Before the

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Washington, DC 20554

_______________________________________
)
In the Matter of )
)
Application of Space Exploration Holdings, ) File No. SAT-MOD-20241011-00224
LLC to Modify Authorization for the )
SpaceX Gen2 Satellite System )
)
Amendment of Space Exploration Holdings, ) File No. SAT-AMD-20241017-00228
LLC to SpaceX’s Pending License Application )
for the SpaceX Gen2 Satellite System )
)

PETITION OF ECHOSTAR CORPORATION TO DISMISS OR DENY

Jeffrey Blum, Executive Vice President Pantelis Michalopoulos

External & Legislative Affairs Andrew Golodny
Alison Minea, Vice President and Associate Colleen McCroskey
General Counsel Steptoe LLP
Hadass Kogan, Vice President and Associate 1330 Connecticut Ave NW
General Counsel Washington, DC 20036
EchoStar Corporation
1110 Vermont Ave NW, Suite 450
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 463-3703

March 10, 2025

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction and Summary .................................................................................................. 1

II. The Commission Should Maintain the Nco=1 Condition Under Which SpaceX is
Required to Operate the Gen2 System........................................................................................ 4
III. SpaceX’s Technical Analysis in Support of Waiving the EPFD Limits is Rife with
Errors ............................................................................................................................................. 6
A. SpaceX Seeks to Abolish the EPFD Limits Based on A Method that Excludes DBS
Dishes—the Very Dishes Whose Protection Is at Issue—From Any Consideration .......... 6
B. SpaceX’s Waiver Request Relies on An Inapplicable ITU Recommendation .......... 7
C. SpaceX’s Analysis of Ka-Band Links Is Similarly Lacking ....................................... 9
IV. The Commission Should Deny SpaceX’s Waiver Request .............................................. 13
A. SpaceX Fails to Meet the Commission’s Requirements for a Waiver ..................... 14
B. SpaceX Misrepresents the United States Position on Potential Revision of the
ITU/FCC EPFD Limits........................................................................................................... 19
C. SpaceX Has Repeatedly Asserted that ITU Radio Regulations are Paramount and
that Delegation of EPFD Limits to the ITU is Proper ......................................................... 20
V. The Commission Should Deny SpaceX’s Request to Operate MSS In Bands Where it is
Authorized or Has Requested Authorization to Operate FSS ................................................ 21
VI. Waiver of the Commission’s Processing Procedures in the V-band Would be Improper
22
VII. EchoStar’s Petition Conforms With D.C. Circuit Precedent .......................................... 24
VIII. .......................................................................................................................................... Conclusion
25

Exhibit 1: Marc Dupuis, Impact of SpaceX Second-Generation System Modifications on GSO

Links
 Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, DC 20554

_______________________________________
)
In the Matter of )
)
Application of Space Exploration Holdings, ) File No. SAT-MOD-20241011-00224
LLC to Modify Authorization for the )
SpaceX Gen2 Satellite System )
)
Amendment of Space Exploration Holdings, ) File No. SAT-AMD-20241017-00228
LLC to SpaceX’s Pending License Application )
for the SpaceX Gen2 Satellite System )
)

PETITION OF ECHOSTAR CORPORATION TO DISMISS OR DENY

I. Introduction and Summary

EchoStar Corporation1 petitions the Commission to dismiss or deny in part SpaceX’s

parallel applications to amend and modify its second-generation (“Gen2”) Starlink system

(collectively, “Gen2 Applications”).2 The Gen2 Applications, among other things, threaten to

1
EchoStar is a party in interest under the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(l). SpaceX’s
second-generation system uses the 12.2-12.7 GHz band (“12.2 GHz band”) for space-to-Earth
user downlinks. EchoStar is by far the heaviest user of the 12.2 GHz band in the United States,
and has invested billions of dollars in development of the frequencies through auctions (directly
or indirectly) or other transactions. Under ITU/FCC rules, the nearly 30,000-satellite Gen2
constellation is required to protect the Direct Broadcast Satellite (“DBS”) services of EchoStar
received by some 6 million U.S. families. Non-geostationary orbit (“NGSO”) systems like the
Gen2 constellation may use the 12.2 GHz band on a non-harmful basis to DBS. EchoStar also
provides satellite broadband access using the GSO Jupiter satellite system in the Ka-band, where
SpaceX also operates, and where NGSO operators are also subject to EPFD limits. As discussed
herein, SpaceX’s Gen2 constellation as proposed to be modified would exceed the Equivalent
Power Flux Density (“EPFD”) limits put in place to protect DBS and FSS operations, seriously
threatening these services.
2
Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, File No. SAT-MOD-20241011-00224 (filed Oct. 11, 2024)
(“Modification Application”); Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, File No. SAT-AMD-
20241017-00228 (filed Oct. 17, 2024) (“Amendment Application”). SpaceX has filed two
applications in conjunction: a request to modify the currently-authorized portion of its Gen2
satellite network, and an amendment to the pending portion of its Gen2 application. SpaceX

1
upend the few remaining protections that remain for satellite television viewers and GSO

satellite broadband customers, protections unanimously approved by the Commission.

Specifically, the Gen2 Applications request four overarching changes to the existing

authorization:

1. Elimination of the Commission’s “Nco=1” restriction— which currently limits

SpaceX to one co-frequency satellite beam per coverage area;

2. A broad waiver of the Commission’s EPFD rules—the core framework preventing

harmful interference to GSO networks;

3. Authority for the entire 29,988-satellite Gen2 constellation to conduct both Fixed-
Satellite Service (“FSS”) and Mobile-Satellite Service (“MSS”) operations—in
various primary or secondary frequency allocations; and

4. Exemption from the Commission’s processing round procedures—including in the V-

band—disadvantaging other operators that properly complied with existing cut-off
deadlines.

All four of these requests should be denied.

SpaceX’s demands would effectively nullify the Commission’s EPFD rules, eviscerate

the protective one-beam-per-area condition, convert the band to MSS without an allocation, and

provide SpaceX with an unfair, fast-tracked advantage relative to its competitors. Ironically,

SpaceX has emphatically argued in the recent past that the method for ascertaining compliance

with the EPFD limits is sacrosanct, and that the Commission may not revisit even the validation

method, let alone the limits themselves, in an application proceeding; SpaceX’s argued that only

a rulemaking is ever suitable for such pursuits. Having succeeded at the Commission on this

submitted “consolidated technical showings” for both the modification and the amendment
requests, and describes them as being filed “in parallel.” Amendment Application, Narrative at i;
Id., Attachment A at 1. SpaceX has stated that these waiver and other requests apply to both
filings. See Letter from Jameson Dempsey, SpaceX, to Marlene Dortch, FCC, File Nos. SAT-
MOD-20241011-00224 and SAT-AMD-20241017-00228 (Jan. 31, 2025) (“SpaceX RFI
Response”). For this reason, EchoStar refers to both applications collectively and does not
distinguish between the modification and amendment application unless necessary for clarity.

2
point, SpaceX now attempts to shift its position 180 degrees. It wants the Commission to allow

it to flout the EPFD limits by no longer observing the Nco-equals-one condition, or jettison the

limits altogether, and do so in the very type of proceeding in which it had vociferously argued

the limits could not be touched—an application proceeding.

The removal of the Nco-equals-one condition would cause the Starlink system to exceed

the ITU/FCC EPFD limits. SpaceX does not dispute that fact, and EchoStar’s expert satellite

engineer Marc Dupuis shows how much the limits would be exceeded in the attached report.

Incredibly, in arguing that the limits are not necessary at all to protect DBS satellite television

dishes, SpaceX resorts to completely ignoring the elephant in the room—the very dishes whose

protection is at issue. SpaceX instead suggests considering a subset of receive antennas that

exclude the pizza-sized satellite TV dishes visible on millions of U.S. roofs. SpaceX concocts an

imaginary world where satellite television customers have installed giant 1-meter dishes on their

roofs instead. Then SpaceX handcrafts its own GSO protection criterion, based on an

inapplicable ITU recommendation. The reason why they do so is obvious: SpaceX’s

modification request asks for authority to vastly exceed the ITU/FCC limits; therefore, SpaceX

proposes a limit that is no limit at all.

And SpaceX also fails to supply a sufficient basis to support its waiver request. If

SpaceX truly does operate within the existing ITU/FCC EPFD rules as it claims to do, it needs

no waiver. Indeed, SpaceX has already petitioned for a rulemaking based on the erroneous view

that the rules are outdated.

EchoStar therefore urges the Commission to reject SpaceX’s request to discard the Nco-

equals-one condition, abandon the EPFD limits altogether, allow full-fledged MSS in FSS bands,

and evade standard processing-round procedures. Each request, standing alone, would be

3
enough to leave the DBS and Ka-bands unprotected from a flood of unconstrained Starlink

transmissions. The Commission should deny SpaceX’s requests to the extent they pertain to

operations in the 12.2 GHz band and maintain the few remaining protections for satellite

television viewers.

II. The Commission Should Maintain the Nco=1 Condition Under Which SpaceX is
Required to Operate the Gen2 System

SpaceX seeks authority to operate with the ability to focus an unspecified number of co-

frequency beams on the same area throughout the entire Gen2 constellation.3 It claims that the

Nco-equals-one condition for the Gen2 system “creates unnecessary regulatory burden without

corresponding public benefit”4—ignoring that the Commission imposed this condition precisely

for the benefit of incumbent GSO systems and the consumers who rely on them.5 SpaceX does

not, and cannot, deny that removal of the condition would cause SpaceX’s constellation to

exceed the EPFD limits. In fact, as Mr. Dupuis shows, with the condition removed, the limits

would be exceeded for the small pizza-sized antennas used by most satellite television

3
SpaceX RFI Response at 10 (“SpaceX seeks to operate with the ability to use any number of
co-frequency beams (“Nco”) transmitted to or from a particular location for all of the 29,988
Gen2 satellites in all of the spectrum bands currently authorized and those new bands included in
the amendment application.”).
4
Id.
5
See Space Exploration Holdings, LLC Request for Orbital Deployment and Operating
Authority for the SpaceX Gen2 NGSO Satellite System, Order and Authorization, 37 FCC Rcd.
14882, 14912 ¶ 46 (2022) (“Gen 2 Order”) (Affirming that “limiting SpaceX’s operation in the
12.2-12.7 GHz band to an NCo of 1 would be sufficient to protect DBS systems from harmful
interference” and conditioning its authorization on that basis); see also Space Exploration
Holdings, LLC Request for Modification of the Authorization for the SpaceX NGSO Satellite
System, Order and Authorization and Order on Reconsideration, 36 FCC Rcd. 7995, 8017-18 ¶
37-39 (2021) (“Third Modification Order”) (Adopting nco equals one condition because
“SpaceX has stated on the record that an Nco value of one, as an input value for how many co-
frequency simultaneously transmitting satellites will service a given point on Earth, actually
reflects the way it operates its system.”).

