IDEOLOGY OF THE FUTURE

The “Ideology of the Future” movement asserts that Russia is a separate civilization in its own right—neither Western nor Eastern. Moreover,
advocates of the ideology in the government assert that Russian civilization as it has evolved provides a superior guide for the future po-
litical and economic formation of global society when compared to the failing liberal democratic systems that predominate in the current
international system. The foundations of the new ideology will be taught to students of all majors in the first semester of their first year at
university. This means that regardless of the students’ course selection, all begin their higher education with ideological indoctrination using
such means as textbooks on the history of Russia. (Photo courtesy of Oleg Elkov)

Russians Are Busy

Hammering Out Their
“Ideology of the
Future”
Dr. Robert F. Baumann
MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2023 73
T he official position of state-sponsored public
intellectuals since the beginning of the war
in Ukraine has been that President Vladimir
Putin’s “special military operation” marked a global
historical turning point. For instance, Dmitri Trenin,
extensive backing from the state and state-approved pub-
lic intellectuals, this publication aimed to provide a forum
for thought about Russia’s future. The main categories
included Russia’s future in focused scientific discussion;
Russia, the Russian world, and Russian civilization in
a scholar at the Center for National Security of the current conditions of global threat; and military-histor-
Russian Academy of Sciences, called it a “watershed ical heritage in the struggle against “myths” and falsifi-
moment” in the November 2022 periodical Russia in cations.3 However, its orientation changed significantly
Global Affairs.1 To make himself perfectly clear, Trenin once the special military operation began to sputter in
noted that he is not talking about a simple “turning March 2022. On 21 March, the state officially registered
point,” which might be subject to reversal, but a defin- it as a source of mass information and thus subject to
itive, irreversible break with the past. This surprising new controls. Suddenly, Ideology of the Future pushed
proposition has become a core tenet of Russia’s emerg- the staggering assertion that over one thousand years of
ing “ideology of the future.” Russian history are divisible into two parts: before and
Vladimir Medinsky—Putin’s handpicked presiden- after 24 February 2022, the date Putin’s special military
tial assistant, head of operation officially launched. The fifth issue, published
the influential Russian in June 2022, reflected a dramatic change of focus. Since
Dr. Robert Baumann Military Historical then, almost every article has drawn alleged scientific
is a former professor of Society (RMHS), and connections to the spetsial’naia voennaia operatsiia (SVO)
history at the Command shaper of ideological as it is abbreviated in Russian.
and General Staff and cultural dialogue— Also in this issue, a new lead section, consisting
College (CGSC) on Fort said essentially the same of eight articles, carried the title “Special Operation:
Leavenworth, Kansas. He thing in equally cata- Ideological and Informational Support.” In effect, the
holds a BA in Russian from clysmic terms, char- journal’s mission statement changed. The first article,
Dartmouth College, an acterizing the present “The Ideology of Russian Victory: Out Sacred Codes,”
MA in Russian and East moment as “the greatest outlined the traits and circumstances that shaped
European studies from challenge” in Russian Russia and contributed to victories through the centu-
Yale University, and a PhD history and warning ries. It established a storyline of defeat and redemption.
in Russian history. Over a that the survival of Its author, Aleksandr Prokhanov, noted the vital role of
span of several decades, Russian civilization miracles in Russian history, exemplified in the twen-
he taught courses in was at risk.2 As bizarre tieth century by victory in the Great Patriotic War.
Russian and Eurasian histo- as this might sound to Demonstrating the same spirit today, the people have
ry at CGSC, the University outsiders, such remarks dug their country out from the ashes and miraculous-
of Kansas, and Kansas State capture the current ly returned Crimea to Russia. “Today’s Russian state
University. In addition hysteria in Russia arose after a huge historic defeat, resurrected itself after
to studying at Moscow resulting from the (so a stunning crash. We have again started the Russian
University and Leningrad far) thwarted attempt reactor.”4 Subsequent articles highlighted the Russian
University in the former to seize Ukraine. information campaign supporting SVO with particular
USSR, he has conducted Just months prior to focus on denazification and allegations of genocide in
numerous research trips to the start of the euphe- Donbas.
Russia and spent several mistically titled special The journal’s editorial board as well as its list of
years as an education ad- military operation principal contributors draws from select sources
visor at the Armed Forces on 24 February 2022, beholden to the regime. There is, of course, the RMHS
Academy of Uzbekistan the RMHS founded a and its network of branches around the country. In
under the auspices of new journal under the addition, there are strong links to academic centers,
the Defense Security pretentious title Ideology defense colleges, and think tanks that also function
Cooperation Agency. of the Future. With as government propaganda arms. Finally, there are

