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The Struggle for Local Government: Indian Democracy's New Phase

Author(s): Peter Ronald deSouza
Source: Publius, Vol. 33, No. 4, Emerging Federal Process in India (Autumn, 2003), pp. 99-118
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3331198
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 The StruggleforLocal Government:
IndianDemocracy'sNew Phase
Peter Ronald deSouza
and Lokniti
Goa University

The 73d ConstitutionalAmendment of 1993 givinglocal government a constitutionalstatus

introducednewinstitutions
intotheworking Indiandemocracy
ofl throughseveralsignificantinnovations,
suchas reservations
ofseatsformarginal groups,women, Dalits,andAdivasis;creation ofa decentralized
planningmechanism; establishment ofstateelectioncommissionsto overseelocal elections
and state
financecommissionstopreparea blueprintforsharingofstaterevenues;and institutionalizationofthe
villageassembly(gramsabha). This articleexaminestheimplications oftheseinnovations forlocal
government and vulnerablegroupsin thecontext ofIndian democracy. It doesso withinthelarger
debateon thecapability toproduceoutcomes
ofpoliticalinstitutions and so a newpoliticalculture.

The jury is still out on how we should judge the impact of the
extraordinary attemptto extenddemocracydownto India's 600,000villages
and towns. In 1993, Parliamentagreed to the introductionof local self-
government throughout the country, through the 73rd and 74th
ConstitutionalAmendments. Withthese changes,India's two-tier federal
system of a union government and (now) 28 stateswas transformed into a
three-tier system.
Should thisdecision be seen as a large step forlocal governmentand
also a large step for democracy,or was it merelya large step for local
government butonlya smallstepfordemocracy?1 Thejuryisstilloutbecause
itis too earlytomakeajudgment. Evaluatingthesuccessoftheamendments,
the institutionstheyhave produced, and the societal processes theyhave
set into motionrequiresa longerhistoricalperspective.However,thejury
is also stillout because we are not clear about whatconstitutes"sufficient
evidence" to arriveat a clearjudgment.
One problem is the sheer scale of the innovation. In rural India, the
reformshave created a three-tierstructuremade up of 227,698 village
councils (grampanchayats)at the base, 5,906 block councils (panchayat
samitis)above these, and 474 districtcouncils (zila parishads)at the top.2
This thirdgroup of 474 correspondsto the 500 or so districts(each under
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am grateful to Douglas V. Verney for his suggestions on how to make this article
more accessible to a non-Indian audience, to Francine Frankel and Anjou Dargar for their comments,
and to the anonymous editor who made the article more readable.
'In an earlier paper reviewing the debate on local government since the 73rdAmendment, I referred
to it as the "second wind" of Indian democracy because it promised so much and was regarded as a
response to India's crises of governability. Peter Ronald deSouza, "Decentralization and Local Government:
The 'Second Wind' of Democracy in India," India's Living Constitution: Ideas, Practices, Controversies,eds.
Zoya Hasan, Eswaran Sridharan, and R. Sudarshan (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2002), pp. 370-404.
2Panchayati Raj Update, (New Delhi: Raj Kishore Institute of Social Sciences, monthly). Facts about
panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) as on 31 May 1998.

? Publius: The Journal of Federalism 33:4 (Fall 2003)

99

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100 Publius/Fall 2003

a districtcommissioner)thatexistedin the daysof the BritishRaj and the

Indian CivilService. There is a similarstructureforurban India composed
of municipalcorporationsand municipalcouncils (nagarpalikas).
Together,theseinstitutions have added to the 500 or more membersof
Parliamentand nearly5,000staterepresentatives approximately threemillion
newelectedrepresentatives. Of these,theamendmentsstipulatethata third,
or about a million,shall be women. In addition,nearly700,000 of these
elected representatives are required to be members of the former
untouchable and tribalcommunities. These twogroups are describedin
the Constitutionas the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,and are
referredto in commonparlanceas "SCs/STs." In adding so manypeople to
the politicalmap of India, the Constitutionhas considerablyincreasedthe
representative densityoftheIndian polity.It nowcomprisesa largenumber
ofinstitutionsand representatives, spreadovera vastgeographical,political,
and social landscape. This new polityis defined by variationsof public
culture,political dynamics,and materialresources. The expanse of this
landscapewillnecessarilyproduce,in termsofpure probability, instancesof
bothachievementand failurein theworkingoflocal government institutions.
What is the "sufficientevidence"forus to attemptsome assessmentof
the reforms?In the scale of things,whateverinformationwe have of the
actual workingof local governmentcan at best be regarded as episodic.
Ideally,we need a theoreticalframework withinwhichthepieces ofevidence,
as theyemerge,can be read as significantor insignificant.In the absence
of knowingwhen we can say thatwe have sufficientempiricalevidence,
because of the scale of things,we mustrelyon such theoreticalreflections
to decide whetheran eventis to be seen as unique or as representinga
larger socio-politicaltruth. Evaluatingthe workingof these two sets of
institutionsof local governmenthence requiresus to be methodologically
cautious. However, we can still say that these changes represent, in
institutionalterms,a majordeparture.The packageofinstitutions produced
by the amendments contains several importantinnovationsthat,if they
functionaccording to theirdesign,will make democracyin India more
inclusiveand representative.
How fardo these institutions, in practice,functionas per theirdesign?
If theydo not we need to knowwhy.
As an example of the difficulty of interpretingevidence,we may take
incidentsof violence against the poor and oppressed untouchables and
tribalpeoples (now knownas Dalits and Adivasis) in the villages.3These
seem to have increased since the passing of the two amendments.4The
:PanchayatiRaj Update.This is a compilationof eventsand episodes relatingto PRIs and servesas an
invaluable chronicleof the recenthistoryofpanchayatiraj.
4Astudyon "Dalits, Discriminationand the StruggleforEqual Citizenship,"recentlycompleted by
the CentrefortheStudyofDeveloping Societies (July2003) fortheWorldBank,showsthatthereservation
of the sarpanchpost in a panchayatproduces both a backlash by the rural dominant castes,which tryto
undermineand frametheDalit sarpanch, and a resistancebytheDalit castes,whichtrytouse theopportunity
space to improvetheirpositional goods.

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The StruggleforLocal Government 101

