Section 9.
The Rise ofPopulistVoting
The Issue
- The rise of populism and the rise of inequality: which relations?
- The debate betweeneconomic and culturalist explanationsof the rise of populism
- The debate betweendemand- and supply-driven explanations
he main issue is that we have seen being the rise of the populist movements and parties. It
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is nothing new but in the 90s they emerge and most importantly they start to atract a growing
share of votes. They existed for many decades but with a very marginal position. They do so
now very rapidly.
This phenomeno is concomitant with the rise of income and wealth inequalities.
e observe a rise of inequalities and a rise of populism.
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The question is that if the both trends are related.
A working definition
opulism:dualistic opposition between (an undifferentiated body of) citizens & (an
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undifferentiated) political elite
omogeneous and antagonistic views. Pure vs corrupt
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3 elements that he would like to stress:
- Dualistic opposition between citizens and elites.
Positive valorisation of the citizens and they tend to understand those groups as very
homogeneous. The traditional elites are depicted as corrupt. The different interests
and so on.
- ntagonistic agendas and interests
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- Claim for popular sovereignty.We need to restore it and give voice to people as if
people had one single voice. Politics should be an expression of the general will of
people.
New cleavages.
- Right/left wing populism:immigration & security issues
- the right mentions those two topics more than the left that normally does not
mention it. Very systematic and strong.
- This is an important cleavege
- Also civil rights.
- ational/international elite: sovereignism→ This one is important, is present but
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still not that systematic.
- Populist parties vs. populist discourses →Populist partiesand discourses are not
the same. Discourses have been more and more adopted by traditional parties as a
part of natural flow of political competition. They may be tempted to include them in
the political platform. Disconnection between populist parties and populist
discourses. Example: LR.
- A descriptive or a normative category ?
- He wants to discuss the empirical evidence with the relationship between that
and the growing of inequalities.
udde (2004: 543):
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“populism considers society to be separated into two relatively homogeneous
and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’,
and argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people”
Positive valorization of ‘the people’ and denigration of ‘the elite’
>
> Antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite
> The idea of popular sovereignty
> The ambiguity of political platforms on socio-economic issues
votes for populist parties
%
at recent parliament elections (last update 2019)
- An old & new phenomenon
-votes/seats,
the electoral system and the US
-cross-national differences
-size & political influence
e look at the votes and not at the seats because of the conversions that could be
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misleading.
There are cross national differences.
Size and political influence.
It has been large enough either to achieve government or to force the traditional parties to
form coalitions opposing populism, reinforcing the argument that they are against these
traditional coalitions.
He saw for years a rising trend. Mostly in southern europe.
A by-product of the economic crisis?
The profile of (right-wing) ‘populist voters’
ducation
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Employment, occupation (working class, small proprietors) & income
Perceived economic outlook, status anxiety
Cultural conservatism
Political distrust
arginal voters, political distrust & electoral participation
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Gender & age
The contact hypothesis
- Individuals in poverty vote more for them
- Invdividuals with fixed term contracts and stability also.
- Working class and low income, finding routine occupations also more likely to vote
for these parties.
- The success is also large among fractions of the middle class: artisans, agricultural
self employed workers, entrepreneurs, craftsmen
- Success among independent workers, middle class and also increasingly the upper
classes.
he relationship between this is there but is far from being related to the disadvantage
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groups only.
he level of education→ low education are disproportionately overrrepresented among the
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voters. They are usually found in low income, routine, unskilled jobs.
Political distrust also is really important.
he perception and subjective perception of their economic situation is even more predictive.
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It is not the fact of being economic disadvantage but also the fear of losing your own
position, of losing you own personal economic situation. STATUS ANXIETY. Experiencing a
deterioration of your economic resources and the fear that your nation will experience
economic decline.
easures of cultural conservatism are one of the stronger indicators. Religious, cultural
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identity preservation.
There are other characteristics that may be predictive but now not in such a systematic way.
ender → more debated. For example: TRUMP.
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There is some evidence that there is a gender difference in right wing populist evidence, but
is probably less indicative than the already mention ones.
conomic disadvantage, distrust and electoral participation can be attenuated
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Express their discontent by not voting. Their capacity to mobilise this electors to participate
in national elections
The Rise of populism
Increasing inequalities and the rising political distrust of the ‘marginal’ voters
The emergence of postmaterialist politics
he decline of traditional patterns of class voting and the political repositioning of right-wing
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parties
utting together the trends:the social bases of
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resentment against the elites
- Rising income & wealth inequalities
- Welfare retrenchment, rising unemployment & occupational precarisation
- High & stagnant educational inequalities
- Stagnation of upward mobility
- Credential inflation
EVIDENCE
astor
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There is evidence at a country level
But there is also some outliers that can change this. Countries dthat have stronger economic
decline/economic inequality we see a tendency that people tend to vote for populist policies.
Other Dimensions of inequality
. AUTOR, D. DORN, G. HANSON AND K. MAJLESI (2018):in the US, districts with
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greater exposure to import competition from China elected congressional representatives
with more extreme ideologies and where the Republican party significantly increased its
electoral support in 2016 compared with 2000.