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 IDEOLOGY OF THE FUTURE

well-publicized discussion clubs consisting of politically durable framework for intellectual and political life,
loyal public intellectuals. and for those inclined to accept it a fully developed
This article aims to examine the intellectual evo- belief system as well. Soviet citizens had an idea of their
lution of the new worldview and especially Russia’s place in political and world history. Even in the worst of
Orwellian quest to produce a rational framework for a times, most Soviet citizens assumed that their country
policy that can galvanize support from a weary popu- was advanced and respected worldwide.
lation for whatever the Putin regime may choose to do. All this came crashing down with the collapse of
Although it has received intensive attention since the the USSR in 1991. Amidst the brief period of euphor-
start of the war in Ukraine, the so-called “ideology of ic flirtation with democracy as the union dissolved
the future” has been in the making for a long time and into fifteen separate republics, the Russian Federation
yet still eludes precise formulation.5 We can, however, headed by President Boris Yeltsin quickly found itself
identify salient tenets in this line of thought and reach groping in the darkness for a new sense of direction and
some tentative conclusions about what the ideology is purpose. For example, how was the Russian Federation
and is not at this stage of its development. to define itself ? Russians made up the preponderant
demographic and cultural component of the coun-
Contextual Review try, but even stripped of the minority republics of the
First, a contextual review is in order. The “deep former USSR, Russia remained a diverse country.
history” of the new ideology reflects concepts such Thus, one attempt to clarify matters was a project
as Eurasianism, whose roots reach back at least as proclaimed in 1996 to establish a “Concept of the State
far as the Russian Revolution of 1917. Briefly stated, Nationalities Policy.”9 The purpose of the document
Eurasianism, as framed by Russian intellectuals, regards was to lay the groundwork for a new federal structure
Russia as a distinctive civilization apart from the adver- that would simultaneously allow for the development
sarial West and profoundly influenced by connections of Russian identity as foundational to the new state
to Asia.6 To be sure, Eurasianist philosophizing is often while making space for non-Russians who were part
convoluted and full of arcane references. In fact, it of the “Russian world” to continue their own cultures
occasionally delves so far down the proverbial “rabbit in a Russian context. Unlike the former Soviet Union,
hole” that it brings to mind George Kennan’s reference whose ideology demanded subordination of Russian
to the “Russian capacity for self-delusion.”7 identity to the concept of a multinational federation
Ideology has multiple uses for Putin. As noted by of “independent” republics, the Russian Federation did
journalist Frank Foer, “Kulturkampf is not merely a di- not conceal its fundamentally national character.
agnosis of the world; it is a political strategy.”8 In Putin’s Accentuating the Russianness of the federation
case, ideology helped him brush off election protests marked a subtle departure from the policies of the
in 2011 and push back at the West over values-based USSR and even the Russian Empire, which had always
debates concerning gender, colonialism, economic bul- highlighted its Russian distinctiveness while fram-
lying, and so forth. Putin learned the utility of ideology ing its decisions in the context of imperial interests
from serving the Soviet Union, which governed the rather than narrowly Russian national prerogatives.10
former Russian Empire for seven decades. It was not so The doctrine of “Official Nationality” put forth under
much the Marxist-Leninist content of the ideology, for Tsar Nicholas I in the 1830s gave official sanction to
which Putin held little admiration, that left a perma- the place of the Orthodox faith, identification with
nent imprint as it was the logical template of official the Russian nation in a civic sense, and autocracy as
ideology as a rubric for officially sanctioned thought. the system of rule.11 In practical terms, this meant
Marxism-Leninism, though often manipulated by the that overt Russian nationalism as expressed by Pan-
leadership to justify all manner political machinations, Slavists lacked the Tsar’s endorsement. Thus, Nikolai
provided the Soviet populace with a philosophical Danilevsky’s hugely influential book, Russia and Europe
north star that provided a seemingly principled ratio- (1869 in serialized form), emphasizing competing civi-
nale for the regime and pointed toward a hazily defined lizations, carried no official imprimatur. To be sure, the
better future. Furthermore, it provided a relatively work resonated with Russian nationalists in political

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2023 75

and military circles, but the regime regarded expres- United States during the Gulf War of 1991. One
sions of popular opinion as undermining the exclusive Russian theorist at the time, Gen.-Maj. Vladimir
tsarist prerogative to determine policy without inter- Slipchenko, characterized it as sixth-generation war-
ference.12 In any case, a decentralized federal national- fare employing means that posed a clear danger to the
ities policy under Yeltsin emerged but did not survive overmatched military of Russia.16 The fact that the
the subsequent Putin presidency that incrementally war immediately preceded the collapse of the USSR
centralized and subordinated the non-Russian regional left Russian military analysts rattled. One prominent
republics to Moscow. This was especially so once Putin interpretation of events that gained currency was that
began his second tour in the presidency in 2012 at the Central Intelligence Agency had played a role in
which point Russian identity openly became the orga- bringing down the Soviet regime. (This is the sort of
nizing principle of the federation.13 thinking that helped condition Putin to accept the

Putin proceeded to do away with the inconvenience of

democracy through a series of new election laws that
impeded formation of an actual opposition.

Putin’s return to the presidency shaped the cur- idea that foreign intelligence services were working
rent environment in important ways. One immediate assiduously in 2011 to do the same to him.) Renewed
consequence of Putin’s election fixing in 2000 was that, protests in 2019 about pension reform and other issues
in the words of now-detained dissident critic Vladimir reminded Putin about the perils of tolerating demo-
Kara-Murza, “Putin proceeded to do away with the cratic expression.
inconvenience of democracy through a series of new Meanwhile, the steady expansion of NATO dove-
election laws that impeded formation of an actual op- tailed nicely with this conspiratorial view of events.
position.”14 After serving the constitutional maximum So potent was this worry that figures such as Mikhail
of eight years, Putin temporarily ceded the presidency Gorbachev who had opened Russia to the West in the
to his ally Dmitry Medvedev. The prospect of Putin’s first place in the late 1980s concurred with much of
return to the presidency prompted widespread protests it. As political scientist William Taubman noted in
in 2011 in Saint Petersburg and Moscow by Russians his biography of the last Soviet leader, “Gorbachev,
who understood that a rigged transition posed an too, condemned Western attempts to ‘turn us into
existential threat to what remained of Russian democ- some kind of backwater’ after the cold war.” Like Putin,
racy. Putin’s “takeaway” from this experience was that Gorbachev protested NATO expansion and the bomb-
the protests of democracy activists could only have ing of Yugoslavia during the conflict over Kosovo.17
been orchestrated from abroad. To be sure, the United For Russia, the decade after the end of the Cold
States, for example, openly voiced its sympathy for War brought vast disappointment following a brief
the democracy activists.15 To Putin, this amounted to period of soaring hopes. Democracy was not working
election interference, whether the elections themselves
were legitimate or not. For him and his inner circle, it
Next page: (From left) Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, President
was part of the accumulation of evidence that the West of the Alexander Solzhenitsyn Russian Charity Foundation Natalia
was orchestrating a so-called color revolution (like Solzhenitsyna, President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Patriarch of Mos-
those on Ukraine or Georgia) in Russia. cow and All Russia Kirill, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and Cul-
ture Minister Vladimir Medinsky take part in unveiling a monument
Another bastion of growing alarm about Western
to the Holy Prince Vladimir, Equal of the Apostles, in Moscow’s
intentions was Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Concerns Borovitskaya Square on 4 November 2016, the National Unity Day.
traced to the display of advanced technology by the (Photo by Dmitry Astakhov, Sputnik via the Associated Press)