incidentscould be explained as a resultof an increasingdeterminationby

thedominantcastesto defendtheirtraditionalprivilegesagainstusurpation
byDalits,thatis byadoptinga policyto "teach thema lesson iftheydo not
knowtheirplace." Such violencebydominantcasteson Dalitsis rarelymet
withpenaltiesbythe state. By thisinterpretation, we could conclude that
today'sDalitsare oftenworseoffthantheywerebefore,whenviolencebased
on caste statuswas endemic but had not yettaken on the overtlypolitical
overtonesseen currently.This increased violence also could be seen as a
struggleby Dalits to shake offcenturiesof oppressionand humiliation,a
strugglemade possible bythe "opportunity space" createdbythe political
reforms. According to this interpretation,today'sDalits can be seen as
being betteroffthan theywere beforethe amendmentsbecause theyare
settingthe basis of a new,egalitarianorder. In short,how should themany
reportsof violence againstDalits be interpreted,withrespectto the short
termin whichlivesare lost,homesteadsburnt,and women raped,5or with
respect to the long termin which the goal of equal citizenshipbecomes
more attainable? Is this body of evidence a measure of the success of
decentralizationor of itsfailure?
I have raised the issue of sufficient
evidencefortworeasons. The firstis
thatmanyof the reportsand studieson decentralizeddemocracyin India,
post-73rdamendment,are eitherexcessivelyevangelicalor overlyskeptical.6
The second is thatdiscussionson democracyin India willalwaysbe between
those who marvel at its achievements'and those who deride its claims,
because thesejudgments are oftenonly about the littleand not the big
picture.8 Both sides tend to be hastyand one-sided. The big pictureof
democracy in India, however, contains elements of both-gains and
drawbacks,empowermentofcitizensand theirdisempowerment, a decrease
in undemocraticspaces, and an increase in the arbitrarinessof those in
authority.To say this is not to prevaricatebut to instead recognize the
paradoxes involvedin transforming, throughdemocraticpolitics,a socially
and economicallyinegalitariansocietyintoone thatis politicallyegalitarian.9
While acknowledgingthe lack of a clear picture,thisessaywillnonetheless
5"Summaryof Digest of NewspaperReported AtrocitiesAgainstDalits (July-December 2002)," PUCL
Bulletin2 April2003; http://www.indianet.nl/atroc.html.
6See the articlesin Kurukshetradealing withpanchayatiraj. Some of the papers byGeorge Matthew,S.
Anand and S. Kothari,and Thomas Issac are examples of the evangelicalmode, whilesome of the papers
byAnand Inbanathan,V. Vijayalakshmi,andJos Chathukulamare examples of the skepticalmode. This
classificationof "evangelicaland skeptical"is borrowedfromthe commentsof Niraja Gopal, who made
themin her discussionof mypaper "Decentralization:An Explorationof Local Governmentin India and
the United States," presented at a conference on Democracy and Diversity:India and the American
Experience,organizedbytheUniversity ofPennsylvaniaInstitutefortheAdvancedStudyofIndia (UPIASI),
Delhi, 24-25January2003.
7AlfredStepan's paper,"Federalism,Multi-NationalStatesand Democracy:A Theoretical Framework,
The Indian Model and a Tamil Case Study,"at the abovementioned conference is an example of this
celebration.
8P.Sainath's writings,such as "The Age of Inequality,"India: AnotherMillennium?ed., Romila Thapar
(New Delhi: Viking,2000), pp. 152-168,are examples of this.
9S. Sabherwal,"Introduction,"India's LivingConstitution:Ideas,Practices, eds. Zoya Hasan,
Controversies,
EswaranSridharan,and R. Sudarshan (New Delhi: PermanentBlack, 2002), pp.l-30.

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102 Publius/Fall 2003

attemptto make a judgment on the decentralizationexperimentthat is

underwayin India.
There are three sections. The firstlooks at the issues that are of
significanceforunderstandingthetwoamendments.The second examines
theworkingof the institutional
innovations,especiallythevillageassembly
(gramsabha) thatthe amendmentsintroduce. The thirdattemptsto place
thesenewlocal governmentinstitutionswithinthelargerschemeofIndia's
federation.
THE ISSUES
In the ten yearssince the passing of the twoconstitutionalamendments,
enough has been written,especiallyabout panchayatiraj, thatit does not
bear repeatinghere.10Most of the commentshave been concerned with
the design characteristicsof the thirdtier." This extensiveliteratureis
writtenlargelyby persons engaged in public administrationand policy.
Hence, muchoftheanalysisis devotedto mattersofdetail,thatis,to refining
the design and fine-tuningthese third-tierinstitutionsas glitches are
noticed."2 Given that this engagement with the micro details of
decentralizationis well documented,I shall not go overit again. Instead,I
will presentin summaryformsome of the interestingissues thatemerge
fromthisliteratureand have significancefor transforming a federation.
The focus here will be onlyon the 73rd Amendment,whichconcerns the
panchayatiraj institutions(PRIs), because these cover a large area and
constitutea different dynamicfromthatwhichis setintomotionbythe 74th
Amendment,whichconcernsmunicipalities.At theformallevel,however,
thereis much in common.
The firstissue is,whatinspiredthe amendments?One viewis thatthey
resultedfroman upsurge frombelow. The evidence suggestsotherwise.
Thinkingabout decentralization had been goingon formorethana century
0The two"StatusReportson PanchayatiRaj" broughtout bythe Instituteof Social Sciences (ISS); the
several articlesin Kurukshetra, TheAdministrator, JournalofRural Development and The IndianJournalof
Public Administration; and the many books on the subject, such as S.N. Jha and P.C. Mathur, eds.,
Decentralizationand Local Politics(New Delhi: Sage Publications,1999), giveample data on the progressof
local governmentinstitutions.
"They have dealt withthe powersand functionsof local government;thejurisdictionsof each tier;
control between the various authorities;personnel; the provisionsfor the participationof membersof
Parliamentand membersof legislativeassembliesin local governmentdecision bodies; the reservationof
places fordisadvantagedgroups; the operation of the state election and financecommissions;inter-tier
relations;issuesoflocal governmentfinance;methodsfortheexecutionofdecentralizedplanning;parallel
programsforruraldevelopmentsuch as the Member of ParliamentLocal Area Development (MPLAD)
scheme; relationshipswith other departmentsof the state government,especially the DistrictRural
DevelopmentAgency(DRDA); relationshipswithparastatals,especiallythose supplyingservicessuch as
sewage, water,and electricity, particularlyin the case of municipalities;relationshipswithcivil society
associations such as community-basedorganizations (CBOs), self-help groups (SHGs), and non-
governmentalorganizations (NGOs). Peter Ronald deSouza, "Multi-StateStudy of Panchayati Raj
Legislationand Administrative Reform,"Reportsubmittedto theWorldBank,New Delhi, February2000.
"'There has even been a suggestionof enactingsome additional constitutionalamendmentsto make
the representationgiven to the disadvantagedgroups more effective.S.S. Meenakshisundaram,"The
73"' ConstitutionAmendment:A Case forFurtherAmendment,"Journal ofRuralDevelopment61 (October
1997): 554.

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The StruggleforLocal Government 103

before the amendmentswere passed. Decentralizationbecame a policy

concernduringthe colonial periodwithLord Ripon's Resolutionin 1882,13
and fora briefperiod the ConstituentAssemblydebates in the late 1940s
suggestedthepossibility ofdevelopingan alternative structure
ofgovernment.
In thepost-independenceperiod,thinkingabout decentralization benefited
fromthedeliberationsofseveralcommittees, includingthethreechairedby
BalwantraiMehta,Asoka Mehta,and L.M. Singhvi.14
In the late 1980s, both the Rajiv Gandhi and V.P. Singh governments
introducedconstitutional amendmentbillsthatwereunsuccessful.'5These
effortsreached fruitionin the 1990s, takingthe formof constitutional
amendmentsduringthe regimeof P.V.NarasimhaRao. When theywere
enacted,theywerethereforetheproductofa centuryor more ofhistory.A
vastintellectualresourceon decentralizationwas createdwhichinformed
the framingof the Amendments. It is worthrecognizingthisintellectual
historybecause manyof the solutionson offerhave long been debated.
There is a storehouseofinformationon local government, on experiments
thatfailedand othersthatwere successful.
The second issueis thattheamendmentsweredrivennotbythedemands
of social or political movements,or pressuresfrombelow for deliveryof
public goods,butbytheconcernsofthepolicycommunityand thepolitical
elite for improving governance, especially in rural India.'6 The
developmentalstate,itwasfelt,had failedto deliver.This wasseen in terms
of the insensitivity,casualness, lack of accountability,and inertia of the
deliveryprocess,'7and also in the abilityof the ruralelite,because of their
controlofthe local powerstructure, to cornerthe opportunitiescreatedby
the variousgovernmentschemes. Decentralizationof planning,as well as
ofpowersand functions,and ofdemocracy,was thereforeseen as a solution
to thiscontinued asymmetry of power. The expectationthatthe solution
lay in "decentralizedplanning"was because of the "slow rate of benefits
flowingfromthe infrastructure alreadybuilt up, as indicated by the slow
growthof productivity, and insufficient percolationof benefitsto the poor
and the sociallydisadvantagedsections,despitethe proliferationofseveral

