Mughal Decline

The Mughal Empire unified the subcontinent under a highly centralized system of
administration for over a century and a half. The issue of the decline of a state, as
large in territory and as magnanimous in dimensions, is naturally one that is a
perennial source of debate.

Various historians and schools of thought present different and divergent views
for the decline of the Mughal Empire in the 18th century. According to M. Alam and
Sanjay Subramanyam, an artificial consensus of sorts has developed on the issue
of the ‘decline’ of the Mughal state and the subsequent transition to colonial rule.
Two distinct approaches have held sway in the study of the dynamics of the
Mughal state in the 18th century. One is seemingly the older fashioned, and focuses
on the personalities of individual rulers and their contribution to this process of
decline. The other approach has been termed by the said scholars as
‘Marxist-flavoured’ history, where ostensibly the primary focus of attention are
institutions rather than individuals. Social groups are identified with particular
material interests and the logic of rise, peak and decline is associated with
tensions stemming from systemic rather than psychological contradictions. The
writings that lie within the framework of this have further been subdivided into
two sub-streams, the first of which studies the tensions between the imperially
appointed, and the numerically caliberated elite under them i.e. the mansabdars
and the amorphous peasant entity. The other strand emphasizes on the tensions
between the state and the rural-based gentry (the zamindars) as the determinants
of the dynamics of the Mughal state, especially in its phase of decline.

The European or colonial historians were among the first to write about the
Mughal state and its alleged decline in the 18th century. They seek to explain the
decline in terms of the overall moral, political, economic degeneration in this
period. Historians like WILLIAM IRVINE sought to explain the decline in terms of a
personal deterioration in the quality of the kings. They rely primarily on the
works of Manucci, Khafi Khan and Bhimsen as source material. The early
nationalist historians, while largely retaining the framework put forth by the
colonial historians, differ in the explanation of the decline. The ‘nationalists’
historians also attempt at understanding the decline in terms of the role of the
new regional power groups that arose in the 18th century. However, right wing
nationalist historians, such as JADUNATH SARKAR, emphasize the role played by
Aurangzeb in accelerating the downfall oh the Mughal state. In his magnum opus
‘History of Auranbgzib’ Sarkar claims that all sections of the Indian society
suffered under the “long and strenuous reign” of Aurangzeb. According to him, the
economic drain was caused due to Aurangzeb’s quarter century of ceaseless
warfare in the Deccan dealt a deathblow to the finances of the Empire. The
pre-occupation with the Deccan also caused a neglect of the state in the North.
This state of constant warfare destroyed the economy internally as trade was
disrupted which in turn brought about the death of indigenous industry. The
jagirdars rack-rented the peasantry, which brought about a falling off in the land
revenue. A diminished income forced a decrease in the armed strength, which in
turn caused great lawlessness. The Empire went bankrupt due to Aurangzeb’s
actions the administration was infested with corruption at every stage. Further,
Sarkar claims that there was a general moral degeneration in the society of the
period. The ruling class was given to vices such as drunkenness and sexual
misconduct. The state was intellectually dwarfed and technologically stagnant
due to the lack of calibre on the part of these men. Sarkar argues that the
Aurangzeb’s orthodox policies such as the order to destroy temples, and the
re-imposition of the jizyah alienated the strongest indigenous ally of the Mughals,
i.e. the Rajputs. This explanation does not lead us beyond the perspective of 17th
century Persian chroniclers, with a difference that Sarkar read evidence of a
‘Hindu reaction’ in the Rathore, Bundela, Maratha and Sikh wars against the
Mughal Empire.

Firstly, it must be mentioned that empirical data states otherwise; the association
of the Rajputs was greatest in terms of numbers under Aurangzeb. The weakening
of the alliance cannot be attributed to Aurangzeb’s orthodoxy. The breach with
Marwar and Mewar was caused because the Emperor tried to interfere in the
problem of succession.