GANGL 2018:economic cycles, unemployment, political trust and populist voting
ROTZER 2019: “swings in support towards Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election
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among US counties were significantly related to low social mobility (but not to inequality or
the presence of immigrants). Second, vote shares for Marine Le Pen in the second round of
the 2017 French Presidential election among the 41 largest departments were significantly
related to poor social mobility (but not income inequality or the presence of immigrants).
Third, vote shares for populist parties in the 2019 European Parliament elections were
significantly related to social mobility but not the alternative hypotheses”
CICCOLINI:at the individual level, a status loss predicts voting for right-wing populist parties
lobalisation promotes more inequaliry. Incrreased competition either from immigrants or the
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working class of developing countries.
xperiencing downard mobility, loss of status predicts the voting for populist parties.
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It is important to put together the trends, the inequality trends that we have anylse in this
cours and that can constitute the social resentlemnt against political elites.
We tend to think immediately to rising unemployment and occupational precarisation.
ne side citizen are more exposed to a number of risks related to a number of conditions
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and on the other side we have seen that this has been weakening.
The decline of class voting
Structural Transformations - Materialistic explanations
Material and cultural explanatrions both talk about voters, but what about the parties.
he decline of class voting→ the connection, the association of the social class and the
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propensity to vote for right or left parties
hey do not relate that much anymore.
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Today it is possible to consider that massive fractionsof
Disconnexion of this groups from the traditional progressive platforms
- the profile of people that we define as working class is radically different. Is much less an
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industrial working class, is more a service sector working class. It is madre much less of
industrial worker in manufacturing and more people that work at macdonalds.
2- It is much more precarious
his three factors all together make the capacity of the working class to actually be able to
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act as a unitary manner has declined.
he decline of trade unions → key political actor connectimng the workng class and the left
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political prties.
aining votes from the working class only is no more feasible. They had to reconfigurate
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their offer and so on. They increasingly need to attract these voters from the middle classes.
Postmaterialist theory (Inglehart)
Overview of the Theory
Inglehart’spostmaterialist theorysuggests that associeties experience greater levels of
economic growth and material security, people’s values shift frommaterialistconcerns
(such as economic security, job stability, and physical survival) topostmaterialistvalues
(such as self-expression, individual autonomy, environmental protection, and quality of life).
his shift, Inglehart argued, occurs because individuals in wealthier and more secure
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societies no longer have to prioritize survival and economic needs. Instead, they begin to
focus on higher-order needs related to self-expression and personal fulfillment. The theory is
particularly concerned with how these changing values impact political behavior, social
movements, and party preferences.
Key Concepts
1. Materialist vs. Postmaterialist Values:
○ Materialist values: These focus on basic economicand physical needs, such
as economic growth, job security, and national defense. People who hold
these values tend to prioritize stability and survival over individual freedoms
or social issues.
○ Postmaterialist values: These emphasize self-expression,individual rights,
environmental protection, and quality of life. People with postmaterialist
values are more likely to advocate for environmental sustainability, gender
equality, cultural diversity, and democratic freedoms.
2. Cohort Replacement:
Inglehart’s theory posits that the shift from materialist to postmaterialist values occurs
gradually as younger generations, who grow up in more prosperous and secure
societies, replace older generations who experienced economic hardship (e.g.,
uring wars or economic crises). As younger generations prioritize postmaterialist
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concerns, society as a whole moves toward postmaterialist values.
3. The Value Change:
According to Inglehart, these value changes are not just temporary or superficial.
They arelong-term cultural shiftsthat affect socialattitudes, political ideologies,
and electoral behavior. The theory also links these shifts topolitical participation
andactivism, where postmaterialist values often correlatewith support for social
movements, environmental causes, and progressive political parties.
. Impact on Political Systems:
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The rise of postmaterialist values has led to a new kind of political activism, where
traditional political conflicts (center-left vs. center-right) become supplemented or
replaced by new dimensions of political conflict, such as social issues (e.g., LGBTQ
rights, environmental protection). Inglehart’s work is instrumental in explaining the
rise of new political parties and movements that focus on non-economic issues.
The Value Map
Inglehart created avalue mapto categorize countriesand individuals based on their
dominant value orientation (materialist vs. postmaterialist). Countries that experienced rapid
economic growth and high levels of security (e.g., Western Europe, Japan) tend to have a
higher proportion of people with postmaterialist values, while less developed countries or
those experiencing economic insecurity may have a higher proportion of materialist values.
Criticisms and Developments
hile Inglehart’s theory has been influential, it has also been criticized. Some argue that
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economic growth does not automatically lead to a shift toward postmaterialism, and
that factors such as political context, cultural history, or economic inequality can also play a
crucial role in shaping values. Moreover, some scholars have pointed out that economic
insecurity can still coexist with postmaterialist values, especially when new concerns such as
environmentalism or social justice emerge even in economically uncertain times.
Inglehart himself revised his theory over time, especially acknowledging thecomplexity of
cultural changeand the need to consider global contexts.
Conclusion
Inglehart'spostmaterialist theoryis a frameworkfor understanding how economic
development and societal security lead to a shift in values from materialist concerns
(economic survival) to postmaterialist concerns (self-expression and quality of life). This shift
has significant implications for politics, as it leads to new forms of political engagement and
the rise of social movements focused on issues such as human rights and
environmentalism.
Cultural Factors
The individual profile