'"Hugh Tinker,TheFoundationsofLocal Self-Government in India, Pakistanand Burma(Bombay: Lalvani

PublishingHouse); M. Venkatarangaiyaand M. Pattabhiram;eds., Local Government in India: SelectReadings
(Bombay:Allied Publishers,1967).
'"S.S. Singh,et al., "Decentralizationand Rural Local Government:HistoricalPerspective,"Legislative
StatusofPanchayati Raj in India (New Delhi: Indian Instituteof Public Administration,1997).
'5K.C. Sivaramakrishnan,Powerto thePeople?The Politicsand Progress ofDecentralisation (New Delhi:
Konark,2000).
'6Ibid. The insider's debates in the ministriesis well documented in Sivaramakrishnan'sbook. He
was secretaryof the Ministryof Urban Development during thisperiod and was a member of the core
group of secretariesentrustedby the prime ministerto prepare a draftbill.
'7Some of these are listedin "Implementation,DeliveryMechanismand InstitutionalDevelopment,"
NinthFiveYearPlan 1997-2002,chapterfive.They include (1) inadequate analysisofavailable information
during programformulation,(2) top-downand target-oriented ratherthan a bottom-upapproach, (3)
lack of accountabilityof the implementingagencies eitherto the governmentor to the people, (4) social
sector programsformulatedwithoutaddressingthe question of sustainability of benefits,and (5) failure
to ensure timelyand adequate flowof fundsto the implementingagencies.

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104 Publius/Fall 2003

povertyalleviationprogrammes."'8Centralizedplanning,it was felt,had

notsolvedthe"basicproblemsofpoverty, unemploymentand inequality."'"
Further,"decentralizeddemocracy," itwasfelt,wouldproduce numerous
benefits. One was breakingthe hold of the ruralelites over resourceuse
and distribution bygivinga greatersayto hithertodisadvantagedgroupsin
thedistribution ofstatewelfareschemes.Anotherwasa deeper involvement
of marginalizedgroupsin the planning,implementation,and monitoring
ofthosedevelopmentalprocessesthathavean impacton ruralareas. Other
benefitswere the developmentof a more balanced and sustainableuse of
local resources;an increasein theaccountability a reduction
oflocal officials;
in thecostsofservicedelivery;a more efficient seniorbureaucracy,relieved
of routine tasks more effectively performedby lower officials;a more
representative politicalsystem with enhanced legitimacy;and, importantly,
promotion ofself-esteem and motivation amongsuppressedgroupsthrough
this activityof political empowerment.20 The amendmentswere seen as
creatingthe institutional space and capabilityto meet theseobjectives.
This preoccupation with the developmental consequences of
decentralizationleads to thethirdissue thatis noteworthy. Bearingin mind
the reforms'long historyand origins,and the concernsbehind them,the
decentralizationinitiativein India should be placed primarilywithinthe
discourse of development. Other discourses that are a part of the
decentralizationinitiative,such as democracy,federalism,law,equity,and
justice, should be seen as supportivediscourses.
Recognizingthe emphasisof India's decentralizationon developmentis
importantbecause itdistinguishes itfromdiscourseson decentralizationin
other regionsof the world. It remindsus thatjust as the initialtwo-tier
federalism wasimposedfromaboveas partofIndia's"centralizedfederation,"
so was the thirdtier. For example,empowermentof womenwas proposed
not because theywere denied "equality of opportunity"by patriarchal
structuresbutbecause theywereseen as agentswhowoulduse ruralresources
in a more sustainablemanner. Because theywere also regarded as less
corrupt, they were expected to better contribute to the all-round
developmentof the village. The democraticdividendsof decentralization
were thereforeseen as secondaryconsequences, not primarygoals, of the
empowermentofwomen. The developmentgoal was primary.
These threeaspectsofthedecentralizationdiscoursein India, in a sense,
indirectlygave the initiativeitsunique character. Because the package of
institutions created by the decentralization scheme had as its goal
development,primarilythe eliminationof rural poverty,it had to factor
into itsdesign the matrixof social and economic poweras it existed.
'8C. H. Hanumantha Rao, "Decentralized Planning: An Overview of Experience and Prospects,"
Economic and Political Weekly,25 February 1989, pp. 411-416.
9B. Mishra, "Rationale of Decentralized Planning," Kurukshetra (June 1997): 19-22.
"2~JamesManor lists 22 reasons in favor of decentralization culled from his comparative study across
continents. The PoliticalEconomy ofDecentralization (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999), pp. 37-38.

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The StruggleforLocal Government 105

This is the fourthissue. Ruralpowerin India is constitutedalong three

axes. Firstis the caste system,whichgovernsrelationsbetweenindividuals,
and even more betweengroups,throughitsprinciplesof segmentation,21
exclusion,and humiliation.22 whichdefinestheterms
Second is patriarchy,
ofgenderrelations,especiallyin thepublicdomain. Patriarchy giveswomen
a subservientrole, denyingthemthe benefitsof equal citizenship.23 Third
is land,whichprovidesthematerialbasisforsociallifeand setstheconditions
fora social exchange thatexhibitsa feudal characterin manypartsof the
countryside. Access to land, and the struggleover it, is of fundamental
importanceforthelivelihoodofthemajorityofthepopulation. The nature
of the power matrixbecomes obvious when the landholdingpatternsare
superimposedon the casteprofileof a region.24Dalitsbyand largeare not
onlythe humiliatedcastesbut also the dispossessedcastes. A studyby the
SC/ST Commissionof April1990 related

bothto casteprejudiceand untouchability,

atrocities on theone hand,
and politicaland economicissuesregarding land,wages,indebtedness,
bondage,etc.on theother.Disputesrelatedtolandareidentified as the
singlemostimportant cause,includingdisputesrelatedtoimplementation
of land reforms,allotmentof cultivable
land and housesites,envyof a
good crop raisedbyDalits,use of community land,etc. Likewiseany
attemptbyDalitagricultural
laborers forreasonable
toagitate wagesusually
meetswithviolenceat thehandofland-owning classes.25

In ruralIndia, these threeaxes are intimately related. The povertyline

and the pollutionline coincide.26It was in thiscontextthatthe package of
decentralizationinstitutionsaimed at addressing rural povertythrough
bettergovernancewas introduced. The amendmentssoughtto tacklethis
power matrixby redesigningand reformingthe existingpanchayatiraj
institutions.The political elite and the policy communitydeveloped an
institutionaldesign that included and sought to involve disadvantaged
groups in governance. They did so byincorporatingsome novel features
in the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments. One interpretation of the
rationale of the amendmentswas that the Union governmentsought to
weaken the power of the state governments (the second tier) by
eds. Hasan,
21SatishSabherwal, "Civilization,Constitution,Democracy,"India's Living Constitution,
Sridharan,and Sudarshan, pp. 1-30.
22GopalGuru, "Dalits: Reflectionson the Search for Inclusion," Contemporary
India: Transitions,
ed.
Peter R. deSouza (New Delhi: Sage Publications,2000), pp. 59-72.
23Nivedita Menon, ed., Gender and Politics in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999).
24TheNational Instituteof Rural Developmentrecognizes thislinkbetweenland, markets,and social
institutionssuch as caste. It sees "land and agrarian reforms(as the) unfinishedagenda of the last five
decades. Even ifitsscope is severelyrestrictedin the presentday due to demographicpressure,access to
land, its optimal use, investment,and cooperation are possible only if such reformsare put in place.
Land reformis notjust distributionof land. It aims to break the land-castebased controls,guarantee
access to technologyand credit,and create conditionsformaximumproductionand marketablesurplus,
all so necessaryforrural transformation."NIRD, India: RuralDevelopment Report1999, p. 121.
25Harsh Mandar, "Dalit Status and an Agenda for State Intervention," The Administrator39 (April-June
1994): 76.
26Ibid.

