................
Do you continue to receive this benefit? .......................................................................
If you no longer receive this benefit when did it come to an end? ..............................
10. REASONS FOR TERMINATION OF SERVICE
10.1 Dismissed ........................................................................................................................
10.2 Contract expired ............................................................................................................
10.3.1 Resigned ...........................................................................................................
10.3.2 Constructive dismissal ......................................................................................
10.4 Employer’s insolvency ....................................................................................................
10.5 Other (Specify) ..............................................................................................................
11. FURTHER REQUIREMENTS
11.1 Are you registered as a workseeker with a Labour Centre established by the
DOL ............................................................................................................ Yes No
11.2 If so, which Labour Centre: ...........................................................................................
11.3 Are you capable or and available for work? .............................................. Yes No
Signature ......................................................
11.4 If you are not capable or nor available for work, please explain ..................................
.........................................................................................................................................
IMPORTANT: READ THIS SECTION BELOW:
If your application is successful then the claims officer will authorise the payment of benefits. You must
report to the employment office on a regular basis as indicated by the claims officer. You must also inform
the claims officer as soon as you resume employment. I declare that the above information is true and
correct. I understand that it is an offence to make a false statement.
UI-2.2
APPLICATION FOR ILLNESS BENEFITS IN TERMS OF SECTION 22(1)
Read with Regulations 4(1), 4(5) and 4(7)
1. PERSONAL DETAILS
1.1 Identity document ..........................................................................................................
1.2 Passport number ............................................................................................................
1.3 Other Identity/Reference number ...............................................................................
1.4 Date of Birth ...................................................................................................................
1.5 Gender Male 5 Female 0
1.6 First names .....................................................................................................................
1.7 Surname .........................................................................................................................
1.8 Previous surname ...........................................................................................................
1.9 Postal address .................................................................................................................
........................................................................................ Code .....................................
1.10 Residential address .........................................................................................................
........................................................................................ Code .....................................
1.11 Telephone number ....................................................... Code .....................................
1.12 Cell. no. ..........................................................................................................................
1.13 E-mail address ................................................................................................................
1.14 SARS number .................................................................................................................
2. PAYMENT DETAILS
2.1 Name of bank or post office ..........................................................................................
2.2 Branch code ...................................................................................................................
2.3 Account number ............................................................................................................
2.4 Account type ..................................................................................................................
3. METHOD OF PAYMENT (Use the UI-2.7 form for Banking Details)
CHEQUE CASH BANK TRANSFER OTHER
4. EMPLOYER DETAILS
4.1 Name of employer/company ........................................................................................
4.2 UIF ref. number .............................................................................................................
4.3 Business address of employer ........................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................
4.4 Postal address .................................................................................................................
4.5 E-mail ..............................................................................................................................
4.6 Telephone number ....................................................... Code .....................................
4.7 Fax number ....................................................................................................................
5. EMPLOYMENT DETAILS
5.1 Occupation .....................................................................................................................
5.2 Occ. code ........................................................................................................................
6. PERIOD OF SERVICE
6.1 Commencement of employment with employer ..........................................................
6.2 Termination of service ...................................................................................................
7. REMUNERATION/SALARY
7.1 Gross pay (before deductions) ......................................................................................
7.2 Salary payment (PW or PM) ..........................................................................................
Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 149
UI-2.3
APPLICATION FOR MATERNITY BENEFITS IN TERMS OF SECTION 25(1)
Read with Regulation 5(1) and 5(4)
1. PERSONAL DETAILS ............................................................................................................
1.1 Identity document ..........................................................................................................
1.2 Passport number ............................................................................................................
1.3 Other identity/reference number .................................................................................
1.4 Date of birth ...................................................................................................................
1.5 Gender Male 5 Female 0
1.6 First names .....................................................................................................................
1.7 Surname .........................................................................................................................
1.8 Previous surname ...........................................................................................................
1.9 Postal address .................................................................................................................
........................................................................................ Code......................................
1.10 Residential address .........................................................................................................
........................................................................................ Code......................................
1.11 Telephone number ....................................................... Code......................................
1.12 Cell. no. ..........................................................................................................................
1.13 E-mail address ................................................................................................................
1.14 SARS number .................................................................................................................
2. PAYMENT DETAILS ..............................................................................................................
2.1 Name of bank or post office ..........................................................................................
2.2 Branch code ...................................................................................................................
2.3 Account number ............................................................................................................
2.4 Account type ..................................................................................................................
3. METHOD OF PAYMENT (Use the UI-284 form for Banking Details)
CHEQUE CASH BANK TRANSFER OTHER
4. EMPLOYER DETAILS
4.1 Name of employer/company ........................................................................................
4.2 UIF ref. number .............................................................................................................
4.3 Business address of employer ........................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................
4.4 Postal address .................................................................................................................
4.5 E-mail ..............................................................................................................................
4.6 Telephone number ....................................................... Code......................................
4.7 Fax number ....................................................................................................................
5. EMPLOYMENT DETAILS
5.1 Occupation .....................................................................................................................
5.2 Occ. code ........................................................................................................................
6. PERIOD OF SERVICE
6.1 Commencement of employment with employer ..........................................................
6.2 Termination of service ...................................................................................................
Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 151
7. REMUNERATION/SALARY
7.1 Gross pay (before deductions) ......................................................................................
7.2 Salary payment (PW or PM) ..........................................................................................
8. SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME
During this period of unemployment have you received income from any of these sources? (Tick the box)
8.1 Monthly pension from State (excluding disability grant) ........................................
8.2 Benefit from Compensation Fund for temporary or total disablement ..................
8.3 Benefits from an Unemployment Fund established by bargaining or statutory
council .......................................................................................................................
8.4 None ..........................................................................................................................
When did you begin to receive this benefit? .................................................................
Do you continue to receive this benefit? .......................................................................
If you no longer receive this benefit when did it come to an end? ..............................
9. ARE YOU STILL EMPLOYED ............................................................................... Yes No
NB: IF YOU ARE STILL EMPLOYED, FORM UI-2.8 MUST ALSO BE COMPLETED.
10. DATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF MATERNITY LEAVE ......................... /........... /............
11. IF YOU HAVE RETURNED TO WORK, STATE DATE ............................ /........... /............
12.
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE (to be completed by a medical practitioner or registered mid-
wife)
I, ................................................................ am a qualified ...................................................
My practice number is .............................. . I confirm that ...................................................
.................................................. is under my treatment and is pregnant. The expected due
date of birth is ........................................................................................................................
OR
I confirm that ............................................................... gave birth on ................................ /
The baby was stillborn on .............................. /had a miscarriage on ...................................
UI-2.4
APPLICATION FOR ADOPTION BENEFITS IN TERMS OF SECTION 28(1)
Read with Regulation 6(1)
1. PERSONAL DETAILS
1.1 Identity document ..........................................................................................................
1.2 Passport number ............................................................................................................
1.3 Other identity/reference number .................................................................................
1.4 Date of birth ...................................................................................................................
1.5 Gender Male 5 Female 0
1.6 First names .....................................................................................................................
1.7 Surname .........................................................................................................................
1.8 Previous surname ...........................................................................................................
1.9 Postal address .................................................................................................................
........................................................................................ Code .....................................
1.10 Residential address .........................................................................................................
........................................................................................ Code .....................................
1.11 Telephone number ....................................................... Code .....................................
1.12 Cell. no. ..........................................................................................................................
1.13 E-mail address .................................................................................................................
1.14 SARS number .................................................................................................................
2. PAYMENT DETAILS
2.1 Name of bank or post office ..........................................................................................
2.2 Branch code ...................................................................................................................
2.3 Account number ............................................................................................................
2.4 Account type ...................................................................................................................
3. METHOD OF PAYMENT (Use the UI-2.7 form for Banking Details)
CHEQUE CASH BANK TRANSFER OTHER
4. EMPLOYER DETAILS
4.1 Name of employer/company .........................................................................................
4.2 UIF ref. number .............................................................................................................
4.3 Business address of employer ........................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................
4.4 Postal address .................................................................................................................
4.5 E-mail ..............................................................................................................................
4.6 Telephone number ....................................................... Code .....................................
4.7 Fax number ....................................................................................................................
5. EMPLOYMENT DETAILS
5.1 Occupation .....................................................................................................................
5.2 Occ. Code .......................................................................................................................
6. PERIOD OF SERVICE
6.1 Commencement of employment with employer ...........................................................
6.2 Termination of service ...................................................................................................
Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 153
7. REMUNERATION/SALARY
7.1 Gross pay (before deductions) .......................................................................................
7.2 Salary payment (PW or PM) ..........................................................................................
8. SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME
During this period of unemployment have you received income from any of these sources?
(Tick the box)
8.1 Monthly pension from State (excluding disability grant) ........................................
8.2 Benefit from Compensation Fund for temporary or total disablement ..................
8.3 Benefits from an Unemployment Fund established by bargaining or statutory
council .......................................................................................................................
8.4 None ..........................................................................................................................
When did you begin to receive this benefit? .................................................................
Do you continue to receive this benefit? .......................................................................
If you no longer receive this benefit when did it come to an end? ...............................
9. ARE YOU STILL EMPLOYED .............................................................................. Yes No
NB: IF YOU ARE STILL EMPLOYED, FORM UI-2.8 MUST ALSO BE COMPLETED.
10. DATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF ADOPTION LEAVE ........................../ .........../ ............
11. IF YOU HAVE RETURNED TO WORK, STATE DATE ............................/ .........../ ............
IMPORTANT: READ THIS SECTION BELOW:
If your application is successful then the claims officer will authorise the payment of benefits. You must
also inform the claims officer as soon as you resume employment. I declare that the above information is
true and correct. I understand that it is an offence to make a false statement.
UI-2.5
APPLICATION FOR DEPENDANT’S BENEFITS BY SURVIVING SPOUSE OR
LIFE PARTNER IN TERMS OF SECTION 31(1)
Read with Regulation 7(1)
1. PERSONAL DETAILS
1.1 Identity document ..........................................................................................................
1.2 Passport number ............................................................................................................
1.3 Other identity/reference number .................................................................................
1.4 Date of birth ...................................................................................................................
1.5 Date of death ..................................................................................................................
1.6 Gender Male 5 Female 0
1.7 First names .....................................................................................................................
1.8 Surname .........................................................................................................................
1.9 Previous surname ...........................................................................................................
1.10 Last residential address ..................................................................................................
.................................................................................................. Code ..........................
1.11 Telephone number ................................................................. Code ..........................
1.12 Cell. no. ..........................................................................................................................
1.13 E-mail address ................................................................................................................
1.14 SARS number .................................................................................................................
2. EMPLOYER DETAILS
2.1 Name of employer/company ........................................................................................
2.2 UIF ref. number .............................................................................................................
2.3 Business address of employer ........................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................
2.4 Postal address .................................................................................................................
2.5 E-mail ..............................................................................................................................
2.6 Telephone number ................................................................. Code ..........................
2.7 Fax number ....................................................................................................................
3. EMPLOYMENT DETAILS
3.1 Occupation .....................................................................................................................
3.2 Occ. code ........................................................................................................................
4. PERIOD OF SERVICE
4.1 Commencement of employment with employer ..........................................................
4.2 Termination of service ...................................................................................................
5. REMUNERATION/SALARY
5.1 Gross pay (before deductions) ......................................................................................
5.2 Salary payment (PW or PM) ..........................................................................................
6. PERSONAL DETAILS OF SPOUSE OR LIFE PARTNER
6.1 Identity document: .........................................................................................................
6.2 Passport number ............................................................................................................
6.3 Other identity/reference number .................................................................................
6.4 Date of birth ...................................................................................................................
6.5 Gender Male 5 Female 0
Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 155
UI-2.6
APPLICATION FOR DEPENDANT’S BENEFITS BY CHILD OF DECEASED
IN TERMS OF SECTION 31(1)
Read with Regulation 7(1) and 7(2)
1. PERSONAL DETAIL
1.1 Identity document: .........................................................................................................
1.2 Passport number ............................................................................................................
1.3 Other identity/reference number .................................................................................
1.4 Date of birth ...................................................................................................................
1.5 Date of death ..................................................................................................................
1.6 Gender Male 5 Female 0
1.7 First names .....................................................................................................................
1.8 Surname .........................................................................................................................
1.9 Previous surname ...........................................................................................................
1.10 Last residential address ..................................................................................................
........................................................................................ Code .....................................
1.11 Telephone number ....................................................... Code .....................................
1.12 Cell. no. ..........................................................................................................................
1.13 E-mail address .................................................................................................................
1.14 SARS number .................................................................................................................
2. EMPLOYER DETAILS
2.1 Name of employer/company .........................................................................................
2.2 UIF ref. number .............................................................................................................
2.3 Business address of employer ........................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................
2.4 Postal address .................................................................................................................
2.5 E-mail ..............................................................................................................................
2.6 Telephone number ............................................................................. Code ..............
2.7 Fax number ....................................................................................................................
3. EMPLOYMENT DETAILS
3.1 Occupation .....................................................................................................................
3.2 Occ. code ........................................................................................................................
4. PERIOD OF SERVICE
4.1 Commencement of employment with employer ...........................................................
4.2 Termination of service ...................................................................................................
5. REMUNERATION/SALARY
5.1 Gross pay (before deductions) .......................................................................................
5.2 Salary payment (PW or PM) ..........................................................................................
6. GUARDIAN’S PERSONAL DETAILS
RELATIONSHIP OF GUARDIAN TO DECEASED ..............................................................
6.1 Identity document ..........................................................................................................
6.2 Passport number ............................................................................................................
6.3 Other identity/reference number .................................................................................
6.4 Date of birth ...................................................................................................................
Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 157
UI-12
NOTICE OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF
THE COMMISSIONER OR A CLAIMS OFFICER
[UI-12 amended by GN 536, 26 April 2004.]
Application in terms of section 37(1) read with regulation 8(1)
A person entitled to benefits in terms of the Act may appeal against a decision of the Commis-
sioner to suspend that person’s rights to benefits, or a decision of a claim officer relating to the
payment or non-payment of benefits. This Notice of appeal must be send to the Regional Appeal
Committee, where an application was lodged.
1. Personal details
1.1 Name ..............................................................................................................................
1.2 ID number: .....................................................................................................................
1.3 Passport number ............................................................................................................
1.4 Residential address .........................................................................................................
1.5 Postal address .................................................................................................................
1.6 E-Mail address ................................................................................................................
1.7 Tel. number (include the code) ....................................................................................
1.8 Cell. no. ..........................................................................................................................
2. Employer details
2.1 Name of employer (prior to unemployment) ...............................................................
2.2 UIF reference number ...................................................................................................
2.3 Physical address ..............................................................................................................
2.4 Postal address .................................................................................................................
2.5 E-mail ..............................................................................................................................
2.6 Tel number .....................................................................................................................
2.7 Fax number ....................................................................................................................
3. Decision appealed against
3.1 What decision are you appealing against?
.........................................................................................................................................
3.2 Which region made the decision?
.........................................................................................................................................
3.3 When was the decision made?
.........................................................................................................................................
3.4 When were you notified about the decision?
.........................................................................................................................................
3.5 Why are you appealing against the decision?
.........................................................................................................................................
3.6 In what respects do you think the decision is incorrect or unfair?
.........................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................
Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 159
6.1 Introduction
Common law does not provide any security or benefits to an employee who has sustained
injuries on duty. In fact, there is no common law obligation on the employer to pay wages
to the employee who is absent due to illness or injuries. The only recourse which the em-
ployee thus has is to institute action against his employer for compensation. This is an
onerous route to follow, since the employee will not succeed with his claim unless he can
prove intent or negligence on the part of his employer, that is, that an act or omission by
the employer was the cause of his injuries.
The first Act to broaden the common law position was the Workmen’s Compensation Act
of 1941. This Act provided for the payment of compensation to employees regardless of
whether the employer was the cause of the injuries and regardless of whether the employee
could prove the intent or negligence of the employer. Compensation in terms of this Act
was paid in the event of injuries sustained on duty, to dependants of an employee if the lat-
ter had died because of his injuries and in the event of industrial diseases. For this purpose
the Accident Fund was established. The loss recoverable in terms of the Act was material
loss caused by the accident, that is, loss of income and medical expenses. The employee,
however, did not lose his right to recover compensation from the wrongdoer personally, be
it his employer or a third party.
On 1 March 1994 the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of
1993 came into operation and the Workmen’s Compensation Act was repealed. This Act,
like its predecessor, also provides for the payment of compensation in respect of occupa-
tional injuries, death as a result of such injuries and occupational diseases. Both the
repealed Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Compensation for Occupational Injuries
and Diseases Act (COIDA) require that, in order to qualify for compensation, the injury
must have been caused by an accident “arising out of and in the course of the employee’s
employment”. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, however, was not clear as to how this
concept should be interpreted. It was left to the courts to interpret and develop the con-
cept. The Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, in section 22(4),
describes what is meant by “arisen out of and in the course of employment”. It appears that
the interpretation given to this concept by our courts over the years has now been codified
in this Act.
Another feature of the 1993 Act is that its application is much wider than that of the old
Act. The definition of “employee” (previously “workman”) has been extended to include a
number of employees who were previously excluded from the right to and security of com-
pensation, such as casual employees, seamen and airmen. Also excluded from the applica-
tion of the old Act were employees who earned more than a specified income per year. This
exclusion has been removed from the 1993 Act, with the result that employees will now
receive compensation regardless of their income. However, compensation for an employee
161
162 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
1
who earns more than R332 479 per annum will be calculated as if he earned R332 479 per
annum.
“Earnings” of an employee is defined as the monthly rate at which an employee was being
remunerated by his employer at the time of the accident and includes the value of food and
quarters supplied by the employer, as well as any overtime payment or special remuneration
in cash or in kind of a regular nature or for work ordinarily performed. Excluded from the
definition are the following: any payment for intermittent overtime; payment for non-
recurrent occasional services; amounts paid by an employer to his employee to cover special
expenses; and ex gratia payments, whether by the employer or any other person (s 63).
The Compensation Fund was created in terms of section 15 of the Act and replaces the
old Accident Fund. It derives its income from contributions by employers and is adminis-
tered by the Director-General.
1 This amount is revised and increased from time to time by the Minister of Labour.
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 163
provincial governments and local authorities may be exempted from furnishing these
details (ss 80(4) and 84(1)). Persons who are not resident in South Africa and body corpor-
ates which are not registered in terms of South African law and who carry on business in the
Republic must furnish the Compensation Commissioner with the address of their head
office and the name and address of their chief officer in the Republic. The chief officer is
deemed an employer in terms of the Act (s 80(5)). If a person (the mandator) enters into
an agreement with a contractor for the execution of work, the contractor must register as
an employer and fulfil all the duties of an employer (s 89).
An employer is obliged to keep records for a period of four years of all its employees,
wages paid and time worked (s 81). Before the end of March every year a statement (re-
turn) setting out the wages paid to employees must be submitted to the Commissioner
(s 82). On the strength of this information the Director-General determines an amount to
be paid by the employer to the Compensation Fund (s 83). The employer must pay that
amount within 30 days of a date specified by the Commissioner (s 86). The State, Par-
liament, provincial governments, exempted local authorities and employers who have
obtained an insurance policy for the extent of their potential liability are not required to
pay an assessment (s 84).
6.6 Compensation
No periodical payments are made in respect of temporary disablement which lasts for three
days or less (s 22(2)). If an accident is the result of the serious and wilful misconduct of an
employee, no compensation is payable, unless the accident results in serious disablement or
death (s 22(3)).
If, at the time of considering a claim for compensation, it appears that the contract of
employment, apprenticeship or learnership of the employee is invalid the Director-General
may deal with the claim as if the contract was valid at the time of the accident (s 27).
When compensation is awarded the Director-General may also decide that the cost of
medical aid or of a medical examination be paid from the Compensation Fund (s 16). If
the injury in respect of which compensation is payable causes disablement of such a nature
that the employee is unable to perform essential actions of life without the constant help of
another person, the Director-General may grant an allowance towards the cost of such help
(s 28).
When the Director-General determines that the requirements as set out in paragraph 6.5
above have been complied with compensation will be awarded to the disabled employee or
to the dependants of a deceased employee.
Compensation in each category of disablement is calculated in accordance with a set
formula (see Schedule 4).
The earnings used as a basis for calculating compensation are subject to a maximum weekly
or monthly income (as prescribed by the Minister). This means that compensation is based
on the weekly or monthly income of the employee. If the employee earns in excess of the
prescribed amount the compensation is calculated as if the employee earned the prescribed
amount. These amounts are revised by the Minister annually.
Temporary disablement lasting longer than 24 months is presumed to be permanent
(s 47(6)).
Compensation for temporary partial disablement consists of such portion of the amount
calculated above as the Director-General may consider equitable (s 47(2)).
The employer of an injured employee is liable to pay compensation to the employee for
the first three months after the date of the accident. The amount so paid by the employer
will be refunded to the employer by the Director-General (s 47(3)).
– a monthly pension of 40% of the monthly pension that would have been payable if the
employee had been 100% permanently disabled (that is, 40% of 75% of the monthly
earnings up to the prescribed amount).
The widow or widower will receive the monthly pension until the day of his or her death.
Remarriage does not change this situation.
• Children under 18 years of age will receive a monthly pension of 20% of 75% of monthly
th
earnings up to the prescribed amount. They receive this monthly pension until their 18
birthday or until their marriage or death before the age of 18.
• The total pension payable to the widow or widower and children may not exceed the
amount that would have been payable had the employee been 100% disabled.
• Funeral costs may be paid from the Compensation Fund. The amount will be deter-
mined by the Director-General.
An employee who is injured or contracts a disease through the negligence of a third party
may claim compensation from the Compensation Fund and from the third party. The em-
ployee must institute proceedings in a court of law against the third party to recover his
damages. In awarding damages the court will have regard to the amount to which the
employee is entitled in terms of COIDA (s 36). The Director-General may institute action in
a court of law against the third party for the recovery of compensation that the Director-
General is obliged to pay.
Questions
Question 1
Compare the common-law position of an employee who sustains injuries while on duty with
that of an employee who enjoys the protection of the Compensation for Occupational
Injuries and Diseases Act. (8)
Question 2
Discuss the application of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act.
Refer also to those groups of employees who are excluded from the application of the
Act. (15)
Question 3
Define the following:
3.1 employee; (10)
3.2 dependants of an employee; (5)
3.3 employer; and (6)
3.4 earnings. (6)
168 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Question 4
For someone to qualify for compensation in terms of the Act certain requirements must be
met. Discuss these requirements in detail and refer to decided cases to substantiate your
answer. (20)
Hint: See Innes v Johannesburg Municipality 1911 TPD 12; Nicosia v Workmen’s Compensation
Commissioner 1954 (3) SA 897 (T); Pyper v Manchester Liners Ltd 1916 2 KB 691; Minister of
Justice v Khoza 1966 (1) SA 410 (A); Assistent-ongevallekommissaris v Ndevu 1980 (1) SA 143
(E); Johannesburg City Council v Marine & Trade Insurance Co 1970 (1) SA 181 (W); Workmen’s
Compensation Commissioner v FA Stewart (Pty) Ltd (1991) 12 ILJ 1015 (Z); Ex parte Commissioner:
In re Manthe 1979 (4) SA 812 (E); Ward v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1962 (1) SA
728 (T); Gumede en Andere v SA Eagle Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1989 (3) SA 741 (T); Mureinik
“Workmen’s compensation and the mugging that arose ‘out of’ employment” (1980) 1 ILJ
33; Le Roux “Beheer oor werkersvervoer en die Ongevallewet” (1980) 1 ILJ 100.
Question 5
Give the formula for the calculation of compensation in each of the following instances:
5.1 temporary total disablement; (2)
5.2 permanent disablement; and (8)
5.3 death of an employee. (4)
Question 6
Is an employee who has sustained injuries at work entitled to institute a claim against his
employer for compensation? Briefly explain. (3)
Question 7
Section 36 of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act makes it pos-
sible for an employee who has been injured to claim compensation from both the Compen-
sation Fund and from a third party who has caused his injuries. Discuss this section in detail
and refer to decided cases to substantiate your answer. (12)
Hint: See Govender v SA Stevedores Service Co Ltd (1981) 2 ILJ 27 (IC); SAR & H v SA Stevedores
Service Co Ltd 1983 (1) SA 1066 (A); and Blumenfeld “Workmen’s compensation: Third par-
ties’ liability” (1983) 4 ILJ 261.
Question 8
State whether the persons in the following circumstances will qualify for compensation in
terms of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act. Motivate each
answer.
8.1 A pupil in the course of a carpentering trade at a school suffers injuries while making
a chair. (4)
Hint: See Booyens NO v OFS Provincial Administration 1924 OPD 120.
8.2 A corporal in the SA National Defence Force is injured while defending the borders
of the country. (3)
8.3 A domestic worker who works at an orphanage is injured while performing her duties.
There are normally twelve workers employed at the orphanage. (2)
8.4 A farm labourer is injured while servicing a tractor. (2)
8.5 An employee who works for a company with its head office in Johannesburg is
injured while working in Namibia for a period of six months. (3)
8.6 A general manager of a company who earns remuneration of R22 000 per month is
injured while taking visitors on a factory tour. (3)
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 169
8.7 A person who operates a machine for the owner thereof hires out his services as well
as the machine. His remuneration consists of a percentage of the profits only (no
fixed salary). He sustains injuries while operating the machine. (5)
Hint: See De Beer v Thomson 1918 TPD 70.
Question 9
William was employed by Wiltshire Dairies (Pty) Ltd. He commenced his duties at 6:00 and
left the dairy at 16:00 every day. His duties comprised the delivery of orders to clients,
followed by clerical work at the office. He also kept the keys to the dairy and safe with him
after working hours. One of the company’s delivery trucks was made available to him for
the deliveries and he was allowed to take this truck back home after the deliveries of the day
had been completed. It often happened that he made some of the deliveries on his way
home in the afternoon or early in the morning on his way to work. One morning, on his
way to work, the delivery truck broke down and he then used his own vehicle to get to work.
On his way to work he was involved in an accident and was killed.
William’s wife now wishes to claim compensation from the Compensation Fund. Advise
her as to the validity of her claim. (8)
Hint: See Ward v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1962 (1) SA 728 (T); Assistent-
ongevallekommissaris v Ndevu 1980 (1) SA 143 (E); Ex parte Commissioner: In re Manthe 1979
(4) SA 812 (E); Gumede en Andere v SA Eagle Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1989 (3) SA 741 (T);
Mureinik “Workmen’s compensation and the mugging that arose ‘out of’ employment”
(1980) 1 ILJ 33; and Le Roux “Beheer oor werkersvervoer en die Ongevallewet” (1980) 1
ILJ 100.
Question 10
Ruben is employed as a truck driver by KwaZulu-Natal Wholesale Liquors. His duties com-
prise the loading and unloading of cases of liquor and the delivery of orders to clients of
KWL. He earns R800 per week.
10.1 On his way to deliver a few cases of liquor to a retailer, he is involved in a motor
vehicle accident caused by one Van Wyk. He sustains serious back injuries and is para-
lysed. He is hospitalised for four months, after which time he slowly starts to regain
mobility. Seven months after the date of the accident he is well enough to resume
work.
(a) Is Ruben entitled to compensation in terms of the Compensation for Occupa-
tional Injuries and Diseases Act under these circumstances? Explain and refer to
case law to substantiate your answer. (8)
Hint: See Nicosia v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1954 (3) SA 897 (T); Min-
ister of Justice v Khoza 1966 (1) SA 410 (A); Assistent-ongevallekommissaris v Ndevu
1980 (1) SA 143 (E); Ex parte Commissioner: In re Manthe 1979 (4) SA 812 (E);
Ward v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1962 (1) SA 728 (T).
(b) Briefly describe the nature of Ruben’s injuries. (2)
(c) Assume that Ruben qualifies for compensation. Give the formula and then calcu-
late the amount of compensation which he will receive. (4)
(d) Is Ruben entitled to claim compensation from Van Wyk? Discuss with reference
to decided cases. (8)
Hint: See Govender v SA Stevedores Service Co Ltd (1981) 2 ILJ 27 (IC); SAR & H v
SA Stevedores Service Co Ltd 1983 (1) SA 1066 (A); and Blumenfeld “Workmen’s
compensation: Third parties’ liability” (1983) 4 ILJ 261.
10.2 Because of a stayaway in which most workers participate, there is an insufficient num-
ber of workers at KWL to complete all the different tasks. Consequently Ruben assists
a co-worker in the warehouse, putting cases of liquor on shelves. Management is
unaware of Ruben helping the other worker. While Ruben is picking up a case he
170 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
experiences a pain in his back. A subsequent medical examination proves that one of
the vertebrae has slipped, probably caused by the movement when he handled the
case of liquor.
(a) Is Ruben entitled to compensation in terms of the Act? Explain and refer to case
law to substantiate your answer. (8)
Hint: See cases mentioned above.
(b) Briefly describe the nature of Ruben’s injuries. (2)
(c) Assume that Ruben qualifies for compensation. Give the formula and then calcu-
late the amount of compensation which he will receive. (4)
10.3 Ruben is conveyed to and from work by an independent driver who has been hired by
the company to transport its workers. The company does not prescribe to the
driver the route he has to take or any stops he has to make; the company only expects
him to fetch the workers at clocking out time and to return them the following morn-
ing in time for work. One morning on their way to work eight of the KWL workers
are injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the negligent driving of the driver.
Ruben is one of the workers who was injured in the accident: he lost his left leg and
suffered a few other minor injuries.
(a) Is Ruben entitled to compensation in terms of the Act under these circumstances?
Explain and refer to case law to substantiate your answer. (8)
Hint: See Assistent-ongevallekommissaris v Ndevu 1980 (1) SA 143 (E); Innes v Johan-
nesburg Municipality 1911 TPD 12; and Le Roux “Beheer oor werkersvervoer en
die Ongevallewet” (1980) 1 ILJ 100.
(b) Consider your answer in (a) and explain whether the situation would be different
since the amendment of section 22(5) of the Act. (5)
(c) Briefly describe the nature of Ruben’s injuries. (2)
(d) Assume that Ruben qualifies for compensation. Give the formula and then calcu-
late the amount of compensation which he will receive. (4)
10.4 While Ruben is on his way to make deliveries to a client of KWL he stops for refresh-
ments at a cafe. When exiting the cafe, he crosses the street without looking out for
oncoming traffic. An oncoming car knocks him down and Ruben’s right leg is bro-
ken, with the result that he cannot work for six weeks.
Is Ruben entitled to compensation in terms of the Act? Explain and refer to case law
to substantiate your answer. (8)
Hint: See Nicosia v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1954 (3) SA 897 (T); Innes v
Johannesburg Municipality 1911 TPD 12; and Johannesburg City Council v Marine & Trade
Insurance Co 1970 (1) SA 181 (W).
Question 11
Gerald Smith is one of several truck drivers in the employ of BP Gas. The drivers’ duties
include the transport of gas and delivery of orders to customers of BP Gas. Gerald noticed a
number of orders ready for delivery. Without the required inspection by the safety unit, he
loaded 150 gas bottles for delivery to a customer. He had on several previous occasions
been reprimanded for not adhering to safety regulations and procedures. On his way to
deliver the gas bottles he negligently caused an accident. He was severely injured and
remained in hospital for seven weeks. Thereafter he had to undergo rehabilitation therapy
for injuries sustained to his legs.
With reference to the above facts, discuss:
(a) the requirement that an accident must take place in the scope of an employee’s
employment; (8)
(b) whether Gerald is eligible for compensation under the Act; (4)
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 171
(c) what the position would have been had Gerald caused the accident while under the
influence of liquor and died in the accident. (4)
Question 12
James was a police officer in the employ of SAPS for 15 years until he was medically boarded.
Three years before his employment ended James was diagnosed as suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder. He claimed compensation from the Compensation Commissioner
in terms of the Act. In his application he submitted that he had during the course of his
work been exposed to numerous deaths, shootings, murders, armed robberies, culpable
homicides, motor vehicle accidents and rapes and as a result was suffering from a work-
based mental disease. Discuss whether his claim will be successful, paying particular atten-
tion to the definition of “accident”. (10)
Hint: See Odayar v Compensation Commissioner 2006 (6) SA 202 (N); Urquhart v Compensation
Commissioner (2006) 27 ILJ 96 (E); Marsland v New Way Motor & Diesel Engineering (2009) 30
ILJ 169 (LC).
172 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Appendix 1
SCHEDULE 2
Percentage of
Injury permanent
disablement
Loss of two limbs ........................................................................................................................
100
Loss of both hands, or of all fingers and both thumbs .......................................................... 100
Total loss of sight .......................................................................................................................
100
Total paralysis .............................................................................................................................
100
Injuries resulting in being permanently bedridden ............................................................... 100
Any other injury causing permanent total disablement ........................................................ 100
Loss of arm at shoulder..............................................................................................................
65
Loss of arm between elbow and shoulder ................................................................................ 65
Loss of arm at elbow ...................................................................................................................
55
Loss of arm between wrist and elbow ....................................................................................... 55
Loss of hand at wrist ...................................................................................................................
50
Loss of four fingers and thumb of one hand ............................................................................. 50
Loss of four fingers ......................................................................................................................
40
Loss of thumb – both phalanges ............................................................................................... 25
one phalanx ....................................................................................................
15
Loss of index finger – three phalanges ..................................................................................... 10
two phalanges ........................................................................................ 8
one phalanx ........................................................................................... 5
Loss of middle finger – three phalanges .................................................................................. 8
two phalanges...................................................................................... 6
one phalanx ........................................................................................ 4
Loss of ring finger – three phalanges ....................................................................................... 6
two phalanges .......................................................................................... 5
one phalanx ............................................................................................. 3
Loss of little finger – three phalanges ....................................................................................... 4
two phalanges .......................................................................................... 3
one phalanx ............................................................................................. 2
Loss of metacarpals – first, second or third (additional) ....................................................... 4
fourth or fifth (additional) .................................................................. 2
Loss of leg – at hip .....................................................................................................................
70
between knee and hip ......................................................................................... 45 to 70
below knee ...........................................................................................................
35 to 45
Loss of toes – all .........................................................................................................................
15
big, both phalanges............................................................................................ 7
big, one phalanx................................................................................................. 3
other than big –
four toes ......................................................................................................... 7
three toes ....................................................................................................... 5
two toes .......................................................................................................... 3
one toe ........................................................................................................... 1
Loss of eye – whole eye .............................................................................................................. 30
sight....................................................................................................................... 30
sight, except perception of light ........................................................................ 30
Loss of hearing – both ears ........................................................................................................ 50
one ear........................................................................................................... 7
Total permanent loss of the use of a limb shall be treated as the loss of the limb.
Any injury to the left arm or hand and, in the case of a left-handed employee, to the right arm or
hand, may in the discretion of the Director-General be rated at ninety per cent of the above percent-
age.
If there are two or more injuries the sum of the percentages for such injuries may be increased, in
the discretion of the Director-General.
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 173
Appendix 2
SCHEDULE 3
[As published in GN 552 in Government Gazette 26302 of 30 April 2004.]
In this Schedule the following general concepts have been defined and clarified as set out below.
General
1. Schedule 3 deals with the List of Occupational Diseases which depicts diseases that are occupa-
tional and compensable on the benefits of an explicit presumption referred to in terms of section
66 of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, 1993.
2. The amended Schedule 3 is issued to align the list of diseases mentioned in the first column of
Schedule 3 of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, 1993 with the list of
occupational diseases appended to International Labour Organization R194 List of Occupational
Diseases Recommendation, 2002.
3. The amended Schedule 3 is issued in conformity with section 65(a) and 66 of the Compensation
for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, 1993.
4. The List of Occupational Diseases appended to this amended Schedule 3 shall supersede the list of
diseases mentioned in the first column of Schedule 3 in terms of 65(a) of the Compensation for
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, 1993.
5. Work shall be defined as:
• all work involving the handling of and/or exposure to any agent(s) mentioned in the List of
Occupational Diseases; and/or
• any occupation involving the handling of and/or exposure to specified agent/work processes
mentioned in the List of Occupational Diseases.
6. Work as defined in the amended Schedule 3 shall supersede all previous work(s) mentioned in
Schedule 3 and in section 66 of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act,
1993.
2.1.7. Extrinsic allergic alveolitis caused by the inhalation of the following organic dusts
and chemicals inherent to the work process: moulds, fungal spores or any other
allergenic proteinaceous material, 2,4 toluene-di-isocyanates
2.1.8. Siderosis
2.1.9. Chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases
2.1.10. Diseases of the lung caused by aluminium
2.1.11. Upper airways disorders caused by recognised sensitising agents or irritants inherent
to the work process
2.1.12. Diseases caused by chronic or repetitive exposure to products of combustion
2.2. Occupational skin diseases
2.2.1. Allergic or irritant contact dermatitis caused by physical, chemical or biological
agents
2.2.2. Occupational vitiligo
2.3. Occupational musculo-skeletal disorders
2.3.1. Musculo-skeletal diseases caused by specific work activities or work environment
where particular risk factors are present. Examples of such activities or environ-
ment include:
a. rapid or repetitive motion
b. forceful exertion
c. excessive mechanical force concentration
d. awkward or non-neutral postures
e. vibration
3. Occupational cancer
3.1. Cancer caused by the following agents
3.1.1. Asbestos
3.1.2. Benzidine and its salts
3.1.3. Bis chloromethyl ether (BCME)
3.1.4. Chromium and chromium compounds
3.1.5. Coal tars, coal tar pitches or soots
3.1.6. Beta-naphthylamine
3.1.7. Vinyl chloride
3.1.8. Benzene or its toxic homologues
3.1.9. Toxic nitro- and amino-derivatives of benzene or its homologues
3.1.10. Ionizing radiations
3.1.11. Tar, pitch, bitumen, mineral oil, anthracene, or the compounds, products or resi-
dues of these substances
3.1.12. Coke oven emissions
3.1.13. Compounds of nickel
3.1.14. Wood dust
3.1.15. Crystalline silica
3.1.16. Mycotoxins
3.1.17. Arsenic
4. Other diseases
4.1. Miners’ nystagmus
176 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Appendix 3
EMPLOYER
1. Registered name with the Compensation Commissioner ..........................................................
2. Registration number of this business with the Compensation
Commissioner
3. Contact person.............................................................................................................................
4. Street address ................................................................................ 5. Postal code....................
6. Postal address.......................................... 7. Postal code.............. 8. Tel. (......) .................
9. Fax (......)........... 10. Situation of business/farm .....................................................................
11. Nature of business, trade or industry ..........................................................................................
EMPLOYEE
12. Is the injured employee a working director, working member of a CC, owner of or a part-
ner in the business? ....................................................................................................................
13. Surname ........................................................... 14. First names ..............................................
15. Id. No. ......................................... 16. Date of Birth ...../...../..... 17. Sex Male Female
ACCIDENT
26. Date of accident ……………/…………/………… 27. Time ......................
28. Place of accident ................................................................................. 29. District ..................
30. Date employee reported accident ……………/…………/………… 31. Time ......................
32. What task was the employee performing at the time of the accident? ......................................
33. Period of experience in task performed (years/months) …………………/………………
34. Was his action at the time of the accident in connection with your trade
Yes No
or business? (If “no” state reasons on reverse side)
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 177
35. Short description of how the accident occurred. (ALSO mark the applicable items on
reverse side and use the reverse side for a full description.).....................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
(Refer to the machine/process involved and whether the injured person fell or was struck
and all the factors contributing to the accident)
36. Was the accident a traffic accident on a public road? Yes No
37. Nature of injury/ies sustained (e.g. index finger of right hand crushed) .................................
Mark any of the following when applicable: Killed Amputation Unconsciousness
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
178 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
W CI 2 (E)
PART A PAGE 2
FURTHER PARTICULARS
51. Should the employee, to your knowledge, have any physical defect, suffer from any serious
disease prior to the accident or has previously received compensation for permanent
disablement, give full particulars ...............................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................................
52. Was first aid given in this case? Yes No
53. If a medical practitioner treated the employee, state name of the practitioner .......................
......................................................................................................................................................
54. If the employee received treatment at a hospital, state name of hospital .................................
......................................................................................................................................................
55. Was the accident caused by the employee’s:
(a) Deliberate non-compliance with directions? Yes No
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 179
Appendix 4
W.Cl.3
Claim No. .............................
NOTICE OF ACCIDENT AND CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION
COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND DISEASES ACT, 1993
(ACT NO. 130 OF 1993)
(Previously Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1941)
[Section 38(1) and section 43(1)–Commissioner’s rules, forms and particulars–Annexure 14)
1. EMPLOYEE
Surname ..............................................................................................................................................
(Capital letters)
First names ..........................................................................................................................................
(Capital letters)
Id. No. ............................................................... Personnel No. ......................................................
Residential address .............................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................. Postal Code ...................
Occupation Date of birth Sex Marital status
2. EMPLOYER
Name of employer in whose service the accident was contracted .....................................................
..............................................................................................................................................................
Address ................................................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................................................
3. ACCIDENT
(i) When and where did the accident occur?
Date ................................... Time ................................... Place ........................................
(ii) What was the workman doing at the time and how did the accident occur?
...............................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................
(iii) Describe in detail the nature and extent of the injury ........................................................
...............................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................
(iv) Did anybody see the accident happen?
If so, specify? Name .............................................................................................................
Address ..........................................................................................................
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 181
5. (a) If the accident resulted in the DEATH of the employee, the following information
relating to his dependants, on whose behalf the claim is made, should be given:
Full name Address Date of birth Relationship with employee
.................................... .............................. ............................ ......................................................
.................................... .............................. ............................ ......................................................
.................................... .............................. ............................ ......................................................
(b) In the case of all OTHER accidents, the following information should be furnished in
regard to next-of-kin of the employee:
Full name Address Relationship
.................................................. ..................................................... ................................................
.................................................. ..................................................... ................................................
.................................................. ..................................................... ................................................
I certify that the information in this form is to the best of my knowledge correct.
7.1 Introduction
Employees enjoy a common-law right to a safe working environment. Health and safety
legislation is aimed at supplementing this basic right. In the South African context health
and safety legislation was a response to the dangers inherent in mining operations and
dates back to the turn of the twentieth century.
The Machinery and Occupational Safety Act 6 of 1983 was replaced with the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 (OHASA) on 1 January 1994. The long title of
OHASA reads as follows:
To provide for the health and safety of persons at work and for the health and safety of persons
in connection with the use of plant and machinery; the protection of persons other than persons
at work against hazards to health and safety arising out of or in connection with the activities of
persons at work; to establish an advisory council for occupational health and safety; and to pro-
vide for matters connected therewith.
OHASA incorporates a number of improvements on its predecessors. Some of these are:
• an employer’s right to unilaterally appoint health and safety representatives is attenuated
by the requirement that he should consult with his employees or their representatives in
this regard (s 17(2));
• the common-law duty of reasonable care is codified in the Act (see the definition of
“reasonably practicable” in section 1);
• the State is no longer exempted from the penal provisions of the Act (s 47);
• the Act greatly enhances the right of participation of health and safety representatives
in health and safety matters (ss 17–20). Although the Act still follows a largely penal
approach to health and safety enforcement (s 38), it is encouraging that the legislature
has taken a step towards realising that worker empowerment and participation in these
matters are crucial to improved health and safety at the workplace;
• the employer’s duties to inform his workforce of dangers present in the working environ-
ment and to provide training are extended (s 8);
• if directed to do so by the Chief Inspector, employers must prepare written health and
safety policies (s 7);
• protection of the public from health and safety hazards emanating from the workplace
has been increased (s 9).
183
184 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
exposed to hazards, even though this is not supposed to occur in the context of employ-
ment. In addition, the Minister may declare that, for the purposes of the Act or some sec-
tions of the Act, a person or category of persons specified by him will be deemed to be an
employee.
The only exclusions from the Act are the following:
• a mine, a mining area or any works as defined in the Minerals Act 50 of 1991, except
insofar as that Act provides otherwise;
• certain vessels as defined in the Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951;
• the Minister may grant exemptions from any or all of the provisions of the Act; and
• labour brokers are not considered to be employers in terms of this Act.
7.3 Advisory Council for Occupational Health and Safety (ss 2–6)
The Advisory Council for Occupational Health and Safety consists of 20 members, with the
Chief Inspector acting as chairperson. Employers’ and employees’ interests are also repre-
sented on the Council.
• Advise the Minister on matters of policy arising out of
the application of the Act.
• Advise the Minister on matters relating to occupational
health and safety.
• Conduct research and investigations.
• Advise the Department on the formulation and publica-
tion of standards, specifications and other forms of guid-
FUNCTIONS ance in order to assist employers and employees to
OF maintain appropriate standards.
THE COUNCIL • Advise the Department on the promotion of education
and training in occupational health and safety.
• Advise the Department on the collection and dissemin-
ation of information on occupational health and safety.
• The Council may establish technical committees.
• Advise the Department on any matter regarding the
performance of its functions.
(g) to ensure that work is performed and that plant or machinery is used under the super-
vision of a trained person;
(h) to conduct his business in such a manner so as to ensure that persons other than em-
ployees are not exposed to hazards to their health and safety;
(i) to ensure that employees are conversant with the hazards to their health and safety
attached to the work they are performing;
(j) to appoint health and safety representatives and to inform them of inspections, inves-
tigations or formal enquiries of which he has been notified by an inspector;
(k) to inform the health and safety representative of any incident in the workplace for
which the representative has been designated;
(l) to identify and evaluate the hazards associated with listed work (s 11) and, if possible,
prevent the exposure of employees to such work. If prevention is not possible, their ex-
posure must be minimised. An employer must also conduct an occupational hygiene
and biological monitoring programme (ss 11 and 12);
(m) to report to a labour inspector any incident at work in which a person dies, becomes
unconscious, suffers loss of a limb or becomes ill, the spilling or release of a dangerous
substance or where machinery is out of control or fractured, resulting in uncontrolled
moving objects and to ensure that the site of the incident is not disturbed (s 24).
Manufacturers supplying articles or substances to employers have the following duties (s 10):
(a) manufacturers must ensure that articles provided by them are safe and without risk to
health when properly used. They must also provide information to employees regard-
ing the use of any article or substances;
(b) persons who erect or install articles to be used at work must ensure that they are safe
and without risk to health when properly used.
commences business or within four months from such time as the number of employees
exceeds 20, as the case may be.
Before an employer appoints one or more health and safety representatives he must con-
sult with the employees or their representative(s), such as a trade union, regarding the
arrangements and procedures for the nomination or election, terms of office and subse-
quent designation of health and safety representatives. If the employer and his employees
cannot agree on the appointment of health and safety representatives, the matter must be
referred to private arbitration or, if the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator within 14 days,
they must give notice to the President of the Industrial Court who, in consultation with the
Chief Inspector, will designate an arbitrator. This provision, contained in section 17(2) of
the Act, is obviously outdated as the Industrial Court no longer exists. One could argue that
the CCMA will have to appoint an arbitrator because, in terms of the transitional provisions
in the Labour Relations Act, the CCMA must perform the functions previously performed
by the Industrial Court. The counter-argument is that, because the Industrial Court no
longer exists, this provision in the Act falls away. An amendment to this provision in
OHASA is awaited to bring clarity as to how disputes about the appointment of health and
safety representatives should be resolved.
Health and safety representatives receive training and perform their functions and duties
during ordinary working hours. The employer must provide facilities, assistance and train-
ing as may be reasonably required and have been agreed upon to such representatives. A
health and safety representative does not incur any civil liability by reason of the fact only
that he failed to do anything which he may do or is required to do in terms of the Act.
representative must be a member of at least one committee. The employer may nominate
and appoint other persons as members of the committees or a committee may co-opt any
person as an advisory member (with no voting powers) by reason of his knowledge of health
and safety matters.
A health and safety committee must meet at least once in three months, but an inspector
may direct that the committee holds a meeting at a place and time determined by him. If
more than 10% of the employees in a workplace have handed a written request to an in-
spector that a meeting be held, the inspector may by written notice direct that such meeting
be held.
7.9 Miscellaneous
In terms of section 7 the Chief Inspector may direct any employer or class of employers to
prepare a written policy concerning the protection of the health and safety of his employ-
ees at work, including a description of his organisation and the arrangements for carrying
out and reviewing the policy. Such direction must be accompanied by guidelines concern-
ing the content of the policy. The policy must then be displayed at a place where employees
normally have access.
In terms of section 35 any person who is aggrieved by the decision of an inspector may
appeal in writing, and within 60 days, against such a decision to the Chief Inspector, who
must consider the appeal and either confirm it or set it aside. A further right of appeal lies
against the decision of the Chief Inspector to the Labour Court. The appeal to the Labour
Court must be made in writing and within 60 days of the decision of the Chief Inspector.
Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 189
The protection of the health and safety of employees and other persons in the mining in-
dustry is governed by the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996. This Act applies to mines,
mining areas and works.
According to the Act, the employer must take responsibility for the health and safety of
workers at a mine. The employer must provide and maintain a working environment that is
safe and without risk to the health of employees, supply and maintain all the necessary
health and safety equipment, appoint persons and provide them with the means to comply
with the requirements of the Act, establish a health and safety policy and provide the neces-
sary health and safety training.
If employees are exposed to health hazards the employer must establish and maintain a
system of medical surveillance and keep a service record of employees who perform work in
respect of which a medical surveillance is conducted.
In terms of the Act every employee, while at a mine, must take reasonable care to protect
his own health and safety and that of other persons. He must use and take proper care of
protective clothing and equipment, report to his immediate supervisor any situation which
presents a risk to the health and safety of employees and comply with the prescribed health
and safety measures. An employee has the right to leave any workplace whenever circum-
stances arise which appear to pose a serious danger to his health or safety or when the
health and safety representative directs the employee to leave the workplace.
Tripartite institutions The Act provides for the establishment and functioning of two tripar-
tite institutions (whose members represent the State, employers and employees):
• the Mine Health and Safety Council which advises the Minister on health and safety at
mines. The Council may, when necessary, establish a committee or committees, which
may include the Mining Regulation Advisory Committee, the Mining Occupational
Health Advisory Committee and the Safety in Mines Research Advisory Committee; and
• the Mining Qualifications Authority which advises the Minister on training and education
to improve health and safety standards and the registration of education and training
standards and qualifications in the mining industry.
Inspectorate of Mine Health and Safety A Mine Health and Safety Inspectorate is established as
a juristic person. The Chief Inspector of Mines, who is appointed by the Minister, must
ensure that the provisions of the Act are complied with. The Chief Inspector must appoint
an officer with the prescribed qualifications and experience as the Medical Inspector and
officers with the prescribed qualifications and experience as inspectors. The inspectors have
varied powers and functions similar to the powers and functions of inspectors under the
Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1993.
Health and safety representatives and committees The Act provides for the appointment of health
and safety representatives and the establishment of health and safety committees. The em-
ployer is required to conclude a collective agreement with the representative trade union at
the mine to regulate the appointment of representatives and the establishment of commit-
tees.
Questions
Question 1
Discuss the appointment and functions of health and safety representatives. (15)
190 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Question 2
Discuss the establishment and the functions of health and safety committees. (10)
Question 3
Discuss the special powers of inspectors with regards health and safety at a workplace. (6)
Question 4
Discuss the following statements, indicating whether you agree with them or not:
4.1 Failure on the part of an appointed health and safety representative to carry out the
duties he has been charged with in terms of s 18 is a punishable offence. (2)
Hint: See ss 8, 18(4) and 28(1).
4.2 An employer and his employees may enter into a binding contract in terms of
which they undertake that certain provisions of the Act would not be applicable
to them. (2)
Hint: See ss 40 and 41.
4.3 An employer may decide, in consultation with the health and safety representatives,
whether to appoint a health and safety committee. (2)
Hint: See ss 19(1) and 38(1)(a).
4.4 In terms of section 24 a traffic accident on a public road need not be reported
to an inspector. (1)
Hint: See s 24(3)(a).
4.5 The Act applies to persons employed in the public sector. (1)
Hint: See ss 38 and 47.
4.6 Any person aggrieved by a decision of an inspector in terms of this Act may
appeal against that decision to the Labour Court. (2)
Hint: See s 35.
4.7 When an accident in the workplace is reported to an inspector in terms of section 24
of the Act, the employer is exempted from notifying the Compensation Commissioner
of that accident as is normally required by the Compensation for Occupational
Injuries and Diseases Act of 1993. (2)
Question 5
The manager of a clothing factory with a workforce of 80 has recently started operations at
a second plant approximately five kilometres from the existing premises and is under the
impression that he has to appoint a health and safety representative for the second plant.
The workforce at the second plant consists of a foreman and 20 workers. These workers
are semi-skilled operators and belong to a general union. The shop steward of the union at
the new plant approaches the manager, requesting that he should be appointed as health
and safety representative for the new plant. The manager initially intended appointing the
foreman as health and safety representative, since he is already serving on the health and
safety committee of the original workplace. Given these facts, answer the following ques-
tions. Give reasons for your answers:
5.1 Is it at all necessary to appoint a health and safety representative for the second
plant? (4)
5.2 Is the foreman already a health and safety representative? (2)
5.3 What factors should be considered when deciding on who to appoint as a health
and safety representative? (5)
5.4 May the employees resort to industrial action if a dispute arose between the
employer and the trade union over the appointment of the health and safety repre-
sentative? (5)
Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 191
Question 6
Discuss the legal implications of the following situations:
6.1 An employer requires his health and safety representatives to “clock out” for the time
it takes them to fulfil their duties as health and safety representatives. (10)
Hint: See ss 17(7), 23, 38(4), 37(4), 37(5) and 39(3) of OHASA.
