Unit 3-2
Unit 3-2
3. Rather than intercept a message, user F constructs its own message with
the desired entries and transmits that message to E as if it had come from manager D.
Computer E accepts the message as coming from manager D and updates its authorization
file accordingly.
4. A message is sent from a customer to a stockbroker with instructions for
various transactions. Subsequently, the investments lose value and the customer denies
sending the message.
Although this list by no means exhausts the possible types of security
violations, it illustrates the range of concerns of network security.
Attack
An assault on system security that derives from an intelligent threat.That is, an
intelligent act that is a deliberate attempt (especially in the sense of a method or technique) to
evade security services and violate the security policy of a system.
Security attack: Any action that compromises the security of information owned by an
organization.
A useful means of classifying security attacks is in terms of passive attacks and active
attacks.A passive attack attempts to learn or make use of information from the system but
does not affect system resources.An active attack attempts to alter system resources or affect
their operation.
Passive Attacks
Passive attacks are in the nature of eavesdropping on, or monitoring of, transmissions
as shown in Fig 1.4. The goal of the opponent is to obtain information that is being
transmitted. Two types of passive attacks are the release of message contents and traffic
analysis.
A second type of passive attack, traffic analysis, is subtler (Figure 1.6). Suppose that
we had a way of masking the contents of messages or other information traffic so that
opponents, even if they captured the message, could not extract the information from the
message. The common technique for masking contents is encryption.
Passive attacks are very difficult to detect, because they do not involve any alteration
of the data. Typically, the message traffic is sent and received in an apparently normal
fashion, and neither the sender nor the receiver is aware that a third party has read the
messages or observed the traffic pattern. However, it is feasible to prevent the success of
these attacks, usually by means of encryption. Thus, the emphasis in dealing with passive
attacks is on prevention rather than detection.
Active Attacks
Active attacks involve some modification of the data stream or the creation of a false
stream and can be subdivided into four categories: masquerade, replay, modification of
messages, and denial of service.
A masquerade takes place when one entity pretends to be a different entity (Figure
1.7). A masquerade attack usually includes one of the other forms of active attack. For
example, authentication sequences can be captured and replayed after a valid authentication
sequence has taken place, thus enabling an authorized entity with few privileges to obtain
extra privileges by impersonating an entity that has those privileges.
Replay involves the passive capture of a data unit and its subsequent retransmission to
produce an unauthorized effect (Figure 1.8).
Security aspects come into play when it is necessary or desirable to protect the
information transmission from an opponent who may present a threat to confidentiality,
authenticity, and so on. All of the techniques for providing security have two components:
Some secret information shared by the two principals and, it is hoped, unknown to the
opponent. An example is an encryption key used in conjunction with the transformation to
scramble the message before transmission and unscramble it on reception.
Fig 1.7 Masquerade
Malicious Software: The most sophisticated types of threats to computer systems are
presented by programs that exploit vulnerabilities in computing systems. Such threats
are referred to as malicious software, or malware. In this context, we are concerned
with threats to application programs as well as utility programs, such as editors and
compilers, and kernel- level programs.
Backdoor:
A backdoor, also known as a trapdoor, is a secret entry point into a program that allows
someone who is aware of the backdoor to gain access without going through the usual
security access procedures. Programmers have used backdoors legitimately for many years to
debug and test programs; such a backdoor is called a maintenance hook. This usually is done
when the programmer is developing an application that has an authentication procedure, or a
long setup, requiring the user to enter many different values to run the application. To debug
the program, the developer may wish to gain special privileges or to avoid all the necessary
setup and authentication. Backdoors become threats when unscrupulous programmers use
them to gain unauthorized access. It is difficult to implement operating system controls for
backdoors. Security measures must focus on the program development and software update
activities.
Logic Bomb:
One of the oldest types of program threat, predating viruses and worms, is the logic bomb.
The logic bomb is code embedded in some legitimate program that is set to “explode” when
certain conditions are met. Examples of conditions that can be used as triggers for a logic
bomb are the presence or absence of certain files, a particular day of the week or date, or a
particular user running the application. Once triggered, a bomb may alter or delete data or
entire files, cause a machine halt, or do some other damage.
Table 5.1 Terminology of Malicious Programs
Name Description
Malware that, when executed, tries to replicate itself into other
Virus executable code; when it succeeds the code is said to be infected.
When the infected code is executed, the virus also executes.
A computer program that can run independently and can propagate a
Worm
complete working version of itself onto other hosts on a network.
A program inserted into software by an intruder. A logic bomb lies
Logic Bomb dormant until a predefined condition is met; the program then
triggers a unauthorized act.
A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but also
has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades security
Trojan Horse
mechanisms, sometimes by exploiting legitimate authorizations of a
system entity that invokes the Trojan horse program.
Any mechanism that bypasses a normal security check; it may allow
Backdoor (trapdoor)
unauthorized access to functionality.
Software (e.g: script, macro, or other portable instruction) that can be
Mobile code shipped unchanged to a heterogenous collection or platforms and
execute with identical semantics.
Exploits Code specific to a single vulnerability or set of vulnerabilities.
Program that installs other items on a machine that is under attack.
Downloaders
Usually, a downloader is sent in e-mail.
Auto-rooter Malicious hacker tools used to break into new machines remotely.
Kit (virus generator) Set of tools for generating new viruses automatically.
Viruses:
A computer virus is a piece of software that can “infect” other programs by modifying them;
the modification includes injecting the original program with a routine to make copies of the
virus program, which can then go on to infect other programs. A virus can do anything that
other programs do. The difference is that a virus attaches itself to another program and
executes secretly when the host program is run. Once a virus is executing, it can perform any
function, such as erasing files and programs that is allowed by the privileges of the current
user. An unconventional acronym of virus in IT industry is Vital Information Resources
Under Siege.
A computer virus has three parts
• Infection mechanism: The means by which a virus spreads, enabling it to replicate. The
mechanism is also referred to as the infection vector.
• Trigger: The event or condition that determines when the payload is activated or
delivered.
• Payload: What the virus does, besides spreading. The payload may involve damage or
may involve benign but noticeable activity.
During its lifetime, a typical virus goes through the following four phases:
Dormant phase: The virus is idle. The virus will eventually be activated by some
event, such as a date, the presence of another program or file, or the capacity of the
disk exceeding some limit. Not all viruses have this stage.
Propagation phase: The virus places a copy of itself into other programs or into certain
system areas on the disk. The copy may not be identical to the propagating version;
viruses often morph to evade detection. Each infected program will now contain a
clone of the virus, which will itself enter a propagation phase. • Triggering phase: The
virus is activated to perform the function for which it was intended. As with the
dormant phase, the triggering phase can be caused by a variety of system events,
including a count of the number of times that this copy of the virus has made copies of
itself. • Execution phase: The function is performed. The function may be harmless,
such as a message on the screen, or damaging, such as the destruction of programs and
data files. Most viruses carry out their work in a manner that is specific to a particular
operating system and, in some cases, specific to a particular hardware platform. Thus,
they are designed to take advantage of the details and weaknesses of particular
systems.