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106 Publius/Fall 2003

strengthening the thirdtier. Prime MinisterRajiv Gandhi's initiativewas

seen in thisconspiratoriallight. Althoughsome credence can be givento
thedividendsthatthispoliticalcalculuswouldbring,theunderlying concern
was development.
This bringsthe discussionto the fifthissue, the innovativefeaturesof
the two amendments. Their evaluationmakes sense only by takinginto
account the above four points: the long lineage of the currentideas on
decentralization,the driverof the decentralizationinitiativebeing the
intellectualand policycommunity,the developmentdiscourse being the
site of itsprimarylocation,and the matrixof ruralpower thatthese novel
institutionshad to contend with. These innovativefeaturesare thusbest
understood in the context of rural society. They are built on certain
assumptionsabout thatsocietythatnow, ten yearsinto the operation of
theseinstitutions, need revisiting.27
Many of the featuresof the 73rd Amendmentare common to the 74th
Amendment, which establishes systemforurbanareas (see table
a three-tier
1). There is an additional feature of both thatis worthnoting. A district
planningcommitteeis to be set up underArticle243ZD to consolidatethe
plans prepared by both panchayatsand municipalitiesand to "prepare a
draftdevelopmentplan forthe districtas a whole."
The passage of the two amendments reveals a paradox; the most
centralizedofinstruments, a constitutionalamendment,has had to be used
to create the thirdtierof decentralizedinstitutionsof governance. This
paradoxin factcapturesthetensionthatis at theheartofthetransformation
of Indian society.The stateadvances the cause of an egalitarianorder by
usingthemostpowerfuldeviceavailableto it,a constitutionalamendment.
It therebycreatesdemocraticinstitutions in theface of resistancefromthe
entrenchedholders of power in society. The state,at least in one of its
avatars,hence should be seen as the locus of a progressivemovement
creatinga societyand politybased on equal citizenship. Decentralization
should thereforebe seen as initiatinga dialectical strugglebetween the
democraticthrustof the institutions oflocal governmenton one hand and
the anti-democratic subversion,or attemptedsubversion,of democracyby
the rural power structureon the other. The manyrecommendationsto
improvedecentralizationshould hence be seen as stagesin thisclass and
caste struggle.28

27Sucha habitof reflexivity is a mustforanyexerciseof democratictransformation.Institutionshave

to be evaluatedperiodicallyin thelightofnewevidenceand in thelightofnewperspectivesand discourses.
It maybe earlydaysyet,as mentioned earlier,but new evidence coming in, although "insufficient," still
needs to be interrogated.
28Examplesare the "ConsultationPaper on theWorkingof the ConstitutionalProvisions(Part IX) for
Decentralization- Panchayats,"submittedto theAdvisoryPanel on Decentralization,NationalCommission
to Reviewthe Workingof the Constitution,InstituteforSocial Science (ISS), New Delhi, 2001; and also
the "ConsultationPaper on Decentralizationand Muncipalities,"submittedbythe Nagarpalika Network
of the All India Instituteof Local Self Government(AIILSG), New Delhi, 2001.

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The StruggleforLocal Government 107

Table 1
Features of the 73"d ConstitutionalAmendment
1. The centrality of the villageassembly(gramsabha),as a deliberativeand decid-
ing body,fordecentralizedgovernance.
2. A uniformthree-tierstructureacross the country,withthe village,block, and
districtas the appropriatelevels. Stateswithpopulations of less than twomil-
lion have the option of not introducingthe intermediatelevel.
3. Direct election to all seats forall membersat all levels. In addition,the chair-
personsof thevillagecouncils (panchayats)maybe made membersof the coun-
cils (panchayats)at the intermediatelevel,and chairpersonsof block councils
(panchayats)at the intermediatelevel may be members at the districtlevel.
Members of Parliament,members of legislativeassemblies,and membersof
legislativecouncils mayalso be membersofpanchayats at the intermediateand
the districtlevels.
4. In all the panchayats,
seats are reservedforScheduled Castes (henceforthSCs
or Dalits) and Scheduled Tribes (henceforthSTs or Adivasis)in proportionto
theirpopulation. One thirdof the total seats are reservedforwomen. One
thirdof the seats reservedforSCs and STs willalso be reservedforwomen.
5. Officesof the chairpersonsof the panchayatsat all levels will be reservedin
favorof SCs and STs in proportionto theirpopulation in the state. One third
of the officesof chairpersonsofpanchayatsat all levelswillalso be reservedfor
women.
6. The legislatureof a state is at libertyto provide the reservationof seats and
officesofchairpersonsin panchayats in favorofmembersofthebackwardclasses.
7. The average panchayathas a uniformfive-year term. Elections are to be com-
pleted beforethe expiryof the term. In the eventof dissolution,electionswill
be compulsorilyheld withinsix months. The reconstitutedpanchayat willserve
forthe remainingperiod of the five-year term.
8. It will not be possible to dissolvethe existingpanchayats
by the amendmentof
any act beforeitstermis ended.
9. A person who is disqualifiedunder any law of the statewill not be entitledto
become a memberof a panchayat.
10. An independent State Election Commissionto be establishedforsuperinten-
dence, direction,and controlof the electoralprocess and preparationof elec-
toral rolls.
11. Devolution of powersand responsibilitiesby the statein the preparationand
implementationof developmentplans.
12. Settingup ofa StateFinance Commissiononce in fiveyearsto revisethefinan-
cial position of these panchayatiraj institutions(PRIs) and to make suitable
recommendationsto the stateon the distributionof fundsamong panchayats.