6.2 One Saturday a backyard mechanic does repair work on a member’s boat at a yacht
club, using a high-speed saw. He often does this type of work over weekends to aug-
ment his income. While busy with this, a club member (Mr X), who is obviously drunk,
comes aboard for a chat. During the chat the backyard mechanic stops working to
fetch a couple of beers from below deck. While thus occupied he hears a commotion
and hastens onto the deck. In his absence the drunken visitor fiddled around with
the saw and amputated his left foot at the ankle. (10)
Hint: See the definitions of “workplace”, “machinery”, “user” and “premises” in s 1 of
the Act, as well as s 24 (in particular paragraph 24(1)(a)). See also regs 12 and 16 of
the General Administrative Regulations (issued under the Machinery and Occupa-
tional Safety Act).
6.3 The situation is similar to the one described in question 6.2, except that the backyard
mechanic hired the saw from Y. Explain who could be held responsible, Y or the
backyard mechanic. (3)
Hint: See the definition of “user” in s 1 of the Act.
Question 7
Employee X’s wife, who is not an employee of the company, visits her husband at work. As
X’s office is on the first floor, she takes the stairs. On the way up her right shoe is caught in
a rubber strip, which has been hanging loose for a considerable time, but which the health
and safety representative failed to bring to the attention of his employer, an inspector or
the health and safety committee. Mrs X loses her balance, falls and hits her head against the
railings, resulting in a momentary loss of consciousness. A subsequent medical examination
shows that she has not sustained any permanent damage or serious injury.
7.1 Must this incident be reported to an inspector? (3)
7.2 Can Mrs X institute a delictual claim against the health and safety representative? (3)
7.3 What can the employer do? More specifically, can he take disciplinary steps against
the health and safety representative? (3)
Question 8
Discuss the duties of employees and employers in terms of the Act. (20)
Question 9
Mr X, the Chief Executive Officer of XYZ Co, discovers that the welding equipment recently
purchased by him does not meet the prescriptions of the Act. Since the replacement of this
equipment will be costly he tries to recoup some of this cost by selling all but one of the
welding machines to a small mechanical workshop. The remaining welding machine he
gives to his neighbour, Mr Y, who is a full time “backyard mechanic”. Mr Y gives Mr X a
verbal assurance that he knows how to adapt the welding machine so that it will comply with
the prescribed requirements. Discuss the legality of both these transactions by reference to
the applicable provisions of the Act. (10)
Question 10
On instruction of an inspector an employer put up no-smoking notices in those sections of
the factory where flammable materials were used. All employees were informed of the
192 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
no-smoking rule in those areas and the supervisors in those sections were instructed to see
to it that employees do not smoke in the demarcated areas. Despite the rule a practice has
developed over time that workers light up at their work stations when they are about to
leave for lunch or going off duty. They then smoke while walking through the non-smoking
areas to the exits. No one seemed to regard this practice as unacceptable and, indeed, some
supervisors were seen doing the same. One day a fire broke out in one of the non-smoking
areas and it was established that the fire was caused by a spark when a worker lit his pipe. As
a result of the fire three workers sustained severe injuries. Explain whether the employer
can be held liable in terms of the Act. (10)
Question 11
A fire started in the air-conditioning shaft of a building in which employees worked with
highly flammable material. The fire was extinguished, but one employee was killed and two
other employees were seriously injured. Discuss the powers of an inspector in these circum-
stances. (5)
Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 193
Appendix
1
ANNEXURE 1
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT, 1993
(ACT NO. 85 OF 1993)
REGULATION 9 OF THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
RECORDING AND INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENTS
A. RECORDING OF INCIDENT
1. Name of employer .....................................................................................................................
2. Name of affected person ...........................................................................................................
3. Identity number of affected person ...........................................................................................
4. Date of incident .................................................... 5. Time of incident ...............................
6. Part of body affected Head or
Eye Trunk Finger Hand
neck
Arm Foot Leg Internal Multiple
________________________
1 Of the general administrative regulations published under GN R929 in GG 25129 of 25 June 2003.
194 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
...................................................................... ......................................................................
Signature of investigator Date
...................................................................... ......................................................................
Signature of employer Date
...................................................................... ......................................................................
Signature of Chairman of Date
Health and Safety Committee
8
SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
8.1 Introduction
A skilled workforce is an essential requirement for the growth of our economy. Training is,
therefore, becoming increasingly important. Since 1922 statutory provisions have been in
existence to ensure that certain categories of employees receive adequate theoretical and
practical training to equip them to perform at prescribed levels of skills in certain trades
and occupations. The first statute was the Apprenticeship Act 26 of 1922. After a number of
amendments over the following 20 years, the Act was finally replaced by the Apprenticeship
Act 37 of 1944. The 1944 Act underwent a number of changes and other statutes were
enacted alongside it, such as the Training of Artisans Act 38 of 1951 and the Black Building
Workers Act 27 of 1951. In 1970 the Industrial Conciliation Act was amended to allow for
the introduction of training schemes into industrial council agreements. The Black Employ-
ees In-Service Training Act was introduced in 1976 and the In-Service Training Act in 1979.
The Wiehahn Commission recommended the consolidation of these laws, which eventually
culminated in the enactment of the Manpower Training Act in 1981.
The Manpower Training Act 56 of 1981 established a statutory framework for employment-
related training, but from 1995 much work and deliberation went into further developing
our laws pertaining to training. These efforts resulted in the publication of a Green Paper
on skills development in March 1997, the Green Paper on Skills Development Strategy for
Economic and Employment Growth in South Africa. Public comment and negotiations fol-
lowed, amendments to the Green Paper were effected and in September 1998 the Skills
Development Bill was submitted to Parliament for approval. The Bill was enacted as the
Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 (SDA) and came into effect on 2 February 1999, save for
the provisions relating to the establishment and functioning of SETAs, the Skills Develop-
ments Planning Unit and labour centres, which commenced on 10 September 1999.
Amendments to the SDA were introduced by the Skills Development Levies Act 9
of 1999, the Skills Development Amendment Acts 31 of 2003, 37 of 2008 and 26 of 2011
and the Higher Education Laws Amendment Act 26 of 2010. A significant change was the
transfer of certain responsibilities in terms of the Act from the Minister of Labour to the
Minister of Higher Education and Training. The Minister of Labour was until 31 October
2009 responsible for administering the regulatory framework of the SDA. With effect from
1 November 2009 the provisions dealing with skills development matters were transferred to
1
the Minister of Higher Education and Training. The Minister of Labour retained responsi-
bility for administering the provisions of the SDA dealing with employment services and
workplace productivity.
________________________
195
196 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
________________________
2 The National Qualifications Framework Act 67 of 2008 has repealed the South African Qualifications
Authority Act 58 of 1995 in its entirety.
Skills development 197
developed: Policy Proposals for a new Employment Statute and Policy Proposals for a new
Employment and Occupational Equity Statute. The Green Paper on Skills Development
Strategy for Economic and Employment Growth in South Africa is complementary to all of
these. The latest strategy development is the National Skills Development Strategy III which
applies until 2015.
The Labour Relations Act stipulates that bargaining and statutory councils have “to pro-
mote and establish training and education schemes” (ss 28(f) and 43(1)(b) of the LRA). In
terms of section 84(1) of the LRA an employer is required to consult with a workplace
forum on education and training. It is, consequently, envisaged that sectoral intermediar-
ies, such as Sector Training and Education Authorities (SETAs), would support and interact
with bargaining councils, statutory councils and workplace forums in respect of training.
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 overlaps with the Skills Development
Act in that an employer and a learner are required to enter into a contract of employment
if the learner was not in the employment of the employer when a learnership agreement
was concluded. The Minister may also by sectoral determinations set terms and conditions
of employment for learners.
The Employment Equity Act of 1998 makes provision for an employer to retain and
develop people from designated groups and to implement appropriate training measures,
including skills development in terms of the Skills Development Act.
QCTO
CHAMBER CHAMBER
AND
AND
responsibilities, powers and duties of the accounting authority of the SETA; identify the
SETA by name and sector; set out the general objectives and functions of the SETA; estab-
lish and identify the functions of committees, such as executive, audit and finance commit-
tees; provide for the appointment of a Chief Executive Officer and other employees; deal
with the finances of the SETA; and include a code of conduct and dispute resolution sys-
tem. A SETA wishing to deviate from the standard constitution must apply in writing to the
Minister and provide the necessary motivation. The Minister may approve a deviation if it is
unique to the functions and operation of the specific SETA and is recommended by the
NSA (s 13).
The Minister must appoint the accounting authority of every SETA. The authority is
composed of a chairperson and 14 members representing organised labour, organised
business, relevant government departments, professional bodies, bargaining councils and
community organisations. In appointing these members the Minister should have regard to
the interests identified in the national skills development strategy, to the knowledge, skills
and expertise required for the effective running of the SETA and to the representation of
disadvantaged groups (s 11).
The accounting authority must within six months of its appointment and after following
a transparent process submit a list of three persons with experience in accounting, financial
and senior management matters to the Minister. The Minister must appoint one of the
three as Chief Executive Officer of the SETA (s 13B).
A SETA may, with the approval of the Minister, establish chambers in its sector. Each
chamber must have equal representation of employees and employers and must perform
the functions delegated to it in terms of the constitution of the SETA. A chamber is entitled
to such a percentage of the skills development levies collected in its jurisdiction as the Min-
ister, after consultation with the SETA, determines (s 12).
The functions of a SETA cover a broad spectrum of activities (s 10). A SETA must inter
alia:
• develop a sector skills plan within the framework of the national skills development strat-
egy;
• implement its sector skills plan by establishing learnerships, approving workplace skills
plans, allocating grants and monitoring education and training in the sector;
• promote learnerships and register learnership agreements;
• apply for accreditation with SAQA as a body responsible for monitoring and auditing
achievements in terms of established education and training standards or qualifications;
• collect and disburse skills development levies in its sector;
• liaise with the NSA in respect of the national skills development strategy and its sector
skills plan;
• submit to the Director-General reports on the implementation of its sector skills plan
and financial statements of its income and expenditure;
• liaise with the provincial offices and labour centres of the Department and any other
education body to improve information regarding employment opportunities;
• liaise with the QCTO regarding occupational qualifications; and
• appoint staff necessary for the performance of its functions.
Every SETA must conclude a service-level agreement with the Director-General for each
financial year. This agreement must make provision for the performance of the SETA’s
functions, for its annual business plan and for any assistance the Director-General is to pro-
vide the SETA (s 10A).
A SETA is financed mainly from skills development levies collected in its sector and mon-
ies paid to it from the National Skills Fund. All monies must be paid into a banking account
and may only be used to fund the performance of its functions. Proper financial statements
must be kept which must be submitted to the Auditor-General for an annual audit (s 14).
Skills development 201
If a SETA is not performing its functions, fails to comply with the service-level agreement,
is not managing its finance according to the Act, is not representative or does not have an
employment equity plan, the Minister may issue a written instruction, setting out the steps
the SETA is required to take and the period within which such steps must be taken (s 14A).
If a SETA fails to perform its functions, is guilty of mismanagement or is no longer rep-
resentative of the stakeholders, the Minister may, after consultation with the NSA and by
notice in the Government Gazette, direct the Director-General to appoint an administrator to
take over the administration of the SETA (s 15).
Chapter 6A provides for the establishment and functions of a national artisan modera-
tion body, the listing of trades, trade tests and the establishment and maintenance of a
national register of artisans.
• National artisan moderation body: The Director-General must establish a national artisan
moderation body to monitor the performance of accredited artisan trade test centres,
moderate artisan trade tests, record artisan achievement, develop and maintain a nation-
al data-bank of assessors and moderators and recommend the certification of artisans to
the QCTO.
• Listing of trades: The Minister may, on application by one or more SETAs, by notice in the
Government Gazette list any occupation as a trade for which an artisan qualification is re-
quired.
• National register of artisans: The Director-General is required to maintain a register of per-
sons who have obtained an artisan qualification and who are practising that trade. The
Act prohibits anyone, whether employed or self-employed, from holding himself or her-
self out as a qualified artisan in a listed trade unless he or she is registered on the nation-
al register.
• Trade tests: No person may obtain an artisan qualification unless he or she has successfully
undergone a trade test administered by an accredited trade test centre. A person may
apply to undergo a trade test if he or she has completed a learnership relevant to the
trade or satisfied the relevant requirements of an apprenticeship or if an accredited
trade test centre has certified that he or she has acquired sufficient prior learning related
to that trade. The applicant must also have completed any other learning programme
resulting in an occupational or vocational qualification that entitles him or her to un-
dergo the relevant trade test. The QCTO must issue trade certificates to persons who suc-
cessfully complete trade tests.
The levies collected by the Commissioner must be paid into the National Revenue Fund.
The Director-General must allocate the funds as follows:
(a) if there is a SETA 20% of the levies must be allocated to the National Skills Fund and
80% to the SETA (provided the SETA has complied with the provisions of the Skills
Development Act);
(b) if there is no SETA 100% of the levies must be allocated to the NSF.
Certain provisions of the Income Tax Act are applicable to the levies paid or payable to the
Commissioner (s 13). These provisions relate, inter alia, to administration, assessments,
objections and appeals, refunds and reporting of unprofessional conduct.
The Minister may determine that the levy is payable to a SETA and not to the Commis-
sioner. Before making such a determination the Minister and the Minister of Finance must
be satisfied that sufficient grounds exist for the SETA to collect the levies from the employ-
ers in its jurisdiction, that the SETA (or nominated body) has demonstrated that it is com-
petent to collect the levy and that the costs of collection will not exceed 2% of the total
amount of the levies collected.
Where the levies are to be paid to a SETA, they may be paid directly to that SETA or to a
body nominated by the SETA to collect the levies on its behalf. The executive officer of the
SETA must then pay 20% of the levies collected to the NSF.
A labour inspector appointed in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act is
regarded as an inspector for the purposes of this Act in so far as it relates to the collection
of levies by a SETA. The Director-General may designate any person to be an inspector of a
SETA or its nominated body. Inspectors have the same powers and functions as provided
for in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.
A levy payable by an employer to a SETA or its nominated body is regarded as a debt due
to the SETA. Any amount that remains unpaid on the due date may be recovered by action
in a magistrate’s court having jurisdiction in the area in which the employer carries on busi-
ness.
The Commissioner or the SETA that collected the levies, may withhold a collection fee
and pay the remainder to the NSF. Interest, as well as a penalty of 10% of the unpaid
amount are payable on the late payment of levies.
These grants may be allocated to employers falling within the jurisdiction of the SETA,
including employers who are not liable to pay the skills levy, to other associations or organ-
isations that meet the criteria for the payment of such grants and to public service employ-
ers in the national and provincial sphere of government.
Questions
Question 1
Discuss the objectives of the National Skills Development Strategy. (20)
Question 2
Give a detailed exposition of the purposes of the Skills Development Act. (12)
Question 3
Briefly state the purpose for which each of the following bodies has been established and
give its main functions:
(a) the National Skills Authority; (8)
(b) a SETA; (10)
(c) labour centres; (5)
(d) national artisan moderation body; and (4)
(e) Quality Council for Trades and Occupations. (4)
Question 4
Define and describe the nature of a “learnership agreement”. Include in your answer the
duties of each of the parties to such an agreement. (10)
Question 5
A learner is fairly dismissed by his employer due to misconduct. Briefly discuss the conse-
quences of such a dismissal. (5)
Question 6
6.1 Bryan Learner has just completed his school career. He wishes to undergo further
training. Explain to Bryan the different learning programmes the Skills Development
Act provides for. (10)
6.2 Assume that Bryan wishes to qualify as an electrician. Explain to him the education
and training he will have to undergo to become a qualified artisan. (8)
Question 7
Discuss the establishment and financing of the National Skills Fund. (4)
Question 8
Discuss the purpose of the Skills Development Levies Act and then refer to:
8.1 employers who are liable to pay the levy; (6)
8.2 registration of those employers; (4)
8.3 the payment of levies; (20)
8.4 grants that employers who provide training may apply for. (8)
208 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Appendix
SCHEDULE 1
Definition and Criteria to Classify an Occupation as a Trade
Section 26B of the Skills Development Act indicates that SETAs may apply to the Minister in the
prescribed form to include an occupation as a listed trade in the Gazette.
In order to align the inclusion of any such occupation as a trade on the gazetted list with estab-
lished skills development planning processes, SETAs will be required to include such an appli-
cation on the form as prescribed in the procedure of submitting new occupations to the
Department for inclusion on the Organizing Framework of Occupations (OFO).
However any occupation that a SETA wants to be included as a trade on the OFO must first be
submitted to the National Artisan Moderation Body (NAMB) for evaluation and possible en-
dorsement that the occupation meets the criteria for classification of an occupation as a Trade.
The relevant forms to request new occupations on the OFO have been adjusted to include the
submission of such an application by a SETA to NAMB should the SETA wish to do so.
In this regard the Skills Development Amendment Act defines:
• An artisan as “a person who has been certified as competent to perform a listed trade in
accordance with the Skills Development Act”
• A trade is “an occupation for which an artisan qualification is required in terms of section 26
B” of the Skills Development Act.
The NAMB will utilize the titles, descriptors, alternate titles, and tasks from the prevailing version
of the OFO as the basis to determine which occupations are trades and can be listed by the Min-
ister.
Criteria that will be utilized by NAMB to classify occupations as Trades.
The occupational titles, descriptors, alternate titles, and tasks will be compared to the following
broad generic description of a trade:
An occupation where in a qualified person applies a high level of practical skills supported
and re-enforced by underpinning and applied knowledge to:
• Manufacture, produce, service, install or maintain tangible goods, products or equipment
in an engineering and/or technical work environment (excluding process controllers and oper-
ators).
• Uses tools and equipment to perform of his/her duties.
• Measure and do fault finding on process, manufacturing, production and/or technical
machinery and equipment to apply corrective or repair actions.
• Apply and adhere to all relevant health, safety and environmental legislation.
• Has an accumulative learning period covering knowledge, practical and workplace learn-
ing that is equivalent to three or more years.
Skills development 209
The route to achieve artisan status will also be considered as such a route is uniquely character-
istic of a trade and usually includes features such as:
• a structured learning programme of knowledge, practical and work experience;
• a structured learning programme that must be successfully completed before a final assess-
ment is attempted;
• a final external summative assessment that must be passed and is known as a trade test.
Historic and global classification of occupations as trades will also be considered.
Any occupation that is determined by NAMB to align to the above criteria will be endorsed for
classification as a trade.
SCHEDULE 2
Occupations to be listed as trades for which artisan qualifications are required:
The list below is based on the prevailing version of the Organising Framework for Occupations
(OFO).
Specialisations under trades as listed could be checked using the prevailing version of the Organ-
ising Framework for Occupations.
9.1 Introduction
The Employment Services Act 4 of 2014 (ESA) was assented to on 3 April 2014, but has not
1
yet come into operation.
ESA is the product of an in-depth review by the Department of Labour, with the
assistance of the ILO, into the effectiveness of its programmes relating, inter alia, to the
provision of public employment services and the promotion of employment for work
seekers. After a comparative study among countries with similar economic conditions as
South Africa, three areas of focus were identified and prioritised by the Department: public
employment services, labour policy and industrial relations and inspection and enforce-
ment.
The Act is, therefore, aimed at the re-organisation of existing public employment ser-
2
vices and bringing programmes in line with the priorities. To this end, the ESA’s aims
include the establishment of public employment services; the establishment of schemes to
promote the employment of young work seekers and other vulnerable persons; the pro-
vision of assistance to employees in distressed companies to retain their employment; to
facilitate the employment of foreign nationals in a manner consistent with the objects of
the Immigration Act 13 of 2002; and the regulation of private employment agencies. In
order to achieve these goals the Act establishes the Employment Services Board, Produc-
tivity South Africa and Supported Employment Enterprises.
In its quest to realise the purposes of the ESA, the legislature decided to remove all the
statutory provisions relating to employment services and Productivity South Africa, at
present contained in the Skills Development Act (see Chapter 8), from that Act and rather
include them in the ESA in the hope that the changes will provide an invigorated legal basis
for the provision of public employment services.
The Act is intended to contribute to government’s objective of “more jobs, decent work
and sustainable livelihoods”. Public employment services will be well-positioned to play a
significant role in the promotion and preservation of employment and assisting employers
and employees to adapt to changing labour market conditions. The Act accordingly pro-
vides a policy framework within which public and private employment agencies can work
together to facilitate entry into employment whilst at the same time providing protection to
vulnerable workers.
213
214 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
work seekers; providing opportunities for new entrants to the labour market to gain work
experience; improving re-employment prospects for employees facing retrenchments;
facilitating access to education and training for work seekers, in particular vulnerable work
seekers; promoting employment, growth and workplace productivity; and facilitating the
employment of foreign nationals in a manner that gives effect to the constitutional right to
fair labour practices, but at the same time not impacting adversely on existing labour
standards and the rights and expectations of South African workers.
The purposes are to be achieved by providing comprehensive and integrated free public
employment services, co-ordinating the activities of public sector agencies whose activities
impact on the provision of employment services; establishing schemes to promote employ-
ment and regulating private employment agencies.
The Director-General of the Department of Labour must maintain labour centres, with
suitable personnel and financial resources, to ensure easy access to members of the public
to the public employment services.
9.3 Definitions (s 1)
Some of the more important definitions are the following:
“employee” bears the same meaning as defined in section 1 of the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act (see Chapter 3 par 3.4);
“employment services” includes the provision of the following services:
(a) advising or counselling of workers on career choices, either by the provision of information
or other approaches;
(b) assessment of work seekers for:
(i) entry or re-entry into the labour market; or
(ii) education and training;
(c) referring work seekers:
(i) to employers to apply for vacancies; or
(ii) to training providers for education and training;
(d) assisting employers:
by providing recruitment and placement services;
(ii) by advising employers on the availability of work seekers with skills that match their
needs;
(e) performing the functions of temporary employment services; and
(f) any other prescribed employment service;
“foreign national” means an individual who is not a South African citizen or does not have a
permanent residence permit issued in terms of the Immigration Act;
“private employment agency” means any person who provides employment services for gain;
“public employment services” means the public employment services the Department of Labour
must provide free of charge to members of the public;
“work opportunity” means a vacancy or opportunity for employment or work experience, self-
employment or community service;
“work scheme” means any programme aimed at assisting people to find or remain in
employment or to set themselves up in self-employment; and
“work seeker” means any person who is looking for work.
3
LABOUR RELATIONS
10
DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN
LABOUR LAW
10.1 Introduction
With the birth of a new, democratic South Africa it was necessary to reform the labour laws
of the country. Soon after the new parliament was elected in 1994 the Minister of Labour
initiated a five-year plan to modernise the legal framework and the institutions that regu-
late the labour market. The first step in this process was to overhaul the laws regulating
labour relations.
1
The following problems with labour relations laws were experienced at the time:
• the multiplicity of laws governing labour relations created inconsistency, unnecessary
complexity, duplication of resources and jurisdictional confusion;
• the lack of an overall and integrated legislative framework for labour law;
• the contradictions in policy introduced by numerous ad hoc amendments to labour legis-
lation over the years;
• the reliance on post hoc rule-making by the courts under the unfair labour practice juris-
diction;
• the extensive discretion given to administrators and adjudicators;
• the haphazard and unintegrated nature of collective bargaining institutions;
• the ineffectiveness of the conciliation machinery and procedures;
• the lengthy and expensive dispute resolution system;
• the criminal enforcement of labour law and collective agreements;
• the lack of compliance with the Constitution of the Republic and public international
law; and
• the fact that the Labour Relations Act of 1956 did not take the objectives of the Recon-
struction and Development Programme into account.
The only manner in which these problems could be addressed, was to rewrite the Labour
Relations Act with the support of all the social partners.
In the old regime the National Manpower Commission (NMC), representing the inter-
ests of the State, employers and employees, conducted investigations and submitted rec-
ommendations to the Minister of Labour on all labour matters. With the advent of the new
South Africa it became evident that a new body was required to address existing problems
and to develop possible solutions in a holistic manner. This body had to be fully representa-
tive of all the stakeholders to make meaningful discussions and negotiations possible. The
first step, therefore, in the transition of South African labour law was the promulgation of
the National Economic, Development and Labour Council Act of 1994.
________________________
1 For a detailed discussion see the Explanatory Memorandum in Government Gazette 16259 of 10 February
1995.
221
222 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
NATIONAL SUMMIT
• Convened annually by Executive Council – not
part of NEDLAC
• Report back on NEDLAC activities to ensure
transparency and obtain inputs
• Composition: maximum of 300 persons
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
• Meet at least quarterly
• Composition: maximum of 18 representatives from
each constituency
• Receive reports from chambers and conclude
agreements between parties
• Duties: to convene an annual national summit of
interested parties; to prepare an annual budget
and annual report; responsible for audited finan-
cial accounts and balance sheets of NEDLAC
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
• Composition: all convenors on Executive Council
and chambers
• Oversees and co-ordinates work of NEDLAC
between meetings of Executive Council
continued
Development of South African Labour Law 223
CHAMBERS
• Composition: 6 delegates per constituency
• Drafts reports and makes recommendations to
NEDLAC
Members representing organised business and organised labour are appointed by the Min-
ister from nominations made by the different organisations, while members representing
government are appointed by the President. Members representing community and devel-
opment interests are appointed by the Minister without Portfolio in the Office of the
2
President from nominations by democratically constituted organisations. These organisa-
tions represent a significant community interest on a national basis and have a direct
interest in reconstruction and development (s 3).
The constitution of NEDLAC provides, inter alia, for the following: the manner in which
nominations for appointment as members must be done, the criteria by which and manner
in which organised business and labour shall admit members, the removal of members, the
appointment, removal, duties and powers of the chairpersons, office-bearers and officials,
the establishment, composition and functions of the executive council, various chambers
and committees, including the management committee, the convening of, quorum for and
conduct of meetings of the executive council, chambers and committees, the keeping of
minutes and the amendment of the constitution (s 4).
The Executive Council of NEDLAC is established in accordance with the provisions of its
constitution. This council possesses extensive competencies and may, inter alia, exercise and
perform all the powers and functions allocated to NEDLAC, adopt a constitution for NED-
LAC and amend it, establish the four chambers and committees, including a management
committee, to assist it in the exercise of its powers and the performance of its functions.
This council may also conduct any enquiries, develop conventions to regulate its relation-
ship with Parliament and its standing committees, develop rules and protocols for the con-
duct of relations with other institutions, develop codes of conduct to regulate the conduct
of members and representatives and appoint a secretariat for NEDLAC.
2 This Ministry was abolished in 1996. Its functions were transferred to the office of the Deputy President.
224 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
(b) seek to reach consensus and conclude agreements on matters pertaining to social and
economic policy;
(c) consider all proposed labour legislation relating to labour market policy before it is
introduced in Parliament;
(d) consider all significant changes to social and economic policy before it is implemented
or introduced in Parliament; and
(e) encourage and promote the formulation of co-ordinated policy on social and econom-
ic matters.
In pursuing its goals NEDLAC has to conduct the necessary investigations and research on
social and economic matters, keep abreast of international development in social and eco-
nomic policy, continually evaluate the effectiveness of legislation and work in close co-op-
eration with departments of State, statutory bodies and other forums and non-govern-
mental agencies engaged in the formulation and the implementation of social and eco-
nomic policy.
Questions
Question 1
Briefly discuss the developments which culminated in the establishment of NEDLAC. (8)
Question 2
Name the key role-players in NEDLAC and discuss NEDLAC’s functions and objectives. (10)
Question 3
Give an exposition of NEDLAC’s structure and then briefly discuss the composition and
functions of the separate structures within NEDLAC. (20)
Question 4
A federation of unions, COSAWU, representing 250 000 employees, applied to become an
employee member of NEDLAC, but its application for membership was denied.
According to section 4 of the National Economic Development and Labour Council
Act 35 of 1994, the constitution of NEDLAC must provide for:
(c) the manner in which organised labour may nominate persons for appointment as members
and
(d) the criteria by which and manner in which organised labour shall admit federations of trade
unions . . .
Clause 9 of the NEDLAC constitution provides for membership of NEDLAC. Clauses 9.4
and 9.5 stipulate that an application must be referred to the constituency concerned – i.e.
business, labour or the State – for that constituency to determine possible membership. In
compliance with clause 9, COSAWU’s application for membership was referred to the con-
venor of the labour constituency. The founding federations of the labour constituency,
COSATU, NACTU and FEDUSA, had informally set as a criterion for membership the re-
quirement that a federation represent at least 300 000 workers. Consequently, because
COSAWU represents only 250 000 workers, its application was turned down.
Discuss whether NEDLAC or a specific constituency should set out the criteria for
admission. (10)
Hint: Confederation of SA Workers Unions v NEDLAC & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 1831 (SCA).
11
LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995
NOTE
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) has been amended by the Labour Relations Amend-
ment Act 6 of 2014. The Amendment Act was assented to on 15 August 2014 and comes into effect
on 1 January 2015 (save for section 37(c) of the Amendment Act inserting section 198(4F) into the
principal Act).
11.1 Introduction
The Industrial Conciliation Act was enacted in 1956 to regulate labour relations. It provided
for collective bargaining and dispute resolution, but was applicable to whites in the private
sector only, thus excluding many employees in a variety of sectors. The Act was amended
from time to time and by the late 1970s it had become necessary to take an in-depth look at
the laws regulating labour relations. The Wiehahn Commission was appointed to investigate
labour legislation and to make recommendations on how the laws should be changed.
Following the Wiehahn Commission’s recommendations significant changes were intro-
duced in late 1979 and early 1980. The more important changes included changing the
name of the Act to the Labour Relations Act, introducing the concept of “unfair labour
practice” into South African Labour Law for the first time, establishing the Industrial Court
and making the Act applicable to all race groups. The Industrial Court was tasked with the
responsibility to develop the concept of “unfair labour practice”.
These amendments were undoubtedly a leap towards a more encompassing law and a
first step in eliminating racial discrimination. Despite incorporating the new ideas, the Act
was still not adequate in all respects. It remained applicable to the private sector only, with
the result that many categories of employees still did not enjoy the rights and protection
created by the Act and the dispute resolution procedures in particular were cumbersome,
time consuming and costly. Subsequent amendments to the Act, including the establish-
ment of a Labour Appeal Court, were not sufficient to satisfy the remaining inadequacies.
The fact that a number of employees were still excluded from the Act gave rise to the
enactment of laws to regulate labour relations in those sectors excluded from the Act. The
Education Labour Relations Act 146 of 1993 (ELRA), the Agricultural Labour Act 147 of
1993 (ALA) and the Public Service Labour Relations Act 102 of 1993 (PSLRA) were prom-
ulgated in 1993. They duplicated to a large extent the provisions of the LRA.
The ELRA was applicable to teachers employed by the Department of Education, that is,
teachers at public schools and colleges. The ALA was applicable to the farming sector, for
the first time making labour relations laws applicable to farm workers. And, the PSLRA was
applicable to the public sector, that is, the State as employer and all employees in public
225
226 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
service. Thus, by the end of 1993 the majority of employees were covered by legislation. The
conspicuous exclusions from all the statutes were domestic workers, teachers at private
schools and lecturers at tertiary educational institutions.
The multiplicity of laws and the resultant unnecessary duplication, the cumbersome and
costly dispute resolution procedures and a number of other inadequacies necessitated a
review of legislation governing labour relations. Soon after the birth of the new, democratic
South Africa in 1994 the Minister of Labour implemented a five-year plan in terms of which
labour legislation was to be overhauled, the Labour Relations Act of 1956 being the first to
receive attention.
A ministerial legal task team was appointed by the Minister of Labour on 8 August 1994
to draft a new Labour Relations Bill. Assisted by the International Labour Organisation
(ILO) and specialist practitioners, the task team produced a document for negotiation in
Bill form, accompanied by a detailed explanatory memorandum. The aim was to initiate a
process of public debate and negotiation by all social partners in order to reach consensus
on a new labour relations dispensation for South Africa. The proposals, tabled before NED-
LAC, the Public Service Bargaining Council and the Education Labour Relations Council,
were published in Bill form in the Government Gazette on 10 February 1995, inviting public
comment.
After due process of discussion and negotiation NEDLAC tabled a report on 21 July
1995, recommending the adoption of the draft Bill by the Cabinet, subject to the necessary
amendments occasioned by the agreements reached between the negotiating parties, pub-
lic submissions, the submissions from the Public Service Bargaining Council and the Edu-
cation Labour Relations Council and the redrafting of the Bill into simple language. The
tripartite Committee of Principals appointed by NEDLAC was authorised to consider any
amendments and to be available to Parliament during the legislative process. The Bill was
adopted by Parliament on 13 September 1995 and became the new Labour Relations Act 66
of 1995 (the LRA).
The new LRA did not come into operation immediately because new structures had to
be created under the 1995 LRA, such as the Labour Court, a new Labour Appeal Court and
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). After the establish-
ment of the new structures the new LRA finally came into operation on 11 November 1996.
The new LRA gives effect to the stated goals and principles of the Reconstruction and
Development Programme of the government, ensures that labour legislation complies with
the provisions of the Constitution and brings the South African labour law in line with the
Conventions and recommendations of the ILO (International Labour Organisation). Some
of the significant changes brought about by the Act are the following:
• the recognition of employees’ right to strike and employers’ recourse to lock-out;
• the introduction of employee participation in decision-making in the workplace;
• the process of conciliation in an attempt to resolve disputes between an employer and its
employee(s) or a trade union and, if conciliation fails, the arbitration by the CCMA or
bargaining councils or adjudication by the Labour Court of those disputes;
• the establishment of a new specialised court, the Labour Court, and a new Labour
Appeal Court; and
• the introduction of statutory councils where no bargaining councils exist.
The main objectives of the Act are to advance economic development, social justice, labour
peace and the democratisation of the workplace (s 1). These goals are to be reached by
furthering the primary objectives of the Act, which are:
• to give effect to the fundamental rights conferred by the Bill of Rights contained in the
Constitution;
• to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic of South Africa as a member state
of the ILO;
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 227
• to provide a framework for collective bargaining between trade unions and employers
and employers’ organisations; and
• to promote orderly collective bargaining, collective bargaining at sectoral level, employ-
ee participation in decision-making in the workplace and the effective resolution of la-
bour disputes.
In an attempt to give greater effect to the objectives of the Act, significant amendments
were introduced in 2002 by means of the Labour Relations Amendment Act 12 of 2002
which took effect on 1 August 2002. Further important amendments have been enacted in
the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014 which take effect on 1 January 2015.
________________________
1 “Employee” is given a different and very specific meaning in the context of a workplace forum (see Ch 5
of the Act). The LRA (and other labour legislation) is applicable to ‘employees’ only, meaning that a per-
son who is not an employee does not enjoy the protection of the LRA. However, in one instance a work
seeker or job applicant is protected and that is in the instance of freedom of association, the provisions
of which are found in Ch 2 of the Act. Job applicants also enjoy protection against unfair discrimination
in terms of the Employment Equity Act (EEA). The protection against unfair discrimination initially
formed part of Sch 7 of the LRA, but was removed from the LRA and included in Ch 2 of the EEA.
228 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
regardless of the form of the contract. The onus is on the employer to prove the contrary.
This rebuttable presumption created in section 200A is applicable for the purposes of the
LRA, any employment law and section 98A of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.
A person is presumed to be an employee if he:
(a) is subject to the control or direction of another person (the employer);
(b) works hours that are subject to the control of another person;
(c) forms part of the organisation;
(d) has worked for another person for an average of at least 40 hours per month over the
last three months;
(e) is economically dependent on the person for whom he works;
(f) is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person; or
(g) only works for one person.
This presumption does not apply to persons who earn in excess of the threshold amount
stipulated by the Minister in terms of section 6(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment
Act (currently R205 433-30). If a person in a proposed or existing work arrangement earns
an amount equal to or less than the amount determined by the Minister, any of the parties
may approach the CCMA for an advisory award on whether that person is an employee or
not.
Persons who do not receive or are not entitled to receive remuneration in cash and/or
kind for the work they perform are also excluded from the definition of “employee”. These
include persons performing unpaid or “volunteer” work, for example, in charitable organ-
isations and a family member of an employer who performs services without payment (see
s 213 for a definition of remuneration.)
The second part of the definition is wider and does not specifically refer to the require-
ment of remuneration in order to be considered an employee. Persons who receive no re-
muneration may thus be included; as may, apparently, independent contractors and other
persons ordinarily not regarded as employees, such as partners and agents. When interpret-
ing the similarly worded definition of “employee” in the 1956 Act our courts traditionally
read some limitations into the wording, otherwise any person who “assists in carrying on the
business of the employer” may be regarded as an employee, such as an accountant or
attorney. Consequently, the courts have distinguished between “assisting in the carrying on
or conducting of business” and “performing work or services which have the effect of pro-
viding such assistance”. Persons involved in the latter category, such as the independent
contractor, are thus excluded.
Included in the definition of “employee” are casual employees, managers and directors
of a company, shop stewards who are employees, migrant workers, probationary employees
and other temporary employees. An employee who was dismissed and who, therefore, can
no longer be termed an “employee” has access to the dispute resolution procedures of the
LRA to challenge the fairness of his or her dismissal.
Because “employer” is not defined in the LRA it is necessary to refer to the definition of
“employee” in order to determine who is an employer. An employer is a person who
receives services from an employee for remuneration or who is assisted in the conduct of its
business by an employee. It has been suggested that an employer is a company or other
person or persons who has control of the undertaking in which the employee is employed.
A difficult situation arises where a labour broker provides labour to a client (e.g. a com-
pany) in return for a fee. The client concludes an agreement with a temporary employment
service (the labour broker) for this purpose. Who then is the employer of the employee?
The Act expressly stipulates in section 198 that the labour broker is the employer and the
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 229
person whose services have been procured (excluding an independent contractor) is the
employee of the labour broker. However, the labour broker and its client are liable in soli-
dum if the former contravenes a bargaining council collective agreement that regulates
employment conditions, an arbitration award dealing with conditions of employment, the
Basic Conditions of Employment Act or a sectoral determination (s 198(4)). This is the
position prior to the enactment of the 2014 amendments.
The furore over labour brokers and the exploitation of labour broker employees and
other temporary employees prompted the legislature to include a number of provisions in
the 2014 amendments to regulate employment by labour brokers and the employment of
vulnerable employees on a temporary basis. Section 198 has been amended and a new
section 198A inserted to regulate labour brokers or temporary employment services (TES).
A new section 198B has been inserted and deals with the employment of fixed-term con-
tract employees earning below the threshold determined by the Minister (in terms of
section 6(3) of the BCEA, currently R205 433-30). A new section 198C deals with part-time
employees earning below the threshold and a new section 198D provides for conciliation
and arbitration of disputes arising from the interpretation or application of sections 198A,
198B and 198C.
The amended section 198 includes the following additions to the existing section 198:
• where a TES and its client are jointly and severally liable in terms of section 198(4) or
where the client is deemed to be the employer of the employee in terms of section
198A(3) (see below), an employee is entitled to institute proceedings against either the
TES or the client or both. Similarly, an inspector acting in terms of the BCEA may se-
cure compliance against either the TES or the client or against both and any order or
award made against the TES or the client may be enforced against either of them;
• a TES may not employ an employee on terms and conditions of employment contrary to
the LRA or other employment law or contrary to a sectoral determination or bargaining
council collective agreement applicable to the client;
• in any proceedings the Labour Court or an arbitrator may determine whether a provi-
sion in an employment contract or the contract between a TES and its client complies
with the LRA, a sectoral determination or an applicable bargaining council agreement;
• no person may perform the functions of a TES unless it has been registered in terms of
applicable legislation. The fact that the TES has not been registered is, however, no de-
fence to any claim instituted in terms of section 198A. This is the only of all the 2014
amendments that will not take effect on 1 January 2015;
• a TES must provide an employee assigned to a client with written particulars of em-
ployment in accordance with section 29 of the BCEA.
In terms of the new section 198A, which is applicable only to TES employees who earn
below the threshold, a “temporary service” means work for a client not exceeding three
months in duration, work as a substitute for an employee of the client who is temporarily
absent or a category of work and for a period of time determined as a temporary service in
a bargaining council collective agreement, sectoral determination or ministerial notice. An
employee who performs temporary services, as defined, is considered the employee of the
TES. If the employee is not performing temporary services (as defined), he is deemed to be
the employee of the client and must be treated on the whole not less favourably than
employees of the client who perform the same or similar work, unless there is a justifiable
2
reason for different treatment. Thus, if a person is employed by a TES and deployed to
________________________
2 In terms of the new s 198D a “justifiable reason” includes seniority, experience, length of service, merit,
the quality or quantity of work and other reasons that are not prohibited in terms of s 6(1) of the EEA.
230 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
work at a client of the TES and if that employee renders services at the client in excess of
three months, for example, the employee is not rendering a “temporary service” and,
therefore, the client is deemed to be the employer; the TES is no longer the employer
(after the initial three months). And, then the employee is deemed to be employed on an
indefinite basis, subject to the fixed-term provisions in the new section 198B. In the event of
a TES terminating the services of the employee, at the instance of the TES or the client, in
order to avoid the deeming provision in section 198A, the termination constitutes a dismis-
sal. If an employee was employed by a TES and placed with a client prior to the com-
mencement of the 2014 amendments, the new provisions will apply only three months after
the date the new provisions come into operation.
The new section 198B provides for fixed-term contracts concluded with employees who
earn below the threshold. For the purposes of this section a fixed-term contract is a con-
tract of employment that terminates on the occurrence of a specified event, on the com-
pletion of a specified task or project or on a fixed date (other than the normal or agreed
retirement age).
Section 198B does not apply to employers who employ fewer than 10 employees or who
employ fewer than 50 employees and whose business has been in operation for less than
two years (unless the employer conducts more than one business or the business was
formed by the division or dissolution of an existing business). Section 198B is also not
applicable to employees who are engaged in terms of a fixed-term contract permitted by
statute or by a sectoral determination or collective agreement.
An employee can be employed for longer than three months only if the nature of the
work is of a limited or definite duration or if the employer can demonstrate any other
justifiable reason for fixing the term of the contract, such as that the employee is replacing
a temporarily absent employee, is engaged on account of a temporary increase in work
volume or to perform seasonal work or is a student who is employed to gain practical
experience. If the work is not of a limited nature or the employer cannot demonstrate a
justifiable reason for fixing the term of the contract, the employee is deemed to have been
employed for an indefinite period and must be treated on the whole not less favourably
than permanent employees who perform similar work. An employee on a fixed-term
contract must be afforded the same opportunities to apply for vacancies as other employ-
ees may have.
If a fixed-term contract of longer than 24 months is justifiable the employer must, on ex-
piry of the contract and subject to any applicable collective agreement, pay the employee
one week’s remuneration for each completed year of the contract. The employer is not
obliged to effect said payment if, before the expiry of the contract, it offers the employee
alternative employment or procures employment elsewhere on similar terms and condi-
tions which employment commences no later than 30 days after expiry of the contract.
Section 198C regulates part-time employment of employees who earn below the thresh-
old. For the purposes of this section a part-time employee is an employee who is remuner-
ated wholly or partly by reference to time worked and who works fewer hours than a
comparable full-time employee. Section 198C does not apply to employers who employ
fewer than 10 employees or who employ fewer than 50 employees and whose business has
been in operation for less than two years (unless they conduct more than one business or
the business was formed by the division or dissolution of an existing business). Sec-
tion 198C also does not apply to employees who work less than 24 hours per month or
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 231
Employees
• has the right to participate in the formation
of a trade union
An employee
• has the right to become a member of a trade
union
No person may discriminate against an employee for exercising any right conferred on him
by the LRA. Therefore, no person may require of an employee or of a person seeking em-
ployment not to be a member or to become a member of a trade union or a workplace
forum. An employee or a person seeking employment may not be prejudiced because of his
membership of or participation in the forming of a trade union or workplace forum or
because of his participation in the lawful activities of the trade union or workplace forum.
No person may advantage or promise a benefit or advantage to an employee or work-seeker
in exchange for that employee or work-seeker’s not exercising any of these rights.
The Act further stipulates that a provision in any contract, whether entered into before
or after the commencement of the Act, that directly or indirectly contradicts or limits any of
these rights or the protection thereof, is invalid, unless such a contractual provision is per-
mitted by the Act.
Employers are granted an equal right to participate in the formation of an employers’
organisation (or a federation of employers’ organisations) and to join an employers’ organ-
isation. An employer also has the right to participate in the lawful activities of the employers’
organisation and to take part in the election of office-bearers or officials. If the employer
is a natural person he may stand for election or be eligible for appointment as an
232 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Employers
• has the right to participate in the formation
of an employers’ organisation
Employer
• has the right to be a member of an employ-
ers’ organisation
Any dispute about the interpretation or application of the rights in Chapter II of the Act
must be referred in writing to a bargaining council or, if no council has jurisdiction, to the
CCMA. The party who refers the dispute must satisfy the council or the CCMA that a copy
of the referral has been served on all the other parties to the dispute.
The council or the CCMA must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation, fail-
ing which, any party may refer it to the Labour Court for adjudication.
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 233
Questions
Question 1
Give a detailed discussion of the meaning of “employee” in terms of the Labour Relations
Act of 1995 (LRA). (20)
Question 2
Discuss the main objectives and the application of the LRA. Also refer to persons who are
excluded from the Act. (10)
Question 3
Briefly explain whether the LRA is applicable to the following persons:
3.1 Richard is a civil engineer. The Eastern Cape provincial administration concludes a
contract with him in terms of which he has to design and build a new bridge across
the Bushman’s River; (2)
3.2 Xoliswa works as a volunteer for an NGO. She does not receive any payment for her
services; (2)
3.3 Ravish is a student and works as a waiter in a restaurant on Saturdays and Sundays
to earn money to pay for his studies. At the restaurant he is called a “casual
employee”; (2)
3.4 Jonathan is a general in the National Defence Force; (2)
3.5 Mr Van der Merwe is the Managing Director of a large insurance company and earns
R800 000 per year. (2)
3.6 Ben and Thandi both live in Johannesburg and are employed by a private airline
company registered in Namibia. The company flies it planes on charter only to Afri-
can countries. When a plane is chartered Ben is the pilot and Thandi the flight attend-
ant on the flight. They get paid per flight in US dollars. (2)
3.7 April is employed by the Moroccan embassy and works at the embassy’s offices in
Pretoria. (2)
Question 4
Discuss the rights connected with the freedom of association that employees and employers
may claim. Refer in your answer to the dispute resolution procedures that apply to resolving
disputes over the freedom to associate. (20)
Question 5
Employee A works for employer B and wishes to become a member of trade union C. A’s
employment contract stipulates that A does not have the right to become a member of any
trade union. Discuss whether this stipulation in A’s contract is valid. (5)
Question 6
A small family business is hit by a protected strike. Because the business deals in perishable
foods it is necessary that the stock is packed and sold immediately. The manager cannot
perform these tasks on his own and, therefore, promises a bonus of R500 to those employ-
ees who are willing to return to work. Explain the validity or otherwise of the manager’s
promise of a bonus. (5)
Question 7
A dispute arises between a trade union and an employer about what constitutes “the lawful
activities” of the trade union. Discuss how this dispute may be resolved. (8)
234 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Question 8
John, a shop steward (union representative) at ABC Company, complains of victimisation
by his immediate superior. He is convinced that he is being victimised because of his union
affiliation and his forthrightness in challenging management on behalf of the union’s
members. In fact, on one occasion his superior told him to cease his union activities, under
threat of dismissal. Identify the true nature of John’s grievance and then explain how his
grievance may be resolved. (8)
Question 9
Jerome was employed by Alert Security (Pty) Ltd as a security guard. He was deployed to
render security services at the premises of one of Alert’s clients, Jeshra Jewellers. One of the
stipulations in Jerome’s contract of employment was that his contract would terminate
automatically upon the termination of the contract between Alert and its client or when the
client no longer required the employee’s services “for whatever reason”. When Jeshra
Jewellers terminated its contract with Alert, Jerome was informed that his services were no
longer required because there was no alternative position for him. Jerome believed he had
been treated unfairly and referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA. Alert denied
Jerome’s claim of dismissal as his contract provided for automatic termination.
Does the termination of Jerome’s services constitute a dismissal or is Alert correct in its
contention that the contract terminated because of the provisions in the contract? If you
decide that Jerome was dismissed, determine the fairness or otherwise of the dismissal. (15)
Hint: See SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule [2010] 10 BLLR 1052 (LAC); Mahlamu v CCMA &
Others [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC).
Question 10
Discuss the legal position of labour broker (TES) employees, fixed-term contract employees
and part-time employees in light of the amended section 198 and the new sections 198A–C
(inserted into the LRA by the 2014 amendments). (15)
12
FRAMEWORK OF THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT
12.1 Introduction
The Labour Relations Act is certainly the most important piece of labour legislation on the
statute book. In addressing the problems experienced with the Labour Relations Act of 1956,
the LRA of 1995 makes provision for entirely new structures and procedures.
Structures created by the 1995 Act for the purpose of collective bargaining are bargaining
and statutory councils. These councils, together with the CCMA and the Labour Courts, are
responsible for dispute resolution. To promote worker participation in decision-making at
the workplace the Act provides for the establishment of workplace forums.
The structures created by the LRA for collective bargaining and dispute resolution can be
illustrated as follows:
Labour Appeal Court
Labour Court
CCMA
Workplace forum
Freedom of association
Employees Employer
235
236 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
In simplified form the structures for collective bargaining are the following:
Bargaining council*
Sector-/industry-
level bargaining
Trade union Employers’ organisation
Plant-/enterprise-level
Trade union Employer
bargaining
* A statutory council may be established in sectors and areas where no bargaining councils exist. The
powers and functions of statutory councils may be extended to include the functions of a bargain-
ing council.
No resolution No resolution
Conciliation Conciliation
Dispute
* Some disputes must be referred to the CCMA for conciliation and arbitration even though a coun-
cil is in existence, such as dispute about organisational rights, workplace forums, disputes about the
interpretation or application of agency and closed shop agreements and ministerial determinations,
demarcation of sectors and areas of councils, etc. See par 18.4.
Bargaining councils replace the old industrial councils. Bargaining councils have, as their
predecessors, collective bargaining and dispute resolution as their main functions, but
enjoy extended powers and functions under the new Act. All industrial councils registered
in terms of the 1956 Act are deemed to be bargaining councils and the Registrar must enter
their names in the register of councils.
be registered. Upon receipt of NEDLAC’s decision, the Registrar considers the application
and registers the council if all legal requirements have been met. In order to qualify for
registration the parties to the council must be sufficiently representative of the specific sec-
tor and area, and there must be no other council registered for that sector and area. The
name of the council is then entered into the register of councils and a registration certificate
is issued. The certificate determines the scope of the council’s jurisdiction. Upon registration
the council becomes a body corporate. If the Registrar is not satisfied with the application,
he must give the applicant a period of 30 days to meet the requirements for registration,
failing which he must refuse to register the applicant.
Cancellation of registration: The Registrar may cancel the registration of a council if he
believes that the council has ceased to perform its functions or has ceased to be representa-
tive. Registration must be cancelled if the Labour Court has ordered the winding-up of the
council. The Labour Court will issue such an order if the council has resolved to wind up its
affairs or if it is unable to continue to function for any reason that cannot be remedied. A
significant consequence of the cancellation of registration is that collective agreements of
the council lapse 60 days after the cancellation of registration, except collective agreements
that regulate conditions of employment. The latter remain in force for one year after the
date the council’s registration was cancelled or until the expiry of the agreement, if earlier.
A council is obliged to provide the Registrar with the names and addresses of its national
office bearers within 30 days after their election. Certified copies of every collective agree-
ment and details of the admission and resignation of parties to the council must be provided
to the CCMA. Minutes of meetings must be kept and all documentation must be preserved
for a period of three years.
Every council must keep record of its income, expenditure, assets and liabilities and its
financial statements must be audited annually. Certified copies of the financial statements
and the auditor’s report must be sent to the Registrar and must be made available to the
parties to the council.
If there is a jurisdictional dispute between two or more bargaining councils in the public
sector, including the PSCBC, any party to the dispute may refer it to the CCMA for concilia-
tion and arbitration (s 38).
a determination impose a levy on all employers and employees in the registered scope of
the statutory council.
Any disputes about the interpretation or application of determinations may be referred
by any party to the CCMA. The Commission must attempt to resolve the dispute through
conciliation, failing which any party may request that the dispute be resolved through arbi-
tration.
GOVERNING BODY
Director and 10 members
Appoint members
MINISTER
NEDLAC
The governing body consists of the Director of the CCMA, appointed by the Commission,
and 10 members appointed by the Minister. The Director manages and directs the activities
of the CCMA and supervises the Commission’s staff. The 10 members nominated by NED-
LAC consist of an independent chairperson and nine other members. Organised labour,
organised business and the State propose the nine members in equal proportion.
