Strategic

AVIATION SAFETY Management

AND SECURITY

MBA Second Year

(General)
Paper No. 2.6

MBA Second Year

( Airline and Airport Management )
Paper No. : 2.7

School of Distance Education

Bharathiar University, Coimbatore - 641 046
 AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY
SYLLABUS
Unit-I
A National security asset : Importance of Air transportation – Airways – Development of the Aviation
industry – Deregulation – Consequences of 9/11 to the industry – Emergency Funding – Protecting Public
Air transportation. Hijacking – Security Measures – International Prospective – Trend begins –Diplomatic
Conference on Air Law – Ministerial Conference on Terrorism – Financing of Terrorism – United Nations –
ICAO / ECAC
Unit-II
Aircraft as Missiles : Early Hijackings – Terrorist Hijackings Spread – Initial Public response – Cockpit Doors
– Profile of a Hijacker – Sky Marshal Program/Federal Air Marshal Program – History of Significant Air
hijackings since 1972. Terrorism – Middle East – Rival Claims – Palestinian Liberation Organization – Abu
Nidal – Hamas –Iranian Support of Terrorism – Hezbollah – Afghanistan: Osama Bin Laden – Europe – Japan
– Peru – Russia – US – Domestic Terrorism – Nuclear Terrorism.
Unit-III
Screening : The last line of Defense – Introduction – Facilities – Screening check Point Augmentation – Law
enforcement Officers at the gate – Flexible Law enforcement response Program – Public and Private Security
Interface. Airborne Aircraft Security. Increased Supervision: Introduction – Criminal Guards – Ergonomic
Solutions – potential Operator concerns – measuring operator Performance –
Unit-IV
A Loose End : Introduction – Cargo Carrier responsibility – Air cargo security – Suicides – Baggage Tags –
Passenger/ Baggage reconciliation – Airport lockers – Container hardening – Blast containment versus blast
management – Airmail security – Indirect air carriers – known and unknown shipper – Vacuum chambers –
Inspection of cargo – International Air cargo standards – Irelands air Cargo Security Program – TSA inspection
of Air port – Conclusion. A slippery slope:
Unit-V
Technological Improvements : Some intrusive and some not: Introduction – Core commission – Micro wave
Holographic Imaging – Body orifice security scanner – Flight Vu™ Aircraft data scanner – New Generation of
video security systems – Bio simmer™ quadruple resonance device – Intelliscan
 Contents
Chapter Name
Chapter Page No.
UNIT I
1 The Economic Impact Of Air Transport 7
2 Development Of Air Transportation In India 11
3 Airline Deregulation 13
4 Consequences Of 9/11 To The Industry 17
5 Emergency Funding 21
6 Protecting Public Air Transportation 26
7 Hijacking 32
8 Framing The Aviation Security Problem 35
9 International Conference On Air Law 43
10 Ministerial Conference On Counter-Terrorism 47
11 Financing Terrorism 51
UNIT II
12 Early Hijackings & Profile Of A Hijacker 54

13 Sky Marshal Program/Federal Air Marshal Program 60

14 History Of Significant Air Hijackings Since 1972 63
15 Terrorism 73
16 Iranian Support Of Terrorism 81

UNIT III
17 Introduction To Screening 91
18 Screening Facilities 94
19 Public And Private Security Interface In Aviation 98
20 Airborne Aircraft Security 101
21 Increased Supervision: Introduction 103
 UNIT IV
22 Cargo Carrier Responsibility 109

23 Air Cargo Security 113

24 Passenger/Baggage Reconciliation & Blast Containment Concepts 120
25 Irelands Air Cargo Security Program 129
26 Tsa Inspection Of Air Port 131
UNIT V
27 Technological Improvements 133
28 Flight Vu™ Aircraft Data Scanner 140
29 New Generation Of Video Security Systems 142
30 Intelliscan 147
 UNIT I

CHAPTER

1
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AIR TRANSPORT
The air transport industry has a substantial economic impact, both through its own
activities and as an enabler of other industries. Its contribution includes direct,
indirect and induced impacts, which are related to the total revenues of the air
transport industry. The catalytic impacts of the industry are “spin-off” effects on
other industries.
1. Direct impacts
These cover employment and activity within the air transport industry including
airline and airport operations, aircraft maintenance, air traffic control and regulation,
and activities directly serving air passengers, such as check-in, baggage-handling,
on-site retail and catering facilities. Not all of these activities necessarily take place
at an airport, with some taking place at head office.
Direct impacts also include the activities of the aerospace manufacturers selling
aircraft and components to airlines and related businesses of the 5 million direct jobs
generated by the air transport industry worldwide, 4.3 million people are employed
by the airlines and airports (aviation sector) globally, contributing around US$
275 billion of GDP to the global economy. This is as large a world industry as the
pharmaceuticals sector.

The breakdown of the 5 million direct jobs is as follows:

• The civil aerospace sector (manufacture of aircraft systems, frames and
engines, etc.) employed 730,000 (14% of total direct jobs) people in 2004.
• An estimated 2.1 million people (or 41%) work for airlines or handling
agents (e.g. as flight crew, check-in staff, maintenance crew, etc.). airport
management, maintenance, security, etc.).
• Around 330,000 people (7%) work directly for airport operators (e.g. in airport
management, maintenance, security, etc.).
• A further 1.9 million (38%) work on-site at airports in retail outlets, restaurants,
hotels, etc.

Indirect impacts:
These include employment and activities of suppliers to the air transport industry,
for example, jobs linked to aviation fuel suppliers; construction companies that build
8 additional facilities; the manufacture of goods sold in airport retail outlets, and a wide
Aviation Safety And
variety of activities in the business services sector (call centres, IT, accountancy,
Security
etc.).
5.8 million Indirect jobs are supported through purchases of goods and services by
companies in the air transport industry.
Examples include jobs in the energy sector generated through the purchase of aircraft
fuel; employment in the IT sector providing computer systems for the air transport
industry; or the workers required to manufacture retail goods.
The contribution of these indirect jobs to global GDP is US$ 375 billion.

2. Induced impacts
These include spending by those directly or indirectly employed in the air transport
sector that supports jobs in industries such as retail outlets, companies producing
consumer goods and a range of service industries (e.g. banks, restaurants, etc.).

2.7 million Induced jobs are supported through employees in the air transport industry
(whether direct or indirect) using their income to purchase goods and services for
their own consumption. This includes jobs in retail and a range of service industries.
The induced contribution to global GDP is US$ 175 billion (2004 estimation).
Air transport generates wider catalytic (spin-off) benefits:
The air transport industry’s most important economic contribution is through its
impact on the performance of other industries and as a facilitator of their growth.
It affects the performance of the world economy, improving the efficiency of other
industries across the whole spectrum of economic activity – referred to as catalytic
or “spin-off” benefits.

• Air transport facilitates world trade : air transport helps countries participate
in the global market by increasing access to main markets and allowing
globalization of production. Air transport also encourages countries to
specialize in activities in which they have a comparative advantage and to
trade with countries producing other goods and services.
• Air transport is indispensable for tourism, particularly for remote and island
destinations : Tourism directly supports jobs in airlines and airports, and
spending of visitors arriving by air creates a substantial number of jobs in the
tourism industry
• Air transport boosts productivity across the global economy : improved
transport links expand the market in which companies operate. As a result,
companies are better able to exploit economies of scale thereby reducing
costs, and to specialize in areas of comparative advantage. By opening up
markets, air services expose companies to stiffer competition, encouraging
them to become more efficient.
• Air transport improves the efficiency of the supply chain, for example, many
industries use air transport to shorten delivery times as part of their just-in-
 time delivery systems, enabling them to deliver products to clients quickly 9
The Economic
and reliably and to reduce costs.
Impact Of Air
• Air transport is an enabler of investment both into and out of countries and Transport

regions : viable air transport links are one of the key considerations that
influence where international companies choose to invest.
• Air transport can act as a spur to innovation by encouraging effective
networking and collaboration between companies located in different parts of
the globe. A good transport infrastructure can also encourage greater spending
on research and development by companies – for example, increasing the size
of potential markets allows the fixed costs of innovation to be spread over
larger sales.
• Air transport provides consumer welfare benefits to individuals in terms of the
increased availability of travel connections, and for local airport communities.
These must be taken into account when considering environmental impacts
on, for example, air quality, noise and congestion in the vicinity of airports.
• There is a clear distinction between these ‘catalytic’ impacts and the direct,
indirect and induced economic impacts of air transport. In simple terms, the
economic value of the direct, indirect and induced effects is related to the total
revenues of the air transport industry, whereas the catalytic impacts are “spin-
off”’ effects on other industries.
• Air transport’s ability to serve larger markets Air transport enables easier and
cheaper trade with distant markets and marketing of goods and services on
a global basis. A survey of companies in Chile, China, the Czech Republic,
France and the US12 found that 70% of businesses reported the ability to
serve a bigger market as a key benefit.

Implications included:
• Increased competition : A significant benefit for consumers which can force
companies to be more efficient, drive down prices and even improve the
quality of goods as companies seek to maintain their global market position.
• Innovation spur : 30% of businesses reported a substantial impact on their
ability to innovate through the potential to serve a bigger market and 70%
reported some impact.
• Increased sales : Air services enable global marketing of goods and services,
providing a competitive transportation medium, especially for time-sensitive
products and trade with distant markets. Over 80% of businesses reported that
air services are sometimes important for their impact on sales, with almost
60% considering them either vital or very important. Companies reported that
on average, 25% of all sales are dependent on air services.
• Better exploitation of economies of scale : Around 25% of businesses report
that air transport services have a substantial impact on their ability to exploit
economies of scale, and over 40% report an impact to some extent.
10
Aviation Safety And
3. Air transport’s impact on business operations
Security
Air transport enables companies to service and meet clients, and promotes the
efficient organization of production.
• Servicing and meeting customers : Air services allow better contact and
more effective communication between buyers and sellers, which contributes
to companies making new sales and to meeting the needs of their existing
customers.
• Production efficiency : some 50% of businesses rely on air services for
production efficiency. Passenger services enable managers to visit overseas
sites and other sub-sections of their business in other countries, enable a
choice of the best suppliers from a range of competitors, facilitate the spread
of new production techniques and make it easier for companies to attract high
quality employees.
• The global supply chain is becoming increasingly dependent on the rapid and
reliable movement of high-value low-weight goods such as computer parts.
Air transportation facilitates such movements by:
• providing fast and reliable delivery of high-value products: especially relevant
to modern-dynamic industries, such as the pharmaceutical/ biotechnology and
telecommunication equipment sectors;
CHAPTER

2
DEVELOPMENT OF AIR TRANSPORTATION IN INDIA
2.1. Introduction
A country‘s transportation sector plays an integral role in the growth and development
of an economy. According to the Indian Aerospace Industry Analysis report, in terms
of passenger traffic, India is currently the ninth largest aviation market in the world.
With regards to air cargo tonnage, India leads the South Asian region consisting
of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka. Currently, India has 128 airports - including 15 international airports.
2.2. Overview of Indian Aviation Sector
Over the past ten years the Indian civil aviation sector grew by 14.2% in terms of
domestic passengers and 7.8% in terms of air cargo (in CAGR - compound annual
growth rate). In 2010- 11 six major Indian carriers with around 400 aircraft catered
to 143 million passengers, including 38 million passengers that originated abroad. In
2010-11, Indian airlines carried approximately 1.6 million tons of air cargo. Further
growth of the aviation sector between 2011- 2013 is estimated at 15%.
India‘s civil aviation sector has evolved over time. On February 18, 1911 India‘s
first commercial airplane flew between Allahabad and Naini. In 1912, India‘s first
commercial international flight operated by the erstwhile Imperial Airways took
place and connected Delhi to Karachi and beyond. In 1932, J.R.D. Tata flew an air
mail service airplane, after which Tata Airlines ventured into scheduled air transport
services.
Up until the late 1980s, India‘s civil aviation sector remained monopolized by
India‘s government owned airlines. However in 1986, the Indian government once
again granted permission to private sector companies to provide air taxi service.
Additionally, India‘s Open Sky Policy of 199013 and the Air Corporations (Transfer
of Undertakings and Repeal) Act of 1994 further freed up India‘s civil aviation
industry and eradicated the government carrier monopoly. While these policy
changes led to a dramatic increase in the number of private airline carriers; due
to viability issues, by the end of the 20th century all private air carriers, except Jet
Airlines and Air Sahara, exited the market.
In 2003 the introduction of a new type of airline service called low cost carriers
- LCCs or of rills air service - by Air Deccan, reinvigorated India‘s civil aviation
sector. By bringing competition into the Jet Airlines-Air Sahara duopoly, Air Deccan
brought a new competitive spirit to India‘s civil aviation. Furthermore, introduction
of low cost airlines also changed the perception that air travel was reserved only
for the elites. By 2007 mergers and acquisitions became common in India‘s civil
aviation sector. Within a span of two years Air India and Indian Airlines merged, as
did Jet Airways and Air Sahara, and Kingfisher Airlines and Air Deccan. Currently,
India maintains bilateral Air Service Agreements (ASAs) with 108 countries. While
12 72 foreign airlines fly in and out of Indi East, two destinations in Africa, and 13
Aviation Safety And destinations in West and East Asia.
Security
Recently, India‘s Ministry of Civil Aviation hosted 65 International Civil Aviation
member nations (ICAO) at the 4th International Civil Aviation Negotiation
Conference (ICAN 2011) during the week of 17 October 2011. The conference
provided a forum for nations to amend and modernize existing ASAs. While India‘s
international carriers lobbied the Indian government to allow them to run more
flights to Oman, Saudi Arabia and Hong Kong, representatives from the Persian
Gulf lobbied the Indian government for additional seats.
As India‘s civil aviation sector developed and evolved over time, in order to
guide market participants the Ministry of Civil Aviation and Government of India
periodically responded to new industry challenges by setting up and amending
existing regulatory frameworks. Until 1994 the Directorate General of Civil Aviation
(DGCA) controlled every aspect of flying including the licensing of pilots, certifying
aircraft and issuing all rules and procedures governing Indian airports and airspace.
However, in 1994 an Act of Parliament established the Airports Authority of India
(AAI). This Act gave the AAI the power to manage all national and international
airports and administer every aspect of air transport operation through the air traffic
control. In 2008, the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act established
the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) of India. AERA regulates
tariffs and other aeronautical charges, as well as monitors airports‘performance
standards.
Table 2.1 : Developments in the Indian Aviation Industry

Within the Indian context of airport regulation, AERA takes the following things into
consideration: airports are natural monopolies; airports are public goods, both in the
case of Brownfield and Greenfield airports the Government of India has made land
available for acquisition, often under the Land Acquisition Act, to airport developers
at a very low cost. Lastly, the same Act established the Appellate Tribunal which
handles appeals from service providers and consumer groups.
CHAPTER

3
AIRLINE DEREGULATION
Prompted by widespread dissatisfaction with CAB policies and the belief that
increased competition would enhance passenger service and reduce commercial
airline fares, Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Congress
believed that fares would drop based on the record of intrastate airlines, where fares
were 50 to 70 percent of the Civil Aeronautics Board-regulated fares over the same
distance. In addition, the Civil Aeronautics Board had already reduced restrictions
on fare competition in 1976 and 1977 and allowed more airlines to operate in many
city-pair markets.

The Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 reestablished the operation of the
Airport and Airway Trust Fund with a slightly revised schedule of user taxes. The
act authorized a new capital grant program, called the Airport Improvement Program
(AIP). In basic philosophy, the AIP was similar to the previous ADAP. It was intended
to support a national system of integrated airports that recognizes the role of large
and small airports together in a national air transportation system. Maximized joint
use of underutilized, nonstrategic U.S. military fields was also encouraged. The
1982 act also contained a provision to make funds available for noise compatibility
planning and to carry out noise compatibility programs as authorized by the Noise
Abatement Act of 1979.

The Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990 authorized a passenger
facility charge (PFC) program to provide funds to finance airport-related projects that
preserve or enhance safety, capacity, or security; reduce noise from an airport that is
part of such a system; or furnish opportunities for enhanced competition between or
among air carriers by local imposition of a charge per enplaned passenger. This act
also established a Military Airport Program for current and former military airfields,
which should help improve the capacity of the national transportation system by
enhancement of airport and air traffic control systems in major metropolitan areas.

3.1. Commercial Aviation Defined

An air carrier is a commercial operator or company that has been certificated by
the FAA under FAR Part 121 or FAR Part 135 to provide air transportation of
passengers or cargo. These operators possess an air carrier certificate and operations
specifications, which is a document that describes the conditions, authorizations, and
limitations under which the air carrier operates. Before December 14, 1995, FAR
Part 121 included the regulations that govern air carriers in multiengine airplanes
with more than 30 seats or 7,500-pound payload. As authorized by the operations
specifications, FAR Part 121 operations can be domestic air carrier (scheduled
passenger service, generally within the U.S.), flag air carrier (scheduled passenger
14 service in international operations), or supplemental air carrier (all cargo and charter
Aviation Safety And
operations).
Security
Until December 14, 1995, FAR Part 135 governed air carrier operations in airplanes
with 30 or fewer seats and payloads of 7,500 pounds or less, including both single-
and multiengine aircraft and all rotorcraft. The types of FAR Part 135 operations, as
per the operations specifications, were commuter air carrier (scheduled passenger
service), air taxi operators (on demand and all cargo and charter operations), and
split certificate (a carrier that operates aircraft under both FAR Parts 121 and 135,
dependent on aircraft size, type, and seating capacity). An industry- coined term
regional air carrier refers to a short-haul, scheduled carrier that services small and
mid-sized communities, generally using turboprop and small turbojet aircraft and
operating under FAR Part 121 or 135.
In the 15 years between 1980 and 1995, hours flown by commuters more than
doubled, from just above 1,000,000 hours in 1980 to nearly 2,600,000 hours in
1995. For the same period, FAR Part 121 carriers hovered just above or just below
2,000,000 hours. In 1980, commuters carried 9,520,000 passengers; by the end of
1995, they carried nearly 28,000,000.
3.2. The commuter safety initiative
As of December 14, 1995, all airplanes with 10 or more passenger seats and all
turbojets operated in scheduled passenger service must operate under FAR Part 121.
Commuter operations with nine or fewer seats and on-demand air taxi airplanes with
30 or fewer seats and all rotorcraft still operate under FAR Part 135. To operate under
FAR Part 121, the aircraft have to meet additional standards involving operational
and airplane certification and equipment and performance upgrades.
The Commuter Safety Initiative, or the Commuter Rule, as it came to be called
over the year of its drafting and enactment, requires the 10-or-more-seat aircraft to
comply with all FAR Part 121 operational requirements, which include
• Dispatch requirements and certificated dispatchers.
• Retirement at age 60. Pilots operating under FAR Part 135 were not required
to stop flying at age 60. The Commuter Rule extends the rule to pilots who had
been flying for former FAR Part 135 operators. Former FAR Part 135 pilots
now over 60 have four years of continued eligibility before they must retire.
• New flight and duty time.
• Manuals and procedures for both flight and ground personnel.
• All cabin safety and flight attendant requirements for 20- to 30-seat airplanes
(19 or fewer seats, no flight attendant required).
• Maintenance duty limits.
• A new training rule. The Air Carrier Training Rule increases training
requirements for all pilots of scheduled passenger operations in airplanes with
10 seats or more. Training and qualifications are comparable to crewmembers
of the larger air carriers. The new rule mandates crew resource management
 (CRM) training for both crewmembers and flight dispatchers. 15
Airline Deregulation
Also issued with the Commuter Rule is FAR Part 119, which consolidates air carrier
certification procedures, provides new definitions, and requires new management
and safety officer positions for FAR Part 121 operators.
All new type certifications after March 1995 for aircraft with 10 to 19 seats must
meet FAR Part 25 transport category standards. Airplanes in production can be
manufactured in the commuter category certification basis with no production
time limit, but the airplanes must meet the upgraded equipment requirements. The
existing fleet can continue to operate but must eventually meet upgraded equipment
requirements. With some limited exceptions for 10- to 19-seat airplanes, the
Commuter Rule requires compliance with the following equipment standards:
Exterior emergency exit markings:
• First-aid kits and emergency medical kits
• Wing ice lights
• Weather radar
3.3. The Regulatory Framework 11
• Protective breathing equipment
• Locking cockpit doors (20- to 30-seat aircraft only)
• Flight attendant portable and first-aid oxygen
• Distance measuring equipment
• Lavatory fire protection
• Pitot heat indication system
• Landing gear aural warning system
• Additional life rafts
• Additional flashlights
For 10- to 19-seat aircraft, some equipment was excepted if their systems were
“functionally equivalent” to FAR Part 121. For example, in 10- to 19-seat aircraft,
passengers are no more than 4 feet away from any exit; consequently, floor proximity
lighting is not required. Because no flight attendant is required on 10- to 19-seat
aircraft, the requirement for a locking cockpit door was excepted so that the crew
can easily conduct the safety briefing and see to the safety of the passengers. Other
exceptions included no crash ax and other cabin safety equipment and aircraft
certification items that would have required a redesign of the aircraft or extensive
engineering to retrofit. Operators of 10- to 30-seat aircraft were given 15 months
to be recertified under FAR Part 121, but there are extended compliance schedules
for certain items, notably installing passenger seat cushions that are not flammable,
pilot heat protection systems, lavatory fire protection, and a third altitude indicator.
Airplanes currently in production have to be fitted with single-point inertial pilot
shoulder harnesses.
16
Aviation Safety And
3.4. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
Security
The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security was established by
President Clinton in July 1996, following the TWA Flight 800 accident, to review
aviation safety, security, and the pace of a modernization of the ATC system.
Chaired by Vice President Gore, the commission functioned solely as an advisory
body, working in conjunction with the National Transportation Safety Board, the
Department of Transportation, and other government agencies and industry advisory
groups. The Department of Transportation was the official sponsor of the commission.
The charter of the commission included performing a comprehensive study of the
current state of civil aviatioWn safety and security (including ATC) and measures
to improve safety and security and modernize ATC, covering both domestic and
international aviation.
The final report of the commission, released on February 12, 1997, made the
following recommendations concerning the ATC system:
• The FAA’s plans to have a fully operational modernized system by 2015
should be revised such that the system is operational by 2005. The FAA may
achieve this by using innovative financing methods.
• Plans should be developed to integrate operational and airport capacity needs
into national airspace system (NAS) modernization.
• Innovative means should be explored to accelerate the installation of advanced
avionics in general aviation aircraft.
• The U.S. government should ensure Global Positioning Satellite/ System
(GPS) accuracy, availability, and reliability to accelerate its use in NAS
modernization and to encourage its acceptance as an international standard.
• NAS users should fund its development and operation.
• The FAA should identify and justify the frequency spectrum necessary for
transition to a modernized ATC system.
CHAPTER

4
CONSEQUENCES OF 9/11 TO THE INDUSTRY
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 shook the United States in a profound
way, deeply upsetting the national perception of safety within U.S. borders. No
industry or sector of the economy felt the impacts of these events more than the airline
industry. Both the immediate reaction to the attacks and the long-term repercussions
have negatively affected the industry.

