DR.
RAM MANOHAR LOHIA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY,
LUCKNOW
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LAW
SESSION: 2023-2024
(B.A. LL.B (Hons.) VIIIth Sem.)
ANALYSIS & OVERVIEW OF THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
PROGRAMMEIN INDIA
SUBMITTED TO :- SUBMITTED BY:-
Dr. Abdullah Nasir Priyanshi Bhageria
Assistant Professor Enrollment No. - 200101101
(Law) B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)
Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia VIII Semester
National Law University,
Lucknow
1|Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I have taken efforts in this project. However, it would not have been possible without the kind
support and help of many individuals and organizations. I would like to extend my sincere
thanks to all of them.
I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my professor Dr. Abdullah Nasir
who gave me the golden opportunity to do this wonderful project of Affirmative Action Law
on the topic “ANALYSIS & OVERVIEW OF THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
PROGRAMME ININDIA”. He also helped me in completing my project and has rendered
endless support, kind and understanding spirit during my project completion. I came to
know about so many new things and I am really thankful to him. The completion of this
project could not have been possible without the participation and assistance of various
people, thus, I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me a lot in
finalizing this project within the limitedtime frame.
I would like to express my gratitude towards my parents & members of ‘Dr. Ram Manohar
Lohia National Law University, Lucknow’ for their kind cooperation and encouragement
which helped me in completion of this project.
My thanks and appreciation also goes to my colleagues and people who have willingly helped
me out with their abilities.
2|Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 4
2. MATTERS OF MERIT.................................................................................. 6
3. EMPERICAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROGRAMME .............................................................................9
a. PRODUCTIVITY IMPACT OF THE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ................................................................ 9
b. ASSESSING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN
HIGHER EDUCATION ................................................................. 11
c. IMPACT OF POLITICAL RESERVATIONS .................................15
4. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................17
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................ 18
3|Page
INTRODUCTION
India’s affirmative action (AA) programme is primarily caste-based, although there is some
AA for women in the electoral sphere. AA in India, as elsewhere in the world, is contentious
for three reasons. First, there is considerable debate over the assessment of caste disparities,
the prima facie reason for the existence of AA – whether these are significant at all; if yes, to
what extent and in which sphere; and whether they have been narrowing over time. Second,
there is a larger debate about whether caste is the valid indicator of backwardness or should
AA be defined in terms of class/income or other social markers, such as religion. Third, there
is the overarching debate about whether AA is desirable at all, in any form, regardless of
which social identity is used as its anchor.
In the polarised debate around AA, it is either demonised as the root of all evil or valorised as
the panacea for eliminating discrimination. It is worth noting at the outset that Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar, the chief architect of the constitution of independent India, who ensured that AA
was constitutionally mandated, himself did not see AA as a panacea. He did not believe that
the caste system could be made less malignant. He said “…my ideal would be a society based
on Liberty, Equality and Fraternity… [the caste system] means a state of slavery … a society
in which some men are forced to accept from others the purposes which control their
conduct” (emphasis in the original). He was constantly engaged with the question of
strategies and instruments which would lead to the annihilation of caste altogether.
However, while the debates around AA are emotionally charged, it is important to take stock
of AA dispassionately through an evidence-based approach. Available national data on caste
are defined by the needs of the affirmative action program which divides the population into
initially three, and now four, broad groups: Scheduled Castes (ex-untouchable jatis, SC), on
average about 18 percent of the Indian population; Scheduled Tribes (ST), on average about 8
percent of the Indian population; Other Backward Classes (OBCs, a heterogeneous collection
of Hindu low castes, some non-Hindu communities and some tribes which are not included in
the STs), not yet counted by the census; however according to the 66th round of the National
Sample Survey (2009-10), these constitute 43 percent of the rural and 39 percent of the urban
population and “Others” (the residual; everyone else)2. Given that data do not allow us to
isolate the upper castes, it needs to be emphasized at the outset that calculations based on this
categorization will underestimate the disparity between the two ends of the jati spectrum.
While the term Scheduled Castes is a product of this official terminology, several members of
4|Page
the ex-untouchable jatis prefer to self-identify themselves as “Dalit” – the originally Sanskrit
but now Marathi term, meaning “oppressed” or “broken”, which is used as a term of pride.
