Disarmament and International

Security Committee
—-----------------------------------------------------
SOMUN 2024

AGENDA: "Discussing the use of Private Military and Security

Companies (PMSCs) and their role in Modern Conflict, with special
emphasis on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict."

Chair:- Sai Sushankh Jetty

Vice Chair:- Shlokya Shekar Badireddi
Rapporteur- Rishabh Mohant
 Involvement of PMSCs in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

The Role of Russia and its Use of PMSCs

Legal and Ethical Implications of PMSCs in Modern Warfare

Impact of PMSCs on Civilians and Human Rights

Current Regulations and International Efforts to Govern PMSCs

Debates Surrounding the Legitimacy of PMSCs in Warfare

Case Studies of PMSC Involvement in Other Conflicts

Possible Solutions and Resolutions for DISEC Consideration

Questions to Consider

Bibliography

LETTER FROM THE CHAIR

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2024 SILVER OAKS MODEL UNITED NATION (SOMUN) and to the
Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). My name is Sai Sushank Jetty,
and I am honoured to serve as your Chair for DISEC at SOMUN 2024. Alongside me, your
Vice-Chair, Shlokya Shekar Badireddiand and I are thrilled to engage with each of you in
what promises to be an impactful and dynamic committee experience.

To all the veterans of MUN, I promise you a very enriching debate, one that you’ve never
experienced before, and to all the newcomers out there, we are thrilled to be a part of your
maiden voyage.

As the world grapples with complex security threats—ranging from nuclear proliferation and
cyber warfare to regional conflicts and emerging non-state actors—the need for innovative
and collaborative solutions is more pressing than ever. In DISEC, we encourage delegates to
think beyond national interests and consider the collective responsibility we hold in
promoting peace, security, and stability. Our committee will explore critical issues that
require careful balancing of sovereignty, international cooperation, and strategic interests.
 Index

Letter from The Chair

Rules and Procedures

About UNGA-DISEC

Introduction to the Agenda

Historical Background

The Role of PMSCs in Modern Conflicts

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Background

We hope to see delegates demonstrate not only an understanding of their country’s foreign
policy but also a willingness to respect and integrate diverse viewpoints. Our goal is for each
delegate to navigate the complex dynamics of negotiation and compromise, ultimately
striving toward practical and universally acceptable resolutions that uphold global security.
The following pages intend to guide you with the nuances of the agenda as well as the
Council. The Guide chronologically touches upon all the different aspects that are relevant
and that will pave the way to fruitful debate in the Council. It will provide you with a bird’s
eye view of the issue.

However, it has to be noted that the background guide only contains the basic information
which may form the basis for your debate, research and understanding. We encourage you to
go beyond this background guide and delve into the extremities of the agenda to further
enhance your knowledge of a burning global issue.

You are the representative of your allotted country and it is our hope that you put in
wholehearted efforts to research and comprehensively grasp all important facets of the
diverse agenda. All the delegates should be prepared well in order to lead the council and the
debate in a productive direction.

Sai Sushankh Jetty

Chair, Disarmament and International Security Committee
SOMUN

Rules and Procedures

1. Roll Call

At the start of each committee session, the Chair conducts a roll call to confirm attendance.
Delegates respond with either “Present” or “Present and Voting.”

• If a delegate says “Present,” they may abstain from voting on substantive matters,
such as draft resolutions. If they say “Present and Voting,” they are obligated to vote
“yes” or “no” on these matters.

2. Setting the Agenda

The committee must decide which topics to discuss first. To set the agenda, a delegate makes
a motion to prioritise one of the agenda items.

• Example: If DISEC has two topics (e.g., “Nuclear Disarmament” and “Cyber
Warfare”), a delegate might motion to discuss “Nuclear Disarmament” first. The Chair
 then opens the floor for speakers to argue for or against this motion, and a vote is
conducted to finalise the agenda order.

3. Speakers’ List

After setting the agenda, the committee opens a speakers’ list, which is a queue of delegates
who wish to speak on the topic under discussion. Each delegate on the list is given a set
amount of time to present their country’s position.

• Example: If a delegate from France is on the speakers’ list to discuss nuclear

disarmament, they might have two minutes to express France’s stance and policy on the
topic.

Motion Phrase: “The delegate of XYZ Country Would like to raise a Motion to open the
General Speakers’ List with an individual speaking time of [specify time, e.g., one minute]
per delegate.”

4. Motions for Moderated and Unmoderated Caucuses

Delegates can motion for a Moderated Caucus (structured debate) or an Unmoderated Caucus
(informal debate).

• Moderated Caucus: The Chair calls on delegates to speak for a limited time on a
specific sub-topic.

Motion Phrase: “The delegate of XYZ country would like to suspend the formal debate and
enter into an moderated caucus for the topic[subtopic] with the total speaking time of [time]
and individual speaking time of [time] per delegate to discuss.”

• Example: A delegate may motion for a 10-minute moderated caucus with a

30-second speaking time per delegate to discuss “reducing nuclear arsenals.”

• Unmoderated Caucus: Delegates can move freely, collaborate, and form alliances
without structured speaking times.

• Example: Delegates motion for a 15-minute unmoderated caucus to draft

clauses for a working paper on cyber warfare.

Motion Phrase: “The delegate of XYZ country would like to suspend the formal debate
amd entre into an Unmoderated Caucus for the total time of [time].”
 5. Points of Order, Inquiry, and Personal Privilege

Various points allow delegates to address specific issues within the session.

• Point of Order: Used if a delegate believes procedural rules are being violated.

• Example: If a delegate feels that the Chair has not followed voting procedures
correctly, they can raise a Point of Order.

• Point of Inquiry: Used to ask questions regarding rules or procedure.

• Example: A delegate may ask the Chair how many votes are needed to pass a
motion.

• Point of Personal Privilege: Used if a delegate experiences personal discomfort

affecting their participation (e.g., can’t hear the speaker).

• Example: A delegate may raise this point if the room temperature is too cold
or if the microphone is not functioning properly.

6. Draft Resolutions

A draft resolution is a formal document proposing specific actions to address the topic. It
must have a certain number of sponsors (delegates who actively support it) and signatories
(delegates who wish to discuss it but do not necessarily support it).

• Example: A draft resolution on nuclear disarmament might include clauses like “calls
upon nuclear states to reduce their arsenals by 10% within five years.” Once submitted, it
is debated and, if approved, becomes a formal resolution.

Motion Phrase: “The delegate of XYZ country would like to raise a Motion to introduce
Draft Resolution [#].”

7. Amendments

Delegates can propose changes to the draft resolution through amendments.

• Friendly Amendments: Changes agreed upon by all sponsors; they are automatically
incorporated.
 • Example: If all sponsors agree to change “10% reduction” to “15% reduction,”
it is a friendly amendment.

• Unfriendly Amendments: Changes not supported by all sponsors, which require a

vote.

• Example: If a delegate proposes adding a clause for “strict sanctions on

non-compliant states” without unanimous sponsor approval, it would be an
unfriendly amendment.

Friendly Amendment Phrase: “Motion to introduce a friendly amendment to Draft

Resolution [#].” (no vote needed)

Unfriendly Amendment Phrase: “Motion to introduce an unfriendly amendment to Draft

Resolution [#].” (vote needed)

8. Voting Procedures

Voting procedures apply to amendments and draft resolutions. During voting, only “yes,”
“no,” or “abstain” votes are allowed. Depending on the rules, certain motions may require a
simple majority or two-thirds majority to pass.

• Example: A draft resolution on cyber warfare might require a two-thirds majority. If

30 delegates are present, 20 must vote in favour for it to pass
.
9. Adjournment of Debate and Closure of Debate
• Adjournment of Debate: Used to suspend discussion on the current topic without
concluding it, allowing the committee to revisit it later.

• Example: If debate on nuclear disarmament stalls, a delegate might motion to

adjourn debate and move to the next topic.

• Closure of Debate: Used to end debate on the topic and move to an immediate vote on
any draft resolutions or amendments.

• Example: If delegates feel that all viewpoints on nuclear disarmament have

been discussed, they may motion to close debate and proceed to voting on the draft
resolution.
 About UNGA-DISEC

The United Nations General Assembly First Committee, also known as the Disarmament and
International Security Committee (DISEC), addresses a range of issues pertinent to
disarmament and international security. This committee is dedicated to maintaining peace and
preventing conflict through various measures of disarmament. It is one of the main
committees within the UN General Assembly and is focused on fostering international
cooperation. The primary role of the First Committee is to conduct a comprehensive debate
on disarmament issues, take stock of the current international security landscape, and weigh
in on solutions to issues that threaten global peace. These tasks are typically accomplished
through an annual session, generally spanning four to five weeks starting in October. The
sessions are divided into several stages, starting with a general debate, followed by thematic
discussions, and are concluded with actions on drafts.
The Committee’s work is reported through two important bodies: the Disarmament
Commission (UNDC) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD), although the latter is not
officially part of the United Nations structure. The discussions during these sessions are vital
as they address prevailing security threats including nuclear proliferation, cybersecurity,
chemical and biological weapons, and potential arms races in domain areas such as outer
space.