76 September-October 2023 MILITARY REVIEW

 IDEOLOGY OF THE FUTURE

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2023 77

well, the economy floundered during the transition to a policy event. Putin shares his latest thoughts in a
market capitalism, angry pensioners aligned with the forum that offers a veneer of intellectual gravitas. After
recently deposed communist party, crime rates ex- all, most members hold advanced degrees as well as
ploded to shocking levels, and Russia’s global influence high-level appointments to research or political centers.
evaporated. The ensuing crisis, brought on by rampant Many members are content contributors to Ideology of
corruption and administrative incompetence under the Future. Prior to the crisis in Ukraine, some Western
President Boris Yeltsin, left most Russians willing to policymakers were invited to participate. In recent years,
accept a partial return to authoritarianism in return conference themes have hewed closer to the govern-
for a bit of stability. mental party line and especially related to how Russia
One sign of Putin’s plans to rejuvenate the country can reshape the world order. While the club may play a
psychologically was the christening in formal legislation modest role in influencing policy, it plays a prominent
of the RMHS in 2012.18 Putin put his personal impri- role in amplifying policy.
matur on the new organization, which received lavish One notable aspect of the Valdai meetings is that
funding. That an ostensibly educational organization a share of them take place outside of the Russian
focusing on military heritage would become part of the Federation itself. For example, in the fall of 2021,
new ideological vanguard revealed a simultaneously old Tashkent, Uzbekistan, hosted a meeting emphasizing
and new strategy. It was old in the sense that the tsarist relations between Russia and the former Soviet repub-
empire and even more so the Soviet government un- lics in Central Asia. At a recent meeting on Central
derstood that control of historical narratives was a key Asia staged in May 2023, one of the Russian organizers,
to defining national identity and justifying current and Timofei Bordachev, exclaimed, “Russia is the closest
future policy. It was new in that it resurrected Russia’s neighbor and ancient partner of the peoples of Central
imperial history as the prime narrative of national Asia.”19 This comment signaled Russia’s not-so-subtle
greatness supplemented by a deep excursion into the view that it retains a strong interest in what it considers
Great Patriotic War. its realm of privileged influence.
In turn, the Izborsk Club, which was established in
Russia Today 2012 in association with the 1,150th anniversary of the
Today, the form of Soviet ideology, though little of founding of its namesake city, has an explicitly patri-
the content, offers a blank template for thinking about otic mission. The chairman is Aleksandr Prokhanov,
Russia. Putin has always tried to shape the dialogue editor of the daily Zavtra (tomorrow) newspaper. A
from a distance, leaving the particulars to others to longtime conservative going back to his opposition to
work out. This way there is a semblance of uncon- Yeltsin (Russia’s first post-Soviet president who enjoyed
trolled public discussion that he can elect to embrace Western backing), Prokhanov became a proponent of
or dismiss. He also gains the opportunity to sense the idea of “Fifth Empire,” which postulates that Russia’s
incipient trends among his core supporters. In addition current regime is the fifth in a series of historic Russian
to the RMHS, Putin has encouraged the activities of empires. This notion, which holds Putin as the founder,
so-called discussion clubs, whose membership exten- has enjoyed considerable play in Ideology of the Future,
sively overlaps with RMHS as well as government insti- where Prokhanov is an editorial board member.20
tutes, defense think tanks, and patriotic organizations. Another interesting example of the discussion group
Collectively, these function both as cheerleaders for the phenomenon is the Zinoviev Club, which proclaims
regime and forums for controlled political analysis. commitment to the outlook and writings of philoso-
The best known of these is the Valdai Club, but oth- pher Alexander Zinoviev who died in 2006. Zinoviev
ers such as the Izborsk Discussion Club and the Zinoviev earned fame as a Soviet-era satirist and as author of the
Discussion Club also have significant public profiles. acclaimed novel Yawning Heights as well as works such as
Established in 2009, the Valdai Club, named after Lake Homo-Soveticus. Exiled by the Soviet government in 1978,
Valdai near Novgorod where the founding meeting was Zinoviev returned to the motherland in 1999. Loosely
held, is the most closely linked to Putin himself. In fact, in the tradition of Nikolai Danilevsky, he embraced an
Putin’s annual address to the Valdai Club has become allegedly scientific analysis of society and history.21

