Terrorism in India: Method in Madness?

Author(s): Saleem Zafar and Awais Bin Wasi

Source: Policy Perspectives , July - December 2010, Vol. 7, No. 2 (July - December
2010), pp. 51-74
Published by: Pluto Journals

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42909276

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Pluto Journals is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Policy
Perspectives

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Terrorism in India:
Method in Madness?
Sa teem Zafar and Awais Bin Wasi *

Abstract

[The incidents of terrorism in India are usually seen as activities carried out by external
elements, particularly the groups based in Pakistan. Whereas the classic cases of Ganga
Hijacking and attack on Indian Parliament explain the fact that rather than losing
something, India gained most of the political and strategic dividends of the two incidents.
An analysis of both the incidents points to two very important factors of a pattern: 1)
without any clear evidence of Pakistan's involvement in the incidents, India took
aggressive military actions and used the incidents for its own political and strategic gains;
2) public sentiments of fear, hatred and resentment against the 'belligerent neighbor' were
effectively used for getting public support to the strategic agenda. In this context, this paper
seeks to analyze Ganga hijacking and attack on Indian parliament as the classic cases of
bringing the two nations at the brink of war; some major terrorist incidents of the recent
past in which either Pakistan or Indian Muslims were blamed; and a brief look at the year
2008 as it witnessed deadly terrorist incidents both in terms of volume and magnitude. The
extraordinary context in which Mumbai attacks took place in November 2008, the Indian
arrogated campaign against Pakistan in the ensuing environment, the Indian claims
regarding the whole Mumbai saga, and style of investigation into the attacks also demand
a thorough examination of the incident to understand the complex phenomenon of
terrorism in India. - Authors]

Introduction

The element of external involvement in the terrorist activities in India

literally consumed the popular Indian discourse in the aftermath of Mumbai
terrorist attacks of November 26, 2008. While the attacks were still going
on at different places in Mumbai, Indian External Minister Pranab Mukherjee
made a statement that some elements from Pakistan were responsible for
these attacks.1 The manner in which Indian government, political and
military establishment, and media reacted to the incident, campaigning
against Pakistan on all fronts- military, political and diplomatic- effectively
wrapped up the four-year long composite dialogue, confidence building
measures (CBMs), and backchannel diplomacy in a zero-sum outcome. The
question arises whether a terrorist incident sabotaging the peace process
which Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then Pakistan's President
Pervez Musharraf declared as 'irreversible' was a natural outcome of a
violent incident or in Shakespeare's words, there is a method in madness.2

* Research Coordinator and Asst Research Coordinator, respectively, at IPS.

1 Swaine, "Mumbai attack: British men 'among the terrorists."
Rahman, Opening Remarks: Pak-India Relations: Security Dynamics and Future
Scenario."

[51]

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Policy Perspectives

Interestingly, the 26/11 Mumbai incident and the case against

Pakistan in its aftermath that was largely based on hypothesis in the
beginning and got the international media carried away with it was not the
only instance of terrorism in India that created war hysteria in South Asia.
Earlier, Ganga hijacking incident in early 1970's set the stage for the 1971
war between the two neighbors and the attack on Indian parliament in
early 2000's resulted in the largest mobilization of Indian forces after the
1971 war along Pak-India border. Since these incidents of violence have
shown the capacity of exacerbating the tension to the brink of war, it is
important to understand the phenomenon of terrorism in India and a
deeper analysis of the terrorist incidents allegedly carried out by Pakistan.

An important aspect of Ganga hijacking case and the attack on

Indian parliament is the fact that both the incidents proved to be politically
and strategically more beneficial for India instead of being advantageous to
Pakistan as in the aftermath of the former, India was able to achieve a
strategic victory by dismembering Pakistan and the latter helped India
mount effective political pressure on Pakistan for withdrawing its support to
freedom movement in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK). A widely acknowledged
element of criminal investigation indicates that an act of victim's malafide
should ideally be explored if the victim gets maximum benefits out of a
criminal offence. Therefore, the later investigations into these two historical
incidents would help understand whether Delhi was malafide or bonafide in
taking serious military actions against a neighbor state on the basis of
initial perceptions or hypothesis. Either scenario would help trace the
pattern of Indian political actions which would provide a direction towards
understanding the hype usually created by the Indian intelligence
community, political leadership and media after every terrorist incident.

Another facet of the discourse on terrorism in India is the popular

Indian perception that Indian Muslims have their own terrorist networks in
India, which are usually sponsored by the external elements or agencies.
The 'data' returned in the context of present international campaign against
terrorism further strengthens this perception that 'radical' or 'radicalized
Muslims' are the main source of violence in the world and that they have
safe havens in Pakistan where such elements are trained and proliferated
from.3 This perception leaves a trail of intriguing questions that need to be
thrashed out, dispassionately analyzed, and explored at length such as:
whether terrorism in India is largely an external phenomenon and what is
the role of Indian Muslim community and Pakistan in terrorist activities in
India; whether Indian aggressive behavior after every terrorist incident is a
natural reaction or it reflects some elements of national policy; and whether
war hysteria, the threats of waging war or carrying out surgical strikes
without carrying out proper investigation have helped in identifying the real
actors and factors.

3 Most recent example of the global gaze on 'Islamist terrorist network working from the
tribal areas of Pakistan' is the case of Faisal Shahzad, an American citizen of Pakistani
descent, who was accused by the FBI for planting a car bomb in the New York's busy
Times Square on May 1, 2010 followed by fiery statements from the US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton while the investigations were still underway.
52

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Terrorism in India: Method in Madness?

For finding the answers to these questions, this paper seeks to

analyze Ganga hijacking and attack on Indian parliament as the classic
cases of bringing the two nations at the brink of war; some major terrorist
incidents of the recent past in which either Pakistan or Indian Muslims were
blamed; and a brief look at the year 2008 as it witnessed deadly terrorist
incidents both in terms of volume and magnitude. The juxtaposition of
these incidents and their analysis will help answer the questions: whether
there is any pattern that connects these incidents or each case has its own
value judgment; and whether Mumbai attacks and the ensuing environment
have any relevance to the previous incidents of such nature.

Ganga Hijacking and Attack on Indian Parliament

These two classic cases are particularly important with regard to measuring
the extent to which such incidents could affect the bilateral relations. They
also explain whether the alleged perpetrator state or the victim state
secured most of the political and strategic dividends out of them.

On January 30, 1971, the plane en route to Jammu from Srinagar

was hijacked and after sending all its passengers to India, was blown up at
Lahore air port. India claimed at the time that the act was carried out by
two Kashmiri individuals namely Hashim Qureshi and his cousin Ashraf
Qureshi at the behest of Pakistani intelligence agencies. This incident was
taken by India as bait for creating war frenzy environment and ultimately
culminated in a full-scale war. However, even after 39 years the trial is still
underway in a Srinagar court and the Indian claim has not been proved
yet.4

Contrary to Indian claims of Pakistan's involvement in the hijacking,

the reports emerged that Hashim Qureshi was recruited by Indian Border
Security Force (BSF) in July 1970 for spying on the Kashmiris visiting
Pakistan's High Commission in Delhi.5 On January 22, 1971, the hijacking
plan was cooked up in a meeting at Srinagar which was attended by senior
Intelligence and Indian civil service officers as well as the management of
Srinagar air port and was executed on January 30, 1971. 6 The former Chief
Minister of Jammu and Kashmir G M Sadiq also reinforced the idea of Indian
involvement in the hijacking saga when he claimed on February 2, 1971
that one of the hijackers was an agent of Indian intelligence agency.7

On the pretext of this incident and using the charged public

sentiments of fear and hatred, India disconnected the communication
between Western and Eastern wings of Pakistan by closing its airspace on
Pakistani planes flying between East and West Pakistan. Besides other
factors, Indian involvement in developing anti-West Pakistan sentiments in
East Pakistan and later the Indian ban on Pakistani planes also contributed
to the dismemberment of Pakistan on December 16, 1971. Although this
incident was not the only fundamental factor for bringing the two countries
at war, it triggered the inevitable for India and strengthened its case for

4 Wani, "39 yrs later, Ganga Hijack Trial Still On."

Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy: 1846-1990, 287-288.
0 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 290.
53

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Policy Perspectives

retaliation against Pakistan. While the idea of Indian involvement in the

hijacking of its own plane may be highly contested, the> way it manipulated
and maneuvered the aftershocks of this incident and its readiness to use
this incident as a political tool in achieving its strategic goals certainly
indicate that India was not caught unawares.