This branch of historiography has also been questioned repeatedly as it tends

assume that historical agency resides principally with the elite, who shape the
empire when talented and cause it’s decline when incompetent. (M. Alam, Sanjay
Subramanyam). No one individual can be singled out and blamed for the downfall
of an entire Empire, as several socio-economic processes operate at various levels
of its existence.Thus, the personality-centered approach (which incidentally,
shares a great deal with the perspective of contemporary Mughal court
chroniclers) is regarded as simplistic by modern historians.

There has been an attempt to look at the institutional reasons to explain the
downfall of the Mughal state in the 18th century. IRFAN HABIB, for instance,
believes that the Mughal state declined due to an agrarian crisis. Habib says that
the 18th century revolts of the Jats. Satnamis, Sikhs and the Afghans that
contributed to the weakening of the Mughal state, were primarily agrarian in
nature. According to Habib, the exploitative nature of the Mughal administration
led to large-scale oppression of the peasantry. He relies primarily on the works of
Bernier.

Habib claims that the Jagir assignments under the Mughals were essentially
assignments of revenue, divorced from permanent rights in land, to be assessed in
terms of money. Since, the military contingents were maintained by the
mansabdar by the revenue collected from the Jagir, the tendency was to set the
revenue demand very high, leaving with the peasant the bare minimum he
required to survive. This appropriation created the great wealth of the Mughal
ruling class. Further, the jagirdar was liable to transfer frequently and did not hold
any Jagir for more than 3-4 years at the most. This he described as the structural
flaw in the jagirdari system. The jagirdar thus had no interest in a far-sighted
policy of agricultural development. Any act of oppression, as long as it conferred
an immediate benefit was sanctioned as long as the revenue demand was met.
This “reckless exploitation” of the peasantry often forced them to migrate to the
urban areas, in the hope of better employment. The peasantry was driven to a
point where it could choose between slavery, starvation and armed struggle. The
peasant unrest was transformed with the intervention of the zamindari class,
which had it’s own reasons for opposing the Mughal ruling class. The main point
of conflict between the zamindars and the imperial authorities was the size of the
latter’s share in the land revenue or surplus produce. The political role of the
zamindars was also accentuated due to the fact that they were often leaders of
caste groups and also, often had arms at their disposal. Habib claims that the
revolts of the Jats (under Aurangzeb), the Satnamis (1672), Sikhs, Bundelas, and
Kolis were all agrarian protests. The rebellious groups were all peasant groups
and more often than not, they targeted the symbols of imperial authority, the
zamindars. The Marathas, who undoubtedly represented the single largest force
responsible for the downfall of the Mughals, also represented the oppressed and
discontent peasant class. This is evident in the fact that their army comprised of
the “destitute peasantry of the dakhin”. Habib proclaims that it was indeed
peasant distress that was the root of these rebellions that shook the Mughal
Empire to its foundations.

SATISH CHANDRA holds that it was because of a structural flaw in the jagirdari
system that the Mughal state declined. The jagirdari system was linked to the
social and economic relations and specifically to the agrarian relations and the
administrative super structure reared on these relations. In the 17th century,
there was a rapid increase in the size of the ruling class and subsequently the
demand for mansabs rose. The long established khaanzaadas, sheikhzaadas,
mansabdars; zamindars all hankered for royal service and were discontent with
the situation. They naturally blamed the new entrants in the Imperial service,
especially, those from the Deccan. Availability of the revenues to be assigned and
the ability of the Mughals to collect them thus became the two crucial
pre-requisites for an effective working of the system. S. Chandra claims that the
shortage of paibaqi land caused the jagiridari system to break down because not
enough lands were available to meet the sharply enhanced demand. This problem
was worsened by the fact that the nobles refused to accept viran Jagir or
waste/fallow land as jagirs.

