2. Sibal vs.
Notre Dame of Greater Manila
Facts:
• Delia R. Sibal was employed as a school nurse by Notre Dame of Greater Manila starting in January
1973. Initially, she was compensated on a 12-month basis, despite working only during the ten-month
academic year, with no obligation to report during Christmas and summer vacations.
• In March 1976, Fr. Enrique Gonzales, the school's director, requested that she shorten her summer
vacation. And required petitioner to report that summer.
• She complied However, soon after, the school decided to reduce her monthly salary to reflect only
the 10 months she was required to work, rather than the 12 months she had been receiving.
• Sibal objected, asserting that her previous 12-month compensation arrangement should continue.
Consequently, she was dismissed from her position.
• After her dismissal, Sibal filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, seeking her reinstatement, back
wages, and other benefits.
LA: Found in her favor and ordered her reinstatement with back wages.
NLRC: Affirmed LA ruling,
Issue:
WON the dismissal of Delia R. Sibal from her position as school nurse was legal? No.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal of Sibal was illegal.
• The Court found that her employment relationship with Notre Dame of Greater Manila had
characteristics of a permanent employment status, given the 12-month compensation arrangement
and the absence of a definite term for her employment.
• The unilateral reduction of her salary and subsequent dismissal without just cause violated her
rights as a permanent employee.
• The Court ordered her reinstatement to her former position without loss of seniority rights and
the payment of back wages from the time of her dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Doctrine:
An employee with a permanent employment status, characterized by continuous service without a
definite term and regular compensation, is entitled to security of tenure. Any dismissal without just
cause and due process violates labor laws protecting such employment relationships.
3. Maternity Children’s Hospital vs. The Secretary of Labor, GR No. 78325 (1987)
Facts:
• Petitioner Maternity Children’s Hospital, managed by the Cagayan de Oro Women’s Club and
Puericulture Center, received a complaint (1986), from 10 employees alleging underpayment of
wages and Emergency Cost of Living Allowances (ECOLAs).
• RD of Labor and Employment, Region X, directed an investigation, confirming underpayment.
• An order was issued, directing the hospital to pay P723,888.58 to all employees.
• The hospital appealed to the Minister of Labor, disputing the order’s applicability to employees
who were not signatories to the complaint and those no longer employed at the hospital.
• The Minister altered the previous decision, calculating the underpayments from May 23, 1983, to
May 23, 1986, and remanded the case for recomputation.
• After a failed motion for reconsideration, the hospital filed a petition for certiorari, challenging
the jurisdiction of the Regional Director.
Issue:
WON the Regional Director of Labor had the authority to adjudicate money claims for underpayment of
wages and ECOLAs in the absence of a clear employer-employee relationship.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Regional Director of Labor to hear and decide money
claims related to underpayment of wages and ECOLAs, even without a formal employer-employee
relationship.
• The Court emphasized that labor laws are designed to promote social justice and should not be
hindered by technicalities.
• It noted that the employees were performing work beneficial to the hospital, and the
employer-employee relationship could be inferred from the circumstances, including the
hospital's semi-governmental status and its receipt of government subsidies.
• However, the Court limited the award to current employees, excluding those who had resigned or
were terminated prior to the decision.
Doctrine:
In labor disputes concerning underpayment of wages and benefits, the Regional Director of Labor
has the authority to adjudicate money claims, even in the absence of a formal employer-employee
relationship, to uphold the principles of social justice enshrined in labor laws.
4. Social Security System Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Reason of SSSEA Strike: SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands,
which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA CBA on check-off of union dues;
payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with 6 months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and
payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the
salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
(1987) Officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to
the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS. The strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor-Management
Council, and the council ordered the strikers to return to work, but the strikers refused to return to
work; and as a result of the strike, SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
This compelled SSS to file with the RTC a complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners
herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
Trial Court:
• Issued TRO
• Petitioners filed MD alleging trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Denied.
Found strike illegal.
• Petitioners’ MR also denied
CA
• Petitioners’ MR also denied.
Issue/s:
1. WON the employees of the SSS have the right to strike? No.
2. WON RTC have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the strikers from
continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work? Yes.
Ruling:
1. The Court viewed that the employees of SSS are covered by the prohibition against strikes.
• Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters", and that the SSS is one such government-
controlled corporation with an original charter, its employees are part of the civil service, and are
covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.
• This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
• Rationale for distinguishing between workers in the private sector and government employees with
regard to the right to strike:
o GR: The terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law.
o Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government
workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector.
• Principle behind labor unionism in private industry:
o Industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private
employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis.
o In private sector, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector
are settled through the process of collective bargaining, subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation.
o In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given
delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and
conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative
circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.
2. Jurisdiction
• The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government employees
shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations; NLRC clearly has no jurisdiction
over the dispute at bar.