Almost the same pattern was followed when Indian Parliament in

Delhi was attacked by five gunmen on December 13, 2001. Importantly,
then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had warned of an imminent
attack on the parliament on December 12 2001, 8 yet a car full of arms and
ammunition could surprisingly pass through all the security checks and the
attackers had been able to execute their mission before all of them were
shot dead. Unlike many a terrorist activity, the 'five' attackers left behind
easy-to-find thick trail of evidence: "weapons, mobile phones, phone
numbers, ID cards, photographs, packets of dried fruit and even a love
letter."9 Immediately after the attack, the then Indian Home Minister L K
Advani blamed Pakistan for carrying out the attack10 and the External
Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh said, "There is credible technical evidence
that the terrorist attack on the seat of democracy and sovereignty of Indian
people was the handiwork of a terrorist organization based in Pakistan-
Lashkar-e-Taiba."11 Based on these allegations, India mobilized its forces
along Pak-India border and the two nuclear powers of South Asia remained
eye ball to eye for almost the whole year.

Interestingly, the gruesome military activism of Indian government

was not translated into a fair and transparent investigation of the incident.
Even after nine years, the identity of the eliminated attackers was not
made public and their number has always been a mystery. The chief whip
of the Congress Party Priyaranjan Dasmunshi said that he counted six men
getting out of the car in front of the parliament on the CCTV camera
recording, but only five of them were killed.12 The question arises where the
sixth person has gone and why the CCTV recordings were not produced as
evidence.13

Later, Indian authorities arrested four Indian nationals; three, of

them were sentenced to death and one was sentenced to five years
imprisonment by the lower courts in India. However, three of the accused
were later acquitted because of lack of substantial evidence and the
sentence to the fourth, Afzal Guru, was upheld by the Supreme Court of
India. Significantly, the death sentence to Afzal Guru was not based on
'credible technical and legal evidences'. In its judgment on August 5 2005,
the apex court admitted, "there is no evidence that he is a member of a
terrorist organization ... Incidentally, we may mention that even going by
confessional statement, it is doubtful whether the membership of a terrorist

8 Roy, "India's Shame."

Ibid. , . _ ^ ^
10 Rediff.com, "Pa
14, 2001, http://w
11 The Indian Express, "Evidence Points to Lasnkar: üovt, uecemDer if, ¿uui,
http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=5541 (accessed July 12, 2010).
Roy, 13 December: The Strange case or tne ArcacK on tne muían ramameli..
13 Ibid., xiii.

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Terrorism in India: Method in Madness?

gang or organization is established."14 Interestingly, accepting the reality

that "there is and could be no direct evidence of the agreement amounting
to criminal conspiracy," the Supreme Court presented the rationale of
awarding the death sentence to Afzal Guru as "the collective conscience of
the society will be satisfied if the capital punishment is awarded to the
offender."15 That is why this sentence has been strongly contested even by
the representatives of Indian civil society.16

So the Indian response to the parliament case reflects the pattern

of using public sentiments of fear and hatred for political and strategic
benefits. As a result of Indian hue and cry and the mobilization of its
diplomatic forces, Delhi was able to gather sympathy of international
community against Pakistan's support to freedom movement in IHK and
achieved its political objective of casting international pressure on Pakistan.
The timing of the incident was also a significant factor as the international
context of post 9/11 War on Terror provided India a conducive environment
for lobbying effectively at regional and international level to club Pakistan
with terrorism. On the military front, the world's 'largest democracy'
threatened the peace and stability of the whole region by mobilizing its
forces to war footings without carrying out proper investigation to the
incident. Neither Pakistan's involvement in the attack could be traced, nor
could the real culprits of the incident be arrested, but the political
environment of the whole region remained hostage to mere perceptions
and hypotheses.

In this context, the analysis of both the incidents points to two very
important factors of a pattern: 1) without any clear evidence of Pakistan's
involvement in the incidents, India took aggressive military actions and
used the incidents for its own political and strategic gains; 2) public
sentiments of fear, hatred and resentment against the 'belligerent neighbor'
were effectively used for getting public support to the strategic agenda.

In both the cases, the international community seemed to back

India's case against Pakistan without demanding substantial proofs and
evidence of Pakistan's role in these incidents. The malafide of Indian
establishment in these crimes needs to be explored on two grounds: a
direct involvement of Indian intelligence community and agencies as in the
case of Ganga hijacking, and an indirect involvement as in the parliament

14 Supreme Court of India, Judgment Information system (JUDIS), "State (N.C.T. Of Delhi)
Vs. NAVJOT SANDHU® AFSAN GURU."
" Ibid.
16 The book titled "13 December: The Strange Case of the Attack on the Indian Parliam
that comprises of sixteen essays written by Indian lawyers, academics, journalists
writers discusses in detail the anomalies present in the case, "raises questions about
Afzal, who never had proper legal representation, can be sentenced to death with
having had an opportunity to be heard without a fair trial. They raise questions a
fabricated arrest memos, falsified seizure and recovery memos, procedural flaws,
evidence that has been tampered with, false telephone records, false testimonies,
lacunae, material contradictions in the testimonies of police and prosecution witne
and the outright lies that were presented in court and published in newspapers. They s
how there is hardly a single piece of evidence that stands up to scrutiny." Roy, "In
Shame."

55

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Policy Perspectives

case in a way that besides having prior intelligence reports of an imminent

threat, the incident was apparently allowed to happen.

Ganga and Parliament cases, though the most significant ones, are
not the only examples. Many other incidents also reinforce the continuity of
the same pattern as a consistent approach. It would be pertinent to look
into some major incidents of terrorism in recent past in which India claimed
that non-state actors or intelligence agencies of Pakistan were involved, to
underline the real dynamics, elements and factors behind these incidents,
and to analyze the pattern of Indian behavior in the aftermath of terrorism
activities in India.

Recent Major Terroristic Incidents in India

Of all the terrorist incidents in India in the recent past, the Malegaon terror
incident 2008 holds the greatest significance as it effectively brought the
factors behind terrorist activities in India into limelight and opened a néw
dimension of inquiry beyond the much publicized conspiracy theories of the
involvement of Pakistan, Indian Muslims or their nexus behind such
incidences in India. So it Is important to briefly discuss Malegaon case.

On September 29, 2008, two bombs went off near Bhikko Chowk in
a predominantly Muslim majority city, Malegaon, in Maharashtra.17
Astonishingly, the two explosions were only tip of the iceberg as 17 more
bombs were planted in various parts of Kalupur region of Ahmedabad, the
largest city in the state of Gujarat on the same day (September 29), just a
day before the start of Navaratri- the biggest religious festival of Gujarat.18
Fortunately, these bombs had been detected before they went off. Since
the festival is generally heavily crowded and celebrated throughout the
state, had the 17 bombs exploded, it would have faced a great tragedy.

The investigations on Malegaon blasts conducted by Maharashtra

Anti Terrorism Squad (ATS) concluded that the accused,19 including the
serving colonel in Indian Army Lieutenant Col Shrikant Prasad Purohit,20

17 BBC News, "Seven Die in Fresh India Blasts," September 30, 2008.
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/7643390.stm (accessed July 13, 2010).
18 It is true that there is no geographical proximity between Gujarat and Malegaon.
However, the linkages between them could also have been drawn if the diffused bomb
cases had been investigated. BBC News, "Police 'Find 17 Bombs' in Gujarat," September
29, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/7642937.stm, (accessed July 13, 2010).
19 The eleven accused include: Sadhvi Pragnya Singh Thakur, Lt. Col. Prasad S. Purohit,
Rakesh Dhawade, Swami Amritanand alias Dayanand Pandey, former armymen Ramesh
Upadhyay and Jagdish Mhatre, Ajay Rahirkar, Shyamlal Bhanwarlal Sahu, Shivnarain Singh
Kalsangra, Samir Kulkami and Sudhakar Chaturvedi. The Times of India, "Court Upholds
Charges Against 11 Malegaon Accused/' January 22, 2009,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Court_upholds_charges_against_ll_Malegaon_a
ccused^rssarticleshow/40 16364. cms (accessed July 13, 2010). Of the eleven accused,
eight are arrested while the three are on the run.
20 The prime accused Lieutenant Colonel Shrikant Purohit was a serving intelligence orricer
and according to the charge sheet, filed by Mumbai Police Anti Terror Squad which
comprised 4,528 pages, he brought the explosives when he returned from his posting in
Kashmir and gave it to Sadhvi who managed the Malegaon blasts. The charge sheet also
stated that "Purohit floated right wing group Abhinav Bharat in 2007 with an intention to
propagate a separate Hindu Rashtra with its own constitution and flag." Bureau Report,
"Malegaon blast chargesheet: Purohit is the main conspirator."
56

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Terrorism ¡n India: Method in Madness?

Major Kulkami,21 retired Major Ramesh Upadhyay and Sadhvi Pragya Singh
Thakur,22 had their close association with extremist Hindu organizations
and their involvement in other terror incidents recently occurred in India.

This was for the first time in Indian history that such a coordinated
Hindu extremist network of terrorism with its links with the military was
discovered. Later, the investigations led by Hemant Karkare, Cheif of the
Maharashtra ATS, gradually unfolded a number of important dimensions of
the network and it was expected that the Malegaon accused might lead to
some other terror groups in the country but Hamant Karare was killed in
26/11 Mumbai attacks that proved a great setback for further progress in
this case.