The governing body appoints adequately qualified persons as commissioners on either a
full-time or a part-time basis for a fixed term. When making these appointments, the gov-
erning body must have due regard to the need to constitute a Commission that is inde-
pendent and competent and representative in respect of race and gender. The governing
body determines the remuneration and other terms and conditions of appointment of the
commissioners and prepares a code of conduct for the commissioners.
The Labour Court consists of a Judge President, a Deputy Judge President and a number
of judges. To be appointed as a judge of the Labour Court a person must be either a judge
of the High Court or a legal practitioner and must have the necessary knowledge of and
experience and expertise in labour law. Their conditions of appointment are similar to
those of judges of the High Court.
The administrative functions of the Court are performed by the Registrar of the Labour
Court, appointed by the Minister of Justice, together with one or more deputy registrars
and as many other officers as the administration requires.
Any party may, with leave from the Labour Court, appeal to the Labour Appeal Court
against any final judgment or order of the Labour Court. The Labour Court may, on its
own accord or at the request of any party to proceedings before it, reserve for the decision
of the Labour Appeal Court any question of law that arises during the proceedings.
If at any stage after a dispute has been referred to the Labour Court it becomes apparent
that the dispute ought to have been referred to arbitration, the Court may stay the proceed-
ings and refer the dispute to arbitration or, if it considers it expedient to do so, continue
with the proceedings in which case the Court may make an order that an arbitrator would
have been entitled to make (save an order for costs, which is still made in terms of the
provisions governing the Labour Court).
Because of the interminably long delays often experienced in the handing down of
judgments, the amendments to section 158 provide for judgments to be handed down as
soon as reasonably possible.
12.6.4 General
The Act established a Rules Board for the Labour Court to make rules to regulate the con-
duct of proceedings in the Court. These rules must be published in the Government Gazette.
The Judge President must ensure that the Rules Board meets at least once every two years
to review the rules.
Proceedings in the Labour Court must be conducted in open court. A party to any pro-
ceedings may appear in person or be represented by a legal practitioner, by an office-bearer
or official of that party’s trade union or employers’ organisation, by a designated agent or
official of a council, by an official of the Department of Labour or, if the party is a juristic
person, by a director or an employee of that juristic person.
It is possible that the Labour Appeal Court, on the hearing of an appeal, may receive fur-
ther evidence or the Court may remit the case to the Labour Court for a further hearing.
Otherwise the court may confirm, amend or set aside the judgment or order or give any
other appropriate judgment or order.
The Judge President may direct that any matter before the Labour Appeal Court be
heard by the court sitting as a court of first instance, in which case the court is entitled to
make any order that the Labour Court would have been able to make.
The decision of the Labour Appeal Court is final and there is no right of appeal against
its final judgment or against its decision on a question of law or against its judgment or
order when sitting as a court of first instance.
Workplace forums are the innovative creations of the LRA to ensure worker participation in
the workplace. The rationale behind the idea of a workplace forum is an attempt to avoid
adversarial industrial relations by way of consultation and joint decision-making. Consult-
ation and joint decision-making become possible through the establishment of a workplace
forum.
A workplace forum may be established in a workplace with 100 or more employees. All
employees, and not only union members, enjoy representation on the workplace forum. A
workplace forum is not a negotiating forum where an employer and his employees bargain
over wages and conditions of employment, but is a platform where the employer consults
with all employees on broader issues within the workplace, such as policy issues on import
and export restructuring of the workplace job grading a retrenchment policy plant closures
mergers and education and training (ss 84 and 85). In a few limited instances the Act
requires that the employer and the workplace forum take joint decisions, such as on the
disciplinary code and procedures and an affirmative-action policy.
Questions
Question 1
Give a broad outline of the structures created by the Act for collective bargaining, worker
participation and the resolution of disputes. (30)
Question 2
An unregistered trade union wishes to apply for membership of a bargaining council. Can
this trade union be admitted as member to the bargaining council? (2)
Question 3
Employees in the building industry in Bloemfontein established a trade union and there-
after applied for membership of a bargaining council.
3.1 Discuss the prerequisites that need to be complied with before applying for registra-
tion of the trade union. (6)
3.2 Discuss the procedure for registration of the trade union. (6)
3.3 The application for registration of the trade union is refused by the Registrar. Briefly
discuss any steps that can be taken in this regard. (4)
Framework of the Labour Relations Act 247
Question 4
Employers’ organisation A and trade unions B and C in the furniture industry in the East-
ern Cape agree to establish a bargaining council and subsequently draw up a constitution.
List the issues that must be included in the constitution and then discuss the procedure to
be followed to register the bargaining council. (30)
Question 5
The parties to a newly registered bargaining council are uncertain about the functions of a
bargaining council and seek information in this regard. As legal representative of the
council, briefly explain to the parties the functions of the council. (10)
Question 6
Explain how a bargaining council can enforce compliance with a collective agreement con-
cluded in the council. (15)
Question 7
Name the bargaining councils established in the public sector and describe the jurisdiction
of each council. (20)
Question 8
Identify the forum that has jurisdiction in each of the following disputes and then describe
the dispute resolution procedure that must be followed for each dispute to be resolved:
8.1 a dispute between the PSCBC and the ELRC over which of them has jurisdiction to
conclude a collective agreement relating to disciplinary and grievance procedures for
the education sector; (5)
8.2 a dispute in the Department of Sea Fisheries over an increase in wages/salaries and
improvement of other conditions of employment; (5)
8.3 a dispute in a service which has been designated an essential service – a state hospital,
say – over wage increases; (5)
8.4 a dispute in the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development over the
dismissal of an employee for incapacity; (5)
8.5 a dispute in SAPS over the dismissals of employees for misconduct; (5)
8.6 a dispute over the dismissal of a number of educators at public schools for operational
reasons; (5)
8.7 a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of a collective agreement on
sick leave entitlements that was concluded in the PSCBC. (5)
Question 9
Discuss the functions of the CCMA. (10)
Question 10
Discuss the jurisdiction and functions of the Labour Court. (20)
13
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
13.1 Introduction
The emphasis of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 (LRA) is on co-operation and construct-
ive engagement between labour and management. To achieve these goals collective bar-
gaining – the centre-piece of industrial relations – has undergone fundamental changes
with the introduction of the 1995 Act.
New structures have been established, such as statutory councils and workplace forums
and the old industrial councils have become bargaining councils with extended functions.
New rights and obligations have been created and a new court, the Labour Court, and the
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) have been established for
dispute resolution. The duplicity of legislation regulating labour relations has been aban-
doned and the LRA is, unlike its predecessor, applicable to all employers and employees
(save for a few exceptions). The recognition of trade unions is no longer interpreted with
reference to the concept of unfair labour practice.
The workplace forum, in particular, has been a concerted effort on the part of the legis-
lature to democratise enterprise-level labour-management relations and make them less
adversarial. By providing for workplace forums an effort has been made to encourage
unions to abandon their adversarial manner of operating, while managerial prerogative is
curbed.
Organised labour wishes to play a significant role in the development of social policy.
NEDLAC, bargaining councils and statutory councils provide the necessary mechanisms to
achieve this goal. Collective bargaining is encouraged rather than compelled, unlike the
situation under the old LRA where the refusal to bargain was considered an unfair labour
practice.
Representative unions enjoy organisational rights and the 1995 Act gives effect to the con-
stitutional right of freedom of association and the right to strike without fear of dismissal.
249
250 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
requirements of the Act. Section 64 makes it compulsory to obtain an advisory award from
the CCMA (or a bargaining council) before notice of the strike is given. The role of the
CCMA (or council) in this instance is to promote collective bargaining by facilitating an
agreement between the disputing parties, but it cannot dictate to the parties what to do, so
that voluntarism is largely kept intact. The CCMA or council must thus attempt to conciliate
the dispute and issue an advisory arbitration award.
Although an advisory award is not binding, it seems likely that it will not be ignored if it
imposes a duty to negotiate. The potential importance of this form of advisory arbitration
becomes clear when one considers that a refusal to bargain includes (s 64(2)):
Conflict is bound to arise because of the absence of a duty to bargain and the dispute reso-
lution structures must guide and assist the parties.
Recognition of a union is the beginning of collective bargaining. Under the LRA of 1956
the Industrial Court, through its unfair labour practice jurisdiction, obliged employers to
deal with and to accord rights to unions. The decisions of the Industrial Court were in con-
flict: some required an employer to bargain with a majority union only, some compelled the
employer to negotiate with any union in its organisation, while the majority of decisions
favoured a duty to bargain once a union was sufficiently representative.
The Labour Relations Act of 1995 removes this uncertainty. An employer is now obliged
to accord rights of recognition only to registered unions which are “representative”. “Rep-
resentativeness” has the following connotations:
• Majority membership. “Majority” indicates a clear majority of union members in the work-
place, that is, 50% plus one employee have joined the union. Only registered unions
with a majority support in the workplace will be able to demand statutory rights with re-
gard to agency shop, closed shop and workplace forum arrangements. Two or more un-
ions may join to establish majority support in order to be accorded these rights.
Furthermore, rights to disclosure of information, to appoint workplace representatives
and to paid leave for representatives are enjoyed only by a majority union;
Collective bargaining 251
• 30% membership. A registered union wishing to establish a statutory council must have a
membership of at least 30% in the relevant industry. Two or more unions may join
together for this purpose. The 30% membership is used only in the context of statutory
councils.
Organisational rights are set out in Part A of Chapter 3 of the LRA. They are union rights,
not employee rights, and are bestowed on registered unions only. The six organisational
rights are found in sections 12 to 16 of the Act and are the right of access to the workplace,
the right to the deductions of union subscriptions from employees’ wages, the right to paid
leave for office bearers, the right to elect union representatives (shop stewards) in the
workplace, the right to paid time off for union representatives and the right to disclosure of
information.
When the LRA of 1995 was enacted a clear delineation was made between majority un-
ions and sufficiently representative unions. A registered majority union was accorded all six
of the organisational rights, while a sufficiently representative registered union enjoyed
three of the rights, namely the rights of access, deduction of union subscriptions and paid
leave for office bearers. The 2014 amendments to the LRA obscured this clear distinction
somewhat by allowing a sufficiently representative union to obtain the rights previously
accorded majority unions only if that union is the most representative union in the work-
place. In terms of the new section 21(8A) the CCMA can, in an arbitration, grant such a
union that already has the rights of access, deductions and leave for office bearers also the
right to elect shop stewards and paid time off for shop stewards if no other union in the
workplace has the latter two rights relating to shop stewards. Or, such a union that already
enjoys all the organisational rights except the right to disclosure of information can be
granted the right to disclosure if no other union in the workplace has that right. These
“additional” rights lapse when the union is no longer the most representative union in the
workplace.
An employer and a registered majority union or parties to a bargaining council can con-
clude a collective agreement in order to establish the threshold of representativeness
required to obtain the rights of access, deductions and leave for office bearers (s 18). For
example, ABC union and an employer have concluded a collective agreement in terms of
which all unions in that workplace must meet the threshold of 35% membership before it
will enjoy these three rights. If XYZ union also recruits employees as members in that
workplace it will not have the three organisational rights until it reaches a membership of
35%. However, in terms of the 2014 amendments it is possible for a union that does not
meet the threshold to be granted these rights. In an arbitration the CCMA can grant these
rights to the union that does not meet the threshold if the union represents a significant
interest or has a substantial number of members in the workplace and if all the parties to
the collective agreement participated in the arbitration proceedings (s 21(8C)). Thus, in
the example XYZ union may be granted these rights even if it has less than a 35% member-
ship if it can prove that it presents a significant interest in the workplace – and if both the
employer and ABC union were involved in the arbitration.
Registered trade unions that are parties to a bargaining council automatically have the
rights of access and deduction of union subscriptions in respect of all workplaces within the
registered scope of the council regardless of such unions’ representativeness in any particu-
lar workplace (s 19).
Nothing prohibits an employer and a (smaller) union to bargain and conclude a collec-
tive agreement to regulate organisational rights in instances where the union is not accorded
organisational rights in terms of the Act (s 20).
252 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
The key to organisational rights turns on the status of a trade union in the workplace. It is
not a bargaining unit only (for example hourly paid workers), but the total number of em-
ployees in the workplace that must be considered to determine the union’s representative-
ness. It is consequently necessary to consider the meaning of a “workplace”.
(i) for the purposes of collective bargaining and dispute resolution, the registered scope of
the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council or a bargaining council in a sector
in the public service, as the case may be; or
(ii) for any other purpose, a national department, provincial administration, provincial
department or organisational component contemplated in section 7(2) of the Public
Service Act, 1994 (promulgated by Proclamation No. 103 of 1994), or any other part of
the public service that the Minister for Public Service and Administration, after consul-
tation with the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council, demarcates as a work-
place;
(b) . . . [repealed]
(c) in all other instances means the place or places where the employees of an employer work.
If an employer carries on or conducts two or more operations that are independent of one
another by reason of their size, function or organisation, the place or places where the em-
ployees work in connection with each independent operation, constitutes the workplace for
that operation.
A “workplace” in the public sector seems clear and presents little difficulty. However, in the
private sector it may be more problematic to determine the exact “workplace”. The follow-
ing considerations may assist in determining the workplace:
Firstly, a workplace means “the place or places where the employees of an employer
work”. The criterion is the employment relationship between employer and employees.
Consequently, lifting the corporate veil is limited in the case of wholly owned subsidiary
companies – each would legally be an employer of its own employees, although certain
decisions may be taken by the holding company. There seems to be limited scope then to
find that a holding company and its subsidiary constitute a single workplace even if they
function as an entity. If, however, the employer’s actions can be considered improper con-
duct of a serious nature, such as dividing an enterprise into different companies in order to
frustrate the intention of the Act, piercing the corporate veil would be justified.
Secondly, the definition refers to a situation where an employer conducts two or more
operations. The workplace comprises all the different places of work, unless one or more of
them are independent as per the definition. It is only where an operation is independent
that it can be considered a separate workplace.
Schedule 2 of the Act, dealing with workplace forums, suggests that parties are free to
decide whether different branches of an organisation should be regarded as one workplace
or not, for example, a bank with many branches may be one workplace, but instead of
establishing just one workplace forum, the constitution of the forum may allow for a co-
ordinating workplace forum at head office and subsidiary forums at some or all of the
branches. The question is whether the same approach can or should be adopted when
determining the “workplace” in order to decide a union’s representativeness and its rights.
Collective bargaining 253
In the early days of the 1995 LRA the concepts “workplace” and “union representative-
ness” received much attention. In NUMSA v Feltex Foam [1997] 6 BLLR 798 (CCMA) Feltex
was one of six operations described as falling within the “Jacobs bargaining unit”, a division
of Island View Industrials and with Romatex Industrials as the holding company. Feltex was
a separate legal entity and employer and was itself made up of two operations, Feltex Foam
Mouldings and Feltex Foam Converters. SACTWU was recognised as the sole bargaining
agent of all workers in the Jacobs bargaining unit, but NUMSA demanded organisational
rights in respect of the latter workplace. Feltex Foam Mouldings fell under the jurisdiction
of the Motor Industries Bargaining Council and was subject to its main agreement. The
CCMA decided that Feltex Foam Mouldings was “physically distinct” and as such was con-
sidered a separate workplace. NUMSA was consequently accorded organisational rights.
SACTWU’s right to exclusive recognition, founded in contract, was overridden by NUMSA’s
statutory rights.
In SACCAWU v The Hub [1998] 12 BALR 1590 (CCMA), however, the company’s head
office and 12 retail outlets were collectively defined as a “workplace”. Similarly, in OCGAWU
v Total SA (Pty) Ltd [1999] 6 BALR 678 (CCMA) it was found that individual distribution
depots did not constitute separate workplaces since they did not conduct independent
operations. The same approach was followed in OCGAWU v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd [1999] 7
BALR 813 (CCMA) where a retail company with 104 outlets was considered one workplace.
Once the “workplace” has been established, the union’s representativeness in that work-
place must be determined to find out whether the union is entitled to any or all of the
organisational rights.
In SACCAWU v Metlife (Pty) Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ (CCMA) some 800 employees joined the
union, which represented 13,5% of the total workforce. The company, with many places of
operation throughout the country, had approximately 6 000 indoor and field staff in its
employ. Both the employer and the union adopted the view that the workplace comprised
all the operations of the company. The CCMA decided that the union was not sufficiently
representative to win organisational rights.
In SACTWU v WM Eachus and Co (CCMA 1997) the union had below 20% membership
and was, therefore, not considered sufficiently representative. No organisational rights were
granted to the union.
In SACTWU v Sheraton Textiles (Pty) Ltd [1997] 5 BLLR 662 (CCMA) the union repre-
sented a fraction under 30% of the workforce. The employer argued that 40% to 45%
should be the target for representativeness. The CCMA commissioner held that “the arbi-
trator is required to have regard to the interests represented by the union and not exclu-
sively the numerical representativeness of employees”. The union represented some 150
workers which, according to the commissioner, was by no means an insignificant number.
Having had regard to the history of the union’s struggle to obtain some rights and the
interests served by it, the commissioner decided that the union was sufficiently representa-
tive and it was granted limited organisational rights.
In UPUSA v Komming Knitting [1997] 4 BLLR 508 (CCMA) a union with 22% member-
ship was granted the rights of access and stop-order facilities.
In CWIU v Millner’s Dental Suppliers (Pty) Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ (CCMA) the employer submit-
ted that its total workforce numbered 70 employees, which included four directors, three
wives of the directors and eight managers. The union had recruited 32 members and, ac-
cording to the company, thus fell short of a majority. The directors’ wives handled confi-
dential correspondence, but did not report for work at the premises and did not have fixed
working hours. Commissioner Bulbring decided that the rights sought by the union were
“workers’ rights” and if these were secured by directors it would create a conflict of interest
vis-à-vis the directors’ fiduciary duties to the company. Furthermore, it was hard to imagine
a director representing a fellow employee at a disciplinary hearing. Section 21(8)(a)(i)
requires a commissioner to consider the organisational history of the workplace and
254 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
prevent a proliferation of trade unions in the workplace. As the history indicated that
directors and managers had not been members of any union, an exclusion of them would
not bring about a proliferation of unions, as per the commissioner. It was further held that
the directors’ wives were independent contractors and hence should not feature in the
calculations. The result was that, according to the commissioner, there were a total of 63
employees at the company, 32 of whom belonged to the union. A very narrow majority!
These early decisions seem to have brought sufficient certainty so that very few cases
were launched in the CCMA for determination in the years that followed. The 2014
amendments are bound to undo the certainty, especially in light of the new provisions
relating to a union with a “significant interest” or a “substantial number” of members and
the fact that, in terms of the new section 21(b)(v), labour broker employees, fixed-term
and part-time employees and other employees in non-standard employment will now have
to be included in the calculations of the total workforce and a union’s representativeness.
In order to determine the membership or support of the registered trade union the
commissioner may make any necessary inquiries, where appropriate, conduct a ballot of the
relevant employees and take any other relevant information into account. The employer is
required to co-operate with the commissioner in this regard and must make available to the
commissioner any information and facilities that are reasonably necessary.
An employer who alleges that a union is no longer a representative trade union may
apply to the CCMA to withdraw any of its organisational rights, in which case the procedure
set out above for the resolution of disputes over organisational rights are mutatis mutandis
applicable.
A dispute about the interpretation or application of Part A of Chapter 3, dealing with
organisational rights, may be referred to the CCMA (not a bargaining council) for concilia-
tion and, if necessary, arbitration, following the procedure set out in this paragraph.
In terms of the amended section 22 an arbitration award can be made binding on
employers, clients of temporary employment services and any person (other than the em-
ployer) who controls access to the workplace if this person has been given an opportunity
to participate in the arbitration proceedings.
The procedure for exercising organisational rights and the resolution of disputes in this
regard may be illustrated as follows:1
2
Determination
14 days
Arbitration
No resolution
Conciliation
CCMA
3
Meeting
30 days
Notification of intention
4
to exercise organisational rights
________________________
1 Diagram 2 is contained in Sch 4 of the Act. Sch 4, however, does not have the force of law and the dia-
gram is provided merely as guidance to the parties. This diagram has been slightly adapted.
2 The Act contemplates determinations about the definition of a workplace, the representativeness of a
union and the manner in which organisational rights are exercised.
3 The purpose of this meeting is the conclusion of a collective agreement on the exercise of the organisa-
tional rights. If no agreement is concluded the union may elect to strike or it can refer the dispute to
the CCMA. If the union elects to strike, it cannot refer a dispute over organisational rights to the CCMA
for a period of 12 months.
4 In terms of s 21(2) a union may notify an employer that it intends to exercise organisational rights. For
example, if a registered union is sufficiently representative it may notify the employer that it seeks to
exercise the right of access.
Collective bargaining 259
• provision is made in the collective agreement for an independent body to hear and
decide appeals against the bargaining council’s refusal to grant exemptions to non-
parties or the withdrawal of an exemption. The appeal must be decided within 30 days
and in accordance with fair criteria (which must be included in the collective agree-
ment). Union and employers’ organisation representatives, office-bearers and officials
may not be members of or participate in the deliberations of the appeal body; and
• the terms of the collective agreement do not discriminate against non-parties.
If the Minister is satisfied that a failure to extend the agreement may undermine collective
bargaining at sectoral level or in the public service as a whole, the extension may be ap-
proved if the parties to the bargaining council are sufficiently representative within the
registered scope of that council. When determining sufficient representativeness, the
Minister has to take into account the composition of the workforce, including employees
assigned to work by temporary employment services, employees engaged on fixed-term con-
tracts, part-time employees and employees in other categories of non-standard employ-
ment.
For the purposes of extending collective agreements concluded in bargaining councils in
the public service any reference to an employers’ organisation refers to the State as an em-
ployer.
bargaining practice as an “unfair labour practice”. This, of course, does not mean that em-
ployers are now at liberty to undermine a trade union or the bargaining process.
Chapter 2 of the LRA allows the Labour Court some measure of ability to scrutinise em-
ployer conduct which threatens to undermine the role of the trade union as employees may
not be discriminated against for participation in lawful union activities or for exercising any
of the rights conferred by the Act.
In SACCAWU v OK Bazaars 1995 (3) SA 622 (A), decided under the previous Act, it was
held that it was legitimate for an employer to offer financial inducements to its employees
in an attempt to dissuade them from participating in strike action. This kind of practice
tends to undermine the role of the union and has, therefore, been outlawed in sections 4
and 5 of the 1995 LRA in light of the fundamental right to strike entrenched in the Bill of
Rights.
Moreover, a union’s rights to disclosure of information and reasonable access to its
members at the workplace also prevent an employer from resorting to dubious practices,
such as bypassing union representatives, hindering communication with union members
and attempting to undermine a union by offering rewards to non-union members or
penalising union members.
Bargaining conduct other than those practices captured by the provisions relating to
freedom of association and organisational rights appears to be largely beyond the reach of
the CCMA and the Labour Court.
• the members of a registered trade union and the employers who are members of a regis-
tered employers’ organisation that are party to the agreement if the agreement regulates
terms and conditions of employment or the conduct of the employers and employees in
relation to each other; and
• employees who are not members of the registered trade union that is party to the
agreement, provided the union party to the agreement commands majority support in
the workplace and provided further that the non-member employees are identified in
the agreement and the agreement expressly binds them.
A collective agreement is binding for a period as agreed and binds every employer who is a
member of the employers’ organisation party to the agreement and every employee who is
a member of the trade union party to the agreement and who was a member at the time it
became binding or who becomes a member after it became binding for the whole period.
The agreement remains binding on these employees and employers whether or not they
continue to be members of the union or the employers’ organisation.
Where a collective agreement has been concluded for an indefinite period any party may
terminate it by giving reasonable notice to the other parties, unless the agreement provides
otherwise.
Where a collective agreement has been concluded in a council, it may be enforced with
the assistance of a designated agent. The council may request the Minister to appoint a
person as a designated agent of the council to promote, monitor and enforce compliance
with collective agreements. A designated agent may secure compliance by publicising the
contents of the agreement, conducting inspections and investigating complaints (s 33).
A designated agent may further issue a compliance order, requiring any person bound
by the agreement to comply with that agreement. Any unresolved dispute concerning com-
pliance may be referred to arbitration by an arbitrator appointed by the council. If a non-
party to the council objects to the appointment of the arbitrator by the council, the CCMA
must, on request of the council, appoint an arbitrator. While arbitrating the compliance
dispute the appointed arbitrator may determine any dispute concerning the interpretation
or application of a collective agreement. The arbitrator may make any appropriate award,
including ordering any person to pay any amount owing in terms of the collective agree-
ment, imposing a fine, ordering a party to pay the cost of the arbitration or confirm, vary or
set aside a compliance order issued by the designated agent.
An arbitration award issued by the arbitrator is final and binding and may be made an
order of the Labour Court. The Minister has published a notice setting out the maximum
fines that may be imposed by the arbitrator. The table of fines is contained in item 29 of
Schedule 7 to the Act.
person may inspect the auditor’s report. Agency fees may not be paid to a political party as
an affiliation fee or to support the election of any person standing for office of a political
party. Furthermore, this money may not be used for any expenditure that does not advance
or protect the socio-economic interests of employees. A conscientious objector may request
the employer to pay the agency fees into a fund administered by the Department of Labour
rather than into an account administered by the union.
An employer is allowed to deduct the agreed agency fee from the wages of an employee
without his authorisation.
An employer or employers’ organisation alleging that a union no longer enjoys majority
support is required to give written notice to this effect. The union then has 90 days from
the date of the notice to establish that it is a majority union. If, after the 90-day period, the
union fails to establish its majority representation, the employer must give the union and
the employees covered by the agency shop agreement 30 days’ notice of termination, after
which the agreement will terminate.
Arbitration
Award No resolution
Agreed council
arbitration proce- Conciliation
dure
No resolution CCMA
No agreed procedure,
Agreed
agreed procedure
council concilia-
OR inoperative or its oper-
tion
ation frustrated by a
procedure
party
of these agreements. Keep in mind that, once the CCMA has issued an arbitration award, a
limited right of appeal to the Labour Court exists – but only in the context of agency shop
6
and closed shop agreements.
Questions
Question 1
Is there a duty to bargain in terms of the Labour Relations Act of 1995? Explain. (12)
Question 2
Name and discuss the organisational rights accorded a representative trade union. (20)
Question 3
A trade union has a 51% membership at Coltex (Pty) Ltd.
3.1 Briefly discuss the procedure to be followed by the union in order to exercise the
right of access to the workplace and the right to stop-order facilities. (8)
Hint: See s 21; SACCAWU v Speciality Stores Ltd [1998] 4 BLLR 352 (LAC); PTWU obo
members v Sahar Security Services [2004] 3 BALR 373 (CCMA); Health & Hygiene Services
v Seedat NO & Others [1999] 11 BLLR 1153 (LC); CEPPWAWU v Tekwani Sawmills
(Pty) Ltd [2004] 9 BALR 1094 (CCMA).
3.2 Assume that the management of Coltex (Pty) Ltd refuses to deduct union subscrip-
tion fees from the employees’ wages. In consequence the union is in dispute with
the company. Discuss the procedure to be followed in order to have this dispute re-
solved. (5)
Hint: See ss 21 and 22.
3.3 When the union seeks to conclude an agency shop agreement with the company,
management refuses because, according to its records, the union enjoys only 48%
support of the employees in the company. The union, however, maintains that it has
already recruited and signed up 51% of the employees. Explain how a dispute with
regard to the representativeness of the union is to be resolved. (5)
Question 4
Discuss the nature and legal effect of collective agreements by discussing the provisions of
sections 23 and 31 of the LRA. Include in your answer the extension of collective agree-
ment in terms of section 32 of the Act. (30)
Question 5
A dispute exists between trade union A and employer B over the interpretation of a pro-
vision in an agreement that they concluded three months before. Discuss the procedure to
be followed to have this dispute resolved. (8)
Hint: See s 24.
________________________
6 The 2013 amendments to the Employment Equity Act creates a second instance in which a CCMA award
is appealable: if the CCMA arbitrates a sexual harassment dispute or any other discrimination dispute
referred to it by an employee earning below the BCEA threshold, that award can be taken on appeal to
the Labour Court.
Collective bargaining 267
Question 6
Trade union A and employer B have negotiated and concluded a collective agreement
providing for organisational rights, a resolution procedure for disputes about the interpret-
ation and application of the agreement, a resolution procedure for disputes about organisa-
tional rights and thresholds of representativeness. Draft this agreement for the company
and trade union of your choice. Assume that union A is a registered majority union. (30)
Question 7
Astron (Pty) Ltd, a manufacturer of car batteries, employs 200 employees of whom 51 have
joined the Motor and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) and 73 have joined the General
Workers Union (GWU). MAWU demands access to the workplace, stop-order facilities and
disclosure of information since it wishes to negotiate an incentive bonus scheme. Manage-
ment notifies MAWU that it is willing to conclude a collective agreement with regard to
access and stop-order facilities, but refuses to disclose the required information.
7.1 Is management obliged to disclose information to MAWU under these circumstanc-
es? Explain. (6)
7.2 Assume that MAWU and GWU act jointly in requesting disclosure. Management re-
fuses to disclose any information because, according to management, the unions are
not sufficiently representative to be entitled to disclosure. The unions are in dispute
with management and want the dispute resolved. Discuss the procedure to be fol-
lowed in order to have this dispute resolved. (8)
Hint: See s 16; NPSU & Others v The National Negotiating Forum & Others [1999] 4 BLLR 361
(LC); NUMSA obo members v Behr Climate & Control [2004] 3 BALR 364 (CCMA); Langa &
Others v Active Packaging (Pty) Ltd [2001] 1 BLLR 37 (LAC).
7.3 Explain whether, in light of the 2014 amendments to the LRA, it is at all possible for
MAWU to obtain the right to disclosure of information. (6)
Question 8
Assume employer A refuses to bargain with trade union B. What, if anything, can B do to
force A to bargain? Explain. Include in your answer a description of the concept “refusal to
bargain”. (12)
Question 9
Is a workplace forum a negotiating body in the true sense of the word? Explain. (5)
Question 10
An arbitration award is generally final and binding with no right of appeal against it. How-
ever, in two instances it is possible to appeal against a CCMA award. Discuss the circum-
stances in which such a right of appeal lies. (8)
Hint: S 24(7) of the LRA and s 10 of the EEA.
Question 11
An agency shop agreement has been concluded between employer A and trade union B.
11.1 Discuss the main characteristics of an agency shop agreement. (5)
11.2 According to A, the union does not enjoy majority membership anymore and there-
fore A wishes to terminate the agency shop agreement. Discuss the requirements that
should be complied with in order to terminate such an agreement. (5)
268 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Question 12
Freedom of association is guaranteed in terms of the Constitution, as well as the Labour
Relations Act of 1995. Give your opinion as to the constitutionality of a closed shop agree-
ment vis-à-vis the right to freedom of association. (8)
Question 13
A closed shop agreement is in existence between employer A and trade union B. Mr X has
just been employed by the company, but he refuses to join the union.
13.1 Can X be dismissed as a result of his refusal to join the union? Briefly explain. (3)
13.2 Assume that X refuses to join the union on conscientious grounds. Can he be dis-
missed under these circumstances? (3)
13.3 Assume that X wishes to join the union, but his application for membership is refused
on the grounds of his race. Can X be dismissed because he is not a member of the
union? Explain. (3)
Question 14
Rand Mining Company employs 2 000 employees. These employees have been deployed to
work at the three mines owned by the company in Johannesburg, Rustenburg and Welkom.
The staff component at each of the mines is as follows:
• at the mine in Johannesburg: five managers, five assistant managers and five engineers,
who have been employed as independent contractors. In addition, there are a number of
supervisors and ‘ordinary employees’ to make up a total of 885 employees other than the
managers and engineers;
• at the mine in Rustenburg: three managers, three assistant managers and three engin-
eers, employed as contractors. The supervisory and ordinary staff make up a total of 478;
• at the mine in Welkom the staff component is the same as at Rustenburg.
The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) has recruited members at all three mines.
Assume that a bargaining council has been established for the mining industry and NUM is
a party to the council. Rand Mining has joined the Chamber of Mines, an employer’s
organisation, who is also a party to the council.
NUM has recruited 101 members at the Welkom mine, 339 members at the Rustenburg
mine and 699 members at the mine in Johannesburg.
14.1 NUM approaches the management of Rand Mining Company with a request to exer-
cise organisational rights. Management responds by informing NUM that it cannot
exercise any organisational rights at the Welkom mine because of its small member-
ship there. NUM argues that it is entitled to all the rights accorded by the LRA at all
three mines. Consider both the company’s and the union’s argument, taking into ac-
count the 2014 amendments to the LRA, and explain whether NUM is entitled to or-
ganisational rights at any or all three of the mines. (10)
14.2 Consider NUM’s representativeness and then list the organisational rights, if any,
that it is entitled to. (8)
14.3 Explain what NUM must do to exercise its organisational rights (assuming that it is
entitled to such rights). (6)
14.4 The Welkom mine has made an unexpectedly large profit over the past financial
year. As a result, NUM approaches the management of the Welkom mine with a re-
quest to negotiate bonuses for its members at that mine only. Management’s re-
sponse is that it will not negotiate bonuses because negotiations have to take place in
the bargaining council.
(a) Briefly explain whether management’s argument is valid. (5)
Collective bargaining 269
Question 15
One for All Union and 34 of its members, reactor operators employed by Electro, claimed
that Electro had agreed to the early retirement of those employees without loss of benefits.
They contended that the in-principle agreement had been reduced to writing and was
embodied in a management directive signed by the power station manager, Mr Phale.
Electro denied the existence of an agreement between the union, the employees and the
employer on three grounds: the management directive had been withdrawn because it had
not been authorised by head office, no consensus had been reached and the Electro repre-
sentative had not been authorised to enter into such an agreement. In the alternative,
Electro argued that, even if there was an agreement between the parties, it was not en-
forceable because early retirement was a condition of service that could only be negotiated
centrally and not at enterprise level.
Decide, with reference to Solidarity & Others v Eskom Holdings Ltd (2012) 33 ILJ 464 (LC),
whether a binding agreement was concluded between the parties. (8)
Question 16
After requesting organisational rights in Hough’s Stores, SACCAWU presented the em-
ployer with a draft recognition agreement that would have extended to SACCAWU the
right to bargain over its members’ terms and conditions of employment. Citing the “Sec-
toral Determination for the Retail Industry” as the reason, Hough’s Stores objected to
extending that right to the union and declined to sign the agreement. SACCAWU referred
a dispute and sought an order declaring that it had collective bargaining rights in the
employer’s workplace. Hough’s Stores contended that the referral was premature because
it had agreed to extend all statutory organisational rights to the union and the clause
relating to collective bargaining was still being negotiated. Advise SACCAWU which further
steps can be taken in this matter. (5)
Hint: See SACCAWU v Cash Crusaders (2010) 19 CCMA 4.7.3.
270 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Appendix 1
OUTCOME OF
When the parties have settled all issues an agreement is drawn up
COLLECTIVE
and signed by them
BARGAINING
Collective bargaining 271
Appendix 2
(The following is an abbreviated version of a collective agreement that recognises a union as a
bargaining agent.)
(RECOGNITION) AGREEMENT
between
United Wines Co Ltd
(hereinafter referred to as the company)
and
National Wine, Liquor & Allied Workers Union
(hereinafter referred to as the union)
1. Objectives
1.1 This agreement regulates the relationship between the company and the union.
1.2 The parties to this agreement acknowledge:
• that sound and fair industrial relations are in the interest of both parties;
• that it is to the parties’ mutual benefit to formalise and regulate their relationship and
to have clearly stated rules and procedures which will reduce the possibility of conflict
between management and labour;
• the right of the union to represent its members;
• the right of management to direct and manage the company.
2. Definitions
Unless otherwise indicated in the content of this agreement
Alternate shop steward shall mean . . .
The company or business shall mean . . .
Office-bearer shall mean . . .
Official of the union shall mean . . .
Representative with regards to disciplinary procedures shall mean . . .
Shop steward committee shall mean . . .
Union shall mean . . .
Union member shall mean . . .
Workers shall mean . . .
3. Recognition
3.1 The company recognises the union as the representative of its members and will continue
to do so while it maintains majority representation of the employees in the defined bar-
gaining unit, subject to termination of this agreement as set out in par 3.3 and par 23.
3.2 Only employees who are paid-up members of the union shall be regarded as members.
3.3 The company may ask for proof of membership, which may be established in a manner
agreed upon by both the union and the company. Should the union membership prove to
be less than half the employees in the defined bargaining unit, the company may withdraw
recognition of the union, subject to a notice period of 2 (two) months, during which time
the union may endeavour to establish a majority membership.
3.4 Subject to the terms of this agreement the company recognises the right of the union to
bargain collectively on the wages and conditions of service of its members.
3.5 The company and the union agree to consultation by their representatives on a regular basis
over workplace issues which affect industrial relations or the welfare of their members.
272 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
3.6 The recognition accorded in terms of this clause shall not affect the right of management
to communicate and consult with employees, provided this does not undermine the struc-
ture and procedures set out in this agreement.
4. Bargaining unit
The bargaining unit for the purpose of this agreement is defined as . . .
5. Freedom of association
5.1 The company and the union recognise the principle of freedom of association, by which is
understood that each worker is free to belong to the union of his/her choice or not to be-
long to a union.
5.2 The company shall not victimise or discriminate against any worker who chooses to belong
to a union or who is elected to represent union members.
5.3 The union shall not victimise or discriminate against a worker who chooses not to belong
to a union.
6. Union subscriptions
The company agrees to deduct union subscriptions weekly from the wages of union members,
provided such members have consented in writing to such deduction.
7. Appointment of shop stewards
7.1 Shop stewards shall be elected in accordance with the constitution of the union.
7.2 The union shall be represented by 2 (two) shop stewards and 2 (two) alternate shop
stewards.
7.3 The election of the shop stewards and alternate shop stewards shall take place during a
general meeting of the shop stewards and the union members in terms of par 13.
7.4 The union shall in writing notify the company within 5 (five) days of such election of the
names of the shop stewards and alternate shop stewards.
8. Rights and duties of shop stewards
8.1 Shop stewards shall function in terms of the union constitution and the procedures and
provisions of this agreement and ensure that the provisions of this agreement are adhered
to by union members.
8.2 Shop stewards shall not leave their work stations without prior permission of management,
which permission shall not be unreasonably withheld.
8.3 A shop steward shall have access to other shop stewards for brief discussions during work-
ing time, provided that such discussions shall not disrupt the business of the company.
8.4 A shop steward’s term of office shall cease under the following circumstances:
• upon his resignation as a shop steward;
• if he ceases to be a union member;
• if he is promoted outside the bargaining unit;
• if the majority of union members request him to vacate his position and the union
authorises his removal from office and informs management in writing thereof;
• if the union does not enjoy the membership of the majority of the workers and recogni-
tion is withdrawn in terms of par 3.
9. Shop steward committee
9.1 The shop stewards and alternate shop stewards appointed in terms of par 7 of this agree-
ment shall constitute the shop steward committee and they may elect one shop steward to
serve as the senior shop steward.
9.2 The union shall notify the company in writing within 5 (five) days of the names of the
chairperson, vice-chairperson, secretary and other shop stewards who make up the shop
steward committee and/or the senior shop steward.
Collective bargaining 273
10. Access
Union officials shall have reasonable access to the premises of the company in order to conduct
union business with their members. The union shall, however, obtain permission from man-
agement and shall make the necessary arrangements in writing with management prior to a
visit to the premises.
11. Meetings of shop steward committee and management
11.1 The shop steward committee and management may meet regularly at either party’s re-
quest in writing. Such meetings shall be held at the company premises.
11.2 An agenda shall be submitted by the party requesting the meeting or by both parties
prior to the meeting.
11.3 Minutes of these meetings shall be kept separately by each party.
11.4 Report back meetings on meetings held between the shop steward committee and
management shall be arranged by a shop steward and shall be held in the cloakroom at a
time granted by management.
12. Shop steward committee caucus meetings
12.1 The shop steward committee will be allowed to meet on company premises once per
month between 17:00 and 18:00 on Mondays to Thursdays, provided that management is
notified in writing thereof at least 2 (two) days prior to such meetings.
12.2 When such a meeting is held each shop steward and alternate shop steward who attends
the meeting shall arrange for another worker as substitute to take his/her place/work
station while the meeting is in progress.
13. General meetings of union members
The shop steward committee and/or union officials may hold general meetings with their
members in the cloakroom on company premises, provided such meetings are held between
17:00 and 18:00 on Mondays to Thursdays and provided further that such meetings shall be
limited to one per calendar month. The union officials and/or shop stewards must notify
management of such a meeting in writing and such notice must reach management at least 2
(two) days prior to the day on which the proposed meeting is to be held.
14. Access to notice board
The shop stewards shall be entitled to display notices and/or announcements concerning
union activities on the company notice board, provided such notices/announcements are not
of a political nature.
15. Negotiations
15.1 The company and the union shall convene a meeting of the negotiating committee
annually for the purpose of negotiating a substantive agreement on wages, conditions of
service and grades.
15.2 Such meeting shall be held as soon as possible after the end of February of each year on
a date agreed upon by both parties.
15.3 The negotiating committee may comprise not more than 4 (four) shop stewards and 2
(two) union officials and not more than 6 (six) company representatives.
15.4 Negotiations on other issues affecting the interests of the workers and/or the company
shall take place at the request of either party and shall be held on a date agreed upon by
both parties and shall be attended by as many representatives on each side as the parties
agree.
16. The negotiating procedure
16.1 The union shall submit its demands in writing by a date agreed upon by the parties, but
not later than 30 (thirty) days prior to the first meeting.
16.2 The company may add its own proposals to the demands of the union and will forward
an agenda for the first meeting to the union.
16.3 A meeting shall take place on a date and at a time and place agreed upon by the parties.
274 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
16.4 The union will be granted access to the cloakroom to report back to its members as it
may deem necessary during negotiations and at the conclusion of the negotiations, pro-
vided that work is not disrupted thereby or, alternatively, a general meeting may be ar-
ranged in terms of par 13.
16.5 The negotiating committee shall reduce all agreements to writing and such written
agreement shall be signed by the General Secretary or his nominee on behalf of the un-
ion and by the General Manager of the company or his nominee. Such agreement shall
only become binding once the last signing party has affixed his signature to the agree-
ment and shall remain binding for a period agreed upon by the parties at the time of
reaching the agreement and subject to the provisions of par 23. The time period so
agreed shall form part of the agreement.
16.6 The implementation date of any amendment to wages or conditions of service shall be
1 May of every year or such other date as agreed upon by the parties.
16.7 In the event of the company and the union failing to reach an agreement at their first
meeting, any number of subsequent meetings as agreed upon by the parties may be held
in order to endeavour to reach an agreement.
16.8 Should the parties fail to reach an agreement after subsequent meetings and it becomes
clear that no agreement will be reached, either party may resort to the dispute proce-
dure.
17. The dispute procedure
17.1 A dispute arising from the employment relationship shall be considered to exist when
either party notifies the other of such dispute in writing, setting forth in precise terms
the nature of the dispute and proposed terms of settlement.
17.2 The answering party shall within one week of receipt of the declaration of dispute serve
on the aggrieved party an answering statement responding to the allegations in the dec-
laration of dispute and further setting out a statement of the answering party’s position
in regard to the solution requested.
17.3 A meeting shall be convened by the parties within 5 (five) working days of the receipt by
the aggrieved party of the answering party’s reply.
17.4 The meeting shall be attended by not more than 3 (three) representatives of either
party.
17.5 At this meeting the parties shall endeavour to resolve the dispute, failing which a second
meeting shall be convened within 3 (three) days.
17.6 Should the dispute not be resolved by the second meeting, the parties may by mutual
agreement agree to a further meeting or the appointment of a mediator or arbitrator (or
refer the dispute to the CCMA).
17.7 The parties agree that neither one shall take any industrial action when they have agreed
on mediation or arbitration, while mediation or arbitration is in progress or after the fi-
nal award of an arbitrator has been made.
18. Peace clause
18.1 Neither party shall resort to industrial action until the procedures laid down by this
agreement have been exhausted.
18.2 Both parties undertake to honour this agreement and to do their best to maintain
industrial peace.
18.3 If industrial action does take place the union and management shall meet and make
every endeavour to resolve the problem and restore normal working conditions.
18.4 The company agrees not to dismiss workers who participate in a protected strike. How-
ever, the parties acknowledge that misconduct by strikers or the company’s operational
requirements may lead to dismissal.
19. Grievance procedure
Both parties agree to abide by the grievance procedure as set out in Annexure 1.
Collective bargaining 275
14.1 Introduction
Strike action is an essential element in the collective bargaining process because it ensures
that an employer bargains more fairly. Collective refusal to work balances the employer’s
ability to make unilateral decisions, to lock out workers or shut down the business. A strike
is a deliberate and concerted withdrawal of labour and it represents the workers’ ultimate
weapon against the employer. If it is accepted that collective bargaining is the best way to
resolve disputes and that the right to withhold one’s labour (that is, to strike) is part and
parcel of this process (“collective bargaining without the right to strike is collective beg-
ging”), then it follows, firstly, that the aim of the law should not be to criminalise striking,
but to regulate it. Secondly, the fact that strikers lose their income for the duration of a
strike will, in most cases, automatically limit the duration of the strike. Thirdly, the product
market will not tolerate the employer acceding to unreasonable wage demands by strikers.
The fact that an employer cannot recoup unreasonable wage increases with impunity from
the consumer public places a limit on the wage demands that strikers can reasonably expect
to be met (except if the object of the strike is to destroy the employer, which is highly
unlikely, since by so doing the strikers will also destroy their own livelihoods).
The Labour Relations Act of 1995 clearly embraces the view that strikes are functional to
collective bargaining and as such the integrity of the bargaining agents is of paramount im-
portance. Therefore, strikers should enjoy considerable job security, provided they play the
collective bargaining game according to the rules as laid down by the Act.
277
278 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
• unprotected strikes (s 68) are strikes that do not conform with the procedural require-
ments of the Act. The most important consequence is that workers can be dismissed for
striking, provided the dismissals are fair. Procedural and substantive fairness standards
still apply (par 14.6 below);
• prohibited strikes (s 65(1)) are strikes that are absolutely prohibited by the Act, for
example, strikes in essential services. The consequences are the same as in the case of
unprotected strikes (par 14.4 below).
The LRA places an absolute prohibition on strikes and lock-outs in certain circumstances.
Section 65 provides that no person may take part in industrial action in any of the following
circumstances:
• if a collective agreement prohibiting industrial action in respect of the issue in dispute is
in force;
• if the issue in dispute is subject to compulsory arbitration;
• if the issue in dispute is one that a party has the right to refer to arbitration or to the
Labour Court in terms of the LRA or any other employment law, for example, dismissals
and unfair discrimination;
• if the employee is employed in essential or maintenance services;
Strikes and lock-outs 279
• no strike or lock-out may occur during the first year of a sectoral determination made in
terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, which regulates the issue in dispute;
and
• no strike or lock-out may occur when an arbitration award, a collective agreement or a
ministerial determination that regulates the issue in dispute has been made.
• ratify a collective agreement that provides for the maintenance of minimum services in a
service designated as an essential service; and
• determine, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the minimum services to be
maintained in the service that is designated an essential service.
The decision or finding of the majority of the panel is the decision of the ESC.
The new section 70E bestows on the ESC jurisdiction throughout South Africa. The seat
of the ESC is at the head office of the CCMA. The CCMA administers the ESC and the
Director of the CCMA is the accounting officer of the ESC.
A notice must be published in the Government Gazette, inviting representation from inter-
ested parties, before launching an investigation into whether a service is an essential service.
Upon conclusion of the investigation and consideration of any representations, the ESC
panel may designate the whole or part of a service an essential service. A notice to this effect
is published in the Government Gazette (s 71).
When deciding whether to declare a service an essential service the ESC panel may issue
an order directing parties to negotiate a minimum services agreement within a prescribed
period and if the parties fail to do so, to refer the matter to a bargaining council with
jurisdiction or to the CCMA. If the parties fail to conclude a collective agreement the panel
may determine the minimum services to be maintained in an essential service. If the parties
conclude a collective agreement, the panel may ratify the agreement. Any party to negotia-
tions concerning a minimum services agreement may, subject to any applicable collective
agreement, refer a dispute arising from those negotiations to the bargaining council or
CCMA for conciliation and thereafter to the ESC for determination.
Because employers and employees in essential services are not permitted to resort to indus-
trial action, section 74 provides for the conciliation and compulsory arbitration of disputes
by a bargaining council or, if no council has jurisdiction, by the CCMA.
procedure that is generally applicable and deviations in respect of specific issues and cir-
cumstances. The general procedure may be illustrated as follows:
DISPUTE
STEP 2 Conciliation
(certificate of non-resolution is issued)1
1 If the dispute is about a refusal to bargain an advisory award must also be issued before the notice to
strike is given.
282 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
employer has given notice of termination of the employees’ contracts of employment and
60 days have lapsed since the section 189(3) notice was issued, the employees or their
union may give notice to strike or may refer the dispute to the Labour Court. Once they
have elected one option, the other falls away. Where a facilitator has not been appointed,
the dispute must be referred to conciliation and if conciliation fails, notice of strike action
may be given or the dispute may be referred to the Labour Court. The option of strike
action is not available where only procedural aspects of the dismissals are challenged. Refer
to paragraph 16.8 (“Dismissal for operational requirements”) for a detailed exposition of
retrenchments and strikes in the context of major retrenchments.
The primacy given to collective bargaining is evident from the instances referred to
above: if a collective agreement regulates industrial action, the procedure prescribed by
that agreement takes precedence over the statutory procedures. Here, as elsewhere in the
Act, the statutory provisions can be regarded as a default option which becomes operative
when the parties have not themselves regulated an aspect of their relationship by way of a
collective agreement.
In SA Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvis & Others [2011] 4 All SA 475 (SCA) the
Supreme Court of Appeal held that section 11 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of
1993 creates a statutory liability on the part of a trade union under whose auspices a gather-
ing or demonstration (protest march) is held. Should the gathering degenerate into a riot
causing damage to others the union will be held liable for riot damages, unless it can prove
that the act or omission complained of did not fall within the objectives of the gathering,
that it was not reasonably foreseeable and that the union had taken all reasonable steps to
prevent the act or omission.
A secondary employer may apply to the Labour Court for an interdict limiting or prohibit-
ing the secondary strike on the basis that the nature and extent of the secondary strike will
cause disproportionate harm to his business in relation to the likely effect the secondary
strike will have on the primary employer. Notice of 48 hours to the union is required before
such an application is brought to Court or, where the union has given 10 days’ notice of a
proposed strike, then five days’ notice is required. If, for example, the secondary strike
takes the form of a full-blown work stoppage, the Labour Court may find that this action
damages the secondary employer more than is necessary for the damaging impact that can
be made on the primary employer by, say, a limited picket staged by the secondary strikers
outside the premises of the primary employer. The trade union may request an urgent in-
vestigation by the CCMA to determine whether the employer’s claim is justified and the
Labour Court may refuse to grant the interdict before considering the outcome of such an
investigation.
The right to picket is a protected fundamental right in terms of the Constitution and is
regulated in section 69 of the 1995 LRA.
Picketing qualifies as a form of protected industrial action, in other words the picketers
may not be dismissed, provided that the statutory requirements have been complied with.
When a picket is planned the employer and the union would normally negotiate and con-
clude a picketing agreement which regulates the picket. They would typically include in
such an agreement the place and times for the picket. In the event of the parties not being
able to conclude a picketing agreement, they can approach the CCMA to establish picket-
ing rules. These rules may, for example, include the picket to take place on the employer’s
premises, outside the premises or even on premises owned or controlled by a person other
than the employer. Picketing on another person’s premises can only be included in the
rules established by the CCMA if that person was afforded an opportunity to make
submissions to the CCMA before the rules were established (s 69(6)).
A dispute concerning the right to picket or any alleged contravention of the statutory
requirements, a picketing agreement or the rules established by the CCMA may be referred
to the CCMA (and not a bargaining council) for conciliation and, if not resolved, to the
Labour Court. The referring party may be the employer, the union or a person who owns
or is in control of premises on which a picket has been allowed (s 69(8)).
employees’ socio-economic interest will presumably have to be reasonably clear and obvi-
ous. The more overtly political the aims of the action are, the greater will be the presump-
tion that the action is impermissible and vice versa.
The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to interdict unprotected protest action or grant
a declaratory order in respect of such action.
Only if the answers to the questions in both stages of the enquiry are in the affirmative will
the employees enjoy protection. The following guidelines are provided to assist in the
determination of the action:
Once it has been established that the action is a strike, it must be determined whether the
prescribed procedures have been complied with. Only if this has been done are the em-
ployees protected against dismissal.
This does not mean that an employer may dismiss unprotected strikers with impunity.