5|Page
MATTERS OF MERIT
The most common criticism of the AA measures is that they go against the consideration of
merit and efficiency by allowing candidates access to preferred positions in higher education
and public sector jobs that they would otherwise not have access. The latter part of this
statement is obvious--quotas are meant precisely for that. The first part of the statement can
actually be verified by the US empirical . However, until recently, there was a surprising
dearth of detailed empirical studies on India and the debate proceeded more on the basis of
pre-conceived beliefs, rather than on the basis of hard evidence.
It should be noted as a general point, though, that the discussion on merit is conducted as if
merit is a neutral, objective characteristic, independent of the standard used to measure it,
similar to height or weight or the number of teeth. Consequently, exam scores are a relatively
uncontroversial instrument for allocating scarce seats in institutions of higher education. The
reality is that “merit” is extremely hard to measure in a standardized way and examination
results, while widely used as a proxy for merit, may not be the best gauge. Whether every
percentage difference in exam scores reflects a qualitative difference in “merit” is a moot
point.
Finally, the debate over lower entry scores for SC-ST misses the value added from being
admitted to a prestigious institution of learning. The focus on drop-outs of quota students
detracts from the success stories – those who successfully complete their program. Bowen
and Bok (1998)1 document the long term positive impact of AA on the lives of beneficiaries
who successfully graduate from elite universities, even if they do so with grades lower than
their white counterparts. For successful blacks, the transformation in their life chances
because of AA is tremendous and the benefits go beyond the final grade they obtained at
graduation.
Before the more rigorous empirical studies came into existence, Galanter (1984) 2 had
undertaken a rough but comprehensive assessment of the AA programme. His main
conclusions can be summarized as follows
1
The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University
Admissions; William G. Bowen and Derek Bok.
2
Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India; Marc Galanter.
6|Page
• The program has shown substantial redistributive effects in that access to education
and jobs is spread wider in the caste spectrum than earlier, although redistribution is
uneven throughout the beneficiary groups. There is evidence of clustering but
Galanter believes that these reflect structural factors, since the better situated enjoy a
disproportionate share of the benefits in any government program, not just in
affirmative action programs.
• The vast majority of Dalits are not directly affected by affirmative action, but reserved
jobs bring a manifold increase in the number of families liberated from subservient
roles.
In the short run, beneficiaries might get singled out and experience social rejection in
offices, college hostels (there is no explicit affirmative action in college hostels
(dormitories); affirmative action in colleges leads to entry of SC/ST students in college
hostels) and other set ups where they are introduced through affirmative action.
However, in the longer run, the association of Dalits with ignorance and incompetence.
Moreover, “resentment of preferences may magnify hostility to these groups, but
rejection of them exists independently of affirmative action programmes”.
• Reserved seats do provide representation to SC-ST in legislative bodies, but that may
not get reflected in enhanced, targeted policies towards these groups for several
reasons. First, these candidates are elected by a common electorate and hence, SC-ST
candidates have to appeal to a wider, multi-group electoral constituency, and tailor
program accordingly. Second, these candidates typically belong to political parties
which have a larger agenda than that of Dalit empowerment, which their elected
representatives, including Dalits, have to reflect.
• Affirmative action has kept the beneficiary groups and their problems visible to the
educated public, but it has not motivated widespread concern for their inclusion
beyond what is mandated by government policy.
Thus, Galanter concludes that affirmative action has been a partial but costly success. It has
accelerated the growth of a middle class and SC/ST members have been brought into central
roles considered unimaginable a few decades ago (However, even this crude calculation will
not work for assessing OBC reservations because first, OBC quota is much more recent, and
two, OBCs are not stigmatized in the same way as SCs because their traditional occupations
7|Page
do not put them in humiliating and subservient roles in the same way as SCs. Thus, OBC
reservations have to be assessed very differently than SC-ST reservations).
Corbridge (2000)3 gathered a wealth of quantitative and qualitative data over the 1980s and
1990s from the Jharkhand region of South Bihar in order to assess the impact of reservations
on the tribals of that region. He finds that the reservation system has benefited mainly the
tribal elite, which had formed over the 1940s and 1950s via jobs in the mines, who are mostly
men and residing in urban areas. However, the capture of reserved jobs by middle class STs
has not been so pervasive that less affluent tribals have no hope of landing a reserved job. In
fact, in his study, almost half the jobs available seem to be going to less affluent tribals men
(and some women). The reservation system has served to expand the size of the tribal middle
class, as well as served to enhance the consciousness of tribals about their rights and about
asking for compensation from the authorities.