• Regional Trial Court is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS’s complaint for
damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for.
5. Bernardo v. National Labor Relations Commission
Facts:
Complainants are deaf-mutes who were hired by Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and
Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called “Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers.”
Their employments were renewed every 6 months. Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees,
Far East Bank and Trust Company maintained that complainants who are a special class of workers were
hired temporarily under a special employment arrangement.
Petitioners’ Argument: Maintained that they should be considered regular employees, because their task
as money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They
further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar
them from becoming regular employees.
Respondent Commission Argument: Ratiocinated that Art. 280 is not controlling in this case. As
complainants were hired as an accommodation to the recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose
employment were covered by Employment Contracts with special provisions on duration of contract as
specified under Art. 80, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the parties.
LA: Petitioners could not be deemed regular employees under Art. 280 of LC.
NLRC: Affirmed LA ruling. NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not
applicable, “considering the prevailing circumstances/milieu of the cases.”. NLRC agreed with the
respondent that Art. 280 is not controlling.
Issue/s:
1. WON petitioners are regular employees? Yes.
2. WON petitioners were illegally dismissed? Yes.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons, show that petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees.
• According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance with
Article 80 of the Labor code, which provides:
“Art. 80. Employment agreement. — Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter
into an employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include: (a) The names and
addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed; (b) The rate to be paid the handicapped
workers which shall be not less than 75% per cent of the applicable legal minimum wage; (c) The
duration of employment period; and (d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers. The
employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly
authorized representatives.”
• The stipulations in the employment contracts conform with the aforecited provision.
• Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons),
however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.
• Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and
renewed the contracts of 37 of them.
• Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead
to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank.
• Moreover, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
• In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee
should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person.
Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides: Sec. 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. — No disabled
person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled
employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and the same
compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able-
bodied person.
• The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment
contracts from the ambit of Article 80.
• Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus
covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:
“Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where
the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination
of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work
or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:
Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service
is continuous or broken, shall be considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.”
2. The Court ruled that as regular employees, petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is,
their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause.
• Because respondent bank failed to show such cause, petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and
therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges.
• Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of money sorting is no longer available
because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally belonged, petitioners are
hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
6. Salazar vs. Achacoso
Facts:
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure
under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
• (1987) Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner. Having ascertained that
the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency.
• Public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND
SEIZURE ORDER.
• The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order.
• There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place,
the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily
allowed them entry into the premises.
• Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman
Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any.
Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number
and saw about twenty more waiting outside,
• The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan
and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
• Petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the confiscated properties. They
alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that since the house the POEA raided was a private
residence, it was robbery.
• Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait
accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view
of the grave public interest involved.
Issue:
WON the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? No.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants.
• Under the new Constitution, which states:
x x x no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
7. PNOC-EDC. vs. NLRC
Facts:
• Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the PNOC-EDC from 1981to 1989, when his employment was
terminated. The events leading to his dismissal from his job are not disputed.
• While holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and Construction
Department, Pineda decided to run for councilor.
• His filing of candidacy prompted protest from local officials (registered by Mayor Cornejos.) He
communicated with the PNOC-EDC that Pineda could not actively participate in politics unless he
officially resigned from PNOC-EDC.
• Local elections resulted Pineda being elected.
• Despite his election, Pineda continued working for PNOC-EDC.
• PNOC-EDC’s Legal Department: opined that under Section 66 the filing of his certificate of
candidacy automatically amounted to his resignation from the corporation. Then formally
terminated Pineda.
• Pineda filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
LA: Declared the dismissal illegal and ordered reinstatement.
• PNO-EDC appeal and MR, Denied.
NLRC: Dismissed.
Arguments:
• PNOC-EDC argued that, despite earlier case law (the “Juco doctrine”) which had classified
employees of government-owned or controlled corporations as being subject to the Civil Service
Law, the 1987 Constitution and subsequent judicial pronouncements (including NASECO v. NLRC
and Lumanta v. NLRC) had redefined the scope of “government-owned or controlled corporations”
to include only those with original charters.
• Petitioner maintained that employees of corporations organized under the general law (Corporation
Code) are subject to the Labor Code, yet Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code should still
apply to them, thereby validating the termination.
• The legal arguments raised also involved whether holding a public office as a councilor while
employed in a government-owned or controlled corporation violated the constitutional prohibition
on receiving additional compensation.
Issue:
WON Pineda can continue his employment with PNOC-EDC while holding at the same time the elective
position of muncipal councilor? No.
Ruling:
According to the SC, despite the fact that there are now two categories of government-owned and
controlled corporation, (in light of Sec. 2, Art. IX-B of the 1987 Constitution):
a. those covered by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations because employed in corporations having
original charters
b. those not subject to Civil Service Law but to the Labor Code because employed in said corporations
organized under the general law, or the Corporation Code.
