Rule 115 US Vs Javier
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Jeffrey AsiloRule 115 US Vs Javier
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Criminal Procedure
Section 10
Hon. Philip Charles G. Santos
Rule 115
Case Title: THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LAZARO JAVIER, ET
AL., defendants-appellants.
Facts:
Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his carabao
valued at P150 in his corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche municipality of
Tanauan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning when he went to look
after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao had
disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the
Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased, on the 20th
of November following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier, Apolinario
Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading the carabao. When the ladrones saw
the Constabulary, that scattered in all directions. On the following day, the
Constabulary found this carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro
Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao
was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken from his
corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen
in the possession of the accused.
As corroborative of such evidence, we have the well-known legal principle, which
as applied to cases of this character is that, although the persons who unlawfully
took a certain carabao are not recognized at the time, and their identity remains
entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal is found in the possession of
the accused shortly after the commission of the crime and they make no
satisfactory explanation of such possession they may be properly convicted of
the crime. (See U. S. vs. Divino [1911], 18 Phil., 425.) In the present instance, the
attempt of the accused to insinuate that one of the Constabulary soldiers
testified against them falsely because of enmity is hardly believable.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as
evidence.
Held:
No, Exhibit B is the sworn statement of sergeant Presa, now deceased, whose
signature was identified, before the justice of the peace of the municipality of
Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. Appellant's argument is predicated on the
provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to
face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), which
says that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: . . . to be
confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him." With
reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day
said in a case of the Philippine origin (Dowdell vs. U. S. [1911], 221 U. S., 325)
that it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts
provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face
to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the
accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the
conviction of the accused upon deposition or ex parte affidavits, and particularly
to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the
exercise of the right of cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is
essential because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the
prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the department and appearance
of the witness while testifying.
The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under
circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is
therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the testimony of a witness
deceased, given in a former action between the same parties relating to the
same matter. Consequently, the exception provided by section 298, No. 8, of the
Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower court is
also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presa a dying declaration or a
deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary examination.
Under these circumstances, not to burden the opinion with an extensive citation
of authorities, we can rely on the old and historic case of R. vs. Paine (1 Salk.,
281 [King's Bench Div.]) occurring in the year 1696. It appears that a deposition
of B., examined by the Mayor of Bristol under oath, but not in P's presence, was
offered. It was objected that B, being dead, the defendant had lost all
opportunity of cross-examining him. The King's Bench consulted with the
Common Pleas, and "it was the opinion of both courts that these deposition
should not be given in evidence, the defendant not being present when they
were taken before the Mayor and so had lost the benefit of a cross-examination."
Although we are faced with the alternative of being unable to utilize the
statements of the witness now deceased, yet if there has been no opportunity for
cross-examination and the case is not one coming within one of the exceptions,
the mere necessity alone accepting the statement will not suffice. In fine, Exhibit
B was improperly received in evidence in the lower court.
The facts come under article 518, No. 3, in connection with article 520, as
amended, of the Penal Code. Accordingly the defendants and appellants are
each sentenced to four years, two months, and one day of presidio correccional,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-third part of costs
of both instances; the carabao shall be returned to Doroteo Natividad, if this has
not already been done.