The employer must still act in accordance with the precepts of fairness as enunciated in the
Act. When employees embark on unprotected action the employer is required to contact
and meet with the union. The purpose of this meeting is to convince the union to intervene
and get the workers to return to work. If the union is unsuccessful in getting the workers to
return, the employer must issue an ultimatum. The ultimatum must include a date and
time for the workers to resume duty and give a clear indication of the consequences should
they fail to return at the specified time, such as that disciplinary action will be instituted
which may lead to dismissal. It is important that the ultimatum reach all the strikers. A
reasonable time must be allowed for workers to reflect on the ultimatum and to return to
work. If they do not resume duties it is advisable that the employer repeat the ultimatum,
obviously with a new date and time for their return. If the workers persist in their strike the
employer can issue letters of suspension and notices to attend a disciplinary hearing. A
hearing must be conducted – it can be a collective hearing or individual hearings – and,
if the circumstances warrant dismissal, the workers can be dismissed. It is interesting to
note that, although section 68 permits the dismissal of unprotected strikers, they cannot be
dismissed if they heed the ultimatum and return to work, although other disciplinary action
may still be possible.
Prominent judgments in this regard include Modise & Others v Steve’s Spar Blackheath
[2002] 5 BLLR 496 (LAC) and NUM & Others v Billard Contractors CC & Another (2006) 27
ILJ 1686 (LC).
288 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
It is important to have regard to item 6 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal (Sched-
ule 8):
6. Dismissals and industrial action
(1) Participation in a strike that does not comply with the provisions of chapter IV is miscon-
duct. However, like any other act of misconduct, it does not always deserve dismissal. The sub-
stantive fairness of dismissal in these circumstances must be determined in the light of the facts
of the case, including –
(a) the seriousness of the contravention of this Act;
(b) attempts made to comply with this Act; and
(c) whether or not the strike was in response to unjustified conduct by the employer.
(2) Prior to dismissal the employer should, at the earliest opportunity, contact a trade union of-
ficial to discuss the course of action it intends to adopt. The employer should issue an ultimatum
in clear and unambiguous terms that should state what is required of the employees and what
sanction will be imposed if they do not comply with the ultimatum. The employees should be al-
lowed sufficient time to reflect on the ultimatum and respond to it, either by complying with it or
rejecting it. If the employer cannot reasonably be expected to extend these steps to the employ-
ees in question, the employer may dispense with them.
14.9 Lock-outs
The lock-out is the employer’s economic weapon during the collective bargaining process
to compel workers to accept his offer or proposal.
Section 213 of the LRA defines a lock-out as follows:
lock-out means the exclusion by an employer of employees from the employer’s workplace, for
the purpose of compelling the employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual
interest between employer and employee, whether or not the employer breaches those employ-
ees’ contracts of employment in the course of or for the purpose of that exclusion.
A lock-out is therefore the exclusion of employees from the workplace. A lock-out can take
no other form, as was the case under the 1956 Act. Under the 1956 Act it was, for example,
possible for an employer to discontinue his business, totally or partially, or to dismiss em-
ployees (the so-called dismissal lock-out) in an attempt to compel them to accept the
employer’s proposals. These other forms of lock-outs have been outlawed in the 1995 LRA
and indeed, a dismissal lock-out is declared an automatically unfair dismissal in section 187
of the LRA of 1995.
The definition of a lock-out implies two elements: (a) an act by the employer (the exclu-
sion of employees); (b) with the specific purpose of persuading the employees to accept the
proposal of the employer. In its simplest form a lock-out is typically where the employer
puts a final proposal of a wage increase on the table at the point when wage negotiations
deadlock and tells the employees and their union that the employees will be excluded from
the workplace until they accept that final proposal. In such a case the employer will close all
entrances and not allow any employee to enter the workplace or to perform any work.
A lock-out can be an offensive lock-out or a defensive lock-out. An offensive lock-out is
industrial action taken by the employer before the union and its members embark on some
action. A defensive lock-out is one in response to the union’s strike action.
If an offensive lock-out conforms with the procedural requirements contained in sec-
tion 64 of the LRA it will withstand any challenge in the Labour Court. In other words, the
employer who intends to embark on lock-out action must refer the dispute to the CCMA or
a bargaining council, conciliation must be conducted, a certificate of non-resolution must
be issued and the employer must give notice (48 hours or seven days) of the lock-out –
similar to a union embarking on protected strike action. If an employer locks out employ-
ees in response to a protected strike it is not necessary for the employer to follow the
section 64 procedure because the union has already followed that procedure for its strike
action. It is merely necessary for the employer to give notice (48 hours or seven days)
before the lock-out commences.
Strikes and lock-outs 289
Questions
Question 1
List the elements of
1.1 a strike; (4)
1.2 a lock-out. (2)
Question 2
Discuss the requirements for a protected strike in terms of section 64(1) of the LRA. (10)
Question 3
Discuss the legal consequences of protected and unprotected strikes respectively in terms of
sections 67 and 68 of the Labour Relations Act. (20)
Question 4
List the requirements that have to be met for
4.1 a sympathy strike to qualify as a protected secondary strike; (5)
4.2 a picket to qualify as protected industrial action. (6)
Question 5
A trade union went on a strike in compliance with the Act, upon which the employer issued
an ultimatum that the strikers should return to work. Although the workers returned to
work, the union informed the employer that it regarded the ultimatum as being without
justification, that the strike was only suspended pending legal advice and that it regarded
the dispute over which the strike was called as unresolved. Two months later the employees
went out on strike again. The employer argued that this was a new strike and not in compli-
ance with the Act as the procedures of the LRA were not complied with. The employer thus
tried to obtain an interdict preventing the strike. The union argued that the strike was a
legitimate continuation of the earlier strike and thus a “protected strike”. Was this a “pro-
tected strike”? (12)
Hint: See AECI Chlor-Alkali & Plastic Ltd & Others v SA Chemical Workers’ Union & Others
(1986) 7 ILJ 300 (W) and Chapter IV of the LRA of 1995. See also Chamber of Mines of SA v
National Union of Mineworkers (1986) 7 ILJ 304 (W); Free State Consolidated Gold Mines v Na-
tional Union of Mineworkers (1987) 8 ILJ 606 (O); Chamber of Mines of SA v National Union of
Mineworkers (1987) 8 ILJ 68 (A).
Question 6
Discuss the circumstances under which an employer may lawfully dismiss employees who
are participating in a protected strike and the manner in which these dismissals have to be
handled. (15)
Hint: See item 6 of Schedule 8 (the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal).
290 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Question 7
ZYX CC is a small fresh produce retailer. It manages to compete against the large retail
stores by staying open seven days a week from 07:00 to 20:00. Although ZYX and its employ-
ees have not formally agreed that overtime should be worked, all the employees have
worked overtime on a regular basis. During recent wage negotiations ZYX was informed by
all its employees that they were no longer prepared to work overtime. As a result of this
refusal ZYX is no longer able to compete with the chain stores and is rapidly losing busi-
ness. ZYX wants to know from you if it can dismiss its employees for striking. (10)
Hint: This ground for dismissal amounts to termination for operational requirements of the
employer.
Question 8
Explain when an employer is prohibited from employing replacement labour (“scab
labour”). (3)
Question 9
9.1 Is it possible for the members of an unregistered trade union to go on a protected
strike? Explain. (4)
9.2 Can employees who do not belong to a trade union go on a protected strike?
Explain. (4)
Question 10
Suppose the employees of XYZ Company go out on strike, demanding that the local author-
ity should institute a public transport service in the area where they live as they find it
difficult to get to and from work.
10.1 Would this constitute a strike? (5)
10.2 Suppose that, instead of directing their demand at the local authority, the strikers
demand that their employer should enter into negotiations with the local authority
about the public transport service. Would this make a difference to your answer? (5)
Question 11
The employees of the XYZ Company embarked on a protected strike in support of a wage
demand. Subsequently, the employees of PTY Company also went on strike in support of
the demands made by the employees of XYZ company. Can the latter strikers rely on the
legality of the primary strike (that is the strike by the employees of XYZ company) to render
their strike (the secondary or sympathy strike) legal or must they also comply with the pro-
visions contained in sections 64? (10)
Question 12
The employees of XYZ Company embark on a protected strike in pursuit of their wage
demands. The employer counters the strike by (a) offering bonuses to non-striking employ-
ees to work additional hours and to perform the tasks of the striking employees and (b)
adopting a policy of withholding annual bonuses from striking employees at the rate of 5%
per day of strike action. Are these legitimate employer tactics and will they survive a chal-
lenge in the Labour Court? (10)
Hint: See Chemical Workers’ Industrial Union v BP South Africa (1991) 12 ILJ 599 (IC); OK
Bazaars (1929) Ltd v SACCAWU (1993) 14 ILJ 362 (LAC). Compare this with s 5(3) of the
LRA.
Strikes and lock-outs 291
Question 13
During a strike an employer requests an employee who is not on strike to do the work of
one of the strikers. If the employee refuses to comply with this request, may he be dismissed
if:
13.1 it is an unprotected strike; (3)
13.2 it is a protected lock-out; (3)
13.3 the work he was requested to do was necessary to prevent a health hazard? (3)
Question 14
The refuse removal services of a local authority that has not been designated an essential
service by the ESC go on strike in accordance with the Act. After three weeks typhoid fever
breaks out in the area. Medical authorities are of the opinion that this alarming develop-
ment is a direct consequence of the fact that refuse is not being removed and processed.
Given this situation, answer the following questions:
14.1 May the local authority apply to the ESC to have the refuse removal service designated
an essential service and what effect would this have on the strike in progress? (5)
14.2 May the local authority employ replacement labour to do the work of the strikers? (3)
14.3 May the local authority dismiss non-striking employees from the roads department
who refuse to assist with the removal of the refuse which has accumulated during the
strike? (3)
14.4 Assuming that there was no strike and further assuming that the local authority
applies to the ESC to have the refuse removal designated as an essential service, ex-
plain the process that the ESC must follow in designating this service as an essential
service. (6)
Question 15
Employees and their employer deadlock on the employer’s final offer during wage negotia-
tions. The union refers the dispute to the appropriate bargaining council. Conciliation fails
to resolve the dispute and a certificate of non-resolution is issued. The employer then gives
the trade union 48 hours’ notice of its intention to dismiss those employees who do not
accept the employer’s final offer. True to its word the employer dismisses the recalcitrant
employees after the expiry of the deadline set for acceptance of the final offer. Discuss the
legal position of the dismissed employees and the remedies, if any, at their disposal. (15)
Question 16
The ABC group of companies is involved in the entertainment and leisure industry. One of
its companies, ABC Wizardry, does business as a chain of entertainment arcades in Johannes-
burg where mostly children and teenagers come to match their skills against video games
and other devices of electronic wizardry. It employs some 200 weekly paid employees, 80 of
whom are members of the Mario Workers Union. The trade union and the employer fail to
resolve a wage dispute and consequently the trade union calls a strike in compliance with
the Act. The strike of the employees at ABC Wizardry is not successful as the company man-
ages to operate by employing school children to do the work of the strikers. The trade
union, therefore, considers further strategies of pressurising the company. One of these is
to get the employees of DEF Company, a subsidiary company, to go on strike. The subsid-
iary company provides a maintenance service to the ABC Wizardry. As maintenance is re-
quired daily at the arcades the trade union feels that this strategy will cause severe disruption
of ABC Wizardry’s operations and force the company to reach an agreement. The workers
of DEF Company duly embark on a secondary strike, causing considerable harm to their
own employer (the secondary employer). DEF Company, who experienced financial diffi-
culties before the secondary strike, is in a real danger of financial ruin because of the strike
and approaches you for advice. Write a legal opinion in which you set out the legal position,
292 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
the arguments that may be used by the employer in support of any application for relief
that he may seek, as well as the type of arguments the trade union would use in opposing
the application. (20)
Question 17
There was a strike at a business dealing in perishable foodstuffs. The parties failed to reach
a wage agreement as the employer was unable to meet the wage demands. The employees
started to strike without notice to the employer and after they had unloaded the frozen
foodstuffs from the cold storage for the day’s deliveries, thereby intending to cause the em-
ployer the maximum financial harm. The employer twice issued ultimatums for the employ-
ees to return to work. The employer contacted the union, but the union official refused to
intervene. About two hours after the commencement of the strike the strikers were dis-
missed. During the course of the day the dismissed strikers jeeringly rejected numerous
offers to negotiate. They also scoffed at suggestions that they should attend disciplinary
hearings to consider their conduct. Throughout the day the employer was willing to rein-
state the dismissed strikers. The next day the union demanded that all the dismissed strikers
be reinstated unconditionally. The employer refused to do so, but said that all employees
who applied for jobs would be re-employed. Those who availed themselves of this offer were
in fact re-employed. Those who declined the offer took the employer to the Labour Court.
At the same time the employer instituted an action in the Labour Court against the trade
union, claiming compensation for the loss suffered by the employer due to the action of the
strikers. Answer the following questions. In your answers distinguish between the situation
where it is a protected strike and an unprotected strike:
17.1 Will the employees be successful in their court application for reinstatement? (8)
17.2 Will the employer be successful in his claim for damages? (8)
Hint: See ss 67 and 68 (especially s 68(1)(b)) of the LRA and Swissport (SA) (Pty) Ltd v SA
Transport & Allied Workers Union & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 1256 (LC). Compare this with the
position under the 1956 LRA and Food and Beverage Workers’ Union v Hercules Cold Storage
(1989) 10 ILJ 457 (IC); Food and Beverage Workers’ Union v Hercules Cold Storage (1990) 11 ILJ
47 (LAC).
Question 18
During the course of a protected strike some strikers vandalise company property. A shop
steward also issues a press release in which he accuses the CEO of the company of embez-
zling the employees’ provident fund contributions. As a consequence of the strike the
company loses a lucrative contract. The CEO approaches you for advice on how to go about
the following:
18.1 suing the union and/or the workers for damage to company property, economic harm
and defamation; (15)
Hint: See SATAWU & Another v Garvas & Others (City of Cape Town as Intervening Party
and Freedom of Expression Institute as amicus curiae) [2012] 10 BLLR 959 (CC).
18.2 dismissing without a hearing those employees who damaged company property (these
individuals are easily identifiable from a video recording made during the strike). (5)
Question 19
May an employer reward employees who did not take part in a protected strike merely
because they did not strike? (5)
Hint: See FAWU & Others v Pets Products (Pty) Ltd (2000) 9 LC 6.12.3; NUM v Namakwa Sands
– A division of Anglo Operations Ltd [2008] 7 BLLR 675 (LC).
Strikes and lock-outs 293
Question 20
Mr Malabane is the director of Malabane Enterprises. His employees approach him with a
request to extend the 30-minute lunch break to an hour. After negotiations it is agreed that
the lunch break will be 45 minutes. The next day, however, the employees hand over a
letter of grievance regarding lunch breaks and the day after that all the employees go on
strike. Mr Malabane approaches you for advice.
20.1 Do the employees enjoy protection? Explain. (5)
20.2 Discuss the legal consequences of the employees’ strike. (10)
Question 21
The trade union FADUSA approaches you for advice. The members of the union employed
by ZZ Trading have been on strike for five days because of a dispute over fringe benefits.
The strike has not been a success and the members of the union are complaining because
they do not receive any wages as a result of the “no work, no pay” rule. The trade union
wants to put more pressure on the employer. Advise the trade union on other possible
industrial action and on the procedures that must be followed to protect the employees
against dismissal. (10)
Question 22
Pro Roof Cape (Pty) Ltd underpaid its employees and did not pay annual leave bonuses
because of financial difficulties. When the night-shift employees found out that they were
not going to be paid their bonuses, they refused to continue working. When the day-shift
employees arrived for duty, they joined their colleagues in refusing to work until the bo-
nuses were paid. The employer issued an ultimatum for them to return to work. When the
employees persisted in their refusal to work they were issued with notices terminating their
employment.
22.1 Does the employees’ refusal to work constitute a strike and, if it does, is the strike
protected or unprotected? (5)
22.2 Can the employer dismiss the employees in the circumstances? (2)
22.3 Assume that the employees can be dismissed. Would you consider the manner in
which the employer dismissed them procedurally fair? Explain. (10)
Hint: See item 6 of the Code of Good Practice; Modise & Others v Steve’s Spar Blackheath
[2002] 5 BLLR 496 (LAC); NUM & Others v Billard Contractors CC & Another (2006) 27
ILJ 1686 (LC).
Question 23
Peter, Sam and Lebo were among a number of employees that Nicholas, the employer, dis-
missed for misconduct after a protected strike characterised by intimidation and widespread
violence, including shooting and the murder of a non-striking employee. Nicholas claimed
that the employees had broken the picketing rules and defied an order of the Labour Court.
A disciplinary hearing was subsequently convened outside Nicholas’s premises. The employ-
ees claimed that the strike was peaceful, that they could not afford transport to the hearing
and that their dismissals were procedurally and substantively unfair. Discuss whether their
dismissals were fair. (10)
Hint: See Kunene & Others v Dunlop Belting Products (Pty) Ltd (2011) 20 CCMA 9.4.2.
294 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Appendix 1
(2) The strike must be a protected strike. In normal cases, employees picket at their own place of
work in support of their strike against their own employer. Cases do arise, however, where
employees picket at their own place of work in support of a strike between another employer
and its employees. This is what is contemplated in section 66 as a “secondary strike”. In this
case, in order to be protected, the picket must further satisfy the requirements of a lawful
secondary strike in terms of section 66 of this Act. This is because the definition of “secondary
strike” in section 66 includes “conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike”. A picket
is “conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike”.
(3) The requirements for a protected secondary strike are:
(a) the strike that is to be supported by the secondary strike must itself be a protected strike;
(b) the employer of the employees taking part in the secondary strike must have received
written notice of the proposed picket at least 7 days prior to its commencement; and
(c) the nature and extent of the secondary strike must be reasonable in relation to the pos-
sible direct or indirect effect that the secondary strike may have on the business of the
primary employer.
(4) If a picket is in support of an unprotected strike, the picket is not protected by section 69 of
this Act.
(5) Pickets may be held in opposition to a lock-out. Section 69(1) does not distinguish between
protected and unprotected lock-outs. This means that a picket may be authorised and held
in opposition to a protected or an unprotected lock-out.
4. Picketing rules
(1) The registered trade union and employer should seek to agree to picketing rules before the
commencement of the strike or picket.
(2) A collective agreement may contain picketing rules. When they negotiate an agreement the
following factors should be considered:
(a) the nature of the authorisation and its service upon the employer;
(b) the notice of the commencement of the picket including the place, time and the extent
of the picket;
(c) the nature of the conduct in the picket;
(d) the number of picketers and their location;
(e) the modes of communication between marshals and employees and any other relevant
parties;
(f) access to the employer’s premises for purposes other than picketing for example access
to toilets, the use of telephones, etc;
(g) the conduct of the picketers on the employer’s premises; and
(h) this code of good practice.
(3) The factors listed in subparagraph (2) apply to the determination of picketing rules by a
commissioner.
5. Pickets on the employer’s premises
(1) A picket may take place on the employer’s premises with the permission of the employer. The
permission may not be unreasonably withheld. In order to determine whether the decision
of the employer to withhold the permission is reasonable, the factors which should be taken
into account include:
(a) the nature of the workplace for example a shop, a factory, a mine, etc;
(b) the particular situation of the workplace for example distance from place to which pub-
lic has access, living accommodation situated on employer premises, etc;
(c) the number of employees taking part in the picket inside the employer’s premises;
(d) the areas designated for the picket;
(e) time and duration of the picket;
296 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
(3) The police have the responsibility to enforce the criminal law. They may arrest picketers for
participation in violent conduct or attending a picket armed with dangerous weapons. They
may take steps to protect the public if they are of the view that the picket is not peaceful and
is likely to lead to violence.
8. General rights, obligations and immunity
(1) A person who takes part in a picket protected in terms of this Act does not commit a delict or
a breach of contract. This means that the employer may not sue a person or a union for
damages caused by a picket.
(2) The employer may not take disciplinary action against an employee for participating in a
lawful picket. Where the employee’s conduct during a picket constitutes misconduct the em-
ployer may take disciplinary action in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
298 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Appendix 2
Ð
1. PARTY MAKING REQUEST
Name:........................................................................................
..................................................................................................
WHAT IS THE Postal Address:..........................................................................
PURPOSE ..................................................................................................
OF THIS FORM? ..................................................................................................
This form is a request by a Tel: .......................................... Fax: ..........................................
party to the CCMA to secure
agreement on picketing rules Contact Person: ........................................................................
during a strike or lock-out. Reference Number: ..................................................................
WHO FILLS IN Details of Request: ....................................................................
THIS FORM? ..................................................................................................
A registered trade union or ..................................................................................................
employer.
..................................................................................................
WHERE DOES THIS
FORM GO? 2. OTHER PARTY’S DETAILS
The Registrar, Provincial Office Name:........................................................................................
of the CCMA. Please refer to the
last page for details. ..................................................................................................
Postal Address:..........................................................................
OTHER
..................................................................................................
INSTRUCTIONS
A copy of this form must be
..................................................................................................
served on the other party. Tel: .......................................... Fax: ..........................................
Proof that a copy of this form
has been served on the other
Contact Person: ........................................................................
party must be supplied by Reference Number: ..................................................................
attaching:
y A copy of a registered slip
from the Post Office;
y A copy of a signed receipt if
hand delivered;
y A signed statement
confirming service by the
person delivering the form;
y A copy of a fax confirmation
slip; or
y Any other satisfactory proof
of service.
If more than one party is
referring the dispute or if the
dispute is referred against more
than one party, write down the
additional names and
particulars on a separate piece
of paper and attach details to
this form.
3. ARE YOU REQUESTING THE CCMA TO DEAL WITH THIS MATTER URGENTLY?
Yes No
If so, provide reasons.
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
CCMA GAUTENG
JOHANNESBURG
Physical address: Johannesburg Regional Office
127 Fox Street
Johannesburg
2001
Postal address: Private Bag X96
Marshalltown
2107
Tel: (011) 220-5000
Fax: (011) 220-5101/02/03/04/05/0861 392 262
E-mail: johannesburg@ccma.org.za
Strikes and lock-outs 301
TSHWANE (PRETORIA)
Physical address: Metro Park Building
351 Schoeman Street (Cnr Prinsloo)
Pretoria
0002
Postal address: Private Bag X176
Pretoria
0001
Tel: (012) 392-9700
Fax: (012) 392-9701/2
E-mail: pretoria@ccma.org.za
CCMA LIMPOPO
Physical address: CCMA House
104 Hans van Rensburg Street
Polokwane
0699
Postal address: Private Bag X9512
Polokwane
0700
Tel: (015) 297-5010
Fax: (015) 297-1649/7343
E-mail: ptb@ccma.org.za
CCMA MPUMALANGA
Physical address: CCMA House
Diedericks Street
Witbank
1035
Postal address: Private Bag X7290
Witbank
1035
Tel: (013) 656-2800
Fax: (013) 656-2885/6
E-mail: wtb@ccma.org.za
RUSTENBURG
Physical address: Shop SG7 11B
Rustenburg Sanlam Centre
43–45 Boom Street
Rustenburg
0299
Postal address: Private Bag X82104
Rustenburg
0300
Tel: To be confirmed
Fax: (014) 538-2167
E-mail: to be confirmed
Appendix 3
Name:..........................................................................................
Date:............................................................................................
Strikes and lock-outs 305
Appendix 4
Ð
PROTEST ACTION
15.1 Introduction
A new and important development in South African labour relations is the introduction of
workplace forums, in terms of which worker participation in decision-making at the work-
place has been established. Workplace forums are designed to facilitate a shift from adver-
sarial collective bargaining to joint problem-solving and decision-making in the workplace.
The purpose of workplace forums, therefore, is not to undermine collective bargaining, but
to supplement it.
The following are important features of workplace forums:
• not only union members, but all employees are included in the system and, therefore,
have a say in workplace decisions which affect them directly. The Act gives a special
meaning to “employee” in the context of workplace forums. An “employee” is defined as
any person who is employed in a workplace, except a senior managerial employee whose
contract of employment or status confers the authority to represent the employer in
dealings with the workplace forum or determine policy and take decisions on behalf of
the employer that may be in conflict with the representation of the employees in the
workplace;
• a workplace forum can be established only at the request of a registered majority trade
union. Two or more registered trade unions may act jointly in order to constitute a
majority for the purpose of initiating a workplace forum;
• the parties, namely the employer and the union(s), are encouraged to create their own
structures. If they reach agreement (under the auspices of the CCMA) the workplace
forum is governed by that agreement. Failure to reach agreement will result in the appli-
cation of the provisions of the Act;
• parties other than those defined in the Act may also establish a workplace forum along
the lines of the statutory workplace forum, but without the underpinning of the Act;
• the matters for consultation and joint decision-making found in the Act, agreed upon by
NEDLAC, may be varied by agreement between the parties;
• workplace forums may also be established in the public service. Such establishment will
be regulated in a Schedule promulgated by the Minister for the Public Service and Ad-
ministration.
The general functions of a workplace forum include the promotion of the interests of all
employees in the workplace, not only the interests of union members, and the enhance-
ment of efficiency in the workplace. In order to achieve this goal the forum must be
consulted by the employer on certain matters. In some instances it participates in joint
decision-making.
The workplace forum has to meet regularly to ensure the efficient functioning of the
forum. In addition, the employer is required to meet with the forum on a regular basis. Fur-
thermore, the members of the workplace forum must meet with the employees to report on
its activities and on those matters discussed with the employer. All meetings must be held
during working hours without loss of pay on the part of the employees.
307
308 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Award
Implementation Arbitration
Award Conciliation
Consensus No consensus
Proposal by employer
Worker participation 311
Questions
Question 1
Give a summary of the salient features of a workplace forum. (6)
Question 2
Define the following in terms of Chapter V of the Act dealing with workplace forums:
2.1 a “representative” union; (3)
2.2 an employee. (4)
Question 3
3.1 Discuss the establishment of a workplace forum. (15)
3.2 Name the general functions of a workplace forum. (5)
Question 4
Give a summary of the provisions that must be included in the constitution of a
workplace forum. (10)
Question 5
Name the different forms of worker participation by way of a workplace forum. (3)
Question 6
6.1 Discuss the disclosure of information by an employer to a workplace forum
and to employees. (8)
6.2 A dispute arises about the disclosure of information by an employer. Discuss the
procedure that must be followed to resolve the dispute. (6)
Question 7
Discuss the matters for consultation between a workplace forum and the employer. (12)
Question 8
Is it possible for the parties to regulate by way of a collective agreement the matters
that a workplace forum must be consulted on by an employer? Briefly explain. (2)
Question 9
Describe the procedure that must be followed before the employer may implement a
proposal on which a workplace forum must be consulted. (6)
Question 10
10.1 Name the matters for joint decision-making prescribed by the Act. (3)
10.2 Describe the manner in which the matters for decision-making prescribed by the
Act may be altered. (2)
312 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
10.3 Describe the procedure that must be followed if the parties cannot reach
consensus on a matter for joint decision-making. (3)
Question 11
A supermarket with its head office in Cape Town has ten branches dispersed around the
country. Discuss the possibility of the establishment of one or more workplace forums:
11.1 if the branches are not regarded as separate workplaces;
11.2 if the branches are regarded as separate workplaces. (10)
Question 12
An employer in the food industry has 300 employees in his employment. These employees
are all working in the same workplace and their occupational structure is as follows: 200
employees are manual workers; 50 are administrative and clerical employees and 50 are
supervisory, managerial and technical employees. Discuss how the workplace forum
should be composed. (8)
Worker participation 313
Appendix
SCHEDULE 2
GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTION OF WORKPLACE FORUM
1. Introduction
(1) This Schedule contains guidelines for the constitution of a workplace forum. It is in-
tended to guide representative trade unions that wish to establish a workplace forum, em-
ployers and commissioners.
(2) This Act places the highest value on the establishment of workplace forums by agree-
ment between a representative trade union and an employer. The role of the commissioner is
to facilitate an agreement establishing the structure and functions of a workplace forum. If
agreement is not possible, either in whole or in part, the commissioner must refer to this
Schedule, using its guidelines in a manner that best suits the particular workplace involved.
(3) For convenience, the guidelines follow the sequence of the paragraphs in section 82 of
this Act.
2. Number of seats in workplace forums (s 82(1)(a))
The formula to determine the number of seats in the workplace forum should reflect the size,
nature, occupational structure and physical location of the workplace. A guideline may be:
(a) in a workplace in which 100 to 200 employees are employed, five members;
(b) in a workplace in which 201 to 600 employees are employed, eight members;
(c) in a workplace in which 601 to 1 000 employees are employed, 10 members;
(d) in a workplace in which more than 1 000 employees are employed, 10 members for
the first 1 000 employees, plus an additional member for every additional 500 em-
ployees, up to a maximum of 20 members.
3. Distribution of seats to reflect occupational structure (s 82(1)(b))
The formula to determine the distribution of seats in the workplace forum must reflect the
occupational structure of the workplace.
Example:
There are 300 employees in a workplace. The occupational structure is as follows: 200 employ-
ees are manual employees; 50 are administrative and clerical employees; and 50 are super-
visory, managerial and technical employees. The six seats may be distributed as follows:
4 seats for members to be elected from candidates nominated from among manual employees
1 seat for members to be elected from candidates nominated from among the administra-
tive and clerical employees
1 seat for members to be elected from candidates nominated from among the supervisory,
managerial and technical employees
4. Elections (S 82(1)(c), (d), (g), (h), (i) and (j))
(1) The constitution must include provisions concerning the appointment of an election
officer.
Example:
(a) Every election or by-election in relation to a workplace forum must be conducted by
an election officer appointed by agreement between the representative trade union
and the employer.
(b) If the trade union and the employer cannot agree, the trade union may apply to the
Commission to appoint an election officer.
(c) The Commission must appoint an election officer to conduct a by-election only if it
is satisfied that the workplace forum cannot function adequately without a by-elec-
tion.
314 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
(2) The constitution must set out what the election officer should do and the procedure for
an election.
Example:
(a) Thirty days before each election of members of the workplace forum, the election
officer must:
(i) prepare a list of all employees in the workplace; and
(ii) call for nominations for members of the workplace forum.
(b) Any employee may be nominated as a candidate for election as a member of the
workplace forum by:
(i) any registered trade union with members employed in the workplace;
(ii) a petition signed by not less than 20 per cent of the employees in the work-
place or 100 employees, whichever number of employees is the smaller.
(c) Any employee who is a member or has previously served as a member of a work-
place forum is eligible for re-election.
(d) Fourteen days before each election of members of the workplace forum, the elec-
tion officer must:
(i) confirm that the nominated candidates qualify for election;
(ii) publish a list of all qualified candidates who have been properly nominated;
and
(iii) prepare a ballot for the election, listing the nominated candidates in alphabet-
ical order by surname.
(e) Voting must be by secret ballot.
(f) Every employee is entitled to vote in the election of the workplace forum during
working hours at the employer’s premises.
(g) Every employee in the workplace is entitled to cast a number of votes equal to the
number of members to be elected to the workplace forum.
(h) Every employee may cast one or more of those votes in favour of any candidate.
5. Terms of office (s 82(1)(k), (l) and (m))
(1) The constitution must provide that the members of a workplace forum remain in office
until the first meeting of the newly elected workplace forum.
(2) The constitution must include provisions allowing the members to resign as well as pro-
visions for the removal of members from office.
Example:
(a) A member of a workplace forum may resign by giving written notice to the chairperson.
(b) A member of a workplace forum must vacate that office:
(i) when the member’s resignation takes effect;
(ii) if the member is promoted to senior managerial status;
(iii) if the member is transferred from the workplace;
(iv) if the member’s employment is terminated;
(v) as a result of an award of a commissioner; or
(vi) if the representative trade union that nominated a member removes the member.
(c) The representative trade union, the employer, or the workplace forum may apply to
the Commission to have a member of the workplace forum removed from office on
the grounds of gross dereliction of the duties of office.
Worker participation 315
(d) Twenty per cent of the employees in the workplace may submit a signed petition to
the Commission applying for the removal from office of a member of the workplace
forum on the grounds of gross dereliction of the duties of office.
(e) An application to remove a member of a workplace forum from office must be
decided by arbitration under the auspices of the Commission.
(f) A by-election to fill any vacancy in the workplace forum must be conducted by an
election officer.
6. Meetings of workplace forum (s 82(1)(n))
The constitution must include provisions governing meetings of the workplace forum.
Example:
(a) The first meeting of a newly elected workplace forum must be convened by the elec-
tion officer as soon as practicable after the election.
(b) At that meeting the members of the workplace forum must elect from among their
number a chairperson and a deputy chairperson.
(c) The workplace forum must meet whenever necessary, but at least once a month.
(d) A quorum of the workplace forum must be a majority of the members of the work-
place forum holding office at any time.
(e) A decision of the majority of the members of the workplace forum present at the
meeting must be the decision of the workplace forum.
(f) The meetings between members of the workplace forum and the employees should
be at least four times a year.
Example 1:
In a workplace that is a single place, the meetings with the employees should be with all the
members of the workplace forum.
Example 2:
In a workplace that is geographically dispersed, the meetings with the employees need not be
with all the members of the workplace forum
7. Time off for members of workplace forum (s 82(1)(p))
The constitution must include provisions governing time off for members to perform their
functions.
Example:
(a) A member of a workplace forum is entitled to take reasonable time off with pay
during working hours for the purpose of:
(i) performing the functions and duties of a member; and
(ii) undergoing training relevant to the performance of those functions and
duties.
(b) The right to time off is subject to conditions that are reasonable, so as to prevent
the undue disruption of work.
(c) The costs associated with the training must be paid by the employer, if those costs
are reasonable, having regard to the size and capabilities of the employer.
8. Facilities to be provided to workplace forum (s 82(1)(r))
The constitution must require the employer to provide adequate facilities to the workplace for-
um to perform its functions.
Example:
(a) The employer must provide, at its cost:
(i) fees, facilities and materials that are necessary for the conduct of elections and
by-elections of the workplace forum; and
(ii) administrative and secretarial facilities that are appropriate to enable the mem-
bers of the workplace forum to perform their functions and duties.
316 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
(b) These facilities must include, but are not limited to, a room in which the workplace
forum may meet and access to a telephone.
(c) The costs incurred by the employer in complying with the provisions of para-
graphs (a) and (b) must be reasonable, having regard to the size and capabilities of
the employer.
9. Experts (s 82(1)(t))
The constitution may provide for the use of experts.
Example:
(a) A workplace forum may ask experts to assist it in the performance of any of its func-
tions.
(b) An expert must ensure that there is no conflict of interest between the assistance
given to one workplace forum and another.
(c) An expert may attend any meeting of the workplace forum and, at its request, ad-
dress any meetings of the workplace forum including a meeting with the employer
or the employees.
(d) An expert is entitled to any information to which the workplace forum is entitled
and may inspect and copy any document.
16.1 Introduction
Many of the current principles pertaining to dismissals have been developed by the Industrial
Court in terms of its unfair labour practice jurisdiction under the LRA of 1956. The days of
“hiring and firing” an employee at will are forever gone because the emphasis is now on fairness.
The Industrial Court laid down two requirements for a fair dismissal: substantive fairness
and procedural fairness. A dismissal was thus unfair, according to the Industrial Court, if
the employer did not have a valid and fair reason to dismiss and/or if the employer failed
to follow a fair procedure by affording an employee an opportunity to state his case before
dismissing him. The numerous decisions of the Industrial Court over its 25 years of exist-
ence left little doubt as to when a dismissal would be considered unfair.
The Labour Relations Act of 1995 codifies the laws, court decisions and principles relating
to dismissals which existed prior to its introduction and creates the right not to be unfairly
dismissed (s 185). A definition of “dismissal” is for the first time provided (in s 186(1)) and
some dismissals are declared automatically unfair (s 187). Section 188 of the Act recognises
three grounds as valid reasons for a dismissal: the misconduct or incapacity of an employee
or the operational requirements of the employer.
317
318 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
employment conditions that are substantially less favourable than those provided by the old
employer (a form of constructive dismissal in the context of a section 197 transfer).
The termination of a contract of employment has in certain circumstances always been
considered a dismissal, such as in the case of a summary dismissal for serious misconduct, but
legislation has never provided a definition of the concept “dismissal”. The 1995 LRA is the
first statute that defines dismissal and gives a much broader meaning to “dismissal” than the
narrower interpretation of the past by incorporating a variety of terminations of employment.
In the first instance the definition states that termination with or without notice consti-
tutes a dismissal. Until the advent of the 1995 LRA it was possible for an employer to termi-
nate the services of an employee on notice of a duration required by the employment
contract, legislation or a collective agreement, for example one month. The employer was
not required to have a valid and fair reason or to observe a fair procedure before giving
notice and terminating employment. The LRA, however, now requires an employer to
adhere to the requirements of substantive and procedural fairness so that even if the re-
quired notice is given, the employer must have a reason for the intended termination and
follow a fair procedure. In NULAW v Barnard NO & Another [2001] 9 BLLR 1002 (LAC) the
Labour Appeal Court held that any act on the part of the employer that brings the em-
ployment contract to an end in a manner recognised by law constitutes a dismissal within
the meaning of section 186(1)(a). See also Ouwehand v Hout Bay Fishing Industries [2004] 8
BLLR 815 (LC); Marneweck v SEESA Ltd [2009] 7 BLLR 669 (LC); Sindane v Prestige Cleaning
Services [2009] 12 BLLR 1249 (LC).
The second instance of dismissal found in the definition relates to the renewal of a fixed-
term contract. A fixed-term contract is concluded for a specified period, say six months, and
based on the principles of Contract Law the contract terminates automatically upon expira-
tion of that period. The old Industrial Court did not accept this principle in the context of
fixed-term contracts of employment because of the ongoing nature of the employment
relationship. If, according to the Industrial Court, the fixed-term contract created an expecta-
tion of an ongoing relationship, the failure to renew the contract constituted a dismissal. This
sentiment has been incorporated in the definition of “dismissal” in the 1995 LRA.
Initially section 186(1)(b) of the LRA declared the non-renewal of a fixed-term contract
or the renewal on less favourable terms a dismissal if the employee could prove that he had
a reasonable expectation of renewal on the same or similar terms. The Labour Court
debated whether this provision included an expectation of permanent employment and was
not consistent in its decisions (see e.g. Dierks v UNISA [1999] 4 BLLR 304 (LC); McInnes v
Technikon Natal [2000] 6 BLLR 701 (LC); University of Cape Town v Auf der Heyde [2001] 12
BLLR 1316 (LAC)) until the Labour Appeal Court in University of Pretoria v CCMA & Others
[2012] 2 BLLR 164 (LAC) eventually decided that section 186(1)(b) was confined to fixed
term and not permanent employment. The legislature took note of the debate and in the
2014 amendments to the LRA included an expectation for permanent employment. Thus,
if an employee can prove that he had a reasonable expectation of the renewal of a fixed-
term contract or of permanent employment and the employer did not renew the contract
or did not employ him permanently (or provided less favourable conditions), the employee
has been dismissed and the fairness of that dismissal will have to be determined.
An employee who alleges a reasonable expectation of renewal of a fixed-term contract
bears the onus of proving that expectation. See Malandho v SABC [1997] 5 BLLR 555 (LC);
Dierks v UNISA [1999] 4 BLLR 304 (LC); McInnes v Technikon Natal [2000] 6 BLLR 701
(LC); Auf der Heyde v University of Cape Town [2000] 8 BLLR 877 (LC); University of Cape
Town v Auf der Heyde [2001] 12 BLLR 1316 (LAC); SACTWU & Another v Cadema Industries
(Pty) Ltd [2008] 8 BLLR 790 (LC); SA Rugby Players’ Association (SARPA) & Others v SA Rugby
(Pty) Ltd & Others; SA Rugby Pty Ltd v SARPU & Another [2008] 9 BLLR 845 (LAC). In the
Dierks judgment the Court enumerated criteria that should be considered in determining
whether a reasonable expectation exists. While the list is not exhaustive it is a good indica-
tion of what should be considered and has been followed in numerous other cases.
Dismissals 319
These decisions were based on the original section 186(1)(b). The amended section
186(1)(b) does not change the burden of proof; the onus remains on the employee to
prove a reasonable expectation, whether for a fixed term or whether for permanent em-
ployment.
The purpose of section 186(1)(b) is to prevent the unfair practice of keeping an employ-
ee on a temporary basis without security of employment until such time as the employer
wants to dismiss the employee without complying with the obligations imposed by the LRA
in respect of permanent employees (see Biggs v Rand Water (2003) 24 ILJ 1957 (LC)). It is
because employees on fixed-term contracts have little job security and are considered
vulnerable employees that the new section 198B has been inserted into the LRA. See para-
graph 11.2 (application of the LRA) for a detailed discussion of section 198B. In summary,
an employee earning below the BCEA threshold is not supposed to be employed for a fixed
term of more than three months unless the work for which he is employed is of a definite
duration or unless the employer has a justifiable reason (such as replacing an employee
who is temporarily absent from work). If the employee is employed in contravention of
section 198B he is considered a permanent employee.
For the first time the job security of a pregnant female employee is entrenched in our
labour legislation. Female employees will certainly welcome this inclusion because for many
years it was possible for employers to terminate the services of a female employee because
of her pregnancy. It was only during the last few years of the Industrial Court’s existence
that a change in thinking could be detected. The Court ruled that in certain circumstances
termination of the services of a pregnant employee was unfair (Randall v Progress Knitting
Textiles Ltd (1992) 13 ILJ 200 (IC)). Now, in terms of section 187 of the 1995 Act, dismissal
on the grounds of pregnancy or for reasons related to pregnancy is automatically unfair.
See in this regard Mashava v Cuzen & Woods Attorneys [2000] 6 BLLR 691 (LC); Victor v Finro
Cash & Carry (2000) 21 ILJ 2489 (LC); Solidarity obo McCabe v SA Institute for Medical Research
[2003] 9 BLLR 927 (LC); Mnguni v Gumbi [2004] 6 BLLR 558 (LC); Ndlovu v Pather (2006)
27 ILJ 2671 (LC); Nieuwoudt v All-Pak (2009) 30 ILJ 2451 (LC); Lukie v Rural Alliance CC t/a
Rural Development Specialist [2004] 8 BLLR 769 (LC). In the Lukie judgment the applicant
took maternity leave with the approval of her manager. The manager then informed her
that she need not return to work after the birth of her baby. She did not return to work and
claimed that she had been dismissed. In terms of section 186(1)(c), read with section 187,
the Court found that she had been dismissed and that, because the reason for her dismissal
was related to her pregnancy, her dismissal was automatically unfair.
Under the previous LRA selective re-employment was considered an unfair labour practice.
It was, therefore, unfair for an employer to re-employ only some of a number of employees
dismissed for the same reason – for an illegal strike, for instance. The position changed with
some later decisions handed down by the Industrial Court when it was held that, when em-
ployees were dismissed – in other words, when their contracts of employment were terminat-
ed – they were no longer employees and the employer was not contractually bound to employ
them. It was thus competent for an employer to employ any person it deemed suitable to
perform the work. Because of the uncertainty created by the contradictory decisions of the
Industrial Court the legislature considered it necessary to clarify the situation, with the result
that the 1995 Act expressly defines selective re-employment as a form of dismissal.
Constructive dismissal was, in terms of the decisions of the Industrial Court under the
previous LRA, an unfair labour practice. It is now included in the definition of “dismissal”.
Rightly so, because everyone would agree that the resignation of an employee due to un-
reasonable and excessive pressure by his employer is not a voluntary resignation or termin-
ation of services, but a situation akin to a dismissal. See WL Ochse Webb & Pretorius(Pty) Ltd v
Vermeulen [1997] 2 BLLR 124 (LAC); Van der Riet v Leisurenet Ltd t/a Health and Racquet Club
[1998] 5 BLLR 471 (LAC); Pretoria Society for the Care of the Retarded v Loots [1997] 6 BLLR
721 (LAC); Ntsabo v Real Security CC [2004] 1 BLLR 58 (LC); CEPPWAWU & Another v Glass &
Aluminium 2000 CC [2002] 5 BLLR 399 (LAC); Mogorosi and SA Reserve Bank (2008) 29 ILJ 439
(CCMA); Murray v Minister of Defence (2008) 29 ILJ 1369 (SCA); Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi
320 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
NO & Others (case no. CCT33/09, [2009] ZACC 17 (CC). The employee who claims construc-
tive dismissal bears the onus to prove that his employer had rendered the working relationship
intolerable (Jooste v Transnet Ltd t/a South African Airways [1995] 5 BLLR 1 (LAC)).
When the LRA was amended in 2002 another form of constructive dismissal was intro-
duced when section 186(1)(f) was inserted into the definition of dismissal. Where the new
employer in a section 197 transfer provides substantially less favourable conditions of
employment, an employee can resign and claim constructive dismissal.
Another form of dismissal is found, not in the definition, but in the new section 198A.
Section 198A deals with the employment of labour broker (TES) employees who earn
below the BCEA threshold. If an employee performs a temporary service (as defined in
section 198A(1)) the TES (labour broker) is the employer. If the employee is not perform-
ing a temporary service as defined, the client of the labour broker is deemed to be the
employer and the employee is deemed to be employed on an indefinite basis (subject to
section 198B). Termination of the employee’s services, at the instance of the TES or the
client, for the purpose of avoiding the deeming provisions or because the employee has
exercised a right in terms of the Act is a dismissal (s 198A(4)).
Section 4 of the Act provides for the right to freedom of association. This right is protected
in sections 5 and 187. An employee may not be dismissed for exercising his right to
Dismissals 321
associate. Dismissal because an employee is exercising any of the rights pertaining to free-
dom of association is an automatically unfair dismissal.
A dismissal is also automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is the employee’s
participation in or support of a protected strike or protest action. Similarly, if an employee
is dismissed because he indicates an intention to participate in or support such action, the
dismissal is automatically unfair.
In terms of the LRA of 1956 an employer could make use of the so-called dismissal lock-
out to compel his employees to accept his proposal or offer. This amounted to a dismissal of
the employees on condition that they would be taken back only if they were willing to accept
the employer’s offer. This form of lock-out is now outlawed and, should an employer dis-
miss his employees to compel them to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual
interest between the employer and employees, their dismissals will be automatically be unfair.
An employee is protected in that he may freely exercise his rights, participate in proceed-
ings and take action against his employer without fear of being dismissed.
It has already been mentioned that the dismissal of an employee because of her preg-
nancy, intended pregnancy or any reason related to her pregnancy is automatically unfair.
If an employer unfairly discriminates (on the basis of race, gender, age, etc or any arbi-
trary ground) against an employee and, because of the discrimination, an employee is dis-
missed, the dismissal is automatically unfair. The emphasis is on unfair discrimination. Fair
discrimination, that is, discrimination on valid grounds, is permissible. Section 187(2) spe-
cifically declares a dismissal fair if the reason for dismissal is based on the inherent re-
quirements of a particular job or if an employee has reached the normal or agreed
retirement age and his services are terminated. Such termination will not be considered an
automatically unfair dismissal.
If a business is transferred from one owner to another – and that implies one employer
to another – either section 197 or section 197A is applicable, depending on whether the
business is transferred as a going concern or in a state of insolvency. Contracts of employ-
ment are automatically transferred to the new employer and the new employer is required
to give the employees conditions of employment similar to those they previously enjoyed. If
the employment conditions are not substantially similar, the employee may elect to resign
under the cloak of a constructive dismissal. If it were found that the employee had indeed
been dismissed, it would constitute an automatically unfair dismissal.
The Protected Disclosures Act of 2000 or the “Whistle-blower’s Act” allows employees to
make protected disclosures about corruption and other irregularities in the workplace with-
out fear of being subjected to an occupational detriment, that is, unfair treatment on
account of the disclosure. An employee who is exposed to an occupational detriment in
contravention of the Act has recourse against the employer. If the employee is dismissed for
having made a protected disclosure, the dismissal is automatically unfair. Other occupa-
tional detriments as a result of the disclosure, such as demotion, non-promotion, suspen-
sion or other disciplinary action or a change in employment conditions constitute unfair
labour practices (see Chapter 17 par 17.9).
322 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
dismissal if they are of a serious nature. The employer’s operational requirements are also a
valid reason for dismissal.
A valid reason is not per se fair. A fair reason means that, considering all the circumstances,
dismissal is the only appropriate sanction; no alternative sanction can be considered. It is
generally accepted that dismissal is justified in circumstances where the employment rela-
tionship has become intolerable or where the trust relationship between employer and
employee has irretrievably broken down.
The blameworthiness of the employee must be considered. In the event of misconduct
an employee is blameworthy because he has control over what he does and can decide
whether or not to commit an act of misconduct. In the case of incapacity or poor work per-
formance an employee is generally less blameworthy or entirely blameless – he cannot con-
trol an illness or other physical incapacity or his poor performance may be the result of no
or inadequate training by the employer.
The employer is required to act consistently in the application of its disciplinary rules,
without being rigid and inflexible. Like cases should be treated alike – not by reference to
the technical classifications of the relevant offences, but with regard to their substance, the
circumstances under which they were committed and the position of the offender. For
example, it will be unfair if an employer starts enforcing disciplinary rules without prior
warning to employees. Similarly, the employer is not allowed to act selectively or to discrim-
inate in respect of employees who are guilty of the same offence.
Before the employer decides on dismissal alternatives to dismissal should be considered. Is
dismissal the only possible sanction or will an alternative sanction be more appropriate in the
circumstances? Mitigating circumstances must be considered before deciding on a sanction.
When dismissal is decided upon, the employer must indicate whether it is a summary dis-
missal or one with a period of notice. This choice will largely depend on the disciplinary
code and the reason for the dismissal. Summary dismissal is dismissal without a period of
notice and is generally accepted in instances of serious misconduct. However, if mitigating
factors or the personal circumstances of the employee warrant it, the employer may decide
on dismissal with notice. In such a case the employer may decide to remunerate the worker
in lieu of notice. In the event of incapacity it seems fairer to dismiss a worker with notice.
[2006] 9 BLLR 833 (LC) the Labour Court confirmed that the “criminal model” of a dis-
ciplinary procedure is no longer applicable to internal disciplinary proceedings. An em-
ployer is merely required to conduct an investigation, give the employee and his
representative an opportunity to respond to the allegations and notify the employee of its
decision. The Code of Good Practice does not require an appeal hearing as an inherent
part of a fair procedure. However, it has become standard practice to afford employees the
right of appeal to a higher tier of management, a practice followed by most employers.
A fair procedure in essence entails two rules: the audi alteram partem rule in terms of
which the employee must be afforded an opportunity to respond to the allegations and the
nemo iudex in sua causa rule in terms of which the decision-maker must be an objective and
neutral person with no knowledge of the case before deciding the matter.
breaches of contract to which they pertain may not have been of a serious nature or the
final infraction may have been of a nebulous nature.
If the final act of misconduct is not in itself sufficiently serious so as to justify summary
dismissal, it is generally required that the various instances of misconduct must be related,
that is, of the same or a similar nature. But even in cases where the present and previous
instances of misconduct are unrelated, it may be possible to detect a general pattern of
misconduct, which may render the continued relationship intolerable. The question, ultim-
ately, is whether dismissal is appropriate in the circumstances.
A suspicion of serious misconduct is not sufficient to warrant dismissal. The employer,
however, is not required to prove the misconduct beyond reasonable doubt. It is sufficient
for the employer to have reason to believe, on a balance of probabilities, that a disciplinary
offence has been committed. The employer must take into account only those facts known
to him at the time of the dismissal.
An employer cannot dismiss an employee for refusing to commit some illegal act, for
example, a refusal to work overtime in excess of the prescribed hours. A dismissal must not
constitute a breach of the employment contract or of any agreement in place in the com-
pany. An unfair dismissal constitutes such a breach.
Based on what has been said, the requirements for a fair dismissal in the case of miscon-
duct may be summarised as follows:
Check List
The following checklist may be used to determine whether the employer has sufficient
reason to dismiss an employee (see item 7 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal):
• Is a disciplinary rule in existence that governs the conduct complained of?
• Is the rule reasonable?
• Was the employee aware of the rule or should he reasonable have been aware of it?
• Was the rule breached?
• Was the employee aware of the consequences of a breach of the rule?
• Has the disciplinary code been consistently enforced?
• Is dismissal the appropriate sanction in the circumstances?
326 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
The summary of procedural fairness that follows reflects the elements of a fair procedure as
it was developed in the old Industrial Court and as it is applied by most employers. The
majority of CCMA commissioners have regard to these elements when determining whether
a dismissal was procedurally fair. Although the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal and recent
Labour Court judgments favour a less formal procedure, most of what follows is still consid-
ered an inherent part of a fair procedure.
• The employee is to be notified of the allegations against him
and of what his rights at the hearing are.
• The disciplinary hearing should be held as soon as possible
after the incident, but the employee must be granted suffi-
cient time to prepare his case.
• At the hearing the employee has the right to state his case in
accordance with the audi alteram partem rule, the right to call
witnesses and the right to cross-examine witnesses called by
management.
• The employee also has the right to an interpreter and to be
represented or assisted by a co-employee.
• The chairperson must be a neutral person and must not
PROCEDURAL prejudge the case.
FAIRNESS • The employee must be informed of the final decision, the
sanction and the reasons therefor in writing.
• The employee must be informed of his right of appeal (if
company policy provides for an appeal).
• The employee must lodge his appeal within the time pre-
scribed by the disciplinary procedures.