4
customers. And they would be exceeded by progressively greater power levels the greater the

number of satellites that SpaceX focuses on a particular area. Specifically, Mr. Dupuis shows

that the convergence of even as few as two satellite transmissions in the same area would exceed

the EPFD limits by about 2 dB for 45 cm antennas, even using the hypothetical user locations

churned up by the ITU software; use of the actual locations of American satellite television

receivers would result in even greater exceedances. While the Commission has rejected

EchoStar’s request for the use of actual user locations out of a deference to the ITU’s method, it

is now astonishingly SpaceX that wants to abandon this method.

Increasing the Nco to four or 10—which is more realistic given the number of satellites

with co-frequency overlapping beams over an area where a geostationary earth station is

located—would result in SpaceX exceeding the EPFD limits by about 4.5 dB and 8 dB,

respectively, for 45 cm antennas, again even using hypothetical user locations. The true value of

excess dB based on an increased Nco would be greater—about 15 dB—if actual user locations

are considered, and greater still depending on more realistic assumptions about the Starlink

system’s irregular plane altitudes and inclination angles.

These exceedances are even greater than those found by Mr. Dupuis in connection with

SpaceX’s lower-power first-generation system. With respect to DBS antennas, Mr. Dupuis had

found an exceedance of about one to three dB for four beams and 5 dB or more for 10 beams.6 It

was precisely for this reason that the Commission required SpaceX to adopt the Nco-equals-one

6
See Marc Dupuis, EPFD Assessment of SpaceX into DISH Ku-band GSO Networks, attached to
Letter from Jeffrey Blum, DISH, to Marlene Dortch, FCC, WT Docket No. 20-443; File No.
SAT-MOD20200417-00037 (Feb. 15, 2021).

5
condition.7 Thus, Mr. Dupuis’ latest study shows that these concerns have only been

exacerbated for SpaceX’s second-generation system.

III. SpaceX’s Technical Analysis in Support of Waiving the EPFD Limits is Rife with
Errors

In advocating for total abolition of the ITU/FCC EPFD limits, SpaceX tries to fudge the

numbers by culling any data that do not support its preferred outcome. As Mr. Dupuis explains,

SpaceX’s analysis in the Gen2 Applications fails to consider DBS links, cherry-picks ITU

regulations and other guidance, omits critical details about how its simulations were performed,

and repeats similar errors in analyzing the Ka-band.

A. SpaceX Seeks to Abolish the EPFD Limits Based on A Method that Excludes
DBS Dishes—the Very Dishes Whose Protection Is at Issue—From Any
Consideration

Crucially, SpaceX has ignored all links with 30cm, 45cm, or 60cm antenna sizes—the

vast majority of DBS dishes. Rather than use the detailed database of GSO DBS links compiled

by the ITU,8 SpaceX took it upon itself to select a truncated set of reference links for analysis—

links, conveniently, that do not include antennas of the size foundational to DBS. According to

SpaceX, it properly excluded reference links characterized by these antenna sizes from its

analysis because such antennas do not “match[] those of the aggregate limits of ITU Resolution

76[.]”9 This assertion is both mistaken and misleading.

As an initial matter, the idea that it is appropriate to allow SpaceX to select and compile

its own cherry-picked set of links for analysis is ludicrous. SpaceX claims, without

7
Third Modification Order, 36 FCC Rcd. at 8020 ¶ 39.
8
According to the Final CPM Report to WRC-2000, the range of antenna sizes included in ITU
CR/116 was from 30cm to 450cm.
9
Gen2 Applications, Annex B at § 1.1.

6
substantiation, that because “the Commission has recognized the need to compile a set of modern

GSO reference links,”10 SpaceX should be allowed to unilaterally establish such a set of links.

Of course, selecting proper links for analysis is both foundational to the protections afforded to

GSO DBS and essential to validating and verifying ITU compliance. And the bottom line is that

any collection of links that excludes pizza-sized DBS dishes, the majority of the antennas that

need protection, is fundamentally flawed.

Just as egregious is SpaceX’s claim that links with 30cm, 45cm, and 60cm antennas do

not “match” those found in Resolution 76. SpaceX states that it assumed a minimum antenna

size of 90cm “based on … limiting antenna diameters to those found in Resolution 76.”11 But

this is incorrect: SpaceX itself seems to accept that Resolution 76 “cover[s] terminals between

30cm” and 60cm.12 The fact that the United States and Intelsat had not submitted such links in

the 1997-2000 period is immaterial.

B. SpaceX’s Waiver Request Relies on An Inapplicable ITU Recommendation

Resolution 76 is not the only ITU regulation critical to proper interference analysis that

SpaceX misreads. In describing the methodology it used to select reference links, SpaceX

suggests that under what it refers to as ITU “regulation” S.1432, an interference to noise ratio

(I/N) criterion of -10.5 dB, not to be exceeded for more than 20% of the time, is the proper

interference value to consider in its analysis. Even setting aside the fact that Recommendation

S.1432 is not a regulatory requirement as it is not part of the ITU Radio Regulations, but merely

a recommendation, it is also inapposite here: it was developed for a static sharing situation

10
Id. at § 1.1 n.6.
11
Id. at § 1.1.
12
Id.

7
involving non-moving interference sources and victims, as was correctly pointed out by some

commenters to SpaceX’s EPFD petition.13 Indeed, SpaceX fails to even consider the short-term

protection criterion that it does include in its cherry-picked set of reference links. Though the

Gen2 Applications continually reference the ITU’s “short-term unavailability increase

criterion,”14 these words ring hollow: SpaceX does not actually provide any results in terms of

“short-term increase in % link unavailability,” the very standard discussed in ITU

Recommendation S. 1432, on which SpaceX relies. Without such a showing, there is no proof,

even of a tentative nature, that the GSO links will not suffer unacceptable increase in their

availability.

The reason for SpaceX’s promotion of the I/N long-term criterion of -10.5 dB (and no

short-term protection at all) becomes obvious when one looks at the power levels that SpaceX

requests authority to power its system up to: as Mr. Dupuis shows, the new power levels would

blast past the EPFD limits, leaving television viewers in the dust. The following chart from Mr.

Dupuis’s report tells the story vividly:

13
See Comments of SES Americom, Inc., and O3b Limited, RM-11990, at 7-8 (Nov. 1, 2024);
Reply Comments of DirecTV, LLC, RM-11990, at 3 (Nov. 18, 2024) (“SpaceX’s reliance on
ITU-R S.1432 is misplaced as that recommendation does not consider how both the long-term
and short-term interference a GSO network receives from an NGSO system varies with time.”).
14
See generally Gen2 Applications at Annex B.

8
 The four curves, starting from the left, are: the EPFD levels presented to the Commission

in SpaceX’s filings for the Gen 2 system that has been authorized; the ITU/FCC EPFD limits; the

EPFD levels that SpaceX’s modification application requests authority for; and finally, to the

right, the “limit” advocated by SpaceX. Notably, the medium-term I/N levels that SpaceX wants

to power up to are much higher than the ITU/FCC limits. Since the RR EPFD limits correspond

to about 3% (single-entry) increase in unavailability, it can be easily deduced that the I/N results

from the SpaceX proposal will result in a much larger increase in signal unavailability. The

long-term -10.5 dB I/N criterion proposed by SpaceX (illustrated by the line to the right) is not

much of a limit at all—it is clearly not sufficient to protect the GSO links with 90 cm antennas.

C. SpaceX’s Analysis of Ka-Band Links Is Similarly Lacking

SpaceX attempts the same overreach when analyzing the impact of its operations on Ka-

band broadband dishes. As it did with the Ku-band links, SpaceX reviews the links that were

provided by Administrations to the ITU-R 1997-2000 study cycle and selects those links that it

deems suitable to represent United States GSO operations.

9
 Just as with the Ku-band links, SpaceX describes a 3-step process to select those Ka-band

links from CR/116 that would supposedly match United States GSO systems, but provides no

details as to which links were retained and why. In this case, however, all antenna sizes that are

contained in Article 22 EPFD and Resolution 76 aggregate EPFD tables are presented, but with

no information on their actual parameters, e.g., earth station and satellite locations. Therefore, it

is still impossible to replicate or verify the I/N results provided in Appendix A of the Annex B to

the Technical Narrative.

SpaceX adds three “generic GSO links” with Adaptive Coding and Modulation (“ACM”)

with receive antenna sizes of 45cm (36.8 dBi), 70cm (41.1 dBi), and 5m (59.3 dBi). There is no

explanation or rationale provided for this selection nor for the selection of the C/N objectives for

each antenna size.

For links not employing ACM, SpaceX again selects a long-term -10.5 dB I/N protection

criterion not to be exceeded for 80% of the time for Ka-band links. Similar to the Ku-band,

there is no rationale for this criterion, especially considering the added impact of the short-term

I/N, which in many cases exceeds 0 dB and would result in a 3-dB fade margin loss.

For links employing ACM, SpaceX decides to use a long-term protection criterion of 3%

throughput degradation, quoting that “this long-term protection criterion aligns with the criterion

that the ITU has established for GSO-NGSO sharing in the Q/V-band for links using ACM.”

While such a criterion was adopted by WRC-19 for the 50/40 GHz bands, the higher bands are

still not in use by either GSO or NGSO networks, and so there is ample opportunity to adjust

system parameters, including link budgets, to accommodate potential interference. As Mr.

Dupuis points out, this is not the case for the United States GSO networks operating in Ka-band,

which have been operational for many years without the burden of suffering NGSO interference.