4.1. Reduction in Passenger Demand

Directly after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the federal government closed airports,
cancelling thousands of flights at a direct cost to airlines. However, even when the
airports reopened, passengers were wary of air travel, and airlines experienced at
least a 30 percent reduction in demand during the initial shock period immediately
following the reopening. In addition, business travel accounts for one of the most
profitable segments in the airline business, and after the attacks, a significant number
of businesses temporarily suspended non-essential travel for their employees.

4.2. Bankruptcy and Large-Scale Layoffs

The week following the attacks, Congress put together a law that created the Air
Transportation Stabilization Board, a body authorized to give faltering airlines up
to $10 billion in loans. Despite this government-funded measure, several prominent
American airlines declared bankruptcy not long after the 9/11 attacks, included US
Airways and United Airlines. As a result of the massive financial loses due to lack
of passenger demand, cancelled flights and increased expenditures for security,
even airlines that did not have prior financial issues were forced to renegotiate labor
contracts and lay off high numbers of employees, such as the 7,000 employees laid
off by American Airlines.

4.3. Indirect Effects of New Air Security Procedures

Established on November 11, 2001, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and its overhaul of airport security processes were one of the most immediate
and long-term consequences of the 9/11 attacks. Although the heightened airport
security procedures do not directly affect airline operations, the new process has
caused a noticeable subset of airline passengers who opt for different modes of
transportation or skip travel entirely. An economic study from Cornell University in
2007 showed that federal baggage screenings brought about a 6 percent reduction in
passenger volume across the board, with a 9 percent reduction in the nation’s busiest
airports, totaling a nearly $1 billion loss for the airline industry.
18
Aviation Safety And
4.4. The Opposing Viewpoint : The Airline Industry Needed to Change
Security Anyway
Some argue that the negative financial effects experienced by the airline industry
following the 9/11 attacks only hastened an industry reorganization that would
have come sooner or later. Many airlines, including US Airways, which filed
for bankruptcy after the attacks, had long-standing financial issues prior to these
events. Other airlines had over-stretched during better financial positions in the
1990s, negotiating plump contracts with unions and purchasing new planes. The
downward dive in passenger demand after 9/11 forced airlines to tighten their belts,
re-negotiating contracts and grounding planes. Increased competition from efficient
low-cost airlines could have also had this effect over a longer timeline.
4.5. The Setting
The airline industry continues to struggle in the wake of 9/11. Although passengers
are returning, the industry is still operating at well below its historical levels. This is
obviously affecting the industry’s profitability. US Airways has filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy and United is suggesting that it may file this fall. Among major airlines,
only Southwest was profitable in 2001 and southwest was the only major carrier still
showing a profit halfway through 2002. Industry losses were at record levels in 2001
and these losses are continuing into 2002. There is, therefore, considerable concern
that the airline industry as we have known it over the last few years is likely to go
through a period of major structural change.
In September 2001, Congress and the Bush Administration moved swiftly to
provide the airline industry with federal financial support. The Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act (Stabilization Act) (P.L. 107-42) signed into
law on September 22, 2001, gave the airlines access to up to $15 billion in short-
term assistance. The first $5 billion provided direct aid to pay for industry losses
associated with the results of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. Access
to the remaining $10 billion in the form of guaranteed loans is subject to stringent
requirements promulgated by the Office of Management and Budget. Thus far, of
this $10 billion, $545 million in loans has been approved and another $900 million
has received tentative approval.
Current Situation. A year after the attack, significant numbers of airline employees
remain laid-off or may yet be subject to layoffs. A few airlines have started to recall
employees and increase flights, but only minimally so far. As many as 1,000 aircraft
operated prior to 9/11 remain parked in the Arizona desert and are in storage for at least
the near future. The actions of the airlines are obviously affecting related industries.
Boeing and its subcontractors have laid-off significant numbers of employees and
production of new aircraft has been reduced. Airline service providers, such as
caterers and airports, as well as the travel industry, also are experiencing revenue
losses.
The Policy Response : The federal government does not typically provide any
financial assistance as a result of an airline accident. The events of 9/11, however,
were extraordinary. The coordinated actions of terrorists leading to the destruction
and loss of life on four aircraft, and widespread destruction and loss of life on the 19
Consequences Of
ground had no precedent in aviation history. These actions were clearly beyond
9/11 To The Industry
the scope of any policy consideration ever envisioned by the United States. As a
result, new thinking about the exposure of the airline industry, and other industries,
to terrorism was required, leading to the Stabilization Act. As mentioned earlier,
the Stabilization Act provides the airline industry with several different forms of
assistance. Most important among these was immediate access to cash assistance.
The Act provided $5 billion in direct aid to the airlines, $500 million of which was
reserved for cargo airlines. The funds were made available on the basis of each
airline’s share of industry traffic measured by available seat miles prior to September
11. Payments from this program could not exceed the direct and incremental losses
suffered by an airline since 9/11. As of July 2002, $4.3 billion of these funds had been
distributed to eligible airlines. The Act also provides the aforementioned $10 billion
in guaranteed loans for the industry. This program is designed to provide longer
term stability to the industry and make it more credit worthy in private markets. The
distribution of these loans is controlled by an “air transportation stabilization board”
(ATSB) consisting of the Secretaries of Transportation and Treasury, the Chairman
of the Federal Reserve, and the Comptroller General (nonvoting). Application and
other operating procedures for this program were in accordance with guidance
provided by the Office of Management and Budget. The Board appears to have
considerable discretion as to how funds from this program will be distributed. All
loan applications for this program were required by June 28, 2002.
Thirteen airlines applied for the loan program. At the time of this writing, one
airline, America West, has received $380 million in loan funds. An additional
loan of $900 million for US Airways has been tentatively approved, pending the
airlines finalization of a business plan compatible with ATSB conditions, and with
the bankruptcy court. The loan applications of several airlines including Vanguard,
Frontier Flying Service (this is not Frontier Airlines, which also applied for a loan),
National and Spirit have been denied by the ATSB. Vanguard partially as a result of
this decision has filed for bankruptcy and ceased operating.
Another important element of the Stabilization Act was a provision extending war
risk insurance to the industry for 180 days, which has since been extended several
times. Most airlines were about to lose their existing private market war risk coverage,
which would have forced them to stop flying. By stepping in, the federal government
essentially provided gap insurance, with the hopes that the regular private insurance
market will become available in the months ahead.
Lessons Learned : There was consensus after 9/11 that the industry needed immediate
help in the short term and that this could best be handled by direct CRS-32 47
Prepared by the Banking, Insurance, Securities and Macroeconomic Policy Section.
Government and Finance Division. Assistance. Even with legislation in place, the
issue of how this aid is being distributed remains an issue a year later. This is because
of a clear desire amongst policy makers to limit aid to a level needed to stabilize
the industry, but not to pay for losses incurred by the industry before September
11 which could mean subsidizing some uncompetitive companies. Further, there is
20 concern that the industry remains competitive after its financial stabilization. This
Aviation Safety And
means that any aid distribution scheme should ensure that a sufficient number of
Security
airlines survive the current turmoil. Airline industry financial results in the first and
second quarter of 2002 have been dismal, with a few notable exceptions (Southwest,
Airtran, Jet Blue). The US Airways bankruptcy filing in August 2002 and United
Airlines announcement that it might file for bankruptcy this fall are seen by many
industry observers as only precursors of additional future bad news. It now appears,
that the events of September 11 changed the airline industry in some fundamental
ways that are not yet fully understood. Business travel, the most profitable part of
the industry’s customer base, seems to be greatly reduced. There are numerous
explanations for this. Absent so far, however, is a market based solution for the
industry’s longer term profitability issues.
We have long since learned that there is a fine line between providing assistance to
an industry and intervening in its business activities. The airline industry was once
highly regulated. There are concerns that too much federal intervention could be
a start down the path to new forms of government regulation. This would be true
if the government were to involve itself in industry business practices. There is a
real concern that the loans being provided by the ATSB could distort the industry
by keeping otherwise incapable competitors in the marketplace for an extended
period of time. In the process it is quite possible that these airlines actions, e.g. fare
sales, will have negative implications for airlines that did not receive federal loans.
The question still to be answered, therefore, is whether the federal response to 9/11
will contribute to a healthy competitive airline industry or whether it will instead
contribute to several additional years of industry financial turmoil.
CHAPTER

5
EMERGENCY FUNDING
An aircraft accident is an unexpected and usually a catastrophic event. The size and
scope of an aviation accident will influence the types of family assistance needed, as
well as the amount of financial, personnel and equipment resources needed to provide
adequate and sufficient assistance. The scale of the family assistance response will
be directly related to the number of people impacted.
Family assistance may require national legislation, regulations and/or policies
to ensure that the necessary resources and commitment to provide assistance are
available at short notice. Effective coordination of the parties involved is considered
essential.

The Council recommends that States:

1. Reaffirm their commitment to ensure that adequate and sufficient assistance is
provided to aircraft accident victims and their families;
2. establish legislation, regulations and/or policies addressing family assistance
plans to ensure that family assistance providers have the necessary financial,
personnel, and equipment resources, and that systems are available at short
notice to provide assistance to aircraft accident victims and their families in a
timely manner;
3. Ensure that their family assistance plans consider the following factors:
recipients of family assistance; types of family assistance to be provided; when
family assistance should be provided; family assistance providers; periodic
review and exercise of the plan; and enactment of legislation, regulations and/
or policies necessary to implement the plan;
4. Establish legislation, regulations and/or policies required to implement
effective coordination and control of the efforts to provide the required family
assistance;
5. Require that air operators implement family assistance plans, and ensure that
these plans are exercised regularly, supervised and audited as necessary;
6. require that airport operators implement family assistance plans, which can
be part of their Airport Emergency Plans, in coordination with air operators,
and ensure that these plans are exercised regularly, supervised and audited as
necessary; and
7. Require air operators to have proper arrangements with airports in which they
operate, so as to facilitate the provision of family assistance as required.
8. Accident Victims and their Families
22 Family assistance plan:
Aviation Safety And
Security 2.4 A detailed, well-considered plan that is periodically exercised is critical to the
provision of family assistance. The need to provide such assistance may occur with
little or no warning, requiring an immediate response, and may involve large numbers
of trained personnel, significant expense and dedicated resources.
2.5 The Council recommends that a family assistance plan should consider the
following factors:

1. Recipients of family assistance;

2. Types of family assistance to be provided;

3. When family assistance should be provided;

4. Family assistance providers;

5. Periodic review and exercise of the plan; and

6. Enactment of legislation, regulations and /or policies necessary to implement

the plan.

2.6 States should count on specific planning and resources from other States, air
operators, airport operators, third parties (such as non-governmental aid agencies
and commercial companies), and family associations. The Council recommends
that States establish Memoranda of Understanding, agreements and/or contracts
with departments, agencies, associations, organizations and other States that could
provide support for the development, preparation and implementation of the plan.

Timeliness of family assistance:

2.7 Following an aircraft accident, the most immediate form of information required
is the confirmation of whether or not the person about whom a family is concerned
was involved in the accident. The ability to provide such information is dependent
upon the availability of an accurate passenger manifest with sufficient detail for
positive confirmation of each passenger’s identity.
2.8 Some States have privacy rules and regulations protecting the identities of
accident victims and their families. As a consequence, delays in providing passenger
manifests may adversely affect the authorities responsible for coordinating and
providing family assistance.
2.9 The Council recommends that States consider legislation, regulations and/or
policies that would enable the entities responsible for providing family assistance
to have access to relevant and appropriate information for the purposes of providing
timely assistance.
Family assistance providers:
2.10 There are five main groups involved in providing family assistance:
1. The government of the State of Occurrence and other States involved in the
occurrence;
 2. The air operators; 23
Emergency Funding
3. The airport operators;

4. Third parties (e.g. non-governmental aid agencies, commercial companies);

and

5. Family associations, when require.

Note : Each group has different resources and responsibilities to the family assistance
efforts. The work of these groups should be synchronized and well-coordinated in
order to have an effective family assistance response.

2.11 The Council recommends that States, as part of the coordination process
established in their family assistance plans, facilitate the cooperation among the
different family assistance providers.

Government State of occurrence:

2.12 The Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP’s) regarding facilitation-
related matters for family assistance are specified in ICAO Annex 9, Chapter 8,
Section I, Assistance to aircraft accident victims and their families. Section I specifies
the State of Occurrence as being responsible for these SARP’s. Other States involved
in the occurrence may also share these responsibilities.

2.13 The Council recommends that States designate and specify in their regulations
and/or policies a coordinator/coordinating agency to ensure that the various family
assistance providers work in an efficient and coordinated manner so as to provide
the most appropriate and timely assistance possible. The coordinator/coordinating
agency may also be the point of contact between the families, the government
agencies and non-government organizations.

Note : When the location of the accident cannot definitely be established as being in
the territory of any State, the State of Registry should be responsible for providing
family assistance to accident victims and their families.

States nearest the scene of an accident in international waters are expected to provide
family assistance as they are able, as well as respond to requests by the State of
Registry.

Aircraft accident investigation authority:

2.14 The Council emphasizes that the sole objective of an aircraft accident
investigation, as defined in Annex 13 Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation,
is the prevention of accidents and incidents, not the apportionment of blame or
liability, and is separate from the provision of family assistance. However, the
accident investigation authority has a responsibility to provide relevant, timely
and validated information to the families and the accident survivors regarding the
progress of the investigation, provided that it does not compromise the objective of
the investigation.
24 2.15 To ensure the timeliness of the release of validated information to accident
Aviation Safety And
victims and their families, the Council recommends that the accident investigation
Security
authority, or other appropriate authority, consider appointing a liaison person as
a focal point to ensure effective communications with other providers of family
assistance, and to coordinate visits to the accident site by the families and survivors
when required, and when access is practicable.

Civil Aviation Authority:

2.16 The civil aviation authority is usually responsible for the regulation, certification
and oversight of the aviation industry. In some States, the civil aviation authority
issues regulations and/or policies mandating that air operators and airport operators
have family assistance plans.

II - 4 Accident Victims and their Families:

2.17 The Council recommends that civil aviation authorities or other appropriate
authorities establish legislation, regulations and/or policies to require that air
operators and airport operators have family assistance plans and resources to provide
timely and effective assistance to aircraft accident victims and their families. Such
plans should be supervised, exercised and audited as necessary.

Non-government organizations:
Air operator:
2.18 The air operator is in the best position to develop and maintain an accurate
passenger manifest to facilitate the identification of those who may be involved in an
aircraft accident. The air operator is also in the best position to notify the families of
accident victims, and to provide the passenger manifest to other authorities involved
in providing family assistance.

2.19 The Council recommends that States ensure that air operators have their family
assistance plans reviewed, exercised and updated periodically to provide timely and
effective assistance to aircraft accident victims and their families.

Airport operator:
2.20 Because airports are often where families and friends first gather to receive
information regarding an accident, airports need to have plans to provide assistance
to accident victims and their families, with focus on immediate care and support
following an accident. Such plans are to be implemented in coordination with air
operators so as to facilitate harmonization of the assistance to be provided. To this
end, the Council acknowledges that, following an accident, all airports associated
with the operation may need to be involved in the provision of family assistance
including the airport of departure, destination airport and alternate airports.

2.21 The Council recommends that States ensure that airport operators have their
family assistance plans reviewed, exercised and updated periodically to provide
timely and effective assistance to aircraft accident victims and their families.
Third parties: 25
Emergency Funding
2.22 The Council recommends that States, air operators and airport operators
consider the experience and services of third parties in the development of family
assistance plans, such as:

1. Aid agencies with extensive experience in dealing with families and disaster
survivors, and which are often able to provide services, such as crisis
counselling and support for the families of accident victims; and
2. Speciality commercial companies that can assist in the provision of family
assistance, such as in handling calls from family members, providing on-scene
family assistance coordination, and managing the identification, custody and
return of personal effects.

