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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article is about the philosophical view. For other uses, see Naturalism
(disambiguation).

Double rainbow at Yosemite National Park.

According to naturalism, the causes of all phenomena are to be found within
the universe and not transcendental factors beyond it.
In philosophy, naturalism is the idea that only natural laws and forces (as opposed
to supernatural ones) operate in the universe.[1] In its primary sense,[2] it is also known
as ontological naturalism, metaphysical naturalism, pure
naturalism, philosophical naturalism and antisupernaturalism. "Ontological" refers
to ontology, the philosophical study of what exists. Philosophers often treat naturalism
as equivalent to materialism, but there are important distinctions between the
philosophies.

For example, philosopher Paul Kurtz argues that nature is best accounted for by
reference to material principles. These principles include mass, energy, and
other physical and chemical properties accepted by the scientific community. Further,
this sense of naturalism holds that spirits, deities, and ghosts are not real and that there
is no "purpose" in nature. This stronger formulation of naturalism is commonly referred
to as metaphysical naturalism.[3] On the other hand, the more moderate view that
naturalism should be assumed in one's working methods as the current paradigm,
without any further consideration of whether naturalism is true in the robust
metaphysical sense, is called methodological naturalism.[4]

With the exception of pantheists – who believe that nature is identical with divinity while
not recognizing a distinct personal anthropomorphic god – theists challenge the idea
that nature contains all of reality. According to some theists, natural laws may be viewed
as secondary causes of God(s).

In the 20th century, Willard Van Orman Quine, George Santayana, and other
philosophers argued that the success of naturalism in science meant that scientific
methods should also be used in philosophy. According to this view, science and
philosophy are not always distinct from one another, but instead form a continuum.

"Naturalism is not so much a special system as a point of view or tendency common to

a number of philosophical and religious systems; not so much a well-defined set of
positive and negative doctrines as an attitude or spirit pervading and influencing many
doctrines. As the name implies, this tendency consists essentially in looking upon
nature as the one original and fundamental source of all that exists, and in attempting to
explain everything in terms of nature. Either the limits of nature are also the limits of
existing reality, or at least the first cause, if its existence is found necessary, has nothing
to do with the working of natural agencies. All events, therefore, find their adequate
explanation within nature itself. But, as the terms nature and natural are themselves
used in more than one sense, the term naturalism is also far from having one fixed
meaning".

— Dubray 1911

History
[edit]
See also: History of materialism and History of metaphysical realism
Ancient and medieval philosophy
[edit]
Naturalism is most notably a Western phenomenon, but an equivalent idea has long
existed in the East. Naturalism was the foundation of two out of six orthodox schools
and one heterodox school of Hinduism.[5][6] Samkhya, one of the oldest schools of Indian
philosophy puts nature (Prakriti) as the primary cause of the universe, without assuming
the existence of a personal God or Ishvara. The Carvaka, Nyaya, Vaisheshika schools
originated in the 7th, 6th, and 2nd century BCE, respectively.[7] Similarly, though
unnamed and never articulated into a coherent system, one tradition
within Confucian philosophy embraced a form of Naturalism dating to the Wang
Chong in the 1st century, if not earlier, but it arose independently and had little influence
on the development of modern naturalist philosophy or on Eastern or Western culture.
 Ancient Roman mosaic showing Anaximander holding a
sundial. One of the contributors to naturalism in ancient Greek philosophy
Western metaphysical naturalism originated in ancient Greek philosophy. The
earliest pre-Socratic philosophers, especially the Milesians (Thales, Anaximander,
and Anaximenes) and the atomists (Leucippus and Democritus), were labeled by their
peers and successors "the physikoi" (from the Greek φυσικός or physikos, meaning
"natural philosopher" borrowing on the word φύσις or physis, meaning "nature")
because they investigated natural causes, often excluding any role for gods in the
creation or operation of the world. This eventually led to fully developed systems such
as Epicureanism, which sought to explain everything that exists as the product of atoms
falling and swerving in a void.[8]

Aristotle surveyed the thought of his predecessors and conceived of nature in a way
that charted a middle course between their excesses.[9]

Plato's world of eternal and unchanging Forms, imperfectly represented in matter by a