Throughout its history, the General Assembly has emphasised the urgent need for
disarmament and consistently reaffirmed its commitment to reducing global stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction. Various challenges remain, such as the paralysis in some parts
of the disarmament machinery and the need to address the proliferation of conventional
weapons.

Thus, the work of the First Committee is crucial not only for its influence over disarmament
policies but also as a platform for multilateral negotiations and consensus-building amongst
the 193-member states. Consistent with the spirit of the United Nations, the First
Committee’s agenda underscores the principles of peace and security, which are of paramount
importance given current global challenges.
Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are entities that operate within the military
and security sector, offering a wide range of services traditionally carried out by national
armed forces and police.

Introduction to the Agenda

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) have significantly reshaped modern
conflict dynamics, stepping into roles traditionally managed by state militaries and law
enforcement. These companies offer various services, including ship and port security,
intelligence gathering, convoy and transport security, site protection, and training for local
militias. Some PMSCs even engage in covert operations and propaganda, influencing public
perceptions and strategic outcomes in conflict zones. Their rise in prominence since the early
2000s can be attributed to a combination of factors, including the privatisation of military
roles, increasing piracy, and security challenges along global shipping routes. Conflicts in
regions like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria have further highlighted their strategic importance,
as PMSCs have filled gaps in military personnel, providing both armed protection and
logistical support.

The Role and Influence of PMSCs in Modern Conflicts

PMSCs have become indispensable in modern international security for both economic and
tactical reasons. States and private corporations see PMSCs as an efficient means to address
short-term security threats, such as piracy and insurgency, without the political and logistical
complexities associated with deploying national forces. Their involvement allows
governments to project influence or control without the direct use of national troops, which
can often carry domestic political risks. Similarly, corporations benefit from PMSC services,
especially those operating in high-risk regions, as these firms provide security that national
governments might be unable or unwilling to guarantee.
PMSCs are particularly active in volatile areas with weak government institutions or ongoing
conflicts. In places like Afghanistan and Iraq, PMSCs handle tasks that include guarding
embassies, military bases, and other critical infrastructure. Their work often includes
protecting high-profile officials, diplomatic staff, and corporate executives, all of which
require specialised personnel skilled in combat, intelligence, and risk management. This
security presence is crucial for maintaining both military operations and civilian functions in
conflict-ridden areas, where the state cannot ensure complete protection. Additionally,
PMSCs’ logistics and support operations extend to managing supply chains, transporting
military equipment, and constructing military bases in hostile or remote areas.

Economic and Tactical Efficiency

The economic efficiency of PMSCs is a primary driver of their increasing popularity.
Governments and organisations facing budgetary constraints may find that hiring PMSCs is
more cost-effective than expanding military forces or creating new security units. The
flexibility and scalability of PMSCs enable them to rapidly mobilise personnel, adapting to
the changing needs of a conflict zone without the bureaucratic delays often associated with
state-run military forces. This flexibility has proven particularly valuable in fast-evolving
situations, such as the post-2001 Afghanistan conflict, where PMSCs provided immediate
reinforcements in high-risk areas, allowing national forces to focus on more critical military
operations.
From a tactical perspective, PMSCs offer a unique advantage as they can deploy specialised
skills quickly, including counter-insurgency operations, hostage rescues, and intelligence
gathering. Their personnel, often drawn from former military ranks, bring specific skill sets
that enable them to operate effectively in diverse environments. For example, PMSC
operatives often undergo extensive training, allowing them to manage risks in high-stress
situations, where adaptability and quick decision-making are crucial. This specialised training
means that PMSCs can provide high-calibre security in unpredictable or hostile situations,
making them an attractive choice for both state and private actors.

Historical Background

Origin and rise of PMSCs: Key events that led to the privatisation of military
and security functions.

The origin and rise of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) can be
attributed to several key historical events and trends that contributed to the
privatisation of military services. During the 1990s, the demand for military skills in
the private market increased substantially, partly due to the global war on terror and
 the military downsizing of traditional military powers after the Cold War. This led to a
disengagement from selected zones of influence, particularly in Africa, creating a
demand for privatised military and security options. Additionally, this period saw an
ample supply of former soldiers due to the aforementioned downsizing efforts, which
aligned with the increasing demand for military skills from various actors, such as
Western states, enhancing their militaries, rulers of weak or failed states seeking
support, and non-state actors, including private firms and non-governmental
organisations.

Another significant catalyst for the emergence and prominence of PMSCs was the
role played during the US-led War on Terror in the early 2000s. PMSCs were able to
provide a diplomatically, economically, and strategically efficient method to achieve
logistical and tactical goals by collaborating with national forces. The rise of Somali
piracy, highlighted by the 2009 Maersk Alabama hijacking, further emphasised the
need for PMSCs in the maritime sector, with existing PMSCs shifting focus to
maritime operations and new companies emerging to address these threats 2.

The internationalisation and globalisation of the security industry resulted in PMSCs

increasingly assuming roles traditionally held by national military forces and police,
including building and site security, convoy and transport security, and advisory
services. This outsourcing of military and security functions means these companies
often step into a regulatory grey area, which facilitates the proliferation of privatised
force without adequate accountability.

In conclusion, the combination of state military downsizing, increased demand due to

global security challenges, and the strategic economic opportunities presented by
neoliberal global markets have all contributed to the rise and continued growth of
PMSCs on the international scene.

- Notable conflicts involving PMSCs (Iraq,Afghanistan, Syria).

- Evolution of PMSCs and their growing roles in combat, security, and logistics.

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) have played a significant and
evolving role in conflict zones such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. Here are some
notable instances and developments regarding their roles:

1. Iraq : In Iraq, PMSCs have been extensively used since the U.S.-led invasion
in 2003. A prominent company, Blackwater (now Xe Services), has been
involved in multiple conflicts and high-profile incidents. They were heavily
employed in military and quasi-military tasks with estimates of 20,000 to
100,000 private contractors being deployed at various times 1. Blackwater, in
particular, gained notoriety for the incident in Fallujah where their convoys
were ambushed, leading to casualties and significant controversy.
 2. Afghanistan : PMSCs have also been actively involved in Afghanistan. They
provide a broad range of services, including traditional guarding services,
high-tech intelligence and risk management, as well as training for Afghan
security forces. About 85% of PMSC staff in Afghanistan comprise Afghan
nationals, while others include third-country nationals. Additionally,
allegations have surfaced of their involvement in detainee interrogations,
although no conclusive evidence has been found.

3. Syria : Although less documented than Iraq and Afghanistan, PMSCs have
been involved in Syria to some extent, often operating in coordination with
other international military forces. Their roles typically revolve around
protection and logistical support but detailed instances remain less publicised
compared to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Over time, the function of PMSCs has expanded from traditional security roles like
guarding facilities and convoys to more complex activities such as intelligence,
tactical training, and logistical support. Modern PMSCs are known to engage in
strategic planning and intelligence gathering, often blurring the lines between
contractor roles and military operations. Government policies, especially those of the
United States, prohibit PMSCs from engaging in direct combat; however, the practical
on-ground dynamics occasionally misalign with official policies, leading to
controversies and debate over their appropriate use.

The Role of PMSCs in Modern Conflicts

Types of services offered by PMSCs:-

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) offer a varied set of services that cater to
both maritime and land-based security needs. Here's a detailed look at the services they
provide:

1. Maritime Security Services : PMSCs offer services in the maritime sector, which
include armed anti-piracy support, signal intelligence for civilian ships, and armed
port security for logistics companies. These services are particularly favoured by
commercial shipping industries and governmental bodies to safeguard international
trade routes, which are threatened by piracy.

2. Static Guarding and Protection Services: PMSCs are known for providing static
guarding for various premises such as offices, embassies, and construction projects.
They also offer escort and protection services to VIPs and convoys in various settings
ranging from civilian areas to active battle zones.
 3. High-tech Intelligence and Risk Management: In addition to traditional security
provisions, PMSCs now offer advanced intelligence and risk management services.
This encompasses everything from strategic planning to detailed intelligence
collection and analysis for various stakeholders, including military units and private
companies.

4. Training and Consultation: PMSCs provide training services for military and police
forces, as well as consultancy in policy development for defence ministries. They are
also involved in demining operations and initiatives like poppy eradication in conflict
zones.

5. Logistics and Support Operations: These companies also provide logistical support for
military operations, including the protection of forward operating bases and other key
installations, often making them crucial to both military and peacekeeping operations.

6. Interrogation and Detainee Handling: Though controversial, PMSCs have been

involved in the interrogation of detainees and in tactical questioning, especially in
conflict areas. However, this has raised legal and ethical questions, particularly after
reports of abuses in some detention facilities.

7. Floating Armouries: In the maritime sector, some PMSCs operate floating armouries,
holding weapons and ammunition and leasing them to private bodies. This practice
has sparked debates about security and regulatory oversight in international waters.

The above services demonstrate the multifaceted roles PMSCs play in global security
scenarios, ranging from traditional security functions to more intricate roles involving risk
management(RM) and direct engagement in war zones.

Key advantages and risks associated with PMSC involvement in conflict.

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) offer several key advantages in conflict
and post-conflict environments, but they also pose significant risks.