Section II. ICAO Policy II-5:

Family associations:
2.23 The Council acknowledges that family associations provide assistance to
their members in various forms and, in some cases, have provided assistance to the
families of victims of other aircraft accidents. Family associations can offer unique
first-hand experience and insight regarding the provision of family assistance and
can serve as interlocutors regarding the handling of certain family assistance issues.
2.24 The Council recommends that States, during the development of their family
assistance plans, take in due account the experience and support that family
associations can provide.
2.25 The Council further recommends that States consider supporting the
establishment of family associations, as necessary.
CHAPTER

6
PROTECTING PUBLIC AIR TRANSPORTATION
6.1. Strategic Actions
The differences in ground-based and airborne aviation security measures enacted
by the nations of the world, the volume of international air traffic, and the speed of
aviation operations make the Air Domain uniquely susceptible to exploitation and
disruption by individuals, organizations, and states. Individuals and groups hostile
to the United States have demonstrated the ability, and a continuing desire, to exploit
vulnerabilities and to adapt to changes in aviation security measures to attack the
Nation and its global interests.
The United States recognizes that, because of the extensive global connectivity
among businesses, governments, and populations, its aviation security policies
affect other nations, and that significant local and regional incidents may have global
effects. Success in securing the Air Domain will not come from the United States
acting alone, but through a coalition of nations maintaining a strong and united
international front. The need for a strong and effective coalition is reinforced by the
fact that most of the Air Domain is under no single nation’s sovereignty or jurisdiction.
Additionally, increased economic interdependency and globalization, made possible
by air passenger and cargo transportation, underscore the need for a coordinated
international approach. The United States recognizes that the vast majority of actors
and activities within the Air Domain are legitimate. The security of the Air Domain
can be accomplished only by employing all instruments of national power in a fully
coordinated manner in concert with other nation-states.
The broad principles that provide over arching guidance to the Strategy have been
used to direct the development of five strategic actions, which collectively advance
the strategic objectives. The Strategy recognizes that collectively these strategic
actions support strategic objectives:
• Maximize domain awareness;
• Deploy layered security;
• Promote a safe, efficient, and secure Aviation Transportation System;
• Enhance international cooperation; and
• Assure continuity of the Aviation Transportation System.
Domain awareness is a critical enabler for all strategic actions. Deploying layered
security addresses not only prevention and protection activities, but also the
integration of domestic and international security. Clearly, international cooperation
is vital to enhancing the effectiveness of each of the other strategic actions.
136.2. Maximize Domain Awareness
Maximizing Air Domain awareness is critical to achieving all of the strategic
objectives including deterring and preventing terrorist attacks, as well as protecting
the United States and its interests in the Air Domain and mitigating the effects of an 27
attack. Achieving shared awareness of the Air Domain is challenging and certain Protecting Public Air
Transportation
threats to the Air Domain are difficult to detect and interdict. The complexity of
aircraft registration and ownership processes, as well as the fluid nature of these
activities, offer additional challenges.
To maximize domain awareness the Nation must have the ability to integrate
surveillance data, all-source intelligence, law enforcement information, and relevant
open-source data from public and private sectors, including international partners.
Domain awareness is heavily dependent on advanced information collection, analysis,
and sharing of that information, and requires unprecedented cooperation and action
among the various elements of the public and private sectors, both nationally and
internationally, while adhering to laws protecting U.S. civil liberties.
• The United States Government will maximize its capability to detect and
monitor aircraft within its airspace, from large commercial aircraft to low-
altitude, low-observable manned or unmanned aircraft, as well as the area
contiguous to U.S. Air space and other airspace that might be of national
security interest. Priority for surveillance will be given to those assets and
those regions identified in specific national level documents.
• The United States Government will enhance its situational awareness through
monitoring to include the combination of information sources regarding a
flight (for example, airframe characteristic, on board sensors, crew, passengers,
Federal Air Marshals on board, Federal Flight Deck Officers and domestic and
foreign law enforcement).
• The United States Government will develop and encourage regulatory and
private sector initiatives to enhance supply chain security practices and
advance robust information collection for persons and cargo.
• The United States Government will work with international partners to
develop agreements that promote enhanced visibility into the aviation supply
chain and the movement of cargo and passengers and will participate in
international coalitions to share aviation situational awareness, as protocols
permit, on a timely basis.
• The United States Government will continue to improve and invest in
an analytic work force, enhanced sensor technology, human intelligence
collection, and information processing tools to persistently monitor the Air
Domain.
• The United States Government will enhance the global aviation intelligence
capability to strengthen intelligence analysis, coordination, and integration.
• The United States Government will enhance the Aviation Transportation
System to provide shared situational awareness to disseminate information
to both public and private users at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels.
• The United States Government will support transformational research and
development programs in information fusion and analysis to advance to the
next level of threat assessment.
• The United States Government, with the cooperation of its foreign partners,
will monitor those aircraft, cargo, and persons of interest from the point
of origin, throughout the route of flight, to the point of entry, to ensure the
28 integrity of the transit, to manage aviation traffic routing, and if necessary, to
Aviation Safety And interdict and/or divert aircraft for law enforcement or defensive action.
Security
6.3. Deploy Layered Security
Deploying layered security will be a critical enabler for strategic objectives such
as deterring and preventing terrorist attacks, protecting the United States and its
interests in the Air Domain, and mitigating damage and expediting recovery. The
ability to achieve aviation security is contingent upon an active, layered aviation
security and defence in-depth that integrates the capabilities of public and private
sector entities acting in concert and using diverse and complementary measures,
rather than relying on a single point solution. At a minimum, a layered approach
to aviation security means further applying some measure of security to each of
the following points: transportation; staff; passengers; conveyances; access control;
cargo and baggage; airports; and in-flight security. Together, as one integrated
system, these measures allow for resilience against expected and unexpected attack
scenarios. Not only does each layer add to security, but its combination serves as
a force multiplier. This layered security deters attacks, which otherwise might be
executed in a multiple, simultaneous, catastrophic manner, by continually disrupting
an adversary’s deliberate planning process. The implementation of a new security
layer must be cost effective, both in absolute terms and relative to other possible
measures, and must protect information privacy and other rights provided by law.
Initiatives to enhance layered security include the following:
• The United States Government will further integrate and align all aviation
security programs and initiatives into a comprehensive, cohesive national
effort of scalable, layered security.
• The United States Government will enhance its capabilities and procedures to
identify, intercept, and defeat aviation threats in the air or on the ground.
• The United States Government will expand domestic partnerships with the
public and private sector to train and equip domestic security forces, consistent
with their jurisdiction and legal authority, to provide physical security for
key assets and critical infrastructure to detect, identify, interdict, and defeat
aviation threats on the ground.
• The United States Government will conduct and sponsor further development,
and where appropriate, encourage implementation of new and emerging
technologies including both aircraft-borne and ground-based systems for
detection of WMD, as well as for reducing susceptibility/vulnerability or
increasing survivability of aircraft to these and other terrorist threats.
• The United States Government will enhance procedures for identifying and
designating flights of interest, as well as coordinating procedures for any
subsequent operational response.
• The United States must have well-trained, properly equipped, and ready
ground-based aviation security response forces from State, regional, local,
and tribal law enforcement agencies, in addition to a Federal response force
 ready to detect, deter, interdict, and defeat any potential adversary. 29
Protecting Public Air
• The United States Government will further collaborate with State, local and Transportation
tribal governments and the private sector to assess and priorities critical
facilities, resources, infrastructure, and venues that are at greatest risk from
hostile or unlawful acts.
• The United States Government will enhance and expand its capability to
assess risks posed by individuals with access to the Air Domain.
• The United States Government, using a risk-based methodology, will continue
to develop measures for the prevention and detection of MANPADS or other
stand-off weapon attack on domestic commercial aircraft.
The integrated planning and management of Federal, State, local, and tribal
resources, reinforced with regular exercises, is essential for an effective response.
Therefore, agencies will further coordinate training, planning, and other resources,
where practical and permissible, to standardize operational concepts, develop
common technology requirements, and coordinate budget planning for aviation
security missions. Interagency acquisition and logistics processes must support the
continuous assessment of all requirements to optimize the allocation of appropriate
resources and capabilities. Cooperative research and development efforts, coupled
with reformed acquisition processes with coordinated requirements, funding, and
scheduling, along with management, will identify current and future needs.
6.4. Promote a Safe, Efficient, and Secure Aviation Transportation
System
Promoting a safe, efficient, and secure system will help meet the strategic objectives
of protecting the United States and its interests in the Air Domain and minimizing
the impact on the Aviation Transportation System and the U.S. economy. Potential
adversaries will attempt to exploit existing vulnerabilities, choosing the time and
place to act according to the weaknesses they perceive. Private owners and operators
of infrastructure, facilities, and resources are the first line of defence and should
undertake basic facility security improvements. Defences against terrorist attacks
and criminal acts can be improved by embedding scalable security measures that
reduce systemic or physical vulnerabilities. The elimination of vulnerabilities
depends upon incorporating best practices and establishing centres of excellence,
including feedback mechanisms for lessons learned, and opens avenues for internal
and external stakeholders to propose and develop security innovations, as well as
a periodic review of each country’s security standards for mutual compatibility.
Initiatives to promote a safe, efficient, and secure Aviation Transportation System
include the following:
• The United States Government will assume the function, currently performed
by the airlines, of checking passenger information against terrorist watch list
information maintained by the United States Government and vetting such
information before the departure of any regularly scheduled commercial flight
for which the place of departure, the place of destination, or any scheduled
stopping place is within the United States (a “U.S. Flight”). The United
30 States Government will also determine the security utility of performing such
Aviation Safety And
function with respect to flights that only pass through U.S. airspace and, if
Security
necessary, develop a system by which this function will be performed for such
flights.
• The United States Government will continue to collaborate with domestic and
international partners to identify options to enhance risk-based screening of
passengers, including, the checking of passenger information against terrorist
watch list information for regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights
that overfly the territorial airspace of the United States.
• The United States Government, in coordination with public and private
partners, will establish requirements for the continued implementation of
air cargo transportation security measures, including all-cargo carriers,
combination carriers, and indirect air carriers operating to, from, or within the
United States.
• The United States Government will develop requirements for the improvement
of airspace and air traffic management-related security measures.
• The United States Government will recommend measures to strengthen the
prevention of entry by, and detection of, individuals with malicious intent
who possess or seek to possess clearance or credentials that permit entry into
secure or restricted areas within the Aviation Transportation System.
6.5. Enhance International Cooperation
Enhancing international cooperation will be a critical enabler for strategic objectives
such as protecting the United States and the Air Domain, actively engaging domestic
and international partners, as well as deterring and preventing terrorist attacks and
criminal or hostile acts. The United States supports enhancing cooperation among
nations and international organizations that share common interests regarding the
security of the Air Domain. New initiatives are needed to ensure that all nations full
fill their responsibilities to prevent and respond to terrorist or criminal actions with
timely and effective enforcement, including:
• The United States Government will work with foreign partners to enhance
international mechanisms to improve transparency in the registration of
aircraft, identification of aircraft owners, and transparency of the cargo supply
chain.
• The United States Government will further cooperate with foreign partners
to enhance and encourage adoption of international standards and best
practices as well as to align regulation and enforcement measures. This
will include initiatives pursued through international organizations, such as
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), that include industry
participation.
• The United States Government will enhance cooperative mechanisms for
coordinating international responses to aviation threats that may span national
boundaries and jurisdictions. The United States will continue to work closely
 with other governments and international and regional organizations to 31
Protecting Public Air
enhance the aviation security capabilities of other key nations by offering
Transportation
aviation and airport security assistance, training, and consultation.
• The United States Government will promote the implementation of the
international anti-air piracy conventions and other international aviation
security arrangements and initiatives.
6.6. Assure Continuity of the Aviation Transportation System
Assuring the continuity of the Aviation Transportation System will be a critical
enabler for strategic objectives such as mitigating damage and expediting recovery, as
well as minimizing the impact on the Aviation Transportation System. This requires:
a common framework with clearly defined roles for those charged with response and
recovery; ready forces that are properly trained and equipped to manage incidents,
especially those involving WMD; carefully crafted and exercised contingency plans
for response, recovery, and reconstitution; and extensive coordination among public,
private, and international communities. Initiatives to assure the continuity of the
Aviation Transportation System include:
• The United States Government will develop response and recovery protocols,
consistent with the NIMS, to ensure a comprehensive and integrated national
effort. Ultimately, these efforts will also need to be aligned with the National
Preparedness Goal (NPG), which will establish readiness priorities, targets,
and metrics.
• The United States Government will enhance the emergency preparedness for
the Aviation Transportation System. This will include pre - staging of resources
as necessary, coordinating, and planning exercises with first responders, and
planning for restoring the function of the Aviation Transportation System in
the event of an incident.
• The United States Government will develop protocols, mechanisms, and
processes to mitigate the operational and economic damage from an attack,
including the possibility of temporarily suspending or restricting flight
operations in select areas of the National Airspace System.
• The United States Government, in coordination with public and private sector
partners, will establish near-term and long-term recovery strategies to support
the Aviation Transportation System in the event of an attack.
CHAPTER

7
HIJACKING
Aviation hijackings occurred as early 1931 when Peruvian Revolutionaries hijacked
a Pan American Ford Trimotor mail plane in order to distribute propaganda leaflets.
24 As the aviation age progressed, so too did aviation related crimes. Why? Terrorists
exploit new technologies as a means to achieve their goals. David Rapoport
chronicles four waves of modern terrorist groups from the 1800’s to the late 1970’s,
and associated with the swell of each new wave of terrorists, was a new transportation
or communication technology that was susceptible to terrorist exploitation 25. In this
case, aviation hijacking or the exploitation of commercial aviation became the new
modus operandi of the international terrorist. The rash of terrorist hijackings that
occurred in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s coincided with the dawn of commercial
jet aviation. The modern era of trans continental travel was growing, and with it so
grew the exploitation of modern commercial jetliners.

7. 1. Hijackings
The first aircraft hijacked within the United States occurred in 1961. Antuilo Ramirez
Ortiz forced a National Airlines Convayer flight crew at gunpoint to fly the aircraft
to Communist Cuba. This marked the starting point of a rash of aviation hijacking
events in the United States, which gained a significant swell in the latter part of the
decade. Between 1968 and 1972, 326 aircraft hijack attempts occurred throughout the
world. Of those 326 hijackings, 124 occurred within the United States. In 1968 alone
there were twenty aircraft hijackings in the U.S. Initially, the rationale for hijacking
an aircraft was for transportation, but the rationale soon expanded. Robert Holden’s
article, “The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking,” placed aircraft hijackings into
one of two main categories depending on the demand or desired objective of the
hijacker, either hijacking for extortion or hijacking for transportation.

a. Transportation:
As aircraft hijacking incidents grew in number, the objective of hijackers tended
to focus more on securing transportation to a desired destination. In the 1960’s, the
majority of aviation hijack incidents in the United States were the result of aircraft
being diverted to Cuba. Out of 111 aircraft hijackings whose hijackers solely sought
a means of transportation from the United States, ninety of those were destined for
Cuba. In 1968 alone there were nineteen U.S. domestic flights that were hijacked to
Cuba, and in 1969, this trend spiked to thirty-nine hijackings within the U.S. and all
but two were 26 United States Department of State, Significant Terrorist Incidents,
1961-2003: A Brief Chronology, seeking destination Cuba as an objective. Many
of these incident hijackers were of Cuban birth and only desired to return to their
homeland, as travel to Cuba from the U.S. was banned. Some hijackings however,
were not only characterized by a desire to utilize commercial aviation as a source of
transportation, but also held additional hijacker demands.
b. Extortion: 33
Hijacking
Initially, hijackers desiring a means of transportation dominated aircraft hijackings,
but as the act of air piracy grew, so to did the reasons for hijacking aircraft. Hijackers
requested additional demands and extortion became a common reason in addition
to modern conveyance. Extortion objectives ranged from political objectives to
prisoner release to media attention. In the U.S. however, monetary gain was the
primary reason for extortion related hijacking attempts. The first extortion related
hijacking in the U.S. occurred in 1970 at Dulles Airport, Virginia when an aircraft was
held for ransom by a hijacker demanding $100 million dollars. Another similar U.S.
hijacking occurred the following year when a hijacker demanded a monetary ransom
and then forced the crew to fly the aircraft to the Bahamas. The extortion element
was not isolated to the U.S., as extortion hijackings were occurring worldwide as
well. Five more extortion related hijackings occurred within the U.S. in 1971, one
of which hijackers demanded the release of several Black Panther members from
prison. The most notable extortion related hijacking of 1971 was unquestionably
the DB Cooper heist in which he demanded a ransom of $200,000 dollars and two
parachutes. He subsequently jumped from the rear door of the Boeing 727 while it
was in-flight and was never caught nor the money recovered.
7. 2. Implications for Security
In the earliest days of aviation, hijacking was a minor concern. It was not an element
of focus even though the act of hijacking an aircraft became more prevalent. U.S.
hijacking incidents in the late 1960’s became commonplace for passengers and
flight crews. In 1969 at least one hijacking occurred each month. Aircrews began to
carry approach information for airports in Cuba, and aircrew training emphasized
compliance with hijackers as diplomatic procedures was in place for the return of
aircraft and passengers. Compliance and Non - Resistance were the focal points
to eventually gain the release of passengers and crew. Hijackers would issue their
demands, be delivered to their destination and eventually, passengers and aircraft
would be returned to the U.S.
From the U.S. perspective, this is how hijackings occurred. It wasn’t until 1971
that the first passenger was killed in the U.S. during an aircraft hijack. Hijackings
became more violent, as the killing of passengers and aircrews or the bombing of
aircraft incidents escalated. In September 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP), simultaneously hijacked and later destroyed four commercial
airliners, two of which were U.S. aircraft. This event was essentially the culmination
or turning point of aviation hijackings for the era. It struck an international chord
and drove the need to establish an international legal stance to counter the problem
of hijacking.
As a result of the rising rate of airline hijackings, the Hague Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft was held in 1970. Sixty cooperating
states agreed on provisions to enact legislation against hijacking, arrest and trial
provisions, and active response measures such as blocking the runway or disabling
the aircraft while on the ground to prevent it from taking off. The Hague Convention
also framed the difficult subject of jurisdiction. Hijacking had become not only
an international problem but it created a gray area of jurisdictional boundary that
hijackers travelling from country to country could exploit. Where did each country’s
34 authority begin and end? The Hague Convention sought to narrow that jurisdictional
Aviation Safety And gap. The Hague convention facilitated the groundwork to apprehend hijack
Security
perpetrators, as it was more punitive in nature than the Tokyo Convention of 1963,
which tended to focus more on the return of aircraft.
Domestically, from 1961 through 1976, as the apprehension rates of domestic
hijackers grew, the number of domestic hijacking incidents subsequently declined.
Prison sentences also increased in duration, which had a corollary impact. The
average sentence for those convicted of hijacking between 1972 and 1974 was thirty
years. The treaty between the U.S. and Cuba to curb the Cuba-hijack-movement also
had a significant impact. Both countries signed a treaty in 1973 agreeing to either
extradite or punish hijackers. This treaty essentially alleviated the safe haven for
asylum seekers regardless of which direction they were travelling, either to or from
Cuba. The security policies governing airport and airline security procedures also
became more stringent. The Federal Aviation Administration provided the airlines
the authority to deny travel to persons that would not consent to a search of their
persons or luggage. Warning signs were also posted in airports as reminders that
it was a federal offense to carry concealed weapons or to hijack an aircraft. In the
face of ever increasing violent hijack events coupled with the aforementioned PFLP
hijacking, on September 11, 1970, President Nix on introduced an anti-hijacking
program that included expanding the Federal Sky Marshal program started in 1961.
These initial efforts were noteworthy, but in 1972 two U.S. aircraft were hijacked
within days of each other resulting in the death of one airline employee, and
another five persons injured. This incident spawned the 100% screening of boarding
passenger’s policy, a mandatory inspection of carry-on luggage in January 1973,
and the placement of armed guards at all airport boarding gates. These security
efforts were not limited only to policy as then current advanced technologies and
science were also employed to enhance security operations such as the procurement
of electronic security detection devices. In 1972, $3.5 million dollars was allotted to
procure detection devices, resulting in the installation of metal detectors in airports
by 1973. The use of behavioural science was also employed to develop behavioural
profiling training for airport personnel in order to identify potential hijackers.
Following 1972, there was a rapid decline in the number of hijackings in the U.S., and
there were zero hijackings in the first eight months of 1973. An increasing number of
anti-hijack related laws, security policies and applied security technologies were put
into place that had a significant impact on the declining hijacking rate. These security
measures had positive results. But it was an applied combination of international
response, implemented legal tools with harsh penalty, improved security policy
coupled with advanced technologies that successfully curbed the hijacking dilemma
of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. There were still sporadic accounts of aircraft
hijackings, but for a period of eight years following 1992, there were no hijack
events within the United States. Prior to 9/11, there was a significant lull in domestic
hijack activity.
CHAPTER

8
FRAMING THE AVIATION SECURITY PROBLEM
A. The Aviation Transportation System
This primary focus of this thesis is one aspect of securing the Aviation Transportation
System, the security measures applied to commercial aviation. In order to frame the
security problem properly, however, a brief description of the Aviation Transportation
System is necessary in order to illustrate the difficulty of providing foolproof security
to a public mode of transportation. The sheer size of the Aviation Transportation
System makes this an almost insurmountable task. The Aviation Transportation
System is comprised of aircraft, operators, airports, facilities and infrastructure,
as well as services and airspace. It is a multi - faceted system that includes both
private and public involvement as well as seven federal government agencies. Both
commercial and general aviation operations are conducted from over 19,800 airports
throughout the U.S. The Transportation Security Administration estimates that there
are a million airport employees including vendor workers employed at commercial
airports throughout the country. These numbers do not even include personnel
located at remote FAA radar facilities or Flight Service Stations.
The complexity of these intertwined aviation elements is compounded by the
numerous government agencies that are also woven within the fabric of the Aviation
Transportation System. These agencies work to secure, maintain, and regulate the
operations and infrastructure of the system. The Department of Transportation
for instance manages the system infrastructure such as airport facilities. The
Transportation Security Administration is the lead agency for security, and the
Federal Aviation Administration regulates operations, coordinates the nation’s
massive volume of airspace, and controls the daily congestion of air traffic over
flying our nation, the majority of which is general aviation.
Although general aviation has not been a primary target of terrorists, it never the less
makes up a large portion of domestic aviation. Three quarters of all aircraft that take-
off and land in the U.S. Are general aviation aircraft. In terms of persons and aircraft,
general aviation operations involve over 550,000 pilots and 200,000 private aircraft.
While these numbers are significant, commercial aviation is by far the leading entity
when viewed in terms movement volume, either of people or goods.

