Briefing Paper

ELECTORAL CORRUPTION

BP 05/11
Author Sarah Birch
 This survey of electoral corruption provides an overview of the phenomenon, including a
summary of the scholarly research on the topic and an assessment of the relevance of
research findings for the practitioner community. The paper is grounded on the assumption
that elections are the keystone of modern democracy, and that understanding electoral
corruption and addressing its main causes can improve electoral integrity around the world.

Introduction and background

Elections are the keystone of democracy as we know it, under this rubric. The phenomenon here termed
but the spectre of corruption and manipulation hangs over „electoral corruption‟ goes by a number of names:
all electoral processes. For as long as elections have electoral malpractice, electoral misconduct, electoral
been held, they have been subject to efforts to corrupt malfeasance, electoral fraud, and electoral manipulation.
them. Vote-buying and fraud were features of elections in These terms will be used interchangeably in the present
ancient Athens and Sparta two and a half thousand years analysis. The defining feature of this activity is that it
ago (Staveley, 1972: chap. 5) as well as in early modern involves the abuse of electoral institutions for personal or
elections across the world (Posada-Carbó, 1996; 2000), political gain.
and the same problems haunt electoral conduct in
virtually all contemporary states. Moreover, there is Electoral corruption can be broken down for the sake of
evidence to suggest that electoral corruption may be convenience into three types according to object: the
growing as a problem. manipulation of rules (the legal framework), the
manipulation of voters (preference-formation and
Not so many decades ago, many of the world‟s most expression) and the manipulation of voting (electoral
authoritarian states refrained from holding elections at all, administration) (see also Birch, 2009).
whereas in the post-Cold War world, changes in value
systems and the forces of globalisation have made it The manipulation of rules involves the distortion of
increasingly difficult for states to resist the pressure at electoral laws so as to benefit one party or contestant in
least to pay lip service to democracy. Consequently, an election. Electoral rules are manipulated to some
many more states have begun to hold elections, though extent in virtually all states, democratic or otherwise, but
the quality of electoral conduct in a number of them electoral rule manipulation can be classified as a form of
leaves much to be desired. electoral corruption when it seriously distorts the level
playing field subtending elections, as, for example, when
Before embarking on a review of the scholarly literature the rules governing candidacy prevent certain political
on this topic, it is necessary to provide a brief forces from contesting elections, or when large sectors of
consideration of what is meant by the term „electoral the adult population are excluded from the franchise.
corruption‟ and what types of activities are collected
 The manipulation of voters takes two principal forms: than intentional efforts to subvert the democratic process.
efforts to distort voters‟ preferences and efforts to sway
preference expression. Voters‟ preferences are distorted But whatever the cause of poor electoral conduct, it
by means of a variety of illicit forms of campaigning: cannot be denied that when elections go wrong,
campaign tactics that are deceptive, activities that violate democracy and governance can suffer considerable
campaign finance laws (typically through over-spending), damage that often takes a very long time to remedy.
the use of state resources to support the campaign of a Following this brief introduction to the problems of
particular candidate or party, or severe bias in media electoral corruption, the following sections consider in
coverage of the election. These techniques are designed turn the salient issues in this topic area, recent research
to alter voters‟ true preferences. The other main form of findings, and how these research findings can be put to
voter manipulation involves the alteration of how use by practitioners. A short conclusion and a
preferences are expressed at the polling station, through bibliography wrap up the analysis.
vote-buying or intimidation in the aim of increasing the
vote of a specific political force. Key issues and problems

The manipulation of voting takes place through a variety

Electoral corruption is an area in which practitioners have
of different forms of electoral maladministration, from
arguably made greater advances to our understanding
classical acts of fraud – personation, ballot-box stuffing,
than have academics. Academic researchers have been
mis-reporting – to other more subtle acts that skew the
relatively slow to take this up as a topic of scholarly
conduct of an election in favour or against a particular
analysis, and electoral malpractice is only just now
contestant. These can include the under-provision of
emerging as a coherent sub-field within the discipline of
voting facilities in opposition strong-holds, lack of
political science. The overview that follows therefore
transparency in the organisation of the election, bias in
combines the insights of practitioner and academic work
the way electoral disputes are adjudicated in the courts,
on this topic.
and so on.