Viruses Classification
There has been a continuous arms race between virus writers and writers of antivirus software
since viruses first appeared. As effective countermeasures are developed for existing types of
viruses, newer types are developed. There is no simple or universally agreed upon
classification scheme for viruses. In this section, we classify viruses along two orthogonal
axes: the type of target the virus tries to infect and the method the virus uses to conceal itself
from detection by users and antivirus software. A virus classification by target includes the
following categories:
• Boot sector infector: Infects a master boot record or boot record and spreads when a
system is booted from the disk containing the virus.
• File infector: Infects files that the operating system or shell consider to be executable.
• Macro virus: Infects files with macro code that is interpreted by an application.
Virus Kits
Another weapon in the virus writers’ armory is the virus-creation toolkit. Such a toolkit
enables a relative novice to quickly create a number of different viruses. Although viruses
created with toolkits tend to be less sophisticated than viruses designed from scratch, the sheer
number of new viruses that can be generated using a toolkit creates a problem for antivirus
schemes.
E-Mail Viruses
A more recent development in malicious software is the e-mail virus. The first rapidly
spreading e-mail viruses, such as Melissa, made use of a Microsoft Word macro embedded in
an attachment. If the recipient opens the e-mail attachment, the Word macro is activated. Then
The e-mail virus sends itself to everyone on the mailing list in the user’s e-mail
package.
The virus does local damage on the user’s system.
In 1999, a more powerful version of the e-mail virus appeared. This newer version can be
activated merely by opening an e-mail that contains the virus rather than opening an
attachment. The virus uses the Visual Basic scripting language supported by the e-mail
package.
It arrives via e-mail and uses e-mail software features to replicate itself across the Internet.
The virus propagates itself as soon as it is activated (either by opening an e-mail attachment
or by opening the e-mail) to all of the e-mail addresses known to the infected host. This
makes it very difficult for antivirus software to respond before much damage is done.
Ultimately, a greater degree of security must be built into Internet utility and application
software on PCs to counter the growing threat.
Antivirus Approaches
The ideal solution to the threat of viruses is prevention: Do not allow a virus to get into the
system in the first place, or block the ability of a virus to modify any files containing
executable code or macros. This goal is, in general, impossible to achieve, although
prevention can reduce the number of successful viral attacks. The next best approach is to be
able to do the following:
• Detection: Once the infection has occurred, determine that it has occurred and locate the
virus.
• Identification: Once detection has been achieved, identify the specific virus that has infected
a program.
• Removal: Once the specific virus has been identified, remove all traces of the virus from the
infected program and restore it to its original state. Remove the virus from all infected
systems so that the virus cannot spread further.
If detection succeeds but either identification or removal is not possible, then the alternative is
to discard the infected file and reload a clean backup version. Advances in virus and antivirus
technology go hand in hand. Early viruses were relatively simple code fragments and could be
identified and purged with relatively simple antivirus software packages. As the virus arms
race has evolved, both viruses and, necessarily, antivirus software have grown more complex
and sophisticated.
• First generation: simple scanners
• Second generation: heuristic scanners
• Third generation: activity traps
• Fourth generation: full-featured protection
A first-generation scanner requires a virus signature to identify a virus. The virus may contain
“wildcards” but has essentially the same structure and bit pattern in all copies. Such signature-
specific scanners are limited to the detection of known viruses. Another type of first-
generation scanner maintains a record of the length of programs and looks for changes in
length.
A second-generation scanner does not rely on a specific signature. Rather, the scanner uses
heuristic rules to search for probable virus infection. One class of such scanners looks for
fragments of code that are often associated with viruses. For example, a scanner may look for
the beginning of an encryption loop used in a polymorphic virus and discover the encryption
key. Once the key is discovered, the scanner can decrypt the virus to identify it, then remove
the infection and return the program to service. Another second-generation approach is
integrity checking. A checksum can be appended to each program. If a virus infects the
program without changing the checksum, then an integrity check will catch the change. To
counter a virus that is sophisticated enough to change the checksum when it infects a
program, an encrypted hash function can be used.
Third-generation programs are memory-resident programs that identify a virus by its actions
rather than its structure in an infected program. Such programs have the advantage that it is
not necessary to develop signatures and heuristics for a wide array of viruses. Rather, it is
necessary only to identify the small set of actions that indicate an infection is being attempted
and then to intervene.
The arms race continues. With fourth-generation packages, a more comprehensive defence
strategy is employed, broadening the scope of defence to more general-purpose computer
security measures.
Figure illustrates an example of an attack that consumes data transmission resources. The
following steps are involved:
i. The attacker takes control of multiple hosts over the Internet, instructing them to send
ICMP ECHO packets with the target’s spoofed IP address to a group of hosts that act as
reflectors, as described subsequently.
ii. Nodes at the bounce site receive multiple spoofed requests and respond by sending echo
reply packets to the target site.
iii. The target’s router is flooded with packets from the bounce site, leaving no data
transmission capacity for legitimate traffic
Another way to classify DDoS attacks is as either direct or reflector DDoS attacks. In a direct
DDoS attack, the attacker is able to implant zombie software on a number of sites distributed
throughout the Internet. Often, the DDoS attack involves two levels of zombie machines:
master zombies and slave zombies. The hosts of both machines have been infected with
malicious code. The attacker coordinates and triggers the master zombies, which in turn
coordinate and trigger the slave zombies. The use of two levels of zombies makes it more
difficult to trace the attack back to its source and provides for a more resilient network of
attackers.
A reflector DDoS attack adds another layer of machines (Figure 10.10b). In this type of
attack, the slave zombies construct packets requiring a response that contains the target’s IP
address as the source IP address in the packet’s IP header. These packets are sent to
uninfected machines known as reflectors. The uninfected machines respond with packets
directed at the target machine. A reflector DDoS attack can easily involve more machines and
more traffic than a direct DDoS attack and hence be more damaging. Further, tracing back the
attack or filtering out the attack packets is more difficult because the attack comes from
widely dispersed uninfected machines.
DDoS Countermeasures
In general, there are three lines of defense against DDoS attacks.
Attack prevention and pre-emption (before the attack): These mechanisms enable the
victim to endure attack attempts without denying service to legitimate clients.
Techniques include enforcing policies for resource consumption and providing backup
resources available on demand. In addition, prevention mechanisms modify systems and
protocols on the Internet to reduce the possibility of DDoS attacks.
Attack detection and filtering (during the attack): These mechanisms attempt to detect
the attack as it begins and respond immediately. This minimizes the impact of the attack
on the target. Detection involves looking for suspicious patterns of behaviour. Response
involves filtering out packets likely to be part of the attack.
Attack source traceback and identification (during and after the attack): This is an
attempt to identify the source of the attack as a first step in preventing future attacks.
However, this method typically does not yield results fast enough, if at all, to mitigate
an on-going attack.
