RULE 132

HERMINIO T. DISINI VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

CASE NO. 205172 PONENTE: Hernado, J.

DATE: June 15, 2021 STUDENT NAME: Soriano, Maribeth Charmaine

DOCTRINE: Witness testimony is important in establishing claims of ill-gotten wealth, particularly when
documentary evidence is lacking or deemed unauthenticated.

FACTS:
This case involves the recovery of ill-gotten wealth against Disini, a close associate of former President
Ferdinand Marcos (President Marcos), in relation to the BNPP (Bataan Nuclear Power Plant) project. The
BNPP project is a nuclear power plant project awarded to Westinghouse Electric Corporation
(Westinghouse) and Burns & Roe, Inc. (B&R), as main contractor and architect-engineer, respectively,
and remains inoperable to this day. On July 23, 1987, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages against Disini, President Marcos and Imelda Marcos (Imelda), for amassing ill-gotten wealth
during President Marcos' term. Among others, the Republic alleged that Disini received special
concessions from President Marcos in relation to the award of the BNPP contract to Westinghouse and
B&R, for a scandalously exorbitant amount. Allegedly, Disini received substantial commissions from
Westinghouse and B&R for the award of the contract and its execution. During the trial, Disini was
declared in default due to the failure to serve summons, and only the Republic presented evidence. The
Republic's evidence included testimonies from various witnesses and documentary evidence. The
witnesses testified that Disini acted as a Special Sales Representative (SSR) for Westinghouse and
B&R, receiving commissions that were not recorded in the books of the companies involved but were
instead funneled to his accounts in Switzerland. In arriving at the total amount of commissions received
by Disini from Westinghouse and B&R, the Sandiganbayan primarily relied on Exhibit E-9, Disini's
purported summary of the total commissions from Westinghouse and B&R in relation to the BNPP
project. The Anti-Graft Court found no probative value on the documentary evidence relating to the
existence of Disini's Switzerland bank accounts to prove receipt of commissions as they were mere
photocopies, unauthenticated and not properly translated. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan ruled that
even if most of the documentary evidence were photocopies with no probative value, the testimonies of
Manahan, Vergara, Jacob and Sison constituted preponderant evidence that: (a) Disini and President
Marcos were close associates, or relatives by affinity; (b) President Marcos acquiesced to Disini's
representation as the exclusive agent for Westinghouse and B&R with respect to the BNPP project; (c)
Westinghouse and B&R agreed to pay commission to Disini for the latter to influence President Marcos
to award the contracts to them; and (d) Disini, did in fact, receive these commissions. The
Sandiganbayan, in its April 11, 2012 decision, declared the commissions received by Disini, amounting to
$50,562,500.00, as ill-gotten wealth and ordered him to account for and reconvey the said amount to the
Republic. Notably, only Disini was found liable by the Sandiganbayan of having amassed ill-gotten wealth
by way of substantial commissions totaling $50,562,500.00 which he received from Westinghouse and
B&R in connection with the BNPP project. It held that there was no evidence of President Marcos' and
Imelda's receipt of the commissions. Thus, they were not held liable. Both parties filed their respective
motions for reconsideration. The Republic argued that it sufficiently proved that anomalous grants of
loans and guarantees were given to the companies owned by President Marcos and Disini.

On the other hand, Disini opined that the Republic had no cause of action against him as there was no
contract or quasi-contract violated. Also, he alleged that witnesses Manahan, Vergara and Jacob had no
personal knowledge of the allegations in their affidavits. Lastly, no evidence was adduced to prove the
amount of commissions he allegedly received from Westinghouse and B&R. On October 24, 2012, the
Sandiganbayan denied both the Republic's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Disini's Partial Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion to Strike Out for lack of merit. Hence, Disini filed the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Meanwhile, on June 3, 2014, Disini died and was substituted in the
suit by his heir Herminio Angel E. Disini, Jr.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated the rule on authentication of documents under Section 20 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court when it admitted and relied on Republic's Exhibit E-9.

RULING:
Yes. "Admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the
question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to
the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue." "Thus, a particular evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the
rules of evidence."

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules on
evidence. Before any private document offered as authentic, such as Exhibit E-9, is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved by anyone who saw the document executed or written,
or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. "During authentication in
court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as evidence is genuine and has been duly
executed or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under
duress."