divine Artisan, contrasts sharply with the various mechanistic Weltanschauungen, of
which atomism was, by the fourth century at least, the most prominent ... This debate
was to persist throughout the ancient world. Atomistic mechanism got a shot in the arm
from Epicurus ... while the Stoics adopted a divine teleology ... The choice seems
simple: either show how a structured, regular world could arise out of undirected
processes, or inject intelligence into the system. This was how Aristotle… when still a
young acolyte of Plato, saw matters. Cicero… preserves Aristotle's own cave-image:
if troglodytes were brought on a sudden into the upper world, they would immediately
suppose it to have been intelligently arranged. But Aristotle grew to abandon this view;
although he believes in a divine being, the Prime Mover is not the efficient cause of
action in the Universe, and plays no part in constructing or arranging it ... But, although
he rejects the divine Artificer, Aristotle does not resort to a pure mechanism of random
forces. Instead he seeks to find a middle way between the two positions, one which
relies heavily on the notion of Nature, or phusis.[10]
With the rise and dominance of Christianity in the West and the later spread of Islam,
metaphysical naturalism was generally abandoned by intellectuals. Thus, there is little
evidence for it in medieval philosophy.
Modern philosophy
[edit]
It was not until the early modern era of philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment that
naturalists like Benedict Spinoza (who put forward a theory of psychophysical
parallelism), David Hume,[11] and the proponents of French materialism (notably Denis
Diderot, Julien La Mettrie, and Baron d'Holbach) started to emerge again in the 17th
and 18th centuries. In this period, some metaphysical naturalists adhered to a distinct
doctrine, materialism, which became the dominant category of metaphysical naturalism
widely defended until the end of the 19th century.

Thomas Hobbes was a proponent of naturalism in ethics who acknowledged normative

truths and properties.[12] Immanuel Kant rejected (reductionist) materialist positions in
metaphysics,[13] but he was not hostile to naturalism. His transcendental philosophy is
considered to be a form of liberal naturalism.[14]

Hegel who together with Joseph von Schelling

developed the form of natural philosophy recognised as Naturphilosophie
In late modern philosophy, Naturphilosophie, a form of natural philosophy, was
developed by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling[15] and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel[15] as an attempt to comprehend nature in its totality and to outline its general
theoretical structure.

A version of naturalism that arose after Hegel was Ludwig Feuerbach's anthropological
materialism,[16] which influenced Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's historical materialism,
Engels's "materialist dialectic" philosophy of nature (Dialectics of Nature), and their
follower Georgi Plekhanov's dialectical materialism.[17]

Another notable school of late modern philosophy advocating naturalism was German
materialism: members included Ludwig Büchner, Jacob Moleschott, and Carl Vogt.[18][19]
The current usage of the term naturalism "derives from debates in America in the first
half of the 20th century. The self-proclaimed 'naturalists' from that period included John
Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook, and Roy Wood Sellars."[20]

Contemporary philosophy
[edit]
A politicized version of naturalism that has arisen in contemporary philosophy is Ayn
Rand's Objectivism. Objectivism is an expression of capitalist ethical idealism within a
naturalistic framework. An example of a more progressive naturalistic philosophy
is secular humanism.

The current usage of the term naturalism derives from debates in America in the first
half of the last century.[20]

Currently, metaphysical naturalism is more widely embraced than in previous centuries,

especially but not exclusively in the natural sciences and the Anglo-American, analytic
philosophical communities. While the vast majority of the population of the world
remains firmly committed to non-naturalistic worldviews, contemporary defenders of
naturalism and/or naturalistic theses and doctrines today include Graham Oppy, Kai
Nielsen, J. J. C. Smart, David Malet Armstrong, David Papineau, Paul Kurtz, Brian
Leiter, Daniel Dennett, Michael Devitt, Fred Dretske, Paul and Patricia
Churchland, Mario Bunge, Jonathan Schaffer, Hilary Kornblith, Leonard Olson, Quentin
Smith, Paul Draper and Michael Martin, among many other academic philosophers.[citation
needed]

According to David Papineau, contemporary naturalism is a consequence of the build-

up of scientific evidence during the twentieth century for the "causal closure of the
physical", the doctrine that all physical effects can be accounted for by physical causes.
[21]

By the middle of the twentieth century, the acceptance of the causal closure of the
physical realm led to even stronger naturalist views. The causal closure thesis implies
that any mental and biological causes must themselves be physically constituted, if they
are to produce physical effects. It thus gives rise to a particularly strong form of
ontological naturalism, namely the physicalist doctrine that any state that has physical
effects must itself be physical. From the 1950s onwards, philosophers began to
formulate arguments for ontological physicalism. Some of these arguments appealed
explicitly to the causal closure of the physical realm (Feigl 1958, Oppenheim and
Putnam 1958). In other cases, the reliance on causal closure lay below the surface.
However, it is not hard to see that even in these latter cases the causal closure thesis
played a crucial role.

— Papineau 2007
In contemporary continental philosophy, Quentin Meillassoux proposed speculative
materialism, a post-Kantian return to David Hume which can strengthen classical
materialist ideas.[22] This speculative approach to philosophical naturalism has been
further developed by other contemporary thinkers including Ray Brassier and Drew M.
Dalton.