With a DoS attack, a hacker attempts to render a network or an Internet resource, such
as a web server, worthless to users. A DoS attack typically achieves its goal by sending large
amounts of repeated requests that paralyze the network or a server.
A common form of a DoS attack is a SYN flood, where the server is overwhelmed by
embryonic connections. A hacker sends to a server countless Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) synchronization attempts known as SYN requests. The server answers each of those
requests with a SYN ACK reply and allocates some of its computing resources to servicing
this connection when it becomes a "full connection." Connections are said to be embryonic or
half-opened until the originator completes the three-way handshake with an ACK for each
request originated. A server that is inundated with half-opened connections soon runs out of
resources to allocate to upcoming connection requests, thus the expression "denial of service
attack."
The following sidebars provide the anatomy of DoS attacks and distributed DoS
(DDoS) attacks.
Fig 1.9 DOS
Those handlers in turn scan their own corporate network, hunting for workstations
to compromise and turn into DDoS agents. Those agents are also referred to as bots, thus
the expression of botnets.
When his army of agents is strategically in place, the hacker launches the attack.
He transmits his orders for the mission to the handlers and agents; these orders usually
cause each of these hosts to send large quantities of packets to the same specific
destination, at a precise time, thus overwhelming the victim and the path to it. It also
creates significant congestion on corporate networks that are infected with handlers and
agents when they all simultaneously launch their attack on the ultimate victim.
A logical route is defined through the network (Internet), from sender to the receiver and
using the communication protocols both the sender and the receiver established
communication.
Any security service would have the three components discussed below:
1. Transformation of the information which has to be sent to the receiver. So, that any
opponent present at the information channel is unable to read the message. This indicates
the encryption of the message.
It also includes the addition of code during the transformation of the information which will
be used in verifying the identity of the authentic receiver.
2. Sharing of the secret information between sender and receiver of which the opponent must
not any clue. Yes, we are talking of the encryption key which is used during the encryption of
the message at the sender’s end and also during the decryption of message at receiver’s end.
3. There must be a trusted third party which should take the responsibility of distributing the
secret information (key) to both the communicating parties and also prevent it from any
opponent.
2. Next, the network security model designer is concerned about the generation of the secret
information which is known as a key.
This secret information is used in conjunction with the security algorithm in order to
transform the message.
3. Now, the secret information is required at both the ends, sender’s end and receiver’s end.
At sender’s end, it is used to encrypt or transform the message into unreadable form and at
the receiver’s end, it is used to decrypt or retransform the message into readable form.
So, there must be a trusted third party who will distribute the secret information to both
sender and receiver. While designing the network security model designer must also
concentrate on developing the methods to distribute the key to the sender and receiver.
An appropriate methodology must be used to deliver the secret information to the
communicating parties without the interference of the opponent.
It is also taken care that the communication protocols that are used by the communicating
parties should be supporting the security algorithm and the secret key in order to achieve the
security service.
NETWORK ACCESS SECURITY MODEL
Network access security model which is designed to secure the information system which can
be accessed by the attacker through the network.
Attackers who attack your system that is accessible through the internet. These attackers fall
into two categories:
1. Hacker: The one who is only interested in penetrating into your system. They do not cause
any harm to your system they only get satisfied by getting access to your system.
2. Intruders: These attackers intend to do damage to your system or try to obtain the
information from the system which can be used to attain financial gain.
The attacker can place a logical program on your system
through the network which canaffect the software on your
system. This leads to two kinds of risks:
a. Information threat: This kind of threats modifies data on the
user’s behalf to which actuallyuser should not access. Like
enabling some crucial permission in the system.
b. Service threat: This kind of threat disables the user from accessing data on
the system.
Private because through this connection, no one else can see your data or
browsing activity.
Now that you know the meaning behind VPN, as well as what VPN stands for,
let's explore the many benefits of a VPN, and why it might be advantageous to
use one.
For anyone seeking a safer, freer, and more secure online experience, the
benefits of using a VPN are myriad. A VPN protects its users by encrypting
their data and masking their IP address, leaving their browsing history and
location untraceable. This greater anonymity allows for greater privacy, as well
as greater freedom for those who wish to access blocked or region-bound
content.
Here are some common reasons as to why you might use a VPN:
Sensitive data like work emails, payment information, and location tagging is
constantly being transmitted online. This information is trackable and easy to
exploit, especially on a public network, where anyone who has access to the
network has potential access your personal data. A VPN connection scrambles
your data into code and renders it unreadable to anyone without an encryption
key. It hides your browsing activity so that no one else can see it.
Today, remote work is more widespread than ever before. With a VPN, remote
workers can access company resources over a private connection from
anywhere, so long as they are able to get online. This provides employees with a
greater sense of flexibility, while also ensuring that company data remains
protected and secure, even on a public Wi-Fi network.
Some sites and services restrict their media content based on geographic
location, which means you may not have access to certain kinds of content. A
VPN disguises, or spoofs, the location of your local server so that it appears as
if it's based elsewhere, such as in another country.
Internet service providers (ISPs) log and track your browsing history through
your device's unique IP address. This information could potentially be sold to
third-party advertisers, given to the government, or left vulnerable in the face a
security compromise. By routing to a remote VPN server instead of your ISP's
servers, a VPN masks your IP address, prevents ISP tracking, and keeps your
personal data private.
Today, you'll find a wide variety of VPNs for computers and mobile, both
premium and free, available for professional and personal use. Here are some of
the most common types:
One of the most widely used types of VPN for the computer, a remote access
VPN, gives off-site users the ability to connect to an organization's network, or
a remote server, from their personal device. This can be accomplished by
entering your authentication credentials via a login page, which then authorizes
you to make the connection through your web browser.
Users may also connect to the VPN through a virtual desktop client or VPN app,
which also connects to a network or server after you enter your credentials. A
client provides its users with an easy interface to work with, connectivity
information, and the ability to toggle between the VPN's various features.
A remote access VPN can be used for both professional and personal use, which
is why it's one of the most common forms of VPN. It gives remote workers the
ability to access company files and resources without having to be in the office,
and it safeguards the private data of remote-first companies so that it's likely to
stay private. As for individual users who simply wish to browse the public
Internet with increased autonomy and anonymity, a remote access VPN is
integral to avoiding content blocks, firewalls, and ISP tracking.
Site-to-site VPN
Large organizations in need of a more robust, custom solution may opt for site-
to-site VPNs. A site-to-site VPN is a private, internal network comprised of
multiple networks within an organization, which are connected to each other’s
local area networks (LANs) through the public Internet. This setup allows users
across two separate networks, either within or adjacent to the organization, to
share resources with each other while still limiting full access to all their
resources, ensuring that communication within the company remains as private
and as secure as possible. Due to the scale and complexity of site-to-site VPNs,
this type of connection is best suited for enterprise-level companies with
departments across multiple locations.
Intranet
An intranet site-to-site VPN links several sites from the same organization
together by way of LAN. This is useful when multiple departments across
multiple locations need to collaborate with each other within a closed, private
network. Through a site-to-site connection, these departments can securely and
efficiently exchange resources with each other.
Extranet
Mobile VPN
Mobile VPNs not only provide the benefits of a traditional VPN, but they also
continue to safeguard data when Internet connectivity is spotty or unstable, or
when toggling between mobile data and Wi-Fi. So long as the app is running,
the VPN connection remains secure, and your device remains protected.
Because of the flexibility, a mobile VPN is ideal for users who travel, or for
those who don’t have access to a reliable internet connection.
When an attempted connection is made to the VPN provider's remote server, the
server authenticates the user and creates an encrypted tunnel for their data to run
through. The data that funnels through this tunnel gets scrambled into code and
rendered illegible by anyone who does not have access to the encryption key,
and therefore does not have permission to read it. Once this data reaches the
server, the server uses its own private key to decrypt the data and make it
readable. The server sends the decrypted data, along with a new IP address,
back to the site you’re attempting to connect with.
In addition to encryption, a VPN also masks your IP address from the public
internet, in turn masking your identity. When a user successfully connects their
computer to the VPN server, the VPN not only secures their data, it also assigns
them a new IP address that conceals their real IP address. This may come in the
form of a shared IP address, which groups multiple users into a single IP so that
activity from any one individual user becomes difficult to discern. This new IP
address may also correspond with the IP address of the VPN server, which
means the more servers there are across the globe, the more IP addresses you
have to choose from. Depending on your needs, this can be configured in the
settings of your VPN client.
When a VPN hides your IP address, it also spoofs, or hides, your location as
well. This is useful for bypassing content blocks and firewalls, which rely on
your IP to initiate the blocking. IP masking has also proven effective against
doxing, where your private identity is made public online, as well as DDoS
attacks, or distributed denial of service attacks. If no one knows your real IP
address, then no one can launch an attack against you.
PUBLIC-KEY INFRASTRUCTURE:
Public-key infrastructure (PKI) is the set of
hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to
create, manage, store, distribute, and revoke digital certificates
based on asymmetric cryptography. The principal objective for
developing a PKI is to enable secure, convenient, and efficient
acquisition of public keys. The Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) working group
has been the driving force behind setting up a formal (and
generic) model based on X.509 that is suitable for deploying a
certificate-based architecture on the Internet. This section
describes the PKIX model.
• Repository: A generic term used to denote any method for storing certificates and CRLs so
that they can be retrieved by end entities. PKIX Management Functions PKIX identifies a
number of management functions that potentially need to be supported by management
protocols. These are indicated in Figure 3 and include the following:
• Registration: This is the process whereby a user first makes itself known to a CA (directly,
or through an RA), prior to that CA issuing a certificate or certificates for that user.
Registration begins the process of enrolling in a PKI. Registration usually involves some off-
line or online procedure for mutual authentication. Typically, the end entity is issued one or
more shared secret keys used for subsequent authentication.
• Initialization: Before a client system can operate securely, it is necessary to install key
materials that have the appropriate relationship with keys stored elsewhere in the
infrastructure. For example, the client needs to be securely initialized with the public key and
other assured information of the trusted CA(s) to be used in validating certificate paths.
• Certification: This is the process in which a CA issues a certificate for a user’s public key
and returns that certificate to the user’s client system and/or posts that certificate in a
repository.
• Key pair recovery: Key pairs can be used to support digital signature creation and
verification, encryption and decryption, or both. When a key pair is used for
encryption/decryption, it is important to provide a mechanism to recover the necessary
decryption keys when normal access to the keying material is no longer possible, otherwise it
will not be possible to recover the encrypted data. Loss of access to the decryption key can
result from forgotten passwords/PINs, corrupted disk drives, damage to hardware tokens, and
so on. Key pair recovery allows end entities to restore their encryption/decryption key pair
from an authorized key backup facility (typically, the CA that issued the end entity’s
certificate).
• Key pair update: All key pairs need to be updated regularly (i.e., replaced with a new key
pair) and new certificates issued. Update is required when the certificate lifetime expires and
SSH Protocol
Symmetric Cryptography
Hashing
IP security (IPSec)
The IP sec4rity (IPSec) is an Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) standard suite of protocols between 2 communication
points across the IP network that provide data authentication,
integrity, and confidentiality. It also defines the encrypted,
decrypted and authenticated packets. The protocols needed for
secure key exchange and key management are defined in it.
Uses of IP Security –
IPsec can be used to do the following things:
To encrypt application layer data.
To provide security for routers sending routing data across the public internet.
Packet Format:
Firewalls
Firewall is a network device that isolates organization's internal network from larger
outside network/Internet. It can be a hardware, software, or combined system that prevents
unauthorized access to or from internal network.
A firewall is a network security device, either hardware or software-based, which monitors
all incoming and outgoing traffic and based on a defined set of security rules it accepts,
rejects or drops that specific traffic.
Accept : allow the traffic
Reject : block the traffic but reply with an “unreachable error”
Drop : block the traffic with no reply
A firewall establishes a barrier between secured internal networks and outside untrusted
network, such as the Internet.
Figure 4.14 Basic Structure of Firewall
Suppose no rule is defined about SSH connection to the server on the firewall. So, it will
follow the default policy. If default policy on the firewall is set to accept, then any computer
outside of your office can establish an SSH connection to the server. Therefore, setting
default policy as drop (or reject) is always a good practice.
Generation of Firewall
Firewalls can be categorized based on its generation.
First Generation- Packet Filtering Firewall: Packet filtering firewall is used to control
network access by monitoring outgoing and incoming packet and allowing them to pass
or stop based on source and destination IP address, protocols and ports. It analyses traffic
at the transport protocol layer (but mainly uses first 3 layers).
Packet firewalls treat each packet in isolation. They have no ability to tell whether a
packet is part of an existing stream of traffic. Only It can allow or deny the packets based
on unique packet headers.
Packet filtering firewall maintains a filtering table which decides whether the packet will
be forwarded or discarded. From the given filtering table, the packets will be Filtered
according to following rules:
Host- based Firewalls: Host-based firewall is installed on each network node which
controls each incoming and outgoing packet. It is a software application or suite of
applications, comes as a part of the operating system. Host-based firewalls are needed
because network firewalls cannot provide protection inside a trusted network. Host
firewall protects each host from attacks and unauthorized access.
Network-based Firewalls: Network firewall function on network level. In other words,
these firewalls filter all incoming and outgoing traffic across the network. It protects
the internal network by filtering the traffic using rules defined on the firewall. A
Network firewall might have two or more network interface cards (NICs). A network-
based firewall is usually a dedicated system with proprietary software installed.
Both types of firewall have their own advantages.
Firewall is categorized into three basic types
Packet filter (Stateless & Stateful)
Application-level gateway
Circuit-level gateway
These three categories, however, are not mutually exclusive. Modern firewalls have a mix of
abilities that may place them in more than one of the three categories.
Figure 4.16 Types of firewall
Stateless & Stateful Packet Filtering Firewall
In this type of firewall deployment, the internal network is connected to the external
network/Internet via a router firewall. The firewall inspects and filters data packet-by-packet.
Packet-filtering firewalls allow or block the packets mostly based on criteria such as source
and/or destination IP addresses, protocol, source and/or destination port numbers, and various
other parameters within the IP header.
The decision can be based on factors other than IP header fields such as ICMP message type,
TCP SYN and ACK bits, etc.
Packet filter rule has two parts −
Selection criteria − It is a used as a condition and pattern matching for decision
making.
Action field − This part specifies action to be taken if an IP packet meets the selection
criteria. The action could be either block (deny) or permit (allow) the packet across the
firewall.
Packet filtering is generally accomplished by configuring Access Control Lists (ACL) on
routers or switches. ACL is a table of packet filter rules.
As traffic enters or exits an interface, firewall applies ACLs from top to bottom to each
incoming packet, finds matching criteria and either permits or denies the individual packets.
Honeypot:
In a fully deployed IDS, some administrators may choose to install
a “honeypot,” essentially a system component set up as bait or
decoy for intruders. Honeypots can be used as early warning
systems of an attack, decoys from critical systems, and data
collection sources for attack analyses. Many IDS vendors maintain
honeypots for research purposes, and to develop new intrusion
signatures. Note that a honeypot should only be deployed when the
organization has the resources to maintain it. A honeypot left
unmanaged may become a significant liability because attackers
may use a compromised honeypot to attack other systems.
Name Description
Packet Decoder:
Packet decoder takes packets from different types of network
interfaces and prepares packets to be pre-processed or to be sent to
the detection engine. The interfaces may be Ethernet, SLIP, PPP,
and so on.
Pre-processors:
Pre-processors are components or plug-ins that can be used with
Snort to arrange or modify data packets before the detection engine
does some operation to find out if the packet is being used by an
intruder.
The Detection Engine:
The detection engine is the most important part of snort. Its
responsibility is to detect if any intrusion activity exists in a packet.
The detection engine employs snort rules for this purpose.
Output Modules:
Output modules or plug-ins can do different operations depending
on how you want to save output generated by the logging and
alerting system of Snort. Basically, these modules control the type
of output generated by the logging and alerting system.
Figure below shows how these components are arranged. Any data
packet coming from the Internet enters the packet decoder. On its
way towards the output modules, it is either dropped, logged or an
alert is generated.
Wireless Communication
Wireless communication refers to any type of data exchange between the parties that is
performed wirelessly (over the air). This definition is extremely wide, since it may correspond to
many types of wireless technologies, like −
All the technologies mentioned above use different communication architecture, however they all
share the same "Wireless Medium" capability.
Wi-Fi
Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) refers to wireless local area network, as we all know them. It is based
on IEEE 802.11 standard. Wi-Fi is a type of wireless network you meet almost everywhere, at your
home, workplace, in hotels, restaurants and even in taxis, trains or planes. These 802.11
communication standards operate on either 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz ISM radio bands.
These devices are easily available in the shops that are compatible with Wi-Fi standard, they
have following image visible on the device itself. I bet you have seen it hundreds of times in
various shops or other public places!
Due to the fact, that 802.11 based wireless network are so heavily used in all types of
environments - they are also the biggest subject for various security researches across other
802.11 standards.
Wireless Clients
Wireless clients are considered to be any end-devices with a wireless card or wireless adapter
installed. Now, in this 21st century, those devices can be almost anything −
Modern Smartphones − These are one of the most universally used wireless devices you see
in the market. They support multiple wireless standards on one box, for example,
Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, GSM.
Laptops − These are a type of device which we all use every single day!
Smartwatch − An example of Sony based smartwatch is shown here. It can synchronize
with your smartphone via a Bluetooth.
Smart-home Equipment − With the current progress of the technology, smart-home
equipment might be for example a freezer that you can control over Wi-Fi or a
temperature controller.
The list of possible client devices is growing every single day. It sounds a little scary that all of
those devices/utilities we use on a daily basis can be controlled via a wireless network so easily.
But at the same time, remember that all the communication flowing through a wireless medium
can be intercepted by anyone who is just standing at the right place at the right time.
For a home environment, most often you have a router, a switch, and an AP embedded in one
box, making it really usable for this purpose.
Wireless Controller (WLC)
In corporate wireless implementation, the number of Access Points is often counted in hundreds
or thousands of units. It would not be administratively possible to manage all the AP's and their
configuration (channel assignments, optimal output power, roaming configuration, creation of
SSID on each and every AP, etc.) separately.
This is the situation, where the concept of wireless controller comes into play. It is the
"Mastermind" behind all the wireless network operation. This centralized server which has the IP
connectivity to all the AP's on the network making it easy to manage all of them globally from
the single management platform, push configuration templates, monitor users from all the AP's
in real time and so on.
Service Set Identifier (SSID)
SSID directly identifies the wireless WLAN itself. In order to connect to Wireless LAN, the
wireless client needs to send the same exact SSID in the association frame as the SSID name,
preconfigured on the AP. So the question now arises how to find out which SSIDs are present in
your environment? That is easy as all the operating systems come with a built-in wireless client
that scans wireless spectrum for the wireless networks to join (as shows below). I am sure you
have done this process several times in your daily routine.
Cell
A cell is basically a geographical region covered by the AP's or BTS's antenna (transmitter). In
the following image, a cell is marked with a yellow line.
Most often, an AP has much more output power, when compared it with the capabilities of the
antenna built-in into the client device. The fact that, the client can receive frames transmitted
from the AP, does not mean that a 2-way communication can be established. The above picture
perfectly shows that situation. - In both situations, a client can hear AP's frames, but only in the
second situation, the 2-way communication can be established.
The outcome from this short example is that, when designing the wireless cell sizes, one has to
take into account, what is the average output transmitting power of the antennas that clients will
use.
Channel
Wireless Networks may be configured to support multiple 802.11 standards. Some of them
operate on the 2.4GHz band (example are: 802.11b/g/n) and other ones on the 5GHz band
(example: 802.11a/n/ac).
Depending on the band, there is a predefined set of sub-bands defined for each channel. In
environments with multiple APs placed in the same physical area, the smart channel assignment
is used in order to avoid collisions (collisions of the frames transmitted on exactly the same
frequency from multiple sources at the same time).
Let's have a look at the theoretical design of the 802.11b network with 3 cells, adjacent to each
other as shown in the above picture. Design on the left is composed of 3 non-overlapping
channels - it means that frames sent by APs and its clients in particular cell, will not interfere
with communication in other cells. On the right, we have a completely opposite situation, all the
frames flying around on the same channel leads to collisions and degrade the wireless
performance significantly.
Antennas
Antennas are used to "translate" information flowing as an electrical signal inside the cable and
into the electromagnetic field, which is used to transmit the frame over a wireless medium.
Every wireless device (either AP or any type of wireless client device) has an antenna that
includes a transmitter and the receiver module. It can be external and visible to everyone around
or built-in, as most of the laptops or smartphones nowadays have.
For wireless security testing or penetration tests of the wireless networks, external antenna is
one of the most important tools. You should get one of them, if you want to go into this field!
One of the biggest advantages of external antennas (comparing to most of the internal antennas
you might meet built-in to the equipment), is that they can be configured in a so-called "monitor
mode" - this is definitely something you need! It allows you to sniff the wireless traffic from your
PC using wireshark or other well-known tools like Kismet.
Wireless
Wimax, IEEE
Metropolitan
All around 802.16 or
Area Between homes and businesses
the city proprietary
Network
technologies
(WMAN)
Wireless
Wide Area Throughout
3G, LTE Wireless access to the internet from
Network the world
(WWAN)
This tutorial is mainly going to cover WLAN technology, however we will also cover the various
aspects of Bluetooth communication (WPAN).
Wi-Fi Networks
The choice of devices used in wireless deployments is influenced by the type of deployment
whether this is going to be a network for a small house, shop, a big enterprise network or the
one for hotels.
As you can see, Wi-Fi networks are becoming faster and faster. Following are a couple of limiting
factors why we don't see high speeds when we download data over Wi-Fi −
There is a difference between the speed and actuals throughout. Since wireless
communication is half-duplex (single antenna can either transmit or receive at one time),
the actual throughput is actually around 50% of the speed. This condition is only true,
when there is one transmitter and one receiver, without any other clients involved, and
without interferences (that leads to collisions and retransmissions).
The most cutting edge standards (802.11ac) are not that widely supported on end-
devices. Most of the laptops or smartphones on the market provides support for
802.11a/b/g/n, but not yet for 802.11ac standard. In addition to that, some devices are
equipped only with antenna, that supports 2,4 GHz frequency band, but not 5 GHz (that
lead to lack of 802.11ac support by default).
Wireless Security - Encryption
In general, encryption is the process of transforming the data, into some kind of cyphertext that
would be non-understandable for any 3rd party that would intercept the information. Nowadays,
we use encryption every single day, without even noticing. Every time you access your web bank
or mailbox, most often when you log in to any type of web page, or create a VPN tunnel back to
your corporate network.
Some information is too valuable, not to be protected. And, to protect the information efficiently,
it must be encrypted in a way that would not allow an attacker to decrypt it. To be honest with
you guys - there is no fully secure encryption scheme. All the algorithms that we use every day
may be broken, but what is its likelihood of this happening with current technology and time?
For example, it might take around eight years to break encryption "X" using new super-fast
computers. Is that risk big enough, to stop using algorithm "X" for encryption? I doubt it, the
information to be protected might be outdated at that point of time.
The most common encryption algorithms are collected in the following table −
The ones that you will most likely meet (in some form) on the wireless networks are RC4 and
AES.
Encryption
Security Authentication
algorithm Possibility of breaking the encryption
Standard methods
user
WEP was the first wireless "secure" model that was supposed to add authentication and
encryption. It is based on RC4 algorithm and 24 bits of Initialization Vector (IV). This is the biggest
drawback of the implementation that leads to WEP being crack able within a few minutes, using
the tools that anyone can have installed on their PCs.
In order to enhance the security, WPA2 was invented with strong encryption model (AES) and a
very strong authentication model based on 802.1x (or PSK). WPA was introduced just as a staging
mechanism for smooth transition to WPA2. A lot of wireless cards did not support the new AES
(at that time), but all of them were using RC4 + TKIP. Therefore WPA was also based on that
mechanism, just with a few advancements.
As one can notice, there are two inputs to the algorithm, one of which is a 24-bit long IV (that is
also added to the final ciphertext in a clear text) and the other is a WEP key. When trying to
crack this security model (WEP), one has to collect a large number of wireless data frames (large
number of frames until the frame with duplicate IV vector value is found).
Assuming that for WEP, the IV has 24 bits. This means that it could be any number from two
frames (if you are lucky enough) to 224 + 1 (you collect every single possible IV value, and then,
the very next frame must be a duplicate). From the experience, I can say that, on a rather
crowded wireless LAN (around 3 clients sending the traffic all the time), it is a matter of 5-10
minutes to get enough frames, to crack the encryption and derive the PSK value.
This vulnerability is only present in WEP. WPA security model uses TKIP that solved weak IV by
increasing its size from 24 bits to 48 bits, and making other security enhancements to the
diagram. Those modifications made the WPA algorithm much more secure and prone to this type
of cracking.
Assuming that you have found your target network, you do as follows −
Collect (sniff) WEP encrypted packets flying over the air. This step may be performed
using a Linux tool called "airodump-ng".
When enough packets are collected (you have collected a set of frames with duplicate IV
vector), you try to crack the network using a tool called "aircrack-ng".
On a highly congested network, the above mentioned two steps can take around 5-10 minutes or
even less. It is that easy! The detailed step by step guide for hacking WEP will be shown under
the topic of "Pen Testing WEP Encrypted WLAN ".
It uses temporal, dynamically created keys instead of static ones used by WEP.
It uses sequencing to defend against replay and injection attacks.
It uses an advanced key mixing algorithm in order to defeat IV collisions and weak-key
attacks in WEP.
It introduces Enhanced Data Integrity (EDI) to defeat bit-flipping attack possible in WEP.
Taking all of these points into account, it makes WPA standard computationally not-possible to
crack (it does not say it is not possible, but it may take reasonably a very long time, assuming
you have advanced resources for breaking the algorithm). Authentication used in WPA standard
has also advanced in respect to one used in WEP. WPA uses 802.1x (EAP-based authentication)
for authentication of the clients. In fact, this is the only weak point, where you may try your
chances for breaking the WPA (and WPA2 in fact).
WPA and WPA2 standards supports two types of authentications - Pre-Shared Key (PSK) and true
802.1x based on external authentication server. When using 802.1x authentication - it is simply
not possible to break the password; it is only doable where local PSK mode is used. Just as a side-note
- all the enterprise wireless deployments, they use true 802.1x authentication, based on the
external RADIUS server, therefore, your only possible target might be very small businesses or
home networks.
One more remark is that, PSK used for protecting WPA/WPA2 must be reasonably short in size
(max 10 characters - in opposite to 64 characters allowed as max length), if you have the
intention to break it. The reason for that requirement is that, PSK is only transmitted once (not
in clear text) between wireless client and the AP during the initial 4-way handshake, and the only
way to derive the original key from those packets is by brute-forcing or using a good dictionary.
There is a pretty nice online calculator that can estimate the time it would take to brute-force the
PSK - http://lastbit.com/pswcalc.asp. Assuming that you have 1 PC that can try 1000 password
per second (composed of lower-case, upper-case, digits and common punctuations) it would take
28910 years to break the password (as maximum of course, if you are lucky it might take a few
hours).
