Rel: March 7, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
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ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CL-2024-0588
_________________________

Alabama Medical Cannabis Commission

v.

Alabama Always, LLC

_________________________

CL-2024-0616
_________________________

Rex Vaughn, Sam Blakemore, Dwight Gamble, Dr. Jimmie

Harvey, James Harwell, Taylor Hatchett, Dr. Eric Jensen, Dr.
Angela Martin, Charles Price, Dr. William Saliski, Loree
Skelton, and Dr. Jerzy Szafarski, in their official capacities
as members of the Alabama Medical Cannabis Commission

v.

Alabama Always, LLC

Appeals from Montgomery Circuit Court

(CV-24-900524)
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

PER CURIAM.

The Alabama Medical Cannabis Commission ("AMCC") and Rex

Vaughn, Sam Blakemore, Dwight Gamble, Dr. Jimmie Harvey, James

Harwell, Taylor Hatchett, Dr. Eric Jensen, Dr. Angela Martin, Charles

Price, Dr. William Saliski, Loree Skelton, and Dr. Jerzy Szafarski, in

their official capacities as members of the AMCC ("the commissioners"),

appeal from a temporary restraining order ("the TRO") entered by the

Montgomery Circuit Court ("the circuit court") in favor of Alabama

Always, LLC. We dismiss the appeals as arising from a void judgment.

Background

The AMCC has three times denied the application of Alabama

Always for an integrated-facility license to produce and sell medical

cannabis under the Darren Wesley "Ato" Hall Compassion Act ("the Act"),

Ala. Code 1975, § 20-2A-1 et seq.; the last denial occurred on December

12, 2023, when the AMCC awarded the five available licenses to other

applicants. After the first two denials, Alabama Always commenced civil

actions against the AMCC challenging its licensing procedures.

Following the December 12, 2023, denial, Alabama Always filed a request

with the AMCC for a "public investigative hearing," see Ala. Code 1975,

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CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

§ 20-2A-56(e), and filed a notice of appeal with the AMCC. Additionally,

as it had done before, Alabama Always pursued relief in the circuit court.

After obtaining a temporary restraining order on January 3, 2024,

to prevent the AMCC from continuing the integrated-facility-licensing

process, Alabama Always commenced several civil actions against the

AMCC. On April 1, 2024, the circuit court, on the motion of Alabama

Always, dismissed all pending actions without prejudice. On April 3,

2024, Alabama Always commenced its sixth civil action arising out of the

integrated-facility-licensing process.1 In its complaint, Alabama Always

included, among other things, a petition for judicial review of the

December 12, 2023, decision to deny its integrated-facility-license

application ("the denial"), and its request for a judgment declaring that

Ala. Admin. Code (AMCC), former r. 538-X-3-.18, was invalid because it

violates the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act ("the AAPA"), Ala.

Code 1975, § 41-22-1 et seq.

1See Ex parte Alabama Med. Cannabis Comm'n, [Ms. CL-2024-

0073, June 21, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), and Ex parte
Alabama Med. Cannabis Comm'n, [Ms. CL-2024-0292, June 21, 2024] ___
So. 3d ___, ___ n.3 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), for a fuller history of the
litigation between the parties.
3
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

Along with the complaint, Alabama Always filed a motion for

another temporary restraining order. The AMCC and the commissioners

moved to dismiss the case and to deny the request for the temporary

restraining order. After hearing oral argument on the motions, on July

11, 2024, the circuit court denied the motion to dismiss and entered a

temporary restraining order ("the TRO").

In the TRO, the circuit court found that Alabama Always had a

reasonable chance of success on the merits of its claim that the AMCC

had failed to comply with its scoring, averaging, and ranking rules, see

Ala. Admin. Code (AMCC), rr. 538-X-3-.10 and 538-X-3-.11, when

denying Alabama Always a license and its claim that

"the [AMCC]'s anticipated investigative hearings

(purportedly to be conducted under Ala. Code [1975,] § 20-2A-
56(e)) violate the [AAPA] because (a) all licensing grants or
denials are 'contested cases' under Ala. Code [1975,] § 41-22-
19(a), and (b) the [AMCC]'s process for conducting
investigative hearings, as Alabama Always contends, does not
comply with the AAPA's contested case requirements, Ala.
Code [1975,] §41-22-12 through -19."