Commercial Aviation:
Commercial aviation operations include both passenger airlines as well as
commercial cargo carriers. In February 2006, 153 commercial air carriers, including
commuter airlines were certified to conduct operations in the United States. In that
same year, certified air carriers employed 589,961 people at locations and airports
throughout the aviation system. And in 2005, 554 domestic airports were operating
as commercial service airports. The large number of commercial passenger carriers
has provided terrorists with a variety of targets, and as passenger volume increases,
so does exploitation source for terrorists. United States Government Accountability
36 Office, General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but
Aviation Safety And Continued Partnership with the Private Sector is Critical to Long-Term Success
Security
a. Passenger:
Passenger airlines have been the principal target for terrorists in the aviation
community. The volume and throughput of commercial passenger aviation
exacerbates the aviation security problem. In 2006, there were 131 commercial
passenger carriers that operated in or from the United States. In 2005, U.S. passenger
carriers ferried 701,509,325 travelers, and that number does not even include
commuter airline enplanements. The year prior, 672,018,635 passengers traveled
on board commercial airliners. These carriers transport millions of travelers each
year, to and from hundreds of major airports, and handle more than 2.5 billion
handheld and checked luggage. In just one month in 2005, passenger commercial
airlines flew 822,374 domestic flights. Many of these commercial passenger carriers
also simultaneously transport cargo within the lower bay of the aircraft, and cargo
security presents yet another challenge to the aviation security arena.

b. Cargo:
There are twenty-five air carriers within the U.S. that dedicate commercial flights
solely to cargo. Within the freight industry, airfreight ships the least amount of cargo
annually in comparison to other industry modes of transportation such as rail or
truck. However, the sheer tonnage freighted by air is still very large. In 2004, over
one 72 Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Certified Air Carriers 2006, Available
from billion tons of commercial air cargo was airlifted either by dedicated cargo
or passenger cargo commercial flights. The commercial air cargo arena is also
filled with additional actors. The “passenger” must be shipped which in turn invites
additional entities to the aviation security arena. The movement of airfreight will
involve the initial shipper, freight forwarders, logistic integrators, and airport logistic
centres. All of these groups will widen the security aperture and present additional
security problems.
Aviation Security Measures:
Building the Security Layers:
The first wave of aviation hijackings was challenged by the development and
implementation of passenger screening devices and regulated security processes.
These initial security and screening efforts laid the foundation for security programs
to follow, many of which in principal are still in use.
a. The 1980’s and Pan Am Flight 103:
In the 1980’s, in the face of increased international hijacking events, President
Reagan signed the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985,
which once again authorized funding to revive the Federal Air Marshal program.
Similar to the Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974, the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1985
allowed the secretary of transportation to levy even harsher penalties on foreign air
carriers operating in the U.S. that failed to meet security standards. Funding was
also appropriated to further develop security and explosive detection technologies.
History and Development of the Department of Transportation, Available from
technologies would soon become even more of a high interest item as emphasis 37
shifted from guns and knives and moved towards finding explosives. Framing The
Aviation Security
The shock value achieved by terrorists targeting commercial aviation was reinforced Problem
again in 1988 with the death of 270 persons flying on board a Pan Am 747 airliner.
Aviation security was once again tested and penetrated by a bomb made of plastic
explosive that was placed on board Pan American Flight 10, inside a piece of
checked baggage. A timer detonated the bomb that exploded the aircraft in mid-air
over Lockerbie, Scotland. The owner of the luggage was not on board. Although
this flight did not depart from a U.S. airport, concern grew within the U.S. regarding
domestic aviation security and the ability to screen and detect explosives. This
concern would generate a presidential commission.
The Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism convened in 1989 following
Pan Am Flight 103 incident. The commission’s charge was to evaluate then current
aviation security policies and practices, and recommend improvements. In general,
the commission found that the aviation security system “was sorely lacking.” It
noted shortcomings in intelligence information, specifically in gaining, accessing
and disseminating intelligence, and also a lack of federal government oversight
of airline and airport activities. The commission cited 64 recommendations to
improve domestic aviation security, one of which was to establish minimum
standards for hiring, training, and employing security personnel. The commission
also recommended placing Federal security managers at high risk airports to ensure
airlines comply with security mandates.
Following the Pan Am incident, the secretary of transportation directed the installation
of new Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) explosive detection machines at 100 of the
main commercial airports in the U.S. Only three machines were deployed for initial
operational testing however, and their performance was evaluated as unsatisfactory.
Due to these initial results, the aforementioned commission also recommended
accelerating research to develop new explosive detection technologies.
As a result of the commission’s findings, President George H.W. Bush signed the
Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, which codified the commission’s
recommendations. The act implemented security enhancements in three main areas,
oversight, screener standards and explosive detection technology. New positions
were created within FAA to provide security oversight. The Act also required FAA
to announce rules requiring airlines to apply standards for the hiring, continued
employment, and training of security workers, to include criminal background
checks. The act also mandated FAA to accelerate research on explosive detection
technology, and to deploy new explosive detection equipment by November 1993. It
is important to note however, that several accounts indicate that the Aviation Security
Improvement Act did little to improve aviation security. The intent to improve
security was worthwhile, yet by the time another 747 accidentally exploded in mid-
air in 1996 due to mechanical failure, airport security had not improved, explosive
detection machines were not deployed to airports, airport screeners were still poorly
trained, and suitcases were not matched to passengers on domestic flights. Almost
simultaneous to the Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism’s hearings, the
U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) completed its report on FAA’s domestic
and international security programs. GAO testimony before Congress noted that
fundamental deficiencies existed in four areas of FAA’s aviation security program:
38 passenger screening, airport security controls, security inspections, and training
Aviation Safety And requirements for security personnel. The report cited that high turnover rates, low
Security
wages, and inadequate training hindered security screening effectiveness. In terms
of airport security, the report cited a lack of employee identification controls, and
access to aircraft operation areas, or restricted areas was fairly open. The report also
noted that FAA airport security inspections were inadequately accomplished, and
standards among different airline security training programs were lacking.
A subsequent 1994 GAO report regarding the development of security technology
referencing the Aviation Security and Improvement Act of 1990, reported that little
progress had been made on deploying new explosive detection systems. At the time
of the report, six years had passed since the Pan Am 103 incident, and FAA was
still assessing forty different detection technologies but none of them had fully met
FAA’s performance requirements to detect sophisticated plastic explosives. As a
result of these shortfalls, there still was no explosive detection capability for checked
baggage.
b. The 1990’s and TWA Flight 800:
The next major aviation security review was by the White House Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security, chaired by then Vice President Al Gore. This
commission was created less than one month after the mid-air explosion of another
U.S. 747 airliner. On July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 laden with 230 passengers and
crew, exploded shortly after take off from New York’s John F. Kennedy airport.
While investigators determined that the cause of the mid-air explosion of TWA Flight
800 was the eruption of the center fuel tank and not the result of a terrorist bomb,
the accident itself looked too similar to Lockerbie. Incident eyewitnesses recounted
seeing a streak of light heading towards the airliner from the ground, which many
speculated was a man portable air defense missile, igniting the possibility of another
terrorist attack. As a result of the TWA incident, President Clinton established the
commission to study aviation security and safety issues, and to establish a plan to
implement new explosive detection technology.
The Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, which was also known as the Gore
Commission, released its final report in 1997, which contained 31 recommendations
to improve aviation security. Many of the recommendations were similar to those
of the previous Aviation Security and Terrorism Commission in 1989 and tended to
fall in one of three main areas: security and screening personnel, explosive detection
technology, and the use of technology to facilitate passenger profiling, and passenger
to bag-matching measures.
The airlines were responsible for screening passengers and their baggage, and for
training the personnel that performed those duties. But training and standards varied
from carrier to carrier. One notable Commission recommendation was to establish
federally mandated standards for screener training, hiring, and operator performance
standards. The federal mandate would also apply to the operation of explosive
detection systems, automated bag match technology, and profiling programs. This
mandate would apply set operating standards to all aspects of security screening
in order to ensure continuity of operations among differing airlines and different
security companies. In order to increase the professionalism of the screener
workforce, the Commission also recommended a national program to certify the
screening companies.
Screening companies would be required to meet the established standards mandated 39
for screener personnel, and company hiring evaluations would be based on screening Framing The
Aviation Security
performance, not the lowest contract cost bid. To further cultivate the profession, Problem
human factors were addressed such as implementing reward-performance programs
and exploring the use of best practice initiatives. The quality of the security workforce
was previously addressed by the 1989 Commission which had also cited a need for
training and hiring standards. The Gore Commission also recommended criminal
background and FBI fingerprint checks for all security screeners and airport and
airline employees with access to secure areas.
Acquiring an explosive detection capability was still a high priority in the aviation
security arena. To enable the FAA to satisfy the delinquent federal deadline of
deploying an explosive detection technology, the Commission recommended
deploying current existing available commercial technology. To this point, only
one explosive detection device had met FAA’s operational requirements, but its
performance was sluggish, and it was expensive. The Commission felt that by
deploying current technology in use at international airports, while not meeting
FAA’s certification standards, it would provide some added measure of protection to
aviation travellers. In order to augment the detection technology, due to its protracted
development, the Commission also recommended expanding the use and deployment
of bomb-sniffing dogs.
The third major area of the Commission’s recommendations surrounded the use of
technology to automate passenger profiling and to implement a 100% bag -105 White
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, Final Report to President Clinton
passenger match measure by December 31, 1997. The checked bags of passengers
selected either by an automated profiling program or at random, would then either
be screened or matched to a boarded passenger. These combined measures would
first identify passengers of “risk,” and second ensure that their bags were screened
for explosives or that the passenger was on board the aircraft prior to the bag being
loaded. This measure would counter the Locker bie scenario of a checked bag with
no owner passenger on board, yet the scenario of a suicide bomber on an aircraft
had not presented itself. One additional measure recommended by the Commission
was to “aggressively test existing security systems” by increasing the use of “Red
Teams” or adversary agents. The Commission recommended incorporating red
teaming as a standard element of airport security measures to continually re-assess
airport security by finding vulnerabilities.
The Federal Aviation Re authorization Act of 1996 was passed following the initial
recommendations of the Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. The measures
enacted that applied to the security workforce directed FAA to certify security
screening companies, to develop uniform security screening performance standards,
and to require employment background checks on screeners and security personnel
associated with baggage or cargo functions. In the arena of explosive detection,
FAA was directed to assess, and deploy, explosive detection technologies that were
currently available to commercial aviation. Passenger profiling was also addressed
but only to the extent that FAA and other agencies “should continue to assist air
carriers in their development of passenger profiling programs.” The same held true in
reference to a passenger bag-match program. Finally, the Act also directed periodic
vulnerability assessments of airport security systems.
40 The Commission on Aviation Safety and Security’s recommendations did meet
Aviation Safety And
Security
with some success. In 1996, the FAA awarded six contracts to explosive detection
technology manufacturers and ordered 54 explosive detection systems. The FAA
also received funding for 114 additional canine teams to augment technology based
explosive detection measures, and FAA hired 300 new special agents to red team
airport security. Progress on an automated passenger profiling system had also been
made. Northwest Airlines had been utilizing a passenger pre - screening program
since 1996. Through coordination between Northwest Airlines and the FAA, the
implementation of the Computer Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) program
began in 1998. Following the Presidential Commission’s initial report however,
GAO testimony in September 1996 on aviation security concluded that the aviation
system still had significant flaws. The Federal Aviation Re authorization Act of 1996
directed FAA to certify screening contractors, but by 2001, certification still was not
complete. The GAO testimony cited that, “Nearly every major aspect of the system,
ranging from the screening of passengers, checked and carry-on baggage, mail, and
cargo as well as access to secured areas within airports and aircraft, has weaknesses
that terrorists could exploit.” Progress had been made at least in terms of security
legislation, but the implementation of the security recommendations fell short of
the intended operational application. Increased security measures meant increased
security costs to the airlines. The lack of full implementation of many of the directed
security initiatives left the security layers vulnerable.

Category of Action Object of Action Aim of Action

Attaining political,
propaganda, and
Hijacking for retention Passengers psychological results;
not connected to causing
direct damage
Transferring of terrorists
Hijacking for movement Aircraft from one geographic
point to another
Inflicting material,
Hijacking for annihilation Aircraft + Passengers political and
psychological damage
Inflicting material,
Direct action against
Aircraft + Passengers political and
aircraft
psychological damage
Ground
Inflicting material,
Direct action against Infrastructure(and,
political and
ground infrastructure more rarely, aircraft or
psychological damage
passengers)
Aircraft (and, more
Peripheral categories rarely, passengers, crew, Various
ground infrastructure)
Current Trend: 41
Framing The
Analyses of the modern dynamics and tendencies of international terrorism as a Aviation Security
Problem
whole, and its numerous particular aspects, make it possible to single out the
following categories of the existing threat framework as they relate to civil aviation:
• Aircraft hijacking for retention/exchange of hostages;
• Aircraft hijacking for movement/transfer;
• Aircraft hijacking for annihilation/destruction;
• Direct action against aircraft from outside;
• Direct action against civil aviation ground infrastructure;
• Peripheral categories of actions.
Hijacking for Retention : Passengers on board of an air plane are the primary
objects of this category of actions. The aim is to achieve political, propaganda, and
psychological effect (show of force and presence; pressuring state structures and
public opinion; attraction of maximum attention; compliance with conditions and
demands). A classical act of terror in the form of the forcible seizure of hostages
on board of an aircraft and a demonstrative threat to their lives poses a practically
unsolvable political and moral-psychological dilemma for the state, which is faced
with the necessities of suppressing terrorism and saving the lives of hostages as
diametrically opposite tasks. As effective means of pressure, this form of terror
provides terrorists with an ample “window of opportunity,” following which they
are in a position to attain their goals. There are tens of episodes where the hijacking
of passenger airliners has been committed for the above-mentioned considerations.
One example took place in November 1991, when a group headed by Shamil
Basayev seized an Aeroflot Tupolev-154 airliner at the Mineralniye Vody airport and
hijacked it to Turkey, establishing as a precondition for the release of the hostages
the cancellation of the state of emergency that had been imposed by the Russian
government in the Chechen - Ingush Autonomous Republic.
Hijacking for Movement : The air plane as a means of transportation is the primary
target of this category of actions, with passengers acting as an additional factor
enhancing safety guarantees for terrorists. The aim is to ensure the movement of
terrorists from a territory that they are restricted or prohibited from exiting for
some reason to another geographical point. In this category, seven acts of seizure of
passenger airliners were committed in the USSR in 1990 alone in an effort to leave
the country on the grounds of personal, political, or economic motivation. In some
countries, this category of terror acts remains a marginal method of the migration of
individuals, taken separately, or of small groups of persons with identical ideas. In
particular, thirteen cases of hijacking of passenger airliners to Taiwan were registered
in China from 1993–98.11 In March–April 2003; two Antonov-24 passenger planes
were hijacked from Cuba to Florida.
Hijacking for Annihilation/Destruction : Using an aircraft it as a weapon for
hitting a previously selected target is a primary object of this category of actions;
passengers act as a factor, ensuring that an additional level of overall damage will
ultimately result from the attack. The aim is to incur direct material damage to an
adversary, in combination with collateral political and psychological damage. This
category of actions is directly attributable to the parameters of asymmetrical warfare.
42 The first operational precedent occurred in December 1994, when gunmen from the
Aviation Safety And Algerian terrorist organization Armed Islamic Group (GIA) captured an Air France
Security
Airbus A-300 with 240 people on board in an attempt to explode it over Paris. It was
a rescue operation at the intermediate landing point in Marcel mounted by a SWAT
team that helped avoid potentially grave consequences.
In October 2002, terrorists attempted to hijack a Saudi Airlines Airbus A-320 with
the purpose of crashing it into a U.S. air base at Al - Udeid in Qatar. The culminating
mega-terrorist attack within this category was the capture of four passenger airliners
on 11 September 2001 and their subsequent use as cruise missiles against targets in
Washington, D.C. and New York City. It should be noted that, despite heightened
safety measures at airports and the introduction of appropriate technologies, the threat
of this absolute use of aviation terrorism does not decrease, but rather increases.
An eloquent testimony to this fact is the information that has been gathered about
Al Qaeda operatives’ testing of innovative techniques of seizing and hijacking air
planes, aiming to realize in practice a form of kamikaze (air plane as a delivery
vehicle, suicide pilot as guidance unit).13 That is why it is not surprising today to
see SAM firing units and radar arrays in capitals around the world, from Washington
to Colombo, to thus protect key government facilities against “uninvited guests.”
Direct Actions against Aircraft : Both airliners and passengers/crew on board are
targets of this category of attack, whose aim is to destroy an aircraft in the air and
annihilate people in order to incur material, political, and psychological damage.
In practice, terrorists prefer to use improvised explosive devices (IED) and man-
portable air defence systems (MANPADS), such as shoulder rocket-propelled
grenade launchers (RPG), anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), heavy and light
machine-guns, anti-material sniper rifles, and assault rifles. Improvised explosive
devices with timers or barometric-work mechanisms of detonation proved to be
effective means of destroying airliners in the 1980’s. A requirement, however, was
to place the explosives inside the target before departure, usually by putting them
into unaccompanied luggage or transferring them to third persons without notifying
them. As a result of the use of such explosives in particular, terrorists succeeded in
destroying the airliners and passengers/crews of Pan American Flight 103 (Locker
bie, Scotland, December 1988, 271 casualties) and French UTA Flight 722 (Niger,
July 1989, 170 casualties). There was also an attempt of this sort of terror act on
board an Israeli Boeing - 747 (London, 1986), where an explosive was deliberately
placed by terrorist Nizar al - Hindaui in the luggage of his bride without his notifying
her.
CHAPTER