The Congress made no effort to distinguish between these two classes of government-owned or controlled
corporations or their employees in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent related statutes, particularly
as regards the rule that an any employee “in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
• It seems obvious, therefore to the Court that a government-owned or controlled corporation
does not lose its character as such because it does not possess of an original charter but
organized under the general law.
• If a corporation’s capital stock is owned by the Government, or it is operated and managed by
officers charged with the mission of fulfilling the public objectives for which it has been organized,
it is a government-owned or controlled corporation even if organized under the Corporation Code
and not under a special statute;
o and employees thereof, even if not covered by the Civil Service but by the Labor Code, are
nonetheless “employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,” and come within
the letter of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, declaring them “ipso facto resigned
from * * office upon the filing of * * (their) certificate of candidacy.”
o Hence, Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those
set forth in the Labor Code.
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
"Section 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. - Any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers
and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy."
8. Filamer Christian Instituter vs CA (this case reverse Filamer vs IAC)
Facts:
• Daniel Funtecha was a working student at the Filamer Christian Institute. He was assigned as the
school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning.
• Allan Masa was the son of the school president and at the same time he was the school’s jeepney
service driver.
• On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa returned
to the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the
students early in the morning.
• Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go home together.
• Funtecha had a student driver’s license so Masa let him take the driver’s seat. While Funtecha was
driving, he accidentally hit an elderly Potenciano Kapunan, Sr. which led in his hospitalization for 20
days.
• Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.
Lower Court Ruling: In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable
for the tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article 2180 which
provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.
• Filamer Argument: assailed the decision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III
of the Labor Code IRR, working scholars are excluded from the employment coverage hence
there is no employer-employee relations between Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of
Funcheta was due to negligence only attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of
being the school janitor.
CA: Denied Filamer’s appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: WON Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable. Yes.
Ruling:
This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this time Kapunan was already
dead).
• The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only meant to
provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and
wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions of any other laws like the
civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is merely
a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction hence Section
14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted
by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and
against the school itself.
• The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an
alleged employee and an alleged employer.
• It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts
of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer.
• Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced.
• An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under
the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver’s position in
order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act
of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the
school to Masa’s house is beneficial to the school because this enables Masa to do a timely school
transportation service in the morning).
Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial
duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was
negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him.
• Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of
a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
9. UERMMMC vs USec Laguesma
Facts:
The existence of an employer-employee relationship between the resident physicians of the University of
the East Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center and the hospital became the crux of the matter in its petition
for certification.
The University of the East Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Medical Center (UERMMMC) is a teaching
hospital in Manila. Resident doctors, undergoing specialized training, formed the UERMMMC-Resident
Doctors Union (RDU) and filed a petition for certification to be recognized as the exclusive bargaining
representative for all resident physicians.
Undersecretary of Labor Laguesma’s decision: Dismissed their petition, ruling that no employer-
employee relationship existed between the resident doctors and UERMMMC.
• This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON the resident doctors of UERMMMC are considered employees, thereby establishing an employer-
employee relationship that permits unionization and collective bargaining? No.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld Undersecretary Laguesma's decision, affirming that the resident doctors
are not employees of UERMMMC.
• The Court reasoned that residency is a continuation of medical education, undertaken voluntarily
to gain specialized knowledge and skills. Since licensed physicians are not legally required to
undergo residency, and many choose to practice independently, the relationship between resident
doctors and the teaching hospital is akin to that of students receiving advanced training, rather
than employees engaged in work for compensation.
Doctrine:
• An employer-employee relationship is essential for union recognition and collective bargaining
rights.
• In the absence of such a relationship, as in the case of resident doctors undergoing voluntary
specialized training, unionization efforts are not legally supported.
10. Hydro Resources vs Paglilauan
Facts:
• (1978) Petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant."
• He received a basic monthly salary of P1,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which
gradually increased to P320.00.
• (1980) Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that he would be considered
terminated effective October 4,1980 because of his alleged failure to perform his duties well.
• Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal.
LA: Ruled that Aban was illegally dismissed.
NLRC: Affirmed LA ruling.
Issue: WON there was an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner corporation and Aban.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, affirming that an
employer-employee relationship existed between HRCC and Aban.
• The Court noted that Aban received a regular salary and allowances, and his duties were integral
to HRCC's operations, including handling legal matters and assisting in employee appointments.
• These factors indicated control over his work, characteristic of an employment relationship.
Consequently, his dismissal was deemed illegal, and HRCC was ordered to reinstate him to his
former position without loss of seniority rights, pay him 12 months' back wages amounting to
P18,000, and provide attorney's fees of P1,800.
Doctrine:
The existence of an employer-employee relationship is determined by factors such as the payment
of regular salaries, provision of allowances, and the employer's control over the employee's work.
These elements grant labor tribunals jurisdiction over employment disputes, including those involving
legal assistants performing duties integral to the employer's business.