The documentary evidence presented by the plaintiff were only admitted as part of the testimony of the
witnesses. Therefore, these pieces of evidence do not have independent status. Its probative force
depends entirely on the credibility of the testimony of the witness who identified the documents.
Nevertheless, the contents of the document will be considered part of the narration of the witness. A
document admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated
therein. It merely forms part of the testimony of the witness and does not have an independent status. Its
probative force depends entirely on the credibility of the testimony of which it is a part of.

Thus, when the Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibit E-9 as part of Manahan's testimony, it was not
supposed to consider Exhibit E-9 as proof of the fact stated therein, i.e., the amount of commissions. The
Anti-Graft Tribunal was supposed to treat Exhibit E-9 only as part of Manahan's testimony. Contrary to its
express statement, the Sandiganbayan actually relied on Exhibit E-9 to determine the amount of
commissions. Since Exhibit E-9 was unauthenticated, and thus inadmissible in evidence as proof of the
fact stated therein, the Sandiganbayan should not have relied thereon in determining the exact amount
of commissions received by Disini. By doing so, it relied on a documentary evidence whose due
execution and genuineness were not established.

The court also addressed the authentication of documents, ruling that the testimonies provided sufficient
evidence to support the claims, even in the absence of original documents. The court noted that the lack
of documentary proof did not negate the credibility of the witness
testimonies, which were deemed sufficient to establish the existence of the contracts and the receipt of
commissions.
 RULE NO. 132

BANKRUPTCY ESTATE OF CHARLES B. MITICH VS. MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY

Case No.:. G.R. No. 238041, 238502 Ponente: Lazaro-JavierJ.

Date: February 15, 2022 Student Name: Lusarez, Nikki Mayenne D.C.

DOCTRINE: The fact of foreign judgment may be proved through: (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. In this case the
petitioners have proven the existence and authenticity of the Default Judgment against respondent
in accordance with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence, the Default Judgment
already enjoys presumptive validity. The burden has therefore shifted to respondent to prove
otherwise. But instead of presenting preponderant evidence against the authenticity of the Default
Judgment, the latter simply indulged in conjectures.

FACTS:
Charles B. Mitich owned and operated Club Tronix in San Diego, California. On March 30, 1991, a
shooting incident occurred at the club, resulting in the death of a patron Theodros Zewdalem.
Subsequently, a wrongful death lawsuit was filed against Mitich in the San Diego Superior Court, United
States, leading to a default judgment ordering him to pay damages.

Mitich had an insurance policy with Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc. in the Philippines, where he
sought indemnification for the judgment amount. Mitich and the Zewdalems filed a complaint against
Mercantile in the Superior Court of California for insurance bad faith. On July 21, 1994, the California
Court issued a default judgment against Mercantile, awarding $1,135,929.14 in favor of Mitich, including
punitive damages and interest, but Mercantile did not appear.

Mercantile Insurance denied the claim, prompting Mitich's bankruptcy estate and its trustee, James L.
Kennedy, to file a case in the Philippines for the recognition and enforcement of the U.S. default
judgment.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of the bankruptcy estate, ordering Mercantile to pay the
judgment amount. It held that Mitich, et al. successfully established the existence and authenticity of the
Default Judgment dated July 21, 1994 of the California Court. Said Default Judgment had been certified
by the clerk of the California Court and authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles,
California, USA, in compliance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence prior to amendment
.
Mercantile Insurance appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the RTC's decision but
deleted the award of legal interest and attorney's fees. Both parties elevated the case to the Supreme
Court, where Mercantile Insurance challenged the enforcement of the foreign judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether the U.S. default judgment can be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, considering the
requirements for proving official records kept in a foreign country under Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court upheld the enforcement of the U.S. default judgment. It held that for a
foreign judgment to be recognized in the Philippines, it must be proven as a fact under Philippine rules on
evidence. Specifically, Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 outline the procedures for authenticating official
records from a foreign country. The Court reiterated that before the presumption may be invoked, the
party seeking the enforcement of the foreign judgment must first prove it as a fact. Verily, the fact of
foreign judgment may be proved through: (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested
by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in
that country and authenticated by the seal of office. Mitich, et al. submitted the July 21, 1994 Default
Judgment, along with a certification from the San Diego Superior Court, attesting to its entry on July 22,
1994. Judge James R. Milliken affirmed this, and Consul Antonio S. Curameng of the Philippine
Consulate in Los Angeles authenticated the documents on August 9, 1994.