Raghuvanshi, the new investigation officer as the successor of

Hemant Karkare, was a close friend of the prime suspect of the case- Col.
Purohit23- and his appointment as investigation officer in this case
deepened the suspicion that Indian authorities might want to keep the
recently discovered military-Hinduvta nexus under wraps. Consequently,
the charge sheet filed by ATS headed by Raghuvanshi on January 20, 2009
ignores the wider Hindu terrorist network, as it does not talk about the role
of Hindu extremist organizations and institutions, including Abhinav Bharat
(AB) and Bhonsala Military School, and it seemingly separates the Hindu
extremist individuals and IB officers involved in the Malegaon blasts
including Mithan Chakrawarty, former IB officer and an expert of bomb
making; Himani Savarkar, president of AB; Shamaro Apte, leader of Vishwa
Hindu Preshid; Milind Ekbote, former BJP Corporator; Jayant Chitale, retired
colonel; and two professors of history,.24

The involvement of serving as well as retired military officers in the

terror incidents in India, and their association with the Hindu extremist
organizations of political lineage expose the fact that Indian establishment
could use terror incidents in its own country for larger internal or external
objectives. Samjhauta Express tragedy and blasts in Hyderabad Mecca
Masjid, Ajmer Sharif Dargah and the Cinema Halls in Ludhiana are some
other examples of the incidents of such kind.

21 Major Kulkami, the second important accused, had served the Territorial Army, the
military's civilian wing, for nearly 12 years before heading the Bhonsala Military School and
College, Nashik, run by the Central Hindu Military Education Society. The Malegaon blasts
were planned during the multiple meetings held at the school. Major (r) Ramesh Upadhyay
has also been associated with BJP and headed the Mumbai unit of the BJP's ex-
servicemen's cell. It was also exposed that he used to be funded by the party for his
'work'. Thomas and Joshi, "Malegaon blast: Two Ex-Army Men Held"; see also, Mateen,
"Retd Major Trained Sadhvi in Bomb-making: Prosecutor," and Smita et al., "Rtd Major
Under Probe has BJP Past."
22 Besides the military officers, the most prominent name in the Malegaon blast is Sadhvi
Pragvi, whose bike was used in the blasts. She is the daughter of a long-time Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) member Chandrapal Singh and has been associated with
several Hindu extremist organizations that include Akhil Bhartiya Vidgarthni Vidyarthi
Parishad (ABVP), the student wing of BJP, Bajrang Dal Rashtrawadi Sena, and the Hindu
Jagran Manch. She is also a founder member of the Vande Mataram Jan Kalyan Samiti,
another Sangh Parivar's myriad 'cultural' organizations. (Rana, "The Fiery and Fanatical
Sadhvi.").
23 Mushrif, "Who Killed Karkare," 247.
24 Ibid., 253-55 and 261.
57

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Policy Perspectives

Samjhauta Express came under attack at Diwana station near

Panipat some 90 kilometers from the north of Delhi on February 18, 2007
around midnight.25 Indian police Inspector-General Sharad Kumar claimed
that a Pakistani confessed to have thrown the suitcase on the track which
caused the explosions26 and after two weeks, on March 6, 2007 during the
first meeting of the India Pakistan Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism the
government of India handed over the photographs of the suspected
Pakistani nationals who were allegedly been involved in the Samjhauta
tragedy. Indian authorities gave the impression that Pakistan's ISI was
behind this terror incident in which a sizeable number of the victims were
Pakistani nationals. Indian opposition party BJP also petitioned the Indian
government to ask Pakistan to comply with the promise of 2004 to stop
cross border infiltration.27 There were strong forces and voices in India that
tried to derail the peace process by asking the Indian government to
condition the composite dialogue with Islamabad's seizure on 'infiltrating
terrorism' in India.28

However, this notion was completely dispelled when Col. Purohit,

the prime accused in the Malegaon case, confessed before the ATS during
the narco analysis test that he provided the explosive material used in the
Samjhauta blasts.29 The Indian army's Court of inquiry has also declared
Col. Purohit an offender in the blast and his court-martial is on the cards.
So the Samjuhata Express tragedy not only dispelled the alleged
involvement of Pakistan's agencies or groups but emphasized the lethality
of the threat emanating from inside elements belonging to Hindu terrorist
network.

The same network was involved in the bomb blast in Hyderabad

Mecca Masjid, one of the oldest and biggest mosques in India, where
thousands of Muslims were present for Friday prayer on May 18, 2007. The
explosion killed 14 people.30 The Home Minister K Jana Reddy said that it
could be an act of the foreign elements.31 However, it was discovered in the

25 Rajesh, "At least 66 Killed in India-Pakistan Train Blast." Since the incident occurred in
the midnight between Feb. 18 and Feb. 19, it was reported in some papers as the incident
of Feb. 18 and in some other as that of Feb 19.
26 Reuters, "Indian Police Release Sketches of Bomb Suspects, February 20, zuu/,
http://www.reuters.com/article/woridNews/idUSDEL34195220070221 (accessed July 12,
2010).
27 The Times of India, "BJP Seeks Anti-terror Bill in Budget Session, FeDruary iy, 2uu/,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/BJP-seeks-anti-terror-bill-in-budget-
session/articlesho w/ 1639890 .cms (accessed July 12, 2010).
28 Durrani, "Pak-India Relations: Security Dynamics and Future scenario, il.
29 Special Prosecutor for Maharashtra ATS, Ajay Misar told the NasniK court tnat a witness
in the Malegaon blast case told the agency that Purohit had claimed he had 60 kg of RDX
in his possession which he had got from Jammu and Kashmir while he was posted there
and he provided the same explosives to a person named Bhagwan. Mustafa and Anubhuti,
"Purhoit Supplied RDX for Samjhauta Bomb." These findings were also further ratified by
the Superintendent of Railway Police Baharati Arora in whose Jurisdiction the blasts took
place. Thaindian News, "Purohiťs Custody Sought for Samjhauta Blast Probe," November
17, 2008, .http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/purohits-custody-sought-
for-samjhauta-blast-probe_100120262.html#ixzzOicOUFM5p (accessed July 12, 2010).
30 BBC News, "Bomb Hits Historic India Mosque, May 18, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/6668695.stm (accessed July 12, 2010).
The Hindustan Times, "Needle of Suspicion for Blasts Points towards lerrorists, nay io,
2007,
58

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Terrorism in India: Method in Madness?

Malegaon investigations that the perpetrators of this act were the same
domestic elements who were involved in the Malegaon blast.32 Moreover,
Col. Purohit, the prime suspect of Malegaon blast, confessed that he had
provided RDX to the Sangh Parivar for causing blasts in Mecca Masjid. It is
also important to mention here two bomb explosions in a popular
restaurant in Hyderabad, capital of Andhra Pradesh on May 26, 2007. Right
after the incident, the state Chief Minister Y S Rajasekhara Reddy drew
similarities of these two blasts with the terrorist activity in Hydrabad Mecca
Masjid, an act facilitated by Col. Purohit, but at the same time said there
were Bangladeshi and Pakistani connections to the twin explosions.33

It is also significant to note here that on the very next day of Mecca
Masjid blast, the Indian police recovered 19 bombs from various thickly
populated places in Hyderabad,34 which indicates that a very systematic
and well coordinated terror plan was hatched in one of the most populated
cities in India that has the largest Muslim community in the state of Andhra
Pradesh. In addition, on May 3, 2010 the Central Bureau of Investigation
also confirmed that Mecca Masjid blasts and Ajmer Sharif bombings were
linked.35

The Ajmer Sharif Dargah blast36 occurred on October 11, 2007

inside the dargah, situated in Ajmer District in Rajasthan state.
Interestingly, the Union Home Minister Shivraj Patii as well as Home
Secretary accused Pakistan for carrying out the incident.37 However,
Malegaon investigations revealed that the attack was planned and executed
by the Hindu terrorist organization- Abhinev Bharat.38