Etymology
[edit]
The term "methodological naturalism" is much more recent, though. According
to Ronald Numbers, it was coined in 1983 by Paul de Vries, a Wheaton
College philosopher. De Vries distinguished between what he called "methodological
naturalism", a disciplinary method that says nothing about God's existence, and
"metaphysical naturalism", which "denies the existence of a transcendent God".[23] The
term "methodological naturalism" had been used in 1937 by Edgar S. Brightman in an
article in The Philosophical Review as a contrast to "naturalism" in general, but there
the idea was not really developed to its more recent distinctions.[24]

Description
[edit]

Hubble Ultra-Deep Field

Flammarion engraving
A 21st century image of the universe and a 1888 illustration of the cosmos

According to Steven Schafersman, naturalism is a philosophy that maintains that;

1. "Nature encompasses all that exists throughout space and time;

2. Nature (the universe or cosmos) consists only of natural elements, that is,
of spatio-temporal physical substance – mass –energy. Non-physical or
quasi-physical substance, such
as information, ideas, values, logic, mathematics, intellect, and
 other emergent phenomena, either supervene upon the physical or can
be reduced to a physical account;
3. Nature operates by the laws of physics and in principle, can be explained
and understood by science and philosophy;
4. The supernatural does not exist, i.e., only nature is real. Naturalism is
therefore a metaphysical philosophy opposed primarily by
supernaturalism".[25]
Or, as Carl Sagan succinctly put it: "The Cosmos is all that is or ever was or ever will
be."[26]

In addition Arthur C. Danto states that naturalism, in recent usage, is a species of

philosophical monism according to which whatever exists or happens is natural in the
sense of being susceptible to explanation through methods which, although
paradigmatically exemplified in the natural sciences, are continuous from domain to
domain of objects and events. Hence, naturalism is polemically defined as repudiating
the view that there exists or could exist any entities which lie, in principle, beyond the
scope of scientific explanation.[27][28]

Arthur Newell Strahler states: "The naturalistic view is that the particular universe we
observe came into existence and has operated through all time and in all its parts
without the impetus or guidance of any supernatural agency."[29] "The great majority of
contemporary philosophers urge that that reality is exhausted by nature, containing
nothing 'supernatural', and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all
areas of reality, including the 'human spirit'." Philosophers widely regard naturalism as a
"positive" term, and "few active philosophers nowadays are happy to announce
themselves as 'non-naturalists'". "Philosophers concerned with religion tend to be less
enthusiastic about 'naturalism'" and that despite an "inevitable" divergence due to its
popularity, if more narrowly construed, (to the chagrin of John McDowell, David
Chalmers and Jennifer Hornsby, for example), those not so disqualified remain
nonetheless content "to set the bar for 'naturalism' higher."[30]

Alvin Plantinga stated that Naturalism is presumed to not be a religion. However, in one
very important respect it resembles religion by performing the cognitive function of a
religion. There is a set of deep human questions to which a religion typically provides an
answer. In like manner naturalism gives a set of answers to these questions".[31]

Providing assumptions required for science

[edit]
According to Robert Priddy, all scientific study inescapably builds on at least some
essential assumptions that cannot be tested by scientific processes;[32] that is, that
scientists must start with some assumptions as to the ultimate analysis of the facts with
which it deals. These assumptions would then be justified partly by their adherence to
the types of occurrence of which we are directly conscious, and partly by their success
in representing the observed facts with a certain generality, devoid of ad
hoc suppositions."[33] Kuhn also claims that all science is based on assumptions about
the character of the universe, rather than merely on empirical facts. These assumptions
– a paradigm – comprise a collection of beliefs, values and techniques that are held by
a given scientific community, which legitimize their systems and set the limitations to
their investigation.[34] For naturalists, nature is the only reality, the "correct" paradigm,
and there is no such thing as supernatural, i.e. anything above, beyond, or outside of
nature. The scientific method is to be used to investigate all reality, including the human
spirit.[35]

Some claim that naturalism is the implicit philosophy of working scientists, and that the
following basic assumptions are needed to justify the scientific method:[36]

1. That there is an objective reality shared by all rational observers.[36][37]

"The basis for rationality is acceptance of an external objective
reality."[38] "Objective reality is clearly an essential thing if we are to
develop a meaningful perspective of the world. Nevertheless its very
existence is assumed."[39] "Our belief that objective reality exist is an
assumption that it arises from a real world outside of ourselves. As infants
we made this assumption unconsciously. People are happy to make this
assumption that adds meaning to our sensations and feelings, than live
with solipsism."[40] "Without this assumption, there would be only the
thoughts and images in our own mind (which would be the only existing
mind) and there would be no need of science, or anything else."[41][self-published
source?]