• The employee enjoys the same rights at the appeal as at the
disciplinary hearing.
• The appeal chairperson must be someone other than the
person who chaired the disciplinary hearing and must con-
sider whether dismissal is the most appropriate sanction.
• The employee must be informed of the outcome of the
appeal.
The test for substantive fairness is whether the employer can fairly be expected to con-
tinue with the employment relationship, bearing in mind the merits of the case. Factors to
be considered include the nature of the incapacity or poor work performance; the extent
or degree of the employee’s inability to perform; the likelihood of improvement; the size
and possible effect on the employer’s operations; the effect on the welfare, safety and
morale of co-employees; the status of the employee, his service record and length of service;
the cause of the poor performance or incapacity; the possibility of transfer to another
position. In the case of poor performance regular assessments or appraisals are required.
If dismissal seems the only option, the employee must be afforded an opportunity to de-
fend himself and to provide reasons why he should not be dismissed. This can be done in
the form of a hearing.
The salient points relating to dismissal for incapacity can be summarised as follows:
Any person who, in the event of misconduct or incapacity, has to consider whether or not
the reason for dismissal is fair or whether or not the dismissal was effected in accordance
with a fair procedure, must take into account the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, con-
tained in Schedule 8 of the Act (App 1).
328 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
The consulting parties must attempt to reach consensus on appropriate measures to avoid
or minimise the dismissals, to change the timing of the dismissals and to mitigate the adverse
effects of the dismissals. The parties must also endeavour to agree on the method for select-
ing the employees to be dismissed and the severance pay for dismissed employees.
The employer must allow the other consulting party an opportunity during consultation
to make representations about the issues under consultation. The employer must consider
the representations and furnish reasons if he disagrees with them. If representations have
been made in writing the employer must respond in writing.
After consultation the employer must select the employees to be dismissed in accordance
with the agreed selection criteria or, if no criteria have been agreed, criteria that are fair
and objective.
Section 189A: The thrust of section 189A is to give trade unions a choice between going
on strike or referring a dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication if the substantive fair-
ness of the dismissals is being challenged; they cannot pursue both routes. The right to strike
in this context is limited to substantive issues only and does not apply to the employer’s
failure to comply with a fair procedure. Furthermore, the right to strike does not apply
where the employer employs fewer than 50 employees or where the employer employs
more than 50 employees, but contemplates dismissing less than the threshold number
during a 12-month period. Another significant feature of section 189A is that it allows for
CCMA facilitation to assist parties in the retrenchment exercise.
Section 189A is applicable to employers employing more than 50 employees and who
contemplate dismissing a number of employees for operational reasons. The provisions of
section 189A apply when the employer contemplates dismissing
• 10 employees where the employer employs 51 to 200 employees;
• 20 employees where it employs 201 to 300 employees;
• 30 employees where it employs 301 to 400 employees;
• 40 employees where it employs 401 to 500 employees;
• 50 employees where it employs more than 500 employees.
These thresholds apply for a period of 12 months. In other words, if the employer dismisses
the prescribed number of employees either at the same time or at different times during a
12-month period, section 189A applies. So, if a number of employees short of the prescribed
number are dismissed and a few months later more employees are dismissed so that the two
groups together exceed the threshold, the employer is subject to the provisions of section
189A.
Any of the consulting parties may request the CCMA to appoint a facilitator to assist the
parties in their consultations. The facilitator is appointed in terms of regulations issued by
the Minister and must conduct the facilitation in accordance with those regulations.
If a facilitator has been appointed and 60 days have lapsed since the date of the sec-
tion 189(3) notice, the employer may give notice of termination of services in accordance
with the provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. In response to the notice to
terminate services the affected employees or registered union who have received the notice
may elect to strike or refer a dispute to the Labour Court. (Note that these provisions do
not require that the matter be conciliated first.) Once the employees or union have elected
one of the two options, the other option falls away. Thus, should the union elect to strike it
cannot at a later stage approach the Labour Court on the issue over which strike action was
taken. It is possible that an employer is hit by both a strike and a court case – the strike
called by the union and the court case by non-union members who do not participate in
the strike.
In circumstances where a facilitator has not been appointed a period of 30 days from the
date of the section 189(3) notice must lapse before a dispute is referred to conciliation.
Once the certificate of non-resolution has been issued or 30 days have lapsed since the
330 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
referral, the employer may give notice of termination. This in effect means that the em-
ployer will not be able to dismiss the employees before a period of 60 days has lapsed. The
union or affected employees may either give notice to strike or refer the dispute to the
Labour Court (if the dispute concerns substantive issues only). If the employer dismisses
the employees or gives them notice of termination before expiry of the 60 days, notice of a
strike may be given.
The provisions relating to strikes found in sections 64 to 69 and 76 apply to strikes in this
context, with a few changes. For example, if a facilitator has been appointed, referral of the
dispute to conciliation is not required and in the case of a secondary strike the notice
period required before commencement of a strike is 14 days (and not seven days). In the
latter instance the employer who received a notice of a secondary strike may request the
Director of the CCMA to appoint a commissioner to conciliate the dispute. Such a request
or the appointment of a commissioner does not affect the right of the employees to strike
on expiration of the 14-day period.
If the procedural fairness of the dismissal is challenged, a consulting party may approach
the Labour Court by way of an application for an order compelling the employer to comply
with fair procedures, interdicting the employer from dismissing the employees or directing
the employer to reinstate the employees until a fair procedure has been complied with. The
application must be brought within 30 days from the date the employer gave notice of ter-
mination or, if no notice was given, 30 days from the date of dismissal. A late application may
be condoned on good cause shown. The Court may make any appropriate order, including
an award of compensation, but may not make an order regarding disclosure of information
that has been the subject of an arbitration award. The Labour Court may not adjudicate a
dispute about the procedural fairness of a dismissal for operational requirements in any dis-
pute referred to it in terms of section 191(5)(b)(ii).
Severance pay: When an employee is dismissed for operational requirements, he must receive
a severance package in addition to the ordinary payments due to him. Originally the LRA,
in section 196, provided for severance pay. These provisions have been removed from the
LRA and can now be found in section 41 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. Sever-
ance pay is equal to at least one week’s remuneration for each completed year of continuous
service with the employer. An employee who unreasonably refuses to accept his employer’s
offer of alternative employment within the company or with another employer forfeits his
right to severance pay. An employer may apply to the Minister for exemption from the pay-
ment of severance pay.
If there is a dispute about the entitlement to severance pay only, that dispute may be re-
ferred to a bargaining council or, if there is no council with jurisdiction, to the CCMA for
conciliation and, if necessary, arbitration.
• cases where the employee alleges that the reason for the dismissal is that the employer
provided substantially less favourable employment conditions or circumstances after a
transfer in terms of sections 197 and 197A (unless the employee alleges that the dismissal
occurred for a reason contemplated in section 187);
• dismissal for operational requirements. In limited circumstances a council or the CCMA
has jurisdiction to entertain an operational requirements dismissal. Where only one em-
ployee is dismissed during a retrenchment exercise that employee may elect to have his
dismissal dispute arbitrated by a council or the CCMA or adjudicated by the Labour
Court. Or, where an employer employs fewer than ten employees the retrenched em-
ployees can opt for arbitration or Labour Court adjudication irrespective of the number
of employees who were dismissed;
• dismissal of a probationary employee must be referred for con-arb.
The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the following alleged unfair dis-
missals (where conciliation has failed):
• an automatically unfair dismissal as contemplated in section 187 of the LRA;
• a dismissal based on the employer’s operational requirements. Note that where only one
employee is dismissed for operational requirements or where an employer employs fewer
than ten employees and some are dismissed, the retrenched employee or employees
have an election between arbitration or Labour Court adjudication;
• dismissal because of participation in an unlawful or unprotected strike;
• dismissal because the employee refused to join, was refused membership of or was ex-
pelled from a trade union party to a closed shop agreement; and
• dismissals (and unfair labour practices) that constitute occupational detriments as envis-
aged in the Protected Disclosures Act of 2000 (see Chapter 17). A dismissal in this con-
text is automatically unfair.
The procedure for the resolution of a dispute regarding an unfair dismissal is as follows:
If there is a dispute about the fairness of a dismissal, the dismissed employee refers the
dispute to a council if the parties to the dispute fall within the registered scope of that
council or to the CCMA if no council has jurisdiction. The referral must be done in writing
within 30 days of the date of dismissal, but the council or CCMA may, on good cause shown,
condone a late referral. The employee must satisfy the council or the CCMA that a copy of
the referral has been served on the employer by e-mail, registered mail, telegram, telex,
telefax or by hand.
The council or the CCMA must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation with-
in 30 days of receiving the referral (the so-called 30-day conciliation period). The parties
can agree to extend the 30-day period. At the conclusion of the conciliation process the
conciliator must issue an outcome certificate indicating whether the dispute was resolved. If
the dispute remains unresolved after conciliation or after expiry of the 30-day conciliation
period, a certificate of non-resolution must be issued. The employee can then refer the dis-
pute to arbitration or to Labour Court adjudication, depending on the nature of the dispute.
In instances in which the Labour Court ordinarily has jurisdiction the parties may agree in
writing to have their dispute arbitrated. Referral to arbitration or to the Labour Court must
be filed within 90 days from the date of the outcome certificate. Condonation for a later
referral may be granted on good cause shown.
Despite the fact that a council or the CCMA has jurisdiction to finalise certain dismissal
disputes by way of arbitration, the Director of the CCMA must, on application, refer the dis-
pute to the Labour Court if deemed appropriate. This will be done after the Director has
considered, inter alia, the complexity of the matter and the parties to the dispute and the
conciliating commissioner have submitted representations. The Director’s decision is final
and binding.
332 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
In any proceedings concerning a dismissal the employee must prove the existence of the
dismissal. Once this has been established, the employer must prove that the dismissal was
fair (s 192).
The 2002 amendments added two new dispute resolution processes aimed primarily at the
quick resolution of a dispute: con-arb (s 191(5A)) and pre-dismissal arbitration (s 188A).
The “pre-dismissal arbitration” has been renamed “inquiry by an arbitrator” in the 2014
amendments.
Con-arb is a fusion of the conciliation and arbitration processes, meaning that, where
conciliation fails the dispute is immediately arbitrated. Con-arb is compulsory in disputes
concerning the dismissal of a probationary employee and unfair labour practices in the
context of probation. Con-arb may also be used in other dismissal disputes that are arbitra-
ble if the parties do not object thereto.
Where an employer brings allegations of misconduct or incapacity against an employee
the process of “inquiry by an arbitrator” can be used instead of summoning the employee to
a disciplinary hearing. The inquiry by an arbitrator in effect takes the place of the disciplinary
hearing. The idea is to circumvent the protracted and time-consuming processes of internal
disciplinary and appeal procedures and thereafter conciliation and arbitration and get a
final outcome on the allegations against the employee much sooner.
An inquiry by an arbitrator can be conducted only with the consent of the employee
concerned. The employer is required to advise the employee of the allegations against him
first and then seek the employee’s consent. If the employee consents, the employer requests
the CCMA (or a council) to appoint an arbitrator to conduct an inquiry into the allega-
tions. An employee who earns in excess of the BCEA threshold may in his contract of
employment consent to an inquiry by an arbitrator.
When the employer approaches the CCMA to appoint an arbitrator the prescribed form
(Form 7.19), signed by both the employer and the employee, must be filed with the CCMA
and the employer must pay the prescribed fee (currently R5 131 per day). Upon receipt of
the form and payment the CCMA will appoint an arbitrator to conduct the inquiry. Coun-
cils have their own forms and fees.
The inquiry conducted by the arbitrator takes the form of an arbitration. For a detailed
discussion of the process see Chapter 18.
The following diagrams are provided to illustrate the procedures to be followed for dis-
1
missals based on different grounds:
________________________
1 These diagrams are contained as flow diagrams 10, 11, 12 and 13 of Sch 4 of the Act. Sch 4, however,
does not have the force of law and the diagrams therein are intended only to provide guidance and as-
sistance to parties involved in a dispute. The diagrams have been slightly adapted.
Dismissals 333
Labour Court
Conciliation
Council CCMA
Award
14 days
Arbitration
Referral to arbitration
90 days
No resolution
Conciliation
Council CCMA
________________________
2 Keep in mind that some operational requirement dismissals can be arbitrated by a council or the
CCMA. Where only one employee is dismissed during a retrenchment exercise or when some employ-
ees of an employer with less than ten employees are retrenched, they can elect between arbitration or
Labour Court adjudication. If they elect arbitration they have to refer the dispute within 90 days after
conciliation to the council or CCMA for arbitration. A council or the CCMA can order reinstatement,
re-employment or compensation, but cannot make any additional appropriate order.
334 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
UNFAIR DISMISSAL
unprotected strikes and reasons related to closed shop agreements
Labour Court
Conciliation
Council CCMA
Where a dismissal is substantively unfair and one of the above circumstances applies, com-
pensation can be considered as a remedy. When a dismissal is found to have been pro-
cedurally unfair the only remedy that can be considered is compensation. Compensation is
at the discretion of the Court or arbitrator and does not have to be awarded.
If a dismissal is automatically unfair or if a dismissal based on the employer’s operational
requirements is found to be unfair, the Labour Court may in addition make any other
order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances. The Court may, for example, issue
an interdict in the case of discrimination, compelling the employer to stop discriminatory
practices. The interdict is then issued in addition to reinstatement, re-employment or com-
pensation.
Where the Court or an arbitrator orders compensation, the amount of compensation
must be just and equitable in the circumstances, but may not exceed the equivalent of 12
months’ remuneration (or 24 months in the case of an automatically unfair dismissal). The
employee’s rate of remuneration on the date of dismissal is used as the basis to calculate the
amount of compensation (s 194).
An order or award of compensation is in addition to and not a substitute for any other
amount to which the employee is entitled in terms of any law, collective agreement or con-
tract of employment (s 195).
The old and new employers are required to agree on the value of accrued leave pay, sev-
erance pay that would have been payable in the event of a retrenchment and other accrued
entitlements, such as bonuses and commission. The value of these entitlements is calculated
as at the date of transfer. The old and new employers must further agree who would be
liable for these amounts. Full disclosure of the value of the entitlements and the employer
who is liable for them is required to all transferring employees.
In addition, the old employer must take any other measures that may be reasonable in
the circumstances to ensure that adequate provision is made for any obligation that may
arise for the new employer in respect of the valued entitlements. This could, for example,
include insurance against the new employer going insolvent.
If the old employer fails to take all the steps required by these provisions, it will for a
period of 12 months after the date of transfer remain liable in solidum with the new employer
for all entitlements due in the event of later retrenchments or the new employer’s subse-
quent liquidation.
A new provision, in the form of section 197A, has been inserted in the Act and provides
for the transfer of employment contracts in cases of insolvency.
In terms of section 38 of the Insolvency Act contracts of employment terminate upon the
insolvency of the employer. Section 197A overrides the effects of the Insolvency Act.
When an insolvent business is transferred subject to a scheme of arrangement, then, un-
less otherwise agreed in terms of section 197(6):
• the new employer is automatically substituted in the place of the old employer in all
employment contracts in existence at the time of the old employer’s winding-up or se-
questration;
• all the rights and obligations between the old employer and his employees at the time of
the transfer remain rights and obligations between them;
• anything done before the transfer by the old employer in respect of his employees will be
considered to have been done by the new employer; and
• the transfer does not interrupt the employee’s continuity of employment and employ-
ment continues with the new employer as if with the old one.
The provisions found in section 197 relating to the provision of conditions of employment
that are not less favourable, transfer to other pension, provident or retirement funds and
the transfer of collective agreements and arbitration awards to the new employer are appli-
cable where contracts of employment are transferred in the event of insolvency.
Questions
Question 1
Discuss the definition of “dismissal” with reference to case law. (20)
Question 2
Name and discuss the requirements that must be complied with in order to ensure a fair
dismissal. (20)
Question 3
Name and discuss dismissals which are automatically unfair. Include in your answer also the
remedies for automatically unfair dismissals. (20)
Hint: See ss 187, 193 and 194 of the LRA.
Dismissals 337
Question 4
Compile the following documents for the company of your choice:
4.1 a disciplinary code (code of conduct); (20)
4.2 disciplinary procedures. (20)
Question 5
Assume that an employee has been charged with and convicted of theft in a criminal court.
Should an employer conduct a disciplinary hearing before dismissing such an employee?
Motivate your answer by referring to decided cases. (10)
Hint: See Sekwati v Masiya & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2219 (LC); Nyalunga v PP Webb Construction
(1990) 11 ILJ 819 (IC); Olkers v Monviso Knitwear (Pty) Ltd (1988) 9 ILJ 875 (IC).
Question 6
What is constructive dismissal? Explain by referring to decided cases. Include in your
answer the remedies available to an employee who has been constructively dismissed. (20)
Hint: See Halgreen v Natal Building Society (1986) 7 ILJ 769 (IC); Howell v International Bank of
Johannesburg Ltd (1990) 11 ILJ 791 (IC); Ndebele v Foot Warehouse (Pty) Ltd t/a Shoe Warehouse
(1992) 13 ILJ 1247 (IC); Amalgamated Beverage Industries (Pty) Ltd v Jonker (1993) 14 ILJ 1232
(LAC); Pretoria Society for the Care of the Retarded v Loots [1997] 6 BLLR 721 (LAC); WL Ochse
Webb & Pretorius (Pty) Ltd v Vermeulen [1997] 2 BLLR 124 (LAC); Quince Products CC v Pillay
[1997] 12 BLLR 1547 (LAC); Van der Riet v Leisurenet Ltd t/a Health and Racquet Club [1998]
5 BLLR 471 (LAC); Ntsabo v Real Security CC [2004] 1 BLLR 58 (LC); CEPPWAWU & Another
v Glass & Aluminium 2000 CC [2002] 5 BLLR 399 (LAC); Bonthuys and Central District Munic-
ipality (2007) 28 ILJ 951 (CCMA); Pienaar v Family Funeral Services (2011) 32 ILJ 2048
(CCMA); SA Police Service v Safety & Security Sectoral Bargaining Council & Others (2012) 33 ILJ
453 (LC); Value Logistics Ltd v Basson & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2552 (LC); Asara Wine Estate &
Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Van Rooyen & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 363 (LC); Murray v Minister of Defence
(2008) 29 ILJ 1369 (SCA); Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO & Others (case no.
CCT33/09, [2009] ZACC17 (CC). See also ss 186, 193 and 194 of the LRA.
Question 7
Assume an employee has been dismissed and he believes the dismissal to be unfair. He
wishes to have the dispute resolved. Describe in detail the procedures to be followed in the
following instances:
7.1 a dismissal based on misconduct or incapacity; (10)
7.2 a dismissal based on the employer’s operational requirements; (10)
7.3 a dismissal based on the participation of the employee in an unprotected strike; (10)
7.4 a dismissal which is automatically unfair. (10)
Hint: See s 191 of the Act.
Question 8
Discuss, with reference to case law, the relief that may be granted to an employee whose dis-
missal has been found to be unfair. (20)
Question 9
Explain whether the following circumstances meet the requirement of substantive fairness:
9.1 An employee in a liquor store has a history of drinking on duty. After several verbal
warnings and counselling, with no success, a final written warning has been issued
which is still valid. He is again caught drinking during working hours and dismissed.
338 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
The employer’s code of conduct provides for summary dismissal in the case of drink-
ing on duty, but because the temptation to drink is so great while working in a liquor
store, the employer has adopted the practice of warning employees once or twice
before dismissing them for this type of misconduct. (5)
9.2 In terms of a company rule employees were required to clock out when they went on
lunch and clock in upon their return. This rule was, however, not rigidly enforced,
with the result that after a few months it was no longer applied. This situation was
accepted by management and for a period of approximately ten months the employ-
ees did not clock in or out over the lunch period. One Monday two employees ar-
rived at their work stations ten minutes late after their lunch break. Both employees
were charged with being late for work and with failure to comply with a company
rule, namely to clock in and out over lunch. Both were dismissed for not obeying this
company rule. (5)
9.3 An employee has been in the employ of a company as a driver for the past 11 years.
He has always been considered a good driver and a reliable worker. Over the past
three months, however, he has caused two accidents and has received three sum-
monses for traffic violations. Upon investigation management discovers that the driv-
er’s eyesight has deteriorated to the extent that he cannot see further than 15 cm
ahead of him. Management thus believes that he cannot possibly be kept on as a driv-
er and dismisses him. (5)
9.4 An employee (A) was charged with assaulting a fellow worker (B). During the inves-
tigation of the incident management discovered that the assault was the result of B
having insulted A’s race and religion and having threatened to rape his daughter if A
refused to pay “protection money” to B. Although management was sympathetic to
the situation A found himself in, it was stressed that assault under any circumstances
whatsoever would not be tolerated and A was dismissed. (The company’s code of con-
duct provided for dismissal in the event of assault.) (5)
9.5 Peter was one of ABC Company’s longest-serving employees, having worked for the
company for fifteen years. He was observed by a colleague surfing the Internet on his
work computer during working hours, downloading child pornography and dissemin-
ating it to his colleagues. An investigation was launched and the company’s IT specialist
discovered Peter’s numerous visits to unsavoury websites. When confronted, Peter ve-
hemently denied the accusations. He was nevertheless summoned to a disciplinary
hearing and subsequently dismissed. (5)
Question 10
Explain whether the following circumstances meet the requirement of procedural fairness:
10.1 Management discovered that 20 tyres had disappeared from the warehouse. Upon
enquiry an employee admitted to having taken them and was summarily dismissed for
theft without a disciplinary hearing. The employee, however, had received the per-
mission of his supervisor to take the tyres because they were rejects – a fact of which
management was unaware. (5)
10.2 An employee made himself guilty of fraud. When his fraud was discovered by the pro-
duction manager of the company, he was informed of a disciplinary enquiry to be
held in the following manner: “You are dismissed for fraud with immediate effect, but
a hearing will be conducted tomorrow and you may attend if you so wish”. The discip-
linary hearing was duly held the following day, but the employee did not attend and
in his absence the dismissal was confirmed. (5)
10.3 An employee was informed of a disciplinary hearing to be held at which hearing a
charge of gross insubordination against him would be investigated. At the hearing
two days later management presented its case, but the employee was not afforded an
opportunity to state his case and when he asked to have a co-worker present as his
representative his request was denied. He was found guilty and dismissed. He was
Dismissals 339
informed of his right to appeal and submitted his grounds for appeal within 24
hours. Before the appeal hearing was convened, however, management was informed
by its legal counsel that the procedures followed during the disciplinary hearing were
incorrect and was advised to rectify the situation. Two days later the appeal hearing
was conducted and the employee informed that he would have an opportunity to
present his case and would be able call a co-worker as his representative. (5)
10.4 A worker had received several verbal warnings for poor work performance. When his
supervisor again complained about his performance, an investigation was launched
and it was found that he had had no formal training and lacked the skills to perform
the tasks given to him. The employee was then transferred to a different department,
given another job and received on-the-job training for two weeks. When his perform-
ance still did not meet the required standards, he was called in by the supervisor and
summarily dismissed. (5)
10.5 A sales representative consistently failed to meet his monthly sales targets over a
period of three years. He was counselled for poor work performance and issued with
two written warnings. When he once again failed to meet his sales targets in the first
month of his fourth year of employment the company convened a formal poor-
performance hearing. The employee was asked to show cause why he should not be
dismissed, but he was not allowed to have a fellow employee represent him at the
hearing. He was dismissed. (5)
Question 11
Julia was an employee at The Steak Ranch. On two occasions she had attempted to steal
steaks, but each time she was stopped by the manager before she could remove the meat.
On both occasions she received verbal warnings. On a third occasion she attempted to steal
sauces which were served with steaks. The sauces were specialities of this restaurant and the
recipes thereof were kept secret at all times. When the manager questioned her, she admit-
ted guilt and was dismissed without a disciplinary hearing. When she objected to her dis-
missal because of the absence of a hearing, the manager argued that a hearing would have
made no difference since she had already admitted guilt.
11.1 Is Julia’s dismissal a fair or an unfair dismissal? Explain and refer to decided cases to
substantiate your argument. (20)
11.2 Assume that Julia’s dismissal was unfair. Would you order reinstatement or would an
award of compensation be a more appropriate remedy? Motivate your answer. (10)
Question 12
Zola applied for the post of supervisor at National Textile Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd, a textile
factory. At his final interview he made it clear to the personnel manager of the company
that he had had no experience in the textile industry as he used to be employed in the
liquor industry. The personnel manager nevertheless appointed Zola in the post of supervi-
sor and the company gave him an undertaking that he would receive training. During the
first three months of his employment Zola received two verbal warnings from Mr Cart-
wright, the manager of his section, because two of the company’s clients had been com-
plaining about the poor quality of the fabrics delivered to them. When a third customer
complained about the poor quality of the fabric and cancelled all his orders Mr Cartwright
reported the incident to the general manager who called Zola to his office. The general
manager impressed upon Zola the importance of good quality fabrics and informed him
that the company could not afford losing clients because of his failure to ensure the quality
of their products. When Mr Cartwright informed the general manager that this was the
third occurrence of this nature, the general manager dismissed Zola without further ado.
Zola protested and tried to explain that he had never received training and did not know
exactly what was expected of him. Mr Cartwright, however, informed the general manager
that a fellow worker had been provided to train Zola. Zola requested the general manager
to reconsider his decision, but the latter confirmed the dismissal and asked Zola to leave
340 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
the company premises immediately. It was later proved that the fellow worker who was
supposed to train Zola was on leave for three weeks at the time of Zola’s appointment and
upon his return he spent half an hour with Zola to show him what he had to do.
12.1 Considering the requirements for a fair dismissal decide whether or not Zola’s dis-
missal was fair. (20)
12.2 Zola believes his dismissal to be unfair and wishes to take the matter further. There is
no council with jurisdiction in the area where the company conducts its business and,
therefore, Zola has to refer the dispute to the CCMA.
(i) Complete LRA Form 7.11 in order to refer the dispute to conciliation. (20)
(ii) Complete LRA Form 7.13 in order to refer the dispute to arbitration. (20)
Question 13
Discuss the procedures an employer is required to follow to ensure fair dismissals in the
instances of (a) a minor retrenchment and (b) a major retrenchment. (30)
Question 14
Seaview Investments (Pty) Ltd employs 177 employees. Due to financial difficulties the com-
pany is contemplating the retrenchment of 20 employees across all occupational levels. The
majority of employees below supervisory level belong to FIWU, a registered trade union.
Some of the union members may be affected by the retrenchments, as well as supervisory
and managerial staff.
14.1 Which provisions of the LRA are applicable in these circumstances? (2)
14.2 Is the company compelled to consult or negotiate about the pending retrenchments?
If so, explain who must be consulted. (5)
14.3 What information is the employer required to disclose, to whom must it be disclosed
and what format should such a disclosure take? (12)
14.4 Discuss in detail the process that must be followed before the affected employees can
be dismissed. (20)
14.5 Explain what the employees and/or the union can do if they wish to challenge (a)
the substantive fairness of the dismissals; and (b) the procedural fairness of the
dismissals. (20)
14.6 Assume that the company dismissed 5 employees in a first round of retrenchments
and five months later another 13 employees were dismissed. Which provisions are
applicable? (2)
14.7 Assume that the company retrenched only eight employees in total. Which provisions
are applicable? (2)
Question 15
Assume a number of employees had to be retrenched because their employer was experi-
encing financial difficulties.
15.1 Discuss the payment of severance pay to these employees. (5)
15.2 Assume that the employer failed to make a severance payment to these employees.
They declare a dispute with regard to the payment of severance pay. Discuss the pro-
cedure to be followed in order to resolve this dispute. (5)
Hint: See s 41 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.
Question 16
Some dismissal disputes must be arbitrated, whilst others must be adjudicated by the Labour
Court once conciliation has failed. Study the following situations and then (a) identify the
Dismissals 341
nature of the particular dismissal dispute; and (b) explain the dispute resolution procedure
for each of the disputes:
16.1 Employer A treats employee X very poorly by making him work long hours, withdraw-
ing his transport allowance and requiring him to perform tasks left unfinished by a
fellow employee. After many months of this treatment X resigns because, according
to him, he can no longer work for A, who is making his working life very difficult.
There is no bargaining council in the sector where A’s company is situated. (5)
16.2 Employer A is a manufacturer of car parts. A terminates the services of employee X
for no other reason than the fact that he does not agree with X’s religious convic-
tions. A explains to X that he cannot work with a person of X’s faith and gives X one
month’s notice pay. A’s company falls within the scope of registration of the Metal
and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council (MEIBC). (5)
16.3 Employer A has to retrench ten employees because his company is experiencing
financial difficulties. On the last day of the month A calls the employees to his
office, explains the situation to them, terminates their services and gives them two
weeks’ notice pay. There is no bargaining council. (5)
16.4 The Department of Labour as employer summarily dismissed employee X for theft
and fraud because X had allegedly embezzled money and then made incorrect en-
tries in the financial statements to hide his theft. When X tried to explain that he
had been on leave at the time the theft occurred, his Head of Department simply
instructed X to leave the workplace. (5)
16.5 Employer A is not satisfied with the work performance of his employee X, who is a
carpenter. A often complains that X is not cutting the wood properly and has
instructed X to use the new machine that has been installed for this purpose on sev-
eral occasions. X, however, cannot operate the new machine as he has never had
training on it. One day when X again cuts the pieces of wood incorrectly, A shouts
at him and instructs him to leave the premises. There is no bargaining council. (5)
16.6 A policeman is dismissed for dereliction of duty. He was, however, on sick leave at
the time SAPS alleges that he neglected to perform his duties. (5)
16.7 Mr A is dismissed when his employer, an insurance company, discovers that he is
gay. The employer argues that A could cause embarrassment in the workplace and
with clients and, therefore, that the dismissal is justified. There is no bargaining
council. (5)
16.8 Ben had 25 years’ service at Cardex Publishing House and was two years away from
retirement when his employer retrenched him. A week after Ben’s retrenchment
the Manager of Cardex appointed his nephew of 22 in the position Ben used to
hold. Ben then claimed that his retrenchment was unfair because the employer
wanted to get rid of him based on his age and nepotism. There is no bargaining
council. (5)
16.9 Althea was an educator (teacher) at a public school. She was dismissed for allegedly
having molested young boys in her class. The person who chaired her disciplinary
hearing, however, had lost sight of the fact that she taught at a girls’ school. Althea
believes her dismissal is unfair and declares a dispute with her employer, the Depart-
ment of Education. (5)
16.10 Jonas was on probation for six months as a newly appointed electrician at Blitz Elec-
trical Services CC. Since his appointment he struggled to understand the work and
often did his job incorrectly. After some counselling his performance did not im-
prove and in his fifth month of employment the manager dismissed him. The Elec-
trical Bargaining Council has been registered for the sector and area in which Blitz
conducts its business. (5)
342 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
16.11 Employee X works at VW in Uitenhage. The company has a strict policy against em-
ployees misusing the Internet and sending private e-mails to friends and colleagues.
X’s girlfriend is in Cape Town and he often phones her and sends her e-mails.
When the company discovers that X is in the habit of downloading pornographic
material from the Internet and sending it to his girlfriend by e-mail X is dismissed
without a hearing. (5)
Question 17
Refer to each of the situations in question 16. Assume that each of these dismissals is unfair.
17.1 Identify the main reason for the unfairness of each of the dismissals. (11)
17.2 Explain in each instance which remedy would be the most appropriate. (22)
Question 18
Joshua was appointed as a computer programmer in the IT Department of Lexus (Pty) Ltd.
Before his appointment he had been working as a computer programmer for another
company for four years. When he commenced duties at Lexus he was instructed to attend
training one day a week for three months. He was also asked to draw up a list of all func-
tions of programming that he had knowledge of. When he had completed the list, the
trainer noticed that, because of his experience, Joshua could perform all tasks covered by
the training. He was nevertheless expected to attend the training.
Two months after Joshua’s appointment his supervisor was informed that he often
missed the training sessions. At the same time the supervisor became aware that Joshua
often took sick leave. He did, however, submit medical certificates. Joshua was counselled
and his performance was monitored. The supervisor discovered that Joshua often neglected
to perform all the tasks he was responsible for. In addition, he often left the office without
permission and spent considerable time talking to friends on the telephone.
On the second last day of his fourth month of employment Joshua arrived at work late,
informed his supervisor that he was feeling ill and wanted to see a doctor. He promised to
return to work after his visit to the doctor because he had many tasks to complete as it was
month-end. He went to the doctor, but did not return to work. For the next ten days Joshua
did not show up at work and did not contact his employer at all. Because the employer did
not know where Joshua was, he was charged with gross negligence in not having performed
his duties and absence without permission or a valid reason. The charge sheet and a notice
to attend a disciplinary hearing were sent to his address by registered mail and a copy
thereof was delivered to his home.
The disciplinary hearing was duly conducted and Joshua was in attendance, represented
by a shop steward of his union. His defence to the charge of gross negligence was that he
had not received adequate training and, therefore, could not to do the job. Regarding his
absence, Joshua explained that he had been ill and spent the time with his family in a
neighbouring town. Joshua was found guilty of gross negligence because he had simply
failed to perform certain tasks. He was also found guilty of absence without leave because
he could not produce a medical certificate for the period of his absence. He was dismissed
because, in terms of the company’s disciplinary code, absence of four days and more would
be regarded as AWOL and constituted a dismissible offence. His dismissal was confirmed on
appeal two weeks later. After the appeal hearing Joshua visited his supervisor to collect his
last pay cheque and then explained that he was HIV positive, which causes different ill-
nesses (the reason for his regular sick leave) and that the week of his absence was spent
with a traditional healer.
18.1 Explain in detail whether or not Joshua’s dismissal was fair. (20)
18.2 Joshua believes his dismissal was unfair. Explain the dispute resolution procedure he
can follow to have the dispute about his dismissal resolved. (5)
Dismissals 343
18.3 Discuss the remedies available to an employee who has been unfairly dismissed and
then briefly explain which of these remedies would be the most appropriate in
Joshua’s case if his dismissal was found to be unfair. (10)
Question 19
Discuss the transfer of contracts of employment in the context of the transfer of a business
as a going concern in terms of section 197. (20)
Question 20
Susan was employed by a university in terms of seven successive fixed-term contracts. She
then applied for one of several permanent positions. Susan was unsuccessful, but was
offered a further fixed-term contract. She rejected the offer, claiming that she had reason-
ably expected to be appointed on a permanent basis and that the university’s failure to
appoint her constituted a dismissal in terms of section 186(1)(b) of the LRA. Advise Susan
whether she is entitled to permanent employment. (8)
Hint: See University of Pretoria v CCMA & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 183 (LAC). But also see the
2014 amendments to s 186(1)(b) of the LRA.
Question 21
Jane, a travel consultant, fell pregnant. Her employer agreed to her taking one month’s
leave after her confinement. She gave birth to twins. The twins were in a poor state of
health and Jane requested another month’s leave to attend to them. The company declined
her request, but was prepared to grant her an extra two weeks’ leave. She declined the offer
and her services were terminated. Jane approached the Labour Court for relief, contending
that her dismissal was automatically unfair in terms of section 187(1)(e) of the LRA because
she had been dismissed for reasons related to her pregnancy. The employer argued that
Jane’s dismissal was in no way linked to her pregnancy. Decide whether Jane’s dismissal was
automatically unfair. (8)
Hint: See De Beer v SA Export Connection CC t/a Global Paws [2008] 1 BLLR 36 (LC).
Question 22
Indicate whether the following retrenchments are fair or not. Motivate your answer.
22.1 A company encountered such financial difficulties that none of its employees was
paid on time. The employer consulted with five employees and retrenched them after
an agreement was reached. One employee refused to participate in the consultation
process, but was also retrenched. She regards the retrenchment as unfair. (3)
22.2 An employer retrenched 40 employees and outsourced the human resources func-
tions to a third-party service provider. The service provider employed the retrenched
employees on contract to do the jobs they had performed when they had been em-
ployed by the company. (3)
22.3 Mr Lebone was in the employ of Goldcash Trading Co for 18 years. He entered into a
settlement agreement setting out the terms of his retrenchment on the strength of
representations made to him by the company that his position was redundant. Two
months after his retrenchment he learned that the MD’s nephew was appointed to
the post he used to occupy. (5)
22.4 The Hilroy Hotel had to retrench ten employees because it was experiencing finan-
cial difficulties. On the last day of the month the manager called the ten employees
to his office, explained the situation to them, terminated their services and gave them
each two weeks’ notice pay. (5)
344 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Question 23
Moketsi was employed as a security officer at Makwasi mine. He was responsible for con-
ducting searches of employees leaving a high-security area to prevent the theft of the mine’s
valuable metals. When he failed to follow the company’s stringent search procedures he was
dismissed. He referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA. The CCMA commissioner
found him guilty of misconduct but, having regard to his clean service record of fifteen
years, ordered the mine to reinstate him, subject to a written warning valid for three
months. Discuss, with reference to case law, whether the commissioner’s decision was
reasonable. (10)
Hint: See Sidumo & Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405
(CC); Theewaterskloof Municipality v SA Local Government Bargaining Council (Western Cape
Division) & Others (2010) 31 ILJ 2475 (LC).
Question 24
Dorothy was employed as an educator her entire adult life. She retired when she reached
the age of 65 years (the retirement age set by the Department of Education). She then took
up employment with the Ubuntu Primary School, a private school. At the time of her
appointment the school had no retirement policy in place and her contract of employment
did not refer to a retirement age. Three years after her appointment the school implement-
ed a retirement policy. In terms of the policy the mandatory retirement age for permanent
employees was 65, but those employees already older than 65 would remain in service, on
fixed-term contracts, until the age of 68. Dorothy was already 69 when the policy was intro-
duced. She received a letter from the school notifying her that her employment would be
terminated at the end of the next school term. Does the termination of Dorothy’s services
constitute a dismissal and, if it does, is it automatically unfair? (10)
Hint: See s 187(1)(f) and 187(2)(b) of the LRA. See also Rubenstein v Price’s Daelite (Pty) Ltd
[2002] 5 BLLR 472 (LC); SA Metal & Machinery Co (Pty) Ltd v Gamaroff [2010] 2 BLLR 136
(LAC); Bedderson v Sparrow Schools Education Trust (2010) 31 ILJ 1325 (LC); Evans v Japanese
School of Johannesburg (2006) 27 ILJ 2607 (LC); Rubin Sportswear v SACTWU & Others [2004]
10 BLLR 986 (LAC); Thomas (Rockliffe) v Mincom (Pty) Ltd [2007] 10 BLLR 993 (LC); Cash
Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Browne [2006] 2 BLLR 131 (LAC).
Question 25
Amman had some 20 years’ service with a supermarket. He was a union office-bearer of the
Food and Retail Workers Union and a shop steward at the supermarket. When the super-
market faced financial difficulties it offered him a managerial position as an alternative to
retrenchment on condition that he relinquish his union positions. When Amman rejected
this condition he was dismissed. Consider the fairness or otherwise of Amman’s dismissal.(10)
Hint: See FAWU & Another v The Cold Chain [2007] 7 BLLR 638 (LC); IMATU & Others v
Rustenburg Transitional Council [1999] 12 BLLR 1299 (LC).
Dismissals 345
Appendix 1
SCHEDULE 8
CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE: DISMISSAL
1. Introduction
(1) This code of good practice deals with some of the key aspects of dismissal for reasons re-
lated to conduct and capacity. It is intentionally general. Each case is unique, and departures
from the norms established by this Code may be justified in proper circumstances. For example,
the number of employees employed in an establishment may warrant a different approach.
(2) This Act emphasises the primary of collective agreements. This Code is not intended as a
substitute for disciplinary codes and procedures where these are the subject of collective agree-
ments, or the outcome of joint decision-making by an employer and a work-place forum.
(3) The key principle in this Code is that employers and employees should treat one another
with mutual respect. A premium is placed on both employment justice and the efficient opera-
tion of business. While employees should be protected from arbitrary action, employers are
entitled to satisfactory conduct and work performance from their employees.
2. Fair reasons for dismissal
(1) A dismissal is unfair if it is not effected for a fair reason and in accordance with a fair pro-
cedure, even if it complies with any notice period in a contract of employment or in legislation
governing employment. Whether or not a dismissal is for a fair reason is determined by the facts
of the case, and the appropriateness of dismissal as a penalty. Whether or not the procedure is
fair is determined by referring to the guidelines set out below.
(2) This Act recognises three grounds on which a termination of employment might be legit-
imate. These are: the conduct of the employee, the capacity of the employee, and the operation-
al requirements of the employer’s business.
(3) This Act provides that a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is
one that amounts to an infringement of the fundamental rights of employees and trade unions,
or if the reason is one of those listed in section 187. The reasons include participation in a lawful
strike, intended or actual pregnancy and acts of discrimination.
(4) In cases where the dismissal is not automatically unfair, the employer must show that the
reason for dismissal is a reason related to the employee’s conduct or capacity, or is based on the
operational requirements of the business. If the employer fails to do that, or fails to prove that
the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure, the dismissal is unfair.
repeated misconduct may call for a final warning, or other action short of dismissal. Dismissal
should be reserved for cases of serious misconduct or repeated offences.
Dismissals for misconduct
(4) Generally, it is not appropriate to dismiss an employee for a first offence, except if the
misconduct is serious and of such gravity that it makes a continued employment relationship
intolerable. Examples of serious misconduct, subject to the rule that each case should be judged
on its merits, are gross dishonesty or wilful damage to the property of the employer, wilful en-
dangering of the safety of others physical assault on the employer, a fellow employee, client or
customer and gross insubordination. Whatever the merits of the case for dismissal might be, a
dismissal will not be fair if it does not meet the requirements of section 188.
(5) When deciding whether or not to impose the penalty of dismissal, the employer should in
addition to the gravity of the misconduct consider factors such as the employee’s circumstances
(including length of service, previous disciplinary record and personal circumstances), the
nature of the job and the circumstances of the infringement itself.
(6) The employer should apply the penalty of dismissal consistently with the way in which it
has been applied to the same and other employees in the past, and consistently as between two
or more employees who participate in the misconduct under consideration.
4. Fair procedure
(1) Normally, the employer should conduct an investigation to determine whether there are
grounds for dismissal. This does not need to be a formal enquiry. The employer should notify
the employee of the allegations using a form and language that the employee can reasonably
understand. The employee should be allowed the opportunity to state a case in response to the
allegations. The employee should be entitled to a reasonable time to prepare the response and
to the assistance of a trade union representative or fellow employee. After the enquiry, the em-
ployer should communicate the decision taken, and preferably furnish the employee with writ-
ten notification of that decision.
(2) Discipline against a trade union representative or an employee who is an office-bearer or
official of a trade union should not be instituted without first informing and consulting the trade
union.
(3) If the employee is dismissed, the employee should be given the reason for dismissal and
reminded of any rights to refer the matter to a council with jurisdiction or to the Commission or
to any dispute resolution procedures established in terms of a collective agreement.
(4) In exceptional circumstances, if the employer cannot reasonably be expected to comply
with these guidelines, the employer may dispense with pre-dismissal procedures.
5. Disciplinary records
Employers should keep records for each employee specifying the nature of any disciplinary
transgressions, the actions taken by the employer and the reasons for the actions.
6. Dismissals and industrial action
(1) Participation in a strike that does not comply with the provisions of chapter IV is miscon-
duct. However, like any other act of misconduct, it does not always deserve dismissal. The sub-
stantive fairness of dismissal in these circumstances must be determined in the light of the facts
of the case, including –
(a) the seriousness of the contravention of this Act;
(b) attempts made to comply with this Act; and
(c) whether or not the strike was in response to unjustified conduct by the employer.
(2) Prior to dismissal the employer should, at the earliest opportunity, contact a trade union
official to discuss the course of action it intends to adopt. The employer should issue an ultima-
tum in clear and unambiguous terms that should state what is required of the employees and
what sanction will be imposed if they do not comply with the ultimatum. The employees should
be allowed sufficient time to reflect on the ultimatum and respond to it, either by complying
with it or rejecting it. If the employer cannot reasonably be expected to extend these steps to the
employees in question, the employer may dispense with them.
Dismissals 347
(b) after a reasonable period of time for improvement, the employee continues to per-
form unsatisfactorily.
(3) The procedure leading to dismissal should include an investigation to establish the reasons
for the unsatisfactory performance and the employer should consider other ways, short of dis-
missal, to remedy the matter.
(4) In the process, the employee should have the right to be heard and to be assisted by a
trade union representative or a fellow employee.
9. Guidelines in cases of dismissal for poor work performance
Any person determining whether a dismissal for poor work performance is unfair should con-
sider –
(a) whether or not the employee failed to meet a performance standard; and
(b) if the employee did not meet a required performance standard whether or not –
(i) the employee was aware, or could reasonably be expected to have been aware,
of the required performance standard;
(ii) the employee was given a fair opportunity to meet the required performance
standard; and
(iii) dismissal was an appropriate sanction for not meeting the required perform-
ance standard.
10. Incapacity: Ill health and injury
(1) Incapacity on the grounds of ill health or injury may be temporary or permanent. If an
employee is temporarily unable to work in these circumstances, the employer should investigate
the extent of the incapacity or the injury. If the employee is likely to be absent for a time that is
unreasonably long in the circumstances, the employer should investigate all the possible alterna-
tives short of dismissal. When alternatives are considered, relevant factors might include the
nature of the job, the period of absence, the seriousness of the illness or injury and the possibil-
ity of securing a temporary replacement for the ill or injured employee. In cases of permanent
incapacity, the employer should ascertain the possibility of securing alternative employment, or
adapting the duties or work circumstances of the employee to accommodate the employee’s
disability.
(2) In the process of the investigation referred to in subsection (1) the employee should be
allowed the opportunity to state a case in response and to be assisted by a trade union repre-
sentative or fellow employee.
(3) The degree of incapacity is relevant to the fairness of any dismissal. The cause of the in-
capacity may also be relevant. In the case of certain kinds of incapacity, for example alcoholism
or drug abuse, counselling and rehabilitation may be appropriate steps for an employer to con-
sider.
(4) Particular consideration should be given to employees who are injured at work or who are
incapacitated by work-related illness. The courts have indicated that the duty on the employer to
accommodate the incapacity of the employee is more onerous in these circumstances.
11. Guidelines in cases of dismissal arising from ill health or injury
Any person determining whether a dismissal arising from ill health or injury is unfair should
consider –
(a) whether or not the employee is capable of performing the work; and
(b) if the employee is not capable –
(i) the extent to which the employee is able to perform the work;
(ii) the extent to which the employee’s work circumstances might be adapted to
accommodate disability, or, where this is not possible, the extent to which the
employee’s duties might be adapted; and
(iii) the availability of any suitable alternative work.
Dismissals 349
Appendix 2
(1) The Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995) (“the Act”) defines a dismissal based
on the operational requirements of an employer as one that is based on the economic, technologi-
cal, structural or similar needs of the employer. It is difficult to define all the circumstances that
might legitimately form the basis of a dismissal for this reason. As a general rule, economic
reasons are those that relate to the financial management of the enterprise. Technological
reasons refer to the introduction of new technology which affects work relationships either by
making existing jobs redundant or by requiring employees to adapt to the new technology or a
consequential restructuring of the workplace. Structural reasons relate to the redundancy of
posts consequent to a restructuring of the employer’s enterprise.
(2) Dismissals for operational requirements have been categorised as “no fault” dismissals. In other
words, it is not the employee who is responsible for the termination of employment. Because
retrenchment is a “no fault” dismissal and because of its human cost, the Act places particular
obligations on an employer, most of which are directed toward ensuring that all possible alterna-
tives to dismissal are explored and that the employees to be dismissed are treated fairly.
(3) The obligations placed on an employer are both procedural and substantive. The purpose
of consultation is to enable the parties, in the form of a joint problem-solving exercise, to strive
for consensus if that is possible. The matters on which consultation is necessary are listed in sec-
tion 189(2). This section requires the parties to attempt to reach consensus on, amongst other
things, appropriate measures to avoid dismissals. In order for this to be effective, the consultation
process must commence as soon as a reduction of the workforce, through retrenchments or re-
dundancies, is contemplated by the employer, so that possible alternatives can be explored. The
employer should in all good faith keep an open mind throughout and seriously consider pro-
posals put forward.
(4) The Act also provides for the disclosure by the employer of information on matters rele-
vant to the consultation. Although the matters on which information for the purposes of consul-
tation is required are specified in section 189(3), the list in that section is not a closed one. If
considerations other than those that are listed are relevant to the proposed dismissal or the
development of alternative proposals, they should be disclosed to the consulting party. In the
event of a disagreement about what information is to be disclosed any party may refer the dis-
pute to the CCMA in terms of section 16(6) of the Act
(5) The period over which consultation should extend is not defined in the Act. The circum-
stances surrounding the consultation process are relevant to a determination of a reasonable
period. Proper consultation will include:
(a) The opportunity to meet and report back to employees;
(b) the opportunity to meet with the employer; and
(c) the request, receipt and consideration of information.
(6) The more urgent the need by the business to respond to the factors giving rise to any
contemplated termination of employment, the more truncated the consultation process might
be. Urgency may not, however, be induced by the failure to commence the consultation process
as soon as a reduction of the workforce was likely. On the other hand, the parties who are
entitled to be consulted must meet, as soon, and as frequently, as may be reasonably practicable
during the consultation process.
(7) If one or more employees are to be selected for dismissal from a number of employees, the Act
requires that the criteria for their selection must be either agreed with the consulting parties or,
if no criteria have been agreed, be fair and objective criteria.
(8) Criteria that infringe a fundamental right protected by the Act when they are applied, can
never be fair. These include selection on the basis of union membership or activity, pregnancy,
or some other unfair discriminatory ground. Criteria that are neutral on the face of it should be
350 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
carefully examined to ensure that when they are applied, they do not have a discriminatory
effect. For example, to select only part-time workers for retrenchment might discriminate against
women, since women are predominantly employed in part-time work.
(9) Selection criteria that are generally accepted to be fair include length of service, skills and
qualifications. Generally the test for fair and objective criteria will be satisfied by the use of the
“last in, first out” (LIFO) principle. There may be instances where the LIFO principal or other
criteria need to be adapted. The LIFO principle, for example, should not operate so as to
undermine an agreed affirmative action program. Exceptions may also include the retention of
employees based on criteria mentioned above which are fundamental to the successful operation
of the business. These exceptions should, however, be treated with caution.
(10) Employees dismissed for reasons based on the employer’s operational requirements are en-
titled to severance pay of at least one week’s remuneration for each completed year of continu-
ous service with the employer, unless the employer is exempted from the provisions of section
196. This minimum requirement does not relieve an employer from attempting to reach consen-
sus on severance pay during the period of consultation. The right of the trade union, through
collective bargaining, to seek an improvement on the statutory minimum severance pay is not
limited or reduced in any way.
(11) If an employee either accepted or unreasonably refused to accept an offer of alternative
employment, the employee’s right to severance pay is forfeited. Reasonableness is determined by
a consideration of the reasonableness of the offer of alternative employment and the reason-
ableness of the employee’s refusal. In the first case, objective factors such as remuneration, status
and job security are relevant. In the second case, the employee’s personal circumstances play a
greater role.
(12) (1) Employees dismissed for reasons based on the employer’s operational requirements
should be given preference if the employer again hires employees with comparable qualifications,
subject to:
(a) The employee, after having been asked by the employer, having expressed within a
reasonable time from the date of dismissal a desire to be rehired.
(b) A time limit on preferential rehiring. The time limit must be reasonable and must be the
subject of consultation.
(2) If the above conditions are met, the employer must take reasonable steps to inform the
employee, including notification to the representative trade union, of the offer of re-employment.
Dismissals 351
Appendix 3
Appendix 4
(The following is an abbreviated disciplinary procedure; it should, of course, be more detailed,
but this should give the reader an idea of what the contents of such procedures are.)
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE
1 Policy regarding discipline
Disciplinary action is any action instituted by Management as a consequence of the unaccepta-
ble, intolerable or unsatisfactory performance and/or behaviour of an employee.
The workforce is considered to be an important component of the Company and the Com-
pany shall thus endeavour to maintain and improve performance by its employees. For this
reason disciplinary action is regarded as a manner in which unacceptable or intolerable behav-
iour and/or unsatisfactory performance is or could be improved. Punishment will, therefore, be
regarded as a last resort in the event of an employee not heeding corrective action.
In the interest of sound labour relations and labour peace the Company undertakes to main-
tain fairness and consistency when disciplinary action is taken.
2 Authority to discipline
The authority to discipline an employee shall vest in the management of each section or depart-
ment, subject to the provision that final written warnings, suspensions without pay and dismissals
shall be handled by the Personnel Officer, with the right to appeal to the Personnel Manager. The
decision taken by the Personnel Manager is subject to the approval of the General Manager.
3 Disciplinary procedures
To ensure that no doubt exists about disciplinary action that has been taken, all reprimands,
warnings and other disciplinary steps shall be kept on the file of the employee concerned.
Disciplinary steps:
Disciplinary action to be taken shall depend on the offence committed (as contained in the dis-
ciplinary code) and shall comprise one or more of the following:
3.1 Verbal warning
3.2 Written warning (First, second, etc)
3.3 Final written warning
3.4 Suspension without pay
3.5 Dismissal with notice or summary dismissal
3.1 Verbal warning
A verbal warning shall be accompanied by counselling.