http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/andhrapradesh/Needle-of-suspicion-for-
blasts-points-towards-terrorists/223746/Articlel-223666.aspx (accessed July 12, 2010).
32 In the course of Malegaon investigations, the accused confessed to have their
involvement in the Mecca Majid blasts as well. The transcript of the recording between
Mahant Sudhakar Dwivedi and retired Major Ramesh Upadhyay, two of the accused of
Malegaon blasts, leaves no doubt regarding the real culprit. In the conversation, Major
says "At the same time, there should be some people who can counter the terrorism of
Muslims and Christians through action, like what happened at the mosque in Hyderabad or
at other places. This was not something done by the ISI. This was one of our own men.
However, from what I know, I cannot pinpoint who was specifically responsible. That I do
not know. That, the Colonel will tell us." Mir and Buddi, "Muslim Youth in Firing Line.";
Nair, "Mecca Masjid Blasts/' See also, The Outlooklndia, "Ajmer, Mecca and Malegaon
Blasts Linked: CBI," May 3, 2010, http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx7680907
(accessed July 13, 2010).
33 The Hindu, "External Forces Behind Hyderabad Blast," May 27, 2007.
34 AlertNet, "Seven More Bombs Found in Blast-hit Indian City/' August 26, 2007,
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/DEL211365.htm (accessed July 07, 2010).
35 Chauhan, "CBI Confirms: Link between Ajmer, Mecca Masjid Blasts.
KS et al., "Terror Hits Ajmer Sharif Dargah; 2 Dead, 17 Injured."
Home Secretary said 'Shahid Bilal of HUJI engineered the attack in collaboration of some
sleeper cells of Jaish Muhammad. The secretary also said that Bilal would send the youth
to Pakistan through Dhaka and Gulf for arms training. (Mushrif, op. cit., 130).
Police sources say that in the course of narco analysis and brain mapping tests Lt. Col
Purohit has revealed that another member Daynand Pandey, also an accused in the
Malegaon blast, has planned the Ajmer blast. (Mahan, "Abhinav Bharat under ATS Scanner
for 7 Ajmer Blats."). Col Purohit also admitted that Vishwa Hindu Parished (VHP) leader
Praveen Togadia was involved in funding Abhinav. (Chakrabarti and Sumon, "Purohit
Claims Togadia Funded Abhinav Bharat."). Besides, in a very comprehensive article titled
"India: Ajmer Blasts- Revisiting Hindutva Terror" Subhash Gatade while referring to
various reports concluded that Ajmer blasts were the handiwork of the Hindutva terrorist
59

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Policy Perspectives

Another incident of bomb blast in Cinema Halls39 in Ludhiana, Punjab on

October 14, 2007 was blamed on Pakistan and Indian Muslims,40 but later
on December 30, 2007, the Punjab police arrested Gurpreet Singh saying
he was the mastermind of Ludhiana blast and seized a huge amount of
explosives from him.41

Although the incidents of Samjhauta Express tragedy and bombing

in Mecca Masjid, Ajmer Sharif Dargah and Ludhiana were carried out by a
particular group of Hindu terrorists, the investigations of many other
incidents of violence make it clear that there are many such groups or
networks of groups, operating in India. The brief information of the terrorist
incidents in India in 2008 in the following two tables also points to the
actors and factors behind the violent and terroristic activities. The list
includes incidents of two kinds: the incidents which were executed
successfully and the ones which were thwarted by the security agencies.

group, Abhinav Bharat. (http://www.sacw.net/article885.html). In addition, the police

have also drawn similarities between the Ajmer Sharif blast and the Mecca Masjid blast
"Sadhvi Pragyasingh and Ajay Rahirkar of Abhinev Bharat said in the police statement that
Purohit also masterminded the blasts in Orissa, Karnataka and at Ajmer Sharif Dargah in
2007." In addition S M Mushrif, the former Inspector General Police Maharshtra, argued
that "An IPS officer, connected with the investigation of Malegaon case confirmed the
involvement of the Malegaon accused in Ajmer blast case." (Mushrif, op. cit., 134-135.
See Also, ' Thaindian News, "CBI-ATS Team Explores Abhinav Bharaťs Role in Ajmer blast,
October ' 23 2009, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/cbi-ats-team-
explores-abhinav-bharats-role-in-ajmer-blast_100264731.html (accessed July 13, 2010).
39 On October 14, 2007 the bomb blast occurred at one or tne cinema nans or a mum
complex in Ludhiana Punjab in which six people were killed and over 30 injured. The hall
has the capacity for 1,050 persons and due to the Eid festival, it was teemed with th
people. (Singh, "Blast in Ludhiana Cinema Hall: 6 Dead, 30 Hurt."). Although the blast
caused six lives, the bombs were in fact misdirected and fortunately the horrific tragedy
was miraculously averted, otherwise this incident would have been one of the greatest
tragedies in the history of India.
40 Garewal, "Police See Islamic Militants in Luaniana unema Domo.
41 Satinder, "Punjab Police Solves Ludhiana Bomb Blast case, Mastermina neia.
60

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
liiiiiiiiiii 'wmm
HMIHgll 1
i i lilii Ü lì1!
Jí! í| ! Mm 3 li î l'I ig:
j'PÉ
•If S Ì HPfÄ fi! ijilï JLJL-!
fí ! ÜÜ (¡Sîfîls fi! Iii .?■■■•,,'
fi ; Si ri Pi «Müi! ill f i| III lllii |f m

«ainiü ih WMMH ? 3

1 ! ! 1 M ¡I Hill itlkHIHHiH : l::' [

f { ! 11 } fi ¡I! ì! Ili il PjlllS I i !
• ! Urli f lit I Hit? 5 H Pili Siiti -II ; 3

I Hill!!! il S fini! i¡¡ îCi

! il! il SI! S il lì II l'I

i nun HI «M «i i i» ir. ti i
! IH' Il li iiilìi
! ili l¡ SI lililí
! i |ïl ¡S ¡¡il! ti 3 H"
¡if "ii IV 11 9 W :
fi li il ìli!

61

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Sii1'
■ í aï aaaSftSi 5• 9: ? ^ft ¿2s -g
!» ££ ioioc C <o c ¿ > ^ ^ "o□.>cSWfd
■ají;}
c S' '53 'a.>■EaaaSftSi
a. ■ • •• ft !» g.
^ </>(/> g. £ s g<o cc ¿£- c^ cc =-§ c^ "o
J í ù ü E ¿J1 ^ «a </>(/> foi» řt £ jõ , „ ._. ,_ •3 d»
i%
= □. o, i%
1
1 UH IM ^
Miài1 h»Ii Ssa
§! > -s
g o« ,
o„
Miài1 řM »3 i h» I s Ssa i 3 g § o
!?>k-,
rt rt
O 3 ûj v> 3 Î5 O
5Ì C^I v>
2 M al|á's 3 3
Z 3 2H^q-|l>a2Ha7025ßü-> W
►sfi*s 3 ûj '?!"s Î5 5Ì SSf C^I 8" 2 M »» Z 3 |3lS5»SffisS|»gSg-g¡ 2H^q-|
§î|îa 5S§8 S i »» T |3lS5»SffisS|»gSg-g¡ fÍ2?3Ê
^ §î|îa 1 1 § = 5S§8 îï|f HI ïi ' i I" lïli
isiís Ii«; ' i fi $?K*n3Jm ip a
it »Ii -;iïi si? ? i| =bsiiis|iss ils-."- a
|S|-¿ l&;-a îi s Si MP|o|lala^ :il|i
?| O?Œ S O£ aTSüSTt-'
O k, Œ $ £& 3- P0°2p
û> - 01 ft& 3-
O. 2 ^ O û> s BÏ«I
' 5 I,Sn S S 01
í (Kî I g" S ^ '
util ? O O k, £ I! aTSüSTt-' || ! û> I - ?! 01 ft thSiif|l|<* O. 2 ^ O ' 5 I,Sn Mtf BÏ«I (Kî
8 3 î S" 5'S = ^ ^ < 3S5Tn8iá ?w,S"2Í.ñ!r
n>û.-
n>û.-
2 -a d** K
2 oî g
< a
2 à 3 <o
« ~■-
Vo î2a>
3 x
■- S ?-ocra.
£ a»
oS -•
3 §^ o
m
3 -•
:1-
- m
^2 2a-a-
î?3ûjfx
^_JÄ«
^ 1111 ™ <ïï
< »*,
& 2 £ g -a ? î« d < î o a> £ -ocra. õ g, «. ft»
'^Q
cri1» ? c c =>' 5? £ £^ =
= ft ™ ™ o >C! >S "<" _. r»o (/)
5T'«q < ft) S" -< o ûTw So s. mS"
" S" í c > ft
»I » 5 p-0.
1,1 cr oo
3 a S3 (/) ä m "
Uw
w5T'«qccwwc£
> c£ ¡'s>
«3 > <o£
o ft)ri
S? ri&>
=t r"-< ori
II^U*-3
ûTw
cl &>-j;î? ^^U*-3
ÍÍ «^^! m
^ ^«!!!!?!
^3s. 3 ícJb
<î-• c -•7»I 2
7-•
» 2ft
5 1 -i
7 ftJi!-;|
ft1,1m
mJ m3a3S
S-É
§
as c w «3 s s?",! =t r" -8 cl -j s ^ is Í « ? m s^i^H <î cJb -i li »s
5
š~:
3 y 3 lû
y aOlû
wïg
■<O 3
i Sí ■< 3 30.Q»
• 30.Q» * s*
3 ^ ft =r iHl
3 ¡ji
11^ Íft
C ä» =r ä= Hl lôs& 11
I
Ii 3 y s lû k O x w ■< =* 3 • 30.Q» ? 3 a