10
The Ka-band GSO links are adequately protected by Ka-band GSO EPFD limits contained in

Article 22, and there was never any consideration of throughput degradation when the limits

were adopted. Considering the number of NGSO systems currently operating in the Ka-band, if

each NGSO system is allowed to degrade the GSO link throughput by 3%, the total degradation

from the combined NGSO interference could easily reach 15 to 30%.15

Again, SpaceX claims to use a short-term metric based on absolute difference in

unavailability but does not present any result with respect to signal availability. SpaceX then

claims that “the simulation results presented below (Figures 2-1 to 2-9, Appendix A) show how

the proposed Gen2 modification and amendment will sufficiently protect GSO downlink

operations in Ka-band in the United States.”16 Yet there is nothing in the Appendix A plots that

would lead anyone else to believe that the GSO links are adequately protected.

Mr. Dupuis opines that the effect on GSO networks would be vast: according to his

report, the impact of such power levels on a GSO system that can maintain 1 Gbps under clear

sky conditions would suddenly drop to between 700 Mbps and 850 Mbps based solely on NGSO

interference if each system is allowed to degrade the throughput by 3% as proposed by SpaceX.

The Commission should not arbitrarily transplant criteria that were adopted by WRC for a future

band to an already existing and heavily utilized band, with millions of customers in the United

States.

15
There are currently five known operational Ka-band systems, including USG USCSID-P, SES
O3B, Eutelsat OneWeb, SpaceX Starlink, Norway’s ASBM and several more are expected to be
imminently deployed, such as Telesat Lightspeed, Amazon Kuiper, Intelsat, Hispasat, as well as
Chinese and Russian systems, and likely others.
16
Amendment Application, Annex B at § 1.2.

11
 Again, as for DBS dishes, the reason SpaceX’s avoiding the -10.5 dB long-term criterion

(and no short-term criterion for Ka-band dishes, too), is evident. Consider the following chart

assembled by Mr. Dupuis:

The four curves illustrate the four power levels explained above (from the left, approved second-

generation power levels, ITU/FCC EPFD limits, the higher power levels that SpaceX is

requesting authority for, and the new “limit” that SpaceX proposes). Again, SpaceX wants to

vastly exceed the current EPFD limits (the third line to the left illustrates the level that it

proposes to power up to), and the new limit that SpaceX proposes (the line to the right) is not

much of a limit at all. Clearly, the new SpaceX simulation utilizes totally different parameters

than the ones provided to the ITU-BR. While the data provided to the BR would pass the EPFD

limits, the new simulation results are typically 10 dB worse than the single-entry limits for a

significant percentage of time. Since the limits were derived on the basis of a 3% increase in

GSO FSS receiver link noise, the data presented by SpaceX would result in significantly higher

signal degradation. What is more, SpaceX does not provide any short-term interference impact,

12
stating only that “[f]or the short-term interference metric, SpaceX applies the absolute difference

in unavailability, i.e., the ‘absolute’ metric, instead of the relative metric for unavailability,”17

without ever providing any calculation of the impact on GSO systems from this increase.

C. SpaceX’s Study is Equally Defective For What It Omits

Beyond its blatant failure to include any DBS links in its analysis, much of SpaceX’s

submission lacks crucial details, making any external verification of its claims basically

impossible. SpaceX does not include any PFD masks, does not explain what Nco it would prefer

to use, does not provide information on GSO satellite and ES locations (and whether that is

worst-case geometry), and does not provide any operational details such as GSO arc avoidance

angles.

IV. The Commission Should Deny SpaceX’s Waiver Request

SpaceX’s requests to remove the Nco-equals-one condition and to simultaneously waive

the EPFD limits18 would have compounding impacts. As discussed above, eliminating the

Commission’s one-beam-per-area condition without waving the EPFD limits would violate the

limits by progressively greater power levels, depending on how many satellites simultaneously

transmit to the same area. In addition, ignoring the EPFD limits would free SpaceX to stretch

the Nco to as many converging satellites as it pleases. SpaceX claims that allowing it to exceed,

to whatever extent it so chooses, the Commission’s EPFD limits would be in the public interest,

17
Amendment Application, Annex B at § 2.2.
18
Amendment Application, Waiver Requests at 17-19; Modification Application, Waiver
Requests at 2-4 (“SpaceX seeks a waiver of Section 25.146(a)(2) and (c) for its amended Gen2
system downlink operations within the territories of the United States, consistent with the
Schedule S and updated interference analysis provided in the Technical Attachment and to the
extent SpaceX's proposed operations exceed the limits in Article 22 and Resolution 76 of the
ITU Radio Regulations”).

13
because “maintaining the status quo is not in the public interest.”19 But these vague claims are

not only based on the faulty analysis discussed above; they also fail to meet the Commission’s

standard for grant of a waiver, and misconstrue the true position of the United States regarding

potential revision of the EPFD limits globally. Beyond these infirmities, SpaceX’s waiver

request also stands in suspiciously stark contrast to its long-held position that the ITU’s Radio

Regulations are paramount and that the Commission is bound to follow them.

A. SpaceX Fails to Meet the Commission’s Requirements for a Waiver

Under D.C. Circuit precedent, applicants seeking a waiver face an exacting burden: they

must demonstrate that the waiver better serves the public interest than would applying the rule as

written. SpaceX’s request fails this standard on multiple grounds. The Commission has

authority to waive its rules for “good cause shown,”20 but must do so “only pursuant to a relevant

standard.”21 The D.C. Circuit has cautioned applicants seeking waiver of a Commission rule

must “substantiate their applications with sufficient basis to demonstrate that waiver would be in

the public interest[.]”22 Good cause exists when “particular facts would make strict compliance

inconsistent with the public interest.”23 The applicant “faces a high hurdle” to receive a waiver

of Commission rules, and must “adduce concrete support, preferably documentary” in support

of the waiver request.24 In particular, waivers requesting a departure from the Commission’s

19
SpaceX RFI Response at 9.
20
47 C.F.R. § 1.3.
21
WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
22
W. Michigan Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 883, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also WAIT
Radio, 418 F.2d at 1159 (“The agency may not act out of unbridled discretion or whim in
granting waivers any more than in any other aspect of its regulatory function.”).
23
Ne. Cellular Telephone Co. v. FCC, 897 F.2d 1164, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
24
WAIT Radio, 418 F.2d at 1157 n.9 ( (holding that the Commission “is not bound to process in
depth what are only generalized pleas, a requirement that would condemn it to divert resources

14
“core allocation rules,” such as EPFD limits, are granted “only in the most compelling of

circumstances.”25 The Commission will not grant waivers where applicants present only

generalized requests or policy-related complaints.26 In addition, “the waiver cannot undermine

the purpose of the rule, and there must be a stronger public interest benefit in granting the waiver

than in applying the rule.”27 SpaceX’s request provides no such showing.

No Unique Circumstances or Hardship. From the start, it is unclear why SpaceX even

needs a waiver as, according to SpaceX itself, “SpaceX is technically able to comply with the

ITU EPFD limits and has in fact received a favorable finding for its entire 29,988-satellite

constellation.”28 If SpaceX truly operates within the power limits, then there is no need for a

of time and personnel to hollow claims. The applicant for waiver must articulate a specific
pleading, and adduce concrete support, preferably documentary.”).
25
Park Pub. Radio, Inc., Letter, 38 FCC Rcd. 4877, 4881 (2023) (quoting Carroll-Harrison
Broadcasting, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 67 FCC 2d 254, 256, ¶ 8 (1977)); see also
Greater Media Radio Company, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59 FCC 2d 796, 797, ¶
5 (1979) (rejecting waiver request of section 73.215(e) because “minimum mileage separation
standards offer the best means for achieving an orderly, efficient, and effective development of
the commercial FM broadcast service”); Boone Biblical College, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 19 FCC 2d 155, 155-156, ¶ 4 (1969) (rejecting waiver request on the basis that “strict
enforcement of the mileage separation rules is of paramount importance to the integrity of the
entire FM assignment plan.”).
26
See Requests for Waiver of Decisions of the Universal Service Administrator by Batesville
Community School Corporation et al., Order, 31 FCC Rcd. 7731, 7733, ¶¶ 5-7 (2016) (denying
requests for waiver that present only generalized arguments, rather than special circumstances
warranting deviation from the general rule); Rio Grande Family Radio Fellowship, Inc. v. FCC,
406 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“When an applicant seeks a waiver of a rule, it must plead
with particularity the facts and circumstances which warrant such action”); Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 5841, 5888, ¶ 87 (1996); Karousel Satellite
LLC, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Authorization, 33 FCC Rcd. 8485, 8489 ¶ 12 (2018)
(“All of these comments relate to issues of general applicability that are more appropriately
addressed in the context of a rulemaking.”); Letter from Albert Shuldiner, FCC, to Troy Adair,
Athens State University, File No. 0000232649; DA 24-563, at 4 (June 13, 2024).
27
Piper Networks Inc. Request for Waiver of Section 15.519(a) and Section 15.519(a)(2) of the
Commission’s Rules, Order, 35 FCC Rcd. 12912, 12914 ¶ 6 (2020).
28
SpaceX RFI Response at 8.

15
waiver at this time, as the Starlink system is currently operational (and indeed thriving) within

the current limits. Any future changes to the EPFD rules should be handled through the ITU

process that is already in place, not through a “waiver” request that would blast an enormous

hole in the existing regulatory framework.

Further, SpaceX would face “no hardship or inequity” should it continue to adhere to the

current EPFD limits.29 SpaceX has presented no evidence that it would not be able to provide

quality service under the current EPFD limits.30 Indeed, Starlink has been thriving under what

SpaceX portrays as the overly restrictive current limits. Starlink hit 4 million subscribers last

fall, adding 233,000 subscribers per month between May and September 2024 alone.31 The

Starlink constellation now numbers almost 6,000 satellites, service is available in nearly 100

countries, and the company has inked deals to provide service to major air and cruise lines. This

is not a company struggling to provide or expand service under the current regulations.

Therefore, SpaceX has failed to show good cause32 that the public interest would be better served

through a waiver.