Four topics have dominated the study of electoral

Broad analytic distinctions such as this are useful in
corruption: debates over how best to measure the quality
helping us to conceptualise the different ways in which
of elections; studies of the causes of electoral corruption;
elections can be manipulated, yet it is virtually impossible
analyses of the effects of poor electoral conduct; and
to list all the different varieties of electoral corruption. Not
strategies for improving the quality of elections.
only is the manipulation of elections highly context-
dependent, but technological advances and sheer
The measurement of electoral corruption
ingenuity have led to a regular increase in forms of
electoral manipulation ever since elections as we know
Whenever one sets out to measure something that is
them began to be held 2,500 years ago.
covert, one encounters problems arising from the fact that
those involved in it have a strong incentive to cover up or
That said, it is important to note that there are many
disguise in some way. The measurement of electoral
serious problems with electoral processes that cannot be
corruption is thus something that it is difficult to do
attributed to intended manipulation. The line between
directly, and most measures of this phenomenon rely on
intentional corruption and unintended maladministration
indirect or proxy measures of some form.
stemming from incompetence, negligence, lack of
resources or simple bad luck is a fine one, and it is often
Electoral misconduct has been measured in two main
in practice impossible to be sure the extent to which a
ways: (a) by means of perceptual data such as reports
given problem with an election can be attributed to
written by observers, legal charges, court rulings, or the
intentional manipulation or an unintentional mistake
findings of popular surveys and opinion polls; or (b) by
(Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002). A large number of the
means of „election forensics‟ (Myagkov et al., 2009) that
problems that beset contemporary elections are the result
involve undertaking statistical analyses of election results
of limited state capacity and lack of experience rather
in order to identify patterns that are unlikely to be found in
unmanipulated elections.

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 To study electoral corruption, researchers have relied on A number of different factors have been found to shape
a variety of different data sources, including Taylor and risk perceptions and consequently behaviour by
Hudson‟s coding of electoral irregularity in 112 states in politicians when confronted with the choice of whether „to
the mid-1960s (Taylor and Hudson, 1972), the „fraud‟ corrupt or not to corrupt‟ (Birch, 2009).
indicator in the World Bank Database of Political
Institutions (Beck et al., 2001), Robert Pastor‟s database The first main category of factors is derived from the
of „flawed‟ elections (Pastor, 1999a), Birch‟s database of institutional framework governing elections. In theory
electoral malpractice (www.essex.ac.uk/government/ many different institutions could affect levels of electoral
electoralmalpractice), or the Freedom House „electoral corruption in a state, from territorial organisation to
process‟ subscore of the well-known Freedom in the executive type or judicial structure, but the two aspects of
World Index (www.freedomhouse.org). institutional design that have been most thoroughly
studied in the context of electoral corruption are electoral

Cross-national survey datasets that contain questions on system type and electoral management body design.

electoral integrity include the Latinobarometer and

A second set of factors that shape the electoral context
Afrobarometer survey series, Module I of the
are those related to a state‟s socio-economic
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the 2004
circumstances; how rich it is, how well educated its
International Social Survey Programme survey.
population, how traditional its culture, and the extent to
which corruption pervades other aspects of political and

A wide variety of country-level data have also been economic life.

employed to analyse electoral corruption in particular

contexts, including surveys (McGann and Dominguez, A final set of factors relates to a state‟s insertion in the
1998; Stokes, 2005), election results (Berezkin et al., international arena, and specifically, the extent to which it

1989; Powell, 1989; Oberst and Weilage, 1990; Baum, welcomes international election observation missions to

1991; Mayfield, 1993; King, 2001; Christensen, 2005; monitor its elections.