INNOVATIONS
In the listof featuresin Table 1, thereare fourthatcould underminethe
ruralpower structure.The firstis the reservationof a proportionof seats
forwomenand theoppressed(Dalitsand Adivasis)in thepanchayat together
withthe reservationof a certainnumber of chairperson(sarpanch)posts
forthem.Thisstrategy ofusingaffirmativeaction,employingthereservation
route forthe empowermentof marginalizedgroups,is revolutionary.By
givingthema voice and a public face,it createsan opportunityforthemto
make theirclaims on social resources (i.e., notjust the money available

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108 Publius/Fall 2003

fromthe state-sponsoredschemesbut also resourcesof the villagesuch as

waterand common pastures)and to have a sayon how theseresourcesare
to be distributed.In the contextof rural India, reservationsforwomen,
Dalits,and Adivasisalso givesthesegroupsaccess to the "symboliccapital"
theyneed in theirstruggleforajust order. The amendmentshave created
the institutionalopportunity, which should be seen as a big advance in
furthering the goals of an inclusivedemocracy.
Whatactuallyhappens when these councils meet and function,however,
remainsto be seen. Sociological studiesneed to be conducted across the
countryto identifythe conditionsunder whichthesemarginalizedgroups
are able to take up thisopportunity.Our general understandingof the
village29tellsus thatentrenchedgroupswillnot easilypermitinstitutional
empowermentand will place obstacles in the way of these marginalized
sections. We thereforeneed to knowwhat these obstacles are, how they
varyin formand substancefromregionto region,howtheycan be overcome,
and whatresourcesare requiredto overcomethem.(Table 2 liststheforms
of discriminationthatDalit sarpanches have to face in thisnew institutional
opportunity space). We also need to knowwhetherthesegroupshaveaccess
to the resourcesavailable, how theycan have access to them,and so on.
Studies show that for this "institutionalopportunityspace""3to be used
literacy,
effectively, some materialsecurity, and social capital,among other
things,"'are required by these groups to triumphover the manylayersof
dominationthatmarktheirexistentialcondition.32In spiteofthesehurdles,
the reservationroute is a major institutionalinnovationwhich,over time,
willresultin a diminishingof the prevailingpowerasymmetries because at
the veryminimum,theygivevoice and a public face to groups thathave
hithertobeen denied these opportunities.This in itselfis a big advance.
The second innovation is the institutionalizationof decentralized
planningthroughthemechanismofthedistrict planningcommittee(DPC).
The DPC seeks to prepare an integratedplan for both rural and urban
spaces in the whole district. The reasoninghere is thatpeople mustbe
involvedin the planning process so thatit is participative,and therefore
presumablyin tune withpeople's needs. It not onlycreatesstakeholders,
but also resultsin an egalitariandistributionand use of social resources.
DPCs are the onlyplanningbodies thathave constitutionalsanction,and
are graduallybeing establishedin moststates. Even so, theyhave not been
seriouslyintegratedinto the planningprocess. For example, in Kerala,
29JanBreman, Peter Kloos and Ashwani Saith, The Village in Asia Revisited (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1997); M.N. Srinivas, 'The Indian Village: Myth and Reality," The Dominant Caste and OtherEssays,
ed. M. N. Srinivas (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994).
30The concept of"institutional opportunity space" is important to signifythe new potential for freedom
available to the oppressed groups, where freedom is seen as a "range of meaningful choices" available.
31Bysocial capital, we refer to the knowledge, status, solidarity, networks, and other resources available
to the groups for effective participation.
3V. Vijayalakshmi, "Politics of Inclusion: Scheduled Tribe Women in Local Governance," Institute for
Social and Economic Change (ISEC) Working Paper 88 (Bangalore, 2001).

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The StruggleforLocal Government 109

Table 2
Forms of Dominant-CasteDiscriminationagainstDalit Sarpanches

*Theydo not allow the Dalit sarpanchto siton the sarpanchchair. This symbolic
struggleis one of the mostimportantthata Dalit has to fight.
*Theykeep the telephone on the table of the secretary,
whichdeprivesthe Dalit
sarpanchof the accoutrementsof power.
oTheyignore the decisions of the sarpanchbut followthe decisions of the deputy
sarpanchwho, in reservedpanchayats, will be fromthe dominant castes. The
deputysarpanchis the alternativelocus of authorityand the real locus of power.
*They boycottgramsabhascalled by the sarpanchbut attend those called by the
deputy.
*They manipulate the minutesof the gramsabha meeting,takingadvantage of
the illiteracyof the Dalit sarpanch.

*Theydeny the sarpanchthe statusof office,of being firstcitizenof the village,

on occasions such as hoistingof the national flag,awardingof prizes,and wel-
comingdrama troupesin thevillage,performingceremoniesthatearlierdomi-
nant-castesarpanches used to perform.
*Theydisallowthe sarpanchfromenteringupper-castehouses.

*Theyaddress and referto the sarpanchbythe caste name.

*TheypreventDalits fromexercisingtheirfranchise.

*TheythreatenDalits fromcontestingelections forthe post of sarpanchand in-

sistthatthe post be keptvacantas long as it is reserved.

*Theyensurethatthe line-department officialsofthe governmentplace obstacles

in the path of developmentworksundertakenbythe Dalit sarpanchso thatthe
sarpanchgetsthe reputationofincapacityand of doing verylittleforthevillage,
therebyeroding the legitimacyof the reservationpolicyand correspondingly
strengtheningthe legitimacyof the "old order." Dominant castes as sarpanch
can get thingsdone.
*Theyembroil the Dalit sarpanchin expenditureillegalities,real or imagined.

where people campaigned to have Delhi's ninth plan incorporate

decentralization,33theydid so not throughthe institutionof the DPC but
through the StatePlanningBoard. There are severalargumentsforhaving
plans produced byDPCs. For one, theyproduce a plan forthedistribution
of resourcesthatis more in tunewithlocal needs, unlikeearlierplans that
were imposed fromabove. Hence theyhave greaterlegitimacy.Second,
the process involvedhas valuable educational consequences for a large
numberof people on issuessuch as the relevantrules and statutesof local
government,ParticipatoryRural Appraisal (PRA) techniques, micro-
developmentmodels,projectformulationand appraisal,and generalissues
concerningthe challenges to development.
The thirdinnovativefeatureis the creation of two new commissions,
state election commissions(SEC) and state finance commissions(SFC).
33Theachievementsand the limitationsof the plan can be found in theworksofThomas Issac andJos
Chatukulamrespectively.

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110 Publius/Fall 2003

The SEC's taskis similarto thatoftheCentralElectionCommission(CEC),

which is to superintend,direct,control,and conduct all elections to the
panchayatsand nagarpalikas. This has ensured thatelections are held at
regular intervals,are free and fair,are openly contested,and that state
governments are not in a position to postpone or nullifyelectoral
outcomes as theyhave frequentlyand casually done in the past. The
integrity of the electoral process as a wayof "selectingone's governors"is
hence restored.
The long-termbenefitsof such stateauthoritiesare twofold.SECs will
produce countervailingpower to the dominantpower structurebecause
the hithertoexcluded castes will now be able to use the vote to increase
theirbargainingpower. They will also make local representativesmore
accountable and responsiveto local needs because the distance between
elected and elector is much less than is the case with higher tiers of
representativegovernment. Since theirsettingup, SECs in some states
have had to face difficultieson matterssuch as "election notification,
delimitation ofconstituencies,reservation ofseats,rotationofreservedseats,
etc.,""4but theseshould be seen as part the dialecticsof powerbetween
of
the second and thirdtiersof governmentwhich,over time,contributeto
institutionalevolution. The second commission,the SFC, has been less
effectivein devolving state finances to the third tier; hence, fiscal
decentralizationhas not keptpace withpoliticaldecentralization.35
We stilldo not have detailed data on the workingof these authorities,
and so we cannotevaluatethem. Buttheirverycomingintobeingrepresents
an increase in the institutionaldensityof representative democracyat the
level of local government.Untilnow local governmenthad onlythe gram
panchayatas an institution.Withthe addition of the SEC, SFC, and gram
sabha,the number of institutionsconcerned withlocal governance has
grown,contributingto institutionaldensity.This, one expects,willmake
local governmentmore rule-governed.In a Weberiansense,thisshould be
seen as constituting an advance. The additionalbenefitof the SFC is that
itsrecommendationswill,over time,come to be regardedas the baseline
fordiscussionson the fiscalaspectsof decentralizedgovernance.
One importantconsequence of theholdingofregularelectionsis thatit
produces a new contestforlocal politicalleadership. Althoughtraditional
brokers of power still operate, they now have to compete with new
contenders. Electionsto the thirdtierincrease the representative density
of democracyin India because now the numberof elected representatives
in the polityhas gone up fromunder 6,000 to about threemillion. These
introduce a new dynamicinto the workingof the politybecause these

Paper on theWorkingof the ConstitutionalProvisions(Part IX) forDecentralization

34""Consultation
- Panchayats,"chaptertwo,p. 6.
35ShikhaJha,"StrengtheningLocal Governments:Rural Fiscal Decentralizationin India," Economic
and Political Weekly29 (June 2002): 2611-2623.