29
Connect America Fund Developing A Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Order, 37
FCC Rcd. 13383 (2022) (“[T]he costs and burdens associated with performing cost studies do
not constitute special circumstances justifying grant of a waiver. Cost studies were always a
requirement for carriers electing cost-based settlements and [applicant] was aware of such
requirements before it elected to convert to a cost company…. Therefore, we find no hardship or
inequity that justifies the requested waiver.”); In Re Chesapeake-Portsmouth Broadcasting Corp.
Request for Waiver, Letter, 34 FCC Rcd. 1117, 1121 (2019).
30
Panora Communications Cooperative & Prairie Telephone Co., Inc. Joint Petition for Waiver,
Order, 25 FCC. Rcd. 5558, 5563 (2010) (Denying request for waiver because applicant failed to
provide “any evidence of adverse consequences that would result absent a waiver of [the rule].”).
31
Aria Alamahodaei, Starlink hits 4 million subscribers, TechCrunch (Sept. 26, 2024),
https://techcrunch.com/2024/09/26/starlink-will-hit-4-million-subscribers-this-week-spacex-
president-says/.
32
See WAIT Radio, 418 F.2d at 1159.

16
 Major policy questions belong in a rulemaking. SpaceX’s waiver request is more

properly the subject of a rulemaking proceeding. SpaceX itself requested just such a rulemaking

when it petitioned the Commission to revise its EPFD limits.33 It has long been Commission

practice to “alter fundamental components of broadly applicable regulatory schemes” only in the

context of rulemaking proceedings, rather than in limited waiver proceedings without the benefit

of a full and well-counseled record.34 Thus, the Commission generally denies requests for

waiver where waiver would “prejudice the [associated] rulemaking proceeding and prematurely

dispose of commenters’ concerns.”35 It is “inappropriate” to address “arguments challenging the

general [] merits of [a] rule [that] ha[s] broad applicability, and suggest changes in the

Commission's basic [] policies, or amendment to the underlying rule itself”36 in a restricted

waiver proceeding because a “waiver must be based upon the premise that the rule is valid for

most people most of the time.”37 What SpaceX is arguing here, in contrast, is that the current

EPFD limits are invalid for all NGSOs all of the time. Grant of a waiver where there is

simultaneously a pending rulemaking on the same topic would also “provide an unfair market

33
SpaceX Petition for Rulemaking, RM-11990 (Aug. 9, 2024).
34
Sunburst Media LP and Clear Channel Broadcasting Licenses, Inc., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 17 FCC Rcd. 1366, 1368 ¶ 6 (2002); see also In Re Birmingham Christian Radio,
Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 7909, 7915 ¶ 19 (2003).
35
Expert Linears America, LLC Request for Waiver, Order, 31 FCC Rcd. 13475, 13476–77 ¶ 8
(2016) (“Expert Linears Order”); Kenneth L. Erikson Application and Request for Waiver,
Order, 32 FCC Rcd. 7587, 7586 ¶ 1 (2017) (“[I]t would be contrary to the public interest to
prejudice the pending rulemaking proceeding.”).
36
Channel 43 Licensee, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 11866, 11887 ¶ 50
(1997).
37
Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies' Petition for Waiver of Sections 65.701, 65.702(b), &
65.703(a), (c), & (d) of the Commission's Rules, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd.
6747 ¶ 4 (1987) (“Bell Atlantic is essentially questioning the wisdom of the rule that established
the monitoring categories. Although such questions may be presented in a petition for Rule
Making, such claims cannot properly be considered in a waiver proceeding.”).

17
advantage”38 to the applicant requesting the waiver by giving them a head-start advantage in

deploying and operating satellites pursuant to the waived limits, while incumbents and other

competitors are still required to adhere to the current rules.

SpaceX’s rulemaking petition for review of the EPFD limits remains pending,39 and if

granted, would start a proceeding whose outcome would adversely affect the entire satellite

industry both domestically and globally. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “rulemaking is

generally a better, fairer, and more effective method of implementing a new industrywide policy

than is the uneven application of conditions in isolated [adjudicatory] proceedings.”40 The issues

raised by SpaceX in asking for relief from the EPFD limits “do not present a unique or unusual

circumstance such that merits a waiver request” because such issues “introduce questions about

the effectiveness” of the limits themselves—precisely the domain of a general rulemaking

proceeding.41 Indeed, because the concerns SpaceX raises in the Gen2 Applications are

applicable to all NGSO operators, “granting these waivers would likely lead to similar waiver

38
Expert Linears Order, 31 FCC Rcd. at 13476–77 ¶ 8.
39
SpaceX Petition for Rulemaking, RM-11990 (Aug. 9, 2024).
40
Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 511 (1983).
41
In Re Hyperion Communications Long Haul, L.P., 15 FCC Rcd. 15615, 15619 (2000); see also
Holy Mother Mary, 2025 WL 511295, at *4 (OHMSV Feb. 14, 2025) (“[I]t would be
inappropriate to make a broad policy decision regarding community coverage, potentially
affecting many LPFM stations, in the context of an individual waiver request in a licensing
proceeding.”). It is also notable that commenters in the pending EPFD rulemaking are in stark
disagreement over updating the current EPFD limits. See e.g., Expert Linears Order, 31 FCC
Rcd at 13476-77 ¶ 8 (denying a request for waiver pending the outcome of a rulemaking
proceeding in part because commenters disagreed over the desirability of the requested rule
change); c.f. American Radio Relay League, Inc., Order, 28 FCC Rcd. 3228, 3229, ¶ 3 (2013)
(granting a request for waiver pending the outcome of a petition for rulemaking in part because
commenters supported the requested rule change).

18
requests,” depleting the Commission’s resources and undermining the sole purpose of SpaceX’s

EPFD Petition for Rulemaking.

B. SpaceX Misrepresents the United States Position on Potential Revision of the

ITU/FCC EPFD Limits

SpaceX also misrepresents the position of the United States regarding potential updates

to the EPFD limits. According to SpaceX, the United States has supposedly taken the view that

current EPFD limits are overprotective of GSO networks and therefore that Commission should

unilaterally adopt new limits.42 However, in stark contrast to the narrative proffered by SpaceX,

the United States’ draft submission to the ITU Study Group recognizes the need for detailed

study and extensive collaboration with stakeholders rather than proclaiming it necessary to

immediately sunset the current regulations.43 Acknowledging that the Article 22 limits are in

need of a “fresh technical review,” the U.S. recognizes that “the cornerstone of the compatibility

sought in Article 22 is that NGSO FSS systems must protect GSO FSS and BSS networks from

unacceptable interference.” Notably, the United States did not endorse the adoption of a specific

new limit or methodology, nor claim, as SpaceX asserts, that the current limits “dramatically

overprotect legacy GSO systems while harming consumers of next-generation NGSO satellite

systems;” rather, the United States submission called for further studies “to ensure [the limits]

continue to protect GSO FSS and BSS networks from unacceptable interference without

unnecessarily overconstraining NGSO operations.” But support for a “fresh technical review” of

the rules does not amount to sanctioning the immediate adoption of an entirely new methodology

42
SpaceX RFI Response at 9.
43
United States of America, Working Document Towards a Preliminary Draft New Report
[Article 22 EPFD Limit Studies], Document 4A/84-E, at 4 (Apr. 19, 2024) (“To properly assess
the epfd limits and their impact to modern satellite operations, further studies should review the
reference links in [Recommendation ITU-R] S.1328 for potential update.”).

19
to calculate EPFD—nor is it a proper foundation on which to base a broad-reaching waiver, grant

of which would invariably harm incumbent GSO operators.

For these reasons—the lack of demonstrated need, the request for a separate rulemaking

covering the same ground as the waiver, the flawed and incomplete analysis, and the

misrepresentation of U.S. policy—SpaceX’s waiver request fails to satisfy the Commission’s

standard.

C. SpaceX Has Repeatedly Asserted that ITU Radio Regulations are Paramount
and that Delegation of EPFD Limits to the ITU is Proper

SpaceX has repeatedly asserted—before both the Commission and the D.C. Circuit—that

the ITU’s Radio Regulations are paramount and that the Commission is bound to follow them

when assessing EPFD compliance. Indeed, SpaceX has long insisted that the Commission “must

adhere to its ITU-based regulatory framework” for verifying compliance with EPFD limits.44

This position was adopted by the Commission and countenanced by the D.C. Circuit.45

Yet in seeking an exemption from those same ITU rules now, SpaceX has reversed

course. SpaceX, who once vigorously argued that the Commission should defer to the ITU,46 is

now urging the agency to derogate from the very same regulations it previously viewed as

sacrosanct. SpaceX has thus gone from insisting on the supremacy of the ITU to stating that the

“ITU adopted long-term interference protection criteria predicated on outdated technical

44
Brief for Space Exploration Holdings, LLC at 22, International Dark Sky Association, Inc. v.
FCC, 106 F.4th 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (No. 22-1337) (“SpaceX Gen 2 Brief”).
45
Gen 2 Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 14911¶ 40; International Dark Sky Association, Inc. et al v.
FCC, 106 F.4th 1206, 1215-17 (2024).
46
See SpaceX Gen 2 Brief at 12-14; see also Brief for Space Exploration Holdings, LLC at 14,
Viasat v. FCC, 47 F.4th 769 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (No. 21-1123) (“[T]he Commission has already
marshalled its engineering expertise in determining the best way to manage [] spectrum…
through incorporation of ITU methodologies into federal regulation…rather than review of ad
hoc studies[.]”); Id. at 3.

20
assumptions, a flawed methodology, and an improper derivation from short-term interference

protection criteria.”47 But the Commission’s Gen2 authorization and the D.C. Circuit’s holdings

in Viasat and Dark Sky did not hinge on SpaceX’s comfort level with the ITU regulations—they

rest on the conclusion that the EPFD rules reflect a consensus on how to prevent harmful

interference to GSO systems.

The Commission should decline to accept SpaceX’s newly manufactured position that the

ITU framework must now be bypassed or diluted. SpaceX cannot use the ITU rules as a shield

against the Commission considering evidence of interference (as it did in earlier stages of this

proceeding), only to cast them aside when those same rules prove inconvenient. The

Commission should not countenance such a naked about face, and deny SpaceX’s request that it

bypass its ITU-based regulatory framework for EPFD limits and verification.