Advantages:

1. Flexibility and Rapid Deployment: PMSCs often offer a flexible and rapid
deployment capability, which can be advantageous in situations requiring immediate
response where national military forces might be slow to mobilise.

2. Filling Security Gaps: PMSCs can fill critical security gaps, particularly in
post-conflict situations where national security forces are inadequate or insufficiently
 developed to handle complex security challenges. This has been seen notably in
Afghanistan, where both national and international organisations rely on PMSCs for
protection, highlighting their essential role.

3. Specialised Expertise and Resources: PMSCs often provide specialised skills and
resources that might not be available within public sector forces, including security
for transnational corporations, convoy protection, and tactical training for local forces.

4. Cost-effectiveness: For governments and organisations, outsourcing security functions

to PMSCs may be more cost-effective compared to maintaining large standing forces
with similar capabilities.

Risks:
1. Accountability and Regulation Challenges:
PMSCs frequently operate in a regulatory grey area, facing little accountability for human
rights violations and other illicit activities. Oversight mechanisms are often weak, and when
violations occur, they can undermine the affected population's trust in peace and
reconstruction efforts.

2. Profit Motive Concerns:

The profit-driven nature of PMSCs may conflict with post-conflict recovery and stabilisation
goals. Critics argue that PMSCs have a financial interest in prolonging conflict to justify their
presence and profits, although some literature argues this is more an issue with monopolistic
conditions rather than when multiple PMSCs operate together.

3. Blurred Lines with Humanitarian Work: In conflict zones where PMSCs work
alongside humanitarian organisations, the distinction between military/security
operations and aid work can become blurred. This can lead to perceptions of bias and
reduce the effectiveness of humanitarian missions.

Cases where PMSCs have played significant roles in warfare or

security missions.

Somalia Case Study

Background on Somalia’s Conflict and Governance Challenges

Since the early 1990s, Somalia has been engulfed in a prolonged civil war that began after the
collapse of its central government in 1991. This political instability led to the rise of various
armed factions and warlords, creating an environment where governance structures were
fragmented, and lawlessness prevailed. The absence of a stable government and the
prevalence of piracy along the Somali coast also posed severe threats to international
maritime security, as shipping routes along the Horn of Africa became increasingly
vulnerable to piracy attacks. Somalia’s security situation thus became a focal point for
international intervention, drawing attention from state actors, international organisations,
and private security firms.

Role of PMSCs in Somalia

In response to the escalating threat of piracy off the Somali coast, PMSCs were hired by
private shipping companies, humanitarian organisations, and even governments to provide
armed protection for vessels traversing these high-risk waters. One of the significant PMSCs
involved was the UK-based Hart Security, which was among the earliest companies to
establish operations in Somalia, deploying armed security personnel on ships and providing
intelligence on pirate activities. These companies operated with varying degrees of
effectiveness, often criticised for their use of force, as well as concerns around accountability
and the legalities of their operations on international waters.
The services provided by PMSCs in Somalia typically included:

• Armed Vessel Protection: PMSCs provided teams of armed guards on merchant

vessels, acting as a deterrent against potential pirate attacks. In many cases, the visible
presence of armed personnel was sufficient to prevent incidents, as pirates would often
avoid heavily guarded ships in favour of softer targets.

• Maritime Intelligence and Surveillance: PMSCs also engaged in intelligence

gathering and monitoring activities. They would relay real-time information on pirate
movements and possible ambush locations to client vessels, helping ships to reroute
when necessary.

• Base Security and Training: In addition to protecting ships, PMSCs also provided
security for onshore facilities, including ports, oil installations, and humanitarian
compounds. Some companies were involved in training Somali forces to handle piracy
threats more effectively.
Outcomes and Controversies
While PMSCs played a critical role in reducing piracy incidents, their operations in Somalia
were marred by controversies and criticisms:

• Legal Ambiguities: PMSCs operated in a complex legal environment with

ambiguous rules around the use of force. Maritime laws did not clearly define the limits
within which PMSCs could operate, leading to incidents where private security personnel
used excessive force or acted beyond their legal mandate.

• Human Rights Violations: There were reported cases of abuse by private security
contractors. For instance, contractors were alleged to have used disproportionate force,
 leading to civilian casualties in some instances. This lack of accountability and oversight
raised concerns among human rights advocates.

• Long-Term Stability Concerns: Although PMSCs temporarily reduced piracy levels,

they did not address the root causes of instability in Somalia. Critics argued that the
reliance on PMSCs created a band-aid solution, ignoring the broader political and
economic issues that fuel conflict and piracy in the region.

Despite these challenges, the presence of PMSCs in Somalia achieved tangible outcomes in
terms of reducing piracy incidents, which had threatened global maritime trade.
However, the case of Somalia underscores the complexities of involving private actors in
conflict zones, where issues of accountability, jurisdiction, and ethical practices are often
blurred.

Afghanistan Case Study

Background on Afghanistan’s Conflict

Afghanistan’s conflict spans several decades, starting from the Soviet invasion in 1979,
through the civil war in the 1990s, the rise of the Taliban, and the subsequent U.S.-led
intervention following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. After the Taliban’s ousting,
Afghanistan became a focal point for Western military and reconstruction efforts. However,
given the vast scale of operations and the challenging terrain, U.S. and NATO forces often
relied on PMSCs to supplement their activities, particularly for logistical support, security,
and training missions.

Role of PMSCs in Afghanistan

The role of PMSCs in Afghanistan has been extensive, with companies like Blackwater (later
known as Academi), DynCorp, and Triple Canopy playing significant roles in both combat
and non-combat functions. Key areas of PMSC involvement included:

• Protection of Military and Diplomatic Personnel: PMSCs provided armed

protection for U.S. and NATO personnel, including high-profile diplomats and political
figures. This included convoy protection, securing military bases, and providing close
personal security to VIPs.

• Training Afghan Security Forces: PMSCs were contracted to train the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), with companies like
DynCorp taking the lead in police training. These training missions were aimed at
building local capacity to manage security independently.

• Logistical Support and Intelligence: PMSCs provided logistical support, such as

maintaining supply chains, transporting equipment, and handling communication
 networks in remote and dangerous areas. They also gathered and analysed intelligence to
support U.S. and NATO operations.
Outcomes and Controversies
The extensive use of PMSCs in Afghanistan led to both positive outcomes and significant
controversies:

• Impact on Security and Operations: PMSCs provided crucial support in a

challenging operational environment, freeing up regular military forces for combat
missions. They allowed the U.S. to maintain a robust presence in Afghanistan without
overstretching its regular military personnel.

• Accountability Issues: Like in Somalia, PMSCs in Afghanistan operated in a legal

gray area. In 2007, Blackwater contractors were involved in a high-profile incident where
they killed 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad’s Nisour Square. Although this incident
occurred in Iraq, it highlighted the broader issue of PMSC accountability in conflict
zones, including Afghanistan.

• Cost and Dependency: The U.S. spent billions on contracts with PMSCs, raising
questions about the cost-effectiveness of privatising security functions. Critics argued
that this dependency on PMSCs created financial inefficiencies and that funds could have
been better allocated toward building Afghan capacity directly.

• Mixed Success in Training Initiatives: Despite significant investment, training

efforts by PMSCs in Afghanistan saw limited long-term success. The rapid collapse of
the ANA and ANP during the Taliban’s 2021 offensive exposed deficiencies in these
programs, with critics attributing some of these failures to the limited accountability and
inconsistent oversight of PMSC-led training.

Lessons Learned and Implications

The use of PMSCs in Afghanistan offers insights into the potential and pitfalls of outsourcing
military and security functions to private actors. While PMSCs played a crucial role in
supporting U.S. and NATO operations, their involvement underscored challenges around
governance, accountability, and ethics in conflict zones. As Afghanistan grapples with the
aftermath of foreign intervention, the role of PMSCs in its history serves as a cautionary tale,
highlighting the limitations of privatised security in fostering sustainable peace and stability.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Background

1. Brief Overview of the Russia-Ukraine War, Key Milestones, and Current
Status:

The Russia-Ukraine war, rooted in decades of complex political, cultural, and historical
tensions, escalated dramatically in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea, a strategic peninsula
in the Black Sea. This move followed the Euromaidan protests, which led to the ousting of
Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, and ignited a national pivot toward the
West, including aspirations for closer ties with the European Union and NATO. The
annexation of Crimea was met with international condemnation and sanctions from Western
countries but emboldened pro-Russian separatist movements in eastern Ukraine, particularly
in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. These regions, collectively known as the Donbas,
became the stage for a proxy war that set Ukraine against Russian-backed separatists in a
low-intensity but costly conflict that simmered for years.
The situation reached a breaking point on February 24, 2022, when Russia launched a
full-scale invasion of Ukraine, marking the most significant military action in Europe since
World War II. Key milestones in this war include:

• Initial Assault and Kyiv Resistance (February-April 2022): Russian forces

attempted a swift capture of the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, but faced unexpectedly fierce
resistance. By April, Russian troops withdrew from northern Ukraine, shifting focus to
the eastern and southern regions.

• Battle of Mariupol (March-May 2022): The port city of Mariupol in southeastern

Ukraine saw some of the most intense fighting. The fall of Mariupol marked a strategic
win for Russia, securing a land corridor to Crimea.