9
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW
1. Background Of The Legal Work Relating To Unruly Passengers
Prior To The 35Th Session Of The Legal Committee:
1.1 On 3 June 1996, the Council decided during the sixth meeting of its 148th Session
to include in the General Work Programme of the Legal Committee the subject “Acts
or offences of concern to the international aviation community and not covered by
existing air law instruments”. On 6 June 1997, the Council further decided during
the sixth meeting of its 151st Session that a Secretariat Study Group should be
established for this item. The Group, designated as the Secretariat Study Group on
Unruly Passengers, held several meetings. As a result of its work, the 33rd Session
of the ICAO Assembly (25 September to 5 October 2001) adopted Resolution A33-4
“Adoption of National Legislation on Certain Offences Committed on Board Civil
Aircraft (Unruly/disruptive Passengers)”, setting forth model legislation developed
by the Group. Further, ICAO Circular 288, Guidance Material on the Legal Aspects
of Unruly/Disruptive Passengers was developed by the Study Group.
1.2 In September 2009, the International Air Transport Association noted during the
34th Session of the ICAO Legal Committee that incidents involving disruptive and
unruly passengers had continued to rise steadily. Its proposal to form a working
group to address this issue was supported by the Committee. Accordingly, the
Secretariat Study Group on Unruly Passengers was reactivated in early 2011 based
on a decision of the Council at the sixth meeting of its 188th Session in October 2009.
The reactivated Secretariat Study Group held its first meeting in Montreal from 2 to
3 May 2011 and its second meeting in Paris from 3 to 4 October 2011. It identified
a number of legal issues related to unruly passengers which needed to be addressed,
including a review of the jurisdictional clauses under the Convention on Offences
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention, 1963) in
order to align them with modern practice; the establishment of common standards
and practices with regard to offences; the strengthening of international cooperation
in harmonizing enforcement procedures; the powers of the aircraft commander
and related immunity; and the status of In-Flight Security Officers (IFSO’s). The
Study Group reached the conclusion that the issue of unruly passengers needed to be
addressed by the international community, that ICAO was the proper forum for this
purpose, and that the Tokyo Convention should be reviewed and the feasibility of its
amendment examined, with particular reference to the issue of unruly passengers. To
that end, the Group recommended that a Sub-Committee of the Legal Committee be
established and be tasked to prepare a draft text to modernize the Tokyo Convention.
1.3 Based on the recommendation of the Study Group, the Council decided on 15
November 2011 during the 5th meeting of its 194th Session to request the Chairman
of the Legal Committee to establish a Special Sub-Committee of the Legal Committee
to review the Tokyo Convention, with particular reference to the issue of unruly
44 passengers. On 20 December 2011, the Chairman of the Legal Committee, Mr. M.
Aviation Safety And Jennison (the United States) established a Special Sub-Committee and appointed Mr.
Security
A. Piera (the United Arab Emirates) as the Rapporteur. The Sub-Committee, chaired
by Ms S. H. Tan (Singapore), held two meetings in 2012.
1.4 Based on the report of the Rapporteur, the Sub-Committee focused its discussions
on jurisdiction, a list of offences, extradition, immunity of the aircraft commander,
IFSO’s and the extent of the modernization of the Tokyo Convention.
1.5 With respect to jurisdiction, the Sub-Committee expressed the sentiment that the
inclusion and exercise of the State of the Operator and State of Landing jurisdictions
will assist to curb the increasing trend of unruly behaviour on board aircraft. There was
general agreement in the Sub-Committee that the establishment of such jurisdictions
is desirable. Other bases of jurisdiction were also considered. What remained to be
determined was whether such jurisdictions would be mandatory or optional.
1.6 With respect to a list of offences, the Sub-Committee agreed not to include such
a list in the draft instrument, but its majority proposed a new Article 15 bis in the
Tokyo Convention to include two types of acts. These would be the act of assault
against a crew member and the act of refusal to follow a lawful instruction given by
or on behalf of the aircraft commander.
1.7 The Sub-Committee concluded that there was no need to change the wording in
Article 6 or 10 of the Tokyo Convention with regard to the immunity of the aircraft
commander. With respect to the issue of extradition, the Sub-Committee believed
that there was no need to include additional provisions in the Tokyo Convention.
1.8 On the status of the IFSO’s, the Sub-Committee noted that IFSO’s did not exist
when the Tokyo Convention was adopted, but today they are being increasingly
deployed on international flights. Further work was considered necessary in order
to build consensus with respect to the role of the IFSO’s and their corresponding
immunities within the framework of the Tokyo Convention.
1.9 In addition, the Sub-Committee also discussed other issues, such as possible
financial claims by airlines against unruly passengers, particularly in cases of
diversion of aircraft; and definitions of certain terms, such as aircraft “in flight”.
1.10 The Sub-Committee considered the possible forms for amending the Tokyo
Convention. If a decision was eventually made to amend the Tokyo Convention,
the Sub-Committee recommended that such amendments be effected through a
supplementary protocol instead of a new and stand-alone convention. The Sub-
Committee prepared for the consideration of the Legal Committee “Main Operative
Clauses for the Draft Protocol to Amend the Tokyo Convention”.
1.11 The reports of the two meetings of the Sub-Committee may be found at the
ICAO website: http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/LC-SC-MOT2/Pages/default.
aspx.
1.12 At the second meeting of its 198th Session on 20 February 2013, the Council
considered a report on the Second Meeting of the Sub-Committee and decided to
convene the 35th Session of the Legal Committee in May 2013.
2. Work Relating To Unruly Passengers During The 35Th Session Of 45
International
The Legal Committee: Conference On Air
Law
2.1 The 35th Session of the Legal Committee, chaired by Mr. M.B. Jennison (United
States), was held in Montréal from 6 to 15 May 2013. Its main agenda item was to
consider the text prepared by the Special Sub-Committee. The Committee focussed
its discussion on jurisdiction, offences and in-flight security officers (IFSO’s). The
Draft Text of the Protocol to the Tokyo Convention of 1963 Proposed by the Legal
Committee is set forth in DCTC Doc No. 3.
2.2 With respect to jurisdiction, there was an overwhelming consensus for the State
of landing jurisdiction and most delegations supporting this jurisdiction would prefer
it to be on a mandatory basis. There was also general support for the inclusion of the
jurisdiction of the State of the operator. Accordingly, the final draft of the text reflects
these two jurisdictional grounds without any square brackets in Article III, although
certain reservations were expressed. The jurisdiction of the State of nationality of the
victim or the alleged offender is reflected in Article III in square brackets.
2.3 With respect to offences, the Committee accepted the recommendation of the
Sub-Committee that no list of offences would be developed. Instead, Article VIII
was introduced to propose an amendment in the form of Article 15 bis to encourage
States to take measures to initiate appropriate criminal or administrative proceedings
against any person who commits on board an aircraft any offence or punishable act
covered by the Convention, in particular the act of assault against a crew member and
the act of refusal to follow a lawful instruction given by or on behalf of the aircraft
commander. The provisions still remain in square brackets for further consideration.
In this context, the Legal Committee recommended that the Diplomatic Conference
should adopt a resolution calling upon ICAO to update Circular 288 mentioned in
paragraph 1.1 above.
2.4 With respect to IFSO’s, while there was no consensus, the Committee was able
to put into the final drafts two options relating to the functions of IFSO’s and some
provisions relating to their immunity. All these provisions are in square brackets in
Articles VI and VII.
2.5 With respect to other miscellaneous items, the Committee dealt with a general
provision about amendment in Article I, definitions in Article II and a consequential
amendment in Article V, concurrent jurisdictions in Article IV, consequential
amendments from jurisdiction in Article IX, and recourse actions from airlines in
Article X. Some of these provisions require further study and deliberation.
2.6 Article I and the underlined parts throughout the text are the changes proposed
by the Committee to the Sub-Committee text. By consensus, the Committee agreed
that the text was sufficiently mature and concluded that the text was ready for
transmittal to the Council as a final draft for presentation to States and, ultimately, to
a Diplomatic Conference. While the basic framework of the draft protocol has been
prepared by the Committee, it was evident that not all the issues could be resolved at
its level. Certain policy matters could only be decided at a Diplomatic Conference.
2.7 The Report of the 35 h Session of the Legal Committee (Report-LC/35) may
be found at the ICAO website : http://www.icao.int/Meetings/AirLaw/Pages/default.
aspx.
46 3. Action By The Council And By The 38Th Session Of The Assembly:
Aviation Safety And
Security 3.1 The Council considered the report on the 35th Session of the Legal Committee
on 14 June 2013 at the eleventh meeting of its 199th Session and decided to convene
a Diplomatic Conference to amend the Tokyo Convention from 26 March to 4 April
2014. The Council agreed that the views of the Air Navigation Bureau (ANB) be
solicited regarding the potential impacts of the recognition in the draft Protocol of
IFSOs on the safety of aircraft and passengers on board, as well as on the provisions
of Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Part I – International Commercial Air Transport
– Aeroplanes relating to the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command. The
view of ANB is set out in DCTC Doc No. 5.

3.2 At the twelfth meeting of the same Session, the Council suggested that the future
Diplomatic Conference should consider a uniform reference to the term “his” or
“her” throughout the text of the proposed protocol.

3.3 The 38th Session of the Assembly considered a progress report on this subject,
which was substantially similar to this paper, and called upon Member States to
participate in this Diplomatic Conference.

4. Action By The Diplomatic Conference:

4.1 The Conference is invited:

• To note this paper;

• To consider the Draft Text of the Protocol to the Tokyo Convention of 1963
Proposed by the Legal Committee as set forth DCTC Doc No. 3; and

• To consider the recommendation of the Legal Committee concerning Circular

288 as referred to in subparagraphs 2.1.2.
CHAPTER

10
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON COUNTER-TERRORISM
1. Introduction
1. The Sub-Regional Ministerial Conference on Counter-Terrorism was held on
5-6 March 2007 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The Conference was co-chaired by the
Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Australia, H.E. Dr N Hassan Wirajuda, and
H.E. The Hon Alexander Downer MP. The Conference was attended by the
Foreign Ministers of Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, and the Senior
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Singapore as well as Justice Ministers,
Attorneys General, Police Chiefs and representatives.
2. The Ministers affirmed that the Sub-Regional Ministerial Conference on
Counter-Terrorism was convened with the aim of deepening counter-terrorism
cooperation in the sub-region and addressing emerging counter-terrorism
challenges. The Ministers acknowledged that the six countries represented at
the Conference were those most affected by the activities of regional terrorist
groups.
3. The Ministers reaffirmed the commitments made at the Bali Regional Ministerial
Meeting on Counter-Terrorism, also co-hosted by Australia and Indonesia in
February 2004, as a significant contribution to regional counter-terrorism
efforts. The Ministers agreed that the follow-up activities conducted under the
Working Groups on Legal Issues and on Law Enforcement, established under
the Bali Ministerial Conference, (commonly known as the Bali Counter-
Terrorism Process), had strengthened the bonds of understanding, shared
purpose and cooperation between legal and law enforcement practitioners in
the region.

Overview of the Current Threat of Terrorist Groups in the Sub-Region:

1. The Ministers discussed issues related to counter-terrorism in the region in
order to address the current threat of terrorist groups; to strengthen existing
counter-terrorism cooperation; to enhance cooperation in law enforcement,
intelligence, legal frameworks and preventing trans-border terrorist movement;
to counter radicalization; to prevent terrorist access to CBRN and respond to
mass casualty terrorist incidents.
2. The Ministers noted that recurring attacks in various locations demonstrated
that terrorism remained a persistent, evolving and long-term threat. The
Ministers renewed their commitment to meet the terrorist threat with
coordinated and targeted policies and measures, at the national, sub-regional,
regional and global levels, in the key areas of law enforcement, information
sharing and strengthening legal frameworks.
48 3. The Ministers noted that Southeast Asia has been facing a real threat posed by
Aviation Safety And
terrorism, largely as a result of attacks conducted by regionally-based terrorist
Security
groups, in particular Al-Jamaah Al- Islamiyah and the Abu Sayyaf Group.
The Ministers commended recent counter-terrorism successes in the region.
Strengthening Existing Counter-Terrorism Law Enforcement Cooperation in
the Sub-Region.

4. The Ministers cited the importance of the international legal framework for
countering terrorism. The Ministers called upon countries of the sub-region
that have not yet done so to sign and or ratify international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism and to work towards concluding negotiations
on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.

5. The Ministers welcomed the signing of the ASEAN Counter- Terrorism

Convention, which provides a legal framework for regional cooperation to
comprehensively counter terrorism in all of its forms and manifestations.
The Ministers pointed out that the Convention showed its own regional
characteristics with the inclusion of elements on prevention and suppression
of terrorism such as addressing factors which contribute to terrorism, interfaith
dialogue, exchange of best practices in rehabilitative programs and legal
cooperation.

6. The Ministers acknowledged that further efforts are needed to deal with trans-
border movements of individuals, weapons, funds, and other related materials
involved in terrorist operations and their supporting activities. The Ministers
agreed on the need to further strengthen the capacities of law enforcement
agencies to obtain, share, manage and analyse counter-terrorism information,
as well as to develop effective databases and mechanisms for that purpose.

7. The Ministers welcomed the significant progress in the implementation of

the electronic ASEANAPOL Database System (e-ADS), which reflected the
commitment of ASEANAPOL to pool rapid, reliable and secure criminal
intelligence information including data on terrorism. The Ministers emphasized
the importance of strengthening cooperation between ASEANAPOL and the
Australian Federal Police (AFP), including developing a regional capability
strategy for the sharing of intelligence and information on counter-terrorism.

8. The Ministers welcomed the increasing communication, cooperation and

coordination between police and intelligence authorities. The Ministers agreed
on the importance of strengthening and continuing support for the Jakarta
Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), the Multi-National
Operational Support Team (MNOST), and other regional counter-terrorism
centres.

Addressing Emerging Counter-Terrorism Challenges:

1. The Ministers noted that more individual and collective efforts are needed
to address violent radicalism, terrorist propaganda and other factors that
 could contribute to terrorism. The Ministers recognized the need to develop 49
Ministerial
strategies to counter radicalization and to support religious, community,
Conference On
and other leaders to counter the extremist ideology and propaganda used by Counter-Terrorism
terrorist groups to justify their violent acts. In this regard, the Ministers also
recognized the need to empower the moderates and strengthen the voice of
moderation, inter alia through dialogue and cooperation among and between
religious leaders, academics, media practitioners and other community leaders
in our sub-region.

2. The Ministers also noted the role that the internet plays in spreading extremist
ideologies, recruiting new members, and assisting terrorist groups in planning
and conducting attacks.

3. The Ministers recognized the threat posed by the possibility of terrorists

acquiring chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons, their
means of delivery and related materials. The Ministers encouraged agencies
with technical expertise in this area and those with traditional counter-terrorism
expertise to cooperate in order to increase capacities for preventing CBRN
terrorism. The Ministers noted that Australia would shortly host a regional
outreach activity to address the nuclear and the bioterrorist threat respectively.

4. The Ministers expressed grave concern at the threat to the subregion resulting
from the link between terrorism and the illicit trafficking in small arms and light
weapons (SALW), including their ammunition and explosives. The Ministers
agreed to take necessary steps for reducing terrorists’ access to illicit SALW
and to take additional steps to prevent weapons that are particularly dangerous,
such as anti-aircraft weapons, from falling into the hands of terrorists.

5. The Ministers urged countries to enhance their preparedness to cope with

mass casualties that could result from terrorist attacks by, among other ways,
increasing cooperation and establishing national contingency plans and
national centres that analyse terrorist acts.

II. Ministers agreed to undertake the follow-up measures, namely: Law

Enforcement:
1. The Ministers agreed to take necessary measures to strengthen regional
and sub-regional networks and to enhance capacities to prevent transborder
terrorist movement through, among other ways, border and custom control
systems; maritime surveillance and development of database. In this regard,
the Ministers also agreed that ASEANAPOL and AFP should undertake joint
efforts to address the problem of transborder terrorist movement.

2. The Ministers agreed to strengthen the Multi-National Operational Support

Team through a permanent presence and to continue supporting the JCLEC.
The Ministers also agreed to enhance cooperation between the JCLEC and the
Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) and the
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA).
50 Legal Frameworks:
Aviation Safety And
Security 1. The Ministers agreed to organize a workshop this year under the auspices of
the JCLEC on the ratification and implementation of relevant international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
2. The Ministers agreed to strengthen their legal frameworks for mutual legal
assistance (MLA) and extradition by providing training for practitioners in
those fields.

Countering Extremism and Radicalisation:

1. The Ministers agreed to sponsor regional/sub-regional second-track meetings
of religious leaders, academics and media practitioners to explore the role
of community, informal leaders and the media in discouraging people from
participating in or supporting terrorist activities. These meetings would
recommend areas for further research as well as possible practical responses.
2. The Ministers agreed to conduct courses at the JCLEC and other regional
counter-terrorism centres on all aspects of the use of the internet, particularly
the spread of extremist messages. Such courses should also consider how
the internet might be used to disseminate positive messages that counter the
damaging ideology of the extremists.

Movement of Weapons:
1. The Ministers also agreed that a workshop of experts should be held to look
into the illicit movement of small arms, light weapons, dual-use materials
and explosives. The workshop may develop strategies to address the issue in
a comprehensive manner at a sub-regional level, including consideration of
training programs for relevant officials.

Mass Casualty Emergency Response:

1. The Ministers agreed to a meeting of officials to advance this issue, including
the option to explore possibilities for increasing regional cooperation and the
fast-tracking of assistance following a mass casualty terrorist incident.

III. Closing:
1. The Ministers expressed their appreciation for the warm hospitality of the
Government of Indonesia and for the excellent arrangements made for the
Conference. The Conference was conducted in a spirit of amity and friendship
under the co-chairmanship of Indonesia and Australia.
CHAPTER

11
FINANCING TERRORISM
Terrorism financing came into limelight in the United States after the terrorist attacks
in the United States on the 11th September in 2001. The US Government passed
the USA PATRIOT Act to, among other reasons, attempt thwarting the financing
of terrorism (CFT) and anti-money laundering (AML) making sure these were
given some sort of adequate focus by US financial institutions. The act also had
extraterritorial impact and non-US banks having correspondent banking accounts
or doing business with US banks had to upgrade their AML/CFT processes. The
Patriot Act has generated a great deal of controversy in the United States since its
enactment.
Initially the focus of CFT efforts was on non-profit organizations, unregistered
money services businessess (MSBs) (including so called underground banking or
‘Hawalas’) and the criminalisation of the act itself. The Financial Action Task Force
on Money Laundering (FATF) made nine special recommendations for CFT (first
eight then a year later added a ninth). These nine recommendations have become
the global standard for CFT and their effectiveness is assessed almost always in
conjunction with AML. The FATF Blacklist (the NCCT list) mechanism was used to
coerce countries to bring about change.

Money laundering:
Often linked in legislation and regulation, terrorism financing and money laundering
are conceptual opposites. Money laundering is the process where cash raised from
criminal activities is made to look legitimate for re-integration into the financial
system, whereas terrorism financing cares little about the source of the funds, but it
is what the funds are to be used for that defines its scope. An in-depth study of the
symbiotic relationship between organised crime and terrorist organizations detected
within the United States of America and other areas of the world referred to as
crime-terror nexus points has been published in the forensic literature. The Perri,
Lichtenwald and MacKenzie article emphasizes the importance of multi-agency
working groups and the tools that can be used to identify, infiltrate, and dismantle
organizations operating along the crime-terror nexus points.
Terrorists use low value but high volume fraud activity to fund their operations.
[citation needed] Paramilitary groups[which?] in Northern Ireland are using[citation
needed] legitimate businesses such as hotels, pubs and taxi operators to launder
money and fund political activities. Even beyond Ireland, terrorists are buying out/
controlling front-end businesses especially cash-intensive businesses including in
some cases money services businesses to move monies.[citation needed] Bulk cash
smuggling and placement through cash-intensive businesses is one typology. They
52 are now also moving monies through the new online payment systems. They also
Aviation Safety And
use trade linked schemes to launder monies. Nonetheless, the older systems have
Security
not given way. Terrorists also continue to move monies through MSBs/Hawalas, and
through international ATM transactions.[citation needed] Charities also continue to
be used in countries where controls are not so stringent.
Suspicious activity:
Operation Green Quest, a US multi-agency task force established in October 2001
with the official purpose of countering terrorism financing considers the following
patterns of activity as indicators of the collection and movement of funds that could be
associated with terrorism financing: Account transactions that are inconsistent with
past deposits or withdrawals such as cash, cheques, wire transfers, etc. Transactions
involving a high volume of incoming or outgoing wire transfers, with no logical or
apparent purpose that come from, go to, or transit through locations of concern, that
is sanctioned countries, non-cooperative nations and sympathizer nations.
• Unexplainable clearing or negotiation of third party cheques and their deposits
in foreign bank accounts.
• Structuring at multiple branches or the same branch with multiple activities.
• Corporate layering, transfers between bank accounts of related entities or
charities for no apparent reasons.
• Wire transfers by charitable organisations to companies located in countries
known to be bank or tax havens.
• Lack of apparent fund raising activity, for example a lack of small cheques or
typical donations associated with charitable bank deposits.
• Using multiple accounts to collect funds that are then transferred to the same
foreign beneficiaries
• Transactions with no logical economic purpose, that is, no link between the
activity of the organization and other parties involved in the transaction.
• Overlapping corporate officers, bank signatories, or other identifiable
similarities associated with addresses, references and financial activities.
• Cash debiting schemes in which deposits in the US correlate directly with
ATM withdrawals in countries of concern. Reverse transactions of this nature
are also suspicious.
• Issuing cheques, money orders or other financial instruments, often numbered
sequentially, to the same person or business, or to a person or business whose
name is spelled similarly.
It would be difficult to determine by such activity alone whether the particular act
was related to terrorism or to organized crime. For this reason, these activities must
be examined in context with other factors in order to determine a terrorism financing
connection. Simple transactions can be found to be suspect and money laundering
derived from terrorism will typically involve instances in which simple operations
had been performed (retail foreign exchange operations, international transfer of 53
Financing Terrorism
funds) revealing links with other countries including FATF blacklisted countries.
Some of the customers may have police records, particularly for trafficking in
narcotics and weapons and may be linked with foreign terrorist groups.
Bank processes:
The neutrality of this section is disputed. Relevant discussion may be found on the
talk page. Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved. (May
2013)In addition to normal AML controls, banks must focus [according to whom?]
on the CFT angle, using knowledge derived from the extensive databank of case
studies now available. Banks must[according to whom?] focus on not just name
matching with sanctions databases but also with other know your customer (KYC)
high-risk databases of good third party vendors.

United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre:

The Strategy acknowledges that consideration should be given to creating an
international centre as part of international efforts to enhance the fight against
terrorism. This proposal for the establishment of such a centre was first put forward
by His Royal Highness King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz when the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia convened the International Counter-Terrorism Conference in Riyadh in 2005.
The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, established within the Office of the
Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and initially funded by the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, will aim to foster international cooperation and implementation of
the Strategy at international, regional and national levels. In addition, it will aim
to help to address the capacity-building needs of Member States and to develop a
comprehensive database of counter-terrorism best practices from around the world.
The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) was launched after the
signing of a contribution agreement between the United Nations and the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, and after the General Assembly adopted resolution 66/10 on
18 November 2011, in which it welcomed the establishment of the Centre and
encouraged Member States to collaborate with the Centre in contributing to the
implementation of the Strategy.