V. The Commission Should Deny SpaceX’s Request to Operate MSS In Bands Where
it is Authorized or Has Requested Authorization to Operate FSS

SpaceX seeks authority to operate both FSS and MSS in various frequencies (including

14.0-14.5 GHz, 19.7-20.2 GHz, and 29.5-30.0 GHz) for the entire Gen2 system, including the

previously authorized portion of the system. This request again threatens to erode established

interference protections. Because MSS operations are not constrained by the ITU/FCC EPFD

limits for NGSO FSS, SpaceX could effectively circumvent the very rules that preserve co-

existence between non-geostationary and geostationary systems, exposing incumbent DBS

service to uncontrolled interference. Grant of this request would amount to nothing more than

license for SpaceX to operate under whatever parameters it so chooses.

47
SpaceX RFI Response at 9.

21
 Permitting both FSS and MSS indiscriminately in these bands would give SpaceX

unilateral latitude to re-label transmissions as “MSS” whenever it felt like it. Because ITU/FCC

EPFD rules apply only to NGSO FSS and not MSS, SpaceX’s dual-use approach could enable it

to evade the EPFD rules entirely as the Commission and affected parties would face the near-

impossible task of confirming which portion of the Starlink traffic would qualify as FSS or MSS.

Indeed, SpaceX predicates its request for MSS authority on the claim that the operations “would

be indistinguishable from FSS operations in the bands.”48 The likely result is an unmonitored

regulatory black hole.

At a minimum, the Commission should require that any MSS transmissions in the 14.0-

14.5 GHz, 19.7-20.2 GHz, and 29.5-30.0 GHz bands be fully subject to the same EPFD ceilings

the ITU Article 22 prescribes for FSS. If SpaceX insists the technologies are

“indistinguishable,” then it follows that these operations have the ability, and must be required,

to adhere to ITU/FCC EPFD limits for NGSO FSS. Alternatively, if both FSS and MSS

operations are authorized in these bands without distinction, MSS use must be limited to a

secondary allocation. This is particularly important for the 14-14.5 GHz band which is allocated

to MSS only on a secondary basis per both the ITU Radio Regulations and the Commission’s

Table of Allocations.

VI. Waiver of the Commission’s Processing Procedures in the V-band Would be

Improper

Not content with the wide berth it has already been given in deploying its Gen2 system,

SpaceX also seeks waiver of the Commission’s processing round procedures for the entirety of

the undeployed portion of the Gen2 network, including in the V-band. According to SpaceX,

48
Amendment Application, Attachment A at 5.

22
waiving processing round procedures for its V-band satellites “would not preclude future system

market entry” because the “second V-band processing round…is still in the very preliminary

stages” and “none of those [second-round] applications are affected” by SpaceX’s request to

operate in the V-band.49 This is not only false but antithetical to the very purpose and intent of

the Commission’s processing round procedures. The request for waiver of the Commission’s

processing round procedures in the V-band should be denied.

As EchoStar previously explained,50 the Commission adopted its processing round

procedures explicitly “to provide a measure of certainty in lieu of adopting an open-ended

requirement to accommodate all future applicants.”51 Such an open-ended processing round “in

which new entrants would be placed on par with previously authorized systems and therefore fail

to provide certainty to these systems as intended when establishing a processing round” would be

“contrary to the public interest goals of [its] processing round rules” because “where multiple

operators plan to share scarce spectrum resources, an open processing round approach would

result in deteriorating investment environment resulting from uncertainty regarding spectrum

availability.”52 But this is the outcome SpaceX seeks. Grant of this waiver would place it on

“equal footing” regarding spectrum sharing with the applicants properly within the second V-

band processing round cutoff date, resulting not only in perpetual regulatory uncertainty for other

49
SpaceX RFI Response at 6.
EchoStar Corporation’s Comments on SpaceX’s Application for Modification of V-band
50

Authority, File No. SAT-MOD-20240813-00183, at 2-4(Dec. 16, 2024).

51
Updates to Parts 2 & 25 Concerning Non-Geostationary, Fixed Satellite Service Systems and
Related Matters, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 FCC Rcd.
7809, 7829 ¶ 61 (2017); see also Kuiper Systems, LLC Application for Authorization to Deploy
& Operate A Ka-Band Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit Sys., Order and Authorization, 35 FCC
Rcd. 8324 (2020) (“Kuiper Order”).
52
Kuiper Order, 35 FCC Rcd. at 8338 ¶ 42.

23
NGSO operators that could be threatened by further modification requests, but obviating the

Commission’s processing round mechanism entirely.

Indeed, the claims SpaceX makes in the Gen2 Applications regarding its request to waive

processing round procedures in the V-band are directly contradicted by its recent request to

modify its V-band system to continue deploying satellites past the milestone cutoff date. In that

application, SpaceX acknowledged that it was seeking a modification because allowing SpaceX

to continue deploying V-band satellites beyond its original milestone date would “create

significant interference problems other operators’ systems” by “increasing the number [of

satellites] beyond the cap that would otherwise apply to its [] V-band system.”53 Here, however,

SpaceX claims the opposite: “[G]iven that the existing application already requests authority for

V-band [] operations on the full 29,998 Gen2 satellites, there is no reason to believe that the

amended orbital plan for the same number of satellites would result in significant interference to

other licensed systems.”54 Such binary disparity between these two claims at worst suggests

falsity, and at least counsels that the Commission must deny SpaceX’s request for a waiver of

processing round procedures in the V-band.

VII. EchoStar’s Petition Conforms With D.C. Circuit Precedent

EchoStar’s challenge to the Gen2 Applications neither conflicts with, nor seeks to

relitigate, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in International Dark-Sky Association v. FCC. That

decision upheld the Commission’s two-step EPFD verification framework and found no

arbitrariness in the agency’s decision to license a subset of Gen2 satellites based on SpaceX’s

53
Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, File No. SAT-MOD-20240813-00183, Narrative at 6 (Aug.
13, 2024).
54
Amendment Application, Waiver Requests at 20 n. 34.

24
self-certification and a pending ITU determination. Here, EchoStar’s Petition arises from

substantially changed facts that go well beyond what the Dark Sky court addressed.

The Dark Sky opinion recognized that the Commission had licensed only a fraction of the

29,988-satellite system initially requested by SpaceX. SpaceX’s current applications, by

contrast, now include new technical claims, a more expansive request for a waiver, and

significant alterations to its approach towards EPFD compliance—none of which the Dark Sky

decision addressed. Indeed, the Court concluded that the Commission’s approach (including

partial waivers of pre-deployment ITU findings) could be consistent with the agency’s statutory

obligations only if the Commission retained all ultimate decision-making authority for

preventing harmful interference.55 Yet SpaceX’s latest requests—together with the incomplete

technical showings noted above—demonstrate even greater need for the Commission to wield its

oversight obligations vigilantly. There is no tension between the idea that an agency must keep

its oversight obligations front and center and Dark Sky’s recognition that relying on the ITU can

be reasonable under certain circumstances. In short, the Dark Sky decision did not—and could

not—resolve the newly-arising factual and legal issues surrounding SpaceX’s revised Gen2

application.

VIII. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Commission should deny SpaceX’s attempts to exceed

the ITU-based EPFD rules, discard the Nco-equals-one condition, claim MSS authority to

circumvent FSS power constraints, and dodge the Commission’s established processing-round

procedures. Granting these requests would upend the existing regulatory framework, harm

55
Internat Dark-Sky Ass'n, Inc. v. FCC, 106 F.4th 1206, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“The FCC
retains all decisionmaking authority to set the power limit.”).

25
EchoStar’s satellite TV operations in the 12 GHz band, and undermine the Commission’s

carefully balanced approach to NGSO-GSO sharing.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Pantelis Michalopoulos

Jeffrey Blum, Executive Vice President Pantelis Michalopoulos
External & Legislative Affairs Andrew M. Golodny
Alison Minea, Vice President and Associate Colleen McCroskey
General Counsel, Regulatory Affairs STEPTOE LLP
Hadass Kogan, Vice President and Associate 1330 Connecticut Ave NW
General Counsel, Regulatory Affairs Washington, DC 20036
ECHOSTAR CORPORATION (202) 429-3000
1110 Vermont Avenue NW, Suite 450
Washington, DC 20005 Counsel to EchoStar Corporation
(202) 463-3703

March 10, 2025

26
 DECLARATION

The foregoing has been prepared using facts of which I have personal knowledge or

based upon information provided to me. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing,

except for those facts for which official notice may be taken, is true and correct to the best of my

information, knowledge and belief.

By: /s/ Jeffrey H. Blum

Executive Vice President, External &
Legislative Affairs
EchoStar Corporation

Executed on: March 10, 2025

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Colleen McCroskey, certify that on March 10, 2025, a copy of the foregoing pleading

was served by mail upon:

David Goldman
Jameson Dempsey
Space Exploration Technologies Corp.
1155 F Street NW, Suite 475
Washington, DC 20004

William M. Wiltshire
Paul Caritj
HWG LLP
1919 M Street NW, Suite 800
Washington, DC 20036
Counsel for SpaceX

/s/ Colleen McCroskey

Colleen McCroskey

Counsel for EchoStar Corporation

EXHIBIT 1
TelecommStrategies Page 1

Impact of SpaceX Second-Generation System Modifications on GSO Links

Introduction
This study was commissioned by ECHOSTAR/DISH to assess the impact of the SpaceX’s latest requests
for modifications to its second generation (“Gen2”) NGSO FSS constellation unto DISH DBS subscriber
terminals.1

This study contains two parts:

I. Assessment of Gen2 EPFD levels against the limits contained in Article 22 of the ITU Radio
Regulations, as a function of the number of simultaneous satellite transmissions to a given area
(Nco parameter); and,
II. Evaluation of SpaceX’s proposed new methodology (I/N) computations that it believes show
that its Gen2 upgraded system will not cause interference into GSO links.

In both cases, this report clearly demonstrates that SpaceX’s assertions are invalid and that unless the
Commissions rejects the upgraded modification and amendment, United States GSO DBS customers will
be subject to harmful interference.