A verbal warning may be issued in the event of any form of misconduct or poor performance
contained in the Disciplinary Code for which a verbal warning is justified (Category 3).
The foreman shall also notify the employee of the possible consequence(s) in the event of a
re-occurrence of the same or a similar “offence”.
3.2 Written warning
A written warning may be issued in the event of any form of misconduct or poor performance
contained in the Disciplinary Code for which a written warning is justified (Category 1, 2 and 3)
and it may be a first or second or final warning. The purpose of such warnings is to endeavour to
improve the poor performance or incorrect or intolerable behaviour of an employee.
All written warnings shall be valid against the employee for a period of six months from the
date of its issue and shall be kept on the employee’s file. The first written warning is considered
the first formal disciplinary step against an employee. This warning serves to inform the employee
of future disciplinary action that can and shall be taken against him in the event of him commit-
ting the same or a similar offence again. This warning is used for less serious offences.
Dismissals 353
A second written warning follows the first written warning when the same or similar offence
has been committed and is used for serious and less serious offences.
A third written warning follows the second written warning when the same or similar offence
has been committed and is used for serious and less serious offences.
3.3 Final written warning
A final written warning is considered the last step in endeavouring to improve the performance
or behaviour of an employee. A final warning is justified for serious and some very serious
offences as contained in Categories 1 and 2 of the Disciplinary Code, as well as in the event of
less serious “offences” being committed repeatedly.
3.4 Suspension without pay
Suspension without pay as a form of discipline or “punishment” shall only be justified in circum-
stances which justify the dismissal of an employee, so that suspension without pay shall be adopt-
ed in lieu of dismissal.
The period of such suspension shall be at the discretion of Management, but shall not exceed
a period of two weeks.
Before an employee may be suspended without pay a disciplinary hearing shall be held and
the employee shall be counselled.
3.5 Dismissal with notice or summary dismissal
Summary dismissal shall only be justified if an employee is guilty of a material breach of contract,
ie if the employee is guilty of a Category 1 offence with a criminal element or if a final written
warning is still operative against him for any other offence. That means an employee shall only
be dismissed if the employer has a valid reason for such dismissal, provided that such dismissal
shall also be fair in the circumstances.
Such dismissal shall take immediate effect and no remuneration shall be paid out in lieu of
notice. Management may, however, at its discretion and if circumstances warrant it, decide on
the termination of an employee’s services with notice or payment in lieu of notice, provided that
such notice or payment in lieu thereof shall not exceed a period of two weeks.
Before an employee may be dismissed a disciplinary hearing shall be held.
4 Disciplinary hearings (enquiries)
If further action is required after an employee has received a final written warning, or in the case
of a Category 1 offence a disciplinary hearing shall be held as soon as possible after an offence
has been committed.
The employee shall be notified of the charge against him, as well as of the date and time of the
hearing. The employee shall be entitled to call any fellow employee as a representative at the
hearing. Furthermore, the employee shall be entitled to an interpreter if he so chooses, provided
that he shall notify Management in advance in order for the necessary arrangements to be made.
The Personnel Officer shall act as presiding officer at the hearing. In the event of the latter
being closely involved with the matter at hand, he shall act as prosecutor and another senior
member of Management shall act as presiding officer.
At the hearing both Management and the employee shall have the right to testify, produce
evidence of whatever nature, call witnesses and cross-examine the other party and his witnesses.
Before a final decision is reached, Management shall afford the employee an opportunity to
prove mitigating circumstances, after which said employee’s record and any other relevant infor-
mation shall be taken into consideration.
The particulars of the hearing and the decision shall be minuted.
The employee shall be notified of his right to appeal against the decision taken at the hearing
if such decision is a final warning, suspension without pay or dismissal.
354 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
5 Appeal
After the employee has been notified of his right to appeal at the disciplinary hearing he has five
working days in which to appeal against the decision taken at the said hearing.
The employee shall appeal in writing on the prescribed form and shall state the grounds for
his appeal.
The appeal hearing shall be chaired by the Personnel Manager or any other person from Man-
agement, other than the person who acted as presiding officer at the disciplinary hearing.
At the appeal hearing the employee shall have the same rights as at the disciplinary hearing.
The proceedings of the appeal shall be minuted.
17
UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES
17.1 Introduction
The concept of unfair labour practice under the 1956 LRA was a catch-all category of conduct
by employers, employees and their organisations which, in the opinion of the Industrial
Court, fell within the definition of an unfair labour practice. With the implementation of
the Labour Relations Act of 1995 this catch-all category disappeared and unfair conduct of
various types is explicitly and separately dealt with. For example, unfair dismissals are dealt
with in Chapter VIII, unfair employer conduct towards employees for exercising their free-
dom of association in Chapter II, organisational rights in Part A of Chapter III and unilat-
eral amendment to employment conditions in section 64. These forms of conduct are no
longer termed “unfair labour practices”; specific reference is made to the type of conduct
or practice and is called “unfair dismissal”, “infringing freedom of association” and so on.
They are derived from what the old Industrial Court identified as unfair practices.
Only a small number of practices considered by the Industrial Court as unfair were not
placed in a specific category. They originally appeared under the heading “residual unfair
labour practices” in item 2 of Schedule 7 of the LRA when the Act took effect in November
1996. They were included in Schedule 7 as a transitional measure because, at the time the
LRA was enacted, it was envisaged that these practices would be incorporated in legislation
applicable to individual labour law (whereas the LRA primarily deals with collective labour
law).
The “new” concept of unfair labour practice consequently refers to only a few specific
practices and does not include labour practices in general as was the case under the old
LRA. In Nawa & Another v Department of Trade & Industry [1998] 7 BLLR 701 (LC) and
National Entitled Workers Union v CCMA & Others (2003) 24 ILJ 2335 (LC) the Labour Court
confirmed that the Act does not provide for a general unfair labour practice definition and
concluded that an employee must show that the practice complained of falls within the
description of “residual unfair labour practices” as envisaged in the then item 2 of Schedule 7.
With the implementation of the 2002 amendments to the LRA on 1 August 2002 “residual
unfair labour practices” were removed from Schedule 7 and were placed in Chapter VIII of
the Act – as section 186(2) of the LRA. Chapter VIII, governing only dismissals before the
2002 amendments, now includes unfair labour practices as well.
It needs to be noted that, unlike the position under the old Act, an unfair labour prac-
tice can, in terms of the repealed item 2(1) of Schedule 7 and now section 186(2), be com-
mitted by an employer only. Employees can no longer make themselves guilty of unfair
practices. It follows then that it is no longer possible for an employer to allege an unfair
labour practice against him by his employee and no remedies in this case are available to
the employer under the LRA. In Maseko v Entitlement Experts [1997] 3 BLLR 317 (CCMA)
the CCMA decided that unfair acts by employees against their employers are not justiciable
under the Act. This approach was endorsed by the Labour Court in NEWU v CCMA &
Others [2004] 2 BLLR 165 (LC).
355
356 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
1 When unfair labour practices were initially defined in item 2 of Sch 7, the definition included unfair dis-
crimination based on race, gender, age, religion, disability, language, marital status, etc. With the ad-
vent of the Employment Equity Act items 2(1)(a) and 2(2) of Sch 7, dealing with discrimination issues,
were removed from the LRA and included in Ch II of the EEA. Unfair discrimination is thus no longer
termed an unfair labour practice; it falls within its own, specific category, namely “unfair discrimina-
tion”. With the removal of discrimination from Sch 7 an “unfair labour practice” was only one of: (a)
unfair employer conduct relating to promotion, demotion, training or provision of benefits; (b) unfair
suspension or other disciplinary action; and (c) refusal or failure to re-employ ex-employees in terms of
an agreement. The additional unfair labour practices now found in s 186(2)(d), occupational detri-
ments as contemplated in the Protected Disclosures Act, have been inserted by the 2002 amendments.
Unfair labour practices 357
17.3 Promotions
The Oxford Dictionary defines “promotion” as “raise to a higher rank or office”. In Mashe-
goane & Another v University of the North [1998] 1 BLLR 73 (LC) the Labour Court held that
an appointment to a position which carries greater authority and status amounts to promo-
tion.
The employer’s unfair conduct relating to promotion constitutes an unfair labour prac-
tice. “Unfair conduct” implies a failure to meet an objective standard and may be taken to
include arbitrary, capricious or inconsistent conduct, whether negligent or intended.
Applied in the context of promotions this means that mere unhappiness or a perception of
unfairness does not necessarily equal unfair conduct. “The process of selection inevitably
results in a candidate being appointed and the unsuccessful candidate(s) being disappoint-
ed. This is not unfair” (see SAMWU obo Damon v Cape Metropolitan Council (1999) 20 ILJ 714
(CCMA)). In PSA obo Badenhorst v Department of Justice (1999) 20 ILJ 253 (CCMA) the De-
partment was restructured. The CCMA held that the Department could have done more to
keep the staff informed of the rationalisation process. “This may have prevented the per-
ception that the process had been unfair, but it does not make the process actually unfair”.
Promotion is a managerial prerogative and the employer can promote whoever it thinks
is the best or most suitable candidate for the position. However, an employer is required to
act fairly when promoting or not promoting an employee; unfair conduct in this regard
constitutes and unfair labour practice. The managerial prerogative is thus limited both pro-
cedurally and substantively, meaning that the employer must act procedurally and substan-
tively fairly in the promotion or non-promotion of an employee.
Procedural fairness implies the following considerations.
• The employer must adhere to the “bottom line” for a fair promotion procedure, which is
to ensure that all candidates are afforded a reasonable opportunity to promote their can-
didature (Mthembu & Another v SA Police Service & Another (2010) 31 ILJ 1014 (BCA); PSA
obo Badenhorst v Department of Justice (1999) 20 ILJ 253 (CCMA)).
• An employer has to follow his own procedures – the source of these procedures may be
legislation, a collective agreement, company policy or an established practice (see NUTE-
SA v Border Technikon [2005] 12 BALR 1302 (CCMA); Manana v Department of Labour
[2010] 6 BLLR 664 (LC)). If the employer discovers that the procedure has not been
followed correctly, a fresh procedure may be conducted to cure the defects. This may
include the re-advertising of a post or granting an interview which was originally refused.
• An employee may challenge the composition and/or the competency of a selection panel.
The persons on a selection panel need not be experts, neither do they need to be qualified
in the particular position that is under consideration. What is required is that the panel
members have reasonable knowledge – that is, they should be in a position to make a
reasonably informed decision – or, as is commonly said, they should “apply their minds”.
________________________
2 In MITUSA & Others v Transnet Ltd & Others [2002] 11 BLLR 1023 (LAC) it was held that unilateral
amendments to conditions of employment may “arguably fall within the ambit of an unfair labour prac-
tice”. It is respectfully submitted that this is incorrect. S 186(2) does not include unilateral amendments
as a form of unfair labour practice; therefore, such amendments cannot be arbitrated as an unfair
labour practice. Unilateral amendments are catered for in a single provision in the LRA, s 64(4), which
provides for strike action as the only relief.
358 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
• Employees who have been acting in a more senior position do not have an automatic right
to be promoted to that position when it becomes available (see SAPS v SSSBC & Others
[2010] 8 BLLR 892 (LC)). However, employers run the risk of acting unfairly if they do not
at least consider the employee who has been acting. Or, as is sometimes argued, the em-
ployer must at least consider some form of remuneration. However, a claim for remunera-
tion is not arbitrable by the CCMA or a council because it is not “unfair conduct relating to
the provision of benefits”: remuneration does not constitute a benefit. Employees often
claim that their acting in a higher position creates a “legitimate expectation” of promotion.
It needs to be noted, however, and our case law is clear on this, that a legitimate expecta-
tion gives the employee nothing more than an opportunity to be heard before a decision is
made (IMATU obo Coetzer v Stad Tygerberg (1999) 20 ILJ 971 (CCMA); Administrator, Trans-
vaal & Others v Traub & Others (1989) 10 ILJ 823 (A); Catholic Bishops Publishing Co & Others
v State President & Others 1990 (1) SA 849 (A); Gurarnah v South African Weather Services
[2004] 4 BALR 454 (CCMA); Limekaya v Department of Education [2004] 5 BALR 586
(GPSSBC); Ramoroka v Robben Island Museum (2012) 33 ILJ 500 (CCMA)).
• Promotion should involve some reward such as a higher salary, according to SACSAAWU
obo Nguyuza v Premier Loss Control CC [1998] 9 BALR 1190 (CCMA). It is submitted, how-
ever, that an elevation involving, for instance, a higher status without a higher salary
could arguably be classified as a promotion.
• An employer should consider the development of an employee. This development may
involve promotion. An employer does not commit an unfair labour practice if it does not
develop or deploy staff so that they can gain more knowledge and experience if it is not
contractually bound to do so. However, sight must not be lost of employment equity. Pro-
motion is an obvious affirmative-action measure and training is specifically mentioned as
such a measure (s 15 of the Employment Equity Act). There is consequently a duty on
employers to train and develop employees in the context of affirmative action. This
means that denial of promotion because of the lack of an attribute, which lack could
have been cured by training, may well constitute unfair conduct relating to promotion.
In this context unfair conduct relating to training could constitute an unfair labour prac-
tice. See, in this regard, Monyakeni v SA Police Service & Others (2008) 29 ILJ 3111 (BCA);
Lotter v SA Police Service (2005) 26 ILJ 578 (BCA).
Substantive fairness in the context of promotions refers to the reasons why the employer
decides to prefer one employee to others for the promotion. The employer retains the
discretion to appoint the person it considers the most suitable candidate for the post. In the
process it may take subjective considerations into account, such as performance at an
interview. Because this is so, the decided cases clearly indicate that the arbitrator should
exercise deference to the employer’s discretion and not interfere, unless it is shown that the
employer has failed to apply his mind in the selection of the candidate. See SAMWU obo
Damon v Cape Metropolitan Council (1999) 20 ILJ 714 (CCMA); Van Rensburg v Northern Cape
Provincial Administration (1997) 18 ILJ 1421 (CCMA). In practice this means that the em-
ployer will be allowed a margin of latitude in coming to its decision, but this is subject to
legislation, such as the Employment Equity Act and, perhaps, a collective agreement.
It may not always be easy to justify why a particular candidate has been preferred over
another, but at the very least the employer should be in a position to provide reasons for its
decision (Mashegoane & Another v University of the North, supra; PSA obo Petzer v Department of
Home Affairs (1998) 19 ILJ 412 (CCMA)). There must be a logical connection between the
real reason and the decision taken. The following have been held to be acceptable consid-
erations in preferring one candidate to another: one selection criterion carries more weight
than the rest of the criteria (Rafferty v Department of the Premier [1998] 8 BALR 1017 (CCMA);
and preferring one candidate with a lower evaluation mark than another candidate is not
necessarily fatal if the employer has good reason for doing so (Van Rensburg case, supra; PSA
obo Dalton & Another v Department of Public Works [1998] 9 BALR 1177 (CCMA)).
Unfair labour practices 359
A fair amount of doubt existed as to the difference between a promotion and an appoint-
ment. The majority of employers use one or a combination of two systems through which
employees may advance in an organisation. The first is a system of level progression where
employees are evaluated on a regular basis and, depending on the outcome of the evalu-
ation, progress from one grade to the next. The second system is where vacancies are adver-
tised and current employees are invited to apply for the posts.
If the latter system is used, employees, alongside external candidates, have to apply for
these posts. Can it be said that an internal candidate who gets the position has been
appointed to that post or has he been promoted?
Some ingenious arguments existed in support of a narrower interpretation, but the ma-
jority of judgments favoured a wider interpretation in terms of which an external applicant
is appointed, while an internal one is promoted. Promotion deals with the substance of the new
job. When the employee’s current job is compared with the new one and the new one brings
about higher remuneration levels, more or better fringe benefits, greater status, authority
and power and more responsibility, the new job involves a promotion, even though the em-
ployee had to apply for the position.
The case of PSA obo Badenhorst v Department of Justice (1999) 20 ILJ 253 (CCMA) clarifies
the issue. In this case the “old” Department was restructured and all existing employees
were invited to apply for newly created posts in the “new” Department. Ms Badenhorst
unsuccessfully applied for a higher post in the new Department. The employer argued that
she should be treated as a job applicant and that the dispute, therefore, did not involve pro-
motion. The Commissioner held as follows:
It appears that the applicant applied for a post which would have resulted in a promotion for her
to a more senior level if her application had been successful . . . While I accept that this was not a
promotion in the ordinary sense of the word, I do not believe that the peculiar nature of the
rationalisation process can allow semantics to change the essential nature of the dispute. No evi-
dence suggested that the applicant’s years of service would not be transferred to the post in the
new structure, nor was it suggested that her employee benefits would be interrupted by such
transfer. A new post would still essentially be with the same employer, the Department of Justice,
but in a remodelled structure in conformity with the rationalisation. It is specious to suggest that
the applicant was a job applicant, in the sense of being an outside job-seeker.
The uncertainty between a promotion and an appointment was finally settled in Department
of Justice v CCMA & Others [2004] 4 BLLR 297 (LAC) when the Labour Appeal Court
decided that an internal candidate for a more senior post is promoted, whilst an external
candidate is appointed to the post. Appointment thus involves a new recruit, whereas promo-
tion is the elevation of a serving employee to a higher position. See also Jele v Premier of the
Province of KwaZulu-Natal & Others [2003] 7 BLLR 723 (LC); City of Cape Town v SAMWU obo
Jacobs [2009] 9 BLLR 882 (LAC).
Another issue which is often encountered in the context of promotions is a promise of a
promotion. Employers or their senior staff members should take care not to make promises
of promotion to a subordinate employee. A promise does not entitle an employee to a
promotion, but it may create a legitimate expectation. However, if a promise has a material
effect on the outcome of the employers’ decision, the position may be different.
Employers will increasingly be expected to make their decisions about promotions within
the context of affirmative action. Employers may thus expect attacks from two sides: from
those who were denied promotion, because they do not form part of a designated group
and from those falling in a designated group being denied promotion despite the fact that
they are part of the targeted employees. It has been argued that it is legitimate for an
employer to consider affirmative action when denying promotion to an employee who is
not part of a designated group. If an employee should challenge his non-promotion
360 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
because he does not fall within one of the designated groups, the real reason underlying
the dispute is discrimination and the matter will have to be adjudicated by the Labour
3
Court.
17.4 Demotions
Demotion is the reverse of promotion, meaning that an employee is moved to a lower rank
or level. The unfair conduct of an employer relating to demotion is an unfair labour prac-
tice.
“Unfair” conduct implies a failure to meet an objective standard and may be taken to
include arbitrary, capricious or inconsistent conduct, whether negligent or intended.
As a disciplinary measure demotion is allowed only in circumstances where a dismissal is
justified but, because of mitigating factors, the employer decides not to dismiss the em-
ployee. See in this regard Arries v Afric Addressing (Pty) Ltd t/a Afric Mail Advertising [1998] 5
BALR 525 (CCMA); Metro Rail (Wits) v SAFWU [1998] 1 BALR 88 (IMSSA); Transtel Johan-
nesburg v TWU [1998] 8 BALR 1127 (IMSSA); TWU obo Van Zyl v Metrorail [1999] 7 BALR
888 (IMSSA); and CWIU obo Sityana & Mane v Valpa Easigas [2000] 1 BALR 23 (CCMA).
In Van Niekerk v Medicross Health Care Group (Pty) Ltd [1998] 8 BALR 1038 (CCMA) the
employee was demoted from managerial to clerical status. The CCMA held that it amounted
to an unfair unilateral alteration of terms and conditions of employment and the employer
was ordered to reinstate the employee to his former position. Similarly, in Visser v Vodacom
(Pty) Ltd [2002] 10 BALR 1031 (AMSSA) the transfer of an employee from a managerial to
a technical position without loss of remuneration was held to be a demotion and, in the cir-
cumstances, an unfair labour practice. See also Van Wyk v Albany Bakeries Ltd & Others
[2003] 12 BLLR 1274 (LC); Solidarity obo Kern v Mudau & Others [2007] 6 BLLR 566 (LC);
Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate Services, Department of Correctional Services & Others
[2008] 12 BLLR 1179 (LAC).
In SALSTAFF obo Vrey v Datavia [1999] 6 BALR 757 (IMSSA) the arbitrator held that a
change from financial to administrative duties without a loss of status or pay did not
amount to demotion. However, prior consultation to the changes was required. See also
Tsweleng v Conron Spring Manufacturing & Engineering [2005] 2 BALR 159 (MEIBC).
In CEPPWAWU obo Mahlabane v Sasol Synfuel [2003] 9 BALR 1022 (CCMA), after the em-
ployee had accepted transfer to a lower post on the grounds of ill health, his salary was
frozen until the scale applicable to his new post reached his current salary. The employee
then claimed that the wage freeze constituted an unfair demotion. The CCMA commis-
sioner noted that the employee had been consulted and offered the alternative of a salary
reduction or a wage freeze. By choosing the latter, it was found, he had accepted a transfer
on the same terms and conditions. Future increments were therefore a matter of interest,
not right.
It is submitted that demotion other than demotion as a disciplinary sanction should
always be preceded by consultation (see Murray and Independent Newspapers (2003) 24 ILJ
1420 (CCMA); Van der Riet v Leisurenet Ltd t/a Health and Racquet Club [1998] 5 BLLR 471
(LAC)). Demotion as a disciplinary sanction should be implemented only if the employer’s
disciplinary code provides for demotion (see Glass v University of Zululand [2006] 4 BALR
388 (CCMA)).
________________________
3 In the paragraph on promotions frequent reference was made to Garbers C “Promotions: Keeping
abreast with ambition (an overview of the current law on promotion of employees)” Contemporary Labour
Law 9(3), October 1999.
Unfair labour practices 361
An employer is also guilty of an unfair labour practice if his conduct relating to the pro-
vision of benefits to an employee is unfair. The meaning of “benefits” has been the focus of
a number of cases. The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus defines “benefit” as “favourable
or helpful factor or circumstance, advantage, profit” and “payment made under insurance,
social security, welfare”. Its list of synonyms includes payment, pay-out, sick-pay, emoluments,
allowances, extras and fringe benefits.
While this broad definition appears to include a range of rights which accrue to an em-
ployee by virtue of the employment relationship – from wages to issues such as pension and
medical aid – the decisions of the CCMA and the Labour Court favour a narrow interpret-
ation of the concept “benefits”, so that all payments that could be interpreted as falling
under the broad ambit of “remuneration” are excluded.
The Labour Court, in Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd [1997] 10 BLLR 1364
(LC) and Gaylard v Telkom SA Ltd [1998] 9 BLLR 942 (LC), determined that remuneration
is not a benefit for the purposes of item 2(1)(b) of Schedule 7 (now s 186(2)(a)). In the
Samsung case Revelas J held that commission forms part of the employee’s salary and is,
therefore, part of the basic conditions of employment. “Remuneration is different from
benefits. A benefit is something extra apart from remuneration. Often it is a term and con-
dition of an employment contract and often not. Remuneration is always a term and con-
dition of the employment contract.”
In Northern Cape Provincial Administration v Hambidge NO & Others [1999] 7 BLLR 698 (LC)
“benefits” was defined as a supplementary advantage conferred on an employee for which
no work was required. A claim to a higher salary or an allowance, therefore, does not
amount to a claim for benefits, but is a matter of mutual interest. Similarly, in SALSTAFF v
Spoornet [2002] 10 BALR 1025 (AMSSA) an acting allowance was held not to be a benefit.
See also SA Post Office Ltd v CCMA & Others [2012] 11 BLLR 1183 (LC); Greeff and Giagas v
Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (SALGBC, ECD051116, 22 June 2012).
In Labuschagne v Techno Plastics (Pty) Ltd [2005] 6 BALR 610 (MEIBC) a pro rata bonus
was held not to be a benefit.
In AWAWU obo Lotter v Safcol [2002] 5 BALR 470 (CCMA) a claim for a housing allow-
ance was held to be a claim for a higher salary and, as such, not a benefit. Although
transport allowances and provident funds have been held to be “benefits”, the weight of
authority suggests that both should be considered as forms of remuneration (see SACCAWU
v Garden Route Chalets (Pty) Ltd [1997] 3 BLLR 325 (CCMA); SACWU v Longmile/Unitred
(1999) 20 ILJ 244 (CCMA)). Medical aid was held to be a benefit in Solidarity obo Du Plessis v
ABB Services [2005] 8 BALR 820 (MEIBC).
In Van Amstel v Eskom [2002] 9 BALR 995 (CCMA) “benefit” was defined as including a
car allowance. In Dube v Otis Elevators [2005] 7 BALR 695 (MEIBC), however, it was held
that the use of a company car for business purposes does not constitute a benefit as con-
templated by the Act.
In Sithole v Nogwaza NO & Others [1999] 12 BLLR 1348 (LC) the Labour Court held that
a “benefit” must be of a material nature, it must have monetary value for the employee and
be a cost for the employer. Examples given by the court include “pensions, medical aid,
housing subsidies, insurance, social security or membership of a club or society”.
In HOSPERSA & Another v Northern Cape Provincial Administration (2000) 21 ILJ 1066
(LAC) and Eskom v Marshall & Others [2003] 1 BLLR 12 (LC) “benefits” were defined as
advantages to which an employee is entitled ex contractu or ex lege. Claiming a separation
package without proving a contractual entitlement thereto consequently does not consti-
tute an unfair labour practice.
362 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
In G4S Security Services v NASGAWU (DA 3/08, 26 November 2009) the Labour Appeal
Court confirmed the prevailing approach of the time and in South African Post Office Ltd v
CCMA [2012] 11 BLLR 1183 (LC) the Labour Court, in following the decisions of the
Labour Appeal Court, confirmed that an acting allowance was not a benefit.
In stark contrast is the Labour Court’s decision in Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others
[2005] 7 BLLR 703 (LC). The Court rejected the argument that a benefit has to be derived
from a contractual or statutory right when it considered travelling concessions to be bene-
fits. According to the Court, disputes concerning benefits fall into two categories: the first
concerns a claim for benefits not presently enjoyed by employees or the reinstatement of
benefits. This category cannot be referred to arbitration and can be resolved through
industrial action. The second category concerns the fairness of the employer’s conduct in
relation to existing benefits. The latter constitutes a dispute of right and can be referred to
arbitration. The fact that an employer has a discretion to provide a benefit “does not . . .
take the benefit outside the ambit of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction provided by
section 186(2)(a) . . . On the contrary, it is clear that the provision was introduced primarily
to permit scrutiny of employer conduct including the exercise of employer discretion in the
context of employee benefits”.
In IMATU obo Verster v Umhlathuze Municipality [2011] 9 BLLR 882 (LC) the Labour Court
decided to ignore the LAC decisions and found support in Protekon to find that an acting
allowance could be arbitrated as an unfair labour practice.
The Labour Appeal Court in Apollo Tyres SA (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others [2013] 5 BLLR
434 (LAC) concluded that the distinction between “benefit” and “remuneration”, drawn in
so many of the previous decisions, was artificial and unsustainable and held that the defini-
tion of “benefit” is wide enough to include wages and most, if not all, extras. The Court was
further of the view that not only employer conduct relating to statutory or contractual
entitlements, but also the manner in which an employer exercised its discretion in award-
ing allowances and other payments constituted unfair labour practices. The LAC concurred
in South African Airways (Pty) Ltd v GJJVV [2014] 8 BLLR 748 (LAC) and held that that
deductions from an employee’s accumulated leave pay to pay his salary while he was on
stand-by duty constituted an unfair labour practice relating to benefits.
It appears that an employer is guilty of an unfair labour practice if he fails to train his
employees when there is a contractual obligation to do so. In MITUSA v Portnet [2000] 9
BALR 1037 (CCMA) the employer denied his employees training in breach of a contract to
do so without consultation. It was held that the employer’s conduct constituted an unfair
labour practice. See also SARHWU v Transtel [1999] 2 BALR 224 (IMSSA). The employees
in MITUSA & Others v Transnet Ltd & Others [2002] 11 BLLR 1023 (LAC) failed to prove a
contractual right to training. It was consequently held that the employer did not commit an
unfair labour practice by denying them training.
It remains to be seen how the issue of training affirmative-action employees will be dealt
with in the absence of an agreement, but in light of the provisions of the Employment
Equity Act.
of unfair labour practice. It was confirmed in Sappi Forests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others [2009]
3 BLLR 254 (LC) that unfair suspension pending disciplinary (or criminal) proceedings fell
within the scope of the definition of “unfair labour practice”.
Employees are often suspended with pay pending a disciplinary hearing. Suspension with
pay is conceivably not unfair if the employer has a reasonable apprehension that a legit-
imate business interest would be harmed by the employee’s continued presence at the
workplace. See NEHAWU obo Makhethu v Robben Island Museum (2008) 29 ILJ 2318 (CCMA).
In Mabilo v Mpumalanga Provincial Government & Others [1999] 8 BLLR 821 (LC) and Ester-
huizen v Jet Demolition (2011) 32 ILJ 734 (CCMA) it was held that suspension pending a dis-
ciplinary hearing is permissible if it is intended to enable the employer to investigate the
charges against the employee. If there is no fair reason for suspension, the employer’s con-
duct in suspending an employee may very well fall foul of section 186(2)(b).
In SAPO Ltd v Jansen van Vuuren NO & Others [2008] 8 BLLR 798 (LC) it was held that a
suspension must be based on substantive reasons and that a fair procedure must be followed.
The Court observed that employers should refrain from hastily resorting to suspending
employees when there are no valid reasons to do so because suspension has a detrimental
impact on the employee and may prejudice his reputation, chances of advancement and
job security. It is therefore necessary, the Court held, that suspensions be based on substan-
tive reasons and that fair procedures be followed before an employee can be suspended –
that is, the employer must offer the employee an opportunity to be heard before placing
him on suspension.
Whether or not a hearing should be conducted prior to a suspension pending a discip-
linary hearing has received some attention, but the judgments in this regard are contradict-
ory. In Mabilo the Court held that it was not essential to hold a hearing provided that the
audi alteram partem principle is observed. In the Koka judgment and in Venter v South African
Tourism Board [1999] 10 BLLR 1111 (LC) it was held that the employer is not required to
give an employee a hearing before suspending him pending a disciplinary inquiry. In
Ngwenya v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal [2001] 8 BLLR 924 (LC), however, the Court decided
that an employee is entitled to be heard before being suspended as the suspension damages
his reputation. A similar judgment was handed down in SAPO Ltd v Jansen van Vuuren NO &
Others (supra) and in Dince & Others v Department of Education, North West Province & Others
[2010] 6 BLLR 631 (LC) it was held that suspension (with or without pay) without a hear-
ing is invalid.
The Court in Ngwenya further held that an employee may not be kept on suspension in-
definitely pending disciplinary action. See also Naidoo v Rudolph Chemicals (Pty) Ltd [2008] 6
BALR 497 (NBCCI).
Suspension without pay pending a disciplinary hearing is unfair (see Tsaperas & Another v
Clayville Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd [2002] 11 BALR 1225 (CCMA); Chaba v Iselwa Investment CC
[2004] 12 BALR 1534 (CCMA)). However, when an employee or his union seeks postpone-
ment of a disciplinary hearing and such postponement is granted, the employee is not en-
titled to pay (see SAEWA obo Members v Aberdare Cables [2007] 2 BALR 106 (MEIBC)).
Suspension without pay is normally adopted as a disciplinary sanction short of dismissal.
In County Fair v CCMA & Others [1998] 6 BLLR 577 (LC) and South African Breweries Ltd (Beer
Division) v Woolfrey & Others [1999] 5 BLLR 525 (LC) it was held that suspension without
pay is a permissible disciplinary penalty where appropriate. It is submitted that an employee
can be suspended without pay only in circumstances where dismissal would be justified,
were it not for mitigating factors. If suspension is imposed as a disciplinary sanction the
ordinary requirements of substantive and procedural fairness should apply.
In NUMSA obo Tshikana v Delta Motor Corporation [2003] 11 BALR 1302 (CCMA) the
CCMA commissioner held that the employer was not required to convene a formal hearing
before imposing a sanction short of dismissal where the penalty of dismissal was never
contemplated. In casu the employer suspended the employee for one day without pay for
364 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
insubordination. The sanction was held to have been justified and consequently did not
constitute an unfair labour practice.
Similarly, in NCAWU obo Tobias & Others v Pick ’n Pay Family Supermarket [2003] 12 BALR
1413 (CCMA) final warnings issued without a hearing to workers who had engaged in a
brief wildcat strike were held to be fair in the circumstances.
In the Breweries case, supra, the Court held that the prohibition on deductions from an
employee’s remuneration in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act does not
preclude an employer from imposing a penalty of suspension without pay.
________________________
4 In the discussion of unfair labour practices frequent reference was made to Du Toit et al. Labour Rela-
tions Law: A Comprehensive Guide 5th edn, LexisNexis (2006) and Du Toit et al. Labour Law Through The
Cases, LexisNexis (2002– ).
Unfair labour practices 365
17.8 Probation
A newly hired employee may be put on probation, provided that the probationary period is
reasonable. The purpose of probation is to allow the employer an opportunity to evaluate
the employee’s performance.
A probationary employee is an “employee” and an employer will be well advised to tread
with caution when dealing with misconduct or poor performance by such an employee. If a
probationary employee makes himself guilty of misconduct, the ordinary rules of substan-
tive and procedural fairness apply.
When the probationary employee’s performance does not meet the required standards,
evaluation and assistance by the employer are required. Only in instances where the em-
ployer has taken reasonable steps to help improve the employee’s performance and his per-
formance does not improve, can dismissal be considered. It must be noted, however, that
poor performance in the event of a probationary employee is treated less strictly than would
be the case with a permanent employee.
Item 8(1) of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal contained in Schedule 8 of the Act
provides the guidelines for probation:
(1) Probation
(a) An employer may require a newly-hired employee to serve a period of probation before the
appointment of the employee is confirmed.
(b) The purpose of probation is to give the employer an opportunity to evaluate the employee’s
performance before confirming the appointment.
(c) Probation should not be used for purposes not contemplated by this Code to deprive em-
ployees of the status of permanent employment. For example, a practice of dismissing em-
ployees who complete their probation periods and replacing them with newly-hired
employees, is not consistent with the purpose of probation and constitutes an unfair labour
practice.
(d) The period of probation should be determined in advance and be of reasonable duration.
The length of the probationary period should be determined with reference to the nature
of the job and the time it takes to determine the employee’s suitability for continued em-
ployment.
(e) During the probationary period, the employee’s performance should be assessed. An em-
ployer should give an employee reasonable evaluation, instruction, training, guidance or
counselling in order to allow the employee to render a satisfactory service.
(f) If the employer determines that the employee’s performance is below standard, the em-
ployer should advise the employee of any aspects in which the employer considers the em-
ployee to be failing to meet the required performance standards. If the employer believes
that the employee is incompetent, the employer should advise the employee of the respects
in which the employee is not competent. The employer may either extend the probationary
period or dismiss the employee after complying with sub-items (g) or (h), as the case may
be.
(g) The period of probation may only be extended for a reason that relates to the purpose of proba-
tion. The period of extension should not be disproportionate to the legitimate purpose that the
employer seeks to achieve.
(h) An employer may only decide to dismiss an employee or extend the probationary period
after the employer has invited the employee to make representations and has considered
any representations made. A trade union representative or fellow employee may make the
representations on behalf of the employee.
(i) If the employer decides to dismiss the employee or to extend the probationary period, the
employer should advise the employee of his or her rights to refer the matter to a council
having jurisdiction, or to the Commission.
(j) Any person making a decision about the fairness of a dismissal of an employee for poor
work performance during or on expiry of the probationary period ought to accept reasons
for dismissal that may be less compelling than would be the case in dismissals effected after
the completion of the probationary period.
366 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
(2) After probation, an employee should not be dismissed for unsatisfactory performance
unless the employer has –
(a) given the employee appropriate evaluation, instruction, training, guidance or counselling;
and
(b) after a reasonable period of time for improvement, the employee continues to perform un-
satisfactorily.
(3) The procedure leading to dismissal should include an investigation to establish the reasons
for the unsatisfactory performance and the employer should consider other ways, short of dismis-
sal, to remedy the matter.
(4) In the process, the employee should have the right to be heard and to be assisted by a trade
union representative or a fellow employee.
Any form of unfair treatment of a probationary employee, other than alleged unfair dismis-
sal, can potentially, in terms of section 186(2)(a), constitute an unfair labour practice. An
unfair labour practice in this context must be referred for con-arb. See paragraphs 15.11
and 16.5 below.
(g) that any matter referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f) has been, is being or is likely to be
deliberately concealed.
In CWU & Another v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd [2003] 8 BLLR 741 (LC) the unsub-
stantiated allegations of alleged fraud by management was held not to be protected by the
Protected Disclosures Act. According to the Court, a “disclosure” must contain information
regarding a criminal offence, a failure by person to discharge a legal obligation, or a mis-
carriage of justice. In Radebe & Another v Mashoff, Premier of the Free State Province & Others
[2009] 6 BLLR 564 (LC) it was held that a disclosure made by an employee must contain
information revealing one or more of the improprieties listed in the Protected Disclosures
Act and that it must be made in good faith – that is, the employee must have reason to
believe in the truth of the information. A disclosure that does not meet these requirements
does not qualify as a protected disclosure.
An employee who discloses any of the above is protected against reprisal only if the dis-
closure is a “protected disclosure”. A disclosure is protected if it is
• made to a legal practitioner or to a legal adviser with the object of and in the course of
obtaining legal advice,
• made in good faith to an employer. If the employer has not prescribed any procedure
for the disclosure of information any disclosure to him in good faith is protected. If a
procedure has been prescribed, the disclosure must be made in accordance with that
procedure in order to qualify as a protected disclosure. If the prescribed procedure au-
thorises disclosure to a person other than the employer, disclosure to that person is con-
sidered to be disclosure to the employer and is protected;
• made in good faith to a member of Cabinet or of the Executive Council of a province if
the employee’s employer is an individual appointed in terms of legislation by a member
of Cabinet or of the Executive Council of a province, a body the members of which are
appointed in terms of legislation by a member of Cabinet or of the Executive Council of
a province or an organ of state;
• made in good faith to the Public Protector or the Auditor-General (or a person or body
prescribed for the purposes of this provision) if the relevant impropriety concerns a mat-
ter normally dealt with by the Public Protector, etc and if the information and/or allega-
tion is substantially true;
• made in good faith to any person or body by an employee who reasonably believes that
the information is substantially true. A disclosure in these circumstances is protected only
if (i) it is made not for personal gain; (ii) if it is reasonable to make the disclosure, having
regard to the identity of the person concerned, the seriousness of the impropriety and
whether it is likely to continue, whether the disclosure is in breach of a duty of confiden-
tiality and public interest; and (iii) if the employee has reason to believe that he or she
will be subjected to an occupational detriment if the disclosure is made to his or her em-
ployer, that evidence relating to the impropriety will be concealed or destroyed if dis-
closed to the employer, if information that is substantially the same has been disclosed
previously and no action was taken within a reasonable period or that the impropriety is
of an exceptionally serious nature.
A protected disclosure does not include a disclosure in respect of which the employee com-
mits an offence by making that disclosure or a disclosure made by a legal adviser to whom
the information was disclosed in the course of obtaining legal advice.
No employee may be subjected to any occupational detriment by his or her employer on
account or partly on account of having made a protected disclosure. An “occupational
detriment”, in relation to the working environment of an employee, means
(a) being subjected to any disciplinary action;
(b) being dismissed, suspended, demoted, harassed or intimidated;
(c) being transferred against his or her will;
368 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
The Companies Act 71 of 2008, in section 159 and with reference to the Protected Dis-
5
closures Act, extends protection to registered trade unions in certain circumstances.
________________________
5 Practitioners should take note of the guidelines published in GG 34572 of 31 August 2011 in terms of
s 10(4)(a) of the Protected Disclosures Act.
370 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Arbitration
* An occupational detriment is referred to the Labour Court once conciliation has failed.
In terms of section 193(4) an arbitrator has the power to determine an unfair labour prac-
tice dispute on terms he or she deems reasonable, including but not limited to ordering
reinstatement, re-employment or compensation. The compensation awarded to an em-
ployee in respect of an unfair labour practice must be just and equitable in all the circum-
stances, but may not be more than the equivalent of 12 months’ remuneration (s 194(3)).
Questions
Question 1
Describe in detail the concept “unfair labour practice” as contemplated in section 186(2) of
the LRA. (20)
Question 2
Discuss or illustrate by means of a diagram the dispute resolution procedures for disputes
concerning unfair labour practices. (7)
Question 3
It is policy and practice in the South African Police Services (SAPS) to advertise posts for
promotion per province. Once applications have been received, a provincial panel is estab-
lished to shortlist the candidates and to recommend one of the shortlisted candidates as the
most suitable candidate for the post. The provincial panel submits the name of the recom-
mended candidate to Head Office and the National Commissioner appoints the recom-
mended candidate to the promotional post.
During 2000 promotional posts for the rank of superintendent were advertised. SAPS
members who were at captain level could apply for these posts. Captain Van der Merwe,
with vast experience in border policing, applied for the post of Superintendent in Border
Policing: Eastern Cape. According to the SAPS policy, border policing is a specialist field
and, therefore, a representative from Head Office: Border Policing had to form part of the
provincial panel selecting the shortlisted and number one candidates. In addition, the policy
requires that the preferred candidate should have experience in border policing because of
the specialist functions that have to be performed.
Thirty applications were received for the post of Superintendent: Border Policing in the
Eastern Cape. The provincial panel convened without informing Head Office. As a result
there was no representative from Head Office on the panel. The panel shortlisted five can-
didates for the post, none of whom had any experience in border policing. Captain Van der
Merwe was the only applicant with experience in border policing, but did not make it onto
Unfair labour practices 371
the shortlist. Captain Ndlovu, one of the shortlisted candidates, was recommended as the
number one candidate and was eventually appointed to the post.
When Captain Van der Merwe challenged his non-promotion he was informed that Cap-
tain Ndlovu had been promoted in accordance with the employment equity plan of the
SAPS. A study of the equity plan revealed that, in the event of a specialist post, experience
and knowledge were of supreme importance and should not be disregarded in favour of
equity. Some further research revealed that none of the applicants for the post in question
had any experience in border policing, neither had they completed any courses in this
field. Captain Van der Merwe was the only applicant who had completed all the required
courses and he had some 12 years experience in border policing.
3.1 Analyse the situation and determine whether or not Captain Van der Merwe should
have been promoted to Superintendent. (20)
3.2 Assume that, when Captain Van der Merwe refers his dispute for resolution, he does
not claim that he has been discriminated against in the promotion process. He simply
challenges his non-promotion on the grounds of experience and qualifications. Dis-
cuss the dispute resolution procedure that has to be followed in order to have his
dispute resolved. (6)
Hint: There is a bargaining council for the safety and security sector (see Chapter 11
par 11.3.3).
3.3 Assume that Captain Van der Merwe alleges that he has been discriminated against
because he is a white male. For this reason he was not promoted. What is the dispute
resolution procedure that must be followed? (6)
Hint: Refer to Chapter II of the Employment Equity Act.
Question 4
According to the company policy of Noddy’s Toys Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd promotion to
the more senior occupational levels in the company will be considered once employees
have undergone an evaluation process in ten areas of responsibility, such as managerial
skills, leadership abilities, experience, standard of performance and so forth. A score out of
10 will be awarded for each category and any employee who scores a total of 55 or more out
of 100 will be regarded as suitable for promotion. The suitable candidates will then be inter-
viewed by a panel consisting of senior managers and Human Resources personnel.
When the position of Assistant Manager in the Administration Department becomes
vacant, six employees are evaluated with the view of promoting one of them to the vacant
position. Mrs Plaatjies, a coloured female with three years’ experience in the company and
who scored 58 on her evaluation is eventually promoted to Assistant Manager. Ms Smith, a
white female with ten years’ experience in the company, challenges her non-promotion.
She scored 77 on her evaluation, but was not even called for an interview. Ms Smith claims
that she was the best candidate for the position and would have been promoted had she
been afforded an opportunity to be interviewed. The company counters her claim by
stating that Mrs Plaatjies was an affirmative-action promotion.
4.1 Discuss Ms Smith’s legal position and consider the validity or otherwise of the com-
pany’s argument. (20)
Hint: See PSA obo Badenhorst v Department of Justice (1999) 20 ILJ 253 (CCMA); SAMWU
obo Damon v Cape Metropolitan Council (1999) 20 ILJ 714 (CCMA); Van Rensburg v
Northern Cape Provincial Administration (1997) 18 ILJ 1421 (CCMA); Rafferty v Depart-
ment of the Premier [1998] 8 BALR 1017 (CCMA); PSA obo Dalton & Another v Depart-
ment of Public Works [1998] 9 BALR 1177 (CCMA); NEHAWU obo Thomas v Department
of Justice (2001) 22 ILJ 306 (BCA); Lotter v SA Police Service (2005) 26 ILJ 578 (BCA);
Kruger v SA Police Service (2003) 24 ILJ 477 (BCA).
372 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
4.2 Assume that Ms Smith claimed that her score of 77, the highest of all the candidates,
and the fact that she had been acting in the post previously, gave her a legitimate
expectation to be promoted. Discuss the principle of “legitimate expectation” and
decide whether Ms Smith should have been promoted in these circumstances. (20)
Hint: See IMATU obo Coetzer v Stad Tygerberg (1999) 20 ILJ 971 (CCMA); Administrator,
Transvaal & Others v Traub & Others (1989) 10 ILJ 823 (A); Catholic Bishops Publishing
Co & Others v State President & Others 1990 (1) SA 849 (A); Ramoroka v Robben Island
Museum (2012) 33 ILJ 500 (CCMA); UTATU obo Fourie & Another v Transnet Ltd (2002)
23 ILJ 1117 (ARB); Gurarnah v South African Weather Services [2004] 4 BALR 454
(CCMA); Limekaya v Department of Education [2004] 5 BALR 586 (GPSSBC).
Question 5
Mr Chang, a senior financial clerk, is demoted because of poor work performance. He has
not been informed that his performance does not meet the required standards. In fact,
three months ago he received a small performance bonus. After investigation it appears
that the demotion in actual fact occurred as a result of one mistake that Mr Chang had
made during the previous month.
5.1 Is Mr Chang’s employer guilty of an unfair labour practice? Explain. (5)
Hint: See Van Niekerk v Medicross Health Care Group (Pty) Ltd [1998] 8 BALR 1038
(CCMA).
5.2 Discuss the dispute resolution procedure that must be followed in order to resolve
the dispute between Mr Chang and his company. (5)
5.3 Assume that Mr Chang was demoted, not as described above, but because of the
operational requirements of his employer. Explain whether his employer is guilty of
an unfair labour practice in these circumstances. (5)
5.4 Assume that Mr Chang was demoted, not as described previously, but because he had
sought legal advice from his attorney as to how the corruption and discrimination
prevalent in his workplace could be dealt with. Is the employer guilty of an unfair la-
bour practice? Explain and include in your answer the dispute resolution procedure,
if any, that must be followed in this case. (10)
Hint: See the definition of “occupational detriment” and sections 3 and 4 of the
Protected Disclosures Act.
5.5 Assume that Mr Chang was a new employee, appointed some three months ago, and
that he was on probation. Explain whether his employer can dismiss him for poor
work performance in the circumstances described above. (20)
Question 6
In terms of the equity plan of TriStar Mining Company employees from designated groups
will receive training so that they can advance to more senior positions in the company.
When the trade union that represents a large number of these employees insists that train-
ing commence, management says there are no financial resources available for training.
Management undertakes to budget for training so that the employees can be trained
during the course of the following financial year.
6.1 Is the company guilty of an unfair labour practice by not providing training to the
employees? (5)
6.2 Assume that training was part of the employees’ contracts of employment. Does this
alter your position in 6.1? (5)
Question 7
Mr Ndlebe is a lecturer at a university. He has been appointed on a two-year contract. In
terms of the contract he is entitled to his monthly salary only and will enjoy no additional
Unfair labour practices 373
benefits. When Mr Ndlebe discovers that other contract lecturers participate in the univer-
sity’s medical aid scheme and that they receive additional payment for lecturing night
classes, he refers a dispute relating to “benefits” to the CCMA.
7.1 Can the issues complained about be termed “benefits”? Substantiate your answer by
referring to decided cases. (10)
7.2 Would a salary increase be deemed a benefit? (5)
7.2 Explain whether the university is committing an unfair labour practice in these
circumstances. (10)
7.3 Does the CCMA have jurisdiction to arbitrate Mr Ndlebe’s dispute? (5)
Hint: See Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd [1997] 10 BLLR 1364 (LC);
Gaylard v Telkom SA Ltd [1998] 9 BLLR 942 (LC); Hoelson v Vista University [1998] 5
BALR 554 (CCMA); Postal & Telekom Association of SA v SA Post Office Ltd [1998] 8
BALR 1012 (CCMA); Northern Cape Provincial Administration v Hambidge NO & Others
[1999] 7 BLLR 698 (LC); NEHAWU v Government of the Eastern Cape [1999] 5 BALR
550 (CCMA); FFATU obo Prinsloo & Others v Johnston [1999] 8 BALR 909 (CCMA);
SAWU obo Green v Buycom Group [1999] 10 BALR 1213 (CCMA); IMATU obo Baker v
East London Transitional Local Council [2000] 3 BALR 280 (CCMA); SAPSAWU obo Jika
v Department of Justice [2000] 3 BALR 309 (CCMA); FAWU v Kelvin Grove Club [2000] 9
BALR 999 (CCMA); Harris v Volkswagen of South Africa (Pty) Ltd [2000] 10 BALR 1140
(CCMA); Sithole v Nogwaza NO & Others (1999) 20 ILJ 2710 (LC); Abrahams v
Lukhanyou Clinic CC t/a Kensington Treatment Centre (2011) 32 ILJ 2773 (CCMA); SA
Post Office Ltd v CCMA & Others [2012] 11 BLLR 1183 (LC); IMATU obo Verster v
Umhlathuze Municipality [2011] 9 BLLR 882 (LC); Apollo Tyres SA (Pty) Ltd v CCMA &
Others [2013] 5 BLLR 434 (LAC); South African Airways (Pty) Ltd v GJJVV [2014] 8
BLLR 748 (LAC).
Question 8
After a post was advertised five external candidates were shortlisted and invited to an
interview. One of them was appointed to the post. Ms Pillay, one of the unsuccessful candi-
dates, believed that she should have been appointed as she was the best candidate.
8.1 Is this matter arbitrable by the CCMA? (5)
8.2 Assume that Ms Pillay claimed that her non-appointment was due to gender discrimi-
nation. Explain whether this matter can be determined under our labour legislation
and, if so, what procedure must be followed. (10)
Hint: Refer to Chapter II of the Employment Equity Act.
Question 9
Mr Fourie is Head of Administration at a public hospital. He is very unhappy because his
immediate superior, a rather dictatorial person, makes life unbearable in the workplace.
When he cannot stand the circumstances any longer he applies for a transfer to another
hospital. His transfer is not approved.
9.1 Is this matter arbitrable in terms of the LRA? (5)
9.2 Assume that Mr Fourie was happy in his work and did not wish to be transferred.
Because he disclosed information regarding corruption in the hospital’s administra-
tion to the provincial government he is transferred without warning or notification.
He wishes to challenge the transfer. Is it possible for him to do so? If so, explain the
procedure that will have to be followed. (10)
Hint: See the definition of “occupational detriment” and sections 3 and 4 of the Pro-
tected Disclosures Act.
374 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Question 10
Identify the nature of the dispute in the following instances and then explain how the dis-
pute can be resolved:
10.1 Employee X is employed at Guestro Wheels. He applies for a supervisory post because
it would mean a promotion for him. A person with lesser qualifications and experi-
ence is appointed as supervisor. X challenges his non-appointment to the post. The
MEIBC (Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council) has jurisdiction in
the sector and area where Guestro Wheels is situated. (5)
10.2 Viwe is an administrative clerk in the Department of Home Affairs. When the post of
Director of Administration is advertised, he applies because the post would mean a
promotion for him. When another clerk is appointed to the post, Viwe claims that he
should have been appointed because he has better qualifications and more experi-
ence than the person who was appointed. (5)
10.3 Bob is employed by Comfy Shoes CC, a small company manufacturing ladies’ and
children’s shoes. He is a Rastafarian, who believes in smoking dagga in order to prac-
tise his religion. His employer is a Muslim and disagrees with Bob’s dagga-smoking
habit. After a few incidents of poor performance by Bob, his employer demotes him.
Bob claims that it is not his performance, but rather his religion that persuaded his
employer to demote him. There is a bargaining council for the leather industry. (5)
10.4 Janet is employed by a travel agency. In terms of her contract of employment she is
entitled to a free air ticket to any overseas destination once a year. This year she
decides to visit the Bahamas in the Caribbean. When she starts planning her trip, her
manager informs her that she would not be entitled to her free ticket because at
times during the course of the year she did not perform up to the required standard.