~
3 O ooO O 5acuLTi
^.oa < SmJÎ "={û»!P
û»!P iû03»?|
30=» 8
7C ZT O C <
i6
Q. 1 3 ?D -5 jí ÛIÇO'OO^'D^SWOHÛ-'DH S H o> H cr H 2 ? !? in Ä
Q. 2 "» ? o
m

■O 1 "D 0) ?D }¿ 'S ÛIÇO'OO^'D^SWOHÛ-'DH 3=f3ce3û,C OQ|3-ft03- - ™n> S ^3" ¡Ã ZT řt> zf 2

-- °>> y
y uíS
¡5 2}¿ Ârr,«Q'^n>a?îoooi^-.
ÏÏ art-<~-^7r33v¡o OQ|3-ft03- - n» n
n w>- ří _
- w>- ™n>
ã S_ ¡Ã o"> ã n? wt3-5Í?
=-ou3^fï
2 !? m il
S 5 *-k H 0û»c0"(0Q-n>3S*N.Q3w™3' û>? 21 î _ î to 2 3"l:T?l'i
1 t->
S t-> I <<5 22f
22fo1 *-koî S.âo.î£32.0W3Q
H âo.î£32.0W3Q 0û»c0"(0Q-n>3S*N.Q3w™3'
« ri- n§ r^âo
3 Sia
o «^<'Ãoi§2.
ft nri^ q§ O
û>? g|°-m
ri q O î to
K) »I °-m
Q 3"l:T?l'i
cu ^ S cu-ÄV
^ P -ÄV
t->
0 rr ° < an § o ^TÎoSSon
?o33-?™n W^ftCLjj ? ÄBoiOäri- 3 o wmiň0-"»
ft 73 ft O 73 3. r»™ ° n° « < t»
§ 0 i rr si an i |^šsl?|is ?o33-?™n ? jfjsřj ÄBoiOä î» miň0
y S ?§ î a?sss-=35" SS|»S! al ¡s ^g- =g^
=r = ¡{■'s. |5'<>= S.äs •«•SS ïf ■o» "s
=r
5 I3 «= g"
I I «
nift
ë £ë |5'<>=
£ g = !î?l» = 3ÕS
aOfi. <^;IÙ%Î
S < i"2.
ïf Sg5;
23
S' « g" a « "2. SSg.5¡J| >-o a^aoj^ g ito K'
«
2 S' 8 -aS
3 jQ- a g
3 û 5 Sai'3,
3 3 o 33->-o
Q ?3 aïi^ll
a vja^aoj^
2 q, _Qn
? w
a ito K' S? Miř 2
2 S 3 <o» a i^^r»ft¡? m o" ^'"'-»3? ■»-■ q, 3 _ °W»

ì è
1 £ fi
12 12 i flip
I î°» l=f»l IP iilf
fig, !
Iff ¡ fig, ì
I 1 £ t 51 I I ïft|5 î°» ||= l=f
§Î2f"J
Î2 «i-n
51 í -o
I ï-*~zU
-n c-o
ïft|5
3í 333 cx~3
hi Ifo CTn
=. Oft(nCTn
2»
,„oíP??3
??3 3: Scî
o S Q>ft
IsQvéî"13
o. cî 13 =3#
3-3-.«;
o Q E.0»
.«;
¡,|&
"J 2.in^' Oft
<- CTCT
c r-j-
'Onďhj-S"®
3œ 3~ ď =.
'3 ~n ^ œ-vOft(n
'3£n£Hoo r-f
r-f >t
o|ít <o5'
>t >^ft
>^ft -
,„oíP
m û»
- 3-
§5-
m -o
-o o S
-=?•_.«
05 »,
3a Q>ft o. 3 SlaM
- 01 Ort "íiA10 rt?n IO15 3Ä o n 3: Q' =» a ®
^ - 01 7 p Ort 5 ^ "íiA10 oftoj ?nß rt?n IO15 o"
^ J' 7 p & 5T ^ a S'^o1«« oftoj ?nß 3^ft ^ 0 3
°Si
& -° S J'
« Ã&
3 ?|l 5T
» S >Q I « ^ ^|I
S ? ? » *i |8
CT I «are c a. 8 ft i?; '?.£

62

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Terrorism in India: Method in Madness?

Although the number of terrorist incidents significantly decreased

and no major terrorist incident happened in India in 2009 apparently in the
wake of the disclosures made by the accused of Malegaon blast, there are
two verdicts of Indian courts of 2009 on the terrorist incidents that also
endorse the operational force of Hindu terrorist elements and their
implications on national and regional politics.

The first verdict was given on the Thane blast case by the Sewree
Fast Track Court on January 15, 2009. The court accepted all the charges
put up by the prosecution against six accused for blasts at auditoriums in
Thane and Vashi and a movie theatre in Panvel.71 All the six accused
belonged to Hindu extremist organization Janjagaran Samiti (HJS), an outfit
nf Sanatana Sanstha.

In the second verdict, Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act

(MCOCA) court acquitted Sadiq Sheikh on May 12, 2009 from his alleged
involvement in the July 11, 2006 (11/7) Mumbai train bombings.72 The is
horrible Mumbai Attack killed 209 people and injured 700. The Mumbai
police had claimed that Sadiq Sheikh, an Indian national, was the prime
accused who hatched the conspiracy of blasts with the help of his Pakistani
friend Amir Raza. Indian authorities had also accused ISI and LeT for
sponsoring the attack73 and the police even went a step ahead saying
Sheikh 'had visited Pakistan in 2004 and received nine months' training in
handling arms and explosives in LeT camps.74

It may be recalled that in the backdrop of 11/7, the Indian

government made an effort to create a hostile environment that could
ultimately lead to the halt of peace process between India and Pakistan.75
The respective diplomats were expelled and fiery statements were issued.
However, an effective diplomatic response from Pakistan, back channel
closed door meetings, and international pressure made it possible for both
the countries to continue the dialogues. However while the 11/7 Mumbai
incident could not derail the peace process, the 26/11 Mumbai attacks
effectively could.76

All these terrorist incidents and court verdicts indicate three very
important factors regarding the issue of terrorism in India. Firstly, keeping
in mind the unsettled dispute over Kashmir and history of antagonism
between Pakistan and India, and the tension between Hindu majority and
significant Muslim minority in India; the possibility of both India and
Pakistan carrying out violent activities in each other's lands at one time or
another cannot be ruled out. Yet, the involvement of extremist Hindu
elements in terrorist activities and their liaison with Indian military and
political establishment is more dangerous and lethal as their nationwide
network backed by politico-military connections may obscure the causes
and real culprits of violent activities. Secondly, military-Hinduvta nexus is in

71 Express News Service, "Court Accepts Charges in Thane Blast Case."

Express Nev/s Service, "ATS Makes up its Mind, Sadiq Freed of 7/11 Charges."
73 BBC News, "Pakistan Role in Mumbai Attacks."
Zeenews Bureau, "Indian Mujahideen Founder Member Caught: Mumbai Police."
Kasuri, "Peace Process and Post Mumbai Tension."
Bureau Report, "Co-founder of IM Sadiq Sheikh Sent to 14 Days Police Custody."
63

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Policy Perspectives

a position to design, facilitate and execute terrorist incidents for larger

political and strategic gains. Thirdly, seeing the Indian track record of
taking military actions in the aftermath of such incidents without carrying
out proper investigation, the presence of military-Hinduvta nexus becomes
a great threat to regional peace and harmony

- . Keeping this backdrop in

need to be analyzed.

Mumbai Attacks 2008

The mysterious incident of Mumbai attacks, though very sad and t

presented a scene of some Bollywood action movie in Indian claims tha
young terrorists crossed the Indian Ocean, passing through the c
points of Indian Navy busy in exercises of countering maritime ter
attacks. Entering Mumbai, they travelled through the city with their
and ammunition, reached Taj Mahal and Oberoi-Trident Hotels, Chhatra
Shivaji Terminus, CST_ CAMA hospital, Nariman House, and Cafe Leopo
and held Indian government, agencies and security forces hostag
almost sixty long hours. Later, the security forces were able to kill ni
the terrorists, whose identity has not been made public as yet, a
conveniently, the CCTV footages are found only of the lone survivor,
Kasab.77 Repeating the same 'mistake' as committed by the 'terrori
Parliament case allegedly belonging to the same group, the 'train
terrorists' of Mumbai attack left behind trails of evidence- the trawler
marking on its engine of a company based in Lahore, a bottle of
packed in Karachi, pistols bearing markings of a gun manufactur
Peshawar and other Pakistani made items like a match box, detergent
powder and shaving cream- 78 for the Indian police to develop a strong
case against the lone survivor and the groups in Pakistan.

Right from the beginning, the Indian media took the lead in
demonizing Pakistani government, agencies and religious groups. The
Indian authorities, political and military establishment, and civil society
organizations diligently played their role in building case against the
neighboring state without waiting for the results of fair and transparent
inquiry into the attacks. The ultimate result of the Indian outrage was the
suspension of the four-year long peace process which makes it rather
important to see the context in which Mumbai incidents took place.