2. That this objective reality is governed by natural laws;[36][37]

"Science, at least today, assumes that the universe obeys knowable
principles that don't depend on time or place, nor on subjective
parameters such as what we think, know or how we behave."[38] Hugh
Gauch argues that science presupposes that "the physical world is orderly
and comprehensible."[42]
3. That reality can be discovered by means of systematic observation and
experimentation.[36][37]
Stanley Sobottka said: "The assumption of external reality is necessary
for science to function and to flourish. For the most part, science is the
discovering and explaining of the external world."[41][self-published source?] "Science
attempts to produce knowledge that is as universal and objective as
possible within the realm of human understanding."[38]
4. That Nature has uniformity of laws and most if not all things in nature
must have at least a natural cause.[37]
Biologist Stephen Jay Gould referred to these two closely related
propositions as the constancy of nature's laws and the operation of known
processes.[43] Simpson agrees that the axiom of uniformity of law, an
unprovable postulate, is necessary in order for scientists to extrapolate
inductive inference into the unobservable past in order to meaningfully
study it.[44] "The assumption of spatial and temporal invariance of natural
laws is by no means unique to geology since it amounts to a warrant for
inductive inference which, as Bacon showed nearly four hundred years
ago, is the basic mode of reasoning in empirical science. Without
 assuming this spatial and temporal invariance, we have no basis for
extrapolating from the known to the unknown and, therefore, no way of
reaching general conclusions from a finite number of observations. (Since
the assumption is itself vindicated by induction, it can in no way "prove"
the validity of induction — an endeavor virtually abandoned after Hume
demonstrated its futility two centuries ago)."[45] Gould also notes that
natural processes such as Lyell's "uniformity of process" are an
assumption: "As such, it is another a priori assumption shared by all
scientists and not a statement about the empirical world."[46] According to
R. Hooykaas: "The principle of uniformity is not a law, not a rule
established after comparison of facts, but a principle, preceding the
observation of facts ... It is the logical principle of parsimony of causes
and of economy of scientific notions. By explaining past changes by
analogy with present phenomena, a limit is set to conjecture, for there is
only one way in which two things are equal, but there are an infinity of
ways in which they could be supposed different."[47]
5. That experimental procedures will be done satisfactorily without any
deliberate or unintentional mistakes that will influence the results.[37]
6. That experimenters won't be significantly biased by their presumptions.[37]
7. That random sampling is representative of the entire population.[37]
A simple random sample (SRS) is the most basic probabilistic option used
for creating a sample from a population. The benefit of SRS is that the
investigator is guaranteed to choose a sample that represents the
population that ensures statistically valid conclusions.[48]
Methodological naturalism
[edit]

Aristotle, one of the philosophers behind the modern day

scientific method used as a central term in methodological naturalism
Methodological naturalism, the second sense of the term "naturalism", (see above) is
"the adoption or assumption of philosophical naturalism … with or without fully
accepting or believing it.”[25] Robert T. Pennock used the term to clarify that the scientific
method confines itself to natural explanations without assuming the existence or non-
existence of the supernatural.[49] "We may therefore be agnostic about the ultimate truth
of [philosophical] naturalism, but nevertheless adopt it and investigate nature as if
nature is all that there is."[25]

According to Ronald Numbers, the term "methodological naturalism" was coined in

1983 by Paul de Vries, a Wheaton College philosopher.[23]

Both Schafersman and Strahler assert that it is illogical to try to decouple the two
senses of naturalism. "While science as a process only requires methodological
naturalism, the practice or adoption of methodological naturalism entails a logical and
moral belief in philosophical naturalism, so they are not logically decoupled."[25] This
“[philosophical] naturalistic view is espoused by science as its fundamental
assumption."[29]

But Eugenie Scott finds it imperative to do so for the expediency of deprogramming the
religious. "Scientists can defuse some of the opposition to evolution by first recognizing
that the vast majority of Americans are believers, and that most Americans want to
retain their faith." Scott apparently believes that "individuals can retain religious beliefs
and still accept evolution through methodological naturalism. Scientists should therefore
avoid mentioning metaphysical naturalism and use methodological naturalism
instead."[50] "Even someone who may disagree with my logic … often understands the
strategic reasons for separating methodological from philosophical naturalism—if we
want more Americans to understand evolution."[51]

Scott’s approach has found success as illustrated in Ecklund’s study where some
religious scientists reported that their religious beliefs affect the way they think about the
implications – often moral – of their work, but not the way they practice science within
methodological naturalism.[52] Papineau notes that "Philosophers concerned with religion
tend to be less enthusiastic about metaphysical naturalism and that those not so
disqualified remain content "to set the bar for 'naturalism' higher." [30]

In contrast to Schafersman, Strahler, and Scott, Robert T. Pennock, an expert

witness[49] at the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District trial and cited by the Judge in
his Memorandum Opinion.[53] described "methodological naturalism" stating that it is not
based on dogmatic metaphysical naturalism.[54]

Pennock further states that as supernatural agents and powers "are above and beyond
the natural world and its agents and powers" and "are not constrained by natural laws",
only logical impossibilities constrain what a supernatural agent cannot do. In addition he
says: "If we could apply natural knowledge to understand supernatural powers, then, by
definition, they would not be supernatural." "Because the supernatural is necessarily a
mystery to us, it can provide no grounds on which one can judge scientific models."
"Experimentation requires observation and control of the variables.... But by definition
we have no control over supernatural entities or forces."
The position that the study of the function of nature is also the study of the origin of
nature is in contrast with opponents who take the position that functioning of the cosmos
is unrelated to how it originated. While they are open to supernatural fiat in its invention
and coming into existence, during scientific study to explain the functioning of the
cosmos, they do not appeal to the supernatural. They agree that allowing "science to
appeal to untestable supernatural powers to explain how nature functions would make
the scientist's task meaningless, undermine the discipline that allows science to make
progress, and would be as profoundly unsatisfying as the ancient Greek playwright's
reliance upon the deus ex machina to extract his hero from a difficult predicament."[55]

Views on methodological naturalism

[edit]
W. V. O. Quine
[edit]
Main article: Naturalized epistemology
W. V. O. Quine describes naturalism as the position that there is no higher tribunal for
truth than natural science itself. In his view, there is no better method than the scientific
method for judging the claims of science, and there is neither any need nor any place
for a "first philosophy", such as (abstract) metaphysics or epistemology, that could stand
behind and justify science or the scientific method.