As part of the second claim, Alabama Always had alleged that the AMCC

could not compel license awardees to participate in public-investigative

hearings as would be required in a contested case under the AAPA and

that former r. 538-X-3-.18, provided no means for denied applicants to

4
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

intervene in the licensing process relating to awarded applicants as

would be allowed by Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-14, a part of the contested-

case provisions of the AAPA.

The circuit court further determined that Alabama Always was

threatened with immediate and irreparable injury because the public-

investigative-hearing process was "likely insufficient to provide Alabama

Always with a meaningful avenue for review of the [AMCC]'s adverse

licensing decision." After concluding that an administrative stay that

had been imposed by the AMCC on the issuance of its integrated-facility

licenses was not an adequate remedy, the circuit court weighed the

competing interests of the parties and the public and concluded that the

balance of the equities favored awarding Alabama Always the TRO. The

circuit court enjoined the AMCC and its commissioners from "taking any

action in furtherance of the December 12, 2023[,] awards of licenses in

the Integrated Facility category, including without limitation the

issuance of any licenses."

The AMCC and the commissioners timely appealed the TRO to

this court. See Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R. App. P. This court has appellate

jurisdiction. See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-3-10 (giving the court of civil

5
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

appeals jurisdiction over "all appeals from administrative agencies"), and

Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Eagerton, 433 So. 2d 452, 454 (Ala. 1983)

(holding that the court of civil appeals has "exclusive jurisdiction of all

appeals involving the enforcement of, or challenging, the rules,

regulations, orders, actions, or decisions of administrative agencies").

Issues

The AMCC and the commissioners have raised various arguments

for reversal of the TRO that may be grouped into two categories. First,

they argue that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to

enter the TRO. Second, they contend that the circuit court abused its

discretion in entering the TRO. We find the first argument dispositive of

these appeals, so we do not address the second argument.

Scope and Standard of Review

Ordinarily, this court does not have jurisdiction over interlocutory

appeals, see Momar, Inc. v. Schneider, 823 So. 2d 701, 703 (Ala. Civ. App.

2001), but Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R. App. P., allows this court to review an

interlocutory order granting an injunction in a case within our exclusive

appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., C.E. v. M.G., 169 So. 3d 1061, 1065 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2015). In these unusual appellate proceedings, review is

6
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

confined solely to the injunctive order appealed. See Lynne v. Ralph, 201

Ala. 535, 535, 78 So. 889, 889 (1918). Thus, this court is not authorized

to review a contemporaneous interlocutory order denying a motion to

dismiss, see Midwest Ent. Ventures, Inc. v. Town of Clarksville, 158

N.E.3d 787, 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), except insofar as the motion to

dismiss asserts that the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,

which would affect the validity of the injunction. See Retta v. Mekonen,

338 S.W.3d 72, 76 (Tex. App. 2011); Cournoyer v. Montana, 512 N.W.2d

479, 479 (S.D. 1994).

The TRO at issue contains both a ruling granting Alabama Always

injunctive relief and a ruling denying the motion to dismiss filed by the

AMCC and the commissioners. We do not directly review the ruling on

the motion to dismiss, but we will consider whether the circuit court had

subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims supporting its decision to

enter the TRO. As to that issue, "[w]e review de novo whether the trial

court had subject-matter jurisdiction." Solomon v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins.

Co., 953 So. 2d 1211, 1218 (Ala. 2006).

7
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

Analysis

"As a threshold matter, injunctive relief is a remedy, not a separate

cause of action." Iliescu, Tr. of John Iliescu, Jr. & Sonnia Iliescu 1992

Fam. Tr. v. Regional Transp. Comm'n of Washoe Cnty., 138 Nev. 741,

745, 522 P.3d 453, 457 (Ct. App. 2022). To obtain injunctive relief, a party

must prove a viable cause of action warranting that extraordinary relief.

See Foothills Park & Recreation Dist. v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of

Jefferson Cnty., 555 P.3d 644, 656 (Colo. 2024). If a court lacks subject-

matter jurisdiction over the claims upon which a request for an injunction

is based, it has no power to issue the injunction, and the injunction is

void. See Ex parte Alabama Med. Cannabis Comm'n, [Ms. CL-2024-0463,

Oct. 4, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (holding that a

January 3, 2024, temporary restraining order entered in a civil action

against the AMCC, which action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign

immunity, was void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). In the TRO,

the circuit court identified two claims that justified injunctive relief. In

determining the subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court to issue

the TRO, we analyze each of those claims in turn.