The indigenous peaceful character of uprising in Kashmir about five

months before Mumbai attacks had its toll on Indian government as the
emergence of democratic force of fourth generation of Kashmiris under
Indian occupation showed: the potency of keeping the future struggle of
freedom movement alive; a shift from militancy or counter-militancy to the

77 Since the Mumbai incident is being discussed here just to analyze whether this incident
should be treated in isolation or in sequence with the previous terrorist acts of such kind,
the lengthy details of the terrorists' voyage, their attacks on various places and activities
for almost three days are avoided. For such details, see Nasim, "Mumbai Dossier A Fairy
Tale."; and Misra, "Mumbai Terror Attack: Further Evidence of the Anglo-American-
Mossäd-Rss Nexus."
78 Nasim, op. cit.
64

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Terrorism in India: Method in Madness?

political course of action; and a vibrancy of influencing the coming elections

in India and IHK, and the changed situation in Pakistan.79 Another
important factor in this context is the defame of Indian nation because of
the Hinduvta violence against Christians in Orissa about six months before
the Mumbai attacks that led to the focus of international media on the term
'Hindu terrorism'.80

Notably, the connection between terrorism in India and peace

process between India and Pakistan also needs to be kept in mind while
discussing Mumbai incident. The first serious meeting between India and
Pakistan after Kargil crisis, Agra Summit, in July 2001 was subverted
admittedly by BJP leader, Lai Krishna Advani.81 A few months later,
Parliament attack took place that further distanced the two countries from
dialogue for next three years. In the subsequent two years of composite
dialogues since 2004, the two sides came closer to the agreement of
demilitarization of Siachin glacier82 when two attacks in Srinagar in May
200683 and Mumbai train bombings just nine days before the Foreign
Secretaries meeting84 in July 2006 halted any kind of talks for several
months. Resumed dialogues in 2007 made considerable progress on Wullar
Barrage dispute and Sir Creek issue which were again derailed because of
Samjhota Express tragedy, and series of bomb blasts in many Indian cities
including Hyderabad, Jaipur, Ahmedabad, Bangalore, and Delhi. The year
2008 was particularly volatile in India that saw unparallel surge of terrorist
activities.

The near conclusiveness of the four-year long Pak-India composite

dialogues on key issues between the two countries is evident from the de
facto acknowledgement of Indian government that Kashmir is an issue that
needs to be resolved,85 and the statement of former Foreign Minister of
Pakistan that both the countries had reached close to the resolution of
Kashmir dispute through peace process,86 are important dimensions in this
regard. However, the deadly 26/11 terrorist attacks held hostage the talks
for the longest period of time since 2001. The Indian government's efforts
of averting the focus of bilateral talks from composite dialogues to the issue

79 Ahmed, "Concluding Remarks: Pak-India Relations: Security Dynamics and Future

Scenario."
80 Nizam, "Hindutva Hand In Mumbai Terror: Dal Khalsa."
81 The Times of India, "I was Supposed to be the Hidden Hand: Advani,' Mar 17, 2008,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/I-was-supposed-to-be-the-hidden-hand-
Advani/articleshow/2872224.cms (accessed July 13, 2010).
2 Srivastava, "India's Army digs in Over Siachen."
83 Hindustan Times, "Srinagar Rally Attack an Act of Cowardice: Sonia," May 21, 2006,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Srinagar-rally-attack-an-act-of-cowardice-Sonia/Articlel-
100274. aspx (accessed July 13, 2010); and Tribune News service, "Azad, Mufti Condemn
Attack on Tourists."
04 the U.S. State Department, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, "Background
Note: India."
85 See "Lahore Declaration".
http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/aptlahore.pdf, India Pakist
Joint Press Statement, Islamabad, January 6, 2004.
86 The Times of India, "Kashmir Pact was Just a Signature Away," April 24, 2010,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Kashmir-pact-was-just-a-signature-away/article
show/5850851. cms (accessed July 13, 2010).
65

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Policy Perspectives

of terrorism87 and BJP's walkout from Lok Sabha after Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh's announcement of the decision of resuming talks with
Pakistan88 should also be seen in the same context while analyzing the
Mumbai attacks.

Although the lone survivor of the Mumbai attack perpetrator, Ajmal

Kasab, received capital punishment by the special court of M L Tahaliyani
on four counts including waging war against the nation, murder, criminal
conspiracy and committing terror activities on May 6, 2010, 89 the case is far
from being closed since there are so many unanswered questions regarding
the whole episode as well as the trial of Ajmal Kasab.

One of the most important factors is the involvement of an

American national, David Headley, who was arrested by FBI from the
Chicago airport on October 3, 2009 and was accused of masterminding the
Mumbai attack.90 Headley had been convicted of heroin smuggling in 1998
and remained in jail for 15 months. Later, he worked for America's Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and remained under the surveillance of
US authorities.91 It is interesting to note here that the US had warned the
Indian authorities twice almost a month before the incident about the
potential maritime attack on Mumbai.92 Whether there could be any implicit
connection between the US agencies, David Headley and the Mumbai
attacks is still a mystery. Although there may be many interpretations of
the seemingly unpreparedness of Indian security forces particularly when
they had received prior warning of the attack, one strong possibility is that
the authorities let the incident happen deliberately.

Another factor of great significance is the obscurities surrounding

the actual incident and the case of Ajmal Kasab. To start with, the so-called
terrorists were marathi-speaking persons93 from Satara district of
Maharashtra carrying SIM cards having Maharashtra connection.94 The 16
CCTV camera footages also shrouded in mystery as initially it was said that
the railway and other officials had the images but later it was stated that
the cameras were not working on the day of the attack.95 Similarly, it is not
clear how only ten people could hold hostage Mumbai- the economic
backbone of India- the entire Indian government, agencies and Navy for
sixty long hours without any local assistance from India.

The killing of Hemant Karkare is another significant aspect of

Mumbai incident because the report submitted during the trial says that
bullets recovered from the bodies of Karkare had been fired from the AK-47

87 Khan, "Running Away from Composite Dialogue."

88 The Times of India, "BJP walks out of Lok Sabha over India-Pakistan statement, July
17, 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/NEWS-India-BJP-walks-out-of-Lok-Sabha-
over-India-Pakistan-statement/articleshow/4789352.cms (accessed July 13, 2010).
89 Chandrashekhar, "India Hands Ajmal Kasab Death Sentence for MumDai Attacxs.
90 Carrie, "US Citizen David Headley Admits Role in Mumbai Attacks.
91 Laura et al., "Alleged Terrorism Plotter David Headley.
9¿ Robertson, "U.S. Warned India about Possible Mumbai AttacK.
9j Misra, "Mumbai Terror Attack: Further Evidence of the Angio-American-Mossaa-Kü
Nexus."
9 Mushrif, op. cit., 190.
9!- Ibid., 189.
66

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Terrorism in India: Method in Madness?

rifle of Kasab.96 However, the tension between fundamentalist Hindu

leadership and ATS chief cannot be ignored in this regard. Since ATS
captured the Hindu activists in the backdrop of bombings and terrorist
activities in India and exposed the Hindu terror network, the Shiv Sena,
RSS and BJP had been questioning Hemant Karkare's integrity, mounting
political pressure on him in terms of blaming him for torturing the Malegaon
accused and alleging him for working against one political force on the
behest of another.97 His wife, Kavita Karkare, also raised some pertinent
questions such as 'why Karkare did not receive reinforcement immediately
and was not picked up from the spot for forty minutes after having been
shot, and where his bullet proof jacket went missing.'98 It has also been
reported that Mumbai police was headed by Anti-Karkare elements during
the Mumbai carnage. Keeping these dimensions in mind, the assassination
of Karkare seems to be a deeper issue and cannot be squared with the
Mumbai saga alone.

The former IG Police Maharashtra, S M Mushrif, deliberates on the

mystery of keeping one terrorist alive as: "The reason why the planners
scripted to keep one of the 'terrorists' alive could be that they had not
expected that the real terrorists would leave some trails behind, in which
case it would have been difficult for them to connect the 'terrorists' in the
CST_CAMA-Rangabhavan section to LeT and Pakistan, and serious doubts
would have been raised about the origin of the terrorists who killed
Karkare. Therefore, to be on the safer side, they kept a 'terrorist' alive so
that they could prove whatever they wished to, by way of his 'confessional
statement', or 'recoveries' from him or by manipulating physical clues like
fingerprints or DNA samples and so on.'99

Therefore, reading the Mumbai attacks along with the terrorist

activities in India in which Pakistan was initially blamed in the past, it
seems that the details under the surface may be much more than what
meet the eye. The Indian authorities, security forces, investigation teams,
and the judiciary need to bring the real facts out in the open so that
incidents of this nature could be thwarted in future. The mysteries and
confusions prevalent in this case need to be sorted out before any side-
India or Pakistan- form any concrete approach or policy as to who should
be held responsible. The way India tried to use this particular incident for
some political and strategic advantages against Pakistan, as it did in the
aftermath of Ganga hijacking, attack on parliament and 7/11 Mumbai blast;
it seems to portray Indian malafide of some sort at least on the surface.