Building in-depth knowledge of the Strategy:

In its resolution 64/297, the General Assembly reaffirmed the need for enhanced
dialogue among the counter-terrorism officials of Member States and for the wider
dissemination of the Strategy in order to counter terrorism.
In order to better promote understanding and knowledge of the Strategy and the
means for its implementation by all stakeholders, the Office of the Counter- Terrorism
Implementation Task Force initiated a project on building in-depth knowledge of the
Strategy with key partners in five regions: South-East Asia, South Asia, Southern
Africa, Eastern Africa and West Africa/Sahel. Three workshops were convened for
that purpose (Bali, Indonesia, in November 2010; Addis Ababa in July 2011; and
Windhoek in October 2011).
54 Those workshops enhanced the exchange of information and good practices on the
Aviation Safety And
implementation of the Strategy among relevant law enforcement, criminal justice
Security
and other national officials at the national level. Their focus on capacitybuilding
allowed participants to identify ways to enhance capacities in more innovative and
sustainable ways, and to ensure that relevant efforts were coordinated and targeted
towards priority needs, so as to develop more effective national, regional and
subregional responses to terrorism
ICAO / ECAC:
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a UN specialized agency,
created in 1944 upon the signing of the Convention on International Civil Aviation
(Chicago Convention).
ICAO works with the Convention’s 191 Member States and global aviation
organizations to develop international Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs) which States reference when developing their legally-enforceable national
civil aviation regulations. There are currently over 10,000 SARPs reflected in the
19 Annexes to the Chicago Convention which ICAO oversees, and it is through
these provisions – as well as ICAO’s complementary policy, auditing and capacity-
building efforts – that today’s global air transport network is able to operate close to
100,000 daily flights, safely, efficiently and securely in every region of the world.

European Civil Aviation Conference:

The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) or Conférence Européenne
de l’Aviation Civile (CEAC) is an intergovernmental organization which was
established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Council
of Europe. It is located in Neuilly-sur-Seine/Paris in France. Founded in 1955 with
19 member states, the ECAC now totals 44 members, including all 28 EU, 31 of the
32 European Aviation Safety Agency member states, and all 40 EURO CONTROL
member states. ECAC “promotes the continued development of a safe, efficient and
sustainable European air transport system. In doing so, it seeks to harmonise civil
aviation policies and practices amongst its Member States and promote understanding
on policy matters between its Member States and other parts of the world”.
Its strategic priorities are safety, security and the environment. ECAC Member States
are: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine and United Kingdom.
 UNIT II

CHAPTER

12
EARLY HIJACKINGS & PROFILE OF A HIJACKER
Aircraft hijacking (also known as aircraft piracy, especially within the special aircraft
jurisdiction of the United States, and informally as skyjacking) is the unlawful
seizure of an aircraft by an individual or a group. In most cases, the pilot is forced
to fly according to the orders of the hijackers. Occasionally, however, the hijackers
have flown the aircraft themselves, such as the September 11 attacks of 2001. In at
least three cases, the plane was hijacked [1]by the official pilot or co-pilot.
Unlike the typical hijackings of land vehicles or ships, skyjacking is not usually
committed for robbery or theft. Most aircraft hijackers intend to use the passengers
as hostages, either for monetary ransom or for some political or administrative
concession by authorities. Motives vary from demanding the release of certain
inmates (notably IC-814), highlighting the grievances of a particular community
(notably AF 8969) to political asylum (notably ET 961). Hijackers also have used
aircraft as a weapon to target particular locations (notably during the September 11,
2001 attacks).
Hijackings for hostages commonly produce an armed standoff during a period of
negotiation between hijackers and authorities, followed by some form of settlement.
Settlements do not always meet the hijackers’ original demands. If the hijackers’
demands are deemed too great and the perpetrators show no inclination to surrender,
authorities sometimes employ armed special forces to attempt a rescue of the
hostages (notably Operation Entebbe).

Terrorist Hijacking Spread:

The early 1970s saw a continuing series of aircraft hijackings. In a coordinated effort,
on 6th September, 1970, a terrorist group hijacked TWA flight 707 on a scheduled
flight from Frankfort to Newyork. The flight was full carrying 145 passengers plus
the crew zeised the plain over Beljium and ordered the pilot flight to Jordan. On the
same day Palestin Guerillas also hijacked Swiss air DC – 8 flight outbound from
Zurich and a pan AM 747 aircraft out of Amsterdam. A Swiss DC – 8 aircraft was
commandeered over France and also ordered to flight to Dawson field in Jordan.
The PAN AM flight turned out to be an afterthought. Earlier that the terrorist made
an attempt to hijack an EL AL flight enroute from TEL AVIV to Amsterdam. The
original hijack team, including Lella Khaleed, Patriq and a third arab initiated a
violent conflict when the pilot refused their demands. One flight attendand was
shot and Israeli sky marshal managed to kill one of the hijackers. The other two
hijackers were subdued and eventually flown to London. Left off of original plain,
the remaining members of the team hijacked the PAN AM Flight.
56 INitial Public Responses:
Aviation Safety And
Security Three days later, a BOAC VC-IO was hijacked; completing the series. The Pan Am
flight was directed to Beirut and Cairo where the plane was eventually destroyed.
The other aircraft were forced to fly to Zarca in the Jordanian desert by members of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The nearly 500 passengers
and crew suffered six days of terrible confinement inside the plane. The remaining
three planes were blown up in full view of media cameras.
This was the first extensively televised terrorist hijacking Terrorists had discovered
ihe media. Some reports of the incident even claim the terrorists prepo-sitioned (he
cameras. After more than 20 days of negotiations, the Jordanian army freed ihe lasl of
the hostages, and the seven political prisoners the hijackers demanded to be released
were in fact released. They had also demanded the release of three members of the
PFLP in a Swiss jail, other terrorists being held in West Germany, and the release
of Leila Khalcd in London. The British, with Prime Minister Edward Health at the
helm, were in turmoil over the events. The hijacked ilOAC V-10 aircraft had 110
British citizens on board. The British capitulated and released Khaled, but vowed
never to submit to terrorism again.
Hijacking an aircraft greatly appealed to extortionists and terrorists with a cause
that they sought to publicize. The incidents were accomplished to achieve hoth
political and personal gains, and were successfully used as a dramatic method of
attempting to enforce their demands. The sensationalism of an aircraft being blown
up or captive hostages huddled in an aircraft cabin was an assured draw for the
cameras. In addition, the Palestinians wanted to send a statement to the Egyptian
government. They wished to express their displeasure with Egypt’s participation in
a Middle Eastern peace plan.

Initial Public Response:

Initially, much was written and debated as how to best deal with the growing
problem. Suggestions ranged from the reasonable to the bizarre. The public was
even asked to forward suggestions to authorities in the hopes of canvassing methods,
which would have broad-based public appeal. One unique proposal opined that the
planes should be equipped with a sleeping gas that would be pumped into the cabin
in the event of an attempted hijack. Thankfully, cooler heads prevailed, and the
Joint Airline/Government Task Force, commissioned at the time to analyze possible
solutions, warned that a gas strong enough to disable hijackers could cause the death
of passengers with certain chronic diseases. Such a method was not feasible, or even
reliable, and was quickly discarded.
Any and all ideas were considered. Some of the more unusual examples now appear
humorous. For instance, one suggestion involved the use of a hypodermic needle
filled with a poison or drug that would be installed in each airline scat. Should a
hijacker or hijackers seek to take over an airborne aircraft, the pilot could activate the
mechanism and disable the perpetrators. How this was to work if the terrorists were
standing up when they seized the aircraft was unclear. Regardless, the idea appealed
to some, but the potential liability associated with misuse or accidental use soon
caused the rejection of such an idea. The potential for inadvertent use on regular
passengers, of course, also doomed this idea from the beginning.
Another humorous, although impractical, proposition suggested that all passengers 57
strip down naked prior to flight. Each passenger would then be required to wear Early Hijackings &
Profile Of A Hijacker
an issued flight suit, thereby supposedly eliminating the ability of a passenger to
smuggle a weapon or explosive device onto the aircraft on their person. The issue
of discovering dangerous weapons potentially hidden in body orifices was never
addressed. Again, the concept of changing clothes fell in disfavor.
By far the author’s favorite and most hilarious idea was proffered on the former
sitcom Ail it: the Family. The family patriarch, Archie, believed that each passenger
should be issued a gun enabling the entire plane of passengers to deal with the bad
guys. As much as this sounds pretty far-fetched, the concept of passengers becoming
involved in subduing terrorists or simply unruly passengers is an issue worthy of
discussion. The idea of life imitating art has unfortunately occurred.

Cockpit Doors:
A cockpit or flight deck is the area, usually near the front of an aircraft, from which
a pilot controls the aircraft. Most modern cockpits are enclosed, except on some
small aircraft. The cockpit of an aircraft contains flight instruments on an instrument
panel, and the controls that enable the pilot to fly the aircraft. In most airliners, a door
separates the cockpit from the passenger compartment. After the September 11, 2001
attacks, all major airlines fortified their cockpits against access by hijackers.
Cockpit windows may be equipped with a sun shield. Most cockpits have windows
that can be opened when the aircraft is on the ground. Nearly all glass windows in
large aircraft have an anti-reflective coating, and an internal heating element to melt
ice. Smaller aircraft may be equipped with a transparent aircraft canopy.
In most cockpits the pilot’s control column or joystick is located centrally (centre
stick), although in some military fast jets the side-stick is located on the right hand
side. In some commercial airliners (i.e.: Airbus which features the glass cockpit
concept) both pilots use a side-stick located on the outboard side, so Captain’s side-
stick on the left and First-officer’s seat on the right.
Except for some helicopters, the right seat in the cockpit of an aircraft is the seat used
by the co-pilot. The captain or pilot in command sits in the left seat, so that he can
operate the throttles and other pedestal instruments with his right hand. The tradition
has been maintained to this day, with the co-pilot on the right hand side.
The layout of the cockpit, especially in the military fast jet, has undergone
standardisation, both within and between aircraft different manufacturers and even
different nations. One of the most important developments was the “Basic Six”
pattern, later the “Basic T”, developed from 1937 onwards by the Royal Air Force,
designed to optimise pilot instrument scanning.
In the modern electronic cockpit, the electronic flight instruments usually regarded
as essential are MCP, PFD, ND, EICAS, FMS/CDU and back-up instruments.

MCP:
A Mode Control Panel, usually a long narrow panel located centrally in front of
the pilot, may be used to control heading, speed, altitude, vertical speed, vertical
navigation and lateral navigation. It may also be used to engage or disengage both
the autopilot and the autothrottle. The panel as an area is usually referred to as the
58 “glareshield panel”. MCP is a Boeing designation (that has been informally adopted
Aviation Safety And as a generic name for the unit/panel) for a unit that allows for the selection and
Security
parameter setting of the different autoflight functions, the same unit on an Airbus
aircraft is referred to as the FCU (Flight Control unit).

PFD:
The Primary Flight Display is usually located in a prominent position, either centrally
or on either side of the cockpit. It will in most cases include a digitized presentation
of the attitude indicator, air speed and altitude indicators (usually as a tape display)
and the vertical speed indicator. It will in many cases include some form of heading
indicator and ILS/VOR deviation indicators. In many cases an indicator of the
engaged and armed autoflight system modes will be present along with some form
of indication of the selected values for altitude, speed, vertical speed and heading. It
may be pilot selectable to swap with the ND.

ND:
A Navigation Display, which may be adjacent to the PFD, shows the current route
and information on the next waypoint, current wind speed and wind direction. It may
be pilot selectable to swap with the PFD.

EICAS/ECAM:
The Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (used for Boeing) or Electronic
Centralized Aircraft Monitor (for Airbus) will allow the pilot to monitor the following
information: values for N1, N2 and N3, fuel temperature, fuel flow, the electrical
system, cockpit or cabin temperature and pressure, control surfaces and so on. The
pilot may select display of information by means of button press.

FMS:
The Flight Management System/control unit may be used by the pilot to enter and
check for the following information: flight plan, speed control, navigation control,
and so on.

Profile of a Hijacker:
First, let’s dispel the myth that hijackers are mentally ill. If you believe that most
hijackers are crazy, psycho, or suicidal you are wrong. 30 years of research has
failed to identify a good profile of a terrorist. We now know that hijackers are no
more likely to have mood disorders, psychopathology, or personality disorders than
non-hijackers from the same background. If you think that hijackers are immoral
and have no empathy for others you are also wrong. Let’s look at this rationally.
Imagine yourself as a terrorist, pick one, any one. You are living an often nomad
existence underground, in fear of being discovered and stopped. The only people
that are around you are people who share your own goals. Would you want an
unstable whacko living with you? Someone who is so out of touch with reality
that they cannot be depended on, or could hurt you or other members of your group
before your goal was met. Not probably. Organized terrorist groups who can plan
successful attacks are also likely to be within the normal range of personality. In
fact, individuals chosen for a terrorist mission have undoubtedly demonstrated that
they are trustworthy, reliable, loyal, organized, intelligent, and dedicated to a specific 59
cause. Increasingly, terrorist groups are recruiting highly skilled professionals Early Hijackings &
Profile Of A Hijacker
who have expertise in fields such as communications, computer programming,
engineering, finance, and the sciences. Hijackers use groups and networks for both
logistical and psychological support. Groups afford a sense of belonging, a sense
of purpose, and perhaps even a sense of identity of course, there are the lone wolf
hijackers. These are individuals who commit violent acts in support of some group,
movement, or ideology, but who does so alone. They are not affiliated with any
command structure and do not get resource assistance from any group. Examples
of lone wolf hijackers rrorists include Timothy McVeigh (Oklahoma City bombing),
Theodore Kaczynski, (the “Unabomber he actually was schizophrenic), and Eric
Robert Rudolph (the Olympic Park bomber). Yes, normal people can be hijackers.
Normalcy is a characteristic feature of hijackers, they just blend in. The Tsarnaev
brothers are a perfect example of this, all the news reports and interviews reinforced
that they were normal Joes. Remember that hijackers are not born hijackers. Let’s
look at Bin Laden. Osama didn’t wake up one morning and decide to be a terrorist.
The path was long and arduous. Hijackers, like Bin Laden, kill for a combination
of shared ideology in conjunction with extremely intense small group dynamics.
Most people believe in something bigger than life. Many of us call this entity God
in one form or another. We need to make sense and meaning in our life…and of
our death. Most people identify with a group whose core sense of values related
to family, religion, ethnicity, and nationality are similar to theirs. Some people are
willing to kill for, and to die for, these values. Why else would you have joined the
law enforcement profession? Or why would men and women enlist in the military?
The point is that most people are capable of terrorist acts under some circumstances.
The five main objectives of political hijackers are quite clear:
• Creating mass anxiety, fear, and panic
• Fostering a sense of helplessness and hopelessness
• Demonstrating the incompetence of the authorities
• Destroying a sense of security and safety
• Provoking inappropriate reactions from individuals, authorities, and/or
governments
Additionally, large-scale terrorist incidents can have adverse effects on world
financial markets, travel and tourism.
CHAPTER

13
SKY MARSHAL PROGRAM/FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL
PROGRAM
Federal Air Marshal Program from Congress passing the first Judiciary Act of
1789 to the present problems with trying to recruit and properly train Air Marshals.
Current events regarding the air marshal program will be discussed to include airport
compliance for the installation of explosive-detection system baggage monitors by
the end of the year. Other issues that go hand and hand with the Federal Air Marshal
Program, to include cockpit door security and the arming of pilots will be discussed.
Finally, there will also be discussions of Air Marshal recruiting and standards for
hiring.

History:
Initially, President John F. Kennedy in 1961 ordered that federal law enforcement
officers be deployed to act as security officers on certain high-risk flights. The Federal
Air Marshal Service began on March 2, 1962 as the Federal Aviation Administration’s
(FAA) FAA Peace Officers Program. On this date, the first 18 volunteers from the
FAA’s Flight Standards Division graduated training. They received training from
the U.S. Border Patrol at Port Isabel, TX. They later went through recurrent yearly
training in Brownsville, Texas. These initial FAA Peace Officers were named by FAA
Administrator Najeeb Halaby. Later, it became an integral part of the Civil Aviation
Security Division of the FAA. As early as 1963, after an article in FAA Horizons
Magazine, the FAA Peace Officers were referred to as Sky Marshals internally
within the FAA, although the term would not be used by the media for nearly a
decade. Many years after their initial inception, personnel were given firearms and
some close quarters combat training at the FBI Academy located on the US Marine
Corps training grounds at Quantico, VA.
In October 1969, due to the increasing violence of hijacked aircraft in the Middle
East, the U.S. Marshals Service started a Sky Marshal Division out of the Miami
Field Office. The program was run by John Brophy and staffed with a handful of
deputies. Since the majority of hijackings were occurring out of Florida in the late
1960s’, the U.S. Marshals Service started their program to try and combat air piracy
given their broad jurisdiction.
The “Sky Marshal Program” of the 1970’s later became a joint effort between the
U.S. Customs Service (now U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)) and the FAA
and would be led by General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., a former Tuskegee Airman. On
September 11, 1970, in response to increasing acts of air piracy by Islamic radicals,
President Richard Nixon ordered the immediate deployment of armed federal agents
on United States commercial aircraft. Initially, the deployed personnel were federal
agents from the U.S. Department of Treasury. Subsequently, the United States
Customs Service formed the Division of Air Security, and established the position
of Customs Security Officer (CSO). Approximately 1,700 personnel were hired for
this position and were trained at the Treasury Air Security Officer (TASOS) training 61
complex at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Customs security officers were deployed on U.S. Sky Marshal
Program/Federal Air
flagged commercial aircraft, flying on both domestic and international routes in an Marshal Program
undercover capacity in teams of two and three. Customs security officers also handled
ground security screening on selected flights at domestic U.S. airports.Following
the mandatory passenger screening enacted by the FAA at U.S. airports beginning
in 1973, the customs security officer force was disbanded and its personnel were
absorbed within the U.S. Customs Service. By 1974 armed sky marshals were a
rarity on U.S. aircraft and the former customs security officers had been reassigned
as customs patrol officers, customs inspectors, and customs special agents.
A small force of Federal Air Marshals were retained at the FAA starting in 1974,
however, the number of personnel trained under this program was limited to between
10-12 persons. For the next several years following the customs security officer
disbandment, the FAA air marshals rarely flew missions.
In 1985, President Ronald Reagan requested the expansion of the program and
Congress enacted the International Security and Development Cooperation Act,
which expanded the statutes that supported the Federal Air Marshal Service.
Contrary to the impression given in the TSA “Our Mission” statement, the FAM
program was begun in response to domestic hijackings and FAM operational flights
were almost exclusively conducted on domestic US flights until 1985. After the
hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985 and the enactment of the International Security
and Development Cooperation Act, the number of FAMs was increased and their
focus became international U.S. air carrier operations. Due to resistance of several
countries e.g., the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany to having
individuals carrying firearms entering their countries the coverage of international
flight operations was initially spotty. As resistance to the entrance of armed personnel
to their countries was overcome through bilateral negotiations and agreements
reached as to the terms and handling of the weapons when they were brought in
country, the FAM’s were able to operate worldwide in carrying out their mission to
protect US aviation from hijackings.
Air marshals were originally designated as U.S. Customs security officers assigned
by order of President Kennedy on an as-needed basis, and later were specially
trained FAA personnel. Also contrary to the impression from the TSA “Our
Mission” statement, the customs officers were phased out in 1974. Many of them
transferred to the FAA’s Civil Aviation Security Division to serve as aviation security
inspectors and also in the volunteer FAM program directed by the FAA’s Civil
Aviation Security Division (later renamed the Office of Civil Aviation Security).
This program later became a non-voluntary one, required of all FAA Inspectors,
breeding other problems within the FAA’s Office of Civil Aviation Security. Later, in
1992, Retired Major General Orlo Steele, then the Associate Administrator for Civil
Aviation Security hired Greg McLaughlin as the Director of the Federal Air Marshal
Program. Greg McLaughlin had been hired as an air marshal after the hijacking of
TWA 847 and was working in Frankfurt, Germany, investigating the bombing of
Pan Am 103. Greg McLaughlin turned the Federal Air Marshal Program into an all
voluntary program. The voluntary nature of the program and efforts by McLaughlin
and Steele turned the small force of Federal Air Marshals into an extremely capable
one. From 1992 to just after the attacks on 9/11, the air marshals had one of the
62 toughest firearms qualification standards in the world. A study from the Joint Special
Aviation Safety And Operations Command (JSOC) later came out with a classified report during this time
Security
period, placing Federal Air Marshals amongst the top 1% of all combat shooters in
the world; this is no longer the case due to changes in capabilities and training.
Before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Federal Air Marshal Service
consisted of varying numbers of FAMs dependent on government funding. Although
50 positions were authorized by congress, only 33 FAMs were active on 09/11/01.
As a result of the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush ordered the rapid
expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Service. Many new hires were agents from
other federal agencies, such as the United States Border Patrol, the DEA, NPS, FBI,
CBP, U.S. Housing and Urban Development Office of the Inspector General (OIG),
(DEA), U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), (ATF), IRS CID, and many others.
Immediately after the attacks on 9/11, then Director Greg McLaughlin, was tasked
with hiring and training 600 air marshals in a one-month period; an impressive feat
that has since not been repeated in any government agency. A classified number
of applicants were later hired, trained, and deployed on flights around the world.
As of August 2013, this number is estimated to be approximately 4,000. Currently,
these FAMs serve as the primary law enforcement entity within the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA).
On October 16, 2005, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff officially
approved the transfer of the Federal Air Marshal Service from U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement (ICE) to TSA as part of a broader departmental reorganization
to align functions consistent with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
“Second Stage Review” findings for the following:
• consolidating and strengthening aviation law enforcement and security at the
Federal level;
• creating a common approach to stakeholder outreach; and
• improving the coordination and efficiency of aviation security operations.
As part of this realignment, the director of the Federal Air Marshal Service also
became the assistant administrator for the TSA Office of Law Enforcement (OLE),
which houses nearly all TSA law enforcement services.
In March 2014, Director Robert Bray announced six of the service’s twenty-six
offices would be closed by the end of 2016. Bray attributed the cuts to a reduction of
operating budget from $966 million to $805 million and the Transportation Security
Administration stated no positions would be eliminated.
CHAPTER