Janet is so upset that she tells her manager that they are in dispute and that she
would take the matter further. There is no bargaining council. (5)
Question 11
Briefly explain whether the following constitute unfair labour practices:
11.1 Employer A dismisses employee B, a Rastafarian, because he does not agree with B’s
religion and does not like his habit of smoking dagga. (2)
11.2 Employer A does not give his employee B, a Rastafarian, a promotion because he
does not agree with B’s religion and does not like his habit of smoking dagga. (2)
11.3 After employee X is found guilty of gross insubordination at a disciplinary hearing,
he is demoted to a position one post level lower than the one he occupied before
the hearing. (2)
11.4 Employee C is transferred from the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Depart-
ment of Labour against his will. (2)
11.5 The owner of a coffee shop suspends all five of his employees without pay because
money disappeared from the till. He informs the employees that the purpose of the
suspension is to force the culprit to come forward and admit guilt. (2)
11.6 Employer H unilaterally amends the conditions of employment of employee K so
that K must now work longer hours. (2)
11.7 Employee T deserts his duties. Because the employer now does not have a sufficient
number of employees to finish a job for a client, the client cancels the order. The
employer holds T liable for the loss. (2)
11.8 Employee R resigns after working a notice month. When he leaves his employer, the
latter refuses to pay him for his annual leave credits. (2)
11.9 In terms of the sick leave policy of Company W employees are entitled to 36 days
sick leave in a three-year cycle. If they have exhausted their normal sick leave and
require more leave, they can apply for additional sick leave on full pay. The policy
Unfair labour practices 375
states that the employer may grant additional sick leave if it is satisfied that the em-
ployee is still ill. Employee X has exhausted his normal sick leave, applies for addi-
tional sick leave and is not granted any more leave. (2)
11.10 During a retrenchment exercise the employer and the union agree that, when jobs
become available in the company again, the employer will re-employ the retrenched
employees. Four months after some 40 employees were retrenched the company
starts employing people again, but does not consider the retrenched employees for
employment. The retrenched employees insist that they be re-employed. (2)
11.11 Employee J works for the Department of Agriculture. He tells his attorney in confi-
dence of the corrupt and other criminal practices in the Department. His supervisor
finds out that J was responsible for the leak and transfers him to another depart-
ment. (2)
Question 12
Harry, a member of the SA Police Service, was notified by letter that he had been perma-
nently transferred to a new position. Harry was convinced that his transfer amounted to a
demotion because, although he remained on level 13 and his salary and benefits were not
changed, his status was diminished in that in his previous position he reported to the Area
Commissioner, but in his new position he was expected to report to a person below the
Area Commissioner. Does Harry’s transfer constitute a demotion? (5)
Hint: See SA Police Service v Salukazana & Others (2010) 31 ILJ 2465 (LC).
Question 13
Peter was acting Human Resources Manager at the National Ports Authority and aspired to
be appointed as the Human Resources Director. The Chief Financial Officer, a good friend
of Peter’s, assured him that the interview process was a mere formality and that he would be
promoted to Human Resources Director. In terms of applicable legislation and company
policy only the Managing Director has the authority to appoint and dismiss employees.
Peter was not popular among the staff and when they got wind of his possible promotion
they decided to air all their grievances against him. They submitted, through their union, a
memorandum and demanded his dismissal. When nothing came of the memorandum the
employees embarked on strike action and vowed that their strike would continue until
Peter was dismissed. In an attempt to calm emotions Peter was placed on suspension with
full pay and benefits and senior management undertook to investigate all the complaints
against him. In the meantime the recruitment process for the position of Human Resources
Director continued, candidates were shortlisted and interviewed and Ms X was appointed.
Peter was not even shortlisted or interviewed for the position. He referred a dispute to the
CCMA, claiming that his employer had committed an unfair labour practice by unfairly
suspending him and by failing to promote him to the position of Human Resources Direc-
tor when he had a legitimate expectation of promotion. His expectation, according to him,
was based on the promises made by the CFO.
13.1 Consider Peter’s claim of a legitimate expectation and decide whether he has any
prospect of succeeding with his claim. (10)
13.2 Did the employer commit an unfair labour practice by suspending Peter? Ex-
plain. (10)
Hint: See Ramoroka v Robben Island Museum (2012) 33 ILJ 500 (CCMA).
Question 14
Dr Joe, a medical practitioner for 22 years employed by both the Department of Correc-
tional Services and the Department of Health (DOH), provided medical care to prisoners
at Pollsmoor Prison. He had on numerous occasions submitted complaints to officials of
both departments about the significant problems with the standard of health care at the
prison. Out of desperation he eventually submitted a report to the Inspecting Judge of
376 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Prisons and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Correctional Services. After an investi-
gation both the judge and the committee compiled reports highly critical of health care at
the prison. Dr Joe was charged by the Department of Health for reporting the matter
without first approaching departmental officials and summoned to a disciplinary hearing.
He launched an urgent application in the Labour Court to have the disciplinary proceed-
ings interdicted and referred a dispute to the bargaining council for conciliation. A settle-
ment was reached and the charges were withdrawn. When Dr Joe attempted to return to
work, he was informed that his services were no longer required at Pollsmoor and he was
deployed to a community health centre.
Could Dr Joe’s removal from Pollsmoor be considered an occupational detriment? If it
can be, describe the dispute resolution path that he needs to follow to have his dispute
resolved and include in your answer the relief that could possibly be ordered should he
succeed with his claim. (20)
Hint: See Theron v Minister of Correctional Services & Another (2008) 29 ILJ 1275 (LC).
Question 15
The employees of Suzie’s Clothing Company went on strike. The company applied the “no
work, no pay” rule during the strike. The company’s interpretation of “no pay” was that no
form of remuneration or benefit would be given or accrue to the employees for the dura-
tion of the strike. Consequently, the striking employees lost not only their wages, but also
the employer’s contributions towards their medical and pension funds, their housing allow-
ances and other benefits for the period they were on strike – in effect, they were subjected
to a “no work, no pay, no benefits” policy. Decide whether the company has committed an
unfair labour practice. (10)
Hint: See SAMWU v City of Cape Town & Others (2010) 31 ILJ 724 (LC).
18
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
18.1 Introduction
The nature of the employment relationship is such that disputes between an employer and
employee (or trade union) occur frequently. It is, therefore, important to have procedures
in place through which disputes can be channelled as and when they arise. The statutory
conciliation procedures of the 1956 Act were ineffective in that they were lengthy and com-
plex, with the result that the merits of a dispute were often lost in procedural technicalities.
The absence of procedures for the independent and effective mediation of disputes was
often the reason for resolvable disputes culminating in industrial action.
The 1995 Act provides a fundamentally new statutory dispute resolution system. It estab-
lishes the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) for the concili-
ation and arbitration of certain disputes, allows bargaining and statutory councils to resolve
disputes that arise within their jurisdiction and also recognises and actively promotes
private dispute resolution procedures negotiated between the parties. In principle, the Act
provides that all disputes must be referred for conciliation and, if conciliation fails, that
certain disputes be arbitrated, whilst others must be adjudicated by the Labour Court.
The Labour Relations Amendment Act of 2002 introduced two new dispute resolution
processes: the con-arb, which is a fusion of the conciliation and arbitration processes, and
the pre-dismissal arbitration, which takes the place of a disciplinary hearing. The “pre-
dismissal arbitration” of the 2002 Amendment Act was renamed an “inquiry by an arbitra-
tor” in the amendments of 2014, but the process is essentially the same.
377
378 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
No resolution No resolution
Conciliation Conciliation
Dispute
* Some disputes must be referred to the CCMA for conciliation and arbitration even though a
council is in existence, such as disputes over organisational rights, workplace forums, ministerial
determinations, demarcation of sectors and areas, etc. See par 18.4.1 below.
The resolution of disputes takes place in accordance with the two-step procedure intro-
duced by the Act:
Step 1: All disputes must be conciliated.
Step 2: If conciliation fails the dispute must be referred to arbitration by the CCMA or a
council or to adjudication by the Labour Court (in the case of a dispute of right),
or industrial action may be taken (in the case of a dispute of interest).
Conciliation is a mediation process where a neutral third party acts as a facilitator and
assists the parties to settle their dispute. If the dispute is resolved, the parties sign a settle-
ment agreement, meaning that the dispute is out of the way. An outcome certificate is
issued to prove that conciliation was conducted and that the dispute has been settled.
Where conciliation fails and the dispute remains unresolved the outcome certificate (or
certificate of non-resolution) will indicate that the dispute has not been settled and, de-
pending on the nature of the dispute, any party to the dispute may refer it to arbitration or
to the Labour Court.
Arbitration is in fact an adjudication process undertaken by the CCMA or an accredited
council or private agency and resolves the dispute by way of the arbitrator making a final
decision or judgment, called the arbitration award. There is no right of appeal against an
arbitration award (save in the context of closed shop or agency shop agreements and in
discrimination disputes arbitrated by the CCMA under the EEA). Arbitrations conducted by
the CCMA or councils are subject to the provisions of the LRA only and the Arbitration Act
of 1965 does not apply, whereas the latter Act applies to private arbitrations.
Dispute resolution 379
• dismissals in terms of section 186(1)(b) – that is, when the employee alleges a reasonable
expectation of the renewal of a fixed-term contract or permanent employment, but the
employer did not renew the contract, renewed it on less favourable terms or did not ap-
point the employee permanently;
• dismissal of a probationary employee (con-arb is required);
• unfair labour practices (but excluding unfair labour practices concerning occupational
detriments in terms of the Protected Disclosures Act). An unfair labour practice in the
context of probation is subject to con-arb;
• disputes over the interpretation or application of the council’s constitution or its collect-
ive agreements;
• dismissal for operational requirements can be arbitrated by a council if only one em-
ployee was retrenched or where an employer employed fewer than ten employees and
the retrenched employee or employees elect arbitration rather than adjudication by the
Labour Court;
• disputes about the interpretation or application of sections 198A, 198B and 198C of the
1
LRA.
In some instances a council has jurisdiction to conciliate a dispute but, should conciliation
fail, the dispute must be referred to the Labour Court for adjudication; it cannot be arbi-
trated. The most common examples of such disputes include disputes over dismissal for
operational requirements (save where only one employee is dismissed or where an employ-
er employs fewer than ten employees), automatically unfair dismissals, dismissals because of
an unprotected strike and an alleged infringement of freedom of association.
________________________
1 S 198A regulates employment by a TES (labour broker), s 198B regulates fixed-term contracts and
s 198C part-time employment. Disputes concerning the application/interpretation of ss 198A – 198C are
referred to a council or the CCMA in terms of the new s 198D.
Dispute resolution 381
An accredited council or private agency may apply to the governing body of the CCMA
for a subsidy to perform those functions for which it is accredited and for the training of
persons to perform those functions.
An accredited council or agency or any person engaged in the performance of its func-
tions is not liable for any loss suffered by any person as a result of any act performed or
omitted in good faith in the course of exercising these functions. A council or agency or
persons employed by them may not disclose information acquired on a confidential basis to
any person or in any court, except where compelled to do so by an order or court.
________________________
2 S 198A regulates employment by a TES (labour broker), s 198B regulates fixed-term contracts and
s 198C part-time employment. Disputes about the interpretation/application of ss 198A – 198C are re-
ferred to a council or the CCMA in terms of the new s 198D.
382 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
• disputes about the exercising of organisational rights. If a trade union has notified an
employer that it seeks to exercise one or more of the organisational rights contained in
Part A of Chapter III of the Act and a collective agreement in this regard cannot be con-
cluded, the dispute must be referred to the CCMA for conciliation and, if necessary, ar-
bitration;
• disputes about the application or interpretation of Part A of Chapter III, which contains
the provisions relating to organisational rights, may not be dealt with by a council or pri-
vate agency, but must be referred to the CCMA for conciliation and arbitration;
• disputes about the interpretation or application of a collective agreement where the
agreement does not provide for a dispute resolution procedure, where the procedure
contained in the agreement is inoperative or where the dispute procedure in the agree-
ment is frustrated by any party to the agreement (s 24(2));
• disputes about the application or interpretation of agency shop or closed shop agree-
ments;
• disputes about the failure or refusal to admit a registered trade union with a significant
interest in the workplace as a party to a closed shop agreement. If conciliation fails, the
matter must be referred to the Labour Court;
• disputes about the interpretation or application of a ministerial determination in terms
of section 44;
• disputes about the interpretation or application of collective agreements of a council
whose registration has been cancelled (s 61(8));
• disputes about the demarcation of sectors and areas of councils (s 62);
• disputes about the interpretation or application of Parts C to F of Chapter III of the Act.
Part C deals with bargaining councils, Part D with bargaining councils in the public ser-
vice, Part E with statutory councils and Part F with general provisions concerning coun-
cils. The disputes referred to here include disputes concerning the constitution of a
bargaining council; powers and functions of bargaining and statutory councils; registra-
tion of bargaining and statutory councils; binding nature and/or extension of collective
agreements concluded in bargaining councils; appointment and powers of designated
agents of councils; amalgamation of bargaining councils; change in status of statutory
councils and accreditation of a council. Any of these disputes not resolved through con-
ciliation must be referred to the Labour Court for adjudication;
3
• disputes about picket during strikes and lock-outs (s 69(8)). Should conciliation fail, the
matter must be referred to the Labour Court;
• disputes about proposals which are the subject of joint decision-making at a workplace
forum in terms of section 86. Only an employer may refer such a dispute;
• disputes about the disclosure of information to workplace forums;
• disputes about the interpretation or application of Chapter V of the Act, which deals
with workplace forums; and
• disputes where some but not all parties to the dispute fall within the registered scope of a
council or fall within the registered scope of two or more councils (s 147(4)).
If a dispute has been referred to the CCMA and thereafter it transpires that the dispute
should in fact have been referred elsewhere, the CCMA may refer it to the appropriate
forum or person (agency) or may conduct the arbitration itself, in which case a fee may be
charged. This provision applies where the dispute should have been referred to an accred-
ited council or private agency and to instances where a collective agreement or private
arbitration agreement provides for a dispute resolution procedure by a forum or person
________________________
other than the CCMA (s 147). If an employee who earns less than the BCEA threshold is
involved in private dispute resolution procedures (in terms of a private agreement) and the
agreement requires the employee to pay part of the private dispute resolution costs, the
CCMA must undertake the conciliation and/or arbitration. Similarly, the CCMA must
undertake the dispute resolution process if the person or body appointed to resolve the
dispute is not independent of the employer.
4 In terms of s 198D a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of ss 198A–C can be referred
to the CCMA (or a council) for conciliation and arbitration.
384 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Court held that rule 13 is ultra vires as the LRA, particularly in section 135, does not allow
for the dismissal of a matter at conciliation. The effect of this judgment is that should an
applicant fail to attend the conciliation proceedings a certificate of non-resolution must be
issued; the matter cannot be dismissed.
Outcome certificate: At the conclusion of the conciliation hearing the commissioner must
issue an outcome certificate (LRA Form 7.12), indicating whether the dispute has been
resolved. If, for whatever reason, conciliation has not been conducted and the 30-day or
extended conciliation period has expired, an outcome certificate will be issued even
though conciliation has in fact not taken place. A copy of the certificate must be served on
each party or his representative and the original is filed with the CCMA. An outcome
certificate which indicates that the dispute remains unresolved is generally known as a
certificate of non-resolution and entitles any party to the dispute to proceed to arbitration
or adjudication.
Settlement agreement: If the conciliation process is successful and the dispute is resolved, the
parties must sign a settlement agreement which finally disposes of the dispute. Such a settle-
ment agreement may be made an order of the Labour Court (s 158(1)(c)) or an arbitra-
tion award (s 142A). In the latter instance the CCMA may, by agreement between the
parties or on application, make a settlement agreement an arbitration award. In this con-
text a settlement agreement means a written agreement in settlement of a dispute that a
party has the right to refer to arbitration or to the Labour Court, excluding disputes that a
party is entitled to refer to arbitration in terms of section 74(4) (essential services) and
section 75(7) (maintenance services). The disputes excluded here are disputes of mutual
interest.
the dispute is entitled to give evidence, call witnesses, cross-examine the witnesses of the
other party and address concluding arguments to the commissioner. If the parties agree,
the arbitration may be suspended and the matter will again be conciliated in an attempt to
settle the dispute.
Representation: In terms of CCMA rule 25(1)(b) a party may be represented by a legal
practitioner or by a member, office-bearer or official of that party’s registered trade union
or employers’ organisation, or by a director or employee if the party is a juristic person.
Note that legal representation is not automatically allowed in misconduct and incapacity
dismissal disputes and a party will have to apply for legal representation (in terms of CCMA
rule 25(1)(c)). The commissioner must consider the complexity of the dispute and the
questions of law raised by it, public interest and the comparative ability of the opposing
parties or their representatives to deal with the arbitration in deciding whether or not to
allow legal representation.
The constitutionality of the limit on automatic legal representation in the case of mis-
conduct and incapacity dismissals was challenged in the courts on more than one occasion.
In Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Mudau & Others [2003] 10 BLLR
1034 (LC) the Labour Court held that the exclusion of legal representation in misconduct
and incapacity dismissal arbitrations was not unconstitutional and that legal representation
was at the discretion of the commissioner. In The Law Society of the Northern Provinces v
Minister of Labour & Others (NGHC 61197/11, 11 October 2012) the North Gauteng High
Court held the opposite view and declared the limit on legal representation unconstitu-
tional and invalid. The Court suspended its judgment for three years to afford the CCMA
an opportunity to change rule 25. The CCMA took this decision on appeal and the Su-
preme Court of Appeal, in CCMA & Others v Law Society of the Northern Provinces (Incorporated
as the Law Society of Transvaal) [2013] 11 BLLR 1057 (SCA), ruled that CCMA rule 25 was
not unconstitutional.
Absence: If the applicant fails to appear in person or to be represented at the arbitration
proceedings the commissioner can dismiss the matter. If the respondent fails to appear or
to be represented, the matter may continue in its absence or may be postponed (CCMA
rule 30).
Essential services: A dispute of mutual interest in an essential service must be arbitrated and
the award issued within 30 days of the date of the certificate of non-resolution (s 139).
Consent to arbitration: In a case that is supposed to be adjudicated by the Labour Court the
parties may agree in writing to have it arbitrated by the CCMA. Such an agreement may be
terminated only with the written consent of all the parties. Any party to the agreement may
apply to the Labour Court to have the agreement varied or set aside, which the Court may
do on good cause. If a party commences proceedings in the Labour Court after the parties
have agreed to arbitration, any party to the proceedings may request the Court to stay the
proceedings and refer the dispute to arbitration or, with the consent of the parties, the
Court may continue with the proceedings, now sitting as an arbitrator and enjoying the
powers of an arbitrator (s 141).
conduct during the arbitration proceedings. Section 138(10) was amended in 2002 so that
a costs order is made in accordance with the requirements of law and fairness. The
amendments, however, made the implementation of the amended section 138(10) subject
to the CCMA’s issuing rules on costs. As the CCMA has not yet issued such rules the basis
for awarding costs remains frivolity or vexatiousness.
An arbitration award is final and binding and may be enforced as if it were an order of
the Labour Court in respect of which a writ has been issued, unless it is an advisory arbitra-
tion award (s 143(1)).
An arbitration award may be enforced in terms of section 143(1) only if it has been certi-
fied by the CCMA.
An arbitration award can order a party to pay a sum of money (e.g. compensation) or to
perform a specific act (e.g. reinstate an employee). Compliance with a certified award that
orders the performance of an act may be enforced by way of contempt proceedings in the
Labour Court (s 143(4)).
If an award orders a party to pay a sum of money, the amount ordered earns interest
from the date of the award at the same rate as that prescribed in terms of section 2 of the
Prescribed Rates of Interest Act of 1975, unless the award provides otherwise (s 143(2)). An
arbitration award in terms of which a party is required to pay an amount of money must be
treated for the purpose of enforcing or executing that award as if it were an order of the
Magistrate’s Court.
In terms of section 144 an arbitration award (or ruling) may be varied or rescinded. The
commissioner who issued an award (or another commissioner appointed for this purpose) may
of his own accord or on application by any affected party vary or rescind an award (or ruling).
The grounds for rescission or variation are only the following: the award (or ruling) was errone-
ously sought or made in the absence of a party; the award (or ruling) contains an ambiguity or
obvious error or omission; the award (or ruling) was granted as a result of a mistake common to
the parties to the proceedings; the award (or ruling) was made in the absence of a party, on good
cause shown. In the latter instance the party who seeks a rescission of the award will have to
establish good and acceptable reasons why he was not present at the arbitration proceedings and
will further have to show that he has reasonable prospects of success in the event that he is
afforded an opportunity to present his case.
There is no right of appeal against an arbitration award, but an award can be reviewed in
terms of section 145. The grounds for review are (a) misconduct by the commissioner in
relation to his duties as arbitrator; (b) a gross irregularity committed by the commissioner
during the proceedings; (c) the commissioner exceeding his powers; and (d) an improper-
ly obtained award. Any party to the dispute may apply to the Labour Court for a review of
the award and an order setting aside the award. The application must be filed with the
Labour Court (in accordance with Labour Court rule 7A) within six weeks from the date
on which the award was served on the parties or, if corruption is alleged, within six weeks
from the date on which the corruption was discovered. If the Court sets the award aside, it
may determine the dispute in any appropriate manner or refer the matter back to the
CCMA for fresh arbitration.
The 2014 amendments add new subsections (5) to (10) to section 145. In terms of the
new provisions an applicant in a review application must apply for a date for the application
to be heard within six months of the filing of the application. Judgment in a review applica-
tion must be handed down as soon as is reasonably possible. The institution of review
proceedings does not suspend the operation of an arbitration award, unless the applicant
furnishes security to the satisfaction of the Labour Court, which must be an amount equal
to the amount of compensation that was ordered or, if reinstatement or re-employment was
ordered, an amount equal to 24 months’ remuneration. A review application interrupts the
running of prescription (in terms of the Prescription Act of 1969). The new provisions
apply to review applications after the commencement of the 2014 amendments (i.e. after 1
January 2015).
Dispute resolution 387
This process takes the place of a disciplinary hearing in instances where an employer
alleges misconduct or incapacity on the part of an employee. The rationale behind
this process is to circumvent the prolonged “normal” procedures of internal disciplinary
and appeal hearings and thereafter conciliation and arbitration by having one hearing. A
final outcome is therefore obtained much sooner than going through all of the normal
processes.
The process is for all intents and purposes an arbitration process. Before the 2014
amendments section 188A indeed referred to “arbitration”. Because of the renaming of the
process section 188A now refers to an “enquiry” but, read in context, the process is in fact
an arbitration.
The essential components of an inquiry by an arbitrator in terms of section 188A are as
follows:
• the allegations against the employee must concern misconduct or incapacity;
• the employee must consent to the process after having been advised of the allegations;
• the employer initiates the process (after having obtained the employee’s consent) by
filing the prescribed form and paying the prescribed fee;
• the arbitrator conducts an enquiry in a fashion that a normal arbitration would be
conducted;
• the decision or ruling of the arbitrator has the same status as an arbitration award.
An employee may consent to an inquiry by an arbitrator by signing the prescribed form or
an employee who earns more than the BCEA threshold may consent thereto in his contract
of employment. It is possible that parties consent to the process in a collective agreement. If
such an agreement exists and if the employee in question is subject to that agreement, it is
not necessary to seek the employee’s consent.
When the employee’s consent has been obtained the employer must file LRA Form 7.19
with the CCMA (or the appropriate form in a bargaining council) and pay the prescribed
fee (in the CCMA the fee currently is R5 131 per day). The consent of the employee must
accompany the form. It is accordingly necessary that the employee’s signature indicating
consent appears on the form or that the contract of employment or the collective agree-
ment is attached to the form.
Upon receipt of the prescribed form and payment the CCMA (or council) must appoint
an arbitrator to conduct the inquiry. The provisions applicable to arbitrations (excluding
the provisions relating to representation) and the arbitration award discussed above apply
equally to the inquiry by an arbitrator. The decision of the arbitrator has the status of an
arbitration award and sections 143 to 146, relating to the effect of an award, rescissions,
variations and reviews apply.
Representation is regulated by section 188A(5) and not by CCMA or council rules. Dur-
ing the inquiry the parties may be represented by an office-bearer or official of the party’s
registered trade union or employers’ organisation or the employer may be represented by
an employee or a director. By agreement the parties may be represented by legal practi-
tioners. If agreement to legal representation cannot be obtained any party may apply for
legal representation and the arbitrator will have to rule on the application (having regard
to the issues in CCMA rule 25).
A council may appoint an arbitrator to conduct an inquiry in terms of section 188A only
if it has been accredited by the CCMA to conduct arbitrations.
If an employee in good faith alleges that an inquiry contravenes the provisions of the
Protected Disclosures Act the employee or employer may require that an inquiry be con-
ducted in terms of section 188A into allegations by the employer into the conduct or
capacity of the employee. The holding of an inquiry in terms of section 188A and the
suspension of an employee on full pay pending the outcome of the inquiry do not consti-
tute an occupational detriment as contemplated in the Protected Disclosures Act.
Dispute resolution 389
continued
390 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
continued
Dispute resolution 393
continued
394 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
continued
396 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
continued
Dispute resolution 397
Questions
Question 1
Describe the nature of the following dispute resolution processes:
1.1 conciliation; (5)
1.2 arbitration; (5)
1.3 con-arb; (2)
1.4 inquiry by an arbitrator in terms of section 188A of the LRA; and (10)
1.5 adjudication by the Labour Court. (5)
Question 2
Considering each of the following set of circumstances, briefly explain whether a council
has jurisdiction to resolve a dispute:
2.1 the parties to the dispute are all parties to the council; (2)
2.2 one of the parties to the dispute is not a party to the council, but falls within the regis-
tered scope of the council; and (3)
2.3 one of the parties to the dispute falls outside the registered scope of the council. (3)
Question 3
List the disputes in which the CCMA has exclusive jurisdiction. (15)
Question 4
Describe the procedure a CCMA commissioner has to follow when arbitrating a dispute.(10)
Question 5
Explain, with reference to CCMA rule 25, whether the parties to a dispute about the fair-
ness of a dismissal for misconduct or incapacity are entitled to legal representation. (15)
Question 6
Explain whether an unresolved dispute (after conciliation) can be arbitrated by the CCMA
in an instance where the Act requires adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court. (5)
398 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Question 7
A dispute is referred to the CCMA. Explain how the dispute will be dealt with in each of the
following circumstances:
7.1 the dispute is about the interpretation or application of a collective agreement; (3)
7.2 the parties to the dispute are parties to a council; (3)
7.3 the parties to the dispute fall within the registered scope of the council, but one or
more are not parties to the council; (3)
7.4 the dispute should have been resolved by private dispute resolution in terms of an
agreement between the parties; and (3)
7.5 the dispute should have been referred to an accredited agency in terms of a collective
agreement. (3)
Question 8
A misconduct dismissal dispute exists between employer A and employee B.
8.1 Complete the prescribed referral form for conciliation. (20)
8.2 Is there any time limit in which the dispute must be referred to conciliation? (2)
8.3 Assume that the matter remains unresolved after conciliation. The employee wishes
to refer his dispute to arbitration. What is the time limit in which he has to lodge his
referral with the CCMA? (2)
8.4 Complete the referral form for arbitration. (20)
8.5 Is the employee entitled to legal representation in this arbitration? Explain. (5)
8.6 Discuss the nature and effect of the arbitration award issued by the commissioner.(10)
8.7 Assume that the commissioner found in favour of the applicant and determined that
the dismissal was unfair. Discuss the relief that the applicant may be entitled to. (10)
Question 9
Identify the type of dispute in the following scenarios and then explain the dispute reso-
lution procedure for each dispute. Include in your answer any timeframes that may be
applicable:
9.1 The Leather Goods Company employs 100 employees. Of these employees 47 join
the Leather and Textile Workers Union (LTWU). The union then requests man-
agement to deduct union subscription fees from the wages of its members, but man-
agement refuses. The company is a member of the Leather and Hide Employers’
Organisation. Both the employers’ organisation and LTWU are parties to the Leath-
er Bargaining Council. (6)
9.2 The Leather Goods Company employs 100 employees. Forty of these employees join
the Leather and Textile Workers Union (LTWU). The union then requests man-
agement to negotiate a recognition agreement and an increase in wages, but man-
agement refuses. The company is a member of the Leather and Hide Employers’
organisation. Both the employers’ organisation and LTWU are parties to the Leather
Bargaining Council. (6)
9.3 The Leather Goods Company employs ten employees. Three of these employees join
the Leather and Textile Workers Union (LTWU). The company does not want any
union involvement. When the manager overhears a heated argument among some of
the employees, the three workers who have joined the union are dismissed on the
grounds of misconduct. In actual fact, management does not know who have been
involved in the argument. The Leather Bargaining Council has jurisdiction in this
sector. (6)
Dispute resolution 399
9.4 The Leather Goods Company is experiencing financial difficulties and, as a result, 20
employees (all of whom belong to LTWU) have to be retrenched. While manage-
ment and the union are consulting on different aspects regarding the retrenchment,
the union requests access to all the financial statements of the company in order to
determine whether the financial situation is such that it justifies retrenchments.
Management refuses to give any financial information to LTWU. Both the company
and LTWU are parties to the bargaining council. (6)
9.5 The Leather Goods Company, employing 210 employees, is experiencing financial
difficulties and, as a result, 20 employees (all of whom belong to LTWU) have to be
retrenched. Management can prove that the retrenchments are justified, but fails to
follow the procedure prescribed by the LRA when retrenching the employees. Both
the company and LTWU are parties to the bargaining council. (6)
9.6 The parties to the Leather Bargaining Council have concluded a collective agree-
ment to regulate conditions of employment in the industry. Unfortunately, when the
agreement was negotiated, the parties had neglected to incorporate a dispute resolu-
tion procedure in their agreement. Both LTWU and the Leather Goods Company
are subject to the provisions of this agreement. A dispute arises between LTWU and
the company because they cannot agree on how the provisions relating to sick leave
should be interpreted. (6)
9.7 B is employed at Guestro Wheels. He applies for a supervisory post because it would
mean a promotion for him. A colleague with lesser qualifications and experience is
appointed as supervisor. B wishes to challenges his non-promotion. The MEIBC
(Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council) has jurisdiction in the sector
and area where Guestro Wheels operates its business. (7)
9.8 ABC Union and XYZ Company deadlock during negotiations for wage increases. The
union decides to take strike action and, while it is following the prescribed proce-
dures for a protected strike, management approaches the employees directly and of-
fer a bonus to those employees who would not participate in the strike. The union is
understandably upset and claims that management is undermining the union. There
is no bargaining council in the sector and area where the company is conducting its
business (6)
9.9 Vuyo is employed by the Department of Agriculture. The post of Head of Depart-
ment is advertised internally. Vuyo applies for the position, which will mean a promo-
tion for him. He has been acting in the position for the past six months, he has been
with the Department for four years and he has the qualifications required for the
post. After the interviews an external candidate is appointed to the post. Vuyo de-
clares a dispute because he believes he deserves the promotion. (7)
9.10 Two policemen are dismissed after they assaulted a prisoner. They believe their dis-
missals are unfair because SAPS as their employer did not follow the prescribed pro-
cedure before dismissing them. (7)
9.11 The PSA is the majority trade union in the Department of Home Affairs. During
wage negotiations the PSA seeks disclosure of the salaries of senior management. The
Department maintains that the information is confidential and refuses to disclose the
salaries. The PSA insists that it is entitled to the information. (6)
9.12 An educator (teacher) at a public school is dismissed for molesting two of the learn-
ers. He believes his dismissal is unfair. (7)
9.13 All the trade unions involved in the public sector and the State as employer conclud-
ed a collective agreement in the PSCBC to regulate leave across all departments in
the public service. When a police officer applies for special sick leave, as provided for
in the collective agreement, SAPS refuses to grant him such leave. He approaches his
union, SAPU, who advises him that SAPS has either interpreted or applied the col-
lective agreement incorrectly because, in terms of the agreement, he is entitled to
leave. (6)
400 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
9.14 The majority of the employees at Super-Save Supermarket are confronted with new
employment contracts in terms of which their conditions of employment will change.
They are required inter alia to work longer hours at no additional pay. They refuse
to accept the amended employment conditions with the result that the supermarket
implements the new conditions without their agreement. There is no bargaining
council. (5)
9.15 Employee X is on a six-month probationary period with ABC Bank. During his fourth
month of employment the bank dismisses him because his performance does not
meet the required standards. There is no bargaining council. (7)
Dispute resolution 401
Appendix 1 *
Ð
PROVINCIAL OFFICES OF
THE CCMA
________________________
* It is expected that, because of the 2014 amendments, some forms will change. The amended forms (if
any) were not yet available at the time of going to print.
402 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
CCMA KWAZULU-NATAL
CCMA WESTERN CAPE
DURBAN
CCMA House
Embassy Building, 6th & 7th Floors
78 Darling Street
199 Smith Street
Cape Town
Durban
8001
4001
Private Bag X9167
Private Bag X54363
Cape Town
Durban
8000
4000
Tel: (021) 469-0111
Tel: (031) 362-2300
Fax: (021) 465-7193/97/87/ 462
Fax: (031) 368-7387/7407
5006
E-mail: kzn@ccma.org.za
E-mail: ctn@ccma.org.za
PIETERMARITZBURG
Gallwey House, 3rd Floor
Gallwey Lane
Pietermaritzburg
3201
P O Box 72
Pietermaritzburg
3200
Tel: (033) 345-9249/71
Fax: (033) 345-9790
E-mail: kzn@ccma.org.za
RICHARDS BAY
Promenade Building, Suite 15, 1st
Floor
Cnr. Tassel Berry & Lira Link Streets
Richards Bay
3901
Private Bag X1026
Richards Bay Visit the CCMA website at:
3900 http://www.ccma.org.za
Tel: (035) 789-0357/1415
Fax: (035) 789-7148
E-mail: kzn@ccma.org.za . . . please turn over Î
Dispute resolution 403
continued
Dispute resolution 405
Signed: .......................................................................................
(Employee party referring the dispute)
continued
Dispute resolution 407
3. REASON OF DISMISSAL
Why were you dismissed?..........................................................
Tick the correct box ; Misconduct Incapacity
Operational Requirements Unknown
(Retrenchment)
Constructive
Other (please describe).........................................................
4. WAS THE DISMISSAL RELATED TO
PROBATION .................................................... YES NO
5. FAIRNESS/UNFAIRNESS OF DISMISSAL
(a) Procedural Issues
Was the dismissal procedurally unfair?..... YES NO
If necessary write the details If yes, why?
on a separate page and attach
to this form. ............................................................................................
............................................................................................
............................................................................................
(b) Substantive Issues
Was the reason for the dismissal unfair? .. YES NO
If yes, why?
............................................................................................
............................................................................................
............................................................................................
Dispute resolution 409
Appendix 2
CERTIFICATE
OF OUTCOME OF DISPUTE
REFERRED TO CONCILIATION
and
........................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................
(other party/parties)
Concerning
........................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................
• was resolved on the ..............................................................or
(give date)
• remains unresolved as at ........................................................
(give date)
..........................................................................
Name of Commissioner
..........................................................................
Signature of Commissioner
Official stamp of the CCMA
(or Bargaining Council or Accredited ..........................................................................
Agency) Place
..........................................................................
Date
Dispute resolution 411
Appendix 3
LRA Form 7.13
Section 136
Labour Relations Act, 1995
Ð
1. DETAILS OF PARTY REQUESTING ARBITRATION
Name: ......................................................................................
.................................................................................................
Postal Address: ........................................................................
.................................................................................................
WHAT IS THE .................................................................................................
PURPOSE
OF THIS FORM? Tel: ...................................... Fax: ............................................
If conciliation fails, a party may Cell: ..................................... E-mail: .......................................
request that the CCMA resolve
the dispute by arbitration.
2. DISPUTE DETAILS
Case Reference Number: .......................................................
WHO FILLS IN The case between....................................................................
THIS FORM? (party)
The party requesting the arbitra- and ............................................................................................
tion. (other party)
WHERE DOES THIS was referred for conciliation but remains unresolved.
FORM GO? The certificate confirming the failure of conciliation is
To the Registrar, at the Provincial attached.
Office of the CCMA. (Please refer
to the last page for details.) In terms of section ..................................................................
This should be the same office (see chart on page 3)
which conducted the conciliation.
I/we now request that the matter be resolved through
If an accredited council or agency
is to arbitrate the dispute, this
arbitration.
form must be sent to their office. The issues still in dispute are .................................................
If in doubt contact the CCMA for
help.
.................................................................................................
Referrals in terms of section 37 .................................................................................................
(2) of the UIF Act must be made .................................................................................................
in the province where the appeals
(Give a brief description. The commissioner may
committee made the decision re:
benefits.
require a more detailed statement of case later.)
CHECK!
Have you sent a copy of this
completed form to the other
party?
Have you included proof
(that you have sent a copy to
the other party) with this
form?
Have you attached the
certificate confirming that
the dispute was unresolved
through conciliation?
CCMA GAUTENG
JOHANNESBURG
Physical address: Johannesburg Regional Office
127 Fox Street
Johannesburg
2001
Postal address: Private Bag X96
Marshalltown
2107
Tel: (011) 220-5000
Fax: (011) 220-5101/02/03/04/05/0861 392 262
Dispute resolution 415
E-mail: johannesburg@ccma.org.za
TSHWANE (PRETORIA)
Physical address: Metro Park Building
351 Schoeman Street (Cnr Prinsloo)
Pretoria
0002
Postal address: Private Bag X176
Pretoria
0001
Tel: (012) 392-9700
Fax: (012) 392-9701/2
E-mail: pretoria@ccma.org.za
CCMA LIMPOPO
Physical address: CCMA House
104 Hans van Rensburg Street
Polokwane
0699
Postal address: Private Bag X9512
Polokwane
0700
Tel: (015) 297-5010
Fax: (015) 297-1649/7343
E-mail: ptb@ccma.org.za
CCMA MPUMALANGA
Physical address: CCMA House
Diedericks Street
Witbank
1035
Postal address: Private Bag X7290
Witbank
1035
Tel: (013) 656-2800
Fax: (013) 656-2885/6
E-mail: wtb@ccma.org.za
RUSTENBURG
Physical address: Shop SG7 11B
Rustenburg Sanlam Centre
43-45 Boom Street
Rustenburg
0299
Postal address: Private Bag X82104
Rustenburg
0300
Tel: To be confirmed
Fax: (014) 538 2167
E-mail: to be confirmed
19.1 Introduction
Apart from the Acts covered thus far in this book, which are of a general nature and appli-
cable to the majority of employers and employees, there are other, less well-known Acts that
also regulate the employment relationship or aspects thereof in specific sectors, such as the
Public Service Act of 1994 for the public service as a whole, the Employment of Educators
Act of 1998 applicable to educators (teachers) at public schools and the Local Government:
Municipal Systems Act of 2000 for municipal employees.
It is not only labour legislation that influences the employment relationship; other legis-
lation may have an impact on one or more aspects of the employment relationship and,
therefore, deserves the attention of any labour practitioner. For example, is an employer
permitted to intercept personal e-mails sent to its employee or search an employee’s office
and seize personal documents? Can an employee in the public sector rely on legislation
other than labour legislation to challenge the decisions taken by the State in the employ-
ment context? Is an employer entitled to evict an employee from accommodation provided
by the employer once the employee’s services have been terminated? These and many other
questions arise in the employment context and are not always specifically regulated by
labour legislation. An employer should, however, know how to handle these situations so as
to ensure fair and lawful treatment of its employees.
The purpose of this chapter is to make the reader aware of other relevant legislation that
has some bearing on employment. For this reason only a concise overview of the more im-
portant statutes is given. It is beyond the scope of this publication to provide detailed analyses.
419
420 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Relations Act (LRA) that are silent on these issues. In making an appointment, due regard
must be had to equality and the other democratic values and principles enshrined in the
Constitution. All persons who qualify for an appointment, transfer or promotion must be
considered and the evaluation of these persons must be based on training, skills, compe-
tence, knowledge and the need to redress the imbalances of the past so as to achieve a
public service broadly representative of the South African people, including representation
according to race, gender and disability (s 11).
Specific requirements are laid down for some appointments such as the appointment of
a person to a permanent post on the establishment. Such a person must, for example, be a
South African citizen, be of good character and be a fit and proper person (s 10). Some
appointments, such as those in Division A or B (s 13), must be made on probation. An em-
ployee may be transferred from his or her post to any other post in the same or any other
department, irrespective of whether the new post is in another division, of a lower or higher
grade or within or outside the Republic (ss 14 and 15).
Chapter V of the PSA provides for the termination of services. An employee may be dis-
charged on account of misconduct, incapacity, the redundancy of a post or a number of
other grounds (s 17). In most instances the normal retirement age is 65.
An interesting provision is found in section 17(3) of the PSA (previously section 17(5)).
An employee, other than a member of the services, an educator or a member of the Intelli-
gence Services, who absents himself from official duties without permission of his head of
department, office or institution for a period exceeding one calendar month shall be
deemed to have been dismissed on account of misconduct with effect from the date imme-
diately succeeding his last day of attendance at work. If the employee reports for duty at a
later stage, the relevant executive authority may, on good cause shown, approve his rein-
statement (in his former or any other post). The period of absence will in such a case be
deemed unpaid vacation leave.
The effect of section 17(3) is that the employee’s services are terminated by operation of
law. In MEC, Public Works, Northern Province v CCMA & Others [2003] 10 BLLR 1027 (LC) the
Court held that “if the deeming provision of the Act applies, there is no dismissal as con-
templated in section 186 of the LRA. The operation of the deeming provision is not de-
pendent on any prior decision by the employer; if its requirements are met, employment
terminates by operation of law”. A similar provision is found in the Employment of Educa-
tors Act. It is still open to the employee, however, to show that the requirements of the
deeming provision have not been met. See also Maidi v MEC for Department of Education
[2003] 8 BLLR 761 (LC); Lebese v SAPS [2003] 7 BALR 755 (SSSBC); Phenithi v Minister of
Education [2006] 9 BLLR 821 (SCA); Mahlangu v Minister of Sport and Recreation [2010] JOL
25011 (LC); PSA obo Van der Walt v Minister of Public Enterprise [2010] 1 BLLR 78 (LC).
In conclusion, the PSA deals with issues such as remuneration, work performed outside
the public service, unauthorised remuneration, grievances and political rights of employees.
19.2.2 Employment of Educators Act
The Employment of Educators Act 76 of 1998 (the “Educators Act”), as amended, provides
for the employment of educators by the State and for their conditions of employment,
discipline, retirement and discharge.
The Educators Act applies to the employment of educators at public schools, departmental
1
offices and adult basic education centres (ABET). The Act is one of only a few which
________________________
1 Educators (lecturers) at FET colleges were initially also included under the Employment of Educators
Act and were employees of the Department of Education (later known as the Department of Basic Educa-
tion), but with the enactment of the Further Education and Training Colleges Act the vast majority of
them were transferred to college employment, with the college being the employer. In terms of the FET
Colleges Act the colleges were the employers of both lecturing and support staff. Amendments to the
FET Colleges Act and the transfer of colleges to the Department of Higher Education resulted in a
transfer back of college employees to the public service, this time to the Department of Higher Educa-
tion. This process is underway.
Other relevant legislation 421
provides a description of who the employer is. The Director-General of the Department of
Basic Education (DoE) is the employer of educators in the service of the Department in
posts on the educator establishment of the DoE for all purposes of employment. The Head
of Department is the employer of educators in the service of a provincial department in
posts on the educator establishment of that department for all purposes of employment.
The Minister of Basic Education is the employer of all educators for the purposes of deter-
mining the salaries and other conditions of employment of educators. The Minister is the
employer for the purposes of creating posts on the educator establishment of the DoE and
the MEC is the employer for such purpose in a provincial department. A public school may
establish posts for educators and employ educators additional to the establishment, in
which case the public school is the employer of such an educator.
The Minister determines the salaries and other conditions of employment of educators,
subject to the provisions of the LRA and any collective agreement concluded in the Educa-
tion Labour Relations Council (ELRC) (s 4).
Chapter 3 of the Educators Act regulates appointments, promotions and transfers.
Appointments, promotions and transfers to posts at public schools can be made only after
the governing body of the school has made a recommendation to the Head of Department.
In considering applications for appointment, promotion or transfer, the governing body
must ensure that the principles of equity, redress, representivity and democratic values are
complied with. The governing body is further required to adhere to the requirements and
procedures for appointment, promotion and transfer in a collective agreement or deter-
mined by the Minister. After the applications have been considered, the governing body has
to submit to the Head of Department a list of the names of at least three recommended
candidates in order of preference. The Head of Department may accept or reject the rec-
ommendation. In the latter instance the Head may appoint any suitable candidate on a
temporary basis or re-advertise the post. If the recommendation is accepted, the Head may
appoint any suitable candidate on the recommended list regardless of that candidate’s
ranking in preference (ss 6–9). An educator may be appointed on probation. If necessary,
the probation period may be extended (ss 7 & 13).
An educator may be discharged on account of misconduct, incapacity or operational re-
quirements in accordance with the requirements of the LRA (s 11). The normal retirement
age is 65, but an educator has the right to retire at 55. An educator may resign by giving 90
days’ notice in writing. If the name of an educator is struck off the register of educators
kept by the South African Council for Educators, he will be deemed to have resigned (s 15).
The Educators Act contains in section 14 a provision similar to the one in section 17(3)
of the PSA in terms of which an educator’s services are terminated by operation of law. If an
educator is absent from work for more than 14 consecutive days without the permission of
the employer, he will be deemed to have been discharged for misconduct. An educator will
be deemed to have been similarly discharged if he assumes other employment while absent
from work without permission, while suspended from duty or while disciplinary steps are
being taken against him. See the discussion and case law in 18.2.1 above.
Chapter 5 of the Educators Act regulates incapacity and misconduct. A Code of Good
Practice, dealing with incapacity and poor work performance, is found in Schedule 1 to the
Act. Sections 17 and 18 of the Act provide an extended list of forms of misconduct. Miscon-
duct is dealt with in terms of the disciplinary code and procedures contained in Schedule 2.
In terms of section 17 an educator must be dismissed if he is found guilty of serious miscon-
duct, including theft, bribery, fraud or an act of corruption with regard to examinations or
promotional reports, sexual assault on a learner or other employee, having a sexual relation-
ship with a learner of the school where he is employed, serious assault on a learner, student
or other employee, or illegal possession of intoxicating, illegal or stupefying substances.
rise to the termination, the interests of the parties, including the comparative hardship to
the owner or person in charge, the occupier concerned and any other occupier if the right
of residence is or is not terminated, the existence of a reasonable expectation that an agree-
ment to reside will be renewed and the fairness of the procedure followed by the owner or
person in charge to terminate the right of residence.
If the right of residence arises solely from an employment contract, such as in the case of
many farm and mining workers, that right may be terminated when the occupier/farm
worker resigns or is dismissed in accordance with the provisions of the LRA. If a farm worker
is dismissed and he or she alleges an unfair dismissal, the dismissal dispute is conciliated by
the CCMA and arbitrated by the CCMA or adjudicated by the Labour Court (depending on
the reason for the dismissal). The right of residence of the employee may not be terminated
until such time as the dismissal dispute has been determined by the CCMA or the Labour
Court (s 8(3)).
The right of residence of an occupier who has resided on the land for 10 years and who
has reached the age of 60 years may not be terminated, unless that occupier intentionally
and unlawfully harmed other occupiers, damaged the property or allowed unauthorised
persons to erect a dwelling on the land, committed a material breach of contract or a
material breach of the relationship between himself and the owner or the person in charge.
The same provisions apply to an occupier who is an employee or former employee of the
owner or person in charge and who, as a result of ill health, injury or disability, is unable to
supply labour to the owner or person in charge (s 8(4)).
The spouse or dependant of an occupier who is 60 and older and has lived on the land
for more than 10 years or of an employee who cannot provide labour because of ill health is
allowed to remain on the land and that right can only be terminated on 12 calendar
months’ written notice, unless the spouse or dependant has committed a material breach
(s 8(5)).
An occupier may be evicted only by way of a court order. An eviction order will be granted
only if the right of residence was terminated in compliance with section 8 and the occupier,
after due notice, has not vacated the land. The owner must give an occupier at least two
months’ notice of his intention to apply for eviction. Section 10 deals with the eviction of a
person who was an occupier on 4 February 1997 and section 11 with the eviction of a per-
son who became an occupier after said date. If the court orders eviction, it will further
order the owner or person in charge to pay just and equitable compensation in respect of
structures erected and improvements made by the occupier and any standing crops planted
by him. The court will also order the payment of any outstanding wages and other payments
due to the employee in terms of the BCEA. The court may order the owner or person in
charge to grant the occupier a fair opportunity to demolish and remove any structures and
improvements erected by him and his predecessors and to tend standing crops to which he
is entitled (s 13).
ESTA provides for the mediation and arbitration of any dispute arising from and out of
the Act (ss 21 and 22). Conceivably an occupier who is an employee can have an unfair
labour practice dispute over benefits conciliated and arbitrated by the CCMA or a bargain-
ing council if, for example, he is denied access to water or deprived from health services. It
remains to be seen whether the courts will consider these rights of an occupier as “benefits”
as envisaged by section 186(2) of the LRA.
If the occupier is an employee, the labour Acts, such as the BCEA, the LRA and so forth
are applicable. Similarly, collective agreements concluded between registered trade unions
and the owner-employer are applicable and, in the case of farm workers, the sectoral deter-
mination for the farming sector is applicable.
of 2000 (PAIA), as amended, was promulgated to give effect to this constitutional right. The
right of access to information held by a public or private body may be limited only to the
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom (s 36 of the Constitution).
The aim of PAIA is to allow access to information in a manner that balances the right to
information with any other rights, including the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. To
achieve this, the Act has established voluntary and mandatory mechanisms and procedures
to ensure access to records of public and private bodies in a swift, inexpensive and uncom-
plicated manner. Ensuring such access is a means of promoting transparency, accountabil-
ity and effective governance of all public and private bodies (s 9).
PAIA applies to records held by both public and private bodies, regardless of when the
records came into existence (s 3). The Act applies to the exclusion of any provision in other
legislation that prohibits or restricts disclosure of a record of a public or private body and
that is materially inconsistent with an object or a specific provision of this Act (s 5).
The Act does not apply to a record of the Cabinet and its committees, a record relating
to the judicial functions of a court of law or a special tribunal, a judicial officer of such a
court or special tribunal, a record of an individual member of Parliament or of a provincial
legislature in that capacity or a document relating to a decision regarding the nomination,
selection or appointment of a judicial officer (s 12).
The Act further does not apply to a record of a public or private body if that record is
requested for the purpose of criminal or civil proceedings, if it is requested after the com-
mencement of such proceedings and the production of or access to that record for criminal
and civil proceedings is provided for in any other law. Any record obtained in contravention
of these provisions is not admissible as evidence in the criminal or civil proceedings, unless
the exclusion of such record will, in the opinion of the court, be detrimental to the interests
of justice (s 7).
A “public body” is any department of State or administration in the national or provincial
sphere of government or any municipality in the local sphere of government or any other
functionary or institution when exercising a power or performing a duty in terms of the Con-
stitution or a provincial constitution or exercising a public power or performing a public
function in terms of any legislation (s 1).
A “private body” is a natural person who carries or has carried on any trade, business or
profession, but only in such capacity, a partnership which carries or has carried on any
trade, business or profession or any former or existing juristic person (excluding a public
body) (s 1).
The Human Rights Committee has published, in terms of section 10 of the Act, a guide
on how to use the Act. The guide includes information on the postal and street addresses,
the phone and fax numbers and e-mail address of the information officer (and deputy) of
every public body, the manner in which information may be requested, assistance available
from the information officers and the Human Rights Committee and the manuals to be
kept by public and private bodies.
A “requester”, that is a person who requests access to a record or a person acting on his
or her behalf, must be given access to a record if he or she has complied with the procedural
requirements of the Act and has included in the request all his or her personal informa-
tion.
A request for access is made in the prescribed form to the information officer of a public
body or to a private body at the address, fax number or e-mail address of that body. The re-
quester must provide sufficient particulars so that the records can be identified. The re-
quester must also state whether the record is preferred in a particular language and specify
a postal address or fax number to which it must be dispatched. If the request is made on
behalf of a person, proof thereof must be submitted. A person who is unable, because of
illiteracy or a disability, to make a written request, may make the request verbally. The
426 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
information officer must then reduce the oral request to writing in the prescribed form and
provide a copy thereof to the requester (ss 18 & 53).
A requester has the right to access regardless of the reason for making such a request if
information is requested from a public body (s 11(3)). In the case of a private body the
requester has to identify the right he or she is seeking to exercise or protect and provide an
explanation of why the requested record is required for the exercise or protection of that
right (s 53).
Access to a record can be refused only on grounds set out in Chapter 4 of the Act (ss 11
and 33). Access will, inter alia, be refused if disclosure involves disclosure of personal infor-
mation, information held by SARS concerning income tax of a third party, trade secrets,
financial, commercial, scientific or technical information of a third party, if disclosure will
constitute a breach of a duty of confidence owed to a third party in terms of an agreement
and if disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an
individual (s 38).