ATHAR ALI provided quantitative support to Satish Chandra’s study. They claim
that the decline of the Mughal Empire resulted from the conflict within the
imperial elite due to a shortage of resources to pay them with. In addition, Ali
provides fresh perspective on the issue of the eclipse of the Mughals in the 18th
century. He claims that the 18th century also witnessed the downfall of the Safavid
Empire, the Uzbek Khanate and even the mighty Ottoman Empire began its career
of slow inexorable decline. The fact that the same fate overcomes all the large
Islamic Empire at precisely the same time cannot be ignored. In terms of value, he
argues, long distance trade must have contributed a sizeable portion of the gross
product of all the said economies. Iran declined as a market and this was bound to
have serious repercussions on the economies of Eastern countries on the whole.
The parasitical urban Indian population was based on the expropriation of
agrarian surplus and Mughal empire fell prey to the ‘million headed’ zamindars
and peasant rebels. The technological backwardness of the Mughals served to
accelerate their downfall. Thus two processes were at work in this context. The
failure of the Mughal Empire seemed to derive essentially from the cultural failure
shared with the Islamic world. This failure in turn rendered the Empire incapable
to grapple with the internal agrarian crisis and tilted the balance in favour of
Europe well before the actual colonization took place.

J. F. RICHARDS critiques both S.Chandra and Athar Ali as they hold the economic
squeeze resulting from Aurangzeb’s conquests of Bijapur, Golconda and the
Maratha kingdom responsible for the decline. He points out that certain
assumptions are inherent in this explanation. Firstly, the decline is treated as an
inevitable consequence of irreversible policy, and secondly, that the principle ties
between the Empire and its leading servants were economic or monetary in
character. Richards believes that policy miscalculations led to the creation of an
artificial shortage of Jagirs and inattention to newly incorporated warrior elites in
the south. According to Richards, the Empire need not have collapsed due to
paucity of resources simply because the enhanced demand arising from a rise in
the nobility would have been more than made up for by the by the expansion of
the Mughal empire in the Deccan and the South. The Mughal state declined due
the inability on part of Aurangzeb to stabilize his southern frontiers and
successfully utilize the resources of Bijapur and Golconda to meet the additional
costs. Aurangzeb also failed to incorporate the local landed elements of the
Marathas (deshpandes, patil) the Bedar, Gond and Telugu warriors (the vellanas,
reddis). This inability to create effective political ties with the local lords led to
open revolt. Based on a case study of Golconda under Aurangzeb, Richards
declares that there was no shortage of jagirs, however an artificial delay had been
caused due to administrative delays in the implementation of orders to grant
Jagirs to the imperial elite. Further, the most lucrative lands had been reserved as
khalisa land the revenue from which was to be in future campaigns. Richards’s
claims that Aurangzeb’s expansion in the Deccan was a purely military measure,
not backed up by administrative efforts, he describes the situation as one of
over-exploitation and under administration. The discontent mansabdars allied
with the opposing factions and plundering raids by local elements such as the
Marathas made the administration of the Mughal impossible. Thus, the collapse of
the Mughal state cannot be attributed to a jagirdari crisis but to incomplete
administrative control and political administration of the newly conquered areas.

Richards’ contribution is significant as it led S. Chandra to revise his explanatory

model. Post revision, S.Chandra declared that the basis of the ‘Mughal stability’
was the tri-polar alliance that developed between the central government, the
zamindars and the cultivators (khudkastas). This stability would last as long as
the Mughal government could convince the zamindars that it was more profitable
for the latter to seek support in the Government for the redress of their
grievances, rather than resist it. The jagirdari system was a complex phenomenon
that was closely linked to the working of the Mughal administration at the local
and the central levels as well as the village society. The peasantry felt alienated in
this alliance. Chandra declared the crisis of the jagirdari system should not be
confused with bejagiri, which affected the new entrants rather than the existing
incumbents. Further, it was not frequent transfer of the jagirdars, but the lack of
them that brought about the crisis. This is because the jagirs became hereditary
and this was followed by the gradual weakening of the administrative checks that
left the landowners and cultivators at the mercy of the new jagirdars and the
zamindars, thus paving the way for the disintegration of the Empire. Thus, central
to the growth of the crisis of the jagirdari system, as suggested by Chandra, was its
non-functionality.