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The StruggleforLocal Government 111

representativesnow become available to help people negotiatetheirway

throughthe system.They are the new fixersof local politics.36
The fourthinnovation,and one worthdwellingon at some length,is the
institutionalizationof the village assembly(gramsabha), where all adult
membersof thevillagecan come and deliberateon issuespertainingto the
village. Mostvillageshave fewerthan 1,000 inhabitants.The rationalefor
thecreationofthisdeliberativespace is notjustthatofextendingdemocracy
downwards, or of expanding participation, but also of combining
representative withdirectdemocracyand therebyofdrawingon thebenefits
of both. The village assemblyis to serveas a watchdog,checkingon the
workingof thevillagecouncil (grampanchayat).37 The creationof such an
opportunity fordebate, a deliberativespace which is open to all,in an Indian
village marked by the boundaries of caste, class, and gender,is indeed a
radical step. These are boundaries thathave performedthe functionof
discipliningsocial behaviorin thevillage. Theyhave overtheyearsbecome
a part of people's life-world.If crossed, in contraventionof norms,the
consequences can be severe. In such a village,a deliberativespace open to
all wheregroupsare requiredto interactis now being createdthroughlaw.
In thissense,the lawis progressivebecause itdoes not make concessionsto
the matrixofruralpower. In fact,ittriesto underminethismatrixthrough
its strategyof reservations. (Table 3 liststhe scope and functionsof the
gramsabha. These have been culled fromthevariousconformity actsofthe
different states.)
The listof 13 functionsgivesthe village assembly(gramsabha) a fairly
widejurisdiction. Yet the ConsultationPaper on Decentralizationstates
that the "experience of the last seven yearsof the post 73rd Constitution
Amendmentphase showsthatthe gramsabhais yetto emerge as a forum
wherecommonpeople can participatein theprocessofcollectivedecision-
making."38
Attentionhas been drawnto the gramsabhabecause it is an interesting
case studyfor the importanttheoreticaldebates on political institutions.
Twoaspectsofthesedebatesneed to be tested.The firstaspectis theclassical
viewthat"institutions are not only 'the rules of the game' (but) theyalso
affectwhatvalues are establishedin a society,that is, whatwe regard as
justice, collectiveidentity, belonging,trust,and solidarity."39 Given what
"6AnandInbanathan, "Fixers,Patronage,'Fixing,' and Local Governance in Karnataka,"Institutefor
Social and Economic Change (ISEC) WorkingPaper 112 (Bangalore, 2002). The term"fixers"is an apt
expression to describe them because theyact as intermediariesor intercedersbetween the citizensand
the politicalsystem.They make the systemaccessible where it is normallyopaque.
37Messageof YashwantSinha, the Union Finance Minister,Governmentof India, to the National
Conference on "The Gram Sabha," Strengthening VillageDemocracy,eds. R.C. Choudhury and S.P. Jain
(Hyderabad: National Instituteof Rural Development, 1999), p. 49.
"8"ConsultationPaper on the Working of the Constitutional
Provisions (Part IX) forDecentralization
- Panchayats," p. 39.
39BoRothstein,"PoliticalInstitutions:An Overview,"A NewHandbookofPoliticalScience, eds. RobertE.
Goodin and Hans-DieterKlingemann (New York:Oxford UniversityPress, 1996), p. 139. This is a view
associated withRonald Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously (London: Duckworth,1977), andJames G. March
and Johan P. Olsen, RediscoveringInstitutions:The OrganizationalBasis ofPolitics(New York: Free Press,
1989).

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112 Publius/Fall2003

was said earlierabout the natureof villagesociety,about boundaries and

theircrossingand the penaltiesthatflowfromsuch behavior,it would be
interestingto map how the gramsabha is able to "affectwhatvalues are
established in society"and how the clash of those values of the village
assembly,of inclusionand equal citizenship,and those representedbythe
traditionalcasteand patriarchalstructures,
ofexclusionand hierarchy,play
themselvesout.
Table 3
Scope and Functionsof the GramSabha
The Gram Sabha is empoweredto:
*examineannual statementsof accounts and audit reports;

*discussthe reportof the precedingyear;

*reviewprogramsof workforthe yearor anynew programsuggested;

*considerproposals forfreshtaxationor forenhancementof existingtaxes;

*selectschemes,beneficiaries,and locations;

and cash forthe community

*mobilizevoluntarylabor and contribution-in-kind
welfareprograms;
*renderassistancein the implementationof developmentschemes and render-
ing servicesin villages;
*undertakeprogramsforadult education and familywelfarewithinthe village;

*promoteunityand harmonyamong all sectionsof society;

*consider the budget prepared by the grampanchayatand the futuredevelop-
mentprogramsand plans of the sabhaarea;
*consider and scrutinize the existing schemes and all kinds of activitiesof
panchavats;
*maintaina complete registerforall developmentworkundertakenbythe gram
panchayator byanyothergovernmentdepartment;and
*scrutinizethe completedworks.60
Source:S.P. Jain, "The Gram Sabha: Gateway to Grassroots Democracy," Journal ofRural
Development16 (October 1997): 557-573.

notonlydistribute
The second aspectis theviewthatpoliticalinstitutions
powerand influence,or disciplinesociety,but also influencehow various
groups come to define their political interests. They influence their
because theydeterminewhoare thelegitimateactors,thenumbers
strategies
of actors,the orderingof action, and what informationactors will have
about each other's intentions. This viewholds thatsmall and seemingly
unimportantchanges in institutionalrules can affectstrategyand greatly
influencetheoutcomeofpoliticalprocesses." We need therefore to discover
how the discursiveand public characterof the villageassembly"launders
4"Elinor Ostrom, "New Horizons in Institutional Analysis," American Political Science Review 89 (March
1995): 174-178.