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 IDEOLOGY OF THE FUTURE

Overall, it is worth taking note of what has been ad- government is so anxious to draw comparisons at
opted and what has been rejected from the Soviet style every opportunity with the special military operation.
of ideological logic. For the Soviets, the cult of Vladimir One popular claim is that the special military opera-
Lenin (and for a while Joseph Stalin), the mytholo- tion with its purported purpose to denazify Ukraine
gy of the October Revolution marked by associated is the perfectly logical step to complete the unfinished
parades and holidays, and the official obsession with work of the Great Patriotic War.25
the Great Patriotic War (World War II to the rest of This new narrative has become official dogma.
the planet) provided the means to glorify the commu- In fact, recent legislation as well as a constitution-
nist regime and establish historical mythology around al amendment (Article 67/1) threatened sanctions
its achievements.22 Of course, the regime’s egregious against historians inclined to challenge the correct
failures remained unacknowledged and consigned to point of view.26 In addition, laws against the rehabil-
the forbidden realm banned ideas. In any case, Putin itation of Nazism and support for extremism used
has marginalized memory of Lenin and October, while language vague enough to put historians on guard. The
elevating memory of the Great Patriotic War and constitutional provision prohibited “diminution of the
Stalin (“mistakes” and all) to the pantheon of ideolog- significance of the achievements of the people in de-
ical monuments reserved for Alexander Nevsky, Peter fense of the Fatherland.”27 At the same time, guardians
the Great, and lately Putin himself. of the official view such as Vladimir Medinsky champi-
Under Putin, the constant memorialization of oned the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—often denounced
World War II along with numerous other milestones by historians, especially in the West—as a triumph of
in Russian military history has been fundamental Soviet diplomacy.28
in forming a new ideology. Victory Day, the 9 May Some republics of the former Soviet Union, such as
holiday commemorating victory in the Great Patriotic in Central Asia, served as venues for commemorative
War, is perhaps now the most important holiday on events through 2021. Victory Day celebrations became
the calendar. Until 2015, it was also Russia’s interna- a transparent instrument of Russian influence. Many
tional calling card, a moment to invite representatives schools incorporated Victory Day events into their
of formerly allied countries in the war against the schedules to complement official diplomatic ceremo-
Nazis to attend the grandiose parade in Moscow and nies staged at various regional war memorials. Russian
bask in the glory of Russia’s most conspicuous achieve- television crews filmed examples of school activities for
ment of the twentieth century. However, following news consumption back in Russia. Historical confer-
Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, some invited ences offered forums for speeches about the war by in-
countries such as the United States and Britain de- ternational representatives, above all those from Russia.
clined to send representatives. One common theme of interest voiced by Russian
Still, Victory Day retained its place even as the speakers was the struggle to rescue the history of the
global COVID pandemic disrupted normalcy around war from distortions by Western scholars seeking to
the world. As observed by Saint Petersburg professor diminish the enormous Soviet contribution to victory.
Ivan Kurilla in 2020, celebration of the seventy-fifth Speakers framed this assault on their favored inter-
anniversary of the end of the war was linked to con- pretation of the history of the war as part of a broader
stitutional reform, the return of Russia to great power cultural offensive against Russians and by extension
status, and the transformation of the official narrative the other peoples of the former Soviet Union who
about the Great Patriotic War into a fiercely defended sacrificed in the war.29 Irina Kaznacheeva, writing in
pillar of the emerging ideology. Political scientist Paul Ideology of the Future, attributed this and other histor-
Goble likens World War II to the “founding myth” of ical heresies to what she terms the Western industry
the Putin government.23 As scholar Gregory Carleton of historical fakes.30 The point was to spread the sense
noted about the spirit of triumphalism, “More than of grievance and insult professed by Russian nation-
any other subject, it [the war] makes Russia the alist historians to other formerly Soviet nationalities.
decisive protagonist in the greatest conflict the world Whereas in fact most Western scholarly challenges to
has ever known.”24 This is a primary reason why the Putin’s favored narrative focus on Stalin’s decisions such

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2023 79

as the deal with Germany in 1939, war crimes in occu- empire advanced by Peter the Great. She concludes
pied territories, widespread purges, and the imposition that Putin is the man to meet the moment today:
of communist regimes in eastern Europe, nationalist “The course of Putin and his team absolutely does not
historians cast these criticisms as an attack on the he- align with the plans of the collective West. Russia has
roes who saved the world from Nazism. entered a phase of global opposition to the American
Victory Day events revealed several layers of the hegemon and its allies.”33
new historically based ideology in both theory and prac- To date, themes propagated in Ideology of the Future
tice. On one hand, they accentuated Russia’s leadership focus overwhelmingly on history, particularly on mili-
role in the war and the solidarity among the peoples tary history, or what in the Soviet Union was known as
of the former Soviet Union. They especially reinforced military-patriotic education. In that context, Russian
Russia’s implicit claim to leadership among the former military achievements constituted the highest mani-
republics. On the other hand, they reflected Russia’s festation of patriotism. The goal of military-patriotic
determination to control the historical narrative of the education was to produce new generations ready to
war and issue an ideological rebuff to the West. sacrifice for the motherland. Today, as in the Soviet era,
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 Russia is engaged in an information war with the West
resulted in a change of atmospherics surrounding over historical truth.34 Thus, while its content is heavily
Victory Day celebrations. Central Asian republics weighted toward historical narrative, the journal is also
such as Uzbekistan muted commemorative events and highly presentist in its outlook. It asserts that history is
steered clear of any actions that might imply an en- directly relevant to the special military operation and
dorsement of Russian foreign policy. In 2023, schools in its success. The new generation must pick up the torch
Uzbekistan acknowledged Victory Day but commemo- and carry Russia to new victories.
rative events remained subdued. Accordingly, the current moment is a decisive one
In any case, the relevant question here concerns in the stream Russian history. Young patriots are living
what Russia’s current historical obsessions tell us about out the latest manifestations of Russia’s historical devel-
an emergent ideology. An examination of the jour- opment. To drive home the point, the journal repeated-
nal Ideology of the Future gives a few indications. One ly identifies Putin as a leader of his age on par with the
derives from the consensus among regime supporters greatest figures in Russian history. His special military
that an officially sanctioned national idea is necessary. operation is an act of resolve and genius dictated by the
R. I. Medinsky, not to be confused with Vladimir circumstances of the times. Putin’s response to foreign
Medinsky, claims Russia needs such an idea like never threat is worthy of comparison to the deeds of his
before. He alludes to his experience in the 1980s when predecessors from Nevsky to Peter to Stalin.35 To drive
he participated in the massive and dangerous cleanup home the point, the Ministries of Defense and Culture,
after Chernobyl. He asserts that a sense of patriotism bastions of the current ideological trend, announced
and values instilled by his Soviet education kept him plans to establish a national network of museums dedi-
and others going under extremely adverse circum- cated to the special military operation, thereby further
stances. Drawing an unflattering comparison with elevating its importance.36 Apparently, the “future” in
the present, he asks, “Where have the true patriots Ideology of the Future is a reference to what is at stake
gone?”31 Echoing Putin, Medinsky condemns the priv- and how Russia must shape the future.
ileged “rats” of the modern “elite” who jump ship when
the country faces adversity.32 Nine Pillars of Russia’s Worldview
In short, Medinsky and others regard a national Although the new ideology is still a work in prog-
ideology as the answer to an immediate problem—how ress, this article tentatively posits nine pillars of the
to sustain support for the special military operation. emerging worldview.
Building on this theme, Kaznacheeva proclaims that One. Though seldom expressed in such blunt terms,
great leaders have always appeared in Russia’s nation- there is a personality cult at the top in Russia that provides
al history to provide guiding ideas ranging from the the underlying rationale behind much of the rest. The
“Third Rome” of the Monk Filofei to the drive for top priority of the Putin regime is its continuation in