Conclusion

96 Herald, "Kasab Killed Karkare, Salaskar: 26/11 Trial."

97 The Economic Times, "Karkare was Unhappy about BJP Questioning his Integrit
Ribeiro."; Rajesh, "Karkare's Response to a Death Threat: A 'Smiley'."; The Indian
Group, "Malegaon: MCOCA Slapped on Accused, PM Dials Advani," November 20
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/malegaon-mcoca-slapped-on-accused-pm-
dials/388349/ (accessed July 8, 2010).
yö Zee News, "6/11: Karkare's Wife Raises Questions about ATS Chiefs Death, No
18, 2009, http://www.zeenews.com/news579995.html (accessed June 22, 2010).
99 Mushrif, op. cit., 217.
67

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Policy Perspectives

The violent incidents are, no doubt, a grave threat to human security and
the necessary measures need to be taken to eliminate them but it is not
less important to examine the political and strategic objectives obtained
through these incidents. It has been surprisingly but certainly observed that
some of the victim states are the great beneficiaries of these incidents and
it by and large seems true in case of India.

From the classic cases of Ganga hijacking and parliament incident

down to the recent major incidents of terrorism in India including
Samjhauta Express tragedy, bomb blasts in Hydrabad Mecca Masjid, Ajmer
Sharif Dargah, and Cinema halls in Ludhiana, and the incidents of terrorism
in 2008, a pattern of Indian political and military behavior can easily be
observed that the world's largest secular democracy manipulates and at
times exploits the initial moments of public fear and hatred for achieving its
internal or external political objectives. The exposure of military-Hinduvta
nexus and their activism in carrying out acts of terrorism for political and
strategic interests explain the inside actors and factors that India would use
for creating violence within with the purpose of using them without. An
element of this kind seems to have played a very active and important role
in Indian national policy during the 26/11 Mumbai incident.

The extraordinary context in which Mumbai attacks took place and

the Indian arrogated campaign against Pakistan reaffirm the pattern of
ignoring the real actors and factors behind these attacks and achieving
political, strategic and diplomatic objectives out of them. This attitude
ultimately results in the sustenance of the causes and elements of
terrorism. Although the public outrage, fear and hatred make it easier for
the state to achieve local or regional political objectives, the bilateral
relationship can never get strong in spite of keeping both the countries
engaged in CBMs, peace initiatives and dialogues. A deplorable, yet
understandable, fact is that Indian authorities do not seem to be making
any substantial efforts in comprehending the real threat and bringing the
facts out to the world.

The soaring violence in India should be a matter of due concern not

only for Indians but for Pakistanis as well, because violent incidents in India
have profound bearing on Pak-India relations; and as it has been witnessed
in the past, they have the potential of provoking an all out war between the
two countries. Given the wars-ridden past and constantly strained relations
between Pakistan and India this possibility cannot be out rightly rejected
that either of the country may involve or has some share in the violent
incidents in the other country. However, to see every violent incident
through the prism of proxy war is not a judicious approach either. In this
context, India needs to realize the threats emanating from within the
country and instead of overlooking them, it should look them over and take
necessary measures to deal with them effectively or else the threats might
push India to the war fronts again.
The role of American citizens, Ken Haywood in bomb blasts in
Ahmadabad, Gujarat and David Headley in 26/11 Mumbai incident; the
statement of US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates that "It is not
reasonable to assume that Indian patience is unlimited in case of another
attack ... [by] "a syndicate of terrorist group ... AI Qaeda, the Tehreek-e-
68

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Terrorism in India: Method in Madness?

Taliban, Pakistan and the Lashkar-e-Toiba,"100 and the Indian intelligence

report of "a plot by militants linked to al Qaeda and the Pakistan-based
Lashkar-e-Taiba group to hijack an Air India or Indian Airlines flight" just
after two days of Robert Gates warning101 make this pattern even more
intriguing.

In this backdrop, the role of international community in general and

big powers in particular is very important as the Indian diplomatic and
media campaign, the thrust of transforming hypotheses and perceptions
into reality, and garnering their support to its war-mongering behavior has
generally been able to convince them of the 'plight' of Indian government
and people. It needs to be realized that if the pattern that the Indian
politico-military establishments have been following to secure their political
and strategic interests becomes a norm of international politics; the causes,
actors and factors, and the solution to the problem of terrorism will remain
obscure, resulting in making the future generations insecure.

100 Bumiller, "Gates Warns of Militant Threat in South Asia."

101 Washington Times, "India Issues Terrorism Alert Over Hijack Plot," January 22, 2010,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jan/22/india-issues-terrorism-alert-over-
hijack-plot/ (accessed June 12, 2010).
69

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Policy Perspectives

Bibliography

Ahmed, Khurshid. "Concluding Remarks: Pak-India Relations: Security

Dynamics and Future Scenario." Policy Perspectives 6, no. 1
(January-June 2009).
Ayyub, Rana. "The Fiery and Fanatical Sadhvi." Tehelka 45, no. 5
(November 15, 2008),
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main40.asp?filename=Nel51108the
_fiery.asp (accessed July 7, 2010).
Bharatiya Janata Party, Press Release. "Press statement issued by BJP
National President Shri Rajnath Singh at Agartala." Bharatiya
Janata Party. October 4, 2008.
http://www.bjp.org/content/view/823/376/ (accessed July 8,
2010).
Bumiller, Elisabeth. "Gates Warns of Militant Threat in South Asia." The New
York Times. January 20, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/world/asia/21gates.html
(accessed July 12, 2010).
Bureau Report. "Co-founder of IM Sadiq Sheikh Sent to 14 Days Police
Custody." Zee News. November 18, 2008.
http://www.zeenews.com/nation/2008-ll-18/484617news.html
(accessed July 11, 2010).
- . "Tripura Blasts: CID Submits Charge Sheet." Zee News. December 28,
2008. http://www.zeenews.com/news494413.html (accessed July
8, 2010).
Bureau, Zeenews. "Blast in Kanpur, Police Say No Terror Act." Zeenews.
October 14, 2008. http://www.zeenews.com/news476189.html
(accessed July 12, 2010).
Chakrabarti, Sumon. "SIMI, LeT may be Behind Bangalore Blasts: IB." The
Times of India. July 25, 2008.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/SIMI_LeT_may_be_behind_Ban
galore_blasts_IB __/artlcleshow/3279993.cms (accessed July 8,
2010).
Chand, Shyam. "Vigilance is the Prices of Liberty: Ugly Hidden Face of
Terrorism." Mainstream XLVI, no. 10 (September 2008).
Chandrashekhar, Vaishnavi. "India Hands Ajmal Kasab Death Sentence for
Mumbai Attacks." The Christian Science Monitor. May 6, 2010.
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-
Central/2010/0506/India-hands-Ajmal-Kasab-death-sentence-for-
Mumbai-attacks (accessed July 12, 2010).
Chauhan, Neeraj. "CB1 Confirms: Link between Ajmer, Mecca Masjid
Blasts." The Indian Express. May 4, 2010.
Durrani, Asad. "Pak-India Relations: Security Dynamics and Future
Scenario." Policy Perspectives 6, no. 1 (January-June 2009).
Editorial. "Terror's New Face." Herald Panjim. June 19, 2008.

70

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Terrorism in India: Method in Madness?

Express News Service. "ATS Makes up its Mind, Sadiq Freed of 7/11
Charges." The Indian Express. May 12, 2009.
http://www.expresslndia.com/latest-news/ats-makes-up-its-mind-
sadiq-freed-of-7-ll-charges/457694/ (accessed July 12, 2010).
"Court Accepts Charges in Thane Blast Case." The Indian Express.
January 16, 2009. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/court-
accepts-charges-in-thane-blast-case/411347/ (accessed July 12,
2010).
Fitzpatrick, Laura etal. "Alleged Terrorism Plotter David Headley." Time.
December 9, 2009.
http://www.time.eom/time/nation/artide/0, 8599, 1946462, 00. html
(accessed July 12, 2010).
Garewal, Geetinder. "Police See Islamic Militants in Ludhiana Cinema
Bomb." Reuters. October 15, 2007.
http://in.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=INIndia-
30000720071015 (accessed July 8, 2010).
Herald, Deccan. "Kasab Killed Karkare, Salaskar: 26/11 Trial." March 15,
2010. Deccanherald.com.
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/58389/kasab-killed-karkare
salaskar-2611.html (accessed July 12, 2010).
Johnson, Carrie. "US Citizen David Headley Admits Role in Mumbai attac
The Washington Post. March 19, 2010.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2010/03
18/AR20 1003 1805407. html (accessed July 12, 2010).
Kasuri, Mian Khurshid Mahmud. "Peace Process and Post Mumbai Tension
Policy Perspectives 6, no. 1 (January-June 2009).
Katakam, Anupama. "Of Saffron Variety". Frontline 25, no. 24
http://www.flonnet.com/fl2524/stories/20081205252411200.htm
(accessed July 8, 2010).
Khan, Raja Muhammad. "Running Away from Composite Dialog
Pakistan Observer. July 2, 2010.
http://pakobserver.net/detailnews. asp?id=28924 (accessed July
12, 2010).
KS, Tomar et al. "Terror Hits Ajmer Sharif Dargah; 2 Dead, 17 Injured."
The Hindustan Times. October 11, 2007.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Terror-hits-Ajmer-Sharif-dargah-
2-dead-17-injured/Articlel-252114.aspx (accessed July 8, 2010).
Lamb, Alastair. Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy: 1846-1990. Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1993.
Mahan, Rajan. "Abhinav Bharat under ATS Scanner for 07 Ajmer Blats."
NDTV. April 14, 2009
Mateen, Hafeez. "Retd Major Trained Sadhvi in Bomb-Making: Prosecutor."
The Times of India. October 30, 2008.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Retd_Major_trained_Sadh
vi_in_bomb-making_Prosecutor/articleshow/3653098.cms
(accessed July 7, 2010).
71