8
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

I.

The First Claim

In the first claim, Alabama Always asserted that the AMCC had

failed to follow its own regulations when making its decision to deny

Alabama Always an integrated-facility license. A claim that an

administrative agency failed to follow its own regulations in making a

licensing decision may be heard only in an appeal of the licensing

decision. See generally City of Graysville v. Glenn, 46 So. 3d 925, 930

(Ala. 2010) (holding that municipality complaining that the Alabama

Department of Environmental Management had issued a landfill permit

in violation of its own regulations could be reviewed only by appeal and

not by a declaratory-judgment action). Section 41-22-20(k)(3), Ala. Code

1975, a part of the AAPA, authorizes a circuit court to reverse a decision

of an administrative agency if that decision is "[i]n violation of any

pertinent agency rule." Thus, we consider the claim that the AMCC

failed to comply with rr. 538-x-3-.10 and 538-X-3-.11 when making its

9
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

integrated-facility-licensing decisions to be subsumed in Alabama

Always's appeal and its petition for judicial review of the denial. 2

When a circuit court has obtained jurisdiction over an

administrative appeal, it is authorized, pursuant to § 41-22-20(k), to

award injunctive relief to remedy an administrative error. See Ex parte

Alabama Dep't of Mental Health, 207 So. 3d 743, 755 (Ala. Civ. App.

2016). To invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court to

hear its appeal and its petition for judicial review, Alabama Always

would first have had to prove a right to appeal the denial. See generally

Hallman v. City of Northport, 386 So. 2d 756, 757 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980)

("The right to appeal is purely statutory, and an appeal taken without

statutory authority must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction."). In this

case, the right to appeal the denial is governed by Ala. Code 1975, § 41-

22-20(a), which provides:

"A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies

available within the agency, other than rehearing, and who is
aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to

2In another discrete claim, Alabama Always alleged that the AMCC
had failed to follow the scoring, averaging, and ranking rules based on an
invalid emergency rule, Ala. Admin. Code (AMCC), r. 530-X-3-.20ER, and
Alabama Always sought a judgment declaring that the emergency rule
was invalid; however, the circuit court did not reference that claim in the
TRO, so we do not address it herein.
10
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

judicial review under this chapter. A preliminary, procedural,

or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately
reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not
provide an adequate remedy."

Although the contested-case provisions of the AAPA apply to the denial,

see Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-19(a) ("The provisions of this chapter

concerning contested cases shall apply to the grant, denial, revocation,

suspension, or renewal of a license."),3 we conclude that Alabama Always

did not have a right to appeal the denial because the denial was not a

final decision, and review of a final agency decision of the AMCC

regarding Alabama Always's integrated-facility-license application

would provide an adequate remedy.

Under the contested-case provisions of the AAPA, a final decision

denying a license application follows an evidentiary hearing before a

hearing officer, and the decision must be formalized in a written order

containing findings of fact and conclusions of law approved by a majority

of the decision-making members of the licensing agency. See Ala. Code

3The parties agree that the contested-case provisions of the AAPA

apply after the denial of a license, but they dispute whether those
provisions apply earlier in the licensing process. Because these appeals
concern only the post-denial process, we do not need to resolve that
dispute.
11
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

1975, § 41-22-15 and 41-22-16. The AMCC fulfilled none of those formal

requirements when denying Alabama Always's integrated-facility-

license application, so the denial was not a final decision that could be

appealed pursuant to the first sentence of § 41-22-20. See Huntsville

Hous. Auth. v. State of Alabama Licensing Bd. for Gen. Contractors, 179

So. 3d 146, 152 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (holding that circuit court lacked

jurisdiction over appeal from administrative decision that was not final

because it had not complied with § 41-22-15 and 41-22-16).4

If the AMCC and the commissioners erred in any respect in the

licensing process in failing to apply the scoring, averaging, and ranking

rules, that error can be rectified in an appeal of the final decision in the

contested case. Upon review of a final agency decision, a circuit court is

empowered to reverse the decision not only if it is "[i]n violation of any

pertinent agency rule," § 41-22-20(k)(3), but also if it is "[m]ade upon

unlawful procedure," § 41-22-20(k)(4), or "[c]learly erroneous in view of

4For that reason, we need not consider whether Alabama Always

was required to exhaust all administrative remedies to invoke the
jurisdiction of the circuit court. See Southeast Cannabis Co., LLC v.
Alabama Med. Cannabis Comm'n, [Ms. CL-2024-0300, Dec. 20, 2024] ___
So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (noting that exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply to nonfinal agency decisions).
12
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record,"