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The StruggleforLocal Government 113

the individual'spreferences,"or those of groups,causingthemto redefine

theirself-interests.41One strategy adopted bypowerfulgroupsis to "change
'the rules of the game' in wayswhichtheybelievewillservetheirinterests,
retainingand extendingthatpower."42
In termsof thisinstitution-society dialectic,therefore,there are three
issues thatneed to be debated when assessingthe data on the workingof
village assemblies. First,how fardo institutions disciplinesociety,thatis,
how successfulis the assemblyin establishinga formofsocial behaviorthat
is consistentwiththerulesoftheinstitution?Does it,forexample,produce
in the participantsa recognitionof the equalityof members,an equality
thatis gender,caste and class neutral? Does it produce a commitmentto
the proceduralintegrity of the institutionor of itsautonomous authority?
Second, how fardoes the powerstructurein societysubverttheinstitution,
that is, if the rules of the institutionare out of step withthe normsand
mores of the society,will the normschange or will the rules get adapted
and distorted? Third, is there a thresholdpoint, dependent on critical
mass,on conjuncture,and on location,when one logic yieldsto another?
We need to know what is required to achieve this thresholdpoint. The
workingof the village assemblyhas to be seen withinthisdialectic. The
data emergingfromthe ground is beginning to provide a sense of the
dynamicrelationshipbetweenthe"fenceand thefield." Is thefenceeating
the fieldor the otherwayaround?
Some yearsafterthecomingintoforceoftheconstitutional amendments,
the SocietyforParticipatory Research in Asia (PRIA) and its Networkof
CollaboratingRegionalSupportOrganizations(NCRSO) studied195village
assemblies in six states,43 and presented its findingsin 1997. The study
foundthat"inthevastmajority oftheseGramSabha meetings,theminimum
required quorum as prescribedbyeach statewas rarelyfulfilled.However
in nearlyone-thirdof the cases under study,records of the Gram Sabha
meetingswere completedeven when the meetingswereeithernot held or
therewasno quorum."44 This experienceofmanipulationofthegramsabha
has since been endorsed by other observerswho have discussed some of
the waysin whichthisis done. For example:
*Sarpanches (chairpersons)convened these meetingsonlyunder
pressurefromhigherlevelsof administration, viz.thepanchayat
samitior zila parishad.45
41David Miller, "Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice," ProspectsforDemocracy,North,South, East,
West,ed. David Held (Oxford, PolityPress, 1993), pp. 74-92.
"PoliticalInstitutions,"p. 153.
42Rothstein,
43Thesix statesare Gujarat,Haryana,Himachal Pradesh,Kerala, MadhyaPradesh,and UttarPradesh.
44SocietyforParticipatory Researchin Asia (PRIA) and itsNetworkofCollaboratingRegional Support
Organizations (NCRSO), "Local Self-Governance:Mythor Realityof Gram Panchayatand Gram Sabha,"
(paper prepared forthe seminar"StrengtheningPanchayatiRaj Institutionsin India," New Delhi: India
InternationalCentre,30 August 1997).
45Thethirdtierof governmentis itselfcomprisedof threetiers. The lowestof these threetiersis the
grampanchayat(village council), the next is the panchayatsamiti(intermediatecouncil comprised of
representativesof village councils), and then the zila parishad(districtcouncil).

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114 Publius/Fall 2003

* Meetingswere mostlycalled withoutprioror adequate notice.

* Veryfewpanchayatsconvenedtheminimumprescribednumber
of meetings.
* Attendancewas thin.
* The participationof women was nominal and conspicuously
absentin places wherepurdahwas observed. Hence, gramsabha
meetingswerenot representative of all sectionsof ruralsociety.
* Appropriaterulesforconduct of meetingswere not framed.
* Generally,no agenda was prepared in advance.
* The gramsabhawas never consulted in the district'splanning
forthe villagesof thepanchayatarea.
* Most people were unaware of theirrole and so theyattended
the meetingsas silentlisteners.
* Proceedingswere mostlynot recorded and never reportedto
thepanchayator panchayatsamiti.46
* There wereviolentincidents.47
This state of affairsis made worse by the fact,as reportedin Andhra
Pradesh, thatgrampanchayats"are functionallyand financiallyweak, and
cannot take the responsibility of providingbasic servicesand community
development. The people by and large,therefore,have lostconfidence in
the PRIs and theyhardlyhave any incentiveto attend the Gram Sabha
meetingsat the cost of theirtime,wages,and own work."48 Some of these
weaknessescan be overcomebygovernmentorders,such as a fine-tuning
of thelawspecifying thedaysand thenumberof times(a minimumoftwo)
when the gram sabhas are to be held, such as the holidaysof 26 January,15
August,or 2 October. Othersneed to be addressedthroughpoliticalmeans,
notablyby a greaterpolitical will to devolve powers and functionsand
finances,or bysocial action.
From the above pictureof the workingof the gramsabha,three issues
appear to need furtherreflection. The firstis low attendance.49Is this
because of the fearof participation,a prudentialstrategyon the partsof
the weaker and vulnerable sections in society? Is it because of the
inconvenienceof the site? Is it the timingof the gramsabha,withwomen,
Dalits, and Adivasisbeing especiallyhandicapped? Is it because of the

46Harsh Mander, "Towards Direct Democracy: The Legal Empowerment of Gram Sabha," Kurukshetra
48 (October 1999): 2-13.
47George Matthew, "Gram Sabha and Social Audit," Kurukshetra48 (October 1999): 25-29.
48M. Devendra Babu, "Working of Gram Sabhas in Andhra Pradesh: Problems and Prospects," Institute
for Social and Economic Change (ISEC) Working Paper 103 (2002).
49The main deficiency is non-attendance or low attendance at the gram sabha because this allows village
oligarchs to claim that they are speaking on behalf of the village and to pass off their self-interest as public
interest.

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The StruggleforLocal Government 115

ineffectiveness of the gramsabha,because in most statesit is primarilya

recommendatorybody?50Is it because of a general politicalapathy?
We need to investigatewhyattendanceat gramsabhameetingsis so low
because good attendanceis at theveryheartof theprojectofdecentralized
democracy. It produces transparency,accountability,responsibility,
participation, and good governance.In theabsence
politicalself-realization,
of good attendance,the ruraloligarchywillcontinue to rule,and does so
now by invokingthe authorityof the gramsabha,providinga democratic
veneerforoligarchicrule.
One realisticreading of whythereis low attendance is in termsof the
opportunity costsofparticipation.These opportunity costsare foundto be
high among impoverished sections of societyand especiallyamong those
womenwhosefamilycommitments barely allow them anysparetime. There
is no guarantee that the impoverishedcommunitieswill find theirvoice
adequatelyreflectedin the gramsabha. Some of themmayfindit easier to
get thingsdone throughtheir traditionalspokespersonsratherthan by
partakingin a largebody like the gramsabha,whichdemands skills. These
are groundrealitiesthatcannot be ignoredwhileconsideringthe position
of the gramsabhavis-a-vis the grampanchayat.51
The second issue is the manipulation of records by the sarpanchor
panchayatsecretary.To createmore proceduresis not thesolutionbecause
theissueofmanipulatedrecordsraisestheclassicproblemofwhowillpolice
the policeman. One wayout is to relyon instruments outside the formal
PRI system.Reliance on the freedom-of-information movementhas been
suggested. This has considerable merit and should result in a more
transparentsystem.However,thisroute too has had to confrontobstacles
such as thatdescribed below when an attemptwas made to employsuch
instruments in Kerala.
An order issued on 5 December 1998 by the Kerala Planning Board
mandated the installationof notice boards in each ward of the panchayats
to let people know about the gramsabha and various developmental
activities.52A subsequent order stated that the plan documentsof those
panchayats whichhad failedto installnoticeboardswould notbe approved.
A popular campaign had thusled to the installationof notice boards in all
wardsofthegrampanchayats, municipalities, and corporations.In theinitial
stages, such notice boards carried handwrittenor printed notices or
informationindicatingwhen beneficiarieswere selected, what was the
procedure,and whereformsforthe same could be obtained.
Now mostofthepanchayats in Keralahavedurablenoticeboardsavailable
in thewards. Theyare no longerused forthepurposesforwhichtheywere
5""ConsultationPaper on the Workingof the ConstitutionalProvisions(Part IX) forDecentralization
- Panchayats,"p. 39.
"'M. S. John and Jos Chathukulam,"The Relationshipbetween Gram Sabha and Gram Panchayat,"
Kurukshetra 48 (October 1999): 40-45.
52KeralaPlanning Board order number 37805 L3/98.

