Rule 120 People Vs Catolico
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Jeffrey AsiloRule 120 People Vs Catolico
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Jeffrey AsiloGroup No.
6
Criminal Procedure
Section 10
Hon. Philip Charles G. Santos
Rule 120
No. L-31260. February 29, 1972.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.ALFREDO
CATOLICO, DISTR ICT JUDGE,COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CAVITE,BRANCH III, RENATO HORTAL, alias Rene, and FELIPE CRUZ,
respondents.
FACTS:
Original action for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction against
respondent judge’s orders denying the State’s timely motion for the
reinstatement and trial of a criminal case of robbery in band after a verbal order
of provisional dismissal and causing the immediate release of the respondents-
accused even before his said verbal order of dismissal could be reduced to
writing and duly signed.
The criminal information charging respondents Renato Hortal and Felipe Cruz
and six other still unidentified per sons with robbery in band committed at
midnight of June 17, 1969 at Carmona, Cavite, was filed with respondent court
under date of August 1, 1969.
Respondents-accused were placed under detention, having failed to post bail in
the recommended amount of P10,000.-00 each. The case was set for trial for the
first time on October 13, 1969 but trial could not be held on this date because of
the absence of the offended parties and their witnesses.
Respondent court then ordered the deputy sheriff to proceed to the residence of
the complainants and personally serve them with the court’s subpoena requiring
their appearance at the trial as reset for the next day, October 14, 1969 at 8:30
a.m.
The provincial fiscal appeared at the scheduled day and hour in lieu of the
assistant fiscal in charge who was not available, and noticing that the
complainants and prosecution witnesses were not yet in court, moved that the
case be called at 10:00 a.m. of the same day.
When the case was thus called at 10:00 a.m., the complainants and their
witnesses were not in court and the provincial fiscal was constrained to ask for a
provisional dismissal. Respondent court verified from respondents-accused,
assisted by their counsel, that they were expressly consenting to such
provisional dismissal.
Within minutes after respondent court dictated the order of provisional dismissal,
the complainants and other prosecution witnesses arrived in the courtroom.
Upon noticing their presence, the provincial fiscal immediately moved for a
reconsideration of the provisional dismissal order and having learned that they
had been delayed by engine trouble, manifested to respondent court said reason
for their delay.
Respondent court, however, asked for the defense counsel, who, however, “all of
a sudden . . . disappeared . . . in only a matter of seconds, perhaps,” according
to the petition. The provincial fiscal urged the court to act favorably on his
motion to lift the provisional dismissal order but respondent court ruled that
“having been dictated in open court it automatically inured in favor of the herein
accused” and that the State’s remedy “should be the refiling of the same case.”
The provincial fiscal orally moved respondent court to reconsider its verbal order
of denial, “contending that the court is expected to dispense justice not only for
the accused but also for the complainants, and explaining that within less than
two or three minutes after the order of provisional dismissal was dictated in open
court, and before the court could adjourn, the prosecution witnesses arrived”
and that no substantial rights of the accused would be prejudiced by such
reconsideration.
Respondent court likewise verbally denied reconsideration and caused the
issuance by the clerk of court of the release order then and there, even before its
verbal order of provisional dismissal could be reduced to writing and duly signed.
The court thereby abruptly lost custody over the persons of the two respondents-
accused, who were not permanent residents of the resettlement area of
Carmona, Cavite, where the robbery charged against them had taken place.
The above-cited actions of respondent court in provisionally dismissing the case,
denying the State’s motion to lift the provisional dismissal and denying
reconsideration are set forth in three orders all dated October 14, 1969 bearing
respondent judge’s signature, which, however, were received by the provincial
fiscal only ten days later on October 24, 1969.3
The petition at bar was therefore filed on November 27, 1969. The Court on
December 4, 1969 issued summons to respondents as well as the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, as prayed for, commanding respondent court
to reinstate the criminal case against respondents-accused and to issue a
warrant for their arrest.
No answer having been filed by respondents, hearing of the case was set for
March 20, 1970. When the hearing was called as scheduled, Provincial Fiscal
Narciso D. Salcedo appeared for the petitioner, an d there being no appearance
for respondents, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and the questioned order be set aside.
HELD:
Yes, In the present case, a timely motion to reinstate the provisionally dismissed
case was made within 2 or 3 minutes after respondent judge had dictated in
open court his order of dismissal and the offended parties and their witnesses,
who had been delayed by engine trouble and had to change vehicles, then
arrived.
No substantial rights of th e accused would be prejudiced by rescinding the
verbal order of provisional dismissal. The verbal order had not yet been put in
writing and duly signed by respondent judge, and hence could be withdrawn or
set aside so that it would produce no legal force and effect.
Respondent court failed to take into account that accused-respondents were not
permanent residents of the resettlement area at Carmona where the robbery
took place, and were without means to put up bail and hence were under
detention. For it to order their immediate release from custody even though its
verbal orders of dismissal and denial of reinstatement of the case were yet to be
duly reduced to writing and signed, was an unauthorized and arbitrary
procedure. Its peremptory denial of the timely motion to reinstate the case has
put the State to needless great expense and trouble, to say the least, to cause
again the apprehension of respondents-accused—if the police agencies succeed
in finding them—when they could very well have been made to face trial then
and there on October 14, 1969, as scheduled.
Although respondents filed no answer, it is apposite to cite the Court’s rejection
anew in Loseo vs. Inting10 of the accused’s stock contention in such cases that
the fiscal should allow the dismissal to stand and just exercise the reservation to
refile the case. The Court through Mr. Justice Dizon, there pointed out that
“(P)etitioner’s contention in this appeal—that the City Fiscal of Davao, instead of
asking the City Court of Davao to set aside the order of dismissal, should have
allowed it to stand, without prejudice to his re-filing the case with the same court
immediately, is a technicality that does not pro mote the speedy and
inexpensive administration of justice.
We have heretofore repeatedly held that technicalities, when instead of
promoting the speedy administration of justice delay it, are not looked with
favor. More so in this case where it appears that the setting aside of the order of
dismissal caused petitioner no substantial prejudice admitting as he does that he
could have been made to face the same charge all over again in a separate
action.”
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the three orders of respondent
court all dated October 14, 1969 are hereby annulled and declared without legal
effect. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction heretofore issued is made
permanent and respondent court is further ordered to proceed to the prompt
trial of the reinstated criminal case (No. N-2296) and thereafter render judgment
thereon in accordance with law. W ith costs against private respondents.