§41-22-20(k)(6). Alabama Always maintains, however, that appeal

following a final decision on its license application is not an adequate

remedy because, it says, it would suffer an irreparable injury if the

AMCC issues the five available integrated-facility licenses while its

appeal of a final decision is pending.

We considered that point in Southeast Cannabis Co., LLC v.

Alabama Medical Cannabis Comm'n, ___ So. 3d at ___, stating:

"Presently, the five integrated-facility licenses have been

awarded, but not issued; however, by the time the circuit
court obtains jurisdiction to review a final decision, it is
possible that no integrated-facility licenses will be available.
The remedy of judicial review following a final decision would
be inadequate if there is 'some suggestion that the
administrative ruling, if incorrect, could not be remedied so
as to cause irreparable harm.' Schlachter v. Georgia State Bd.
of Exam'rs of Psychs., 215 Ga. App. 171, 171, 450 S.E.2d 242,
244 (1994)."

(Footnotes omitted.) In this case, however, the record shows that the

AMCC has imposed an administrative stay to prevent the issuance of any

integrated-facility licenses until it makes its final licensing decisions, and

it has confirmed in its minutes that it will not amend or revise the stay

while the integrated-facility licenses remain under administrative

review. After administrative review is complete, and if Alabama Always

13
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

appeals the final decision, the circuit court would have the power to issue

a stay to prevent the issuance of the licenses. See Ala. Code 1975, § 41-

22-20(c). Any such stays would prevent Alabama Always from being

irreparably harmed.

On December 28, 2023, the commissioners voted not to impose an

administrative stay and to proceed with steps toward completing the

licensing process and issuing the integrated-facility licenses that had

been awarded.5 On April 11, 2024, the commissioners voted to impose

the administrative stay that is currently in place. In the TRO, the circuit

court considered the stay to be an inadequate remedy. Alabama Always

argues that the commissioners could change their position, as they did

before, and lift the stay, allowing the AMCC to issue the integrated-

facility licenses, which, Alabama Always says, would expose it to

irreparable harm. We believe that possibility does not render the review

of a final decision to be an inadequate remedy.

5The AMCC draws a distinction between a "license awarded" and a

"license issued." An applicant who has been awarded a license becomes
a licensee with the permission to conduct medical-cannabis activities
only upon issuance of the license. See Ala. Admin. Code (AMCC), r. 538-
X-3.02(11) and (12).
14
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

In Richards v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 270 N.W.2d 616

(Iowa 1978), property owners objecting to the issuance of a franchise that

would authorize a power company to obtain their property through

eminent domain to construct an electric-transmission line filed an appeal

from an intermediate decision of the administrative agency considering

the petition for the franchise. Like in Alabama, the Iowa Administrative

Procedure Act requires a party seeking review of an interlocutory

administrative decision to prove that "review of the final agency action

would not provide an adequate remedy." Iowa Code § 17A.19.1. (2017).

The property owners argued that an appeal from a final decision would

not be an adequate remedy because the agency could issue the franchise

before final judicial review could be completed, which, they said, would

render their objections moot. The Iowa Supreme Court rejected the

property owners' argument, stating:

"The legislature realized however that immediate

implementation of final agency action would render some
questions moot, thereby denying effective judicial review. To
prevent unfairness the legislature provided that when judicial
review of final agency action is sought, the district court can
stay implementation of agency action in appropriate
circumstances. § 17A.19(5).

"The statutory procedure for stay does not guarantee a

grant of stay, and the possibility exists in a given case that

15
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

one or more issues could be mooted before judicial review is

completed. But this possibility exists as to all parties similarly
situated, and a party seeking to meet the second requirement
for intermediate judicial review must show more than the
possibility that a district court will not stay the final agency
action. The second requirement would be practically
meaningless if it only required an assertion that a judge might
not stay final agency action; every party seeking intermediate
review could satisfy the requirement."