• Kherson Counteroffensive (August-November 2022): Ukrainian forces launched a

counteroffensive in the southern region of Kherson, eventually recapturing the city. This
victory underscored Ukraine’s ability to push back against Russian advances with
Western-supplied weapons and strategic resilience.

• Bakhmut and the Donbas (2023): The battle for Bakhmut became symbolic as both
sides suffered heavy casualties, with control frequently shifting. Despite its limited
strategic value, Bakhmut highlighted the attritional nature of the conflict.

• Current Stalemate (Late 2023): As of now, the conflict remains largely at a

deadlock, with continued artillery exchanges, drone attacks, and localised skirmishes
along a sprawling front line. The war has drained resources, displaced millions, and
reshaped alliances, with no clear path to peace in sight.

This war is characterised by intense media coverage, diplomatic manoeuvring, and

economic sanctions on Russia, aiming to weaken its resolve and military capabilities.
The use of technology, including drones and cyber warfare, has brought a modern,
high-tech dimension to traditional warfare tactics.
2. Initial Involvement of PMSCs in the Conflict and How It Escalated

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) have played an increasingly visible role in
the Russia-Ukraine conflict, serving as force multipliers for both conventional military forces
and covert operations. Russia’s initial involvement of PMSCs can be traced back to the
annexation of Crimea and the early stages of the Donbas conflict, where groups like the
Wagner Group emerged as key players. Founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close associate of
Russian President Vladimir Putin, Wagner operates as a quasi-state military entity that offers
the Kremlin plausible deniability in international conflicts.
Initially, the Wagner Group and other PMSCs operated in the Donbas region under the guise
of “volunteer” militias. Their presence allowed Russia to support separatist forces without
committing official troops, effectively blurring the lines between state and non-state actors.
As the conflict escalated in 2022, PMSCs became integral to Russia’s military strategy,
especially in high-risk areas where conventional military involvement might be politically or
logistically challenging. These contractors are often tasked with reconnaissance, artillery
targeting, sabotage, and frontline combat support.
The use of PMSCs has escalated over time, in part due to the heavy casualties faced by
regular Russian forces. In Ukraine, Wagner and other private entities have recruited
extensively from Russian prisons, promising inmates freedom in exchange for military
service. This controversial practice has underscored the brutal tactics employed by these
groups, as many recruits are sent into high-casualty operations with limited training.

On the Ukrainian side, PMSCs have also provided support, although their role is
comparatively limited due to Ukraine’s dependence on state-backed Western military aid and
volunteer foreign fighters. The presence of PMSCs complicates accountability, as these
entities operate in a legal gray zone where international law often lacks enforcement
mechanisms. Moreover, allegations of war crimes, including torture and extrajudicial killings,
have been levied against Wagner and other PMSCs in the region, further intensifying calls for
regulation and oversight of private military actors.

3. Importance of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict in the Global Geopolitical

Landscape

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has reverberated far beyond Eastern Europe, reshaping global
alliances, economic policies, and security strategies. Several factors underscore the global
significance of this war:

• Challenge to International Norms and Sovereignty: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

represents a direct challenge to the post-World War II international order, which is based
on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. By attempting to redraw borders
through force, Russia has triggered a crisis that echoes the Cold War era and raises
concerns about the potential for similar actions by other authoritarian regimes,
particularly in Asia and the Middle East.
• Energy and Economic Repercussions: Europe’s heavy reliance on Russian oil and
gas has made the energy dimension of this conflict particularly acute. The war has
disrupted global energy markets, leading to surges in prices and prompting Europe to
expedite its transition to renewable energy and alternative suppliers. Sanctions on
Russian energy exports have affected not only Russia’s economy but also triggered
inflationary pressures worldwide, with developing countries disproportionately impacted.

• Military Alliances and NATO Expansion: One of the unintended consequences of

Russia’s invasion has been the reinvigoration of NATO, which has expanded its
membership and heightened its readiness. Sweden and Finland, historically neutral
countries, applied for NATO membership in response to the perceived threat from Russia.
This expansion represents a strategic setback for Russia, which cited NATO’s growth as a
justification for its actions in Ukraine.

• Rise of New Military Technologies and Cyber Warfare: The Russia-Ukraine war
has been a testing ground for modern military technologies, from drones to cyber
warfare. Both sides have deployed drones for reconnaissance and attack, while cyber
warfare has targeted critical infrastructure, media, and financial systems. The
implications for future conflicts are profound, as these technologies are likely to be more
widely adopted.

• Humanitarian Crisis and Refugee Waves: The war has triggered one of the largest
refugee crises in recent history, with millions of Ukrainians displaced. The humanitarian
impact extends beyond Europe, straining resources and support systems globally and
drawing attention to the need for comprehensive frameworks to address displacement in
conflict zones.

• Impact on Global Food Security: Ukraine and Russia are major exporters of grains
and fertilisers. The war has disrupted agricultural production and trade, contributing to
global food insecurity. Countries in Africa and the Middle East, already vulnerable to
food shortages, face heightened risks of famine and political instability due to these
supply chain disruptions.

• Geopolitical Realignment and the “New Cold War”: The conflict has solidified a
divide between Russia, China, and other authoritarian states on one side, and the U.S.,
EU, and their allies on the other. This realignment signals a potential “New Cold War,” as
the U.S. and China vie for influence in regions like Africa, Latin America, and Southeast
Asia. Additionally, this polarisation influences global governance, as rival blocs shape
policies on trade, technology, and security.

• Future of Private Military Companies: The use of PMSCs like Wagner in the
Ukraine conflict raises concerns about the future role of these entities in warfare. The
normalisation of PMSCs could lead to an era of privatised conflicts, where states
increasingly outsource combat to private entities, complicating accountability and
amplifying the potential for human rights abuses.
 In conclusion, the Russia-Ukraine conflict represents a geopolitical earthquake that has
destabilised norms, economies, and alliances worldwide. The protracted nature of the
war, coupled with the involvement of PMSCs and other non-state actors, suggests that its
impacts will be felt for decades to come, shaping the contours of international relations in
the 21st century.

Involvement of PMSCs in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Overview of key PMSCs involved in the conflict:

The Wagner Group is a significant private military and security company (PMSC) operating
in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, known for its close ties to the Russian state and military
structures. Originally appearing during the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, the group has
been deployed extensively in eastern Ukraine, including the Donbas region, where it played a
pivotal role in bolstering pro-Russian forces. Despite private military companies being illegal
in Russia, Wagner has been effectively legitimised by the Russian government under the term
"volunteer detachments" due to its heavy participation in Ukraine. Wagner's operations are
not limited to Ukraine; it has also been involved in conflicts across Syria, Libya, the Central
African Republic, and Mali, often supporting regimes favourable to Russia in exchange for
mining contracts. Wagner operatives have faced numerous accusations of committing war
crimes, including murder, torture, and robbery.

The Russian government has integrated the Wagner Group into its military operations to
ensure plausible deniability and to maintain secrecy about the scale and consequences of its
military engagements abroad. However, the group is reported to have recruited individuals
with criminal backgrounds in Russia, raising concerns over the potential for illicit arms
trafficking.

In contrast, the context provides limited details on Western-based PMSCs operating in the
same theatre. The international perception often views Russian PMSCs like Wagner as tools
of state policy, whereas Western based PMSCs, such as Academi (formerly known as
Blackwater), are typically privately managed, yet they also face scrutiny related to
transparency and human rights accountability.
A significant challenge in the context of private military companies, whether affiliated with
Russian or Western powers, is the ambiguity over their registration and regulation, which
raises legal and ethical concerns internationally. For Western PMSCs, adherence to human
rights and ensuring accountability remains a topical issue in discussions about their
operations and effectiveness in international security environments.

Overall, PMSCs such as the Wagner Group play critical roles in contemporary conflicts,
acting as force multipliers while complicating international legal standards due to their
opaque operational guidelines and affiliations with state interests.

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) have played several roles in the
Russia-Ukraine conflict, ranging from direct combat participation to various support
functions. Notably, some Russian PMCs, such as Wagner Group, MAR, and E.N.O.T. Corp,
have been active in Eastern Ukraine. These entities, although described as private, are often
controlled by Russian government organs like the FSB and GRU, indicating their utilisation
as unofficial instruments of Russian foreign policy.

1. Combat and Military Engagement: Russian PMCs have been involved in direct
combat operations. Their engagement has been crucial at several points, such as the
expansion of separatist-controlled zones.

2. Training and Support: PMSCs have provided training to local separatists and other
affiliated groups, effectively enhancing their combat capabilities and organisational
structures.

3. Intelligence Gathering: PMSCs often carry out intelligence operations that contribute
to military strategies and tactical planning. These operations are crucial for both
offensive manoeuvres and defensive measures against Ukrainian forces.

4. Protection of Assets and Security Services: PMSCs are tasked with protecting key
assets, including strategic locations, personnel, and infrastructure vital to operations in
conflict zones. This aligns with their broader remit of offering security services in
unstable regions.

The integration of these companies into broader military tactics reflects the
complexity and multifaceted nature of modern conflict where traditional state military
forces are supplemented by non-state actors like PMSCs.
Overall, the role of PMSCs in the Russia-Ukraine conflict highlights their use in areas
traditionally executed by national military forces, including direct engagement and auxiliary
support tasks, providing flexibility and deniability to state actors like Russia.