Chetan Singh and Satish Chandra also point out the role of ‘caste’ as an institution
in the various revolts against the Mughal state. For instance, the Sikhs directed
their attack against the Rajputs, who constituted the predominant zamindar class.
The Marathas emerged and drew their strength form the lower classes, i.e. the
kolis and the kumbis. They try to analyse these movements in terms of their social
base, and term it as a social crisis. M. Alam also claims that zamindars were
sharply divided among themselves on caste, clan, and territorial lines and were
perpetually at war with each other M.N. PEARSON claims that it was the rebellion
by the Marathas in the ‘seat of trouble- Deccan’, that dealt the deathblow to the
Mughal empire. Athar Ali also claims that the move to the Deccan was an
indication of weakness of the Central administration. Pearson notices basic flaw in
the Mughal system, Mughal rule, he argues, was very ‘indirect’ and it was not state
control but local ties and norms that governed the lives of most people ordinarily
except the nobility, for which, other ‘primordial attachments’ assumed second
priority. The nobles were bound to the Empire by ‘patronage’ that depended on
the ‘constant military success’ of the Emperor. Pearson argues that because of the
centrality of the military concerns in the military upper levels of the state, there
was no alternative but to respond aggressively to a military challenge. The move
south was thus, a final and desperate attempt to crush a formidable enemy, which
had already inflicted humiliating defeats on the Empire. Pearson claims that the
only ties that existed between the 8000 mansabdars (who, he insists, were the
Empire), were those of loyalty and patronage. Thus, Pearson argues that military
efforts in the south and the defeats inflicted by Shivaji decisively affected the
loyalty of the nobles and this impersonalised bureaucracy spelt doom for the
Empire. PETER HARDY maintains that the Mughal Empire in India failed on its
own terms, long before the East India Company established it a colony here.
Certainly, the military ethos of the Empire is relevant to that failure. He seeks to
explain the decline in terms of the control over internal and external trade routes.
The Mughal decline has also been explained in terms of the participation of
certain groups, conventionally regarded as non-political. KAREN LEONARD
proposes the ‘Great Firm’ theory of the decline of the Mughal Empire. This theory,
which relies on secondary sources for its comprehensive database, extends the
existing economic theories of the decline. Leonard speaks about the role of
groups, which were not conventionally political in nature but played an important
socio-economic role, such as the bankers. Indigenous banking firms were
indispensable allies of the Mughal Empire, and it was the diversion of resources of
the great firms, from the Mughals to other nascent regional polities in the
subcontinent, that led to bankruptcy and contributed to the decline. Leonard
claims that the bankers decided to switch sides as the Mughal states failed to
protect their interests in the second half of the 17th century. She cites Shivaji’s raid
on Surat in 1664 as an example. Thus, the financiers of the Empire, when decided
to extend support either to local regional political powers or to Europeans,
accelerated the downfall of the Mughal state. However, many of the nobles
themselves had an interest in trade, or sauda i khass.

Societal ‘crisis’ is the dominant theme in the writings of Cantwell Smith,

K.M.Ashraf, Irfan Habib and Athar Ali. The Mughal Empire, according to them,
declined as society failed to produce enough surplus to sustain a vast, all-India
polity. In other words, economic failures, at least coincided with, if not preceded,
political decline.

It is pertinent to stress on two hitherto neglected points. The argument is that the
Mughal state evolved throughout this period, and had not been ‘perfected’ by
1600 as is often assumed. Secondly, the incorporation of new regions necessitated
adjustments to local conditions, so that the state eventually resembled a
‘patchwork quilt’ rather than a ‘wall to wall’ carpet. (M. Alam, Sanjay
Subramanyam)

The situation, which developed in the country following the collapse of the Mughal
Empire, must be discussed at this juncture in order to progress forward in the
discussion. Post the fall off the Empire two kinds of states emerged. The first
category comprised those Riyasats, which were set up by the Mughal subahdars
and ambitious nobles who, after seizing control, exercised power almost as
independent potentates. These were the states of Bengal, Hyderabad, Awadh and
for some time Punjab. The heads of these states, acknowledged Mughal suzerainty,
and were content to call themselves ‘Nawabs’. A second rung of successor states
comprised those that had come into existence in course of popular rebellions or
the movements against the Mughal States These were the states of the Marathas,
Jats, Afghans and later the Sikhs. (Satish Chandra)
In order to comprehend the next argument, it is pertinent to give a quick survey
of the successor states of the Mughal empire.

Awadh – Muzaffar alam’s work on Awadh suggests marked economic growth and
prosperity, prevalence of a cash nexus and monetization. Culturally, the region
remained very Mughalized: the emperor remained the refernce point of legitimacy
until the early 19th century. The regional orientation of this erstwhile suba led to
the emergence of the ‘Awadhi culture’.
Hyderabad- according to Leonard, Hyderabad polity was based upon patron client
relationship between the ruler and his nobles. The Nizam benefited from the
presence of an active mercantile community and Mughal emperor remained the
high ref pt of legitimacy.

Bengal- experienced considerable economic growth under the Mughal subedars-

murshid Quli khan etc, esp in context of the pre-colonial trade, and profits derived
from the European trading companies.later studies focus on the agrarian based
regimes. Bengal’s prosperity contd till the middle of the century.

Recent scholarship has questioned the very basis of the decline theory. Historians
like Satish Chandra, Seema Alavi and Chris Bayly claim that the Mughal state did in
fact, not decline, but continued in various manifestations of administrative and
cultural traditions in the various successor states. Seema Alavi writes that the
fixing of the historians gaze on the imperial center alone takes no cognizance of
the diverse ways in which Mughal institutions were being adapted at the regional
level, preparing the way for a shift of power away from Delhi. The regional
polities realignments were explained within the framework of the Mughal system.
Pervical Spear insists that the Mughal Empire was still strong and effective to the
end of Aurangzeb’s reign, and even beyond. According to Satish Chandra, despite
the visible weakening of the Empire, many of the economic and administrative
institutions of the Mughal Empire continued over the bulk of the country in an
attenuated form, for instance, the Ruhela chieftain entrusted their revenue
collection in the hands of the diwans and the munshis. The 18th century, says
Chandra, was economically, culturally and even politically a continuation of the
trends visible during the 17th century rather than a preparation for the state of
colonial economy that developed during the 19th century. M.Alam highlights the
fact that the symbols of the Empire continued to be persuasive, even though the
power, which had promoted them, decayed. Social, political realities of the 18th
century continued to require reference to at least the semblance of an imperial
centre. The collapse of the central government, according to Alam, was
accompanied by restabilization in certain regions and this was achieved almost
within the Mughal institutional framework. In other words, the consensus among
regional powers or ‘successor states’ to maintain Mughal imperial symbols to
obtain legitimacy and thus the stability and security of their spoils- all indicated
the 18th century endeavour to make use of the possibilities for growth within
existing social structures. The whole notion of the cataclysmic event of the decline
of the Mughal state raises questions about the very nature of the state itself, it is
now increasingly being viewed as a process rather than a centralized political
form (Subramanyam)The fact that the Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar II was
declared the leader of the Revolt of 1857, when the nadir, allegedly, had been
reached, goes to show the extent of popular legitimacy the Mughals enjoyed in the
eyes of the people.
The question of the fall of the Mughal Empire is arguably one of the most fiercely
debated issues in Mughal historiography. The fact that the notion of the ‘decline’
of the Mughal state itself is being re-analysed and questioned, complicates the
issue further. It is simplistic to insist on the existence of a single logic that
explains a phenomenon so complex as the decline of the great Mughal Empire. No
mono- causal explanation shall suffice in this regard as the very occurrence of the
alleged process is being re-examined.