The Court found that the bankruptcy estate had sufficiently complied with these requirements, as the
foreign judgment was duly authenticated and presented in accordance under the Rules of Evidence and
thus, the Default Judgment already enjoys presumptive validity.
 RULE NO. 132

MAZY'S CAPITAL, INC. VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE

DEPARTMNENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Case No.:. G.R. No. 259815 (Formerly UDK 17421) Ponente: Caguioa, J.

Date: August 5, 2024 Student Name: Balili, Carmela Jane

DOCTRINE: Under Rule 132, Section 21, “an ancient document [is] one that: 1)is more than 30
years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3)is
unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion.”

FACTS:
This is a case involving the Republic of the Philippines that had expropriated a tract of land, the issue that
cropped up was whether there was full payment of just compensation that effectively operated to transfer
ownership of the same from the private persons who owned it to the Republic. One key piece of
documentary evidence that was pivotal to the decision is the Provincial Voucher which was issued more
than thirty (30) years prior. Given its antiquity, the one who issued it was no longer available to give
testimony to prove its genuineness. Thus, the heirs of the previous owner who had sold the land to a
company, had claimed that there was no such expropriation of their land much less any payment of just
compensation.

ISSUES:
Whether the Provincial Voucher and the Mocion cannot be considered as an ancient document since it
was not produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that both the Provincial Voucher and the Mocion are ancient
documents, and no further evidence of their authenticity is needed. Under Rule 132, Section 21, "an
ancient document is one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of
suspicion." The Court's discussion of the second requirement in CercadoSiga v. Cercado, Jr. is
instructive: Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which
they might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate
origin or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a
document is found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must
be satisfactorily accounted for.

Here, both the Provincial Voucher and Mocion are undoubtedly more than 30 years old. They were found
in the archived case records of the Expropriation Case. The Provincial Voucher was executed by the
CFI's Clerk of Court, Eugenio Rodil, in connection with the Expropriation Case. Therefore, it is reasonable
to expect the Provincial Voucher to be in the records of the Expropriation Case. The same goes for the
Mocion which was filed by Felisa with the CFI in the Expropriation Case. With respect to the third
element, the Court does not see any sign of alteration or suspicious circumstance that would cast doubt
on the authenticity of the Provincial Voucher and the Mocion.
 RULE 133

WILSON B. TAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JAMES ROULYN R. ALVARICO

CASE NO. A.C. No. 10933 PONENTE: Peralta, C.J.

DATE: November 3, 2020 STUDENT NAME: Abitong, Michael Angelo

DOCTRINE:
The case reiterates the following legal principles:

Burden of Proof in Disbarment Cases: In administrative proceedings against lawyers, the

complainant must prove the allegations by substantial evidence, defined as "that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." Mere allegations,
without sufficient evidence, are insufficient to warrant disciplinary action.

Substantial evidence is defined under Section 6, Rule 133 of the 2019 Amendments to the 1989
Revised Rules on Evidence35 as "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion," while burden of proof is defined under Section
1, Rule 131 as "the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his or her claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law."

The basic rule is that reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an
administrative complaint with no leg to stand on. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence. Thus, failure on the part of complainant to discharge his
burden of proof by substantial evidence requires no other conclusion than that which stays the
hand of the Court from meting out a disbarment order.

In the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors, the quantum of proof by which the charges against respondent were assessed was
preponderance of evidence, which is defined under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence as "superior weight of evidence on [where] the issues involved lies." Notably, however,
the Court has already clarified in Reyes v. Atty. Nieva that based on a survey of jurisprudence,
the quantum of proof for administrative proceedings against lawyers is substantial evidence and
not preponderance of evidence. We stressed that this pronouncement ought to control and quell
any further confusion on the proper evidentiary threshold. Moreover, we recognized that the
evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence, as opposed to preponderance of evidence, is
more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending
disciplinary cases:

Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence – as opposed to preponderance of

evidence – is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations
attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates, '[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or
a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
 actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.'