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116 Publius/Fall 2003

originallyintended. Noticesof thepanchayatdo not appear on the board.

Instead,theboardsoftencarryadvertisements ofprivatecompanies,notices
ofmeetingsofpoliticalpartiesand, in municipalareas,cinemaposters.No
arrangementhas been made by the panchayatsto maintainthe board or
ensure regulardisplayofpanchayatnotices.54
Institutionalinnovationsneed to be sustained,and perhapscontinuously
re-made,or else theybecome routine. Inertiasetsin and elite democracy
again triumphsover people's democracy. One mustthereforeremember
thatthe struggleforgood governanceis notjust the means to an end but
the end itself.The processis the goal.
The thirdissue is thatof the violence thatthe dominantgroupsin the
villageunleash on the marginalizedgroupsthatseek to use the gramsabha
to make theirclaims. How does one cope withsuch violence,especiallyin
the contextof a police forcethatis controlledbythe dominantcastes,that
is insensitiveand inattentiveto the plightof the suppressedgroups,and
thatin factembodiesthemoresof traditionalsociety?When lookingat PRI
empowerment, we need to considerthephenomenonofretaliatory violence,
especiallybecause itis directedagainsttheweakestsectionsofsociety,persons
who have littleaccess to the redressalmachineryof the state.
From thisbriefaccount of theworkingof the gramsabha,it is clear that
thebattlebetweenthefenceand thefieldis on. The gramsabhaas a modern
institution is attemptingto disciplinetraditionalsocietythat,as mentioned
earlier,is hostileto thenotionofrationaldebate accordingto rules. In this
struggle,dominantgroups have responded by attemptingto change the
rules of the game by manipulatingrecords,by threateningmarginalized
groups when theystake theirclaims,and by turningthe procedural and
social systemto their advantage. Their actions, however,do not go
uncontested because marginalized groups also take advantage of this
opportunity space to combatthepowerasymmetries ofthevillageand stake
theirclaims.:
Whatthenabout the evidence,the issue withwhichI began thisarticle?
It appears that the village assembliesmay have gottenoffon the wrong
foot,losing to the entrenchedforcesof traditionalpower in the villages.
Giventhatthe discipliningof societyis a long, drawn-outprocess,we need
to keep collectingevidencefromacrossthecountryto assesswhichwaythe
battle will eventuallyturn. In view of the numbers involved,perhaps a
countrywide judgmentwillneverbe possible. Instead,victoriesand defeats
may have to be recorded regionally.
To strengthengrassrootsdemocracy,the intellectualand policy elites
have offeredsuggestionsthatwillmake local governmentinstitutions more
53Kerala Planning Board MS number 17/2000, dated 3 April 2000.
54JosChathukulam and M. S.John, "Five Years of Participatory Planning in Kerala: Rhetoric and Reality,"
Economic and Political Weekly,7 December 2002, p. 4923.
55Matthew, "Gram Sabha and the Social Audit;" George Matthew, "Panchayati Raj Institutions and
Human Rights in India," Economic and Political Weekly,11 January 2003, pp. 155-161.

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The StruggleforLocal Government 117

Those that involvefine-tuningof the institutionaldesign are

effective.56
the most popular, but theyconstituteonly necessarybut not sufficient
conditions for successfullocal government,especially a successfulPRI
system.Additionalextra-institutional
initiativesare required. We need to
increasethecapacitybuildingofpanches,villagerepresentatives,fromthese
marginalizedgroupsby offeringtrainingprogramsand providingthema
smallsalary.We need partnershipsbetweenvoluntary associationsand PRIs.
The freedom-of-information movementneeds to be strengthened.Political
strugglesneed to be encouraged. The literatureon PRIs is repletewith
recommendationson how to make local governmentmore effective.
LINKS TO FEDERALISM
How does thisdecentralization fitintothediscourseon federalism?
initiative
Clearlytheconstitutional amendmentstransformed India'stwo-tierfederation
intoone thatis supposed to be three-tier. However,itis one thingto change
thelaw;itis anotherto transform actualpractice.So far,therehas been little
evidencethatthestatesrecognizethatlocal governments are intendedto be
no longertheircreatures,whollysubordinateto statepolicies. Instead,they
are expected to be part of a coordinatesystemin whicheach of the three
ordersof governmentis responsibleto the Constitution.
It maybe possiblefortheUnion governmentto bypassstategovernments
and come to the aid oflocal authorities.This has been done in theUnited
States. But in Canada, a parliamentaryfederationlike India, the attempt
byone primeminister,PierreElliottTrudeau, to do thisfailed.
It maybe possible to tease out fromthe 73rdand 74thAmendmentssome
concernwiththedistribution ofpowerthatanimatesfederalism.57 In actual
practice,the institutionalstructurethathas so faremerged is subservient
to the second tierof government.Local governmentin both urban and
ruralIndia, althoughconstitutionally mandated,has a veryweak existence
in itsown right.It is controlledbystategovernments, whichhave retained
numerous powers. Among them are the power to make rules, to make
changes in the content of schedules, to appoint officials,to dismissthe
sarpanch,to cancel resolutions or decisions of panchayats,to dissolve
panchayats, to inspect records/works, and so on. Local governmentsare
hence inferiorto stategovernments.Theytherefore violatethebasicfederal
principlethatno order of governmentshould be subordinateto another.
Further,local governmentshave no power to legislate,nor have theythe
capacityto approach the courtsto rule upon disputesover the respective
constitutionalpowersof the second and thirdtiersof government.In fact,
thereis no case law on local governmentin India as thereis in the United

"Examples are the "ConsultationPaper on the Workingof the ConstitutionalProvisions(PartIX) for

Decentralization- Panchayats,"and the "ConsultationPaper on Decentralizationand Municipalities."
57DanielJ.Elazar,"Federalism,"TheEncyclopedia ed. SeymourMartinLipset (Washington,
ofDemocracy,
DC: CongressionalQuarterly,1995): volume 2, p. 475.

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118 Publius/Fall 2003

States.58Althoughlocal governmentshave a constitutionalstatuswhose

basic features,such as the four innovationsmentioned earlier,are not
amendable bythe second tierof government,theyare unable to function
as units of self-government.They are dependent on state governments
thathaveconceded onlypoliticaldecentralization, notfiscaldecentralization
or the administrative decentralizationof powersand functions.
If one were to set aside the structuralissue of the nature of the
arrangementof powersand jurisdictions,local governmentin India would
also fail the other testof "a special mode of politicaland social behavior
involvinga commitmentto partnerships and activecooperationon thepart
ofindividualsand institutions thatat thesame timetakepridein preserving
theirownintegrity.""59 There is no consistentcommitment among thestates'
political leaders to such partnerships because acceptance of themdepends
on whetheritwillhelp themin retainingor acquiringpoliticalpower. The
supportofpoliticiansis based on expediency.In contrast,however,thereis
a commitmentto local governmentat thefirsttierofgovernment.But this
should be understood in the contextof development,not of democracy
and federalism. The grassrootsof India's new democracydeservebetter
nurturingthan theyappear to be receiving.

Law: Casesand Materials,3'd ed. (St. Paul, MN: WestPublishing

"5WilliamD.Valente, Local Government
Company,1987).
59Elazar,"Federalism,"p. 479.

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