Herron and Johnson, 2007; Myagkov et al., 2007; 2008;

2009) and official criminal data (Molina and Lehoucq, All of these factors have been found to be associated with

1999; Lehoucq and Molina, 2002; Eisenstadt, 2002; the degree of electoral corruption. In addition, the

Ziblatt, 2009). dynamics of the interactions between governing party,

opposition elites and masses has also been shown to be
closely associated with the quality of elections. In some
The causes of electoral corruption states political forces in power are able successfully to
co-opt and buy off the opposition for extended periods of
Politicians in all countries face a trade-off between the time by means of patronage perks of various types, and
desire to be re-elected and the desire to retain legitimacy minor offices in government. In other cases efforts to
(Schedler, 2002b, pp. 36-7; Birch, 2007). They may be quell opposition through co-optation have been less
tempted to engage in electoral malpractice in order to successful, and active repression has been necessary.
ensure their re-elections, but in many contexts the cost of Sometimes repression is successful and in other cases it
misconduct in the electoral sphere will be too high, as is not successful. The precise outcomes of contests
electoral conduct will, if detected, have such a negative between political groups in society typically depend on
impact on their legitimacy that it will not be worth the risk. their relative assets as well as on a variety of contingent
This is not true in all contexts, however, and the study of factors (Magaloni, 2010).
the causes of electoral corruption is largely a matter of
identifying the conditions under which the corruption of The consequences of electoral corruption:
elections will seem to make sense to political actors – in
the sense that the risk to legitimacy will not be a sufficient Electoral misconduct can have a number of severe
deterrent – and the circumstances under which the risks consequences for democratic performance. Most
of corruption are too high. obviously, electoral corruption can result in the „wrong‟

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 people being elected, and can therefore subvert the number of scholars in recent years is whether the holding
democratic will. Electoral corruption also makes the of elections eventually leads to democracy, in the sense
resulting government less representative and less that once a state begins to hold elections, the country will,
accountable than it would otherwise be; those who are under the right conditions, gradually become more
elected in corrupt elections will obviously have less of an democratic and elections will become cleaner (Howard
incentive to do as their constituents would want them to and Roessler, 2006; Lindberg, 2009; Magaloni, 2010), or
do. Poor-quality elections can also have knock-on effects whether, on the contrary, electoral corruption and
for popular perceptions of the legitimacy of political manipulation enable leaders in authoritarian and semi-
leaders and it can undermine the bonds of trust that must authoritarian states to use elections to prop up their non-
link the people with their rulers as well as individual democratic regimes (non-democratic regimes that use
members of the political elite with each other. elections to help shore them up are often referred to as
„electoral authoritarians‟ (Schedler, 2006; cf Ziblatt, 2009),
But poor-quality elections also have a number of or „competitive authoritarian‟ states) (Levitsky and Way,
consequences that go beyond the bounds of 2002; 2010).
representation and democratic accountability as narrowly
understood. Corrupt elections can lead to corruption in
This section has mapped the terrain of electoral corruption
other spheres. This is true for two principal reasons. studies. In the next section we go on to survey the
Firstly those elected through corrupt means are more principal findings of research in this field.
likely to be the sorts of people who would be prepared to
engage in other forms of corruption once elected.
Secondly, many forms of electoral malfeasance are quite
expensive, and politicians are often tempted to use other Evidence and analysis
forms of corruption to build up election war-chests that
can then be used to fund their re-election through Electoral corruption has been studied by political scientists
nefarious means. For this reason, corrupt elections can for decades, yet most of the existing research is based on
represent a considerable drain on the public purse. case studies of particular elections in particular countries.
The systematic comparative study of electoral irregularities
Under certain circumstances, electoral corruption can
remains in its infancy.
have even more dire consequences in that it can provoke
violence and sometimes even lead to civil war.
Yet research in the field of electoral corruption has yielded
a number of important insights into this phenomenon and
Strategies for reducing electoral corruption: has gone some way toward addressing the questions
identified in the previous section.
Historically, electoral corruption has been found to vary
considerably from period to period. This has naturally Much research has been devoted to delineating the
caused scholars to wonder why in some contexts we different forms that electoral corruption takes and
observe dramatic increases or decreases in this describing the political economy of electoral malpractice
phenomenon. Practitioners are particularly interested in (e.g. Mackenzie, 1958; Pravda, 1976; Rouquié, 1978;
the factors associated with decreases in electoral Birch, 1997; Elklit and Svensson, 1997; Bratton, 1998;
corruption, and research has established that there are a Elklit, 1999; Callahan, 2000; Schedler, 2002a; Elklit and
number of particular types of context in which electoral Reynolds 2002; 2005a; 2005b; Schaffer, 2002; 2007;
corruption declines, depending on changes in electoral Brusco et al., 2004; Case, 2006; D‟Anieri, 2005; Stokes,
institutions (including the franchise), changes in levels of 2005). A smaller body of scholarship has been concerned
socio-economic development and international pressure to examine the factors that condition perceptions of
(including electoral assistance). electoral corruption at mass level (McGann and
Dominguez, 1998; Birch, 2008).

