Ishaan Pratap Singh

19010211

B.A. L.L.B. 2019 , Section - A

Professional Ethics

Reflection Paper on "The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the

Lawyer-Client Relation" by Charles Fried
In "The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation", Charles Fried
analyses the complex dynamics of lawyer-client relationships. Fried outlines the ethical contours
of the lawyer-client relationship, and stresses on the importance of personal connections, the
autonomy that lawyers should exercise while dealing with clients, and the obligations of the legal
profession. The article provides a cogent understanding of the moral considerations that shape
interactions between lawyers and clients. Fried argues against a purely adversarial model of the
attorney-client relationship, instead he advocates for a professional friendship. This reflection
paper analyses Fried's perspective, examining the interplay between personal relationships, client
autonomy, and the lawyer's professional obligations.

Fried takes exception to the traditional notion of the lawyer as a mere practitioner, one whose

profession involves only the application of legal tools to achieve a client's expected result

regardless of its ethical implications. He argues that a lawyer's role also involves a moral

commitment to the client’s welfare, extending beyond mere technical expertise — “There is no

wrong if a venture fails for lack of talent or lack of money-no one's rights have been violated.

But rights are violated if, through ignorance or misinformation about the law, an individual

refrains from pursuing a wholly lawful purpose. Therefore, to assist others in understanding and

realizing their legal rights is always morally worthy.”1

One of the predominant themes of Fried's article is the importance of personal relationships in

the lawyer-client relationship. Here, the belief of "professional friendship" comes into play.

According to Fried, the lawyer's role extends beyond mere representation; it involves forming a

genuine friendship with the client. This friendship is rooted in trust, empathy, and mutual

respect. Fried contends that through this bond, the lawyer gains a deeper understanding of the

client's needs, concerns, and aspirations, enabling them to provide more effective counsel. This

moral commitment thus entails a relationship based on trust and a common, shared

understanding of the clients predicament.

1 Fried, Charles. "The lawyer as friend: The moral foundations of the lawyer-client relation." Yale. LJ 85
(1975): 1060.
This emphasis by Fried's on a professional friendship between a lawyer and their client
challenges the traditional notion of lawyers as impersonal and clinical professionals. Instead,
Fried has advocated for a more compassionate framework where lawyers are involved and
engaged with their clients on a personal level. This approach allows for a sense of affinity and
consensus, nourishing the lawyer-client relationship and effectively improving the quality of
legal representation. Fried uses the example of a doctor to further his argument wherein a doctor
serves as a special purpose friend — “The needs to which the doctor ministers usually are
implicated in crises going to one's concreteness and individuality, and therefore what one looks
for is a kind of ministration which is particularly concrete, personal, individualized. Thus, it is
not difficult to see why I claim that a doctor is a friend, though a special purpose friend, the
purpose being defined by the special needs of illness and crisis to which he tends.”2

Fried also explores the concept of autonomy within the lawyer-client relationship. He concedes
the inherent asymmetry of power that exists between the two parties, but has argued that the
lawyer's foremost obligation is to empower the client to make informed decisions. The
successful fulfilment of this obligation thus necessitates respecting the client's autonomy and
honouring their choices, even if they differ from the lawyer's counsel. The existence of a
professional friendship, however, is not one of intimacy but is a relationship defined by mutual
recognition and respect, truthfulness, and a fidelity to the best interests of the client, within the
contours of the law. The lawyer thus serves as a trusted vizier, advocating for the client's
objectives while also providing sound counsel and calling into question any dubious actions.
This ethical foundation ultimately serves the legal system better according to Fried.

One of the most important aspects Fried explores is the balance between client autonomy and the

professional obligations that a lawyer must adhere to. On one hand, clients have the absolute

right to make decisions about their cases, even if those decisions seem improper. A lawyer

cannot simply overrule a client's decisions; to do so would be violating the client's autonomy.