14
HISTORY OF SIGNIFICANT AIR HIJACKINGS SINCE 1972
March, 1971 : Philippine Airlines flight was hijacked in March 1971 by six students
from the Mindanao State University, opposed to the Marcos government. The plane
landed in Guangzhou (Canton) in southern China, and the Chinese authorities let the
students stay in the country. The plane was then allowed to fly back to the Philippines.
No one was hurt.
May 1971 : an IL-14 with 4 staff members and 16 passengers was hijacked by 6 men
at the Oradea Airport (Romania), then forced to flew to Budapest (Hungary), then
Vienna (Austria). The passengers and the crew were released in Vienna, while the
hijackers flew to West Germany.
July 2, 1971 : Braniff Flight 14, a Boeing 707 flying from Acapulco to New York
with 102 passengers and a crew of eight was hijacked on approach to a refueling stop
in San Antonio, Texas. The ordeal lasted 43 hours across Texas, Mexico, Peru, Brazil
and ended happily in Argentina.
A Pakistan Air Force T-33 trainer was hijacked on August 20, 1971 during the
Bangladesh Liberation War (before Indo-Pakistani war of 1971) in Karachi when a
Bengali instructor pilot, Flight Lieutenant Matiur Rahman, knocked out the young
Pilot Officer Rashid Minhas with the intention of defecting to India with the plane
and national secrets to join Mukti Bahini in the Bangladesh Liberation War.
November 24, 1971 : A man who became known as D. B. Cooper hijacked Northwest
Orient Airlines Flight 305, a Boeing 727-100 aircraft flying from Portland, OR, to
Seattle, WA, received US$200,000 in ransom, and parachuted from the plane. The
actual name of the hijacker remains unknown. The hijacker revealed what appeared
to be a bomb to a flight attendant and demanded the ransom and parachutes.
January 12, 1972 : Braniff Flight 38, a Boeing 727, was hijacked as it departed
Houston, Texas bound for Dallas, Texas. The lone armed hijacker, Billy Gene Hurst,
Jr., allowed all 94 passengers to deplane after landing at Dallas Love Field but
continued to hold the 7 crewmembers hostage, demanding to fly to South America
and asking for US $2 million, parachutes, and jungle survival gear, amongst other
items.
January 28, 1972 : TWA Flight 2, Los Angeles to New York, was hijacked by con
man and bank robber Garrett Trapnell while over Chicago. Trapnell demanded
$306,800 in cash (to recoup the loss of a recent court case), the release of Angela
Davis (as well as that of a friend of his who was also imprisoned), and clemency
from President Richard Nixon. The FBI was able to retake the aircraft during a crew
switch at Kennedy Airport; Trapnell was shot and wounded, no one else was hurt.
22 February 1972 : Lufthansa Flight 649, a Boeing 747-200 from Tokyo to Frankfurt,
is hijacked by a group commandeered by the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) during the Delhi-Athens leg and forced to divert to Aden, where all
182 passengers and crew are released on the next day in exchange for a $5 million
ransom.
64 June 3, 1972 : Western Airlines Flight 701 from Los Angeles to Seattle was hijacked
Aviation Safety And by Willie Roger Holder, a black Vietnam veteran, and Catherine Marie Kerkow.
Security
The hijackers claimed they had a bomb in an attache case and demanded $500,000.
After allowing all 97 passengers to get off in San Francisco, they flew to Algeria
where they were granted political asylum. The Algerian government confiscated and
returned $488,000 of the ransom money to US officials.
June 23, 1972 : In the 9th copycat D.B. Cooper-style hijacking Martin J. McNally
under the pseudonym of Robert W. Wilson hijacked American Airlines Flight 119,
a Boeing 727 bound from St. Louis to Tulsa and demanded $502,500. The plane
flew back and forth between Tulsa and St. Louis while the loot was raised. In St.
Louis, live news reports about the hijacking prompted David J. Hanley, a 30 year old
businessman, to crash his 1972 Cadillac at 80 mph through two airport fences, travel
down the runway at high speed and crash into the nosegear of the plane, which was
beginning to taxi.
July 5, 1972 : Pacific Southwest Airlines Flight 710 was hijacked by two Bulgarian
immigrants shortly after take-off from Sacramento, California en route to San
Francisco. The hijackers demanded $800,000, two parachutes and to be flown to
the Soviet Union. The hijacking ended on the runway in San Francisco when agents
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation stormed the plane killing both hijackers and
one passenger. Two other passengers were wounded. These were the first passengers
killed and wounded in a skyjacking in the United States.
July 31, 1972 : Delta Air Lines Flight 841 was hijacked by five members of the Black
Liberation Army including the elusive George Wright. The flight was originally from
Detroit to Miami. The hijackers exchanged the passengers for $1 million in Miami
and forced the plane to fly to Boston, then to Algeria, who returned the plane and
cash but released the hijackers.
September 15, 1972 : SAS DC 9 - Gunder Viking - with registration number LN-
RLO en route from Torslanda, Gothenburg, Sweden, to Stockholm, Sweden, was
hijacked five minutes after take off by 3 armed Croatians connected to Ustasa. The
plane was ordered to land at Bulltofta airport, Malmö, Sweden. 86 passengers and
4 crew members were held hostage until the next morning when the hostages were
released in exchange for 500,000 Swedish Kronor and seven Croatian imprisoned
in Sweden.
October 29, 1972 : Lufthansa Flight 615, a Boeing 727, from Beirut to Frankfrurt,
piloted by capt. Walter Claussen, was hijacked by three men and flown to Zagreb,
asking for liberation of the three surviving perpetrators of the Munich Massacre on 5
September that year. After boarding the three liberated men, the plane was redirected
to Tripoli in Libya where all hostages were finally released.
November 10, 1972 : Southern Airways Flight 49, was hijacked by three men and
flown to multiple locations in the United States, and one Canadian city. At one point,
the hijackers threatened to fly the plane into the nuclear reactor at the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, if their demands for $10 million in cash were not met. While
stopped for refueling at McCoy Air Force Base, Orlando, the FBI shot out the plane’s
tires, prompting the hijackers to force pilot William Haas to take off.
December 14, 1972 : QuebecAir Flight 321 en route to Toronto was hijacked by
Larry Maxwell Stanford and diverted to Montreal where the hijacker surrendered.
April 24, 1973 : The hijacking attempt of Aeroflot Tu-104 flying from Leningrad to 65
Moscow. When a flight attendant tried to disarm the hijacker, the bomb detonated, History Of
Significant Air
killing both and causing decompression. The crew made an emergency landing in Hijackings Since
Leningrad; the plane was written off. 1972

May 18, 1973 : Another hijacking attempt of Aeroflot Tu-104 flying from Irkutsk to
Chita. The hijacker demanded the plane be diverted to China. The bomb detonated
and the plane crashed near Lake Baikal, killing all 82 people on board.
May 18 to May 20, 1973 : Domestic flight of a two-engine Convair aircraft with 32
passengers to Caracas, Venezuela hijacked between Valera and Barquisimeto. Three
male and one female hijackers linked to the leftist group “Punto Cero” demanded the
release of 79 “political prisoners” from Venezuelan prisons. Diverting the plane via
Curacao in the Dutch Antilles and Panama, where three passengers were released, to
Mérida, Yucatán and Mexico City, where they issued an ultimatum.
October 31, 1973 : The Mountjoy Prison helicopter escape, in which three members
of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) were allowed to escape from
Mountjoy Prison in Dublin, Ireland aboard a hijacked light helicopter; prison guards
initially presumed the vehicle was carrying government officials.
November 25, 1973 : A KLM Boeing 747, “Mississippi”, was hijacked by three
young Arabs over Iraqi airspace on a scheduled Amsterdam-Tokyo flight with 247
passengers on board. After the hijackers threatened to blow up the plane when no
country would grant landing permission, the plane landed in Malta.
February 22, 1974 : Samuel Byck shot and killed Maryland Aviation Administration
Police Officer George Neal Ramsburg before storming Delta Air Lines Flight 523 to
Atlanta. When informed by pilots Reese (Doug) Loftin and Fred Jones they could not
take off until wheel blocks were removed, he shot them both and grabbed a nearby
passenger, ordering her to “fly the plane.” Jones died as he was being removed from
the aircraft after the event was concluded;
June 27 - July 4, 1976 : The hijack of Air France Flight 139 on June 27, 1976, by
members of the militant organizations Revolutionary Cells and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine - External Operations was brought to an end on July
4 at Entebbe Airport, Uganda by Operation Entebbe: Israeli commandos assaulted
the building holding the hijackers and hostages, killing all Palestinian hijackers and
rescuing 105 persons, almost all Israeli hostages. However, three passengers and one
commando were killed.
September 10, 1976 : TWA Flight 355 was hijacked by Croatian separatists. Some
passengers were allowed to deplane in Canada before the hijackers continued on to
Iceland, then France, where they released the remaining passengers and surrendered
to authorities. One New York police officer was killed while working on a bomb
which the hijackers had planted at Grand Central Station.
September 28, 1977 : Japan Airlines Flight 472 was being hijacked by the Japanese
Red Army (JRA). The JRA hijacked the plane over India and forced it to land in
Dhaka, Bangladesh. The Japanese Government freed six imprisoned members of the
group and allegedly paid a $6M ransom.
1977 : Lufthansa Flight 181 (also known as the Landshut) was hijacked by Palestinian
hijackers on a flight from Palma de Mallorca to Frankfurt. The ordeal ended in
66 Mogadishu, Somalia when GSG 9 commandos stormed the plane. Three hijackers
Aviation Safety And were killed and 86 hostages were freed.
Security
December 4, 1977 : Suspected lone member of Japanese Red Army hijacked
Malaysian Airline System Flight 653. The Boeing 737 then crashed after he shot
both pilots and himself. All 100 people on board died.
March 13, 1978 : United Flight 696 was hijacked by a lone American immediately
after takeoff out of SFO. The aircraft landed in Oakland and the release of cabin crew
and passengers was negotiated by the flight crew. The fueling was cut short by the
hijacker and Flt 696 took off only partially refueled. Flight 696 landed in Denver to
take on more fuel for Cuba.
August 30, 1978 : LOT Polish Airlines Flight 165 was hijacked by two East Germans
in order to escape to West Berlin. There were no casualties, the hijackers surrendered
and were tried by never-before-convened United States Court for Berlin.
September 30, 1978 : Finnair Flight 405 was hijacked by Aarno Lamminparras;
the flight was en route from Oulu to Helsinki. He requested a ransom of 675,000
markka, which he received, and as a result he released all 44 passengers on board.
Then he ordered the plane to fly him to Amsterdam in the Netherlands and then back
to Oulu.
December 20, 1978 : Devendra Nath Pandey and Bhola Nath Pandey hijacked Indian
Airlines flight IC-410. They demanded the immediate release of Indian National
Congress party leader Indira Gandhi who was imprisoned at that time on the charges
of fraud and misconduct. Later, they were awarded with party tickets for this act
by the Indira Gandhi government in 1980 such that Devendra Nath Pandey rose to
become a minister in the government of most populous state of India, Uttar Pradesh.
This case was also mentioned by Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale to justify his claim
regarding the hypocrisy of the Indian government.
December 21, 1978 : 17-year-old Robin Oswald hijacked TWA Flight 541 flying
from Louisville to Kansas City claiming she had three sticks of dynamite. The plane
landed at Williamson County Regional Airport where she hoped to seek the release
of Garrett Trapnell who was serving time at Marion Federal Penitentiary. Trapnell
was serving time for a January 28, 1972 hijacking (see January 28, 1972 above). On
May 24, 1978 her mother Barbara Ann Oswald was killed after hijacking a helicopter
in an attempt to rescue Trapnell. Robin eventually surrendered at the Williamson
Airport. The dynamite was revealed to be flares.
June 20, 1979 : Nikola Kavaja, a Serbian nationalist and anti-communist hijacked
American Airlines Flight 293. During the hijacking, Kavaja demanded and received
another airplane with the intent of crashing it into the headquarters of the Yugoslav
Communist Party. His lawyer convinced him to surrender after landing at Shannon
Airport, Ireland.
1980’s
1981 : On March 2, 1981, Pakistan International Airlines’s flight PK-326 began as a
routine domestic trip from Karachi to Peshawar. In midair three heavily armed men
seized the plane, diverted it to Kabul, Afghanistan, and demanded the release of
92 “political prisoners” from the Pakistani jails. On March 7, twenty nine hostages
including women, children and sick men were released in Kabul.
1981 : The Hijacking of Flight Garuda Indonesia GA 206 on March 28, 1981. This 67
was the first serious Indonesian airline hijacking, since the first case was a desperate History Of
Significant Air
Marine hijacker who was killed by the pilot himself. The hijackers, a group called Hijackings Since
Commando Jihad, hijacked the DC 9 “Woyla”, en route from Palembang to Medan, 1972
and ordered the pilot to fly the plane to Colombo, Sri Lanka. But since the plane
didn’t have enough fuel, it refueled in Penang, Malaysia and then to Don Muang,
Thailand.
1981 : Aer Lingus Flight 164 from Dublin to London was hijacked and diverted to
Le Touquet in France by a man demanding that the Pope release the third secret of
Fatima. While authorities negotiated with the hijacker by radio in the cockpit, French
special forces entered the rear of the aircraft and overpowered him.
September 26, 1981 : Yugoslav Airlines Flight from Titograd via Dubrovnik
to Belgrade - A few minutes after take-off from Dubrovnik Airport Čilipi, three
hijackers diverted Boeing 727 YU AKF to Brindisi Airport in Italy. Just when the
crew was preparing for the final approach, the hijackers decided to divert the plane
once again, but to Tel Aviv, Israel.

February 25, 1982 : Kuwait Airways Flight KU561 from Kuwait to Beirut to Libya
(return flight to Libya) was hijacked on the ground in Beirut, Lebanon on the return
from Libya, with 150 aboard by Hamza akl Hamieh shortly after landing, demanding
news and release of Imam Musa al-Sadr, founder of the Islamic group AMAL, who
had disappeared in Libya in 1978. The hijackers threatened to kill passengers if
demands were not met and Lebanese security forces did not withdraw from the area
around the plane.
July 1, 1982 : A Sri Lankan, identified as Sepala Ekanayake, who was 33 years old,
hijacked an Alitalia jumbo jet from Bangkok, Thailand, in order to be united with his
wife and child and to return to Sri Lanka.
August 22, 1982: A lone Sikh militant, armed with a pistol and a hand grenade,
hijacked an Indian Airlines on a scheduled flight from Mumbai to New Delhi carrying
69 persons. Indian security forces killed the hijacker and rescued all passengers.
Peter Lamont, production designer working on the James Bond film Octopussy, was
a passenger.
On February 16, 1983 an Iranian man, Hussein Shey Kholya, hijacked a Rio Airways
Dash 7 flight Killeen, TX ILE- Dallas, TX DFW. The plane landed in Nuevo Laredo,
Mexico

1983 : Tbilisi hijacking incident.