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 IDEOLOGY OF THE FUTURE

Vladimir Medinsky, head of the influential Russian Military Historical Society and de facto minister of culture, gives a lecture 22 February
2022 on the three hundredth anniversary of the Russian Empire. (Photo by the Russian Military Historical Society)

power and every subsequent ideological claim serves regime. Unwavering support of the state is fundamen-
that end. It starts with the assertion that a “vertical tal to their identity.
state” with some trappings of democracy is perfectly Three. An essential aspect of this historical tradition
natural for Russia and so the modern presidency is is the view that Russia has earned its status as a world
consonant with the traditions of princes and tsars.37 civilization and all the perquisites that this implies.
After all, what did Alexander Nevsky, Peter the Great, Some authors refer to a “code” like the primordial DNA
Catherine the Great, or Joseph Stalin need with of Russian civilization that is permanently reflected in
democracy? Putin is simply the latest in this proud lin- its national character and drive to secure its sphere of
eage. Prokhanov writes in Ideology of the Future, “No, it influence.39 Therefore, Russia has legitimate interests, is en-
is not Putin who has written his name in Russian histo- titled to its historic space, and can only be judged by its own
ry. Russian history has been written in him.”38 Insulting standards. Russia does not need Western-style democ-
the president, entailing almost any form of explicit or racy because it enjoys a unique consensual relationship
implicit criticism, is illegal. Consequently, the govern- between the ruler and the governed.
ment’s unyielding refusal to face the dismal outcome to Four. The history of the Russian Orthodox Church
date of the special military operation stems from fear exemplifies what is distinctive about the Russian world.
that any lack of firmness would suggest that the current Its oppositional relationship to Catholicism (and subse-
regime is incompetent. quently Protestantism as well) has lasted for a millen-
Two. The role of historically based military-patriotic nium. Orthodoxy has been crucial to the idea of Russia
education in Russia today is to justify the current regime as a separate civilizational center. In fact, references to
and its policies by invoking the mythical greatness of “third Rome” imply world leadership. Although for
an eternal Russian civilization defined as Eurasian most Russians Orthodoxy is more a matter of cultural
and shaped by the Orthodox Church, transcendent heritage than religious conviction, the country retains a
leaders, and a distinct set of values. That civilization profound emotional connection to its enduring sym-
is entitled to a seat at the table of great powers but is bolism whether in its distinctive church architecture or
currently under threat from the perpetually hostile veneration of icons.
West. Programs underway in schools and civic organi- Five. Russia is a Eurasian power. Affinity with China,
zations across Russia tell young people that the essence as expressed in the “unlimited partnership” declared by
of being Russian is to embrace the received traditions of Putin and Xi Jinping, is a naturally occurring strate-
their ancestors as interpreted for them by the current gic alignment against the West to thwart American

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2023 81

hegemony. This relationship resides in the tradition include respect for the human rights of individuals as
of Alexander Nevsky who stood firmly against the well as for democracy, and above all the right to criticize
West while making accommodation with the Mongol one’s government, for which Solzhenitsyn was arrest-
Empire in the East. As long ago as 2015, Russian fi- ed and eventually exiled.) Furthermore, Putin added,
nancial commentator Aleksandr Razuvayev compared “Over the past nearly half a century, this blindness that
Putin’s choice to Nevsky’s, noting, “He preferred the Solzhenitsyn spoke of—openly racist and neo-colonial in
Horde to the Catholic West and an Asian market from nature [Putin’s words, not Solzhenitsyn’s]—has taken on
the Volga to China to trade with Europe.”40 Not to resist simply ugly forms, especially after the emergence of the
Western influence would result in gradual assimilation so-called unipolar world.”43
by Europe and cost Russia its identity. Today, Russia Eight. As framed by Putin, Russian sovereignty is
seeks to organize states worldwide that do not wish to at stake. Moreover, he is not so subtly trying to align
submit to colonization by Western values. Russia with states (especially dictatorships) in Africa
Six. Hence, Western hybrid war aimed at undermin- and Asia that were once part of European colonial
ing Russia and imposing Western values is the central empires yet today must tolerate European critiques of
problem of the present age. The Great Patriotic War their politics and human rights records. Putin would
provides a victory narrative to inspire emulation. One have us believe that Russia feels their pain. (Actually,
practical objective of the reverence for history is to build Putin is calling on authoritarian rulers to close ranks
support for a renewed militarization of Russia. This is evi- against pressure to democratize.) Somehow, to suggest
dent not only through the fixation with the development that authoritarianism is wrong is “to deny the very ex-
of a multilayered system of military-patriotic education istence of culture, art, science of other peoples.”44 Putin
but also the gradual introduction of wartime norms in falsely extends this to “prohibitions of Dostoevsky and
Russian society. These range from clamping down on Tchaikovsky” (which have not occurred), all a part of
what little remains of press freedom and jailing political “the modern Western culture of cancellation.”45 With
opponents to expanding laws pertaining to treason and the breathtaking audacity of one who allows no serious
espionage. To oppose Russia’s special military operation domestic dissent, Putin claims that he is the one stand-
against Ukraine in print or speech is construed to dis- ing up for “open society” and the right of every country to
credit the army and provide moral support to the enemy. choose its own form of government. (As though Russia’s
To describe it as war or invasion is illegal. Even as the elections were not fixed, and the people actively and
special military operation stalled at the start of spring consciously chose dictatorship as their preferred sys-
2022, various Russian websites began compiling lists tem of governance.) In effect, Russia’s president holds
of traitors.41 Broadly speaking, establishing a wartime that choosing to have no political rights is a fundamen-
regime grants Putin maximum latitude to classify any tal individual right reflecting the natural distinctive-
critic as an enemy of the state or a foreign agent. ness of different cultures.46
Seven. Russia is a victim. Creating their own peculiar In turn, all Western criticism is inherently malicious
brand of identity politics, advocates of the new order con- and aimed at absorbing Russia into the decadent, anti-
stantly perceive evidence of Western disrespect, anti-Rus- traditional European cultural orbit. Traditional values,
sian racism, foreign subversion, and so on. Speaking of the Putin posits, flow from unique national experiences
West at the Valdai Discussion Club Meeting in October and are entitled to respect. After all, Russia does not
2022, Putin argued, “It [the West] denies the sovereignty tell Europe how to live. Again and again, Putin returns
of countries and peoples, their originality and uniqueness, to the question posed by Russian Pan-Slav philosopher
does not put the interests of other states in anything.”42 Nikolai Danilevsky, “Why does Europe hate us?”47
Ironically, Putin invoked writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s There is ample precedent for such thinking. During the
famous speech at Harvard in 1978 when, while exiled Soviet era, the Communist Party constantly cited the
by the Soviet regime as punishment for exposing the destruction resulting from the Nazi invasion to ex-
evils of Stalinism, he nevertheless criticized the Western plain away systemic inefficiencies and shortcomings in
sense of superiority and its insistence that other coun- economic development. At the same time, internal pro-
tries follow its norms. (Of course, these dreaded “norms” paganda about the war covered up errors and atrocities