270 N.W.2d at 620.

In this case, the AMCC would have to lift the administrative stay,

and the circuit court would have to deny a judicial stay, for the awarded

integrated-facility licenses to be issued. That is possible, but, as Richards

illustrates, that possibility does not render an appeal from a final

decision an inadequate remedy. Thus, Alabama Always did not have a

right to appeal the denial pursuant to the second sentence of § 41-22-20,

and the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the

TRO based on the first claim. 6

6Based on our conclusion, we pretermit discussion of the other

jurisdictional arguments asserted by the AMCC and the commissioners
relating to the first claim.
16
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

II.

The Second Claim

Section 20-2A-56(e), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

"After denial of a license, the commission, upon request, shall provide a

public investigative hearing at which the applicant is given the

opportunity to present testimony and evidence to establish its suitability

for a license." Consistent with § 41-22-19(a), which provides that the

contested-case provisions of the AAPA shall apply to the denial of a

license, see Ex parte Alabama Pub. Charter Sch. Comm'n, 256 So. 3d 98,

100 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018), Ala. Code 1975, § 20-2A-57(c), provides, in

pertinent part, that the AMCC "shall comply with the hearing procedures

of the [AAPA] when denying ... a license." The hearing procedures of the

AAPA are contained within the contested-case provisions of the AAPA,

Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-12 et seq. The contested-case provisions provide

for notice and an opportunity for a public evidentiary hearing of record

before a hearing officer with the authority to issue subpoenas and

discovery orders in which the witnesses are subject to cross-examination.

See Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-12 and § 41-22-13.

"In contested cases, upon timely application, any person

shall be permitted to intervene when a statute confers an

17
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

unconditional right to intervene, or when the applicant has an

individual interest in the outcome of the case as distinguished
from a public interest and the representation of the interest
of the applicant is inadequate."

§ 41-22-14. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the administrative agency

renders a final decision supported by findings of fact based on the

evidence in the record, see § 41-22-12(i), § 41-22-14, and § 41-22-16,

subject to an application for a rehearing. Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-17.

Decisions in contested cases may be appealed to the circuit court

pursuant to § 41-22-20.

This brief discussion shows that, as a matter of statutory law, the

contested-case provisions of the AAPA apply when an administrative

agency reviews the denial of a license. Nevertheless, Alabama Always

claims that there is a bona fide controversy between the parties regarding

whether the AMCC will apply the contested-case provisions during the

public-investigative hearing because former r. 538-X-3-.18 does not

specifically require the AMCC to do so.

At the time Alabama Always requested a public-investigative

hearing, former r. 538-X-3-.18 provided, in pertinent part:

"In accordance with § 20-2A-56(e), Code of Ala. 1975, (as

amended), any Applicant who has been denied a license by the
Commission may seek an investigative hearing before the

18
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

Commission to seek reconsideration of said denial. ... The

decision of the Commission on such hearing is considered a
final action; thereafter, a disappointed Applicant may appeal,
as provided in the Act (§ 20-2A-57(f), Code of Ala. 1975, (as
amended))."7

As Alabama Always contended in its complaint, former r. 538-X-3-.18

does not expressly incorporate the contested-case provisions of the AAPA

or otherwise describe in detail the specific procedures to be utilized in a

public-investigative hearing. That does not mean, however, that there

are no preexisting rules governing the procedure. See Mallinckrodt US

LLC v. Department of Env't Prot., 90 A.3d 428, 436 (Me. 2014) (holding

that, when governing statute provides that hearing procedure shall be

controlled by administrative procedure act, the "argument that no

preexisting rules governed the proceeding therefore fails"). Pursuant to

the terms of the Act alone, the contested-case provisions of the AAPA

clearly apply in a public-investigative hearing, and the AMCC could not

adopt a rule providing otherwise. See Ex parte State Dep't of Hum. Res.,

548 So. 2d 176, 178 (Ala. 1988) (holding, without specific legislative

7The AMCC has since amended former r. 538-X-3-.18, but the

amendment was effective February 12, 2024, and does not apply to
requests for public-investigative hearings made before that date. See r.
538-X-3-.18(k).
19
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

authority, that administrative agency could not adopt a rule altering the

appellate procedure in contested cases as established in the AAPA).