Background
It is important to recall that SpaceX had to amend its second-generation system and its showing
repeatedly before finally achieving a showing—doubtful in itself—of compliance with the EPFD limits.
SpaceX specifically had to resort to extreme measures in order for its system to pass the EPFD
evaluation; these included:

- Acceptance of Nco = 1 as a condition of license;

- Reduction of its “GSO arc avoidance” (minimum alpha angle) from 18° to only 4°, while
maintaining a satellite PFD mask that is only consistent with the larger angle.

The files for the revised constellations were provided to the Commission in Autumn 2022 but available
to DISH and other operators only on December 30th, 2022. These have subsequently been submitted to
the ITU-BR under the USASAT-NGSO-3X filing.

In its October 2024 upgrade amendment and modification,2 SpaceX requests that the Commission allow
it to, inter alia, modify its constellation:

- To allow orbital reconfiguration of satellites operating at nominal altitudes of 340 and 360 km by
modifying some inclinations, altitudes, and changing satellite distribution in various planes;
- Add new frequency bands to its authorization and pending applications;
- Lower the minimum elevation angles for its satellites operating below 500 km altitude;

1
SpaceX Gen2 upgrade amendment (IBFS File No. SAT-AMD-20241017-00228) and Gen2 upgrade modification
(IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20241011-00224).
2
Idem
TelecommStrategies Page 2

- “Seeks to operate with a flexible set of technical parameters in the band, including
- the ability to use any number of co-frequency beams transmitted to or from a particular
location”.3

Furthermore, in response to the Commission’s questions on the amended application,4 SpaceX

reiterates that IT “seeks to operate with the ability to use any number of co-frequency beams (“Nco”)
transmitted to or from a particular location for all of the 29,988 Gen2 satellites in all of the spectrum
bands currently authorized and those new bands included in the amendment application.”

There is no supporting evidence for this request in the SpaceX amendment, since neither the technical
narrative nor its Annex B (on NGSO-GSO sharing) contain any details of how the simulations were
performed, and whether in fact a larger number of serving satellites would produce the results
presented therein. In fact, as demonstrated below, any value of Nco greater than one will result in
exceedance of EPFD limits, even in the earth stations locations assumed by the ITU software, which are
clearly not representative of United States DBS subscribers.

SpaceX’s Request for the Removal of the Nco Equals One Condition
Would Lead to Vast Exceedances Over the ITU’s and FCC’s EPFD Limits
When SpaceX originally presented to the FCC the results of its EPFD calculations,5 it did so on the basis
of the ITU-R S.1503 simulation software, with its default settings, including the use of the software’s
worst-case geometry (“WCG”) algorithm. As was pointed out several times before, that algorithm does
not always capture the worst-case earth station location, since it only considers the maximum EPFD
level, and the exceedance in EPFD limits is often not at maximum level (in dBW/m2), but is caused by
percentages associated with lower-level EPFD values. But for purposes of this analysis, I will first ignore
this infirmity and show that removal of the Nco equals one condition would cause significant
exceedances over the limit even using the worst-case algorithm without change or improvement. I will
then show the exceedances are even worse for actual user locations in the U.S.

In its recently upgraded application, SpaceX requested the Commission to remove the above Nco
condition, based on its claim that it is no longer warranted, stating that “SpaceX seeks to operate with a
flexible set of technical parameters in the band, including the ability to use any number of co-frequency
beams transmitted to or from a particular location, that is consistent with the modernized sharing
criteria and considerations included in its NGSO-NGSO and NGSO-GSO analyses in Annex A and Annex B,
respectively”.6

The following sections compare the predicted EPFD levels for various GSO DBS antenna sizes, for both
the ITU S.1503 WCG location and the more representative United States DBS locations.

Impact of SpaceX (Nco=1) into 45cm and 60cm DBS Receivers

3
Attachment A to Reference 11, “Technical Information to Supplement Schedule S”, at 8.
4
Reference 12, response to Question 8
5
Reference 6, SpaceX October 2022 letter stating that “It can analyze the Gen2 EPFD data files, which SpaceX has
provided to the Commission just as it did for requesting parties in this proceeding”.
6
Reference 10, section A.3.1
TelecommStrategies Page 3

This section reproduces the results obtained with the VisualyseEPFD software using the default
parameters, and the Nco =1 for the USASAT-NGSO-3X filing, as was submitted to the ITU-BR. It compares
these results with the ones obtained when moving the GSO satellite to 119W and its Earth station to
39N and 105W (in Texas).

The following Figures show the placement of the GSO satellite and its ES for both scenarios, with
software default settings on the left, and user-specified locations on the right.

Default WCG User-Defined Geometry

Nco = 1 (45 cm antenna (top) and 60cm antenna (bottom)

Default WCG User-Defined Geometry

TelecommStrategies Page 4

The CDF plots on the left, based on the ITU’s S.1503-2 WCG algorithm, show that Gen2 would barely
meet the Article 22 EPFD limits – even when complying with the Nco equals one condition— towards
that fictional DBS subscriber terminal in the Pacific Ocean.

The above results on the right show that the typical United States DBS subscriber will witness
significantly more interference than the location (in the Pacific Ocean) selected by the software’s WCG
algorithm for the smaller antennas. I recognize that the Commission has rejected DISH’s claims that the
software was not predicting worst-case locations, on the basis that the ITU was responsible for
determining compliance with EPFD limits. But since SpaceX now advocates jettisoning the very ITU
method that it had previously invoked as sacrosanct, it will be necessary to examine real links at real
locations.

Impact of Larger Nco into 45cm and 60cm DBS Receivers

SpaceX committed to operate with Nco =1 for its Gen2 constellation but now wishes to renege on that
promise and requests the Commission to allow it to use whatever Nco value it chooses.

On that basis, the following graphs show the EPFD generated by the Gen2 constellation (USASAT-NGSO-
3X parameters) using different values for Nco.

Nco = 2 (45 cm antenna (top) and 60cm antenna (bottom)

Default WCG User-Defined Geometry

TelecommStrategies Page 5

Nco = 4 (45 cm antenna (top) and 60cm antenna (bottom)

Default WCG User-Defined Geometry

TelecommStrategies Page 6

Nco = 10 (45 cm antenna (top) and 60cm antenna (bottom)

Default WCG User-Defined Geometry

As the above graphs show, the interference into DBS 45cm and 60cm antennas would be very damaging
to the GSO DBS links as they significantly exceed the EPFD single-entry limits, which were derived to
meet the link’s unavailability criterion (10% increase in unavailability due to aggregate NGSO
interference, which was the basis upon which the EPFD limits in the Radio Regulations were derived). In
fact, even with Nco =4, the SpaceX-proposed long-term criterion (for I/N not to exceed a value
of -10.5 dB for more than 20% of the time) is barely achieved.7 As discussed in the next section, this
criterion is not acceptable for NGSO FSS interference into GSO DBS anyway when considering that there
is also additive short-term interference.

SpaceX’s Proposal to Replace the ITU’s EPFD Limits and Validation Methodology is
Flawed
I have prepared a number of reports assessing the interference effects of SpaceX’s proposed systems. At
no time was SpaceX able to demonstrate any technical flaw in these analyses. Instead, SpaceX has
criticized these studies as “bespoke EPFD analysis[es],” and has claimed that the studies “departed from
the ITU methodology.” In its most recent amendment and modification requests,8 however, SpaceX
takes a totally different approach, disregarding and disparaging the ITU’s EPFD validation method
contained in Recommendation ITU-R S.1503—the same method that SpaceX criticized me for modifying;

7
See next section for conversion from EPFD to I/N values.
8
References 10 and 11 above.
TelecommStrategies Page 7

instead creating its own GSO protection criteria from thin air and providing a cursory analysis devoid of
any supporting rationale in an attempt to convince the Commission to ignore past EPFD validation and
remove all constraints on its operation.

Technical Flaws in SpaceX Annex B

In its supporting material,9 “SpaceX provides in Annex B to its Technical Attachment an analysis,”
attempting to demonstrate “that its upgraded Gen2 system will not cause unacceptable downlink
interference to GSO systems in bands subject to Article 22 EPFD limits," but the Annex is riddled with
technical mistakes and omissions.

Ku-Band Links
The so-called Ku-band GSO reference links10 do not even consider any United States GSO DBS/BSS links.
Instead, SpaceX’s analysis is based only on the links provided by Administrations to the ITU in the 1997-
2000 Study Cycle that led to the adoption of the RR Article 22 EPFD limits.

SpaceX describes its 3-step process to determine which of the original 1997-2000 ITU reference links it
considers valid for its analysis. It purports to have investigated the “more than six hundred GSO
reference links in the Ku-band that were considered by the ITU during the development of EPFD limits in
the 1990s,” in order to reduce the list to 229 links. But SpaceX does not explain why its study excludes
real GSO DBS systems and should be limited only to the reference links that were adopted in the 1997-
2000 ITU study cycle, and a small subset of these links at that.

In fact, this choice seems at odds with SpaceX’s pleadings in support of its petition for revision of the
Commission’s rules on EPFD.11 In those pleadings, SpaceX advocates a new method that would “identify
realistic GSO reference links that are representative of GSO downlink operations in the United States.”
In that vein, SpaceX criticizes the 1997-2000 list as “inconsistent with typical GSO operations in some
key respects, such as power levels and noise temperatures.” SpaceX also requests that the Commission
“identify modern, realistic reference GSO links,” while noting that “GSO links that underlie current limits
date back to 1999 and 2000.”12 In support of its rulemaking petition, SpaceX further states that
“initiating a rulemaking proceeding would allow the Commission to start fresh from a set of modern,
realistic GSO reference links.” In the same spirit, SpaceX states that “ultimately, an NGSO system should
be tested against an appropriate and realistic set of GSO reference links.”13

In light of these statements in SpaceX’s rulemaking petition, and the supportive pleadings, it is self-
contradictory for SpaceX here to only consider a subset of the 1997-2000 GSO links for its analysis in
support of its Gen2 application, while at the same time supporting a new methodology and interference

9
Idem, Attachment A (Technical Information to Supplement Schedule S) and its Annex B (GSO-NGSO Spectrum
Interference Analysis)
10
Idem, Section 1.1 at 2.
11
Reference 8, Re: RM-11990: Revision of the Commission’s Rules to Establish More Efficient Spectrum Sharing
Between NGSO and GSO Satellite Systems, at 3.
12
Idem, at 21
13
See, Reply Comments of Space Exploration Holdings LLC in Support of Petition for Rulemaking, submitted
November 1st, 2024, at 6.
TelecommStrategies Page 8

criterion based on “tailoring GSO-NGSO sharing rules based solely on reference GSO links operating over
the United States.”14

If SpaceX really intends for the Commission to evaluate NGSO interference from its Gen2 system to real
United States GSO operations, it should not restrict such assessments only to GSO links that were
espoused for the sole purpose of adopting ITU EPFD rules back in 2000.