3
Competing Inequalities: The Scheduled Tribes and the Reservations System in India's Jharkhand ;
Stuart Corbridge.
8|Page
EMPERICAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMME
PRODUCTIVITY IMPACT OF THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In the first empirical study of the effects of AA in the labor market, Deshpande and
Weisskopf (2011)4 focused on the Indian Railways to assess if AA, i.e. the presence of SC-
ST employees who have gained entry through quotas, has impacted productivity negatively.
Analyzing an extensive data set on the operations of one of the largest employers in the
public sector in India, the study found no evidence whatsoever to support the claim of critics
of affirmative action that increasing the proportion of SC and ST employees will adversely
impact productivity or productivity growth. On the contrary, some of the results suggest that
the proportion of SC and ST employees in the upper (A and B) job categories is positively
associated with productivity and productivity growth.
The finding of such positive associations in the case of A and B jobs is especially relevant to
debates about the effects of AA on behalf of members of SC and ST communities, for two
reasons. First, the impact of AA on productivity is likely to be much more affected by the
efficacy with which high-level managerial and decision-making jobs are carried out than the
efficacy with which lower-level semi-skilled and unskilled jobs are fulfilled. Thus, critics of
reservations are likely to be, and indeed are, much more concerned about the potentially
adverse effects of reservations at the highest decision making levels that at lower levels.
Second, it is precisely in the A and B jobs – far more than in C and D jobs – that the
proportions of SC-ST employees would not have risen had it not been for quotas.
It was beyond the scope of this study to explain just how and why AA in the labour market
may have such a favorable effect. However, the answer may be found in one or more of the
following suggestions that others have advanced to explain such a finding. Individuals from
marginalized groups may well display especially high levels of work motivation when they
succeed in attaining decision-making and managerial positions, because of the fact that they
have reached these positions in the face of claims that they are not sufficiently capable – in
consequence of which they may have a strong desire to prove their detractors wrong. Or
individuals from marginalized groups may simply believe that they have to work doubly hard
to prove that they are just as good as their peers. Having greater numbers of SC & ST
4
Does Affirmative Action Reduce Productivity? A Case Study of the Indian Railways; ASHWINI
DESHPANDE and THOMAS E. WEISSKOPF
9|Page
managers and professionals working in high-level A+B positions in the Indian Railways
might also serve to increase productivity because their community backgrounds make them
more effective in supervising and motivating SC & ST workers in C and D jobs. Finally,
improvements in organizational productivity may well result from the greater diversity of
perspectives and talents made possible by the integration of members of previously
marginalized groups into high-level decision-making teams.
10 | P a g e
ASSESSING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION
All available evidence indicates that a large majority of SC-ST candidates owe their presence
in institutions of higher education to reservation policies. While empirical studies on effects
of AA in higher education are very few due to lack of data, the few studies that exist point
towards the fact that SC-ST students find it hard to succeed in competitive entrance
examinations due to past handicaps (lack of good quality schooling, lack of access to special
tutorial or coaching centres that prepare candidates for open competitive examinations and so
forth).
Evidence presented in Weisskopf (2004)5 suggests that at least half the seats reserved for SCs
and at least two-thirds of the seats reserved for STs remain unfilled, if all institutions of
higher education are considered together. He argues that this is because of ‘wastage’
(dropping out) as well as ‘stagnation’ (repeating courses because of failure or attendance
gaps) at prior levels of education. While these are very serious problems, the real pity is that a
mechanical approach to the issue of AA means that no effort is made to understand the basic
underlying factors that cause dropouts and stagnation (which are discrimination and
deprivation and lack of access to good-quality education at prior levels), and thus no serious
efforts are made to remedy them. Since the overwhelming opinion remains anti-AA, the
larger the proportion of dropouts, the more it ‘proves’ the contention of the anti-AA
opinion—that quotas are costly and useless. As a matter of fact, there are specific remedial
measures that could be applied to address these problems: bridge courses, special courses in
mathematics and English (the two areas with the maximum gaps between SCs and Others),
and so forth. The University Grants Commission, a government body designed to regulate
higher education, has special funds allocated for such remedial measures, but these funds
remain unutilized for the most part, both because of lack of awareness about these funds and,
more fundamentally, because of a lack of serious will to make the AA programme succeed.