Alabama Always maintains that former r. 538-X-3-.18 is invalid

because it does not contain sufficiently detailed procedural rules

incorporating the contested-case provisions in alleged violation of § 41-

22-4(a)(2), which provides, in pertinent part:

"In addition to the other rulemaking requirements imposed

by law, each agency shall:

"….

"(2) Adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and

requirements of all formal and informal procedures available,
including a description of all forms and instructions used by
the agency …."

Pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-10, the circuit court may determine

the validity of a rule in an action for a declaratory judgment and stay the

enforcement of that rule by injunctive relief, but only "if the court finds

that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or

threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the

plaintiff."

In this case, Alabama Always contends that, based on its silence as

to the procedure to be employed in a public-investigative hearing, former

20
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

r. 538-X-3-.18 threatens to interfere with its right to a hearing governed

by the contested-case provisions regarding the denial of its integrated-

facility-license application. However, even assuming the invalidity of the

rule, which we do not expressly decide, Alabama Always retains the right

to a contested-case hearing based on § 20-2A-57(c) alone. In Keith v.

LeFleur, [Ms. 2200821, Sept. 8, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2023),

we held that a group of landowners could maintain a § 41-22-10 action to

challenge the validity of a racial-discrimination-grievance procedure that

had been informally adopted by the Alabama Department of

Environmental Management in violation of the rulemaking provisions of

the AAPA. We concluded that the grievance procedure threatened the

landowners' procedural right to administrative relief from racial

discrimination as established by 40 C.F.R. § 7.90(a) because, if the

grievance procedure was invalid, any relief the Department of

Environmental Management received pursuant to the procedure would

not be enforceable. In Keith, the landowners did not have any other

method of pursuing relief. Unlike in Keith, the invalidity of former r.

538-X-3-.18 would not deprive Alabama Always of its statutory right to a

contested-case hearing to obtain enforceable relief.

21
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

Although the circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a §

41-22-10 claim, see Ex parte Vaughn, [Ms. CL-2024-0737, Nov. 15, 2024]

___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), the AMCC is immune from suit under

§ 41-22-10, so the TRO is void insofar as it purports to enjoin or restrain

the AMCC pursuant to that statute. See Ex parte Alabama Med.

Cannabis Comm'n, [Ms. CL-2024-0463, Oct. 4, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___

(Ala. Civ. App. 2024). The commissioners may be made defendants to a

§ 41-22-10 claim, but that claim still must be ripe for judicial review. See

Oyarzo v. Maryland Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 187 Md. App.

264, 273, 978 A.2d 804, 809 (2009). Ordinarily, declaratory and

injunctive relief is not available "against administrative determinations

unless those remedies arise in a context ripe for judicial determination."

Evers v. Board of Med. Exam'rs, 516 So. 2d 650, 656 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).

" Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed 'to

prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to
protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects
felt in a concrete way ....' "

National Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Department of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803,

807 (2003) (quoting Abbott Lab'ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49

22
CL-2024-0588 and CL-2024-0616

(1967)); see also Ex parte Riley, 11 So. 3d 801, 806-07 (Ala. 2008). Our

supreme court has recognized that applying the doctrine of ripeness to a

declaratory-judgment proceeding is challenging because the purpose of

the action is to avoid harm before it is inflicted. See Ex parte Marshall,

323 So. 3d 1188, 1199 (Ala. 2020). "Nonetheless, ripeness is still required

for a court to entertain a request for a declaratory judgment." Id. In a

declaratory-judgment action, a court cannot decide an anticipated

controversy, resolve abstract questions, or give advisory opinions. Id.

Although framed as an action challenging the validity of former r.

538-X-3-.18, the underlying controversy asserted by Alabama Always in

its complaint concerns whether the contested-case provisions of the

AAPA will be applied in the anticipated public-investigative hearing

concerning the denial of its integrated-facility-license application.

Alabama Always did not plead that it had requested the AMCC to apply

the contested-case provisions of the AAPA in that hearing. Likewise,

Alabama Always complains that it may not be able to challenge the

award of integrated-facility licenses to other applicants, but it did not

allege in the complaint that it had ever raised a challenge to those awards

in the administrative process or that it had requested a hearing pursuant

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to the contested-case provisions of the AAPA to challenge those awards.