One of the questions that has particularly occupied a

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 The systematic nature of electoral corruption is Culture and values have been found to impact electoral
something that has been noted by virtually all corruption as well. In particular, the dominance of more
commentators on this topic. The corruption of elections is traditional cultural forms has been identified as one of the
not typically something that can be traced to individuals background conditions that provides fertile ground for
acting in isolation. Electoral corruption requires several different forms of electoral corruption, in particular
considerable logistical organisation, and as such it those that involve the corruption of voters (McDonald,
requires the collusion of many actors in different parts of 1972; Beck, 1997; Callahan, 2000; Schaffer and
the political system. Schedler, 2005; Bermeo, 2010).

The systematic nature of electoral corruption can also be Finally, the presence of international observers has
traced to the structures that subtend and facilitate it. generally been associated with improved election quality
Institutions – and specifically electoral institutions – are (Bjornlund, 2004; Council of Europe, 2008: 147-8;
central in this regard. The electoral management Goodwin-Gill, 1994: 78; but see Beaulieu and Hyde, 2008
structure provides the overarching framework within for a different perspective).
which electoral conduct takes place. It is therefore not
surprising that electoral management body design should
A considerable amount of research has also enabled us
have been found to influence the quality of electoral better to understand how electoral corruption can be
governance. In particular, effective electoral commission effectively reduced.
independence has been found to have a strong positive
impact on electoral integrity (Hartlyn, 1994; Lopez-Pintor, In some cases, gradual social-structural and cultural
2000; Mozaffar, 2002; McCoy and Hartlyn, 2006). changes over the years can result in an altered climate
for electoral corruption, which may gradually become less
A second key finding is that single-member district prominent.
electoral systems have been found to encourage
electoral corruption to a greater extent than more Institutional change can also lead to abrupt changes in
proportional electoral systems (Lehoucq and Molina, levels of electoral malpractice. For example, changes in
2002; Birch, 2007). suffrage requirements that gradually make vote-buying
too expensive, which then generates impetus for reform
(O‟Leary, 1962; O‟Gorman, 1996; Lehoucq and Molina,
In addition to institutions, a key social structural factor
2002).
that interacts with electoral corruption is the level of
socio-economic development in a state, and a number of
Likewise governments may face such severe legitimacy
studies have linked lower level of socio-economic
crises that they are obliged to „clean up‟ their electoral
development with higher levels of electoral corruption
process to prevent mass disturbances, as happened in
(Gosnell, 1968; Scott, 1969; McDonald, 1972; Hartlyn,
Argentina prior to the Sáenz Peña law of 1912 (Díaz,
1994; Lehoucq, 2003; Stokes, 2005). In addition there is
1983).
some evidence that wealth inequality within states is
associated with higher levels of electoral corruption
In other cases, electoral corruption can be dramatically
(Ziblatt, 2009).
reduced in a short period of time due to popular
mobilisation, The „colour revolutions‟ that took place in

There is also a limited body of research that has Serbia in 2000, in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in

investigated the interaction of electoral corruption with 2004, where popular mobilisation resulted in fraudulent

other sorts of corruption in the public sector, and other election results being overturned, has promoted a rash of

forms of corruption have been found to be one of the studies that have helped us better to understand the

more important factors that facilitate malpractice in the conditions under which popular mobilisation can be of

electoral sphere (Birch, 2007). Thus different types of help in pressuring leaders to improve the quality of their

corruption hang together. elections. In other contexts also, popular mobilisation has