Given that there is no monitoring and no penalties for lackadaisical implementation,
institutions can turn a blind eye to the issue of unfilled quota seats.
Desai and Kulkarni (2008)6 examine AA in higher education by focusing on outcomes. In
particular, they examine the question of whether educational inequalities between SCs and
5
Impact of Reservation on Admissions to Higher Education in India ; Thomas E. Weisskopf.
6
Changing Educational Inequalities in India in the Context of Affirmative Action ; Sonalde Desai,
Veena Kulkarni.
11 | P a g e
STs on the one hand, and upper caste Hindus on the other, have reduced by using data from
successive NSS rounds between 1983 and 2000. They calculate “transition probabilities”
across six levels of education (probability of making a transition from primary to middle
school, from middle to high school, and so forth). Their study is rich in its detail and its
bottom line is clear. The educational inequalities between SC-STs on the one hand, and upper
caste Hindus on the other hand, have declined significantly at the primary education stage.
For the middle and high school levels, there is a decline too, but not significant. At the
college levels, the inequalities between ST men and upper caste Hindus have declined, but for
ST women, SC men and SC women, the inequalities have increased.
They attribute these declines to AA. This is suggested by the fact that a similar decline is not
seen for Muslims, who suffer similar disadvantages as the Dalits, but do not get any
preferential treatment. The authors suggest that the decline in inequalities at the primary level
might be due to AA in employment. However, in college education, where AA is directly
applicable, they find that inequalities have actually widened, which puts a question mark on
the efficacy of AA. Also, they find that after accounting for income and residence, SCs
experience greater disadvantage in college education than did STs. The reasons for AA in
higher education not being to successfully narrow the gaps is a cause for concern, but the
gaps would, in all likelihood, have been even larger in the absence of AA.
They attribute these declines to AA. This is suggested by the fact that a similar decline is not
seen for Muslims, who suffer similar disadvantages as the Dalits, but do not get any
preferential treatment. The authors suggest that the decline in inequalities at the primary level
might be due to AA in employment. However, in college education, where AA is directly
applicable, they find that inequalities have actually widened, which puts a question mark on
the efficacy of AA. Also, they find that after accounting for income and residence, SCs
experience greater disadvantage in college education than did STs. The reasons for AA in
higher education not being to successfully narrow the gaps is a cause for concern, but the
gaps would, in all likelihood, have been even larger in the absence of AA.
The “mismatch hypothesis” suggests that AA actually harms targeted students by placing
them in programs for which they are academically unsuited and result in the higher drop-out
rate among reserved category students. To date, only three substantive quantitative studies
gauge the impact of AA in higher education by focusing on this mismatch hypothesis.
12 | P a g e
The first study, by Bertrand, Hanna and Mullainathan (2008) 7 , focuses on individuals
applying to an engineering college, via a competitive entrance examination, in one Indian
state in 1996. Engineering colleges are among the most prestigious educational institutions in
India. The authors first took a census of all students applying to this engineering college and
found that the qualifying scores for admission were roughly 480 out of a possible 900 for
upper caste individuals, 419 for OBC and 182 for SC. These score disparities provide
elementary support for the hypothesis that lower-caste students would not be able to perform,
and will not benefit from AA because of the mismatch between their basic skill levels and the
skill requirements of engineering education. This could lead to wastage and drop-outs. To
better understand the outcomes across caste groups, the authors then interviewed about 700
households from the census of all applicants between 2004-2006 (approximately 8-10 years
after the entrance examination). They surveyed both the applicant and their parents to gauge
life outcomes including income and occupation, job satisfaction, social networks, and caste
identity.
Contrary to popular belief, they find that caste-based targeting results in the targeting of
economically disadvantaged individuals: the parental income of upper-caste students
displaced by AA is Rs.14,088, compared to Rs. 8340 among displacing lower-caste students.