82 September-October 2023 MILITARY REVIEW

 IDEOLOGY OF THE FUTURE

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a laying ceremony 9 May 2020 at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin Wall in Mos-
cow, marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Nazi defeat in World War II. Putin postponed the massive Victory Day parade due to the
coronavirus pandemic but ordered a flyover of warplanes over Red Square. (Photo by Alexei Druzhinin, Associated Press)

by Stalin and the Communist Party. That Putin, as assertions of the right of states to manage their inter-
an ex-KGB operative, would fall back on this style of nal affairs without interference, it makes few univer-
reasoning is not shocking. Thus, his view is that today sal claims to relevance characteristic of Marxism-
the United States and the West are attacking Russia Leninism or Western liberalism. The ideology of the
without any provocation whatsoever. future applies to Russia and a specific understanding of
Nine. Many Russian nationalist commentators in- Russia’s place and prerogatives in the world. From this
voke the importance of justice. However, what this usually vantage point, Russia is a benign power, a threat to no
implies is not justice for individuals in a Western sense but one. It is simply claiming its rightful place among world
rather justice for Russia itself. In short, the war in Ukraine civilizations. Accordingly, neighboring peoples that
seeks a kind of restorative justice, returning to Russia were once under Russian sway within the empire or the
what rightfully belongs to it. As for Russia’s position in USSR should gravitate naturally to their proper place
the international system, Putin claims that Russia is in subordination to a greater power. Russian national-
fighting for democracy in international relations: “But ists regard the contiguous former republics as beholden
today the absolute majority of the world community to Russia for the gift of Russian civilization and mem-
demands democracy in international affairs and does bership in the Russian world. In this scenario, Russia
not accept any form of authoritarian dictate by individ- was never an imperialist colonizing nation like the
ual countries or groups of states. What is this if not the European powers. The accumulation of territory across
direct application of the principles of democracy at the Eurasia was natural and, for the most part, benevolent.
level of international relations?”48 Equally important, as Putin himself has indicated,
Overall, a striking feature of commentary about Russian territorial gains under Peter, for example, did
ideology in Russia is its particularity. Other than pious not require the approval of Europe.49

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2023 83

Pedestrians walk past a New Year decoration stylized as the “Kremlin Star” 2 January 2023 in Moscow. The decoration includes the letter “Z,”
a tactical insignia used by Russian troops in Ukraine. (Photo by Natalia Kolesnikova, Agence France-Presse)

Conclusion the still unresolved “ideology of the future” will in all

Ultimately, Putin’s regime and its formative ideol- probability far outlive the Putin administration. They
ogy may have staked too much on the special military withstood past societal changes and political earthquakes
operation in Ukraine. Failure in this overhyped endeavor in Russia and will retain their grip on the imagination
could grievously undermine claims about historical inev- of nationalists for decades to come. Even so, it is not
itability, Russia’s unique “victory code,” Putin’s infallibili- certain that a new ideology really offers a solution to
ty, and Russia’s civilizational mission. Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Russia’s underlying problems. Support for the war seems
June declaration (not to mention his brief mutiny) about widespread but tepid. This is consistent with the impact
the falsehood of Russia’s pretext for launching the war of ideology during the Soviet era. Still, the ideology does
against Ukraine offers evidence to that effect. Still, the provide a useful lens through which to understand the
principal streams of reasoning that collectively constitute ambitions of the Putin government.

Notes
1. Dmitri Trenin, “Spetsial’naia voennaia operatsiia na Ukraine chajshim-vyzovom-v-svoej-istorii. The English language tends to
kak perelomnaia tochka vneshnei politiki sovremennoi Rossii” [The conflate the Russian adjectives russkoe, which is an ethnic term of
special military operation in Ukraine as a watershed moment in the reference, and rossiiskoe, which implies belonging to the Russian
foreign policy of contemporary Russia], Rossiia v global’noi politike state or civilization. The point is that the Russian Military Historical
[Russia in global affairs], 30 November 2022, accessed 15 May Society focuses not on a narrow ethnic history but on the history
2023, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/perelomnaya-tochka/. of the state and the many peoples that populate it and belong to
2. Vladimir Medinsky, “Rossiia sevodnia stolknulas’ s veli- the lands that constituted the empire.
chaishim vyzovom v svoei istorii” [Russia today confronts the 3. Ideologiia budushchego [Ideology of the future], no. 1
greatest challenge in its history], Russian Military Historical Society, (2021), accessed 15 June 2023, https://histrf.ru/magazine/release/
24 March 2022, accessed 25 March 2022, https://rvio.histrf.ru/ac- ideologiya-budushchego-obshchestvenno-politicheskiy-nauch-
tivities/news/vladimir-medinskij-rossiya-segodnya-stolknulas-s-veli- no-teoreticheskiy-ekspertno-analiticheskiy-zhurnal-2021-1.