Admission by Silence: Under Section 33, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, silence may
be considered an admission only if the declaration naturally calls for action or comment, and it is proper
and possible for the party to respond. In this case, respondent’s failure to cross-examine complainant
on the commission issue did not constitute an admission, as the allegations were unrelated to the
criminal case and did not require immediate rebuttal.

Complainant asserts that since Atty. Alvarico did not cross-examine him on his testimony
regarding the offer of commission, Atty. Alvarico's silence must be considered an admission.
Section 33, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence64 provides for admission by silence:

An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who
does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or
comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him or her to do so, may be given in
evidence against him or her.

To appreciate the application of the rule on admission by silence, we must determine if such
declaration made by complainant called for an action or comment if not true, and if it were
possible for Atty. Alvarico to refute the same when such was uttered. Notably, when complainant
was testifying on the alleged offer of commission, he was on direct examination for the criminal
case of theft filed against Manco. We find Atty. Alvarico's explanation sufficient to negate a
finding of admission by silence. Indeed, the imputations made by complainant during direct
examination for the criminal case he filed against Manco were shocking, unexpected, and in no
way related to the subject matter of theft. Making such statements during direct examination for
an unrelated case casts doubt as to whether such declaration called for an immediate action or
comment in the course of judicial proceedings. Further, we agree with Atty. Alvarico that it would
be immaterial to the issues in the criminal case for theft had he cross-examined complainant on
the alleged commission. It would be improper for Atty. Alvarico to respond to the allegations
made against him, who was not even the accused in the criminal case being heard.

FACTS:
Wilson B. Tan (complainant) filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. James Roulyn
R. Alvarico (respondent) for alleged conflict of interest and betrayal of trust and confidence. Complainant
is the offended party in a theft case (Crim. Case No. 2014-22652) pending before the Regional Trial Court
of Dumaguete City, where respondent is the counsel for the accused, Blas Fier "Buddy" Manco.
Complainant alleged that respondent approached him to negotiate a settlement, demanding a 15%
commission, which complainant countered with a 5% offer. No settlement was reached due to
respondent’s insistence on the higher commission. Complainant argued that respondent violated Rule
15.03 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

To support his claims, complainant presented respondent’s affidavit and the Transcript of Stenographic
Notes (TSN) from the criminal case, arguing that respondent’s failure to cross-examine him on the
commission issue constituted an implied admission. Respondent denied the allegations, stating that he
negotiated with complainant at the behest of his client and without demanding any commission. He also
argued that the negotiations were in his client’s interest and that complainant’s allegations were baseless.

ISSUE/S:
The primary issue is whether Atty. Alvarico violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically
Rule 15.03 (prohibition against representing conflicting interests) and Canon 17 (duty of fidelity to a
client), based on the evidence presented by complainant.
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court found that complainant failed to
prove by substantial evidence that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court
emphasized that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof lies with the complainant, and mere
allegations, without sufficient evidence, are insufficient to establish a violation.

The Court noted that respondent’s negotiations with complainant were conducted in the interest of his
client, Manco, and were aimed at settling the civil aspect of the theft case. This aligns with the duty of a
lawyer to encourage fair settlements under Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court also rejected complainant’s argument that respondent’s failure to cross-examine him on the
commission issue constituted an implied admission, as the allegations were unrelated to the criminal case
and did not warrant
immediate rebuttal.

RULE NO. 133

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LEONARDO CABORNAY

Y BATULA

Case No.:.GR No. 250649 Ponente: Peralta, C.J.

Date: March 24, 2021 Student Name: Lusarez, Nikki Mayenne D.C.

DOCTRINE: If there is no other direct evidence available. There is, therefore, a need to resort to
circumstantial evidence. Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules on Evidence, as amended, sets
forth the following requirements of circumstantial evidence that is sufficient for conviction: (1) There
is more than one (1) circumstance; (2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

FACTS:
On July 30, 2012, five-year-old AAA was last seen alive with Leonardo "Totoy" Cabornay by her friend,
BBB, and farmer Conceso Abonge. Later that day, AAA was found dead with a stab wound on her
abdominal region and injuries on the different parts of her body, which wound/injuries caused her
instantaneous death.