They also find that despite much lower basic skills (as measured by scores on the entrance
exam), those who are admitted through AA economically benefit from attending engineering
college. They estimate that attending engineering college increases lower-caste members’
monthly income between Rs. 3700 and Rs.6200. This corresponds to an increase of 40 to 70
percent. In other words, they find no evidence of the “mismatch hypothesis”. In addition to
improving earning potential, they find that AA could also increase access to more satisfying
careers, measured in terms of job quality and satisfaction.. However, they also find evidence
of the “creamy layer” as well as gender imbalance within those who benefit from AA, much
like the Corbridge study described above. Specifically, they find that those from higher socio-
economic backgrounds, and men more than women within the lower-caste groups, benefit
more.
The second empirical study of the mismatch hypothesis is by Bagde et al (2011) 8 , who
analyse data from 214 engineering colleges in one state in India. They have data on student
7
Affirmative Action in Education: Evidence From Engineering College Admissions in India ;
Marianne Bertrand, Rema Hanna & Sendhil Mullainathan.
8
Bagde et al 2011 (Tsmsi).
13 | P a g e
performance on the entrance examination as well as on the high school completion
examination. The scores on the high school leaving examinations and on entrance tests reflect
a gradation based on caste: the average scores of STs are the worst, SCs next, followed by
backward castes and finally, the best scores are obtained by the general category students.
This study finds that AA increases college attendance with effects that are proportionately the
greatest for members of the most disadvantaged castes. Similarly, they find that improved
priority in college selection improves achievement (measured by scores on a comprehensive
examination administered after the first year of the program), with proportionately greater
effects among the more disadvantaged castes. Finally, they find that the ability to choose a
better college because of preferential treatment results in improved academic performance in
college – thus, they find no evidence of a mismatch – i.e. quotas harming intended
beneficiaries.
The third study, which is the most recent one (Robles and Krishna, 2012)9, contrary to these
findings, suggests that in highly technical courses, Dalits do not catch up with the non-Dalit
students in terms of grades – in other words, they start with lower grades and graduate with
lower grades. They measure mismatch by post-college earnings and find that SC students
who enroll in more selective majors through preferential policies end up earning less than
what they would have earned if they had enrolled in less selective majors. Thus, their results
are not directly comparable to the other two studies as mismatch is defined differently.
However, the study finds, like the previous studies, that AA targets the population it is
designed for: the targeted students are poorer than the average displaced students. Given the
larger benefits associated with AA, if the targeting is accurate, then admission to prestigious
courses would alter the lives of those who get in through AA despite a gap in the graduating
grades between SCs and non-SCs.
9
Affirmative Action in Higher Education in India: Targeting, Catch Up, and Mismatch ; Verónica
C. Frisancho Robles & Kala Krishna.
14 | P a g e
IMPACT OF POLITICAL RESERVATIONS
Pande (2003) 10 examines if reservation in state legislatures for disadvantaged groups
increases their political influence. She finds that political reservations increase transfers (such
as welfare expenditure in the state plan) towards groups that are targeted by reservations.
Thus, reservation for SCs and STs does provide them with policy influence. Similar
conclusions at the village level are seen in a study by Besley, Pande et al (2004), which finds
that the availability of public goods for SC-ST households increases significantly if the
constituency is reserved, compared to non-reserved constituencies.
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004)11 studied the consequences of mandated representation for
women in gram panchayats (GPs) by conducting a detailed survey of all investments in local
public goods in a sample of villages in two districts, Birbhum in West Bengal and Udaipur in
Rajasthan, and compared investments made in reserved and unreserved GPs. They find that
reservations affect policy decisions in that women’s preferences are better represented. This
provides strong empirical support to the logic which led to political reservations in the first
place.
Jafferlot (2003)12, in discussing the political rise of low castes in North India, highlights some
tensions inherent in what he terms the “silent revolution” – the transfer of power, peacefully,
from upper caste elites to various subaltern groups. While his analysis is mainly about the
OBCs, the issues he raises have a broader applicability, and the constraints faced by the
OBCs would be faced even more strongly by the Dalits, given their traditional subordinate
position.
First, he argues that such a transfer of power, in other contexts, would be accompanied by
violence. The reason this is peaceful in India, by and large, violent episodes notwithstanding
(such as during the Mandal agitation), is due to the fact that the transfer is incremental. To a
large extent, upper castes still hold the reins to power and OBCs (and in some cases, Dalits)
form the second rung of leadership. Given the educational and social backwardness of the
latter two, they will not be able to dislodge the upper castes for a long time.
Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities?
10
Theory and Evidence from India ; Rohini Pande.
11
WOMEN AS POLICY MAKERS: EVIDENCE FROM A INDIA-WIDE RANDOMIZED POLICY
EXPERIMENT; Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo.
12
India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India ; Christophe Jaffrelot.
15 | P a g e
He also points out the tremendous unevenness in the rise of low caste politicians – in UP and
Bihar, one sees a much more pronounced rise than in Rajasthan, for instance. Also, the
conflict or the transfer of power is not clear-cut; most political parties are not organized
solely on upper-caste or lower caste lines – all, including the Dalit-dominated Bahujan Samaj
Party (BSP), have upper caste members. He also suggests that liberalization of the economy
has opened up new arenas and opportunities for upper castes, more lucrative than government
jobs, and thus, they might not regret their traditional hold over bureaucracy being challenged
(the new opportunities opened up by liberalization might not be available to Dalits to the
extent needed to close disparities. In particular, they do not, as yet, have the skills needed to
take advantage of the new kinds of jobs which are getting opened up due to liberalization and
globalization). Such as management jobs in the private corporate sector.
Finally, he suggests that the rise of the lower castes is not linear and irreversible. There is no
clear-cut unity among lower caste parties or individuals, made more complicated by the fact
that OBCs and SCs are often at odds, given their conflicting class interests (witness the
antagonism between the BSP and the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh).
Keeping this larger picture in mind helps us to understand a critical reality about political
reservations: that they will help to increase representation and access of traditionally
marginalized groups such as low castes and women. However, the translation of this
increased representation into real power is bound to be a long journey, which traverses an
uneven, non-linear and rocky road.
16 | P a g e
CONCLUSION
In order to increase its efficacy, AA has to be less mechanical: provision of quotas should be
seen as the beginning of AA, not its end, as is the current practice. A big problem with the
existing nature of implementation is that there is no monitoring, and there are no penalties for
evading AA. Thus, the mere announcement of quotas is seen as sufficient, and very little
attention is paid to outcomes.
Further, just providing entry into jobs or educational institutions is not sufficient. There have
to be supplementary measures that need to be mandatorily incorporated: remedial teaching,
counseling and other measures to lower the incidence of drop-outs; skill enhancing
programmes and so forth: which would ensure that the benefits of entry into prestigious jobs
and educational programmes are fully utilised.
To be effective, AA should contain self-liquidating and self-perpetuating features: as AA
becomes stronger at entry level, it should be gradually lowered at the later stages. But for
this, strict monitoring of outcomes, with penalties for non-compliance are essential.The idea
of abolishing quotas can meaningfully be mooted only after they have been implemented in
their entirety and have been in place for at least a decade (to follow Ambedkar’s original
timeline).
Finally, “outside the box” measures targeted towards Dalits and Adivasis (tribals) must be
considered that go beyond the scope of the current AA program: free, compulsory and good
quality primary education, vigorous expansion of non-farm employment, land reforms
wherever feasible, subsidies/support for Dalit business/self- employment. All these will
benefit a much larger section of Dalits than the current AA programme.
The important thing to note is that the existing AA program and these supplementary
measures need not be considered mutually exclusive. They can strengthen and reinforce each
other. Admittedly, all these measures have costs, but the benefits of integrating large sections
of nearly 160 million Dalits and unleashing the suppressed reservoir of talent is the need of
the hour for the rapidly growing Indian economy.
17 | P a g e
BIBLIOGRAPHY
• Social Justice Through Affirmative Action in India: An Assessment; Ashwini
Deshpande :
http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/scho/WEE/papers/Ashwini%20Deshpande1.p
df
• Quest for Equality: Affirmative Action in India; Ashwini Deshpande :
https://www.jstor.org/stable/27768186
• An Assessment of Rights and Affirmative action Policies in India ; Bhavna Sharma :
https://anvpublication.org/Journals/HTMLPaper.aspx?Journal=International+Journal+
of+Advances+in+Social+Sciences%3BPID%3D2017-5-2-8
18 | P a g e