Notable incidents involving PMSCs in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), particularly Russian entities like the
Wagner Group, have played a significant role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The Wagner
Group, which is described as a Russian paramilitary organisation, has been involved in
operations in Ukraine since early 2014. They initially appeared during Russia's 2014
annexation of Crimea and continued their involvement in the Donbas region where conflict
erupted between the Ukrainian government and pro-Russian forces. Their activities included
destabilising government security forces, seizing ammunition stores, and taking control of
towns.

Furthermore, the ambiguity and lack of regulation surrounding PMSCs like Wagner
complicate accountability for actions and potential violations of international law. They offer
combat and combat support services, often under opaque contracting arrangements that
enable evasion of regulation and legal accountability. This opacity has implications for
human rights and the rights to life and due process, and makes attributing responsibility for
abuses more challenging.

Moreover, the use of these entities provides plausible deniability for the Russian state, offers
public secrecy about military operations, and helps manage the portrayal of Russian foreign
military engagements. Though officially illegal in Russia, PMSCs have been referred to by
the government using terms like "volunteer detachments"

Legal and Ethical Implications of PMSCs in Modern

Warfare
Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) play a significant role in modern warfare,
prompting discussions around their legal status and ethical implications.

International Laws and Treaties:

1. Montreux Document: The Montreux Document, initiated by Switzerland and the

International Committee of the Red Cross, outlines international legal obligations and
good practices for PMSCs. While not legally binding, it offers guidelines for States on
managing PMSCs, focusing on ensuring they respect international humanitarian law
and human rights law. The document differentiates the responsibilities of contracting,
territorial, and home states.

2. UN Mercenary Convention: PMSCs operate in a legal grey area, often blurring lines
with mercenaries. While the UN Mercenary Convention aims to address such issues,
it is not widely ratified, making its impact limited. PMSCs often circumvent the term
"mercenaries" by presenting themselves as security firms contracted for legitimate
purposes.

Legal Status in Conflict Zones:

PMSCs present complex challenges in distinguishing between combatants and civilians. They
often engage in both offensive and defensive operations, leading to debates about their status
under international law. This ambiguity can undermine the Geneva Conventions, which
traditionally differentiate civilians from combatants. While some PMSC employees are
considered civilians under international humanitarian law, taking direct part in hostilities can
strip them of these protections.

Ethical Considerations:

1. Accountability: PMSCs have been criticised for a lack of accountability. The existing
legal frameworks often target individuals rather than companies, making it difficult to
hold PMSCs as entities accountable for violations

2. Transparency: Contracts with PMSCs frequently involve complex layers of

subcontracting, complicating oversight and enforcement. These layers can obscure
responsibility and make it difficult to ensure compliance with laws, as seen in
complex contract structures and multi-layered insurance arrangements.

3. Human Rights: Privatised combat raises concerns over potential human rights
violations, including excessive use of force and violations during operations. Some
argue that PMSCs prioritise economic objectives over human rights and security, as
they pursue profit-driven motives rather than national goals.
Conclusion:

While PMSCs provide essential services in modern conflict zones, their operations raise
significant legal and ethical questions. Greater regulatory efforts, transparency, and
accountability measures are needed to ensure PMSCs adhere to international standards and
human rights protections.

Impact of PMSCs on Civilians and Human Rights

Impact of PMSCs on Civilians and Human Rights: Russia-Ukraine War

1. Wagner Group’s Activities and Civilian Impact

The Wagner Group, a prominent Russian PMSC, has been heavily involved in the Ukraine
conflict. This group has been implicated in numerous incidents involving human rights
violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and intimidation of civilians. The
Wagner Group’s activities often blur the lines between state and non-state actions,
complicating accountability and raising concerns about impunity. For example, the
group has reportedly engaged in forced disappearances and arbitrary detentions,
targeting individuals perceived as threats to pro-Russian control .

2. Use of PMSCs to Maintain Deniability and Avoid Accountability

Russia’s use of PMSCs in Ukraine, particularly the Wagner Group, allows it to maintain
plausible deniability, avoiding direct responsibility for alleged war crimes and human
rights abuses. By using PMSCs, the Russian government can distance itself from
certain actions, which might otherwise lead to international condemnation and
sanctions. This tactic complicates the legal landscape, making it difficult to hold
perpetrators accountable and denying justice to victims of rights abuses in Ukraine .
 3. PMSCs’ Role in Occupied Territories and Resource Exploitation

In Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, PMSCs have been accused of not only providing
security but also enabling resource exploitation. These companies often work closely
with pro-Russian authorities to secure control over valuable resources, such as coal
and other natural assets, benefiting financially while local communities face increased
exploitation and economic hardship. This situation exacerbates local grievances and
undermines civilian welfare, as resources that could support recovery are instead
diverted to fund conflict efforts .

4. Psychological Impact on Civilians and Forced Migration

The presence of armed contractors in civilian areas, particularly in conflict zones like
Donbas, creates a constant state of fear among local populations. PMSCs, operating
with little oversight and engaging in violent confrontations, contribute to the
psychological trauma of civilians, including children and vulnerable populations. Their
actions have prompted waves of forced migration, as civilians flee from areas where
PMSCs are active, fearing violence and instability. The psychological toll on displaced
populations further complicates the humanitarian response needed to address trauma
and secure safe environments for civilians .

Global Impact of PMSCs on Civilians and Human Rights

1. Human Rights Violations in Conflict Zones: Afghanistan and Iraq

Outside Ukraine, PMSCs have a history of human rights abuses in conflict zones, notably
in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, for example, PMSC personnel have been
implicated in incidents involving excessive use of force, mistreatment of detainees,
and civilian casualties during security operations. The Nisour Square incident in
Baghdad, where Blackwater contractors killed 17 Iraqi civilians, highlighted the risks
posed by PMSCs in populated areas and the lack of accountability mechanisms to
address such abuses.

2. Economic Exploitation and Labor Concerns in Host Countries

In many regions where PMSCs operate, they employ local workers for low wages and
under substandard conditions, exploiting the socioeconomic vulnerabilities of these
communities. This practice not only undermines the economic stability of local
populations but also creates resentment and social divides. For instance, local security
personnel in Africa and the Middle East working for PMSCs often face poor working
conditions, limited benefits, and minimal job security, fueling local grievances and
exacerbating inequality.

3. Impediments to Humanitarian Operations and Erosion of Neutrality

 PMSCs’ presence can hinder humanitarian organisations’ ability to deliver aid in conflict
zones, as their association with foreign governments or corporations makes neutral
humanitarian workers targets for local insurgent groups. For example, in regions like
Somalia, PMSC operations have complicated the work of NGOs and aid agencies, as
local actors often perceive them as part of foreign intervention forces, thereby
endangering humanitarian workers and reducing their access to vulnerable
populations.

Current Regulations and International Efforts to Govern PMSCs

1. The Montreux Document (2008)

The Montreux Document is one of the most prominent international frameworks aimed at
regulating PMSCs. Established in 2008, the document outlines a set of rules and good
practices for states regarding the operations of PMSCs in armed conflicts. It was developed
through a Swiss-led initiative in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) and was supported by several countries, including the United States and the
United Kingdom.

Key Provisions of the Montreux Document:

• Applicability of International Humanitarian Law (IHL): The Montreux Document

reaffirms that PMSCs operating in armed conflicts are bound by IHL and human rights
law. It emphasises that PMSCs and their personnel should respect and comply with
international legal standards, such as the Geneva Conventions.

• State Responsibility: The document states that both the contracting states (those that
hire PMSCs) and the territorial states (where PMSCs operate) have responsibilities to
ensure that PMSCs do not violate international laws. It also calls on home states (where
PMSCs are based) to take preventive measures to avoid abuses by PMSCs.
 • Guidelines for States: The document provides best practices for states regarding
licensing, authorization, and oversight of PMSCs. These include procedures for vetting
personnel, rules of engagement, and establishing accountability mechanisms.

While the Montreux Document is non-binding, it has become a cornerstone in PMSC

regulation, with over 50 countries and three international organisations endorsing it.
However, enforcement remains voluntary, and the lack of binding commitments has
limited its effectiveness in holding PMSCs accountable for human rights abuses.

2. The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC)
Following the Montreux Document, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service Providers (ICoC) was established in 2010 to create a voluntary code of ethics for
PMSCs. The ICoC focuses on promoting accountability, respect for human rights, and
transparency among PMSCs.

Key Provisions of the ICoC:

• Human Rights Standards: The ICoC requires PMSCs to respect the rights of
individuals, including the right to life, liberty, and security. It prohibits practices such as
torture, cruel treatment, and arbitrary detention.

• Transparency and Accountability: PMSCs that sign the ICoC commit to

transparency in their operations and to cooperating with investigations into any
allegations of misconduct. The code also encourages companies to implement grievance
mechanisms for affected individuals.

• Certification and Audits: The ICoC created the International Code of Conduct
Association (ICoCA) to oversee compliance. ICoCA provides certification to companies
that adhere to the code’s standards and conducts audits to ensure ongoing compliance.