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 played an important role in bringing about reform IDEA to regional bodies such as the Organisation for
(Eisenstadt, 1999; Magaloni, 2010). Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of
Europe, Organization of American States and the African
The impact of electoral corruption on other aspects of Union, to networks of electoral administrators - such as
politics, society and the economy have also been the the Global Electoral Organization, the Association of
object of a number of studies. For example, Birch has Central and East European Election Officers - not to
found that when large sectors of the population believe mention bilateral assistance projects and the work of
that elections are corrupt, this has the effect of international non-governmental organisations.
depressing turnout (Birch, 2010).
At the same time, there is still no international convention
In summary, scholars are only just beginning to study or treaty that is primarily concerned with elections, and
electoral corruption in a systematic way, but the research we still lack a major international body with the clout to
that does exist has identified a number of key causal serve as an international elections watchdog or to
factors that are related to this phenomenon as well as its adjudicate in the case of disputes; in other words, the
effects. international elections „regime‟ remains patchy and
under-developed despite the fact that a vast amount of
effort and resources have gone into strengthening
electoral conduct over the course of the post-war period.
Practical implications of research
International legal institutions have not developed as far
findings
in the electoral sphere as in some other areas – e.g.
Electoral conduct is an area in which international actors trade, defence, or environmental regulation. The
have begun to play a larger role in recent years, as international elections regime is a hotchpotch of different
election monitoring, electoral assistance and standard- regional organisations that monitor elections and offer
setting in the electoral field has become more electoral assistance.
professional and more systematic (Pastor, 1999b).
This situation has implications for the ways in which
International law (the Universal Declaration of Human
states respond to international efforts to comment on and
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
improve the quality of elections; it also has implications
Rights) stipulates that elections must be held periodically;
for electoral assistance itself. The weakness and
in addition they must meet five criteria to be considered
fragmentation of the international electoral regime means
free and fair: they must be held (1) by secret ballot, (2)
that making assistance conditional on maintaining certain
under universal and equal suffrage (3) in a non-
standards is somewhat more difficult that might be the
discriminatory manner (4) allowing direct choice and (5)
case in another area. It also means that though electoral
free expression (Beigbeder, 1994; Goodwin-Gill, 1994;
processes can be evaluated in relation to a relatively
1998).
coherent set of international norms (see, for example,
Elklit and Raynolds, 2005a; Boda, 2005; Katz, 2005;
There are also a number of approaches to electoral Council of Europe, 2008), domestic standards and norms
conduct that have come to be recognised as „best are of overwhelming importance in the evaluation of
practice‟ by the international community, following debate electoral processes by political actors within states.
and practical efforts undertaken by organisations such as
the United Nations, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Another consequence of the weakness of the
International IDEA, and regional bodies.1 international electoral regime is that there are limited
channels through which the findings of research on
There are an increasing number of organisations involved electoral corruption can be put into practice in any
in electoral monitoring and assistance, from global systematic ways. But this is not to suggest that these
intergovernmental organisation such as the United findings are not relevant or that they cannot inform
Nations, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and International practice in the sphere of electoral conduct.