The main issue with the link selection that SpaceX performed in Annex B to its upgrade amendment and
modification is that none of the links actually represents United States DBS (or BSS in ITU parlance)
receive antennas. SpaceX’s 3-step process starts with over 600 original GSO links, and ends up with 148
links, none of which involve a receive antenna less than 90cm in diameter.15 It is very well-known,
however, that current DBS subscriber antennas are 45cm to 60cm in diameter (the ubiquitous pizza-
sized dishes), with peak gains in the 34 dBi to 36 dBi range.

Furthermore, SpaceX claims to have selected links of receive earth stations located at latitudes that
correspond to the continental United States, as if Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands
do not warrant any consideration. What is more, the claim that the links reflect continental U.S.
locations appears itself to be contradicted: a footnote in SpaceX’s submission stipulates that only links
“submitted by the USG and Intelsat” were considered. Therefore, links submitted by other
administrations such as Canada, European nations and Japan, and operated at similar latitudes as the
United States, seem to have conveniently missed the cut.

As a result, SpaceX’s results are not representative of DBS subscriber stations. For this reason alone, the
study should be considered invalid and the requested modification rejected.

SpaceX’s third step is also of concern: SpaceX decided to remove any links that SpaceX computed would
not meet the 10% increase in unavailability based on Resolution 76 aggregate limits.16 Setting aside the
fact that, as will be seen below, this is not a valid exclusion criterion, SpaceX does not even produce the
calculations that led to the exclusion decision.

Another objectionable portion of SpaceX’s submission is the use of a new arbitrary definition for GSO
link protection criteria. Space X adopts a “long-term protection criterion (single-entry allowance per
NGSO system) of -10.5 dB I/N shall not be exceeded for 80% of the time,” based on its logic that
“the -10.5 dB value is linked to an aggregate protection criterion of -6 dB I/N to be respected by co-
located NGSOs, in alignment with Recommendation S.1432 of the ITU Radio Regs [sic].”17

Ignoring for now that Recommendation ITU-R S.1432 is not a regulatory requirement as it is not part of
the ITU Radio Regulations, but merely a recommendation, it is also inapposite here: it was developed for
a static sharing situation involving non-moving interference sources and victims, as was correctly
pointed out by some commenters to SpaceX’s EPFD petition.18

14
Idem, at 5.
15
Annex B (GSO-NGSO Spectrum Interference Analysis) at 2, and also Figure 1-1 at 6.
16
Annex B (GSO-NGSO Spectrum Interference Analysis) at 3.
17
Idem.
18
See SES/O3b comments at 7-8, reply comments from DirecTV at 3.
TelecommStrategies Page 9

In addition to adopting an invalid long-term protection criterion for NGSO-GSO sharing, SpaceX
completely ignores the short-term interference component, by simply asserting that, instead of the
relative increase in unavailability that was used for the development of ITU Radio Regulation EPFD
limits, an undefined “absolute metric” should apply. This premise is flawed; all work in ITU-R since the
WRC-2000, including at WRC-19 for the Q-/V-bands,19 has in fact also been based on the relative
increase in unavailability. In any case, SpaceX does not even propose a preferred “absolute metric.”

Instead, SpaceX provides I/N curves for the Complementary Cumulative Distribution Functions (“CCDF”)
that it deems worthy—i.e., excluding all dishes smaller than 90 cm in diameter. But this takes into
account less than 10% of the original CR-116 links– and none of these looks anything like GSO DBS links.

What is more, SpaceX provides “short- and long-term interference statistics with respect to the
representative GSO reference links” (emphasis added), in terms of I/N results, without specifying key
information:

- Which are the resulting 58 GSO links that were considered?

- What is the GSO satellite location and resulting GSO ES elevation angle, and are these values
worst-case in terms of geometry?
- What are the SpaceX satellite parameters in terms of gain, EIRP and PFD?20
- Did SpaceX employ PFD masks for each satellite or assumed only interference from the “worst-
case” satellite?
- How many Gen2 Starlink satellites transmit towards the victim GSO ES (Nco)?
- Are all satellites considered active and transmitting sidelobe energy towards the victim GSO ES if
they are not directly pointing a beam towards that location?
- What is the GSO arc avoidance angle employed?

Also, there is absolutely no consideration of the actual impact of the I/N results on GSO link
performance, which would have required answering the following questions:

- What is the fade margin for each GSO link?

- What is the C/N+I level corresponding to signal unavailability?
- What is the range of link availability values under rain-fade conditions only?
- What is the increase in GSO link unavailability (both absolute and relative to rain-faded
conditions)?

From the above open questions alone, it is clear that the analysis is defective and incomplete. As a
result, the Commission is in no position to assess the impact of the proposed Gen2 modifications on
GSO links even if it were to accept the premise that it should deviate from the ITU RR Article 22 EPFD
limits.

Ka-band Links

19
See ITU-RR, No. 22.5L and Resolution 770.
20
Section A3.1 of the technical narrative stipulates beams with minimum gain of 34 dBi and a maximum gain of
48 dBi at boresight, but the Annex is silent as to the actual values used. Tables A.4-1 and A.4-2 provides satellite
PFD in Ku-band depending on elevation angle, but the Annex does not specify whether the simulations employ
these values.
TelecommStrategies Page 10

As it did with the Ku-band links, SpaceX reviews the links that were provided by Administrations to the
ITU-R 1997-2000 study cycle and selects those links that it deems suitable to represent United States
GSO operations.

Just as with the Ku-band links, SpaceX describes a 3-step process to select those Ka-band links from
CR/116 that would supposedly match United States GSO systems, but provides no details as to which
links were retained and why. In the Ka-band case, however, all antenna sizes that are contained in
Article 22 EPFD and Resolution 76 aggregate EPFD tables are presented, but with no information on
their actual parameters, e.g., earth station and satellite locations. Therefore, it is still impossible to
replicate or verify the I/N results provided in Appendix A of the Annex B to the Technical Narrative.

SpaceX adds three “generic GSO links” with Adaptive Coding and Modulation (“ACM”) with receive
antenna sizes of 45cm (36.8 dBi), 70cm (41.1 dBi), and 5m (59.3 dBi). There is no explanation or
rationale provided for this selection nor for the selection of the C/N objectives for each antenna size.

For links not employing ACM, SpaceX selects a long-term protection criterion of -10.5 dB I/N not to be
exceeded for 80% of the time for Ka-band links. Similar to the Ku-band, there is no rationale for this
criterion, especially considering the added impact of the short-term I/N, which in many cases exceeds
0 dB and would result in a 3-dB fade margin loss.

For links employing ACM, SpaceX decides to use a long-term protection criterion of 3% throughput
degradation, quoting that “this long-term protection criterion aligns with the criterion that the ITU has
established for GSO-NGSO sharing in the Q/V-band for links using ACM”. Whilst correct that such a
criterion was adopted by WRC-19 for the 50/40 GHz bands, it must be pointed out that the higher bands
are still not in use by either GSO or NGSO networks, and so there is ample opportunity to adjust system
parameters, including link budgets, to accommodate potential interference. This is not the case for the
United States GSO networks operating in Ka-band, which have been operational for many years without
the burden of suffering NGSO interference. The Ka-band GSO links are adequately protected by Ka-band
GSO EPFD limits contained in Article 22, and there was never any consideration of throughput
degradation when the limits were adopted. Considering the number of NGSO systems currently
operating in the Ka-band, if each NGSO system is allowed to degrade the GSO link throughput by 3%, the
total degradation from the combined NGSO interference could easily reach 15 to 30%.21

Again, SpaceX claims to use a short-term metric based on absolute difference in unavailability but does
not present any result with respect to signal availability, as if one would need to trust that their I/N
curves will result in some acceptable, but unstated, short-term increase in unavailability.

Even absent all of the above data, SpaceX claims that “the simulation results presented below (Figures
2-1 to 2-9, Appendix B) show how the proposed Gen2 modification and amendment will sufficiently
protect GSO downlink operations in Ka-band in the United States.” Yet there is nothing in the Appendix
B plots that would lead anyone else to believe that the GSO links are adequately protected.

21
There are currently five known operational Ka-band NGSO systems, including USG USCSID-P, SES O3B, Eutelsat
OneWeb, SpaceX Starlink, Norway’s ASBM and several more are expected to be imminently deployed such as
Telesat Lightspeed, Amazon Kuiper, Intelsat, Hispasat, as well as Chinese and Russian systems and likely others.
TelecommStrategies Page 11

The impact to a GSO system which can maintain 1 Gbps under clear sky condition would suddenly drop
to between 700 Mbps and 850 Mbps based solely on NGSO interference if each system is allowed to
degrade the throughput by 3% as proposed by SpaceX.

The Commission should not arbitrarily transplant criteria that were adopted by a WRC for a future band
to an already existing and heavily utilized band, with millions of customers in the United States.

SpaceX’s I/N Methodology Would Vastly Exceed the Current EPFD Limits Both in the Ku- and the
Ka-bands.
This study demonstrates that SpaceX’s proposals to replace the ITU-RR EPFD limits by a process that is
ill-described, and for which the Commission and its GSO licensees would have to trust the NGSO
operators, is totally without warrant.

The study that SpaceX relies on is based on an undefined methodology, using an unacceptable
interference criterion (I/N) that completely ignores the impact of short-term interference as well as the
signal degradation due to the proposed long-term I/N value, and would result in harmful interference
into GSO links, especially as the number of NGSO satellites allowed to transmit towards any given
location, where a GSO earth station may be located, is increased.