BBB, a friend and neighbor of AAA, testified that she last saw AAA going with Totoy (Cabornay) to a
gemelina plant. Later that day, she saw AAA dead at home. In court, she identified Totoy as the accused
and confirmed her police affidavit. Conceso Abonge testified that on July 30, 2012, around 11 a.m., while
he was on his farm he saw Totoy walking ahead of AAA and BBB. By 3 p.m., he joined the search for
AAA, who was later found dead. Oscar Nabong, BBB’s father, testified that he found Angel’s body near
coconut trees, covered with "hantatabako" leaves. She was lying face-up with legs spread apart and
elevated. Her white dress was lifted, and her panty was about a meter away and that the police officers
arrived around 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

Dr. Cornelio Solis, Municipal Health Officer of Pinabacdao, Samar, testified that he conducted a post-
mortem examination on the victim at 6:08 PM on July 30, 2012. He found the victim in rigor mortis with no
post-mortem lividity, indicating death occurred about six hours earlier, around 1 PM that day. He noted
hematomas near the vaginal area, suggesting an attempted rape. He collected vaginal samples for lab
analysis, but the PNP Crime Laboratory refused to examine them. Additionally, he found a stab wound to
the victim's navel, causing evisceration, an incised wound on the back, and hematomas on the right
buttocks, left knee, and wrist.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the accused-appellant Cabornay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape with Homicide. The trial court relied on People v. Develles, stating that in said case, this Court
upheld the conviction for rape with homicide where the accused was positively identified to be the last
person seen with the victim on or about the time she was killed at the place where the latter was found
dead.

The Court of Appeals (CA) set aside the RTC Decision and entered finding the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape with homicide. The CA found that the circumstances in this
case, taken together, lead to no other conclusion than that the accused-appellant, to the exclusion of
others, had attempted to rape AAA and then killed her. It did not sustain the findings of the RTC, which
relied on Dr. Solis' conclusion that the victim was raped. The doctor did not declare that there was the
slightest penile penetration of the victim's vagina and the whitish discharge found by the doctor on the
victim's vaginal canal
was not tested for chemical analysis. In fact, the doctor testified that the perpetrator could have been
trying his best to rape the victim.

ISSUE:
Whether the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict Cabornay, despite lack of direct evidence.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal is bereft of merits.

In the case at bench, there is no direct evidence presented that could link appellant to the commission of
the crime. As observed by the RTC, "The victim is dead and there is no other direct evidence available.
There is, therefore, a need to resort to circumstantial evidence." Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, as amended, sets forth the following requirements of circumstantial evidence that is
sufficient for conviction:

(1) There is more than one circumstance;

(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The CA found that the combination of the circumstances in this case lead to the same conclusion that
Cabornay is the author of the crime. However, it did not sustain the findings of the RTC that that the victim
was raped. Instead, the CA entered a new finding that the accused is guilty of attempted rape with
homicide, because the doctor did not declare that there was the slightest penetration of the victim's
vagina and the whitish discharge found by the doctor on the victim's vaginal canal was not tested for
chemical analysis.

The Supreme Court agreed with the CA that the totality of all the circumstances produces a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. While it is a long-standing rule that medical finding is not an element of rape
and cannot establish the one responsible for the same, jurisprudence dictates that in the absence of a
direct evidence, it is corroborative of a strong circumstantial evidence that the victim was raped. The
medical examination on the samples taken from the vagina is not indispensable to an inference leading to
rape. However, based on the hematoma on the left inguinal area, as well as on the perineal area of the
victim's vagina, the position of the victim when she sustained the hematoma and the removed underwear
one (1) meter away from the victim, we are convinced that, at the very least, there was an attempt to rape
the victim. Dr. Solis testified that the perpetrator could have been trying his best to rape the victim. No
other evidence indicates that the accused succeeded in having a carnal knowledge of the victim.

Thus, the Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the ruling of the CA that the accused is guilty of
Attempted Rape with Homicide beyond reasonable doubt.
 RULE 133 (SECTION 5)

TAN-ANDAL VS. ANDAL

CASE NO. 196359 PONENTE: Leonen, J.

DATE: May 11, 2021 STUDENT NAME: Demdam, Migel S.

DOCTRINE:
Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven
through expert opinion. According to the Supreme Court, “there must be proof, however, of the durable
or enduring aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests itself
through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family.