An information officer of a public body or the head of a private body must, when consid-
ering a request for access to a record, take all reasonable steps to inform a third party to
whom the record relates of the request (s 47). Such a third party may, within 21 days of
receiving the notice, consent to disclosure or submit oral or written representations as to
why the request should be refused (ss 48 and 71).
An information officer of a public body may refuse a request for access to a record if the
request is manifestly frivolous or vexatious or if the work involved in processing the request
will substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of the public body (s 45).
Every public and private body is required to compile – and make available as prescribed
– a manual containing, inter alia, a description of its structure and functions, its postal and
street addresses, its telephone and fax numbers and e-mail address of its information officer
and deputy information officer(s), sufficient detail to facilitate a request for access to a
record, a description of the subjects on which the body holds records and the categories of
records held on each subject and the categories of records which are available without
having to request access (s 14).
An information officer of a public body must, and the head of a private body may, at
least once a year submit to the Minister responsible for the administration of justice a
description of the categories of records that are automatically available for inspection or for
purchase without a person’s having to request access in terms of the Act (ss 15 and 52).
These reports are published in the Government Gazette.
If a document no longer exists or if an information officer of a public body or the head
of a private body has taken all reasonable steps to find the requested record and cannot
find it, he or she must notify the requester accordingly by way of affidavit or affirmation
(ss 23 and 55).
A requester who has been notified that the request for access has been granted must be
given access immediately or, if an access fee is payable, upon payment of that fee (ss 29 and
54). Access to health records is restricted (ss 30 and 61).
Part 4 of the Act provides for an appeal procedure against the decision of an information
officer of a public body. A requester or third party may lodge an internal appeal with the
relevant authority. A court may not be approached for appropriate relief unless the internal
appeal procedure has been exhausted (ss 74 and 78).
The centrepiece of PAJA is thus an “administrative action” and the Act seeks to ensure
that administrative actions are lawful, reasonable and fair and, if not, that such actions can
be challenged.
Section 1 of the Act defines an “administrative action” as
any decision taken, or any failure to take decision, by –
(a) an organ of state, when –
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation;
or
(b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or
performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision, which adversely affects
the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect.
The Act further requires, in section 3, that any administrative action which materially and
adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally
fair. If not, any person may institute proceedings in a court or a tribunal for the judicial
review of such an action (s 6).
There seems to be a degree of overlap between PAJA and labour rights. Every time pow-
ers are exercised or functions are performed by an ‘organ of state’ in respect of conditions
of employment and related matters, the question arises whether labour or administrative
laws are applicable. According to the Labour Court in SAPU & Another v National Commis-
sioner, SAPS & Another (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 (LC), “[t]he powers and functions concerned,
derive from employment law and are circumscribed by the constitutional rights to fair
labour practices and to engage in collective bargaining. One is instinctively drawn to the
conclusion that the concept of administrative action is not intended to embrace acts
properly regulated by private law”. See also Hlope & Others v Minister of Safety & Security &
Others (2006) 27 ILJ 1003 (LC).
The question is whether the conduct of an organ of state or a person exercising a public
power or performing a public function can be regarded as an “administrative action” as
envisaged in PAJA or whether it constitutes conduct of an employer in accordance with
labour legislation.
This question has received attention in a number of contradictory judgments, the major-
ity of those judgments seeming to favour a separation of labour law and administrative law
and finding that any decision regarding employment should be dealt with under the LRA
(and other labour legislation) and would not be justiciable under PAJA.
In PSA obo Haschke v MEC for Agriculture & Others (2004) 25 ILJ 1750 (LC) the Labour
Court held that “if the right to just administrative action competes or is in conflict with the
right to fair labour practice then the LRA and the BCEA, read with the constitutional right
to fair labour practices, must prevail over the right to administrative justice”.
In Greyvenstein v Kommissaris van die SA Inkomste Diens (2005) 26 ILJ 1395 (T) the Court
considered the submission of the applicant that the decision to institute disciplinary pro-
ceedings against him was an administrative act as envisaged in PAJA. Having had regard to
relevant case law, the Court concluded that the act of instituting disciplinary proceedings
against an employee could not be said to constitute the exercise of a public power or the
performance of a public function and, therefore, did not constitute an administrative
action. The Court based its finding on the fact that section 18 of the SA Revenue Service
Act 34 of 1997 clearly described the terms and conditions of employment between SARS
and its employees. The Court held that “the labour relationship between the respondent
and its employees is not regulated by any other legislation, save the protection afforded by
the constitutional era labour legislation which falls outside the scope of ‘administrative
action’” (p 1402).
In Western Cape Workers Association v Minister of Labour (2005) 26 ILJ 2221 (LC) the Regis-
trar of Labour Relations had deregistered the trade union as a result of its failure to comply
with its statutory trade union obligations. The union appealed against the decision of the
428 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Registrar and argued that the appeal should be dealt with under PAJA. The Court dismissed
the application and distinguished between PAJA and the LRA as follows (at 2223):
The LRA is national legislation designed for labour disputes, including administrative law type
disputes arising in labour law. PAJA is also national legislation. However, I have said elsewhere
that PAJA does not apply to labour disputes. Section 210 of the LRA makes it clear that if there is
any conflict relating to matters dealt with in the LRA between the LRA and the provisions of any
other law except the Constitution, the provisions of the LRA must prevail. The procedures, time-
limits and the requirements of PAJA differ substantially from the LRA. The LRA, for instance,
provides a right of appeal to this court against a decision of the registrar, which is a far wider and
more generous right than the right of review, which is a narrower and more limited right that
PAJA offers. The time-limits in PAJA are not the same as those contemplated in the LRA, which
are tailor-made for labour disputes. In all the circumstances, PAJA does not apply to this dispute.
The High Court in Dunn v Minister of Defence & Others (2005) 26 ILJ 2115 (T) held the
opposite view.
In Hlope & Others v Minister of Safety & Security & Others (2006) 27 ILJ 1003 (LC) the
Labour Court held that the decision of the Area Commissioner of Police to transfer the
applicants, all members of SAPS and engaged as plain-clothes detectives, did not involve the
exercise of a public power or the performance of a public function with a direct external
effect. The decision to transfer them, therefore, did not amount to an administrative action
for the purposes of section 33 of the Constitution or as envisaged in PAJA. The Court fur-
ther observed that collective bargaining and the adjudication of rights disputes in terms of
the LRA are the appropriate channels for balancing employer and employee interests in
the public sector rather than the judicial review of administrative actions (p 1011). See also
Louw v SA Rail Commuter Corporation Ltd & Another (2005) 26 ILJ 1960 (W).
In Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & Others [2006] 11 BLLR 1
(SCA) an employee of the appellant, a security guard, was dismissed. His alleged unfair
dismissal dispute was arbitrated by the CCMA and the arbitration award ordered his rein-
statement. A review of the arbitration award by the Labour Court and a subsequent appeal
to the Labour Appeal Court against the decision of the Labour Court followed. The SCA
finally had occasion to consider the matter.
In its judgment the SCA dealt with some important issues, such as the distinction be-
tween an appeal and a review, the question as to whether a CCMA arbitration award consti-
tutes and administrative action, as defined, and the applicability of the LRA and/or PAJA.
The SCA held that CCMA arbitrations were administrative actions, that PAJA applied and
that awards were reviewable under PAJA.
The Constitutional Court disagreed with the SCA. In Sidumo & Another v Rustenburg Plat-
inum Mines Ltd & Others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) the Constitutional Court confirmed
that a decision or award by a CCMA commissioner constituted an administrative action, but
held that it was not reviewable under PAJA. The Constitutional Court supported the notion
of separating labour laws from administrative laws and the extensive debate about PAJA
versus the LRA has now finally been settled. PAJA is not applicable to decisions in the
labour context.
2 Jordaan B “Protection of Confidentiality and Privacy Issues in South Africa”, paper delivered at the
SASLAW National Conference, October 2006.
Other relevant legislation 431
Protection of personal data is clearly required. The current legal position is that, in terms
of our common law, the individual’s dignitas is protected and breach thereof is actionable
under the actio iniuriarum. Breach includes inter alia entry into a private home, reading of
private documents, disclosure of private facts, breach of confidentiality, publishing a photo-
graph without the person’s consent and a medical practitioner divulging medical infor-
mation.
In addition to common law, limited protected is granted by the Employment Equity Act,
the Promotion of Access to Information Act, the Electronic Communications and Transac-
tions Act, the National Credit Act, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Labour
Relations Act. However, none of these provisions provide adequate protection, hence the
new Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013, which awaits full commencement. A
few sections of the POPI Act entered into force on 11 April 2014 (ss 1, 39–54, 112 and 113).
In considering the development of statutory protection of personal information – in the
workplace in particular – guidance was sought in the ILO’s Code of Practice on the Protec-
tion of Workers’ Personal Data. The Code deals with the collection, storage, security and
communication of employees’ personal data and sets out broad guidelines in this regard.
Personal data can be obtained from the individual employee only and only for reasons
directly relevant to his or her employment. The duty is on the employer to justify the
collection of the data. Employees and their representatives should be kept informed of any
data collection process, the rules that govern the process and their rights. The processing of
personal data should not have the effect of unfairly discriminating against anyone and no
personal data can be communicated to third parties without the employee’s explicit con-
sent. Waiver of these rights is not permitted.
The Protection of Personal Information Act is aimed at promoting the protection of per-
sonal information processed by public and private bodies. Once fully in force, the Act will
apply to the automatic and manual processing of personal information. In this regard one
of the objects of the Act is to give effect to the constitutional right to privacy by safeguard-
ing a person’s personal information when processed by public or private bodies.
The Act accords a number of rights to persons whose information is being collected,
such as collecting information directly from and with the consent of the person concerned
and collecting information for a specific, explicitly defined and legitimate purpose. Infor-
mation must not be kept for longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose for which it
was collected and specified personal information about a person is prohibited.
________________________
The Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (the “BEE Act”) was
promulgated to achieve these goals. Section 1 of the Act defines BEE as follows:
broad-based black economic empowerment means the viable economic empowerment of all black peo-
ple, in particular women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas
through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies that include, but are not limited to –
(a) increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control enterprises and pro-
ductive assets;
(b) facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets by communi-
ties, workers, co-operatives and other collective enterprises;
(c) human resources and skills development;
(d) achieving equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the work-
force;
(e) preferential procurement from enterprises that are owned or managed by black people; and
(f) investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black people.
The Act provides for the integration of persons into the economy by way of ownership,
corporate advancement and involvement at small, medium and micro-enterprises level.
Some significant amendments to the Act took effect on 2 October 2014 when the Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment Amendment Act 46 of 2013 was enacted.
The BEE Amendment Act defines a “fronting practice” as a transaction, arrangement or
other act or conduct that directly or indirectly undermines or frustrates the achievement of
the objectives of the Act or the implementation of any of its provisions. Any person who
knowingly engages in such a practice commits an offence.
The Act also makes provision for the establishment of the BEE Commission with inter alia
the following functions:
(a) to oversee, supervise and promote adherence with the Act in the interest of the public;
(b) to strengthen and foster collaboration between the public and private sector in order to
promote and safeguard the objectives of broad-based black economic empowerment;
(c) to receive and investigate complaints concerning broad-based black economic empow-
erment;
(d) to promote advocacy, access to opportunities and educational programmes and initia-
tives of broad-based black economic empowerment;
(e) to keep a register of BEE transactions;
(f) to receive and analyse reports concerning BEE compliance from organs of state, public
entities and private sector enterprises; and
(g) to promote good governance and accountability by creating an effective and efficient
environment for the promotion and implementation of BEE.
The Amendment Act also provides for specialist committees appointed by the Minister to
advise the Commission on the management of its resources or the performance of its
functions.
The BEE Act thus addresses the economic empowerment of black people in seven areas,
which can be referred to as a “generic scorecard”. The scorecard is the tool to be used in
determining the BEE status or progress of a business. It is also a measure of standardisation
and allows government and other procurement agencies to apply qualification criteria for
the granting of licences and concessions, to determine the sale of state-owned enterprises
and to develop criteria for entering into partnerships in the private sector.
The seven elements in the scorecard are ownership, skills development, preferential pro-
curement, management, employment equity, enterprise development and social invest-
ment. The first three elements each carry a 20% weight; the remaining elements each carry
a 10% weight. Codes of Good Practice have been published on each of the seven elements.
Each code has its own scorecard to test the BEE status of a business in a particular area.
Once the scorecards have been completed, they have to be submitted to an accredited
verification agency for validation. If validated, a verification certificate is issued and remains
valid for a year after date of issue.
Other relevant legislation 433
Albertyn C & Kentridge J “Introducing the right to equality in the interim Constitution”, South
African Journal on Human Rights vol 10(2), 1994.
Anstey M Negotiating Conflict Cape Town: Juta (1991).
Bendix S Industrial Relations in South Africa Cape Town: Juta (1989).
Blumenfeld J “Workmen’s compensation: Third parties’ liability” (1983) 4 ILJ 261.
Brand J, Lotter C, Mischke C & Steadman F Labour Dispute Resolution Cape Town: Juta (1997).
Brassey M, Orleyn T & Myburgh A Employment Equity and Contemporary Labour Law Developments
Seminar 1997 Durban: Butterworths (1997).
Cheadle H et al Current Labour Law Cape Town: Juta (1994–1997).
De Villiers D The Small Businessman’s Guide to Labour Legislation Pretoria: Academica (1989).
Du Plessis JV, Fouché MA, Jordaan B & Van Wyk MW A Practical Guide to Labour Law 2nd edn,
Durban: Butterworths (1996).
Du Toit D et al Labour Law Through the Cases Durban: LexisNexis (2002– ).
Du Toit D et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 5th edn, Durban: LexisNexis (1999).
Finnemore M & Van der Merwe R Introduction to Industrial Relations in South Africa 5th edn,
Johannesburg: Lexicon (1989).
Fouché MA et al Legal Principles of Contracts and Commercial Law 8th edn, Durban: LexisNexis
(2015).
Fullinwider RK The Reverse Discrimination Controversy: A Moral and Legal Analysis Totowa, New
Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield (1980).
Garbers C “Promotions: Keeping abreast with ambition (an overview of the current law on
promotion of employees)” Contemporary Labour Law, vol 9(3), October 1999.
Gibson JTR South African Mercantile and Company Law 6th edn, Cape Town: Juta (1988).
Grogan J Riekert’s Basic Employment Law 2nd edn, Cape Town: Juta (1993).
Grogan J Workplace Law 2nd edn, Cape Town: Juta (1997).
Israelstam I & Marais P Making Workplace Forums Work Labour Law Group (1996).
Jordaan B “Protection of confidentiality and privacy issues in South Africa”, paper delivered at
the SASLAW National Conference, October 2006.
Le Roux P “Beheer oor werkersvervoer en die Ongevallewet” (1980) 1 ILJ 100.
Le Roux PAK & Van Niekerk AJ “The dismissal of strikers – Ten years on . . .” Contemporary
Labour Law vol 2(12), 1993.
Levy A Unfair Dismissal Johannesburg: Divaris Steyn (1984).
Mureinik E “A bridge to where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” South African Journal on
Human Rights vol 10(1), 1994.
Mureinik E “Workmen’s compensation and the mugging that arose ‘out of’ employment”
(1980) 1 ILJ 33.
Ringrose HG The Law and Practice of Employment 2nd edn, Cape Town: Juta (1976).
Rycroft A & Jordaan B A Guide to South African Labour Law 2nd edn, Cape Town: Juta (1992).
Thompson C “Collective bargaining” in Current Labour Law (1995).
Van Jaarsveld SR Suid-Afrikaanse Handelsreg vol 1, 3rd edn, Johannesburg: Lex Patria (1988).
Van Jaarsveld SR & Van Eck BPS Principles of Labour Law Durban: Butterworths (1998).
435
TABLE OF CASES
Page
A
Abrahams v Lukhanyou Clinic CC t/a Kensington Treatment Centre
(2011) 32 ILJ 2773 (CCMA).......................................................................................................373
Absa Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd [2001] 1 All SA 1 (A) ....................... 29, 33
Adcock Ingram Critical Care v CCMA & Others [2001] 9 BLLR 979 (LAC) ...............................324
Administrator, Transvaal & Others v Traub & Others (1989) 10 ILJ 823 (A) ...................... 358, 372
AECI Chlor-Alkali & Plastic Ltd & Others v SA Chemical Workers’ Union & Others
(1986) 7 ILJ 300 (W) ..................................................................................................................289
Allpass v Mooikloof Estates (Pty) Ltd t/a Mooikloof Equestrian Centre
(2011) 32 ILJ 1637 (LC).............................................................................................................101
Amalgamated Beverage Industries (Pty) Ltd v Jonker (1993) 14 ILJ 1232 (LAC) .......................337
Apollo Tyres SA (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others [2013] 5 BLLR 434 (LAC)............................ 362, 373
April and Gen-Tech Engineering Services CC (2005) 26 ILJ 407 (BCA) .....................................364
Arries v Afric Addressing (Pty) Ltd t/a Afric Mail Advertising [1998] 5 BALR 525 (CCMA) .....360
Asara Wine Estate & Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Van Rooyen & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 363 (LC) ...............337
Assistent-ongevallekommissaris v Ndevu 1980 (1) SA 143 (E) ..................................... 168, 169, 170
Atkins v Datacentrix (Pty) Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 1130 (LC)...............................................................104
Auf der Heyde v University of Cape Town [2000] 8 BLLR 877 (LC) ...........................................318
Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA & Others
[2006] 9 BLLR 833 (LC).................................................................................................... 323, 324
AWAWU obo Lotter v Safcol [2002] 5 BALR 470 (CCMA) .................................................. 356, 361
B
Bedderson v Sparrow Schools Education Trust (2010) 31 ILJ 1325 (LC) ....................................345
Biggs v Rand Water (2003) 24 ILJ 1957 (LC) ........................................................................ 102, 319
BMW (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Van Der Walt [2000] 2 BLLR 121 (LAC) .................................324
Board of Executors Ltd v McCafferty [1997] 7 BLLR 835 (LAC)...................................................11
Bonthuys and Central District Municipality (2007) 28 ILJ 951 (CCMA)......................................337
Booyens NO v OFS Provincial Administration 1924 OPD 120 .....................................................168
Borchards v Pearce & Sheward t/a Lubrite Distributors 1993 2 LCD 28 (LAC)............................11
Bouwer v SA Breweries [2002] 7 BALR 699 (CCMA) ...................................................................364
Building Bargaining Council (Southern & Eastern Cape) v
Melmons Cabinets CC & Another [2001] 3 BLLR 329 (LC) ......................................................12
C
Callanan v Tee-Kee Borehole Casings (Pty) Ltd & Another 1993 2 LCD 43 (IC)..........................11
Carter & Co (Pty) Ltd v McDonald 1955 (1) SA 202 (A).......................................................... 29, 32
Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Browne [2006] 2 BLLR 131 (LAC) .....................................345
Catholic Bishops Publishing Co & Others v State President & Others
1990 (1) SA 849 (A) ........................................................................................................... 358, 372
CCMA & Others v Law Society of the Northern Provinces (Incorporated as the Law Society of
Transvaal) [2013] 11 BLLR 1057 (SCA) ...................................................................................385
CEPPWAWU v Tekwani Sawmills (Pty) Ltd [2004] 9 BALR 1094 (CCMA) .................................266
CEPPWAWU & Another v Glass & Aluminium 2000 CC [2002] 5 BLLR 399 (LAC) .......... 319, 337
437
438 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Page
CEPPWAWU obo Mahlabane v Sasol Synfuel [2003] 9 BALR 1022 (CCMA) ..............................360
Chaba v Iselwa Investment CC [2004] 12 BALR 1534 (CCMA) ...................................................363
Chamber of Mines of SA v National Union of Mineworkers (1986) 7 ILJ 304 (W) ..................... 289
Chamber of Mines of SA v National Union of Mineworkers (1987) 8 ILJ 68 (A) ........................ 289
Chemical Workers’ Industrial Union v BP South Africa (1991) 12 ILJ 599 (IC) ......................... 290
Chinese Association of South Africa & Others v The Minister of Labour & Others
case no. 59251/2007 ....................................................................................................................91
Chirach Tyre Company (Pty) Ltd t/a Falcon Tyre Centre v
Minister of Trade and Industry & Another 1997 (3) BCLR 319 (T)) ........................................88
City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) ..........................................................89
City of Cape Town v SALGBC & Others [2011] 5 BLLR 504 (LC) .............................................. 324
City of Cape Town v SAMWU obo Jacobs [2009] 9 BLLR 882 (LAC)..........................................359
CMS Support Services v Briggs [1997] 5 BLLR 533 (LAC) ............................................................11
Coetzer & Others v Minister of Safety & Security & Another (2003) 24 ILJ 163 (LC)................. 103
Coin Security v Vukani Guards (1989) 10 ILJ 239 (C) ....................................................................32
Commissioner, Ex parte: In re Manthe 1979 (4) SA 812 (E) .................................................. 168, 169
Confederation of SA Workers Unions v NEDLAC & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 1831 (SCA) ............. 224
Continuous Oxygen Suppliers (Pty) Ltd t/a Vital Aire v Meintjes & Another
(2012) 33 ILJ 629 (LC).................................................................................................................34
County Fair v CCMA & Others [1998] 6 BLLR 577 (LC) .............................................................363
County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others [1999] 11 BLLR 1117 (LAC) ............................ 324
CWIU v Millner’s Dental Suppliers (Pty) Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ (CCMA) ..........................................253
CWIU obo Sityana & Mane v Valpa Easigas [2000] 1 BALR 23 (CCMA) ..................................... 360
CWU & Another v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd [2003] 8 BLLR 741 (LC) ................. 367
D
De Beer v SA Export Connection CC t/a Global Paws [2008] 1 BLLR 36 (LC) ..........................344
De Beer v Thomson 1918 TPD 70 .................................................................................................169
De Lange v ABSA Makelaars (Edms) Bpk (2010) 31 ILJ 885 (SCA) ..............................................12
Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber [2005] 9 BLLR 849 (LAC) .....................................................................11
Department of Correctional Services & Another v
Police & Prisons Civil Rights Union & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2629 (LAC) ................................102
Department of Justice v CCMA & Others [2004] 4 BLLR 297 (LAC) ..........................................359
Dierks v UNISA [1999] 4 BLLR 304 (LC) .....................................................................................318
Dince & Others v Department of Education, North West Province & Others
[2010] 6 BLLR 631 (LC)............................................................................................................ 363
Discovery Health Ltd v CCMA & Others
[2008] 7 BLLR 633 (LC), (2008) 29 ILJ 1480 (LC) ........................................................ 12, 14, 34
Dube v Otis Elevators [2005] 7 BALR 695 (MEIBC) ....................................................................361
Dunn v Minister of Defence & Others (2005) 26 ILJ 2115 (T).....................................................428
E
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality Germiston and Van Rooyen
(2002) 23 ILJ 1104 (ARB) ..............................................................................................................8
Energy Measurements (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd
[2000] 2 All SA 396 (W) ......................................................................................................... 29, 33
Eskom v Marshall & Others [2003] 1 BLLR 12 (LC) ....................................................................361
Eskom v NUM [2003] 6 BALR 708 (CCMA) .................................................................................356
Ess Kay Electronics (Pty) Ltd & Another v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd
[2001] 1 All SA 315 (A).......................................................................................................... 29, 33
Esterhuizen v Jet Demolition (2011) 32 ILJ 734 (CCMA) ............................................................363
Evans v Japanese School of Johannesburg (2006) 27 ILJ 2607 (LC) ............................................345
F
F v Minister of Safety and Security [2012] 3 BLLR 244 (CC) ................................................... 28, 34
FAWU v Kelvin Grove Club [2000] 9 BALR 999 (CCMA) ............................................................373
Table of cases 439
Page
FAWU & Another v The Cold Chain [2007] 7 BLLR 638 (LC) ................................................... 345
FAWU & Others v Pets Products (Pty) Ltd (2000) 9 LC 6.12.3 ....................................................292
Feldman v Mall 1945 AD 743 ..................................................................................................... 28, 32
FFATU obo Prinsloo & Others v Johnston [1999] 8 BALR 909 (CCMA) ....................................373
Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Pearmain [1998] 3 BLLR 335 (SE) .....................................30
Fisher v Clinic Holdings Ltd [1995] 8 BLLR 27 (IC)......................................................................30
Food & Allied Workers Union & Others v Rainbow Chicken Farmers
(2000) 21 ILJ 615 (LC)...............................................................................................................103
Food and Beverage Workers’ Union v Hercules Cold Storage (1989) 10 ILJ 457 (IC) ...............292
Food and Beverage Workers’ Union v Hercules Cold Storage (1990) 11 ILJ 47 (LAC) ..............292
Free State Consolidated Gold Mines v National Union of Mineworkers
(1987) 8 ILJ 606 (O) ..................................................................................................................289
G
G4S Security Services v NASGAWU (DA 3/08, 26 November 2009) ............................................362
Gaylard v Telkom SA Ltd [1998] 9 BLLR 942 (LC).............................................................. 361, 373
General Tyre & Rubber Co (SA) Ltd v Kleynhans & Another 1963 (1) SA 533 (N) ............... 28, 32
George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd [1996] 8 BLLR 985 (IC) ....................................100
Glass v University of Zululand [2006] 4 BALR 388 (CCMA) ........................................................360
Gordon v St John’s Ambulance Foundation
[1997] 3 BLLR 313 (CCMA), [1997] 6 BLLR 785 (CCMA) .......................................................11
Govender v SA Stevedores Service Co Ltd (1981) 2 ILJ 27 (IC) ........................................... 168, 169
Greeff and Giagas v Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality
(SALGBC, ECD051116, 22 June 2012) ......................................................................................361
Greyvenstein v Kommissaris van die SA Inkomste Diens (2005) 26 ILJ 1395 (T) ........................ 427
Grieve v Denel (Pty) Ltd [2003] 4 BLLR 366 (LC).......................................................................368
Groenewald v Cradock Munisipaliteit en ’n Ander 1980 (4) SA 217 (E) .......................................16
Gumede en Andere v SA Eagle Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1989 (3) SA 741 (T) ........... 168, 169
Gurarnah v South African Weather Services [2004] 4 BALR 454 (CCMA) ......................... 358, 372
H
Halgreen v Natal Building Society (1986) 7 ILJ 769 (IC) .............................................................337
Harksen v Lane NO & Others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC)............................................................89
Harris v Volkswagen of South Africa (Pty) Ltd [2000] 10 BALR 1140 (CCMA) .................. 356, 373
Health & Hygiene Services v Seedat NO & Others [1999] 11 BLLR 1153 (LC) ..........................266
Hendrickz v Cutting 1937 CPD 417 ........................................................................................... 28, 32
Hlope & Others v Minister of Safety & Security & Others (2006) 27 ILJ 1003 (LC)............ 427, 428
Hoelson v Vista University [1998] 5 BALR 554 (CCMA) ..............................................................373
Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC), (2000) 21 ILJ 2357 (CC) ............... 89, 101
HOSPERSA & Another v Northern Cape Provincial Administration
(2000) 21 ILJ 1066 (LAC) .................................................................................................. 356, 361
HOSPERSA obo Van Wyk v SA National Parks (Golden Gate) [2009] 2 BALR 169 (CCMA) .... 356
Howell v International Bank of Johannesburg Ltd (1990) 11 ILJ 791 (IC) ................................. 337
I
IMATU & Others v Rustenburg Transitional Council [1999] 12 BLLR 1299 (LC) .....................345
IMATU obo Baker v East London Transitional Local Council [2000] 3 BALR 280 (CCMA) ..... 373
IMATU obo Coetzer v Stad Tygerberg (1999) 20 ILJ 971 (CCMA)...................................... 358, 372
IMATU obo Verster v Umhlathuze Municipality [2011] 9 BLLR 882 (LC) ......................... 362, 373
Ingwane v Med-Afrique [1997] 2 BLLR 210 (CCMA) ....................................................................15
Innes v Johannesburg Municipality 1911 TPD 12 ................................................................. 168, 170
440 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Page
J
J & J Freeze Trust v Statutory Council for the Squid & Related Fisheries of SA & Others
(2011) 32 ILJ 2966 (LC)......................................................................................................... 12, 33
Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (2009) 30 ILJ 131 (LC)...................................................................15
Jele v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal & Others [2003] 7 BLLR 723 (LC) .................359
Johannesburg City Council v Marine & Trade Insurance Co 1970 (1) SA 181 (W) ............ 168, 170
Jooste v Transnet Ltd t/a South African Airways [1995] 5 BLLR 1 (LAC) ..................................320
Joy Mining Machinery (A division of Harnischfeger (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v
NUMSA & Others (2002) 11 LC 6.12.1 .....................................................................................101
K
K v Minister of Safety and Security [2005] 8 BLLR 749 (CC)................................................... 28, 33
Knox D’Arcy Ltd v Shaw 1996 (2) SA 651 (W)................................................................................30
Koka v Director-General: Provincial Administration North West Government
[1997] 7 BLLR 874 (LC)............................................................................................................ 362
Komane v Fedsure Life [1998] 2 BLLR 215 (CCMA) ...................................................................324
Kompecha v Bite My Sausage CC (1988) 9 ILJ 1077 (IC) .............................................................324
Kotze & Genis (Edms) Bpk v Potgieter 1995 (3) SA 783 (C) .........................................................30
Kruger v SA Police Service (2003) 24 ILJ 477 (BCA) ....................................................................371
Kunene & Others v Dunlop Belting Products (Pty) Ltd (2011) 20 CCMA 9.4.2 .........................293
“Kylie” v CCMA & Others [2008] 9 BLLR 870 (LC) ................................................................. 13, 34
“Kylie” v CCMA & Others [2010] 7 BLLR 705 (LAC)............................................................... 14, 34
“Kylie” v CCMA & Others (2010) 31 ILJ 1600 (LAC)......................................................................12
“Kylie” v Van Zyl t/a Brigittes [2007] 4 BALR 338 (CCMA) ..................................................... 13, 34
L
Labuschagne v Techno Plastics (Pty) Ltd [2005] 6 BALR 610 (MEIBC) ............................. 356, 361
LAD Brokers v Mandla [2001] 9 BLLR 993 (LAC) .........................................................................11
Langa & Others v Active Packaging (Pty) Ltd [2001] 1 BLLR 37 (LAC) .....................................267
Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security & Others 1998 (4) BCLR 444 (T) ................... 89, 100
Larbi-Odam & Others v Member of the Executive Council for Education & Another
1997 (12) BCLR 1655 (CC) .........................................................................................................89
Law Society of the Northern Provinces, The v Minister of Labour & Others
(NGHC 61197/11, 11 October 2012)........................................................................................385
Lebese v SAPS [2003] 7 BALR 755 (SSSBC) .................................................................................420
Leon-Cachet v De Jager 1994 3 LCD 47 (IC) ..................................................................................11
Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council & Others v
Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd & Others [1997] 11 BLLR 1438 (LC) .............................................99
Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd v Niselow [1996] 7 BLLR 825 (LAC) ..................................11
Limekaya v Department of Education [2004] 5 BALR 586 (GPSSBC) ................................ 358, 372
Lotter v SA Police Service (2005) 26 ILJ 578 (BCA) ............................................................. 358, 371
Louw v SA Rail Commuter Corporation Ltd & Another (2005) 26 ILJ 1960 (W)........................ 428
Lukie v Rural Alliance CC t/a Rural Development Specialist [2004] 8 BLLR 769 (LC) ..... 140, 319
M
Mabilo v Mpumalanga Provincial Government & Others [1999] 8 BLLR 821 (LC) ...................363
Mabinana & Others v Baldwins Steel [1999] 5 BLLR 453 (LAC) .................................................324
McInnes v Technikon Natal [2000] 6 BLLR 701 (LC) ................................................................. 318
McKenzie v SABC [1996] 5 BLLR 635 (IC), [1999] 1 BLLR 1 (LAC) ...........................................12
Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) ........................................30
Mahlamu v CCMA & Others [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC).................................................................234
Mahlangu v Minister of Sport and Recreation [2010] JOL 25011 (LC).......................................420
Maidi v MEC for Department of Education [2003] 8 BLLR 761 (LC) .........................................420
Malandho v SABC [1997] 5 BLLR 555 (LC) .................................................................................318
Table of cases 441
Page
Manana v Department of Labour [2010] 6 BLLR 664 (LC).........................................................357
Mankahla & Others v University of Transkei [2004] 11 BALR 1340 (P)......................................356
Marneweck v SEESA Ltd [2009] 7 BLLR 669 (LC).......................................................................318
Marsland v New Way Motor & Diesel Engineering (2009) 30 ILJ 169 (LC)......................... 166, 171
Maseko v Entitlement Experts [1997] 3 BLLR 317 (CCMA) ........................................................355
Mashava v Cuzen & Woods Attorneys [2000] 6 BLLR 691 (LC) .......................................... 140, 319
Mashegoane & Another v University of the North [1998] 1 BLLR 73 (LC) ................................357
MEC, Public Works, Northern Province v CCMA & Others [2003] 10 BLLR 1027 (LC) ............420
Medical Association of SA v Minister of Health & Another [1997] 5 BLLR 562 (LC) ..................11
Metcash Trading Ltd t/a Metro Cash & Carry v Fobb & Others [1998] 11 BLLR 1136 (LC) ..... 324
Metro Rail (Wits) v SAFWU [1998] 1 BALR 88 (IMSSA) .............................................................360
Minister of Finance & Another v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC)..........................................88
Minister of Justice v Khoza 1966 (1) SA 410 (A)............................................................. 28, 168, 169
Minister of Safety and Security v Jordaan t/a Andre Jordaan Transport
2000 (4) SA 21 (SCA)....................................................................................................... 28, 32, 33
MITUSA v Portnet [2000] 9 BALR 1037 (CCMA) ........................................................................362
MITUSA & Others v Transnet Ltd & Others [2002] 11 BLLR 1023 (LAC) ......................... 357, 362
Miyambo v CCMA & Others [2010] 10 BLLR 1017 (LAC)...........................................................324
Mkize v Martens 1914 AD 382.................................................................................................... 28, 32
Mncube v Transnet (2009) 30 ILJ 698 (CCMA) ..............................................................................15
Mnguni v Gumbi [2004] 6 BLLR 558 (LC)........................................................................... 140, 319
Modise & Others v Steve’s Spar Blackheath [2002] 5 BLLR 496 (LAC) .............................. 287, 293
Moghamat v Centre Guards CC [2004] 1 All SA 221 (C) ......................................................... 28, 32
Mogorosi and SA Reserve Bank (2008) 29 ILJ 439 (CCMA) ........................................................319
Monyakeni v SA Police Service & Others (2008) 29 ILJ 3111 (BCA) ........................................... 358
Moses v Magnum Security Services [2002] 11 BALR 1166 (CCMA) ............................................356
Motala & Another v University of Natal 1995 (3) BCLR 374 (D) ...................................................88
Mthembu & Another v SA Police Service & Another (2010) 31 ILJ 1014 (BCA)......................... 357
Mthembu & Others v Claude Neon Lights (1992) 13 ILJ 422 (IC) ................................................91
Mtshali & Others v Nestlé SA [2002] 6 BALR 632 (CCMA) .........................................................364
Murray and Independent Newspapers (2003) 24 ILJ 1420 (CCMA)............................................360
Murray v Minister of Defence (2008) 29 ILJ 1369 (SCA)...................................................... 319, 337
Myers v Sieradzki 1910 TPD 869 ......................................................................................................17
Mzimni & Another v Municipality of Umtata [1998] 7 BLLR 780 (Tk) .......................................356
N
Naidoo v Rudolph Chemicals (Pty) Ltd [2008] 6 BALR 497 (NBCCI) ........................................363
National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight Industry, The & Another v
Carlbank Mining Contract (Pty) Ltd & Another
(unreported case, no. JA 52/10, 20 March 2012 (LAC))..............................................................8
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality & Others v
Minister of Home Affairs & Others 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) .............................................................89
National Entitled Workers Union v CCMA & Others (2003) 24 ILJ 2335 (LC) ........................... 355
National Union of Textile Workers & Others v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd & Another
1982 (4) SA 151 (T) .....................................................................................................................20
Nawa & Another v Department of Trade & Industry [1998] 7 BLLR 701 (LC) ..........................355
NCAWU obo Tobias & Others v Pick ’n Pay Family Supermarket
[2003] 12 BALR 1413 (CCMA)..................................................................................................364
Ndebele v Foot Warehouse (Pty) Ltd t/a Shoe Warehouse (1992) 13 ILJ 1247 (IC) .................. 337
Ndikumdavyi v Valkenberg Hospital & Others [2012] 8 BLLR 795 (LC) ................................ 14, 34
Ndlovu v Pather (2006) 27 ILJ 2671 (LC) .....................................................................................319
NEHAWU v Government of the Eastern Cape [1999] 5 BALR 550 (CCMA) .............................. 373
NEHAWU obo Makhethu v Robben Island Museum (2008) 29 ILJ 2318 (CCMA) ..................... 363
NEHAWU obo Thomas v Department of Justice (2001) 22 ILJ 306 (BCA) .................................371
Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Mudau & Others
[2003] 10 BLLR 1034 (LC) ........................................................................................................ 385
NEWU v CCMA & Others [2004] 2 BLLR 165 (LC).....................................................................355
442 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
Page
Ngwenya v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal [2001] 8 BLLR 924 (LC) ..................................................363
Nicosia v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1954 (3) SA 897 (T) .................. 168, 169, 170
Nieuwoudt v All-Pak (2009) 30 ILJ 2451 (LC)...............................................................................319
Niselow v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 752 (SCA) .....................................11
Northern Cape Provincial Administration v Hambidge NO & Others
[1999] 7 BLLR 698 (LC)............................................................................................ 356, 361, 373
NPSU & Others v The National Negotiating Forum & Others [1999] 4 BLLR 361 (LC) ...........267
Ntlabezo & Others v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape & Others [2002] 3 BLLR 274 (Tk)...... 356
Ntsabo v Real Security CC [2004] 1 BLLR 58 (LC) .............................................................. 319, 337
NULAW v Barnard NO & Another [2001] 9 BLLR 1002 (LAC) ..................................................318
NUM v Namakwa Sands – A division of Anglo Operations Ltd [2008] 7 BLLR 675 (LC)........... 292
NUM & Others v Billard Contractors CC & Another (2006) 27 ILJ 1686 (LC) ................... 287, 293
NUMSA v Feltex Foam [1997] 6 BLLR 798 (CCMA) ...................................................................253
NUMSA obo Khanye & Another v Havco Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd
[2003] 12 BALR 1349 (MEIBC).................................................................................................364
NUMSA obo members v Behr Climate & Control [2004] 3 BALR 364 (CCMA)......................... 267
NUMSA obo Tshikana v Delta Motor Corporation [2003] 11 BALR 1302 (CCMA) ...................363
NUTESA v Border Technikon [2005] 12 BALR 1302 (CCMA) ...................................................357
NUTESA v Technikon Northern Transvaal [1997] 4 BLLR 467 (CCMA) ................................... 101
Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate Services,
Department of Correctional Services & Others [2008] 12 BLLR 1179 (LAC ..........................360
Nyalunga v PP Webb Construction (1990) 11 ILJ 819 (IC) ..........................................................337
O
OCGAWU v Total SA (Pty) Ltd [1999] 6 BALR 678 (CCMA) ......................................................253
OCGAWU v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd [1999] 7 BALR 813 (CCMA) ................................................ 253
OCGAWU obo Mapolie v Metlite Alloys [2002] 10 BALR 1058 (CCMA) ....................................364
Odayar v Compensation Commissioner 2006 (6) SA 202 (N).............................................. 166, 171
OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd v SACCAWU (1993) 14 ILJ 362 (LAC)....................................................290
Olkers v Monviso Knitwear (Pty) Ltd (1988) 9 ILJ 875 (IC) ................................................. 324, 337
Opperman v Research Surveys (Pty) Ltd [1997] 6 BLLR 807 (CCMA) .........................................11
Ouwehand v Hout Bay Fishing Industries [2004] 8 BLLR 815 (LC)............................................318
P
Pam Golding Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus & Others (2010) 31 ILJ 1460 (LC) .........................12
Pedzinski v Andisa Securities (Pty) Ltd (Formerly SCMB Securities (Pty) Ltd)
[2006] 2 BLLR 184 (LC)............................................................................................................ 368
Phenithi v Minister of Education [2006] 9 BLLR 821 (SCA) .......................................................420
Pienaar v Family Funeral Services (2011) 32 ILJ 2048 (CCMA) ...................................................337
Postal & Telekom Association of SA v SA Post Office Ltd [1998] 8 BALR 1012 (CCMA) ........... 373
Premier of Gauteng & Another v Ramabulana NO & Others [2008] 4 BLLR 299 (LAC) ..........383
Pretoria Society for the Care of the Retarded v Loots [1997] 6 BLLR 721 (LAC) .............. 319, 337
Protekon (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others [2005] 7 BLLR 703 (LC) .................................................362
PSA obo Badenhorst v Department of Justice (1999) 20 ILJ 253 (CCMA) .................. 357, 359, 371
PSA obo Dalton & Another v Department of Public Works
[1998] 9 BALR 1177 (CCMA)............................................................................................ 358, 371
PSA obo Haschke v MEC for Agriculture & Others (2004) 25 ILJ 1750 (LC) .............................427
PSA obo Petzer v Department of Home Affairs (1998) 19 ILJ 412 (CCMA) ................................ 358
PSA obo Van der Walt v Minister of Public Enterprise [2010] 1 BLLR 78 (LC)..........................420
PTWU obo members v Sahar Security Services [2004] 3 BALR 373 (CCMA) .............................266
Public Servants’ Association of South Africa & Another v Minister of Justice & Others
1997 (5) BCLR 577 (T) ................................................................................................................90
Pyper v Manchester Liners Ltd 1916 2 KB 691..............................................................................168
Q
Quince Products CC v Pillay [1997] 12 BLLR 1547 (LAC) ..........................................................337
Table of cases 443
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R
R v Feun 1954 (1) SA 58 (T)............................................................................................................10
Radebe & Another v Mashoff, Premier of the Free State Province & Others
[2009] 6 BLLR 564 (LC)............................................................................................................ 367
Rafferty v Department of the Premier [1998] 8 BALR 1017 (CCMA) ................................. 358, 371
Rainbow Farms (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others
[2011] 5 BLLR 504 (LC); [2011] 5 BLLR 451 (LAC) ...............................................................324
Ramoroka v Robben Island Museum (2012) 33 ILJ 500 (CCMA) ................................ 358, 372, 375
Randall v Progress Knitting Textiles Ltd (1992) 13 ILJ 200 (IC)..................................................319
Rossouw v Central News Agency 1948 (2) SA 267 (W) ...................................................................29
Roux v Evkom [2002] 2 All SA 462 (T) ..................................................................................... 28, 33
Rubenstein v Price’s Daelite (Pty) Ltd [2002] 5 BLLR 472 (LC) .................................................345
Rubin Sportswear v SACTWU & Others [2004] 10 BLLR 986 (LAC) .......................................... 345
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & Others
[2006] 11 BLLR 1 (SCA)............................................................................................................ 428
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v NUM & Others
[2001] 3 BLLR 305 (LAC) ......................................................................................................... 324
S
SA Metal & Machinery Co (Pty) Ltd v Gamaroff [2010] 2 BLLR 136 (LAC) ...............................345
SA Police Service v Safety & Security Sectoral Bargaining Council & Others
(2012) 33 ILJ 453 (LC)...............................................................................................................337
SA Post Office Ltd v CCMA & Others [2012] 11 BLLR 1183 (LC) .............................. 356, 362, 373
SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule [2010] 10 BLLR 1052 (LAC) .....................................................234
SA Rugby Players’ Association (SARPA) & Others v SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd & Others;
SA Rugby Pty Ltd v SARPU & Another [2008] 9 BLLR 845 (LAC) ..........................................318
SA Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvis & Others [2011] 4 All SA 475 (SCA).............283
SABC v McKenzie [1999] 1 BLLR 1 (LAC) .....................................................................................11
SACCAWU v Cash Crusaders (2010) 19 CCMA 4.7.3 ...................................................................269
SACCAWU v Elite Industrial Cleaning (Pty) Ltd (CCMA 1997) ..................................................261
SACCAWU v Garden Route Chalets (Pty) Ltd [1997] 3 BLLR 325 (CCMA)...............................361
SACCAWU v The Hub [1998] 12 BALR 1590 (CCMA)................................................................253
SACCAWU v Metlife (Pty) Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ (CCMA) .................................................................253
SACCAWU v OK Bazaars 1995 (3) SA 622 (A) .............................................................................262
SACCAWU v Speciality Stores Ltd [1998] 4 BLLR 352 (LAC) .....................................................266
SACCAWU & Another v The Clicks Organisation (Pty) Ltd [1997] 2 BLLR 164 (IC) ................324
SACSAAWU obo Nguyuza v Premier Loss Control CC [1998] 9 BALR 1190 (CCMA) ...............358
SACTWU v Sheraton Textiles (Pty) Ltd [1997] 5 BLLR 662 (CCMA)......................................... 253
SACTWU v WM Eachus and Co (CCMA 1997).............................................................................253
SACWU v Longmile/Unitred (1999) 20 ILJ 244 (CCMA)............................................................361
SAEWA obo Members v Aberdare Cables [2007] 2 BALR 106 (MEIBC).....................................363
St Clair v CFS Aviation CC t/a Corporate Flight Services (2010) 31 ILJ 486 (CCMA) ..................12
SALSTAFF v Spoornet [2002] 10 BALR 1025 (AMSSA) ...............................................................361
SALSTAFF obo Vrey v Datavia [1999] 6 BALR 757 (IMSSA) .......................................................360
SAMWU v City of Cape Town & Others (2010) 31 ILJ 724 (LC)..................................................376
SAMWU obo Damon v Cape Metropolitan Council (1999) 20 ILJ 714 (CCMA)......... 357, 358, 371
Sanlam Life Insurance Ltd v CCMA & Others (2009) 30 ILJ 2903 (LAC) .....................................12
SAPO Ltd v Jansen van Vuuren NO & Others [2008] 8 BLLR 798 (LC) .....................................363
Sappi Forests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others [2009] 3 BLLR 254 (LC)...........................................363
SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard [2014] ZACC 23 (CC)..................................................................103
SAPS v SSSBC & Others [2010] 8 BLLR 892 (LC)........................................................................358
SAPSAWU obo Jika v Department of Justice [2000] 3 BALR 309 (CCMA) .................................373
SAPU & Another v National Commissioner, SAPS & Another (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 (LC) ............ 427
SAR & H v SA Stevedores Service Co Ltd 1983 (1) SA 1066 (A) .......................................... 168, 169
444 A Practical Guide to Labour Law
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SARHWU v Transtel [1999] 2 BALR 224 (IMSSA) .......................................................................362
SATAWU & Another v Garvas & Others (City of Cape Town as Intervening Party
and Freedom of Expression Institute as amicus curiae) [2012] 10 BLLR 959 (CC) ..................292
SATDU v Marine Taxi’s CC [1997] 6 BLLR 823 (CCMA) ..............................................................11
Sauer NO v Duursema 1951 (2) SA 222 (D) ............................................................................. 28, 32
SAWU obo Green v Buycom Group [1999] 10 BALR 1213 (CCMA) ...........................................373
Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd [1997] 10 BLLR 1364 (LC) ................. 70, 361, 373
Sekwati v Masiya & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2219 (LC) .....................................................................337
Sidumo & Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others
(2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) .................................................................................................... 345, 428
Simela & Others v MEC for Education, Province of the Eastern Cape & Another
[2001] 9 BLLR 1085 (LC) .......................................................................................................... 356
Sithole v Nogwaza NO & Others [1999] 12 BLLR 1348 (LC), (1999) 20 ILJ 2710 (LC) ..... 361, 373
SMCWU & Another v Party Design CC (Doll’s Dairy) [2001] 6 BLLR 667 (LC)......................... 324
Smith v Cycle and Motor Trade Co 1922 TPD 324 .........................................................................16
Solidarity & Others v Eskom Holdings Ltd (2012) 33 ILJ 464 (LC) .............................................269
Solidarity obo Barnard v SA Police Service (2010) 31 ILJ 742 (LC) .............................................103
Solidarity obo Du Plessis v ABB Services [2005] 8 BALR 820 (MEIBC) .......................................361
Solidarity obo Kern v Mudau & Others [2007] 6 BLLR 566 (LC)................................................360
Solidarity obo McCabe v SA Institute for Medical Research [2003] 9 BLLR 927 (LC) ....... 140, 319
Sonka v Johnny Bags (Pty) Ltd [2001] 10 BALR 1116 (CCMA) ...................................................356
South African Airways (Pty) Ltd v GJJVV [2014] 8 BLLR 748 (LAC)................................... 362, 373
South African Breweries Ltd (Beer Division) v Woolfrey & Others
[1999] 5 BLLR 525 (LC)............................................................................................................ 363
State Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others
(2008) 29 ILJ 2234 (LAC) ...................................................................................................... 11, 12
Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO & Others
(case no. CCT33/09, [2009] ZACC 17 (CC) ............................................................. 319, 320, 337
Swanepoel v AECI Ltd (1984) 5 ILJ 41 (IC) ..................................................................................324
Swart v Greenmachine Horticultural Services (A Division of Sterikleen (Pty) Ltd)
(2010) 31 ILJ 180 (LC)...............................................................................................................140
Swissport (SA) (Pty) Ltd v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & Others
(2011) 32 ILJ 1256 (LC).............................................................................................................292
T
TGWU obo Malahla v Red Alert Security [2000] 10 BALR 1165 (CCMA) ..................................356
Theewaterskloof Municipality v SA Local Government Bargaining Council
(Western Cape Division) & Others (2010) 31 ILJ 2475 (LC) ...................................................345
Theron v Minister of Correctional Services & Another (2008) 29 ILJ 1275 (LC) ........................ 376
Thomas (Rockliffe) v Mincom (Pty) Ltd [2007] 10 BLLR 993 (LC) ........................................... 345
Transtel Johannesburg v TWU [1998] 8 BALR 1127 (IMSSA).....................................................360
Tsaperas & Another v Clayville Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd [2002] 11 BALR 1225 (CCMA).............363
Tshishonga v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & Another
[2007] 4 BLLR 327 (LC)............................................................................................................ 368
Tsweleng v Conron Spring Manufacturing & Engineering [2005] 2 BALR 159 (MEIBC).......... 360
TWU obo Van Zyl v Metrorail [1999] 7 BALR 888 (IMSSA) ........................................................360
U
University of Cape Town v Auf der Heyde [2001] 12 BLLR 1316 (LAC) ....................................318
University of Pretoria v CCMA & Others
[2012] 2 BLLR 164 (LAC), (2012) 33 ILJ 183 (LAC) ....................................................... 318, 344
UPUSA v Komming Knitting [1997] 4 BLLR 508 (CCMA) ..........................................................253
Urquhart v Compensation Commissioner (2006) 27 ILJ 96 (E) .......................................... 166, 171
UTATU obo Fourie & Another v Transnet Ltd (2002) 23 ILJ 1117 (ARB) .................................372
Table of cases 445
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V
Vaal Toyota (Nigel) v Motor Industry Bargaining Council & Others
[2002] 10 BLLR 936 (LAC) .......................................................................................................324
Value Logistics Ltd v Basson & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2552 (LC)..................................................337
Van Amstel v Eskom [2002] 9 BALR 995 (CCMA) .......................................................................361
Van der Riet v Leisurenet Ltd t/a Health and Racquet Club
[1998] 5 BLLR 471 (LAC) ......................................................................................... 319, 337, 360
Van Niekerk v Medicross Health Care Group (Pty) Ltd [1998] 8 BALR 1038 (CCMA) ..... 360, 372
Van Rensburg v Northern Cape Provincial Administration
(1997) 18 ILJ 1421 (CCMA)............................................................................................... 358, 371
Van Wyk v Albany Bakeries Ltd & Others [2003] 12 BLLR 1274 (LC) ........................................360
Venter v South African Tourism Board [1999] 10 BLLR 1111 (LC)............................................363
Victor v Finro Cash & Carry (2000) 21 ILJ 2489 (LC) .......................................................... 140, 319
Visser v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd [2002] 10 BALR 1031 (AMSSA).......................................................360
W
Wallace v Du Toit (2006) 27 ILJ 1754 (LC)........................................................................... 100, 140
Waltons Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie 1994 (4) SA 507 (O) ................................................30
Ward v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1962 (1) SA 728 (T) ............................. 168, 169
Wespro (Cape Town) v Stephenson [1995] 4 BLLR 86 (IC) .........................................................30
Western Cape Workers Association v Minister of Labour (2005) 26 ILJ 2221 (LC) .................... 427
Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 2133 (LC) .......................................................100
WL Ochse Webb & Pretorius (Pty) Ltd v Vermeulen [1997] 2 BLLR 124 (LAC) ............... 319, 337
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Beverley Whitehead [2000] 6 BLLR 640 (LAC).....................................100
Workforce Group (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 738 (LC) ........................................12
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner v FA Stewart (Pty) Ltd (1991) 12 ILJ 1015 (Z) ......... 168
Z
Zondo v Group 4 Security Services [2009] 12 BALR 1329 (CCMA).............................................356