The general process of breaking a WPA/WPA2 encryption (only when they use PSK) is as follows
−
Collect (sniff) wireless packets flying over the air. This step may be performed using the
Linux tool called "airodump-ng".
While packets are being collected, you should de-authenticate the current clients. By
doing that, you are getting to the situation, when the client would need to authenticate
again in order to use a Wi-Fi network. This is exactly what you wanted! By doing this, you
prepare a good environment to sniff a wireless user authenticating to the network. You
can use Linux based tool "aireplay-ng" to de-authenticate the current wireless clients.
As you have a 4-way handshake sniffed (and saved in the dump file), you can once again
use "aircrack-ng" to crack the PSK. In this step, you have to reference a dictionary file
containing all the combinations of the password, that aircrack-ng tool will use. That is
why, a good dictionary file is a most important element here.
Detailed step-by-step hacking of WPA/WPA2 networks will be shown under the topic " Pen
Testing WPA/WPA2 Encrypted WLAN ".
How to Defend Against WPA Cracking?
I have a feeling, that after going through the last sections of this tutorial, you will already have
some idea, what should be done in order to make WPA cracking not possible (or rather say:
impossible within a reasonable period of time). Following are some pointers of the best practices
for securing your home/small business wireless network −
If there is a chance for that, use WPA2 instead of WPA. It has a direct impact on the
encryption scheme used by a suite. AES (used by WPA2) is much more safe than TKIP
(used by WPA).
As you saw earlier, the only way to break WPA/WPA2 is by sniffing the authentication 4-
way handshake and brute-force the PSK. To make it computationally impossible, use a
password of at least 10 characters composed of random combination (not any plain word
that you can meet in any dictionary) of lower case, upper case, special characters and
digits.
Disable Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) - WPS is one of the "cool features" invented to make
connecting new wireless clients to the network much more easy - just by putting a
special 8-digit PIN number of the AP. This 8-digit is a very short work for a brute-force
attack, and also this 8-digit may be found on the back of the AP box itself. Give yourself
a try and have a look at your home router - do you see WPS PIN on the back? Do you
have WPS feature enabled on your home router?
Let's imagine that legitimate wireless client called victim (Step 1) is writing an e-mail to the
friend (e-mail will go to the internet), asking for money return of 1000$ and putting bank
account number in the e-mail.
Assuming the information is not well encrypted (or attacker broke the encryption and have the
chance of reading everything in clear text), wireless attacker (Step 2) reads the whole packet
flowing in the air to the AP. The attacker modifies a message by swapping the bank account
number to its own and re-inject a message back to the air, to go to the internet via the AP.
In that situation, if there are no integrity checks that would detect a change in the content of the
message - the recipient would get a message with a modified bank account number. Probably,
the situation described would be extremely hard to implement in real life, since all the tools like
mail exchange, are secure against those types of attacks (via proper encryption and message
integrity checks), it perfectly shows the concept of the attack.
There are 2 main counter-measures against this type of an integrity attack − encryption (so that
attacker would not be able to read the message at all) and Message Integrity Codes (MICs) that are
basically hashing function like MD5 or SHA1 that take a footprint of the whole message and
create a hash of 128 bits (MD5) or 160 bits (SHA1). Anytime, there is a change in the packet
content, the hash value would also change, resulting in message being denied (already by
wireless router).
No Encryption/ WEP Encryption − These are not very secure approaches and should not be
used under any circumstances.
TKIP Encryption − This encryption model is used in WPA deployments. It has not yet been
cracked, but TKIP is not considered as strong mean of encryption, due to the use of
weaker RC4 algorithm.
CCMP Encryption − This is used with WPA2. So far, it is considered the safest encryption
model that is based on not-breakable (at least for today) AES algorithm.
The main goal of all kinds of attacks is to break the encryption and get a value of the key. This
would give the attacker 2 things: broken confidentiality of other users and direct access to the
wireless network.
Wireless networks are also playing a crucial part in productivity of the employees. We all use
wireless laptops and smartphones in a workplace. With the lack of wireless network working, our
productivity is decreased.
Layer 1 DoS
Layer 2 DoS
Layer 3 DoS
The most common types of Layer 2 DoS attacks involve spoofing of disassociation or de-
authentication management frames. The reason, why it is so efficient is that, those frames are
NOT the request frames but notifications!
Because authentication process is a pre-requisite for association (as illustrated above), a de-
authentication frame will automatically disassociate the client as well.
This kind of attack maybe (once again), started using aireplay-ng tool. Can you see how powerful
this tool is?
Targeting once again my home network with ESSID of "home_e1000", I first check connected
clients with airodump-ng.
Fraggle Attack
Attacker sends a large amount of UDP echo requests to IP broadcast address. The source IP
address is spoofed and is set to a victim IP address. By doing that, all the replies originated on
by the clients on the broadcast subnet are sent back to the victim.
Ping Flood Attack
Attacker sends a large number of ICMP packet to the target computer using ping. Imagine a
malicious party that owns botnet of thousands of PCs. If we imagine a ping flood attack running
at the same time from all of those PC, then it may become pretty serious.
Smurf Attack
Exactly the same step by step operation, as in case of Fraggle Attack. The only difference is that,
Smurf attack uses ICMP echo request packets, opposite to Fraggle attack that uses UDP packets.
These type of Layer 3 DoS attacks are not specifically wireless technology attacks. They can be
used over any Layer 2 technology, either Ethernet, Frame Relay, ATM or Wireless. The main
requirement of this attack to be successful, is that the attacker is in control of a large amount of
overtaken PCs (botnet). Then particular packets are sent to the target from each and every
single infected host in the Botnet - assuming that botnet has 1000+ devices, the cumulative
traffic may be significant. Using a Layer 3 DoS from a single PC is not effective at all.
We have already described the scenario based on EAP-authentication used in WPA/WPA2, with
PSK authentication. By sniffing the 4-way handshake between the client and the authenticator
(AP), one may perform a brute-force attack (example – offline dictionary attack) to break the
encryption and derive the PSK value.
Another example can be LEAP (Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol). It was used in
olden times as a mechanism to generate dynamic WEP keys. In this setup, the password hashes
were flowing over-the-air hashed with MS-CHAP or MS-CHAPv2 algorithms (both of them are
crack-able with an offline dictionary attack). A short description of the authentication attack that
may be applied to LEAP would consist of the following steps −
With the current evolution of the IT industry, rogue access point might be very well hidden and
extremely hard to find. Would you be able to easily spot a Raspberry Pi connected to your
network switch, if it would be placed at the back of the rack hidden in between hundreds of
network cables? I can definitely say, you would NOT spot it at all!
If the network resources are exposed by a rogue access point, the following risks may be
identified −
A malicious hacker may use this default behavior, and bring its own wireless AP to the physical
area, where you are normally using your Wi-Fi. If the signal from that AP, would be better than
the one from original AP, the laptop software will mis-associate to the fake (rogue) access point
provided by the hacker (thinking it is the legitimate AP, you have used in the past). These kind
of attacks are very easy to perform in some big open spaces, such as airports, office
environments or public areas. These kind of attacks are sometimes referred to as Honeypot AP
Attacks.