FACTS:
Mario and Rosanna were married in Makati City on December 16, 1995. After four (4) years of marriage,
the couple separated. Rosanna retained sole custody of their only child. Rosanna testified that Mario
exhibited erratic behavior, including unexplained absences, financial irresponsibility, and drug use. Mario
admitted using marijuana and shabu. Mario’s mismanagement of finances led to the closure of Rosanna’s
construction firm. He also made unauthorized purchases using Rosanna’s credit card and attempted to
take their daughter without Rosanna’s consent. After repeated confrontations and Mario’s violent
outbursts, Rosanna permanently separated from him. She build her own home where she lived with her
child and parents.

ISSUES:
Whether or not psychological incapacity may be established only on the basis of testimonial evidence
attesting to the behavioural pattern of the spouse; or an expert opinion on a party’s psychological
incapacity is a required to support such claim

RULING:
Yes, psychological incapacity may be established only on the basis of testimonial evidence attesting to
the behavioural pattern of the spouse; and, no, expert opinion is not required to support such claim. Here,
the Supreme Court ruled that psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality
disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. According to the Supreme Court, “there must be
proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,”
which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family.
 RULE 133

RYAN ANTHONY O. LIM VS. ATTY. CARLO MARCO BAUTISTA

CASE NO. A.C. NO. 13468 (FORMERLY CBD CASE PONENTE: Per Curiam
NO. 17-5379

DATE: February 21, 2023 STUDENT NAME: Abitong, Michael Angelo

DOCTRINE:
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence, which is a lower
standard than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Evidence must be relevant, credible, and adequate to
establish the allegations. Lawyers are held to the highest ethical standards, and acts of dishonesty,
influence-peddling, or failure to account for client funds constitute gross violations of professional
responsibility. Such acts erode public trust in the legal profession and warrant disbarment in clear
cases of misconduct.

Nature of and quantum of proof in disbarment proceedings

In disbarment proceedings, a lawyer's fitness to continue in the practice of law is determined. In

these proceedings, the quantum of proof is substantial evidence and the burden of proof is on
the complainant to establish the allegations in his complaint. In Tan v. Atty. Alvarico, the Court
explained that substantial evidence is the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, specifically to wit:

Substantial evidence is defined under Section 6, Rule 133 of the 2019 Amendments to the 1989
Revised Rules on Evidence as "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion," while burden of proof is defined under Section
1, Rule 131 as "the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his or her claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law."

The basic rule is that reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an
administrative complaint with no leg to stand on. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence. Thus, failure on the part of complainant to discharge his
burden of proof by substantial evidence requires no other conclusion than that which stays the
hand of the Court from meting out a disbarment order.

FACTS:
This administrative case involves a complaint for disbarment filed by Ryan Anthony O. Lim against Atty.
Carlo Marco Bautista for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Lim alleged that
Bautista misrepresented himself as having connections with the Makati Prosecutor's Office, promising to
influence the outcome of his father's criminal case. Lim issued numerous checks to Bautista amounting to
millions of pesos for legal services, retainer fees, and purported "favors" to ensure a favorable resolution.
Despite these payments, Lim's father's case resulted in an unfavorable decision. Bautista denied an
attorney-client relationship, claiming the money was for safekeeping and unrelated to influence-peddling.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found substantial evidence of Bautista's dishonest conduct,
highlighting the improbability of the safekeeping defense and Bautista's failure to account for the funds
received. The IBP initially recommended disbarment, later reduced to indefinite suspension, but the
Supreme Court reinstated the disbarment penalty.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the evidence presented in the disbarment proceedings sufficiently proved that Atty. Bautista
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and merited disbarment.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that there was substantial evidence to prove Atty. Bautista's violations of the
CPR. Substantial evidence, as defined under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, is that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The Court
found that the checks issued by Lim, annotated with specific purposes such as "attorney’s fees," "retainer
fees," and "favors," corroborated Lim’s claims. Bautista's defenses—denying an attorney-client
relationship and asserting safekeeping—were deemed incredible and unsupported by evidence.

The Court further emphasized that in disbarment proceedings, reliance on mere conjectures and
unsubstantiated claims is insufficient. Bautista’s actions, including his failure to provide an accounting of
the funds, his purported involvement in influence-peddling, and his violation of multiple CPR canons,
justified the penalty of disbarment.