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Japan and Germany
A comparison of demographic and foreign policy
Cian Münster
Japan and Germany, which are both nations that were defeated during
the Second World War, have developed into stable democracies. The
two countries’ politics have certain similarities and differences that are
both advantageous and disadvantageous. This essay will focus on these
key differences and present a detailed comparison of certain areas in
which either country has achieved more success. Firstly, it will discuss
how Japan and Germany have sought to mitigate their demographic
issues. Secondly, the essay will examine foreign policy by examining
the different states of both nations’ regional ties following the Second
World War. Finally, it will also evaluate how Japan’s relationship with
regional adversary China has had greater success than Germany’s
relationship with Russia.
I. POPULATION DECLINE
Firstly, Japan is currently experiencing a massive demographic decline.
Clark et.al (2010) notes that while population and workforce decline are
not a process unique to Japan, the nation will likely experience this
decline first. It is projected that Japan’s workforce will have declined
by more than a third in the first half of the 21st century and that this
impact will be even more significant in per centage terms (Clark et al.
2010). Due to Japan’s high life expectancy, the working population is
expected to shrink faster than the overall population, leading to an
overall lower share of the population able to work (Clark et.al 2010).
This overall decline in the working-age population will slow economic
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growth and raise pressure on the country’s social security system (Clark
et al. 2010).
Germany faces similar demographic issues. Its natural population
growth has been negative since 1972 and also has an ageing population
along with low birth rates (Goldenberg 2020). In 2020, 1 in 15 Germans
were over the age of 80 compared to 1 in 100 in 1950 with projections
showing this will reach 1 in 10 by 2040 (Goldenberg 2020). Both
countries’ responses can be roughly divided into efforts to reduce the
scale of the demographic problems and to mitigate their consequences.
The German approach to managing its demographic problems has some
differences from that of Japan. Firstly, Germany has managed to
temporarily offset its population decline through large amounts of
immigration (Arnold 2020; Fuchs 2017). The 2015-2016 European
Migrant Crisis led to a large inflow of young working-age people into
the country. This resulted in German population growth returning to
positive levels after a steep decline in the early 2000s (Arnold 2020;
Fuchs 2017). In comparison, Japan has faced several issues in attracting
immigration to solve its demographic issues. The innate conservatism
and homogeneity of Japan mean that opposition to immigration is much
stronger (Evaniuk 2017; Strausz 2022). Several initiatives to promote
immigration to Japan have also largely been unsuccessful (Strausz
2022). Meanwhile, in Germany, large waves of migration have
occurred since the 1950s which has led to a greater acceptance of
immigrants (Evaniuk 2017).
While Japan may struggle to promote immigration by traditional means,
it could play a larger role in the intake of refugees. The intake of
refugees in Japan has historically been low compared to other
developed countries (Strausz 2022). In the year 2020 for example, there
were approximately 4000 applications in Japan for refugee status and
special residence permits however only approximately 100 applications
were approved (Nippon 2021). In comparison, there were
approximately 1.8 million people with a refugee background in
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Germany in 2018 of which 72% had approved applications for asylum
(Keita & Dempster 2020). Approximately half of these refugees have
since found work or are involved in the workforce through other means
(Keita & Dempster 2020). Therefore, if Japan were to increase its
humanitarian intake, the shrinking of Japan’s workforce may be
reduced in line with the German experience.
Likewise, Japan and Germany’s policies for incentivising higher birth
rates have significant differences. In Germany, generous policies for
working families with children have been credited with raising the
country’s birth rate from 1.33 children per woman in 2007 to 1.57 in
2017 (Arnold 2020). However, policies directly incentivising having
children have largely not been implemented due to the historical legacy
of similar policies implemented in Germany during the Nazi era
(Evaniuk 2017). Despite this lasting influence, the German government
did implement a program during the Covid-19 pandemic that provided
a one-off bonus to families that had children in the year 2020 (Seibel
2020). Meanwhile, in Japan, similar policies have proved successful.
The birth rate in Japan rose from a low of 1.26 in 2005 to 1.46 in 2015
(Holodny 2010). The areas where births increased the most were places
where bonuses were paid for having children (Holodny 2010). Should
Japan extend the granting of funds for having children and work to
support working families, this may help further increase birth rates.
Similarly for Germany, directly incentivising having children and
expanding upon the 2020 one-off payment may be another step to raise
its birth rate provided it is considered culturally acceptable.
Japan and Germany have also placed significant emphasis on managing
the impacts of their unfavourable demography. In Japan, the
comprehensive long-term care insurance policy implemented in 2000
offers a variety of ways to care for the elderly mitigating healthcare
costs (Sze-Yunn & Arivalagan 2020). Additionally, the development
of robots and research into new medical treatments seek to automate
processes and thus mitigate and reduce future shortages in the
workforce (Sze-Yunn & Arivalagan 2020). In Germany, steps to
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mitigate the impact of demographic issues have taken a more economic
focus. The country has already legislated an increase in the retirement
age from 65 to 67 by the year 2029 and there are discussions of raising
this further to 69 soon (Scuster 2021). Furthermore, restrictions on
private pension plans have been eased in an attempt to incentivise
private savings (Bonin 2009).