While the ICoC provides an ethical framework for PMSCs, it is still voluntary and lacks
legal enforceability. This limitation means that companies can easily opt out, and even
certified companies may face minimal consequences for non-compliance. Nonetheless,
ICoCA’s certification has become a symbol of credibility for PMSCs seeking contracts
with governments and international organisations.

3. The UN Working Group on Mercenaries and the UN Draft Convention on PMSCs

The United Nations has also taken steps to address the issue of PMSCs through the Working
Group on the Use of Mercenaries, which was established in 2005. This working group has
highlighted the impact of PMSCs on human rights and has advocated for stronger
international regulations.
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/MercenarismandPrivateMilitarySecurityCompanies.
pdf (Go through this doc)
Key Initiatives:
 • UN Draft Convention on PMSCs: The UN has proposed a draft convention aimed at
regulating PMSCs and distinguishing them from mercenaries, who are often banned
under international law. This draft convention emphasises the need for state
responsibility and accountability in cases where PMSCs violate human rights. It also
calls for a global registry of PMSCs to monitor their activities and ensure transparency.

• Human Rights Monitoring: The UN Working Group has conducted numerous

studies on the impact of PMSCs on human rights in conflict zones, such as Afghanistan
and Iraq. It has consistently called for increased oversight, particularly regarding the use
of force by PMSC personnel.

While the draft convention is a significant step forward, it faces considerable opposition
from countries that rely heavily on PMSCs, as well as from the PMSC industry itself. As
a result, the convention has not yet been adopted, and progress remains slow.

4. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international
foundation that works on security sector reform and governance, including the regulation of
PMSCs. DCAF has produced several guidelines and best practices for PMSC regulation and
has collaborated with governments and international organisations to promote accountability.

Key Contributions:

• Research and Policy Development: DCAF has published numerous studies on

PMSC regulation, providing valuable data and recommendations for policymakers. These
studies cover issues such as the impact of PMSCs on human rights, accountability
mechanisms, and best practices for state oversight.

• Training and Capacity Building: DCAF offers training programs for governments
and security providers to enhance their understanding of international standards and
improve oversight of PMSCs. This includes training on the Montreux Document and the
ICoC.

• Support for National Regulation: DCAF works with individual countries to develop
national laws and policies for PMSC regulation. For example, DCAF has supported
several African and Latin American countries in drafting legislation to oversee PMSC
activities.

5. National Regulations and Regional Efforts

In addition to international initiatives, several countries and regional organisations have
implemented national laws and regional agreements to govern PMSCs.
United States:

• Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA): The MEJA allows the U.S.
government to prosecute contractors employed by the Department of Defense for crimes
 committed overseas. However, it does not cover contractors working for other agencies,
such as the Department of State.

• Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS): DFARS imposes

specific requirements on contractors working with the U.S. Department of Defense,
including vetting personnel, adhering to specific rules of engagement, and ensuring
compliance with international laws.
European Union:

• EU Directive on Private Security Services: The EU has implemented regulations

that require PMSCs operating in EU countries to comply with strict licensing and training
requirements. These regulations aim to improve oversight and ensure that PMSCs respect
human rights within EU member states.

• European Parliament Resolutions: The European Parliament has passed several

resolutions calling for increased transparency and accountability in PMSC operations,
particularly in conflict zones where EU countries are involved.
African Union:

• African Union Model Law on PMSCs: The African Union has developed a model
law to guide its member states in regulating PMSCs. This model law provides
recommendations for licensing, training, and oversight, as well as guidelines for holding
PMSCs accountable for human rights abuses.

6. Challenges and Limitations

Despite the progress made, there are several challenges in regulating PMSCs effectively:

• Jurisdictional Issues: PMSCs often operate in multiple countries, making it difficult

to determine which jurisdiction applies. This can complicate efforts to hold companies
accountable for misconduct.

• Weak Enforcement Mechanisms: Most international frameworks, including the

Montreux Document and the ICoC, are voluntary and lack binding enforcement
mechanisms, limiting their effectiveness.

• Influence of Powerful States: Major powers like the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Russia heavily rely on PMSCs and may resist regulations that would
constrain their operations.

• Transparency Concerns: PMSCs frequently operate in secrecy, making it difficult

for regulators and the public to monitor their activities. This lack of transparency hinders
accountability and increases the risk of human rights abuses.

Debates Surrounding the Legitimacy of PMSCs in Warfare

The discussions regarding the role and legitimacy of Private Military and Security Companies
(PMSCs) in conflict situations cover a range of legal, ethical, and operational concerns.

1. Legal Framework and Accountability: PMSCs are often used in areas of armed
conflict by individuals, companies, and governments, but there is a demand for
clarification of their legal obligations under international humanitarian and human
rights law. The Montreux Document, an initiative by Switzerland and the
International Committee of the Red Cross, articulates existing international legal
obligations for states and PMSCs, as well as good practices to promote compliance
with these laws. However, the document does not legitimise the use of PMSCs in any
particular instance and is not legally binding. Similarly, PMSCs are rarely held
accountable due to a lack of parliamentary oversight and the absence of effective
accountability mechanisms in the states that contract them or where they operate.

2. Profit Motive and Implications for State Sovereignty: PMSCs, especially in maritime
settings, may disproportionately emphasise economic over security objectives. Their
profit incentive potentially undermines the security and sovereignty of states, as force
is traditionally a state prerogative. As a result, they face criticism for acting as
mercenaries and the vagueness in applying international law, particularly concerning
piracy.

3. Ethical Concerns and Impact on Humanitarian Efforts: The line between the roles of
humanitarian NGOs and profit-driven PMSCs is often blurred, especially in conflict
areas like Afghanistan and Iraq. This confusion might associate humanitarian aid with
military interventions, challenging their perceived neutrality and sparking debates
over the ethicality of PMSC involvement in sensitive environments.

4. Operational Efficiency Vs. Long-term Stability: While PMSCs have been praised for
effectively countering piracy and filling security gaps, such as the reduction of piracy
off Somalia's coast, they are criticised for the long-term destabilising effects of their
profit-driven motives. Critics argue PMSCs have little incentive to address the root
causes of conflict, as resolving these would undermine the demand for their services

Case Studies of PMSC Involvement in Other Conflicts

Private military companies (PMCs), often operating in the shadows of global affairs, have
become key players in several international conflicts. Here, we delve into four detailed case
studies of PMCs' involvement, focusing specifically on the Wagner Group, a notorious
Russian private military company.

1. Wagner Group in Syria

The involvement of the Wagner Group in Syria has been reported as part of Russia’s attempt
to bolster the Assad government. Wagner operatives provided combat support as part of a
broader Russian military strategy aimed at stabilising the Assad regime. Officially, the
Kremlin has denied direct involvement with or control over Wagner's activities, although this
is contradicted by reports of significant Russian funding and direction 1. Wagner's operations
in Syria reportedly include frontline combat operations, logistical support, and security
functions at key installations. Their presence has been linked to allegations of human rights
abuses, including torture and summary executions, which have added layers of complexity to
the Syrian conflict and presented significant barriers to peace and accountability.

2. Wagner Group in Ukraine

Wagner’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict highlights the use of PMCs in proxy wars. The
group reportedly played a significant role in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, where it has been
accused of supporting separatist movements, engaging in direct combat, and orchestrating
operations to destabilise regions in favour of Russian geopolitical interests. These operations
have raised concerns about the use of irregular combatants in warfare, complicating efforts
for peace negotiations and ceasefire agreements. Reports point out the involvement of
personnel with criminal backgrounds recruited to bolster these forces, a practice that
contributes to lawlessness and human rights abuses.
3. Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR)
In the Central African Republic, Wagner Group activities have expanded beyond military
engagements to include political influence and economic exploitation. Wagner mercenaries
were reportedly deployed to protect the CAR president, impinging on the autonomy and
sovereignty of the nation. Their operations in the CAR have included controlling vital
airports, which has affected local employment and economic activities. The group has also
been implicated in illegal diamond mining operations, which finance their operations and
strengthen their economic foothold in the region. There have been violent encounters
between Wagner operatives and local populations, reportedly leading to civilian deaths and
further escalating tensions in the already unstable nation.

4. Wagner Group in Libya

The presence of Wagner Group operatives in Libya signifies another crucial involvement in
regional conflicts. Wagner has supported General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army
(LNA) against the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). This
involvement is part of a broader geopolitical strategy by Russia to gain influence in North
Africa and control over energy resources. Reports of Wagner mercenaries using weaponry not
subject to international control mechanisms underscore the threat posed to regional stability
and highlight the opacity surrounding state-sponsored traditional and mercenary military
operations.

In each instance, the presence of PMCs like the Wagner Group has contributed to the
persistence of conflict, delayed peace efforts, and complicated international diplomatic
engagements. The private nature of these companies’ operations often shields them from full
accountability under international law, posing ongoing challenges to global governance and
human rights protections.

When discussing “Violent Non-State Actors” (VNSAs) in the context of Private Military and
Security Companies (PMSCs) in conflicts, it’s essential to examine both the roles VNSAs
play in modern conflicts and how PMSCs operate in these environments. This is especially
relevant for committees like the Disarmament and International Security Committee
(DISEC), as understanding VNSA-PMSC dynamics provides insight into the complex
challenges in maintaining international peace and security. Below is a detailed overview and
background guide for the committee.