Therefore, philosophy should feel free to make use of the findings of scientists in its own
pursuit, while also feeling free to offer criticism when those claims are ungrounded,
confused, or inconsistent. In Quine's view, philosophy is "continuous with" science,
and both are empirical.[56] Naturalism is not a dogmatic belief that the modern view of
science is entirely correct. Instead, it simply holds that science is the best way to
explore the processes of the universe and that those processes are what modern
science is striving to understand.[57]

Karl Popper
[edit]
Karl Popper equated naturalism with inductive theory of science. He rejected it based
on his general critique of induction (see problem of induction), yet acknowledged its
utility as means for inventing conjectures.

A naturalistic methodology (sometimes called an "inductive theory of science") has its

value, no doubt. ... I reject the naturalistic view: It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice
that whenever they believe to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed a
convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn into a dogma. This criticism of the
naturalistic view applies not only to its criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of
science, and consequently to its idea of empirical method.

— Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (Routledge, 2002), pp. 52–
53, ISBN 0-415-27844-9.
Popper instead proposed that science should adopt a methodology based
on falsifiability for demarcation, because no number of experiments can ever prove a
theory, but a single experiment can contradict one. Popper holds that scientific theories
are characterized by falsifiability.

Alvin Plantinga
[edit]
Alvin Plantinga, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Notre Dame, and a Christian, has
become a well-known critic of naturalism.[58][failed verification] He suggests, in his evolutionary
argument against naturalism, that the probability that evolution has produced humans
with reliable true beliefs, is low or inscrutable, unless the evolution of humans was
guided (for example, by God). According to David Kahan of the University of Glasgow,
in order to understand how beliefs are warranted, a justification must be found in the
context of supernatural theism, as in Plantinga's epistemology.[59][60][61] (See
also supernormal stimuli).

Plantinga argues that together, naturalism and evolution provide an insurmountable

"defeater for the belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable", i.e., a skeptical
argument along the lines of Descartes' evil demon or brain in a vat.[62]

Take philosophical naturalism to be the belief that there aren't any supernatural entities
– no such person as God, for example, but also no other supernatural entities, and
nothing at all like God. My claim was that naturalism and contemporary evolutionary
theory are at serious odds with one another – and this despite the fact that the latter is
ordinarily thought to be one of the main pillars supporting the edifice of the former. (Of
course I am not attacking the theory of evolution, or anything in that neighborhood; I am
instead attacking the conjunction of naturalism with the view that human beings have
evolved in that way. I see no similar problems with the conjunction of theism and the
idea that human beings have evolved in the way contemporary evolutionary science
suggests.) More particularly, I argued that the conjunction of naturalism with the belief
that we human beings have evolved in conformity with current evolutionary doctrine ... is
in a certain interesting way self-defeating or self-referentially incoherent.

— Alvin Plantinga, Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument

Against Naturalism, "Introduction"[62]
The argument is controversial and has been criticized as seriously flawed, for example,
by Elliott Sober.[63][64]

Robert T. Pennock
[edit]
Robert T. Pennock states that as supernatural agents and powers "are above and
beyond the natural world and its agents and powers" and "are not constrained by
natural laws", only logical impossibilities constrain what a supernatural agent cannot do.
He says: "If we could apply natural knowledge to understand supernatural powers, then,
by definition, they would not be supernatural." As the supernatural is necessarily a
mystery to us, it can provide no grounds on which one can judge scientific models.
"Experimentation requires observation and control of the variables.... But by definition
we have no control over supernatural entities or forces." Science does not deal with
meanings; the closed system of scientific reasoning cannot be used to define itself.
Allowing science to appeal to untestable supernatural powers would make the scientist's
task meaningless, undermine the discipline that allows science to make progress, and
"would be as profoundly unsatisfying as the ancient Greek playwright's reliance upon
the deus ex machina to extract his hero from a difficult predicament."[65]

Naturalism of this sort says nothing about the existence or nonexistence of the
supernatural, which by this definition is beyond natural testing. As a practical
consideration, the rejection of supernatural explanations would merely be pragmatic,
thus it would nonetheless be possible for an ontological supernaturalist to espouse and
practice methodological naturalism. For example, scientists may believe in God while
practicing methodological naturalism in their scientific work. This position does not
preclude knowledge that is somehow connected to the supernatural. Generally
however, anything that one can examine and explain scientifically would not be
supernatural, simply by definition.

See also
[edit]

 Atheism
 Clockwork universe
 Daoism
 Deism
 Dysteleology
 Empiricism
 Hylomorphism
 Legal naturalism
 Liberal naturalism
 Materialism
 Monism
 Naturalist computationalism
 Naturalistic fallacy
 Naturalistic pantheism
 Philosophy of nature
 Physicalism
 Platonized naturalism
 Poetic naturalism
 Religious naturalism
 Scientism
 Sociological naturalism
 Supernaturalism
  Transcendental naturalism
 Vaisheshika
References
[edit]
Citations
[edit]

1. ^ "naturalism". Oxford English Dictionary Online.

2. ^ Papineau, David (22 February 2007). "Naturalism". In Edward N. Zalta
(ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. According to philosopher Steven
Lockwood, naturalism can be separated into an ontological sense and
a methodological sense.
3. ^ Kurtz, Paul (Spring 1998). "Darwin Re-Crucified: Why Are So Many Afraid of
Naturalism?". Free Inquiry. 18 (2). Archived from the original on 18 October
2012. Retrieved 6 April 2011.
4. ^ Schafersman 1996, Methodological naturalism is the adoption or assumption of
naturalism in scientific belief and practice without really believing in naturalism.
5. ^ Chatterjee, A (2012). "Naturalism in Classical Indian Philosophy". In Zalta,
Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition).
6. ^ Riepe, Dale (1996). Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought. Motilal
Banarsidass Publ. pp. 227–246. ISBN 978-8120812932.
7. ^ Leaman, Oliver (1999). Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy. Routledge.
p. 269. ISBN 978-0415173629.
8. ^ O'Keefe, Tim (2010). Epicureanism. University of California Press. pp. 11–13.
9. ^ See especially Physics, books I and II.
10.^ Hankinson, R. J. (1997). Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought.
Oxford University Press. p. 125. ISBN 978-0-19-924656-4.
11.^ William Edward Morris, "David Hume", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (21 May 2014), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
12.^ Abizadeh, A. (2018). Hobbes and the Two Faces of Ethics. Cambridge
University Press. p. 23. ISBN 978-1-108-41729-7. Retrieved 14 June 2023.
13.^ Rohlf, Michael (28 July 2020). "Immanuel Kant". Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
14.^ Hanna, Robert, Kant, Science, and Human Nature. Clarendon Press, 2006, p.
16.
15.^ Jump up to:a b Frederick C. Beiser(2002), German Idealism: The Struggle
Against Subjectivism 1781–1801, Harvard university Press, p. 506.
16.^ Axel Honneth, Hans Joas, Social Action and Human Nature, Cambridge
University Press, 1988, p. 18.
17.^ See Georgi Plekhanov, "For the Sixtieth Anniversary of Hegel's Death" (1891).
See also Plekhanov, Essays on the History of Materialism (1893)
and Plekhanov, The Development of the Monist View of History (1895).
18.^ Owen Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth
Century, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 165: "During the 1850s
German ... scientists conducted a controversy known ... as the materialistic
controversy. It was specially associated with the names of Vogt, Moleschott and
 Büchner" and p. 173: "Frenchmen were surprised to see Büchner and Vogt. ...
[T]he French were surprised at German materialism".
19.^ The Nineteenth Century and After, Vol. 151, 1952, p. 227: "the Continental
materialism of Moleschott and Buchner".
20.^ Jump up to:a b Papineau, David "Naturalism", in "The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy"
21.^ Papineau, David (2011). "The Rise of Physicalism". In Gillett, Carl; Loewer,
Barry (eds.). Physicalism and its Discontents.
Cambridge. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511570797. ISBN 9780521801751. Archived
from the original on 1 June 2016. Retrieved 9 January 2018.
22.^ Quentin Meillassoux (2008), After Finitude, Bloomsbury, p. 90.
23.^ Jump up to:a b Nick Matzke: On the Origins of Methodological
Naturalism Archived 2006-09-03 at the Wayback Machine. The Pandas
Thumb (March 20, 2006)
24.^ "ASA March 2006 – Re: Methodological Naturalism". Archived from the
original on 1 August 2012. Retrieved 18 June 2006.
25.^ Jump up to:a b c d Schafersman 1996.
26.^ Sagan, Carl (2002). Cosmos. Random House. ISBN 9780375508325.
27.^ Danto 1967, p. 448.
28.^ Stone 2008, p. 2: Personally, I place great emphasis on the phrase "in
principle", since there are many things that science does not now explain. And
perhaps we need some natural piety concerning the ontological limit question as
to why there is anything at all. But the idea that naturalism is a polemical notion
is important"
29.^ Jump up to:a b Strahler 1992, p. 3.
30.^ Jump up to:a b Papineau 2007.
31.^ (Plantinga 2010)
32.^ Priddy, Robert (1998). "Chapter Five, Scientific Objectivity in
Question". Science Limited.
33.^ Whitehead 1997, p. 135.
34.^ Boldman, Lee (2007). "Chapter 6, The Privileged Status of Science" (PDF).
35.^ Papineau, David "Naturalism", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
quote, "The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily... reject