Section 20-2A-20(p), Ala. Code 1975, provides that the AAPA applies to

the AMCC, and § 20-2A-57(e) specifically authorizes the AMCC to

conduct contested-case hearings pursuant to the AAPA. Alabama

Always did not assert in the complaint that it had invoked these statutes

in the administrative proceedings before the AMCC. Alabama Always

also presented no evidence to the circuit court indicating that the AMCC

had threatened to proceed with the public-investigative hearing without

applying the contested-case provisions of the AAPA. Although

statements of counsel are not evidence, we note that, in their motion to

dismiss, in their response in opposition to the application for the TRO, in

the oral argument before the circuit court on the application, and at oral

argument on appeal, counsel for the AMCC consistently stated that the

AMCC intends to apply the contested-case provisions in the requested

public-investigative process. The burden was on Alabama Always to

allege a bona fide existing controversy of a justiciable character showing

otherwise, or the circuit court was without jurisdiction. Smith v.

Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 293 Ala. 644, 309 So. 2d 424

(1975). "Allegations which merely show that the plaintiff anticipates

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such a controversy may arise are not sufficient to invite judicial

declaration of rights." 293 Ala. at 651, 309 So. 2d at 429.

In DeBuys v. Jefferson County, 511 So. 2d 196 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987),

two landowners commenced a civil action against Jefferson County after

their applications for sewer-impact-connection permits were denied. On

appeal, the landowners argued that their due-process rights had been

denied by the failure of the Jefferson County Sewer Moratorium

Committee to promulgate ascertainable standards governing permit

decisions. This court rejected that contention, stating:

"Once again, the fact that the plaintiffs refused to go

before the Committee to present their permit requests causes
their argument to fail. The plaintiffs have no right to attack
the standards used by the Committee in making
determinations on permit applications when they refused to
give the Committee the opportunity to apply those standards
to their requests."

511 So. 2d at 199. Although this court was applying the doctrine of

exhaustion of administrative remedies, its reasoning applies equally to

the doctrine of ripeness. See Dawson v. Cole, 485 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Ala.

Civ. App. 1986) (noting the close relationship between exhaustion of

remedies, finality, and ripeness).

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In this case, immediately after requesting a public-investigative

hearing, Alabama Always obtained injunctive relief preventing the

AMCC from proceeding with a public-investigative hearing, and the TRO

continues to obstruct that hearing. 8 Unless and until the AMCC and the

commissioners are allowed to proceed, it remains speculative as to

whether, based on former r. 538-X-3-.18 or otherwise, they will impair or

threaten to impair the procedural right of Alabama Always to a

contested-case hearing.

At present, the claim for declaratory and injunctive relief based on

the alleged invalidity of former r. 538-X-3-.18 is not ripe for judicial

determination. If a controversy between a citizen and an administrative

agency is not ripe for judicial review, it is not a justiciable case within the

subject-matter jurisdiction of a court. See Baldwin Cnty. v. Palmtree

Penthouses, Ltd., 831 So. 2d 603 (Ala. 2002). Thus, the circuit court did

8Theparties agree that the TRO prevents the AMCC and the
commissioners from proceeding with the public-investigative hearing.

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not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the second claim, and it could

not have issued the TRO based on that claim.9

Conclusion

Because the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the

first and second claims, the TRO issued based on those claims is void.10

See Ex parte Vaughn, ___ So. 3d at ___. A void judgment will not support

an appeal. See Miller v. Riley, 37 So. 3d 768, 772 (Ala. 2009). An

appellate court must dismiss an attempted appeal from a void judgment.

Hunt Transition & Inaugural Fund, Inc. v. Grenier, 782 So. 2d 270, 274

(Ala. 2000). We therefore dismiss these appeals, albeit with instructions

to the circuit court to vacate the TRO. See Vann v. Cook, 989 So. 2d 556,

559-60 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).

CL-2024-0588 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

CL-2024-0616 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

All the judges concur.

9Based on our conclusion, we pretermit discussion of the other

jurisdictional arguments asserted by the AMCC and the commissioners
relating to the second claim.

10Based on our disposition of these appeals, we pretermit

consideration of the other arguments asserted by the AMCC and the
commissioners for reversal of the TRO.
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