Background on Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs)

Violent Non-State Actors, or VNSAs, encompass a range of groups engaged in organised

violence that operate outside state control. These actors include insurgents, militias, rebel
groups, terrorist organisations, drug cartels, and, in some instances, paramilitary units.
VNSAs often challenge state sovereignty, disrupt regional stability, and complicate peace
efforts due to their independence from traditional political structures. They are active in
conflicts across various regions, particularly in areas with weak governance, civil unrest, or
socio-economic instability.
Categories and Characteristics of VNSAs

VNSAs typically differ based on their goals, ideologies, and structures:

1. Insurgents and Guerrillas: Often motivated by political or ideological

objectives, insurgents use irregular warfare to challenge state authority. Examples
include groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan.

2. Terrorist Organisations: These groups, like ISIS and Al-Qaeda, aim to instil
fear to achieve ideological or political goals, often employing violent tactics.

3. Criminal Organisations: Cartels and organised crime networks operate to

gain economic power, like Mexican drug cartels that wield significant influence over
territories and populations.

4. Paramilitary Groups: Often linked to states unofficially, these groups act as

proxies in conflicts and are difficult to regulate, blurring the line between state and
non-state violence.

VNSAs thrive in destabilised regions, capitalising on governmental vacuum, poverty, and

social grievances. They employ unconventional warfare, such as guerrilla tactics,
terrorism, and psychological warfare, to resist larger state forces and influence civilian
populations.

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs): An Overview

PMSCs are private firms offering military, security, and logistical services, often operating
alongside or in place of official state militaries. They have grown in prominence since the
1990s, as states and international organisations increasingly outsource security services to
private actors. PMSCs provide various services, including personnel protection, military
training, intelligence gathering, and operational support. Examples include well-known
companies like Blackwater (now Academi), G4S, and DynCorp.

Advantages and Risks of PMSCs in Conflict Zones

The rise of PMSCs has been driven by several factors:

• Flexibility and Scalability: PMSCs can be mobilised quickly and adjusted based on
need, offering states and organisations the ability to respond rapidly to crises.

• Reduced Political Accountability: States may employ PMSCs to avoid deploying

their own forces, which could otherwise draw political scrutiny or lead to domestic
opposition.
 • Cost-Effectiveness: PMSCs can, in some cases, be a cost-effective alternative to
maintaining large standing armies.

However, PMSCs also pose significant challenges:

• Legal and Ethical Concerns: PMSCs operate in a regulatory gray area, often leading
to human rights abuses, as seen in the 2007 Blackwater incident in Iraq.

• Accountability and Transparency: Many PMSCs lack transparency, which can

complicate efforts to monitor their actions and hold them accountable.

• Threat to State Sovereignty: The presence of private military actors may undermine
the authority of local governments or exacerbate conflicts, as PMSCs may have interests
that conflict with state goals.

To understand the impact of PMSCs on conflicts involving VNSAs, it’s useful to examine
several case studies where PMSCs have operated alongside or against these groups. Here are
some key examples:

1. Iraq War (2003–2011)

The Iraq War witnessed unprecedented use of PMSCs, with companies like Blackwater,
DynCorp, and Triple Canopy extensively involved. PMSCs provided a wide array of services,
from securing personnel and convoys to supporting combat operations. They operated in an
environment rife with VNSA activity, including insurgents and terrorist groups such as
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Challenges and Implications:

• Human Rights Violations: Blackwater’s 2007 Nisour Square incident, where

company personnel killed 17 civilians, exemplified the risks of using PMSCs in conflict
zones with VNSA presence. The incident fueled anti-Western sentiment and reinforced
insurgent narratives of foreign occupation and abuse.

• Undermining Stability: PMSCs often acted with little accountability, sometimes

escalating violence in ways counterproductive to stabilisation efforts. Their presence
complicated relations with local populations and exacerbated existing tensions, offering
insurgent groups justification for their anti-occupation stance.

2. Afghanistan (2001–2021)
In Afghanistan, PMSCs were employed extensively for logistical and security support amidst
a challenging environment marked by VNSA activity from groups like the Taliban and
ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K). Companies like Academi, DynCorp, and ArmorGroup were key
actors in U.S. and NATO operations.
Challenges and Implications:

• Interactions with VNSAs: PMSCs in Afghanistan had to frequently navigate regions

controlled by VNSAs, negotiating “safe passage” or becoming targets themselves. This
dynamic blurred lines between combatants and civilians, complicating
counter-insurgency operations.

• Impact on Local Trust and Security: Local Afghan forces often distrusted PMSCs,
viewing them as foreign mercenaries with little accountability. This undermined coalition
efforts to build trust and promote Afghan security forces’ legitimacy.

• Regulatory Loopholes: PMSCs operated with limited oversight, leading to

unreported incidents, clashes with civilians, and, at times, fueling local grievances that
the Taliban exploited in their propaganda.

3. West Africa: Nigeria and Boko Haram

In Nigeria, PMSCs have been indirectly involved in the fight against the terrorist group Boko
Haram, particularly in advisory or logistical roles. While the Nigerian government has not
openly admitted to using PMSCs in combat roles, reports indicate that foreign military
contractors have trained and supported Nigerian forces in areas affected by Boko Haram’s
insurgency.

Challenges and Implications:

• Dependency on Foreign Actors: The Nigerian government’s use of PMSCs reveals a
dependency on foreign actors for internal security, which may weaken state authority and
foster resentment.

• Legal and Ethical Complications: Nigeria’s reliance on PMSCs, especially when

handling civilian populations or sensitive areas, raises concerns over human rights and
international law. Since these contractors operate with different legal standards, they are
less accountable for civilian casualties, exacerbating local grievances and aiding Boko
Haram’s anti-government narratives.

Analysis and Implications for DISEC

The involvement of PMSCs in conflicts with active VNSAs presents a complex security
dilemma for DISEC. Several key issues arise:

1. Accountability and Governance: PMSCs operate in a regulatory vacuum,

especially in conflict zones where state control is weak. This lack of oversight leads to
 potential human rights abuses, as PMSCs may not adhere to the same legal standards
as national militaries.

2. Escalation of Conflicts: The presence of PMSCs can sometimes escalate

violence, as they operate with fewer constraints and may prioritize profit over peace.
In regions with VNSA activity, PMSCs may inadvertently bolster VNSA recruitment
efforts by alienating local populations or by increasing perceived occupation.

3. Challenges to State Sovereignty: PMSCs, though contracted by states, often

act as quasi-independent entities, which can undermine state authority. This is
particularly problematic in fragile states, where the legitimacy of government forces is
essential to counter VNSA influence.

4. Legal Ambiguity: VNSA activities are already difficult to regulate under

international law, and PMSCs add another layer of complexity. Establishing clear
international guidelines for PMSCs, especially in conflicts involving VNSAs, is a
pressing need that DISEC could address.

Conclusion and Recommendations for DISEC

The intersection of PMSCs and VNSAs is a growing area of concern for international
security. PMSCs are increasingly present in conflict zones involving VNSAs, leading to
complex challenges related to accountability, human rights, and conflict escalation. DISEC
may consider the following approaches:

• Establishing International Regulations for PMSCs: A standardised legal

framework governing PMSC activities in conflict zones could improve accountability
and limit human rights abuses. This might include licensing requirements, rules of
engagement, and clear consequences for violations.

• Promoting Transparency and Monitoring: Encouraging transparency in PMSC

operations, including reporting mechanisms and independent oversight, could reduce the
likelihood of abuses.

• Fostering Local Trust: PMSCs should work in cooperation with local forces and
respect cultural sensitivities, particularly in areas dominated by VNSAs, to avoid
exacerbating local grievances.
 Possible Solutions and Resolutions for DISEC Consideration

The use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in modern conflicts presents
both opportunities and challenges, necessitating detailed consideration by the Disarmament
and International Security Committee (DISEC). Here are some potential solutions and
resolutions for DISEC to consider:

1. International Binding Regulations: Many actors in international discourse

recommend the development of a legally binding international regulatory framework
for PMSCs. Such a framework could address accountability gaps, provide
standard-setting, and improve monitoring and oversight of the industry. Currently,
initiatives like the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct (ICoC)
exist, but these are not legally binding. Implementing a binding international
agreement could provide clearer accountability and rights for violations by PMSCs.

2. National Regulatory Enhancements: It is crucial that countries enhance their

national legal and policy frameworks regarding the registration, licensing, and
oversight of PMSCs operating both domestically and internationally. This includes
establishing regulations that govern the recruitment, screening, and training of PMSC
personnel, as well as setting clear criteria for the types of services they are allowed to
offer.

3. Improved Industry Self-Regulation: Although industry self-regulation has been

criticised for its lack of enforceability, it remains a crucial component. Improving
self-regulation by including rigorous oversight mechanisms such as certification
processes could help ensure compliance with international norms and human rights
standards. Encouraging PMSCs to adhere voluntarily to comprehensive codes of
conduct can solidify good practices within the industry.