'supernatural' entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not
necessarily the only one) to important truths about the 'human spirit'."
36.^ Jump up to:a b c d Heilbron 2003, p. vii.
37.^ Jump up to:a b c d e f g Chen 2009, pp. 1–2.
38.^ Jump up to:a b c Durak 2008.
39.^ Vaccaro, Joan. "Reality". Retrieved 22 December 2017.
40.^ Vaccaro, Joan. "Objectiveism". Retrieved 22 December 2017. Objective
reality exists beyond or outside our self. Any belief that it arises from a real world
outside us is actually an assumption. It seems more beneficial to assume that an
objective reality exists than to live with solipsism, and so people are quite happy
to make this assumption. In fact we made this assumption unconsciously when
we began to learn about the world as infants. The world outside ourselves
appears to respond in ways which are consistent with it being real. The
assumption of objectivism is essential if we are to attach the contemporary
meanings to our sensations and feelings and make more sense of them.
41.^ Jump up to:a b Sobottka 2005, p. 11.
42.^ Gauch 2002, p. 154, "Expressed as a single grand statement, science
presupposes that the physical world is orderly and comprehensible. The most
obvious components of this comprehensive presupposition are that the physical
world exists and that our sense perceptions are generally reliable."
43.^ Gould 1987, p. 120, "You cannot go to a rocky outcrop and observe either the
constancy of nature's laws or the working of known processes. It works the other
way around." You first assume these propositions and "then you go to the
outcrop of rock."
44.^ Simpson 1963, pp. 24–48, "Uniformity is an unprovable postulate justified, or
indeed required, on two grounds. First, nothing in our incomplete but extensive
knowledge of history disagrees with it. Second, only with this postulate is a
rational interpretation of history possible and we are justified in seeking—as
scientists we must seek—such a rational interpretation."
45.^ Gould 1965, pp. 223–228.
46.^ Gould 1984, p. 11.
47.^ Hooykaas 1963, p. 38.
48.^ "Simple Random Sampling". Archived from the original on 2 January 2018.
Retrieved 6 January 2018. A simple random sample (SRS) is the most basic
probabilistic option used for creating a sample from a population. Each SRS is
made of individuals drawn from a larger population, completely at random. As a
result, said individuals have an equal chance of being selected throughout the
sampling process. The benefit of SRS is that as a result, the investigator is
guaranteed to choose a sample which is representative of the population, which
ensures statistically valid conclusions.
49.^ Jump up to:a b "Kitzmiller v. Dover: Day 3, AM: Robert Pennock
(continued)". www.talkorigins.org.
50.^ Scott, Eugenie C. (1996). ""Creationism, Ideology, and Science"". In Gross;
Levitt; Lewis (eds.). The Flight From Science and Reason. The New York
Academy of Sciences. pp. 519–520.
51.^ Scott, Eugenie C. (2008). "Science and Religion, Methodology and
Humanism". NCSE. Retrieved 20 March 2012.
52.^ Ecklund, Elaine Howard (2010). Science vs. Religion: What Scientists Really
Think. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0195392982.
53.^ [[wikisource:Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District/4:Whether ID Is Science#4.
Whether ID is Science |Kitzmiller v. Dover: Whether ID is Science]]
54.^ "Kitzmiller v. Dover: Day 3, AM: Robert Pennock
(continued)". www.talkorigins.org.
55.^ Pennock, Robert T. (10 June 2015). "Supernaturalist Explanations..." msu.edu.
Archived from the original on 10 June 2015. Retrieved 16 June 2021.
56.^ Lynne Rudder (2013). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. Oxford
University Press. p. 5. ISBN 978-0199914746.
57.^ Quine has argued that "Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into
place as a chapter of psychology." The Quinean view that we should abandon
epistemology for psychology, however, is not widely accepted by contemporary
naturalists in epistemology. See Feldman, Richard (2012). "Naturalized
Epistemology". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2012 ed.). Retrieved 4 June 2014. Quinean Replacement
Naturalism finds relatively few supporters.
 58.^ Beilby, J.K. (2002). Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary
Argument Against Naturalism. G – Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary
Subjects Series. Cornell University Press.
p. ix. ISBN 9780801487637. LCCN 2001006111.
59.^ "Gifford Lecture Series – Warrant and Proper Function 1987–1988". Archived
from the original on 4 January 2012. Retrieved 14 January 2012.
60.^ Plantinga, Alvin (11 April 2010). "Evolution, Shibboleths, and Philosophers —
Letters to the Editor". The Chronicle of Higher Education. ...I do indeed think
that evolution functions as a contemporary shibboleth by which to distinguish the
ignorant fundamentalist goats from the informed and scientifically literate sheep.