84 September-October 2023 MILITARY REVIEW

 IDEOLOGY OF THE FUTURE

4. Aleksandr Prokhanov, “Ideologiia Russkoi pobedy: nashi 13. Robert Baumann, “Culture under Construction: History and
sviashchennye kody” [The ideology of Russian victory: Our sacred Identity as Instruments of Russian Policy,” in Great Power Compe-
codes], Ideologiia budushchego [Ideology of the future], no. 5 ( June tition: The Changing Landscape of Global Geopolitics, ed. Mahir J.
2022), 8, accessed 27 May 2023, https://histrf.ru/files/ideology_of_ Ibrahimov (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General
future_part5.pdf. Staff College Press, 2020), 42.
5. For a concise discussion, see Andrei Kolesnikov, “Scientific 14. Vladimir Kara-Murza, “Stealing the Vote: The Kremlin Fixes
Putinism: Shaping Official Ideology in Russia,” Carnegie Endow- Another Election,” World Affairs 174, no. 3 (September-October
ment for International Peace, 21 November 2022, accessed 2011): 47–48, accessed 6 November 2015, http://www.jstor.org/
15 June 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88451. stable/41290343. Kara-Murza is currently imprisoned in Russia as
Kolesnikov notes that the effort to construct an ideology has punishment for speaking out about the war in Ukraine.
gained urgency with the war in Ukraine. See also Rayna Breuer, 15. For an in-depth look at the changing political climate in
“The Cocktail of Ideologies Behind Putin,” Deutsche Welle, 24 Russia during the Obama administration, see Michael McFaul, From
March 2022, accessed 15 June 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/ Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia
the-cocktail-of-ideologies-behind-vladimir-putin/a-61242466. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018); for insight into Putin’s
6. For a thorough discussion of the origins of Eurasianism, see redefinition of “democracy,” see Angela Stent, Putin’s World: Russia
Marlene Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire (Balti- against the West and with the Rest (New York: Hachette Book Group,
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). 2020), 41.
7. X [George Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Con- 16. See Jacob Kipp, review of Future War [Budushchaya
duct,” Foreign Affairs (website), 1 July 1947, accessed 13 June voyna], by Vladimir Slipchenko and Makhmut Gareev, Journal
2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/ of Slavic Military Studies 20, no. 1 (2007): 150–51, https://doi.
george-kennan-sources-soviet-conduct. org/10.1080/13518040701205878.
8. Franklin Foer, “It’s Putin’s World,” Atlantic (website), 15 17. William Taubman, Gorbachev: His Life and Times (New York:
March 2017, accessed 13 June 2023, https://www.theatlantic.com/ W. W. Norton, 2017), 685.
magazine/archive/2017/03/its-putins-world/513848/. 18. Presidential Decree No. 1710 (Moscow: The Kremlin, 29
9. Helge Blakkisrud, “Blurring the Boundary between Civic and December 2012), accessed 15 June 2023, http://static.kremlin.ru/
Ethnic: The Kremlin’s New Approach to National Identity under media/acts/files/0001201301040034.pdf.
Putin’s Third Term,” in The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, 19. Timofei Bordachev, “Russia and Central Asia: A Great Peace-
Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–2015, ed. Pal Kolsto and Helge ful Game,” Valdai Discussion Club, 15 May 2023, accessed 15 June
Blakkisrud (Edinburgh, GB: Edinburgh University, 2016), 261, ac- 2023, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-and-central-asia-a-
cessed 14 June 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1bh- great-peaceful-game/?sphrase_id=1525266.
2kk5. This is a thoughtful and well-researched anthology. Meanwhile, 20. “Aleksandr Prokhanov,” Izborsk Club of Experts, 7 November
for context, a concise conceptual outline of Soviet federalism is 2016, accessed 15 June 2023, https://izborsk-club.ru/10978.
available in Aleksandr M. Iusupovskii, Poiski novykh podkhodov k 21. See Philip Hanson, “Alexander Zinoviev’s Russian Tragedy:
resheniiu natsional’nykh problem: uroki istorii [An investigation of The Reality of Post-Communism,” accessed 15 June 2023, https://bal-
new approaches to resolution of nationalities problems: Lessons of ticworlds.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/zinovjev.pdf. Note the
history] (Moscow: “Knowledge” Society, 1990), 37–38. similarities in Danilevsky’s work Rossiia I Evropa [Russian and Europe]
10. Vera Tolz analyzes the problem of post-Soviet nation-build- (Saint Petersburg, RU: n.p., 1871), especially chapters 2 and 5. Also
ing in “Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building of interest is Danilevsky’s collection of articles under the title Gore
in Post-Communist Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 50, no. 6 (Septem- pobediteliam [Grief to the victors] (Moscow: n.p., 1998).
ber 1998): 993–1022, accessed 15 June 2023, http://www.jstor. 22. See Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and
org/stable/154053. Olga Malinova discusses Russia’s post-Soviet Fall of World War II in Russia (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 133–46.
struggle to construct “the national idea of ‘We’ in Russian society” in 23. Paul Goble, “History Is the Ideology of Putin’s Russia and Is
“A Workable Past: Symbolic Politics in Post-Soviet Russia,” Russia in Increasingly Controlled as Such, Kurilla Says,” Window on Eurasia, 30
Global Affairs, no. 4 (October-December 2012): 84–94, accessed 15 September 2020, accessed 15 May 2023, http://windowoneurasia2.
June 2023, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/a-workable-past/; For blogspot.com/2020/09/history-is-ideology-of-putins-russia.html.
a concise overview of pre-2005 literature in English on the place of 24. Gregory Carleton, “History Done Right: War and the
Russian identity in imperial and Soviet contexts, see Peter Duncan, Dynamics of Triumphalism in Contemporary Russian Culture,”
“Contemporary Russian Identity between East and West,” Historical Slavic Review 70, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 616, https://doi.org/10.5612/
Journal 48, no. 1 (March 2005): 277–94, accessed 15 June 2023, slavicreview.70.3.0615.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4091687. 25. Iurii Rubtsov, “Bitva s natsizmom prodolzhaetsia: operat-
11. For a summary, see Nicholas Riasanovsky, “Nationality in the siia po denatsifikatsii ukrainy est’ logicheskoe zavershenie velikoi
State Ideology during the Reign of Nicholas I,” Russian Review 19, otechestvennoi voiny” [The battle with Nazism continues: The
no. 1 ( January 1960): 38–46, https://doi.org/10.2307/126191; for operation in Ukraine as the logical conclusion of the Great Patriotic
a more detailed look, see Riasanovsky’s Nicholas I and Official Na- War], Ideologiia budushchego [Ideology of the future], no. 5 ( June
tionality in Russia, 1825–1855 (Los Angeles: University of California 2022): 13–16, accessed 15 June 2023, https://histrf.ru/files/ideolo-
Press, 1959). gy_of_future_part5.pdf.
12. For a recent discussion of Danilevsky’s view on civilizations, 26. Ivan Kurilla, “Rossiia: kakuiu istoriiu napi-
see Vlad Alalykin-Izvekov, “The Russian Sphinx: Contemplating Da- shut sledovateli?” [Russia: What history do the re-
nilevsky’s Enigmatic Magnum Opus Russia and Europe,” Comparative searchers write?], Eurasianet, 28 September 2020,
Civilizations Review, no. 86 (Spring 2022): 73–89, accessed 15 June accessed 15 May 2023, https://russian.eurasianet.
2023, https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol86/iss86/9/. org/%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8F-