Creating a fake AP does not require any physical hardware. The Linux distribution, used through
all this tutorial is Kali Linux, has an internal tool called airbase-ng that can create AP with specific
MAC address and WLAN name (SSID) with a single command.
Let's create a following scenario. In the past, I have used the SSID of "Airport-Guest" at one of
the European airports. That way, I know that my smartphone has saved this SSID on the PNL
(Preferred Network List). So I create this SSID using airbase-ng.
After I have created the WLAN, I have used Layer 2 DoS attack described earlier, to constantly
de-authenticate my smartphone from Home_e1000 wireless network. At that point, my
smartphone detects the other SSID (Airport-Guest) with a very good link quality, so it connects
automatically to it.
This is something you see in the dump above starting from 21:48:19. At that point, we are in the
good situation to perform some additional attacks having this initial connection. It can be either
a man in the middle attack, to forward all the wireless traffic via attacker's PC (attacking
integrity and confidentiality of the traffic exchange. Or you may connect back from the attacker's
PC directly to smartphone by exploiting some vulnerabilities using Metasploit Framework... There
is a plethora of possible ways forward.
Some AP configurations are left to factory defaults, like usernames and passwords or
default WLAN's broadcasted (SSID's) and default settings may be found in manuals of the
specific vendor on the internet.
Human Error - advanced security policies are configured on a set of AP's across the
organization, and other ones are forgotten and left with default weak security settings.
As a counter-measure against misconfigured AP, organizations should follow the ongoing site
surveys as a tool to monitor a secure wireless environment.
Examples of a default username/password database for some of the Linksys wireless home
devices are −
Step 2: If you have already enabled confidential mode for an email, click Edit in the
bottom right corner of the window to add an expiration date and a passcode. These
setting impact both the message text and any attachments.
If you select “No SMS passcode,” recipients using the Gmail app will be able to open it
directly and those who don’t use Gmail will receive an email with a passcode.
On the other hand, if you select the “SMS passcode” recipients will get a passcode by a
text message for that you have to provide the recipient’s phone number.
Step 3: After providing the phone number click the save button.
Step 4: In the next step write the email and sent it to the recipient.
Mobile Security
Mobile security is the strategy, infrastructure, and software used to protect any device that
travels with users, including smartphones, tablets, and laptops. Cybersecurity for mobile
devices includes protecting data on the local device and the device-connected endpoints
and networking equipment. As mobile devices continue to be a user preference over
desktops, they will be bigger targets for attackers.
Mobile devices have a much bigger attack surface than desktops, making them a
more significant threat to corporate security. A desktop is immobile with threats
mainly from outside attackers, but mobile devices are vulnerable to physical and
virtual attacks. Users carry mobile devices with them wherever they go, so
administrators must worry about more physical attacks (e.g., theft and loss) and
virtual threats from third-party applications and Wi-Fi hotspots (e.g., man-in-the-
middle attacks). Stationary desktops don’t move from the corporate network,
making it easier for administrators to control network and endpoint security. With
mobile devices, users can root them, add any app, and physically lose them.
For many of these reasons and more, corporations have a lot more overhead when
creating strategies surrounding mobile devices. Even with the overhead, it’s a
critical part of cybersecurity as mobile devices pose significant threats to data
integrity.
Physical Threats
There are two main physical threats to a mobile device: data loss and theft. Natural
disasters are also an issue, which would be the cause of data loss but not data theft.
Lost data can be recovered, but data theft is an expensive issue for organizations.
Mobile devices have lock screens to help stop data theft after a device is stolen, but
the technology must be strong enough to prevent an attacker from bypassing the
screen lock by removing the storage device and extracting the information.
Should the device be stolen, it should request a few PIN attempts to get only to the
home screen before locking the phone. This security feature stops brute-force
home screen PIN attacks. For devices with sensitive data, the company should use
wipe applications that delete all data on the phone after several incorrect home
screen PIN attempts. Encrypted storage drives stop attackers from exfiltrating data
directly from the device by bypassing the PIN feature.
Protect the way your people work today—in email, social media, WiFi hotspots,
and mobile apps
Application Threats
Administrators can block applications from being installed on a desktop, but a user
with a mobile device can install anything. Third-party applications introduce
several issues to mobile device security. Corporations must create a policy
surrounding mobile devices to help users understand the dangers of installing
unapproved third-party apps.
Users should not be able to root their phones, but some do, rendering many of the
internal operating system security controls unusable. Third-party applications
running on rooted devices can disclose data to an attacker using a number of attack
methods.Third-party applications can also have
hidden malware and keyloggers embedded in the code. Anti-malware programs
can be installed, but rooted devices leave even these applications open to malware
manipulation.
Network Threats
Administrators can force anyone with a BYOD to have antimalware installed, but
it still does not ensure that the software is up to date. If the corporation offers
public Wi-Fi hotspots for customers and employees, this too can be a point of
concern. When employees connect to public Wi-Fi and transfer data where other
users can read data, it leaves the network vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MitM)
attacks and possible account takeover if the attacker steals credentials.
Mobile apps connect to data and internal applications using endpoints. These
endpoints receive and process data, and then return a response to the mobile
device. The endpoints and any web-based application add threats to the
organization. Endpoints used by the application must be properly coded with
authentication and authentication controls to stop attackers. Incorrectly secured
endpoints could be the target of an attacker who can use them to compromise the
application and steal data.
Because mobile devices have been increasingly more popular, some web-based
attacks target these users. Attackers use sites that look like official websites
tricking users into uploading sensitive data or downloading malicious applications.
It’s not uncommon for an attacker to tell a user that they must download an app to
view a video or other media source. Users download the app and don’t realize it’s a
malicious app used to probe the devices for vulnerabilities and disclose data.
Organizations that use mobile devices have several options to protect them from
attackers. Components in mobile security can be used to define cybersecurity
strategies surrounding mobile devices. In addition to the infrastructure added to
corporate strategy, it’s also important to create BYOD and mobile device policies
that instruct users what can and cannot be installed on the device.
The following components will help any organization protect from attacks directed
towards mobile devices:
Virtual Private Network (VPN): Users connecting to the network from a remote
location should always use VPN. VPN services and always on VPN
alternatives installed on a mobile device will encrypt data from the device to the
endpoint or from the device to the internal network. Plenty of third-party services
are set up specifically for protecting corporate traffic from a mobile device to the
internal network.
Auditing and device control: While administrators can’t remote control a
smartphone or tablet, they can require users to install remote wiping capabilities
and tracking services. GPS can be used to locate a stolen device, and remote
wiping software will remove all critical data should it be stolen.
Email security: Phishing is one of the biggest threats to all organizations. Email
services are usually added to a mobile device so that users can obtain their email
messages. Any phishing messages could target mobile devices with malicious links
or attachments. Email filters should block messages that contain suspicious links
and attachments.