According to Richard Dawkins, 'It is absolutely safe to say that, if you meet
somebody who claims not to believe in evolution, that person is ignorant, stupid,
or insane (or wicked, but I'd rather not consider that).' Daniel Dennett goes
Dawkins one (or two) further: 'Anyone today who doubts that the variety of life
on this planet was produced by a process of evolution is simply ignorant—
inexcusably ignorant.' You wake up in the middle of the night; you think, can that
whole Darwinian story really be true? Wham! You are inexcusably ignorant.

I do think that evolution has become a modern idol of the tribe. But of course it
doesn't even begin to follow that I think the scientific theory of evolution is false.
And I don't.
61.^ Plantinga, Alvin (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Chap. 11. ISBN 0-19-507863-2.
62.^ Jump up to:a b Beilby, J.K., ed. (2002). "Introduction by Alvin
Plantinga". Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument
Against Naturalism. Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary Subjects
Series. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 1–2, 10. ISBN 978-0-8014-8763-
7. LCCN 2001006111.
63.^ Oppy, Graham; Trakakis, N. N. (11 September 2014). Twentieth-Century
Philosophy of Religion: The History of Western Philosophy of Religion.
Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-54638-2.
64.^ Fitelson, Branden; Sober, Elliott (1998). "Plantinga's Probability Arguments
Against Evolutionary Naturalism". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 79 (2): 115–
129. doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00053.
65.^ T., Robert (10 June 2015). "Supernaturalist Explanations..." msu.edu. Archived
from the original on 10 June 2015. Retrieved 16 June 2021.
References
[edit]

 Audi, Robert (1996). "Naturalism". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). The Encyclopedia of

Philosophy Supplement. USA: Macmillan Reference. pp. 372–374.
 Carrier, Richard (2005). Sense and Goodness without God: A defense of Metaphysical
Naturalism. AuthorHouse. p. 444. ISBN 1-4208-0293-3.
 Chen, Christina S. (2009). Larson, Thomas (ed.). "Atheism and the Assumptions of
Science and Religion". Lyceum (2): 1–10.
 Danto, Arthur C. (1967). "Naturalism". In Edwards, Paul (ed.). The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. New York: The Macmillan. pp. 448–450.
 Dubray, Charles Albert (1911). "Naturalism" . In Herbermann, Charles (ed.). Catholic
Encyclopedia. Vol. 10. New York: Robert Appleton Company.
 Durak, Antoine Berke (6 June 2008). "The nature of reality and knowledge".
 Gauch, Hugh G. (2002). Scientific Method in Practice. Cambridge University Press.
 Gould, S. J. (1965). "Is uniformitarianism necessary?". American Journal of
Science. 263 (3): 223–228. Bibcode:1965AmJS..263..223G. doi:10.2475/ajs.263.3.223.
 Gould, Stephen J. (1984). "Toward the vindication of punctuational change in
catastrophes and earth history". In Bergren, W. A.; Van Couvering, J. A.
(eds.). Catastrophes and Earth History. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press.
 Gould, Stephen J. (1987). Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the
Discovery of Geological Time. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 119.
 Heilbron, John L., ed. (2003). The Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0195112290.
 Hooykaas, R. (1963). The principle of uniformity in geology, biology, and
theology (2nd ed.). London: E.J. Brill.
 Kurtz, Paul (1990). Philosophical Essays in Pragmatic Naturalism. Prometheus Books.
 Lacey, Alan R. (1995). "Naturalism". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to
Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 604–606. ISBN 978-0-19-866132-0.
 Post, John F. (1995). "Naturalism". In Audi, Robert (ed.). The Cambridge Dictionary of
Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 517–518.
 Rea, Michael (2002). World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of
Naturalism. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-924760-9.
 Sagan, Carl (2002). Cosmos. Random House. ISBN 978-0-375-50832-5.
 Schafersman, Steven D. (1996). "Naturalism is Today An Essential Part of Science".
Archived from the original on 5 July 2019. Retrieved 3 November 2010.
 Simpson, G. G. (1963). "Historical science". In Albritton, C. C. Jr. (ed.). Fabric of
geology. Stanford, California: Freeman, Cooper, and Company.
 Sobottka, Stanley (2005). "Consciousness" (PDF).
 Strahler, Arthur N. (1992). Understanding Science: An Introduction to Concepts and
Issues. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. ISBN 9780879757243.
 Stone, J.A. (2008). Religious Naturalism Today: The Rebirth of a Forgotten Alternative.
G – Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary Subjects Series. State University of
New York Press. p. 2. ISBN 978-0-7914-7537-9. LCCN 2007048682.
 Whitehead, A.N. (1997) [1920]. Science and the Modern World. Lowell Lectures. Free
Press. ISBN 978-0-684-83639-3. LCCN 67002244.
Further reading
[edit]

 Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (eds) Naturalism in

Question. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004.
 Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (eds) Naturalism and Normativity. New
York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
 Friedrich Albert Lange, The History of Materialism, London: Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner & Co Ltd, 1925, ISBN 0-415-22525-6
 David Macarthur, "Quinean Naturalism in Question," Philo. vol 11, no. 1
(2008).
  Sander Verhaeg, Working from Within: The Nature and Development of
Quine's Naturalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
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