It is important to recall that SpaceX had to amend its second-generation system and its showing
repeatedly before finally achieving a showing—doubtful in itself—of compliance with the EPFD limits.
SpaceX specifically had to resort to extreme measures in order for its system to pass the EPFD
evaluation; these included:

- Acceptance of Nco = 1 as a condition of license22

- Reduction of its “GSO arc avoidance” (minimum alpha angle) from 18° to only 4°, while
maintaining a satellite PFD mask that is only consistent with the larger angle

The files for the revised constellations were provided to the Commission in Autumn 2022 but available
to DISH and other operators only on December 30th, 2022. These have subsequently been submitted to
the ITU-BR under the USASAT-NGSO-3X filing.

Comparing SpaceX I/N Method to the EPFD Limits in the Ku-Band

SpaceX computed I/N for some undefined NGSO constellation parameters. It is possible to compare the
EPFD validation results for the data submitted by SpaceX to the ITU for the USASAT-NGSO-3X filing,
comprising 29,988 satellites to the upgrade amendment I/N results, by simply converting EPFD into I/N.

The conversion factor can be calculated as follows:

I/N = EPFD – 10 log (4 π/λ2) + Grx – K T B

Where,

EPFD is in dBW/m2 per 40 kHz

B is 40 kHz

22
Applicable to the entire Ku-band (10.7-12.7 GHz) and the upper portion (19.7-20.2 GHz) of the Ka-band
TelecommStrategies Page 12

And λ = 0.3/11.7

For a 90cm antenna with 38.6 dBi gain and 100 K assumed noise temperature, the conversion factor is:

I/N = EPFD + 158.4

Using this conversion factor, the EPFD results presented to the ITU-BR for the USASAT-NGSO-3X
system,23 as well as the ITU RR limits, are overlaid on the I/N results presented by SpaceX in its upgrade
modification and amendment.

The four curves, starting from the left, are: the EPFD levels presented to the Commission in SpaceX’s
filings for the Generation 2 system that has been authorized; the ITU/FCC EPFD limits; the EPFD levels
that SpaceX’s modification application requests authority for; and finally, to the right, the “long-term
limit” advocated by SpaceX. Notably, the medium-term I/N levels that SpaceX wants to power up to are
much higher than the ITU/FCC limits. Since the RR EPFD limits correspond to about 3% (single-entry)
increase in unavailability, it can be easily deduced that the I/N results from the SpaceX proposal will
result in a much larger increase in signal unavailability. The long-term -10.5 dB I/N criterion proposed by
SpaceX (illustrated by the line to the right) is not much of a limit at all—it is clearly not sufficient to
protect the GSO links with 90 cm antennas.

Similar conclusions can be obtained by comparing the resulting I/N from the SpaceX simulations to their
EPFD curves supplied to the ITU-BR. Again, the short-term maximum I/N values are close, but the

23
These results are based on Nco = 1 and using the default ITU software worst-case geometry (WCG) setting,
which has been shown not to always capture the worst possible GSO satellite and Earth station locations.
TelecommStrategies Page 13

longer-term I/N values are vastly higher than the corresponding I/N values from their predicted EPFD
levels, as submitted to the BR, and even the RR Article 22 limits.
TelecommStrategies Page 14

In all cases above, the predicted I/N levels are much higher in the medium and long-terms than the
corresponding ITU RR EPFD Limits and the EPFD levels predicted by the ITU software for the USASAT-
NGSO-3X system, when converted to I/N units. This may be because SpaceX used different assumptions
in terms of PFD mask, Nco, and GSO Earth station locations; SpaceX is silent on these matters, however.

Clearly, the SpaceX proposal will result in much higher signal degradations than those allowed under the
Radio Regulations through the EPFD limits. The results also negate the argument for the proposed long-
term I/N criterion as this would result in much higher signal degradations than allowed by the regulatory
limits.

I/N for 45cm and 60 cm DBS Receivers

Similar computation results are presented for the USASAT-NGSO-3X filing, based again on the default
values for user settings in the software and Nco =1.
TelecommStrategies Page 15

For a 45cm antenna with 32.6 dBi gain and 100 K noise temperature is -152.4 dB.

For a 60cm antenna with 35.1 dBi gain and 100 K noise temperature is -154.9 dB.
TelecommStrategies Page 16

For both cases above, a long-term I/N criterion of -10.5 dB would significantly increase the unavailability
of the DBS signals.

Comparing SpaceX I/N Method to the EPFD Limits in the Ka-Band

SpaceX computed I/N for some undefined NGSO constellation parameters in the Ka-band, too. It is
possible to compare the EPFD validation results for the data submitted by SpaceX to the ITU for the
USASAT-NGSO-3X filing, comprising 29,988 satellites, to the upgrade amendment I/N results contained
in its Appendix A, by simply converting EPFD into I/N.

The conversion factor can be calculated as follows:

I/N = EPFD – 10 log (4 π/λ2) + Grx – K T B

Where,

EPFD is in dBW/m2 per MHz

B is 1000 kHz

And λ = 0.3/17.8

For a 1 m antenna with 43.5 dBi gain and 180 K assumed noise temperature, the conversion factor is:

I/N = EPFD + 143

Using this conversion factor, the EPFD results presented to the ITU-BR for the USASAT-NGSO-3X
system,24 as well as the ITU RR limits, are overlayed on the I/N results presented by SpaceX in its
upgrade modification and amendment.

24
These results are based on Nco = 1 and using the default ITU software worst-case geometry (WCG) setting,
which has been shown to not consistently identify the worst possible GSO satellite and Earth station locations.
TelecommStrategies Page 17

The four curves illustrate the four power levels explained above (from the left, approved second-
generation power levels, ITU/FCC EPFD limits, the higher power levels that SpaceX is requesting
authority for, and the new “limit” that SpaceX proposes). Again, SpaceX wants to vastly exceed the
current EPFD limits (the third line to the left illustrates the level that it proposes to power up to), and
the new limit that SpaceX proposes (the line to the right) is not much of a limit at all. Clearly, the new
SpaceX simulation utilizes totally different parameters than the ones provided to the ITU-BR. While the
data provided to the BR would pass the EPFD limits, the new simulation results are typically 10 dB worse
than the single-entry limits for a significant percentage of the time. Since the limits were derived on the
basis of a 3% increase in GSO FSS receiver link noise, the data presented by SpaceX would result in
significantly higher signal degradation. What is more, SpaceX does not provide any short-term
interference impact, stating only that “For the short-term interference metric, SpaceX applies the
absolute difference in unavailability, i.e., the “absolute” metric, instead of the relative metric for
unavailability”, without ever providing any calculation of the impact on GSO systems from this increase.
Lastly, the SpaceX proposed -10.5 dB I/N criterion is clearly not adequate to avert NGSO interference
into GSO links, because, among other things, it does not account for signal degradation due to short-
term interference.

Similar conclusions can be obtained by comparing the resulting I/N from the SpaceX simulations to the
EPFD curves supplied by SpaceX to the ITU-BR. Again, the short-term maximum I/N values are close, but
the longer-term I/N results in the SpaceX curves are vastly higher than the corresponding I/N values
from the predicted EPFD levels submitted to the BR, and then the RR Article 22 limits.
TelecommStrategies Page 18

For the upper Ka-band (19.7-20.2 GHz), the conversion factor can be calculated as follows:

I/N = EPFD – 10 log (4 π/λ2) + Grx – K T B

Where,

EPFD is in dBW/m2 per MHz

B is 1000 kHz

And λ = 0.3/19.7

For a 0.7 m antenna with 41.3 dBi gain and 180 K assumed noise temperature, the conversion factor is:

I/N = EPFD + 140

TelecommStrategies Page 19

For the 0.9m antenna, it is 142 dB.

TelecommStrategies Page 20

Conclusion
This study demonstrates that SpaceX’s proposals to remove the Nco equals one condition and replace
the ITU-RR EPFD limits by a process that is ill-described, and for which the Commission and its GSO
licensees would have to implicitly and unverifiably trust the NGSO operators, are totally without
warrant.

First, removal of the Nco equals one condition would lead to significant exceedances over the EPFD
limits, both for DBS dishes in the 12.2.-12.7 GHz band, and for dishes receiving broadband
communications in the Ka-band.

Second, the study that SpaceX relies on to support wholesale abandonment of the EPFD limits is based
on an undefined methodology, using an unacceptable interference criterion (-10.5 dB I/N) that
completely ignores the impact of short-term interference and the signal degradation due to the
proposed long-term I/N value, and would result in harmful interference into GSO links, especially as the
number of NGSO satellites allowed to transmit towards any given location, where a GSO earth station
may be located, is increased.

_______________

Relevant Documents
1. SpaceX Gen2 application (IBFS File No. SAT-LOA-20200526-00055)

2. SpaceX Gen2 amendment (IBFS File No. SAT-AMD-20210818-00105)

3. FCC O&A 37 FCC Rcd. 14882 (2022) (“Gen2 Authorization”); Space Exploration Holdings, LLC;
Request for Orbital Deployment and Operating Authority for the SpaceX Gen2 NGSO Satellite System,
DA 24-222, ICFS File Nos. SAT-LOA-20200526-00055, SAT-AMD-20210818-00105

4. SpaceX response to FCC letter – dated 2022-01-07

5. SpaceX EPFD data files (SRS and Masks) – provided by SpaceX on 2022-02-04

6. SpaceX letters to the FCC on 2022-10-17, 2022-10-27 and 2022-11-28

7. SpaceX Gen2 amendment (IBFS File No. SAT-AMD-20221216-00175)

8. SpaceX Petition for Rulemaking on Revision to the Commission’s Rules to Establish More
Efficient Sharing Between NGSO and GSO Satellite Systems, August 9, 2024

9. Echostar comments on SpaceX Petition on NGSO and GSO Sharing 2024-11-01 and its reply
comments on 2024-11-18.

10. SpaceX Gen2 upgrade amendment (IBFS File No. SAT-AMD-20241017-00228)

11. SpaceX Gen2 upgrade modification (IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20241011-00224)

12. SpaceX letter to M. Dortch on January 31, 2025 in response to FCC questions.