Fried's take on autonomy highlights the importance of client agency in the legal process. He

rejects paternalistic attitudes and instead argues for a model of practice that prioritises the client's

needs and values. By equipping clients to participate actively in their legal matters, lawyers

2 Id.
champion the principles of autonomy, fostering a more equitable and client-centred approach to

representation.

Fried also inspects the ethical obligations that lawyers owe to their clients and to the society at
large. He argues that while lawyers have a duty to advocate fervently for their clients, this duty is
mitigated by greater moral duties. Lawyers must navigate an intricate web of professional
responsibilities, such as upholding the rule of law and safeguarding public interest. This creates a
tightrope walk for the lawyer. How to respect client autonomy while upholding their professional
obligations? Fried proposes a solution based on the concept of moral explanation. The lawyer,
while acting as a friend, must engage in a genuine and truthful dialogue with their client. This
involves explaining the complete legal implications of the client's choices, the prospective
consequences, and ethical limitations of the lawyer. By creating a space for open and truthful
communication and moral reasoning, the lawyer directs the client towards ethically well founded
choices while still respecting their autonomy.

Fried highlights the delicate tension that lawyers must strive for between their obligations to
individual clients and the extensive ethical obligations of the profession. He warns against the
temptation to affirm the need to satisfy shallow self-interest over the common good, thereby
urging lawyers to act with righteousness and moral fibre in all their professional activities.
Furthermore, Fried argues that the existence of a professional friendship, built on a foundation of
mutual trust, allows for a more nuanced appreciation of the client's objectives. With open
communication, the lawyer may find intrinsic concerns or needs that may fall within the ethical
framework and could be achieved. For example, a client may prioritise the preservation of their
reputation over a victory at all costs. A lawyer who comprehends this deeper, underlying
motivation can develop a more effective and ethical strategy.

However, Fried's thesis of a professional friendship also raises concerns. How does a lawyer

navigate scenarios where the client has malicious aims or chooses a course of action that

flagrantly violates the law? Or even scenarios where the client lacks the capacity to make

rational decisions, or the lawyer and the client are simply at odds in terms of temperament or

ethics? In such scenarios, it is difficult to adapt the lawyer's obligations to the client, the justice
system, and potentially the society as well. In such situations, upholding professional obligations

may require a more limited role from the lawyer or even necessitate a withdrawal from

representation. Fried recognises these problems. He suggests that a lawyer may have to resign

from their representation of such a client in situations where it is absolutely necessary.

Undoubtedly, this is a challenging choice as it conflicts with the attorney's obligation to provide

counsel, however maintaining the rule of law and the profession's integrity might call for it. The

potential for professional and personal boundaries to be blurred within a professional friendship

is another issue. If a lawyer is too emotionally invested in their client's situation, is it still

possible to remain objective and render wise counsel? Fried says that one ought to keep a

professional distance. Although the lawyer should really worry about the client's welfare, they

should never let their personal feelings towards their clients influence their professional

judgement.

Despite these complexities, Fried's reasoning remains compelling. A legal system that fosters a

relationship of trust and mutual respect between lawyer and client can facilitate more ethical

decision-making and ultimately lead to a fairer legal process. It is crucial to understand that

Fried's thesis does not advocate doing away with the adversarial system completely. Instead, it

points to a development in which the lawyer's function goes beyond simple representation. The

intention is to provide an environment where fervent legal representation is blended with a

dedication to moral behaviour and an awareness of the client's welfare while operating within the

law. Legal ethics have witnessed a great deal of controversy as a result of Fried's work. While

some support the idea of a professional friendship, others contend that it distorts the nature of the

lawyer-client relationship or threatens the adversarial system. However, Charles Fried's paper

provides an insightful examination of the moral underpinnings of the attorney-client relationship.

Fried offers a convincing framework for comprehending the ethical aspects of legal practice by

highlighting the significance of interpersonal connections, individual autonomy, and professional

responsibilities.