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Policy Perspectives

Mir, Ayub and Buddi, Mahesh. "Muslim Youth in Firing Line." The Times of
India. May 17, 2010.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5938604.cms
(accessed July 7, 2010).
Misra, Amaresh. "Mumbai Terror Attack: Further Evidence of the Anglo-
American-Mossad-Rss Nexus." Counter Currents. December 3,
2008. http://www.countercurrents.org/misra031208.htm (accessed
June 25, 2010).
Mushrif, S. M. Who Killed Karkare. New Delhi: Pharos Media and Publishing,
2009.

Mustafa, Plumber and Anubhuti, Vishnoi. "Purhoit Supplied RDX for

Samjhauta bomb." The Indian Express, November 15, 2008
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/purohits-
custody-sought-for-samjhauta-blast-
probe_100120262.html#ixzzOicOUFM5p (accessed July 7, 2010).
Nair, Smita. "Mecca Masjid Blasts: Yah Koyi ISI-Waala Aakey Nahi Kar Raha
Tha...Yah Apna hi Koyi Aadmi Tha." The Indian Express. January
25, 2009, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/mecca-masjid-
blasts-yah-koyi-isiwaala-aakey-nahi-kar-raha-tha...yah-apna-hi-
koyi-aadmi-tha/415002/0 (accessed July 7, 2010).
Naqvi, Haider. "9 Injured in Kanpur Blast, Bomb Kept on Bicycle." Th
Hindustan Times. October 14, 2008.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/9-injured-in-Kanpur-blast-bomb-
kept-on-bicycle/Articlel-344672.aspx (accessed July 12, 2010).
Nasim, Rafi. "Mumbai Dossier A Fairy Tale." The Nation. January 24, 2009.
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-
englishonline/opinions/Columns/25-Jan-2009/Mumbai-dossier-a-
fairy-tale (accessed July 13, 2010).
Nizam, Mubashar. "Hindutva Hand in Mumbai Terror: Dal Khalsa. Pakistan
Times. December 1, 2008. http://www.pak-times.com/2008/12/01/
hindutva-hand-in-mumbai-terror-dal-khalsa/ (accessed July 13,
2010).
Pandey, Bhupendra. "Kanpur Blast Case: Asimanand under Scanner Again."
The Indian Express. June 9, 2010.
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/Kanpur-blast-case--
Asimanand-under-scanner-again/631282 (accessed July 8, 2010).
Press Trust of India. "Srinagar Rally Attack an Act of Cowardice: Sonia."
Hindustan Times. May 21, 2006.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Srinagar-rally-attack-an-act-of-
cowardice-Sonia/Articlel-100274.aspx (accessed July 13, 2010).
Qasmi, Burhanuddin. "A Nation Riding On Killer Bicycles." Asian Tribune.
May 16, 2008. http://www.asiantribune.com/node/11187 (accessed
July 12, 2010).
Rahman. Khalid. "Opening Remarks: Pak-India Relations: Security
Dynamics and Future Scenario." Policy Perspectives 6, no. 1
(January-June 2009).

72

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Terrorism in India: Method in Madness?

Rajesh, Y P. "Karkare's Response to a Death Threat: A 'Smiley'." The Indian

Express. November 27, 2008.
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/karkares-response-to-a-
death-threat-a-smiley/391325/3 (accessed July 12, 2010).
- . "At Least 66 killed in India-Pakistan Train Blast." Reuters. Feb 19,
2007. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSDEL34195220070219
(accessed July 7, 2010).
Riyaz, Wani. "39 yrs Later, Ganga Hijack Trial Still On." The Indian Express.
March 24, 2010. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/39-yrs-later-
ganga-hijack-trial-still-on/594748/ (accessed May 3, 2010).
Robertson, Nic. "U.S. Warned India about Possible Mumbai attack." CNN
International. December 2, 2008.
http://edition.cnn.eom/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/01/india.attacks2/i
ndex.html (accessed July 12, 2010).
Roy, Arundhati. "13 December: The Strange Case of the Attack on the
Indian Parliament." New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2006.
- . "India's Shame." The Guardian. December 15, 2006.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/dec/15/india.k
(accessed May 3, 2010).
Sathe, Ahbijit. "ATS Chief Karkare Wanted Sanatan Sansth
Mirror.in. October 21, 2009.
http://www. punemirror. in/index. aspx?page=article&sectid=3&conte
ntid=2009102120091021034829465bf2491&sectxslt=&pageno=l.
(accessed July 8, 2010).
Satinder, Bains. "Punjab Police Solves Ludhiana Bomb Blast Case,
Mastermind Held." . Punjab Newsline. December 30, 2007.
http://www.punjabnewsline.com/index2. php?option=com_content&
task=view&id=7535&Itemid=38&pop=l&page=0 (accessed July 8,
2010).
Singh, Onkar. "Blast in Ludhiana Cinema Hall: 6 Dead, 30 Hurt." Rediff.
October 14, 2007.
Smita, Nair et al. "Rtd Major Under Probe has BJP Past." The Indian
Express. October 27, 2008.
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/rtd-major-under-probe-has-
bjp-past/378350/ (accessed July 7, 2010).
Special Correspondent. "Assault on Agartala." Calcutta: The Telegraph.
October 2, 2008.
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081002/jsp/frontpage/story_9918
102.jsp (accessed July 8, 2010).
Srivastava, Siddharth. "India's Army Digs in over Siachen." Asia Times
Online. November 16, 2006.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HK16Df01.html
(accessed July 13, 2010).
Supreme Court of India, The Judgment Information system (JUDIS). "State
(N.C.T. Of Delhi) vs. NAVJOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU." Supreme
Court of India. August 4, 2005.
73

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Policy Perspectives

http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs.aspx (accessed July 1,

2010).
Swaine, Jon. "Mumbai Attack: British Men 'Among the Terrorists." The
Telegraph. November 28, 2008.
http://www.telegraph.co.Uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/3533075/M
umbai-attack-British-men-among-the-terrorists-Bombay-India.html
(accessed June 15, 2010).
The U.S. State Department, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.
"Background Note: India." The U.S. State Department. November
12, 2009. http://www.state.goV/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm (accessed
July 13, 2010).
Thomas, Presley and Joshi, Satyajit. "Malegaon Blast: Two ex-Army Men
Held." The Hindustan Times. October 25, 2008.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/maharashtra/Malegaon
-blast-2-ex-Army-men-held/347316/Articlel-347219.aspx
(accessed July 7, 2010).
Tribune News Service. "200 kg Ammonium Nitrate Recovered." The
Tribune. September 29, 2009.
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2008/20080930/mainl.htm (accessed
July 12, 2010).
- . "Azad, Mufti Condemn Attack on Tourists." The Tribune, Chandigarh.
May 27, 2006.
http ¡//www.tribuneindia. com/2006/20060528/j&k. htm# 1 (accessed
July 13, 2010).
VK, Shashikumar. "1 Month after Jaipur Blasts, Probe Reaches Dead End."
IBN Live. June 14, 2008. http://ibnlive.in.com/news/l-month-after-
jaipur-blasts-investigation-reach-deadend/67119-3.html (accessed
July 8, 2010).
Vyas, Neena. "Hindu Rashtra our Aim: Bajrang Dal Chief." The Hindu.
October 2, 2008.
http://www.hindu.eom/2008/10/02/stories/2008100261401200.ht
m (accessed July 3, 2010).
Zeenews Bureau. "Indian Mujahideen Founder Member Caught: Mumbai
Police." September 24, 2008.
http://www.zeenews.com/Nation/2008-09-24/471585news.html
(accessed July 11, 2010).

74

This content downloaded from

152.59.89.211 on Thu, 20 Feb 2025 07:41:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms