1 Douglas C. Smith, Esq.
(SBN 160013) Exemptfrom Filing Fees Per
Karen L. Capasso, Esq. (SBN 226655) Gov't Code Section 6103
2 SMITH LAW OFFICES, LLP
4001 Eleventh Street
3
Riverside, CA9250l
4 Telephone: (95 1) 509-1 355
Facsimile: (95 1) 509-l 356
5 dsmith@smitlaw.com
kcapasso@smitlaw.com
6
1 Attorney for Defendant
MATTHEW SHANNON
8
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9
10 FOR THE COI-]NTY OF RIVERSIDE
11 BRENDA DENNSTEDT, an individual ) Case No.: CVRI2200885
L2
) [Assigned to Hon. Daniel Ottolia, Dept. 4]
Plaintiff, )
13 ) DEFENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S
vs. ) NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION F'OR
L4 ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE
COLTNTY OF RIVERSIDE, a Public Entity; ) ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY
15
JEFFREY HEWITT, an individual; ) ADJUDICATION; AND MEMORANDUM
L6 MATTHEW SHANNON, an individual, and ) OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
DOES I through 25, inclusive, )
T7 ) IRESERVATION ID: 362098 6097 901
Defendants. )
18
) DA TE 316124
I9 TIME: 8:30 a.m.
DEPT. 4
20
[Filed Concurrently with Separate Statement of
2L
Undisputed Material Fact; Notice of Filing
22
Exhibits; Declarations of Karen L. Capasso,
Esq. and Matthew Shannonl
23
Complaintfiled 3/3/23
24
25 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE and notice is hereby given, that on March 6,2024 at 8:30 a.m., or
26 as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard in Department"4" of the above-entitled Court, located at
27 4050 Main Street in Riverside, California, Defendant MATTHEW SHANNON ("Shannon") will,
2B and does hereby move this Court, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure ("C.C.P.") $ 437c,
DEFENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S NOTICE OF MOTION AI{D MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
1
for an order granting summary judgment on the entirety of the Complaint of Plaintiff BRENDA
2
DENNSTEDT ("Dennstedt") in Shannon's favor and against Plaintiff, or alternatively, summary
3
adjudication as to each cause ofaction:
4
This Motion is based on the grounds that no triable issues of material fact exist as to Plaintiff
tr
Dennstedt's Complaint as to Shannon in its entirety or as to the causes of action alleged therein, and
6
that Shannon is therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, Shannon
1
moves for summary judgment on the entirety of Plaintiff s Complaint against him, or alternatively,
8 on each and every cause of action against Shannon in Plaintiff s Complaint on the following grounds:
9 Plaintiff s sixth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails as
10 Shannon did not engage in any extreme and outrageous conduct toward Dennstedt, did not intend to
11 inflict emotional distress on Dennstedt; and Dennstedt also did not suffer any severe emotional
72 distress. No issue of material fact exists as to whether Shannon intentionally inflicted emotional
13 distress upon Dennstedt.
L4 Plaintiff s seventh cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress fails as
15 Matthew Shannon did not owe or breach any duty owed to Dennstedt; and Dennstedt did not suffer
L6 serious emotional distress.
17 This Motion will be based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment or,
18 in the Altemative, for Summary Adjudication, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and
19 Authorities in support thereof, the concurrently filed Separate Statement of Undisputed Material
20 Facts, Notice of Filing of Exhibits, the accompanying Declarations of Matthew Shannon and Karen
2L Capasso and the exhibits filed herewith, all pleadings, papers, and records on file in this matter,
22 Defendant Shannon's reply brief, and upon any oral and/or documentary evidence that may be
z3 presented at the hearing of this Motion.
24 DATED: December 22, 2023 SMITH LLP
25
By
26
Karen L. Capasso
21 Attorneys for Defendant
MATTHEW SHANNON
28
DEFENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
1
RANDUM OF POINTS AND A
2
L
3
INTRODUCTION
4
Plaintiff Brenda Dennstedt ("Dennstedt") was hired by Defendant Matthew Shannon
5 ("Shannon") in January of 2020 to work as a Legislative Assistant in the office of Riverside County
6
Supervisor Jeff Hewitt. Mr. Shannon made every effort to help Dennstedt succeed in her position and
'7
maintained a friendly relationship with her. Dennstedt, however, continually refused to follow
8 directives and attempted to use her position in the Supervisor's office to gain benefits and special
9 treatment for herself and her loved ones. As a result, she was released from her employment. After
10 her release, Dennstedt filed this action against the County, Hewitt and Shannon claiming she was
11 harassed and mistreated during her employment, despite never making any complaints prior to her
L2 release. Dennstedt's Complaint asserts only two common law causes of action against individual
13 defendant Matthew Shannon: intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of
L4 emotional distress. In fact, there was never any intent by Shannon to inflict emotional distress or
15 negligent causation of emotional distress, nor did Dennstedt suffer extreme emotional distress.
L6 Dennstedt was simply a disgruntled employee who became unhappy with the way her supervisors
I7 were running the office because it differed from how she thought it should be run and she was not
18 allowed to get away with her improper conduct. Shannon in no way intended to or negligently caused
I9 her emotional distress and is therefore entitled to summary judgment on all causes of action.
20 I
2L FACTUAL BACKGROUND SUPPORTING SUMMARY
aa JUDGMENT OR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
z5 Plaintiff Brenda Dennstedt was hired by the County of Riverside in March of 2019 as a
24 Legislative Assistant in Riverside County Supervisor Jeffrey Hewitt's Offrce (SS 6). Dennstedt's
25 duties included acting as a liaison to the County's public safety departments, including the Sheriff s
26 Department, Fire Department and Code Enforcement Department, as well as addressing constituent
issues with those departments. The public safety liaison assignment was given to Dennstedt due to
28
her experience in law enforcement (SS 7-8). Densest had no involvement with or responsibility for
DEFENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
1
Mr. Hewitt's campaign, including the completion or review of campaign forms (SS 12-13).
z
Matthew "Boomer" Shannon was Supervisor Hewitt's Chief of Staff from Jaruary 2019
3
through January 2023. His duties included managing the staffs day-to-day activities, along with my
4
portfolio of projects-mainly special issues such as redistricting, coordinating events, and escalated
tr
J
constituent concerns. (SS 4-5). He hired Dennstedt and was her supervisor throughout the time she
6
was employed by the County. (SS 6, 9).
1
Dennstedt had many problems with her performance which eventually led to her termination.
8 First, she tried to obtain inappropriate benefits for her romantic partner, a County Code Enforcement
9 Officer, on multiple occasions. She then attempted to obtain Class A uniforms for Code Enforcement
10 Officers and her partner's promotion from a low-level management position to director of the
11 department. Again, this was unrelated to her job duties and inappropriate. Shannon had to speak to
L2 the Director of the County Transportation and Land Management Authority (which supervises Code
13 Enforcement) regarding the potential impact on both her department and Supervisor Hewitt's Office.
L4 He also had to remove the Code Enforcement Department from Dennstedt's portfolio to avoid a
15 conflict of interest. (SS 24-29).
L6 Dennstedt actively attempted to arrange these items without reporting them back to Shannon
17 or Supervisor Hewitt. Shannon would find out about her behavior from department heads or other
18 employees. This gave him cause to repeatedly counsel Brenda Dennstedt on her role, the necessity
19 transparency with her superiors, and that it was inappropriate for her to attempt to use the
20 Supervisor's offrce to promote her partner's career. Even after this counseling, she tried to weigh in
21" on tenant improvements at the new Code Enforcement Office being built in Cabazon,seeking better
)) office space for her partner. (SS 30-33).
23 In or around Spring or Summer of 2019, Dennstedt brought Shannon a dossier on a County
an Flood Control employee whom she claimed was inappropriately using County cars and other
25 property. Dennstedt's job was not related to Flood Control in any way and all her experience and job
26 duties were related to law enforcement. After researching the employee, Shannon found she was also
21 an elected official on the Western Municipal Water District ("WMWD") Board of Directors with
2B
Dennstedt, and there was a political issue between Dennstedt and the woman. When Dennstedt
DEFENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION F'OR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
1
delivered the paperwork to Shannon, she stated "She should be fired for this behavior," meaning the
2
employee should be terminated from her position with Flood Control. It was clear to Mr. Shannon
3
that Dennstedt's intent was to have the woman removed from the WMWD Board of Directors. After
4
reviewing the file, he spoke to the Director of Flood Control about Dennstedt's concerns and closed
5
the matter as it lacked merit. Dennstedt's political career was not within the scope of her work for
6
Supervisor Hewiu. (SS 34-40).
1 Dennstedt also had problems interacting with coworkers. She was abusive toward the junior
8 staff and made inappropriate comments, including calling a Black female coworker "nappy."
9 Numerous staff complained to Shannon regarding Dennstedt's conduct, and he repeatedly counseled
10 her regarding appropriate conduct in the workplace. (SS 41-44).
11 In or around mid-October of 2020, Supervisor Hewitt's Office was conducting a Community
I2 Cleanup event in Cabazon. This involved coordinating involvement from various County
13 departments regarding the organization and operation of the event. Dennstedt's job was to coordinate
L4 with the Sheriff s Department to provide traffic control, something they had done many times
1-5 previously for similar events. Dennstedt planned to have Code Enforcement Officers go door to door
16 in the surrounding community to ask people to bring out their trash. She then stated in a staff meeting
I1 she wanted to have Sheriff s officers do door-to-door visits. Shannon told Dennstedt they were not
18 allowed to send Sheriff s officers to people's doors and the SherifPs Department involvement was to
L9 be limited to traffic control. He subsequently had a call with the Sheriff s Captain who informed him
20 Dennstedt had asked him to provide door-to-door staffing. Shannon told him that would not be
2t needed and that their role was to serve as traffic control. He then counseled Dennstedt about ignoring
zz his instructions and agun advised her the SherifPs Department could absolutely not conduct door-to-
23 door visits and their involvement was limited to traffic control. (SS 45-53).
24 After the issue with the Sheriff s Department, Mr. Hewitt and Mr. Shannon decided the
25 County could not continue to employ Dennstedt. Shannon contacted Human Resources for guidance
26 and advised them of the reasons they wanted to release Dennstedt from employment. Human
21
Resources approved and arranged for Dennstedt's release. Human Resources prepared a release letter
28
for Dennstedt, which Shannon approved and signed. The Human Resources employee and Shannon
DEFENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
1
then met with Dennstedt at the County Administrative Center in downtown Riverside and advised
2
of her termination on October 26,2020. Human Resources arranged a time with Dennstedt to retrieve
3
her belongings from her office in Perris. Dennstedt received the maximum allowable severance
4
package at the time of her release. (SS 54-62).
5
Following her release from employment, Dennstedt filed this lawsuit alleging Mr. Shannon
6 harassed her and caused her emotional distress (though she does not bring a cause of action for
1 harassment against Mr. Shannon) (SS 1-3). She had not made any complaints of harassment to
8 Shannon during her employment (SS 66-83). Her only allegations are vague claims of inappropriate
9 comments or conversations and one incident where she claims Mr. Shannon dressed inappropriately
10 in a bathrobe. She then used the lawsuit as a political tool, sending text messages to thousands of
11 citizens claiming she had been unlawfully fired by Hewitt's office (SS 97-98). Dennstedt's claims
1-2 lack merit for the reasons set forth below.
13 ilL
I4 LEGAL AUTHORITY
15 Summary judgment is warranted where there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the
16 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Code Civ. Proc., $ 437c(c). The purpose of
L1 summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in
18 order to determine, despite the allegations, whether trial is in fact necessary to resolve the dispute.
L9 Aguilar v. Atlantic RichJield Co. (2001)25 Cal.4th826,843. To succeed on summary judgment, a
ZU defendant need not affirmatively disprove the plaintiff s case. Rather, the defendant meets its burden
27 if it demonstrates that the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of the cause of action. Id. A
22 plaintiff "may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue o
23 material fact exists, but instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of
z4 material fact exists as to the cause of action." Code Civ. Proc., $ a37c(pX2).
25 Summary adjudication is appropriate if it disposes of an entire cause of action, affirmative
26 defense, claim for damages, or legal dvty. Code Civ. Proc. $ a37c(f)(l). Summary judgment motions
t'1 are defined by the material allegations in the pleadings. Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th
28
l5l,159.
DEFENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JT]DGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
1
IV.
2
ARGUMENT
A.3 Shannon Is Entitled to Summarv Judsment Adiudication as to Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of
4
Action for Intentional of Emotional Distress.
Jtr
Dennstedt's sixth cause of action against Shannon is for intentional infliction of emotional
6
distress. The essential elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are:
1 "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless
8 disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff s suffering severe or
9 extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the
10 defendant's outrageous conduct." Davidsonv. City of Westminster (1982)32Ca1.3d197,209; CACI
11 1600. Dennstedt cannot prove any of these elements.
L2 1. Shannon Did Not Engaqe in Anv Extreme and Outrageous Conduct (Intentional or
13 Unintentional).
L4 "Extreme and outrageous conduct is that which goes beyond all possible bounds of decency
15 so as to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Davidson v. City
L6 of Westminster, supra, 32 Cal.3d at209-210; CACI 1602. *lt is generally held that there can be no
L7 recovery for mere profanity, obscenity, or abuse, without circumstances of aggravation, or for insults,
18 indignities or threats . . . On the spectrum of offensive conduct, outrageous conduct is that which is
T9 most extremely offensive . . . offensive conduct which falls along the remainder of the spectrum may
20 be initating, insulting or even distressing but it is not actionable ..." Yurick v. Superior Court (1989)
2L 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, I128-1129. "Insults, indignities, annoyances, petty oppressions or other
22 trivialities will not suffice. The conduct must be such that it would cause an average member of the
community to immediately react in outrage." Gomon v. TRW, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th116I,1172.
24 Employment situations in which the employee finds conduct by her employer offensive do not
25 constitute outrageous conduct sufficient to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of
26 emotional distress. Helgeson v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 44 F.Supp.2d 1091, 1095-97 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
zt [insulting statements and termination do not constitute outrageous conduct]; Schneider v. TRW, Inc.
2B 19th Cir. I99l) 938 F.2d 986,992-993 [no outrageous conduct where an employee's supervisor
DEFENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
1
screamed, yelled and made threatening gestures while criticizing her job performancef; Ankeny v.
2
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 53l, 536-537 [no outrageous conduct where a
3
plaintiff alleged his employer prevented him from becoming a union steward, transferred him from
4 job to job, wrongly denied him promotions, assigned him inappropriate job tasks, and personally
Jtr
insulted himl; Yurickv. Superior Court,209 Cal.App.3d 1116 (1989) [comments that plaintiff
6
employee was over forty and senile did not give rise to claim for intentional infliction of emotional
7 distressl.
8 Dennstedt alleges Shannon committed "wrongful acts" towards her including "harsh
9 treatment, beratement, and sexual harassment of Plaintiff; being put in various uncomfortable
10 situations on almost a daily basis, including being subject to uncomfortable and inappropriate
11- conversations which both Hewitt and Shannon participated in ... yelled at her frequently, threatened
I2 her employment, and ultimately helped facilitate her isolation and ultimately her retaliatory
13 dismissal" with the intention of causing severe emotional distress to Dennstedt. No specific conduct
L4 is cited as evidence of the above allegations other than her release from employment. (Complaint,
1tr
]J Exhibit 1,'l]fl 81-82). Shannon denies engaging in any such conduct. As set forth above, however,
L6 law is clear that insults and employment actions up to and including termination do not support a
L7 cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Here, Dennstedt was released from
18 employment because of performance issues and inappropriate conduct (SS 24-62). There is no
I9 evidence of improper conduct by Shannon other than Dennstedt's own unsubstantiated allegations,
20 Shannon never intended to cause Dennstedt any emotional distress (SS 88, 92). There is simply no
2L evidence of extreme or outrageous conduct.
22 Dennstedt was released for good cause due to her performance issues. Her termination had
23 nothing to do with any complaints she may have made during her County employment. Mr. Shannon
24 had no knowledge of any such complaints (SS 63-66, 78,96.) Mr. Shannon did not engage in any
4tr, inappropriate conduct toward her, including making comments regarding her physical appearance or
26 her dating life or speaking to her in a sexually suggestive way. (SS 75-76, 89-91.) Dennstedt herself
a'7 was outspoken and spoke repeatedly about her dating life in the office. (SS 77.) Even assuming
2B
arguendo that he had engaged in the conduct alleged it the Complaint, that conduct does not rise to
DEFENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
1
the level of extreme or outrageous conduct. Dennstedt never complained she was being mistreated
2
during her employment, only after her release when she could use those complaints for personal and
3
political advantage (SS 78-83, 97-98.) Dennstedt was not treated any differently than any other
4
employee in the Office, other than being given certain accommodations due to her life circumstances.
5
(SS 67-73, 84-87.) There is certainly no conduct here that rises to the level of the extreme or
6
outrageous standard required for this cause ofaction.
1 Regarding the robe incident alleged in Dennstedt's Complaint, Mr. Shannon did attend a
8 Zoom staff meeting in March of 2020 wearing a bathrobe while quarantined at home and very ill with
9 COVID. He had a high fever and was asleep at home when he was asked to attend aZoom meeting to
10 discuss staff s concerns about the COVID virus. He immediately joined the meeting and discussed
11 with his staff their concerns and the steps the County was taking to address COVID. (SS l8-20.) The
I2 bathrobe he was wearing was no more revealing than standard clothing commonly worn to the office
13 and his behavior was not sexual in any way. Mr. Shannon's dress on that occasion was clearly due to
I4 his severe illness and not meant to offend Dennstedt or any other staff. (SS 2l-23.) Such conduct
oobeyond
15 does not rise to the level of extreme or outrageous conduct which goes all possible bounds
76 of decency." Davidson, srrpra, at209-210.
L7 2. Plaintiff Did Not Suffer Severe Emotional Distress.
18 Severe emotional distress means emotional distress of such substantial or enduring quality
L9 that no reasonable person in civilized society should be expected to endure it. Potter v. Firestone Tire
20 & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th965,1004; Girard v. Ball (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d772,787-788.
2L Factors that substantiate severe emotional distress include: the inability to work; the inability to pay
22 bills; and permanent loss of function from the inability to obtain needed medical care. Hailey v.
23 California Physicians' Service (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 452, 477 . Testimony of plaintiffs that they
24 were upset, disturbed and furious does not meet the requisite test. Fuentes v. Perez (1977) 66
atr Cal.App.3d 170,172. Furthermore, recovery for worry, distress and unhappiness as the result of
26 damage to property, loss of a job or loss of money is not permitted when the defendant's conduct is
27
negligent because emotional distress is part of the human condition. Branch v. Homefed Bank (1992)
ao 6 Cal.App.4th793,80l.
DEF'ENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENTO OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
1
In the present litigation, Dennstedt claims she "suffered severe emotional distress."
2
(Complaint, Exhibit 1,!T83.) Despite Dennstedt's alleged emotional distress, she was able to work in
3
her position with the County until her release, years after the allegedly offensive conduct began. She
4
was also able to work continually in her position with the Water District (SS 103). She did not seek
5
any medical treatment for her alleged severe emotional distress, nor did she require any medication.
6 (SS 100-102). kry emotional distress Dennstedt suffered was not the type of emotional distress that
7
significantly altered her normal activities. She was clearly able to fully function normally despite any
8 anger or upset she allegedly suffered due to the alleged actions of Mr. Shannon. She therefore did not
9 suffer severe emotional distress within the meaning of this particular cause of action.
10 B. Shannon Is Entitled to Summarv J or Adiudication as to Plaintiffs Seventh
11 Cause of Action for Neelisent Infliction of Emotional Distress
L2 There is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress; rather, such a claim
13 is inherently a negligence claim. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th965,984;
L4 Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064,1072. Recovery for negligent infliction of
15 emotional distress is generally permissible only where physical injury occurs. The California
16 Supreme Court has allowed negligent infliction of emotional distress actions of "direct victims"
I7 without physical injury in only three specific types of specialized factual situations: (l) the negligent
18 mishandling of corpses (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 879); (2) the negligent
L9 misdiagnosis of a syphilis, resulting in severe emotional distress to spouse (Molien v. Kaiser
20 Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Ca1.3d916,923); and (3) the negligent breach of a duty arising out
2L of a preexisting relationship (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1076).
22 In order to prevail on a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, therefore,
23 Dennstedt must prove (1) Shannon was negligent; (2) Dennstedt suffered serious emotional distress;
24 and (3) Shannon's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the serious emotional distress.
25 CACI 1620. "The traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and darnages apply.
26 Whether a defendant owes a duty of care is a question of law. Its existence depends upon the
foreseeability of the risk and upon a weighing of policy considerations for and against the imposition
ao of liability." Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 583, 588.
DEFENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
1
Plaintiff brings this cause of action under a "direct victim" theory, by which "damages for serious
2
emotional distress are sought as a result of a breach of duty owed the plaintiff that is 'assumed by the
3
defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of a relationship between
4
the two."' Burgess, supra, at1073. Dennstedt must therefore prove a negligent breach of a duty
5
arising out of preexisting relationship, as she has not alleged any statutory basis or assumption of a
6
duty by Shannon.
1
Against that background, Dennstedt's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress fails
8 for several reasons. Dennstedt is unable to prove a cause ofaction for negligence as she cannot prove
9 duty, breach or causation. Mr. Shannon owed no duty to Dennstedt to refrain from engaging in good
10 faith employment actions regarding her. Mr. Shannon did not engage in any acts which constitute any
11 breach of any duty potentially owed to Dennstedt. There is simply no evidence of any breach of duty
12 in this case.
13 Second, as set forth above, Dennstedt herself is claiming Shannon's conduct was intended to
14 cause her emotional distress, and intentional conduct is inconsistent with a claim for negligent
15 causation of emotional distress. A supervisor's conduct in taking employment actions with regard to
I6 an employee is inherently intentional. Semore v. Pool (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1105. Where
1-1 conduct is intentional,"it cannot be used as the basis for a negligent infliction of emotional distress
18 claim." Edwards v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. (N.D. C.A. 1994) 848 F.Supp. 1460,
L9 1466. As Dennstedt is alleging that Shannon intentionally took action to harass and then terminate
20 her, she cannot prove negligent conduct by Shannon. Thirdly, workers' compensation is the exclusi
21 remedy for injuries caused by employer negligence. Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th70l,
7t3-714.
ZJ Finally, as set forth above, Dennstedt is unable to prove that any conduct by Shannon caused
24 her emotional distress, or that she suffered serious emotional distress. "Serious emotional distress" is
25 functionally the same as "severe emotional distress" and the standard is therefore the same as that
26 required to prove a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress . Wong v. Jing
2'7
(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1378. As set forth above regarding Dennstedt's claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, she is unable to prove she suffered severe emotional distress, and
28
DEF'ENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
1
therefore cannot prove she suffered serious emotional distress sufficient to prevail on this cause of
2
action. For all of these reasons, Dennstedt's cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
3
distress fails.
4
V.
5
CONCLUSION
6
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Matthew Shannon requests that the Court grant summary
1 judgment as to Dennstedt's Complaint in its entirely as to Shannon only, or in the altemative
8 sunmary adjudication as to Dennstedt's sixth and seventh causes of action against Shannon.
9
DATED: December 22, 2023 SMITH CES, LLP
1U
11
By
L2
Karen L. Capasso
13 Attorney for Defendant
MATTHEW SHANNON
1"4
15
L6
L'l
18
79
20
2L
22
23
24
25
zo
21
zd
DEFENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
I PROOF'OF SERVICE
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE
J I am employed in the County of Riverside, State of California. I am over the age of 18
and not apar.ry to the within action; my business address is 4001 Eleventh Street, Riverside, CA
4 92s01.
5
On December 2212023,I served the foregoing document desuibed as:
6
DEFENDANT MATTHEW SHANNON'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY
7
ADJUDICATION; AND MEMORANDUM OF.POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
8
on interested parties in this action by placing a true and correct copy thereof enclosed in a sealed
9 envelope addressed as follows:
l0 See Attached Proof of Service List.
ll [ (BY MArL)
t2 tl I deposited such envelope in the United States Mail at Riverside, California. The
envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.
l3
t] As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and
l4 processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited
with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at
l5 Riverside, Califomia in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on
motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date
t6 or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in
affidavit.
t7
l8 txl (BY ELECTRONIC MAIL) I caused the foregoing document to be served electronically
by electronically mailing a true and correct copy through Smith Law Offices' electronic
mail system to the e-mail address(es) of each interested party, as stated below, and the
t9
transmission was reported as complete and no emor was reported.
20
tl ryIA FEDEML EXPRESS) By depositing the envelope in the box regularly maintained
2t by Federal Express in an envelope designated by Federal Express with delivery fees paid,
as addressed below.
22
tl (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused to be delivered each such document by hand to
23 each addressee as set forth below.
24 lxl (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Califomia that
the above is true and correct.
25
Executed on December 2212023, at Riverside, California.
26
27
28
I PROOX'OF'SERVICE - MAILING LIST
2 Case: Dennstedt v. County of Riverside, et al.
Court Case No.: CVRI2200885
J Our File: RVC-597
4 Joseph L. Richardson, Esq. Attomey for Plaintiff
Bryanna Popka, Esq. BRENDA DENNSTEDT
5
McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP
3281 E. Guasti Road, Suite 100
6
Ontario, CA9776l
Telephone: 557-1250
7
Facsimile: (909) 557 -127 5
8
com
l0 Sarah Lustig, Esq. Attomey for Defendants
Angelo Mishriki, Esq. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE ANd JEFFREY
1l Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo HEWITT
12800 Center Court Drive South, Suite 300
t2 Cerritos, CA 90703-3200
Telephone : (5 62) 653 -3200
t3 Facsimile: (562) 653 -3333
S arah. Lusti g@aalrr. com
t4 Anee I o. Mi sbri.ki@aaln. c om
15
t6
t7
l8
t9
20
2t
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