II. POST-WAR REGIONAL TIES
Furthermore, a key area where Japan could take inspiration from
Germany is in its reproach of former enemies of the Second World War.
Germany has normalised openness about its role in the second world
war and the atrocities of the Holocaust, allowing the nation to forge
strong partnerships with its former enemies and retain a greater degree
of independence from the United States. Meanwhile, Japan’s actions
are often seldomly discussed. This has made Japan’s neighbours wary
of it and caused several disputes (Gaunder 2017). These disputes have
significant economic consequences for Japan.
An example of Japan’s unwillingness to recognise the effects of its
actions during the Second World War is the current trade dispute
between Japan and South Korea, which began as a result of court rulings
that ordered Japanese companies to compensate wartime labourers and
families (Ezell 2020). The ruling led Japan to reintroduce several export
controls on trade with the country (Ezell 2020). A particular economic
area which could be harmed is the Japanese chemical industry, which
has many connections to South Korea’s semiconductor industry (Ezell
2020). Japan’s problems in finding regional partners ultimately leads to
its continued dependence on the US. This increases the extent to which
Japanese security is dependent on accommodations from the United
States. Tsuruoka (2018) notes that while Japan was spared from the
Trump administration’s demands to increase defence spending, many
European NATO allies were faced with a less accommodating United
States. Should a future American administration be less willing to
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guarantee Japanese security, Japan would be left considerably exposed
(Tsuroka 2018). If Japan is to further ensure its security, it should seek
to diversify its ties with other regional neighbours. The recent trade
dispute with South Korea, along with other disputes Japan has with its
neighbours regarding its actions during the Second World War, needs
to be resolved to do so.
In comparison, Germany has pursued effective reproach with its former
enemies. This has been done through economic and political integration
with its neighbours. This is particularly the case with France with which
Germany once shared a centuries-long enmity but is now considered its
closest partner (Krotz 2014). Additionally, West Germany under
chancellor Willy Brandt pursued a policy known as “Ostpolitik”
(Eastern Policy) in the 1970s in which he successfully pursued
reconciliation with the then nations of the eastern bloc in Europe (Grau
2003). While Germany continues to have disputes regarding the
payment of reparations from the Second World War with countries such
as Greece, the normalisation of relations has mostly stayed intact and
has not led to major trade disputes on the scale of Japan and South
Korea (Deutsche Welle 2021). Japan could thus attempt a similar
undertaking with its regional neighbours.
III. REGIONAL ADVERSITIES
Japan’s experience in conducting diplomacy with adversaries appaears
largely advantageous when compared to that of Germany. Under the
leadership of chancellor Angela Merkel, the country’s approach to
bilateral relations with Russia attempted to separate political
differences from economic opportunities (Falk 2022). Through this
approach, Germany became dependent on Russian gas and has
indicated it would be unable to sanction gas trade with it in response to
the country’s invasion of Ukraine (Von der Burchard & Segue 2022).
While Germany has made commitments to reduce its dependency on
Russia, these are long-term measures that will not have an immediate
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effect (Atlantic Council 2022). Germany’s dependency on Russian gas
relates to its energy needs. With the country planning to phase out
nuclear energy by the end of 2022 and phase out coal in the longer term,
gas is an important transition fuel (Fenkse 2021; Wettengel 2022).
Therefore, its dependence on Russian gas has placed it in a situation
where it must factor in both geopolitical and domestic factors.
Meanwhile, Japan has engaged China both as an important trading
partner and a geopolitical adversary. Under Japanese prime minister
Shinzo Abe, the “Free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy was launched
which had the initial goal of countering Chinese influence in the region
(Wan 2022).
This approach however was not directly confrontational and allowed
room for cooperation with China on certain Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) projects (Wan 2022). Japan also successfully led ratification
efforts for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a grouping which did not include China
(Wan 2022). At the same time, Japan was one of the major parties in
the ratification of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) which did include China (Wan 2022). The Japanese approach
to its adversary China is therefore one of both countering and
cooperating with it to ensure stable relations. In comparison, Germany’s
economic dependence on Russia for gas supplies has weakened its
position.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, Japan and Germany have different approaches to demographic
and foreign policy issues. Both countries face major demographic
problems, however, Germany’s approach appears to be more effective
and could inspire future Japanese policy. Likewise, Germany has
encountered more success in building regional partnerships with its
former Second World War enemies. On the other hand, Japan appears
more effective at handling relations with its regional adversary, China,
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as opposed to Germany’s relationship with Russia. This analysis shows
that both countries have differing strengths and weaknesses in
developing their international relationships following the Second World
War.
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