4. Transnational Cooperation and Sharing of Information: Establishing platforms for

international cooperation and information sharing can help States tackle issues like
extraterritorial jurisdiction, evidence collection, and the extradition of suspects. Such
platforms can also facilitate the sharing of best practices for regulating PMSCs,
thereby improving the understanding of the industry's impact on global security.

5. Zero Tolerance for Human Rights Violations: Countries must adopt a zero-tolerance
policy regarding PMSCs involved in human rights abuses. This includes blacklisting
companies with a history of violations and encouraging or mandating adherence to
international human rights standards.

6. Focus on Accountability: Emphasising accountability for PMSCs that operate in

conflict zones and those that provide security in regions with weak rule of law is
 essential. Mechanisms for victims to attain remedies and ensure criminal
accountability for abuses committed by PMSC staff should be prioritised.

By adopting these resolutions, DISEC can meaningfully contribute to the regulation of

PMSCs and enhance global security by ensuring that these companies operate responsibly
and are accountable for their actions.

(Note: The above Solutions have been finalised by the Executive Board and wouldn’t be the
only solutions. However, The delagates can come up with any other solutions as well.)

Questions to Consider

1. What are the primary motivations for the involvement of various

state and non-state actors in this conflict or security issue?
2. How effective are existing international treaties and conventions in
addressing this issue, and what are their major limitations?
3. What ethical considerations arise when proposing solutions to this
issue, particularly in terms of civilian impact and human rights?
4. How can DISEC address the growing challenge of emerging
threats, such as cyber warfare and autonomous weapons, within the
current security frameworks?
5. To what extent should the international community prioritise global
security over national sovereignty when addressing this issue?
6. How can DISEC foster cooperation among member states with
conflicting interests or regional tensions?
7. What role should international sanctions play in addressing
non-compliance with disarmament agreements, and how can they be
enforced effectively?
8. How should DISEC handle the involvement of private military and
security companies (PMSCs) in conflict zones, considering their impact
on international security and accountability?
 9. What preventive measures can be taken to control the proliferation
of advanced weaponry among non-state actors and terrorist groups?
10. How can DISEC ensure that proposed resolutions are both
practical and enforceable given the diverse interests and capabilities of
member states?

Bibliography

General PMSCs Information

1. United Nations General Assembly First Committee: Disarmament and
International Security - United Nations Digital Library

2. Military Downsizing and the Demand for Private Security - United Nations
Digital Library

3. UN Report on PMSCs and Human Rights - United Nations Digital Library,

2020

4. The Privatization of Security: Role and Controversies of PMSCs - Council on

Foreign Relations

5. Expansion and Regulation of the PMSC Industry - United Nations Digital

Library, 2008
Wagner Group-Specific Sources

6. The Wagner Group’s Operations and Controversies - BBC News

7. Russian Private Military Companies in Conflict Zones - Council on Foreign

Relations

8. UN Meeting Discussion on Wagner Group - United Nations Digital Library,

2022

9. Wagner Group’s Role in Ukraine and Beyond - Reuters

10. Wagner Group and Russian Military Presence in Africa - Al Jazeera

 11. “Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics” on Hurst Publishers:

12. “Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics” on Internet Archive:

Legal and Ethical Aspects of PMSCs

13. Legal and Ethical Challenges of PMSCs - International Committee of the Red
Cross

14. PMSCs and International Humanitarian Law - United Nations Digital Library,
2008

15. Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies - United

Nations Digital Library, 2008

16. Private Maritime Security Companies: Framework and Challenges - RAND

Corporation

17. UN Report on Transnational Corporations and Private Security Companies -

United Nations Digital Library, 2008.

Effective Research Strategies for Tackling the Agenda

“The use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in Modern

Conflict, with special emphasis on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict”. Each point is
designed to be thought-provoking, strong, and conducive to debate:

1. Human Rights Violations and PMSCs’ Impunity

• Unchecked Abuse in Conflict Zones: Argue that PMSCs often operate with
impunity, leading to a history of human rights abuses like torture, forced disappearances,
and extrajudicial killings, as seen in Iraq with companies like Blackwater. Raise the
question: Should PMSCs face the same war crimes charges as regular militaries?

• Profit Over People: Highlight that PMSCs prioritise profit, creating a dangerous
incentive to ignore human rights when it suits their client’s interests. Ask: Can we allow
profit-driven motives to justify potential abuses in conflict zones?
 • Case Studies of Civilian Tragedy: Use incidents like the Nisour Square massacre in
Iraq, where Blackwater contractors killed 17 civilians, to showcase the risks of allowing
armed private actors in war zones. Emphasise how such cases erode public trust in
peacekeeping and international interventions.
2. Threat to National Sovereignty and Destabilisation

• A Threat to Every Nation’s Sovereignty: Point out that allowing PMSCs to operate
within a country can undermine government control, especially in fragile states. They
function almost as unregulated militias, which threatens the stability of governments
trying to recover from conflict.

• Creating Power Imbalances: PMSCs empower factions that might otherwise lack
the means for violent action, destabilising regional power balances and creating
prolonged conflicts. Emphasise cases where PMSCs have supported authoritarian
leaders, further oppressing citizens.

• Weaponizing the Wealth Gap: Wealthier nations or groups can hire PMSCs to
enforce power, but poorer nations cannot afford such forces, creating an imbalance. Ask:
Are PMSCs transforming war into a business that only the wealthy can afford to win?

3. Legal Loopholes and Global Accountability Crisis

• “Legal Limbo of Modern Warfare”: Highlight that PMSCs operate in a gray zone,
outside the reach of international law. Current frameworks, like the Montreux Document,
are non-binding and cannot hold these companies accountable. Ask: Do we need a new
Geneva Convention for PMSCs?

• Selective Justice: Point out how PMSC personnel often escape punishment, even for
severe offences. This undermines justice in conflict zones and sends the message that
private armies can break laws without consequences.

• International Blacklist Proposal: Propose a system for “blacklisting” PMSCs that

violate international norms, arguing for a binding registry of PMSCs and their activities
to increase transparency and prevent repeat offenders from obtaining contracts.

4. Humanitarian Impact and Civilian Protection

• Collateral Damage in the Name of Profit: Stress that PMSCs, unlike national
forces, may not be bound by humanitarian principles and often fail to distinguish
between civilians and combatants, leading to innocent casualties.

• Compromising Humanitarian Missions: PMSCs are often embedded in the same

regions as humanitarian organisations, complicating neutrality and making aid workers
targets of hostility. Challenge delegates: Are we putting civilians and aid workers at risk
by allowing PMSCs in conflict zones?
 • Displacing Millions: Draw attention to the displacement crises exacerbated by
PMSCs, particularly in places like Africa, where civilians flee due to the presence of
armed contractors who often act recklessly. This disrupts communities and erodes
humanitarian efforts.

5. Security Risks and Escalation of Conflicts

• Escalating Violence in Fragile Regions: PMSCs have a track record of worsening

conflicts, as they have no vested interest in peace but in prolonging contracts. Point out
how their profit-driven motives lead them to escalate conflicts rather than resolve them.

• Turning Peacekeeping into Profiteering: PMSCs’ role as ‘peacekeepers’ is a mask

for profiteering; they have no allegiance to conflict resolution. Use the example of
Wagner Group in Syria and Ukraine to show how these companies can inflame conflicts
for their own gain.

• Rise of Unchecked Private Armies: Emphasise that PMSCs are a form of privatised
warfare that operates without state oversight, posing a long-term risk to global stability.
Argue that if unchecked, we risk a future where private armies outnumber national
militaries.

6. Economic Manipulation and Exploitation of Resources

• Privatising War’s Profits, Socialising Its Costs: PMSCs gain financially by

exploiting war-torn areas. Their operations in resource-rich regions often lead to
exploitation rather than aiding in reconstruction. Should resource exploitation by PMSCs
be considered war profiteering?

• Weaponized Economics: Companies like the Wagner Group use access to resources
(diamonds in the Central African Republic, for instance) to finance their operations,
blurring lines between economic exploitation and military strategy. Challenge the
committee to address this hybrid warfare strategy.

• A Cycle of Dependency: Once PMSCs enter a region, they create a cycle of

dependency, where local security and economic stability depend on their continued
presence. This dependency hinders long-term peace and recovery.

7. Proposed Solutions for Regulating PMSCs

• Establishing a UN-Controlled PMSC Oversight Body: Propose a UN-controlled

regulatory body to oversee and hold PMSCs accountable, ensuring they adhere to
international humanitarian law and human rights standards.

• Mandatory Licensing and Global Registry of PMSCs: Argue that countries should
licence PMSCs and register their activities under international law, requiring
 transparency in their operations and setting strict guidelines on their engagement in
conflict zones.

• Strict Sanctions for Violations: Call for strict sanctions against PMSCs that commit
human rights abuses, including barring them from future contracts. Use previous
incidents like Blackwater in Iraq to emphasise the need for repercussions.

• Ban on Direct Combat Roles for PMSCs: Advocate for limiting PMSCs to support
roles only, banning them from direct combat to reduce risks to civilians and avoid
complicating conflict dynamics.

(NOTE:- The Executive Board encourages delegates to broaden their

focus beyond the Russia-Ukraine conflict.)