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2023 85

%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%83%D1%8E-%D0%B8 36. Ekaterina Morozova, “Putin poruchil sozdat’ muzei, posvi-
%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8E-% ashchennye SVO [special military operation] na Ukraine” [Putin
D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%88%D1%83%D directed establishment of museums dedicated to the SVO in
1%82-%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0- Ukraine], Prufy.ru, 28 April 2023, accessed 15 June 2023, https://
%B2%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B8; J. Sadowski, prufy.ru/news/society/136457-putin_poruchil_sozdat_muzei_
“Amendments of 2020 to the Russian Constitution as an Update posvyashchennye_svo_na_ukraine.
to Its Symbolic and Identity Programme,” International Journal 37. Prokhanov, “Putinskii kod pobedy,” 22.
of Semiotic Law 35 (2022): 723–36, https://doi.org/10.1007/ 38. Ibid.
s11196-020-09802-w. 39. Aleksandr Prokhanov, “Dukhovnye konstanty russkoi
27. Kurilla, “Rossiia.” Kurilla wrote his dissertation on the Vlasov pobedy” [The spiritual constants of Russian victory], Ideologiia bu-
army, which was a legion of Russian prisoners of war formed by dushchego [Ideology of the future], no. 8 (2023): 39–40, accessed
Germany into military units to fight Joseph Stalin. 14 June 2023, https://history.ru/files/ideology_of_future_8.pdf;
28. Ibid.; Iain King, “Is Past Prologue? The Eightieth Anniver- see also Prokhanov, “Putinskii kod pobedy,” 19–22.
sary of the Start of World War II and a Secret Pact Between Great 40. Paul Goble, “Putin Is the Alexander Nevsky of Today, Razu-
Powers,” 23 August 2019, accessed 27 June 2023, https://www.csis. vayev Says,” Window on Eurasia, accessed 9 August 2015, http://
org/analysis/past-prologue-eightieth-anniversary-start-world-war- windowoneurasia2.blogspot.cz/2015/09/putin-is-alexander-of-to-
ii-and-secret-pact-between-great. day.html.
29. The author of this article was in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 41. Robert Baumann, “Russia’s Latest Historical Revisionism
during Victory Day ceremonies in 2021, and personally witnessed and Reinventing the Future,” Military Review Online Exclusive, 29
some of the activities and was a guest speaker at three different November 2022, accessed 13 June 2023, https://www.armyupress.
events. army.mil/journals/military-review/online-exclusive/2022-ole/
30. Irina Kaznacheeva, “Velikaia natsional’naia ideia Rossii” Baumann/; “Russofoby 2022, polnyi spisok” [Russophobes 2022:
[The great national idea of Russia], Ideologiia budushchego [Ideol- The complete list], Tsargrad TV, accessed 15 June 2023, https://
ogy of the future], no. 8 (2023): 14, accessed 15 May 2023, https:// tsargrad.tv/rusofob.
histrf.ru/files/ideology_of_future_8.pdf. 42. Vladimir Putin, “Vladimir Putin Meets with Mem-
31. R. I. Medinsky, “Chemu uchat nas uroki istoricheskoi bers of the Valdai Discussion Club. Transcript of the Ple-
pravdy? O neobkhodimosti natsional’noi idei (gosudarstvennaia nary Session of the 19th Annual Meeting” (speech, Valdai
ideologiia)“ [What do the lessons of historical truth teach us: On Discussion Club, Moscow, 27 October 2022), accessed 15
the necessity of a national idea (state ideology)], Ideologiia budu- June 2023, https://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/
shchego [Ideology of the future], no. 8 (2023): 11, accessed 15 vladimir-putin-meets-with-members-of-the-valdai-club/.
May 2023, https://histrf.ru/files/ideology_of_future_8.pdf. 43. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 10. 44. Ibid.
33. Kaznacheeva, “Velikaia natsional’naia ideia Rossii,” 17. 45. Ibid.
34. Vladimir Kiknadze, “Sila v pravde” [Power is in the truth], 46. Ibid.
Ideologiia budushchego [Ideology of the future], no. 7 (2022): 23– 47. Nikolai Danilevsky, Rossiia I evropa [Russia and Europe]
27, accessed 15 June 2023, https://histrf.ru/images/RVIO_7_2022. (Saint Petersburg, RU: Slavica Pub, 1871), chap. 2.
pdf. 48. Putin, speech.
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RVIO_7_2022.pdf. pire-restoration-endgame-intl-cmd/index.html.

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