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 The research findings that are arguably of most practical The research findings in the field can be summed up
relevance are those that relate to the role of institutions under a number of different claims: firstly, electoral
and the role of civil society in holding governments to corruption is systematic and operates by leveraging
account for the quality of the elections they hold. existing resources and structures in the society in which it
operates. The systematic nature of electoral corruption
The practical relevance of the findings on electoral means that it can never be entirely eliminated, but it can
institutions goes without saying; institutions are among be significantly reduced if the structures and attitudes on
the easiest aspects of a political system to alter, and if the which it relies are altered.
institutional determinants of electoral corruption can be
identified, this can provide valuable advice for those who Secondly, institutions matter: institutional factors - from
are in a position to initiate electoral reform as well as the overall architecture of the electoral system to electoral
those who engage in democratic assistance. The body management design and many other more minor
importance of maintaining genuine electoral commission aspects of the electoral regime - can be important in
independence is one of the more relevant lessons from structuring the opportunities and the incentives that face
the research on electoral corruption. political actors who might potentially be tempted to
engage in electoral corruption.
The impact of electoral system design, and in particular
Thirdly, electoral corruption is integrated into the political
the negative impact of single-member district electoral
economy of a state in complex ways, and to understand
systems on electoral integrity, is also an important finding
how elections are corrupted in a state, it is necessary to
that could well be of relevance in informing the practice of
have a good understanding of the way power is
electoral reform in a number of contexts.
structured by both formal and informal institutions. It is for
this reason that quick technical fixes are often ineffective
The importance of popular mobilisation in maintaining or
in improving the quality of elections, as they do not
improving the quality of elections also has considerable
engage with the underlying role of electoral corruption in
practical relevance. Those active in the area of
regime maintenance. Institutional reform can be effective
democracy assistance have played a key role in
in improving the quality of elections, but only when that
developing mechanisms through which members of the
reform simultaneously works to restructure power
public and civil society grounds can hold their
relations and change the incentives under which key
governments to account for the quality of the elections
political actors operate.
they deliver. Tools such as domestic monitoring and
quick counts have played a huge role in increasing the
Electoral corruption is a subject of tremendous
capacity of civil society in promoting good electoral
importance, but the systematic study of electoral
governance.
corruption is just beginning. Within political science this is
currently a „hot topic‟, and more and more scholars are
Summary and conclusions beginning to study this problem. At the same, time, it is
the practitioner community, not political scientists, that
It is often remarked that democracy involves far more has been most active in developing means of reducing
than the holding of free and fair elections. Commentators electoral corruption, such as domestic and international
then typically move straight on to discuss all the aspects monitoring, quick counts, analysis of the legal frameworks
of that „more‟, without considering in detail the role of free governing elections and other means of holding regimes
and fair elections in a democracy. While it is undeniably to account for the quality of the elections they hold. The
true that free and fair elections do not a democracy make, literature mentioned above on the „colour revolutions‟ are
they are nevertheless an essential component of any an exception in this regard, but political scientists have a
democracy. In the modern world, electoral corruption is long way to go before they can provide a coherent
one of the major obstacles to democratisation; it is also a theoretical account of how to reduce electoral corruption.
significant problem in many established democracies.

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 Much work remains to be done in the emerging field of Berezkin, A. V., V. A. Kolosov, M. E. Pavlovskaya, N. V.

electoral corruption, but the research that has been Petrov, and L. V. Smirnyagin, 'The Geography of the

carried out to date has begun to give us insight into what 1989 Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR

drives this important phenomenon and the range of tools (Preliminary Results)', Soviet Geography 30.8 (1989),

that can be employed to address it. Further research is 607-34.

required further to explore both the causes and the

consequences of electoral corruption and to broaden our Bermeo, Nancy, „Interests, Inequality, and Illusion in the

understanding of how best to reduce it. Choice for Fair Elections‟, Comparative Political Studies
43.8/9, pp. 1119-1147.
Notes
1 Beigbeder, Yves, International Monitoring of Plebiscites,
See, for example, the Inter-Parliamentary Union
Referenda and National Elections: Self-Determination
„Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections‟ at
and Transition to Democracy, Dordrecht, Boston and
http://www.ipu.org/Cnl-e/154-free.htm and the Council of
London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994.
Europe (Venice Commission) „Code of Good Practice in
Electoral Matters‟ at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/
Birch, S, „Nomenklatura Democratization: Electoral
2002/CDL-AD(2002)023rev-e.asp, International Institute
Clientelism in Post-Soviet Ukraine‟, Democratization, 4.4
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, International
(1997), pp. 40-62.
Electoral Standards: Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal
Framework of Elections, Stockholm: International IDEA,
Birch, S, „Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct‟,
2002, and the CSES „Copenhagen Document‟ at
Comparative Political Studies 40.12 (2007).
http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pd
f, the Organization for American States „Inter-American
Birch, S, „Electoral Institutions and Popular Confidence in
Democratic Charter‟ at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/
Electoral Processes: A Cross-National Analysis‟,
Documents/Democractic_Charter.htm.
Electoral Studies 27.2 (2008) pp. 305-20.
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