August 27, 1983. Armed with guns and grenades, hijackers seized a Boeing 727
aircraft after departure from Vienna, Austria. They forced it to land in Geneva, then
Sicily and Damascus, - over which period 93 of the 111 passengers and crew were
released - before arriving in Tehran. The hijackers demanded the release of Lebanese
prisoners in French prisons and the withdrawal of French troops from Lebanon.
February 3, 1984 : a Cruzeiro do Sul Airbus A300B4-203 flight 302 en route from
São Luís to Belém-Val de Cães with 176 passengers and crew aboard was hijacked
by 3 persons who demanded to be taken to Cuba. The flight reached Camagüey in
less than a day. There were no victims.
68 August 1, 1984 : an Air France Boeing 737-200 en route from Frankfurt to Paris
Aviation Safety And with 82 passengers and crew aboard was hijacked by 3 hijackers who demanded to
Security
be taken to Tehran. They were Arab protesters against military cooperation between
France and Iraq on the Iran-Iraq war context. One steward escaped to the hijacker in
Larnaka. The hijacking duration was 48 hours. The hijackers destroyed the aircraft
with explosives in front of the TV cameras. There were no victims. Strangely, the
hijackers were taken in a big black limousine and disappeared in Iran.
August 24, 1984 : Seven young Sikh hijackers demanded an Indian Airlines jetliner
flying from Delhi to Srinagar[69] be flown to the United Arab Emirates. The plane
was taken to UAE where the defense minister of UAE negotiated the release of the
passengers. It was related to the Sikh secessionist struggle in the Indian state of
Punjab.
December 3, 1984 : Kuwait Airways Flight 221 Lebanese Shi’a hijackers divert
a Kuwait Airways flight to Tehran. Two American USAID officials are shot dead
and dumped on the tarmac. The plane is taken by Iranian security forces who were
dressed as custodial staff.
1985 : Lebanese Shi’a Amal hijackers divert TWA Flight 847 from Athens to Beirut
with 153 people on board. The stand-off ends after Israel frees 31 Lebanese prisoners.
Among the passengers was famous Greek singer Demis Roussos. US Navy diver
Robert Stethem is tortured and murdered.
1985 : Three Palestinian members of the Abu Nidal Organization hijacked on
November 23, its Athens to Cairo route, EgyptAir Flight 648 and fly it to Malta.
All together, 60 people died, most of them when Egyptian commandos stormed the
aircraft.
December 19, 1985 : Yakutsk United Air Group Flight 101/435 was hijacked by the
co-pilot and diverted to China. The hijacker was apprehended by the Chinese upon
landing, while the passengers returned safely to the Soviet Union.
May 3, 1986 : The Taiwanese pilot of China Airlines Flight 334 subdued his two
crew mates on board the cargo flight to Bangkok, Thailand and flew the plane to
Guangzhou, mainland China where he defected. The incident triggered the isolationist
ROC government to reopen cross-strait negotiations and eventually scrap its Three
Noes policy.
September 5, 1986 : 22 people are killed when Pakistani security forces storm Pan
Am Flight 73 at Karachi, carrying 360 passengers and crew after a 16-hour siege. The
flight was en route to Frankfurt from Mumbai, India when the flight was hijacked on
the ground in Karachi. December 25, 1986: 63 people are killed when Iraqi Airways
Flight 163 crashes near Arar, Saudi Arabia due to an explosion in the cockpit. The
plane was hijacked by 3 men of the pro-Iranian group Islamic Jihad.
January 11, 1987 : A Continental Airlines DC-9 was hijacked in flight by Norwood
Emanuel, a Muslim hijacker that wanted to crash into the White House on Jan.
11, 1987. The crew diverted a possible disaster 14 years before the 9-11 attack.
Captain Mark Meyer was credited with thwarting the hijacking by quickly landing at
Dulles International outside of Washington D.C.. Capt. Meyer then confronted and
distracted Emanuel in the rear of the cabin allowing all 49 passengers and crew to
successfully evacuate onto the ramp. Capt. Meyer escaped 2 hours later.
May 19, 1987 : An aircraft refueller at Nadi International Airport, Fiji, attempted to 69
hijack an Air New Zealand Boeing 747-200 stopping at Nadi en route from Tokyo to History Of
Significant Air
Auckland. The hijacker entered the cockpit and held the captain, first officer and flight Hijackings Since
engineer hostage, demanding that the Timoci Bavadra-led government be restored 1972
after they were ousted in a military coup d’état six days earlier. After six hours,
the hijacker got distracted and the flight engineer knocked him out with a bottle of
whisky. None of the 105 passengers or 24 crew (including the three hostages) on
board were injured.
March 8, 1988 : Ovechkin family (a mother and her 10 children) attempted to hijack
a Tu 154 flight from Irkutsk to Leningrad while trying to escape from the USSR. The
plane landed on a military airfield near Vyborg and was then stormed. A stewardess
and three passengers were killed. The mother was killed by one of her sons by her
own request, then four of them committed suicide.
April 5, 1988 : Kuwait Airways Flight 422 was hijacked from Bangkok to Kuwait
with 111 passengers and crew aboard, including three members of the Kuwaiti Royal
Family. 6 - 7 Lebanese men (including Hassan Izz-Al-Din, a veteran of the TWA
847 hijacking[74]) armed with guns and hand grenades forced the pilot to land in
Mashhad, Iran and demanded the release of 17 Shiite Muslims guerrillas held in
Kuwait. Lasting 16 days and traveling 3,200-miles from Mashhad in northeastern
Iran to Larnaca, Cyprus, and finally to Algiers, it is the longest skyjacking to date.
September 29, 1988 : a man hijacked a VASP Boeing 737-300 registration PP-SNT
operating flight 375 en route from Belo Horizonte-Pampulha to Rio de Janeiro. He
wanted to force a crash on the Palácio do Planalto, the official presidential workplace
in Brasília. The pilot convinced the hijacker to divert to Goiânia where an emergency
landing was made. The hijack ended with 1 victim.
March 29, 1989 : Two teenagers from Czechoslovakia armed with grenades and
shotguns hijack Malév Hungarian Airlines Flight 640 at Prague Ruzyně Airport, and
fly the Tupolev Tu-154B with 15 hostages to Frankfurt Airport before surrendering.
1990s
October 2, 1990 : A hijacker seized a plane from China which later crashed as it
tried to land in Guangzhou, killing 128 people.
March 26, 1991: Singapore Airlines Flight 117 was hijacked en route from Subang
Airport to Singapore Changi Airport by 4 individuals claiming to be members of the
Pakistan Peoples Party.
November, 1991 : Shamil Basaev seized a plane from Mineralnye Vody Airport and
landed in Turkey in sign of protest of August Coup and State Committee on the State
of Emergency
February 11, 1993 : Lufthansa Flight 592 scheduled service from Frankfurt to Cairo
and Addis Ababa, was hijacked at gunpoint by Nebiu Demeke, an Ethiopian man.
1993 : Two separate hijackings of Indian Airlines aircraft to Amritsar, Punjab, India
in the month of April. In the first case the hijacker was talked into surrendering; in
the second, the NSG stormed in and killed the two hijackers and captured one.
1993 : Russian Aeroflot passenger jet flying from Perm to Moscow diverted to
Gardermoen airport by two Iranian brothers. Hijackers surrendered and hostages
went free. The hijackers were later given asylum in Norway for humanitarian reasons.
70 1994 : FedEx Flight 705 experienced an attempted hijack by disgruntled employee
Aviation Safety And Auburn Calloway as it left Memphis, Tennessee, with the intention of using it as
Security
a cruise missile against FedEx HQ. He was subdued by the flight crew before an
emergency landing back at Memphis.

December 24, 1994 : Air France Flight 8969 was hijacked from Algiers by four GIA
hijackers planning to crash into the Eiffel Tower in central Paris. After the murder of
3 passengers, GIGN commandos stormed the plane in Marseilles, killing all hijackers
and freeing all passengers.

1995 : Russian cargo jet flying from Tirana to Kabul was forced to land in Kandahar
by Taliban forces. Jet’s crew had been held in a captivity until escape in 1996.

1995 : Iranian defector and flight attendant Rida Garari hijacked Kish Air flight 707,
which landed in Israel. No casualties.

1996 : Hemus Air Tu-154 aircraft was hijacked by the Palestinian Nadir Abdallah,
flying from Beirut to Varna. The hijacker demanded that the aircraft be refuelled
and given passage to Oslo, Norway after landing at Varna Airport. All of the 150
passengers were freed at Varna, afterwards the crew continued the flight to Oslo,
where the hijacker surrendered and asked for political asylum.

1996 : Ethiopian Airlines Flight 961 crashed into the Indian Ocean near a beach in
the Comoros Islands after hijackers refused to allow the pilot to land and refuel the
plane. 125 passengers died and the remaining 50 passengers survived with minor
injuries. This was the third incident in which there were survivors of a passenger jet
that had been intentionally ditched into a body of water.

1997 : Two Turkish men hijacked Air Malta Flight 830 en route from Malta to Turkey
on June 9, 1997 surrendered to police at an airport in Cologne, Germany, early on
the same day and freed without incident about 80 crew members and passengers on
board.

1998 : Four men hijacked PIA Flight 544 en route from Gwadar to Turbat. The
hijackers were arrested without casualties.

1999 : All Nippon Airways Flight 61 was hijacked by a lone man. He killed the pilot
before being subdued.

1999-2000 : Pakistan-based hijackers hijacked Indian Airlines Flight 814 en route

from Kathmandu and diverted it to Amritsar, Lahore, Dubai and finally Kandahar.
After a week-long stand-off India agreed to release three jailed Pakistani men in
exchange for the hostages. One hostage was stabbed to death and his body thrown
on the tarmac as a “warning attack”.

2000’s[edit]:
2000 : Ariana Afghan Airlines Boeing 727 was hijacked on an internal flight within
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and ended up at London Stansted Airport, where
most of the passengers claimed political asylum.
2000 : Philippine Airlines Flight 812 was hijacked en route from Davao City,
Philippines to Manila. The hijacker parachuted from the aircraft while still airborne;
his body was later found.
2000, August 18 : a VASP Boeing 737-2A1 registration PP-SMG en route from 71
Foz do Iguaçu to Curitiba-Afonso Pena was hijacked by 5 persons with the purpose History Of
Significant Air
of robbing BRL 5 million (approximately US$2.75 million) that the aircraft was Hijackings Since
transporting. 1972

2000, October 14 : Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight 115,[82] flying from Jeddah to
London was hijacked en route by two men who claimed they were armed with
explosives. The hijackers commandeered the Boeing 777-200 to Baghdad, Iraq,
where all 90 passengers and 15 crew members were safely released.
2000, 11 November : A Vnukovo Airlines Tu-154 flying from Makhachkala to
Moscow was hijacked by a man demanding it be diverted to Israel. The plane landed
at an Israeli military base where hijacker surrendered. None of 59 people on board
were injured.
2001, 15 March : Another Vnukovo Airlines Tu-154 flying from Istanbul to Moscow
was hijacked by a three Chechens demanding it be diverted to Saudi Arabia. After
the plane with 174 people on board landed at Medina the hijacker threatened to blow
it up unless it would be refuelled for flying to Afghanistan.
United Airlines Flight 93 wreckage at the crash site in Somerset County, Pennsylvania
on September 11, 2001.
2001, September 11 : American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175,
American Airlines Flight 77, United Airlines Flight 93, were hijacked on the
morning of September 11 by Al-Qaeda-affiliated extremists. Flight 11 and 175 were
deliberately crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, Flight 77 was
crashed into the Pentagon and Flight 93 crashed into a field in Pennsylvania after
hijackers crashed the plane due to a revolt by passengers. Both towers of The World
Trade Center collapsed; in total 2,996 people, including the 19 hijackers, were killed
and over 6000 people were injured. The attacks led to the War on Terror.
2006 : Turkish Airlines Flight 1476, flying from Tirana to Istanbul, was hijacked by
Hakan Ekinci in Greek airspace. The aircraft, with 107 passengers and six crew on
board, transmitted two coded hijack signals which were picked up by the Greek air
force; the flight was intercepted by military aircraft and landed safely at Brindisi,
Italy.
2007 : an Air West Boeing 737 was hijacked over Sudan, but landed safely at
N’Djamena, Chad. 2007: an Air Mauritanie Boeing 737 flying from Nouakchott to
Las Palmas with 87 passengers
on board was hijacked by a man who wanted to fly to Paris, but the plane landed in
an air base near Las Palmas and the hijacker, a Moroccan, was arrested.
2007 : an Atlasjet MD-80 en route from Nicosia to Istanbul was hijacked by two
Arab students, who said they were Al Qaeda operatives, one trained in Afghanistan,
and wanted to go to Tehran, Iran.
2008 : Eagle Airways Flight 2279 a British Aerospace Jetstream 32EP ZK-ECN
flying from Blenheim to Christchurch was hijacked shortly after takeoff. The hijacker
demanded the flight be diverted to Australia. She stabbed both pilots and a passenger
before the plane safely landed at Christchurch Airport.
72 2008 : a Sun Air Boeing 737 flying from Nyala, Darfur, in Western Sudan to
Aviation Safety And
Security the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, was hijacked shortly after takeoff.[citation
needed] The hijackers demanded to be taken to France where they reputedly
wanted to gain asylum.

2009 : CanJet Flight 918, a Boeing 737-800 preparing to depart from the Sangster
International Airport in Montego Bay, Jamaica to Canada was hijacked by a gunman
who forced his way through airport security onto the plane. His main motive was a
demand to the crew to fly him to Cuba. Most of the passengers on the plane gave him
money to buy their freedom.
2009 : AeroMéxico Flight 576, a Boeing 737-800 flying from Cancún to Mexico
City was hijacked by José Marc Flores Pereira, a Bolivian citizen claiming he had a
bomb and demanding to speak to Mexican president Felipe Calderón.
2010s
January 2011 : Turkish Airlines Flight 1754, flying from Oslo to Istanbul, was in
Bulgarian airspace when an unsuccessful attempt was made to hijack it. The suspect
allegedly said that he had a bomb and that he would blow up the aircraft unless
the plane returned to Norway. Some passengers overpowered the hijacker and the
flight safely landed at Atatürk International Airport at 9:30 p.m after the pilot notified
emergency service.
April 2011 : an attempt was made to hijack Alitalia Flight 329, en route from Charles
de Gaulle Airport, Paris, France to Fiumicino Airport, Rome and divert it to Tripoli
International Airport, Libya.
June 29, 2012 : an attempt was made to hijack Tianjin Airlines Flight GS7554 from
Hotan to Ürümqi. Six people tried to hijack the aircraft 10 minutes after take-off.
There were 6 police officers on board. Four were in plain clothes, taking the plane
for a business trip. The hijackers used aluminium canes with sharpened tips to attack
the members of the crew.
February 7, 2014 : Pegasus Airlines Flight 751, during the start of the 2014 Winter
Olympics, a man attempted to hijack Pegasus Airlines Flight 751 that was on a flight
from Kharkiv, Ukraine, to Istanbul, Turkey, saying he had a bomb on board, and
demanding to be flown to Sochi, the host city of the 2014 Winter Olympics.
CHAPTER

15
TERRORISM
The events on 11 September 2001 (henceforth 9/11) served as a wakeup call to the
world that transnational terrorism poses grave risks. The four simultaneous hijackings
on 9/11 represent watershed terrorist incidents for a number of reasons. First, the
deaths associated with 9/11 were unprecedented: the human toll was equal to the
number of deaths from transnational terrorism from the start of 1988 through the end
of 2000 (Sandler, 2003). Second, the losses associated with 9/11 topped $80 billion
and caused insurance companies to end automatic coverage of terrorist-induced
losses. Since 9/11, many companies have been unable to afford terrorism insurance.
Third, 9/11 showed that ordinary objects can be turned into deadly weapons with
catastrophic consequences. Despite the huge carnage of 9/11, the death toll could
have been much higher had the planes struck the towers at a lower floor. Fourth, 9/11
underscored the objectives of today’s fundamentalist terrorists to seek maximum
casualties and to induce widespread fear, unlike the predominantly left-wing terrorist
campaigns of the 1970’s and 1980’s that sought to win over a constituency. Fifth,
9/11 mobilized a huge reallocation of resources to homeland security – since 2002,
the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) budget has grown by over 60%
to $36.2 billion for the fiscal year 2004 (DHS, 2003). In fiscal year 2005, the DHS
budget grew another 10% to $40.2 billion (DHS, 2004). A little over 60% of DHS’s
budgetgoes to defending against terrorism on US soil. This expenditure is small
compared to proactive measures taken in fighting the “war on terror,” including the
invasion against the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. Still
other proactive spending involves improving intelligence, tracking terrorist assets,
and fostering cooperative linkages with other countries. Sixth, protective actions
taken by rich developed countries have transferred some attacks against these
countries’ interests to poorer countries – for example, post-9/11 attacks in Egypt,
Indonesia, Morocco, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Middle East:
The Middle East has a tradition of radical Islam as a minority phenomenon that has
been revitalised in the last three decades through the war in Afghanistan against
the former Soviet Union and other events in the Middle East (the Taliban, the war
against them by the West after September the 11th and the war in Iraq since 2003.
the Jihadists are from the lower and lower-middle classes and are marked by cultural
uprootedness, in the Muslim world most of the Jihadists are from the modernized
middle classes and their adhesion to Jihadism translates their deep disappointment
towards Muslim governments that are seen as the “lackeys of the West”, corrupt, and
unable to cope with the Muslims’ pride (mainly Arab but more and more Muslim
as the Pakistani case pinpoints) and submitted to humiliation by the West, mainly
America who is perceived as the main culprit in the Arab mistreatment by Israel.
74 These modernized middle classes mostly belong to the scientific and engineering
Aviation Safety And circles, among them one finds doctors, scientists, engineers and all those who have
Security
a modern scientific education. These new Jihadists are impatient with the political
elites in the Muslim countries and they combine the rejection of the Islamic
governments (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan…) and the opposition to the
West, mainly the United States. Their motto is change, the fight against the close
(Muslim governments) and far enemies (America, the West) and the establishment
of Muslim rule and law all over the Muslim world in the name of a radicalized
version of Islam.
Terrorism marked by Marxist or Communist ideologies had a set of tenets that claimed
direct bearing on economics. Right or wrong, this ideology could be expressed in a
rationalised way
by its proponents. The wave of anarchist terrorism originating in Russia and
spreading throughout Europe and America had also a corpus of ideological schemes
that could be argued and exposed in a “rational” manner. The extreme left ideologies
of the 1970s were also marked by mental constructions based on the denunciation
of imperialism and the fight for the Proletariat and the praise of anarchy as the best
type of government on earth. All these ideologies claimed roots in social, political
and economic sciences. The fact that they were tendencious and non rational did
not prevent them from having a corpus of ideological “evidences” that claimed
the Enlightenment’s fatherhood or the utopias of Progress as their core material.
The Jihadist ideology is the less developed among the three radical currents
already mentioned. There are three major “ideas” which underline its ideological
construction. The first one is the idea of the “neo-umma” already underscored.
This is not a factual entity but a cultural construction based on a mythical Islamic
community. The second ideological tenet is a demonic West10. This idea has a dual
origin. The first is in the leftist ideology of imperialism. The second goes back to the
“dar ul kufr” as opposed to “dar ul islam” (respectively the House of Impiety and the
House of Islam). According to jihadist interpretation, Muslims should endeavour to
convert the non Muslims and spread Islam all over the world. Those countries which
are populated by non Muslims are at a state of war with Islam and every Muslim
should contribute, directly or indirectly to their forced or peaceful conversion to
the religion of Allah. This is the root of the third major idea, Jihad. In Islam it is
traditional to distinguish between two types of duties: if Islam is in danger, every
Muslim has to engage in the fight to preserve it (fardh al ayn). If the fight is to
spread Islam, Muslims should contribute to it through financial means or otherwise,
without having to be involved directly (fardh al kifayah). For the Jihadists, Islam is
the only valid religion and one has to go to the extreme to establish its rule the world
over. In the same vein, Islamic radicals believe that Islam is in danger through the
malevolent action of the West (particularly the United States) and therefore, Muslim
should accept even martyrdom in order to fight against an enemy who is militarily
and economically the most potent.

Rival Claim:
We identify four scenarios in which states might be motivated to instrumentalize
terrorism in the context of rivalries. Noting that in their survey of state support for
insurgent movements worldwide Byman et al. (2001) find that ideological, co-ethnic
and co-religious affinity rarely explain patterns of relationships between non-state 75
Terrorism
armed groups and government patrons, our four scenarios map out political and
strategic motivations for states to directly support terrorist movements.
First, states might use terrorist groups to manage the strategic and political costs of
rivalries. This scenario has several manifestations. Lacquer (1996) regards support
for terrorist proxies by interstate rivals to be an optimal strategy for contemporary
states because traditional interstate “wars of aggression” are too costly and uncertain
in modern times. In this sense, states use terrorist movements to “manage” their
interstate military rivalries by using them to exact real costs on rivals – the targeted
nation must spend resources on counterterrorism and often sustains casualties –
while preventing higher-stakes, open military conflict that impose large costs on
both parties. Using much the same strategy the United States and the Soviet Union
employed when supporting guerrilla insurgencies like the Afghan Mujahideen or the
Salvadoran Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) during the Cold War,
nuclear rivals like India and Pakistan use sponsorship of groups like the Baluchistan
Liberation Army and Jaish ul-Muhammad as tools to impose small-scale military
costs on each other without provoking formal interstate military confrontation.
Second, state sponsorship of terrorism can be motivated out of a desire to compensate
for strategic weakness vis-a-vis rivals (Byman 2008). States that lack the capacity
to project traditional military power, or that lack strategic military assets, may use
terrorist proxies to make up for this deficit. Clear examples of this scenario are Iran’s
support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as a means to impose
military costs on Israel and Iranian support for the Iraq-based Mahdi Army as a proxy
to use against the United States and coalition forces. Syrian intelligence cultivated
similar proxy relationships with various Palestinian terrorist movements including
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and its own Palestinian faction,
al-Saiqa (“the Lighting Bolt”), to deploy against Israeli and Lebanese targets in the
1980s. In both the Iranian and Syrian cases, the interstate rivals, Israel and the United
States, had much greater capacity to project military power. Terrorist movements
provide a means of bridging the capacity gap.
Third, states often support terrorist movements to cultivate bargaining assets with
rivals. In this scenario, states cultivate relationships with terrorist movements that
direct attacks against their rivals and then hold out implied offers to terminate support
or to hand over terror suspects in order to gain strategic concessions from the rival.
Perhaps the best example of this scenario is Syria’s financial support for the Kurdish
Workers Party (PKK), an anti-Turkish secessionist group, in the early 1990s. The
Syrian government had little interest in encouraging militant Kurdish nationalism,
given it had a Kurdish minority population, but chose to arm the PKK to develop
a bargaining chip in its conflict with Turkey over Turkey’s Euphrates river water
policy (Darwish 1998). Syrian support for the Lebanese Shi’i Hezbollah movement
is frequently seen in the same vein: motivated by a desire to compel Israel to make
concessions on the Golan Heights.
Fourth, state sponsorship of terrorist groups that target rival states may also be the
product of domestic politics. Government officials may offer support to terrorist
76 movements whose objectives are met with widespread popular sympathy in the
Aviation Safety And
country as a means to build and maintain domestic political support. Likewise, state
Security
support of terrorism may be the result of intra-regime political maneuvering between
hardliners and moderates. In this scenario, hard line elements within regimes that
seek a more aggressive foreign policy stance against interstate rivals work to secure
state support for terrorist movements in order to politically neutralize moderate
political actors. Hardliners may also favor supporting terrorists in the hopes of
precipitating an inter-state crisis that can be exploited to stoke nationalism, sideline
moderate voices, and shape policy. Governments in the Arab World and in Sub-
Saharan Africa regularly gave support to various national liberation movements,
such as the Palestine Liberation Organization or the armed wing of the African
National Congress to bolster regime popularity at home and to distract their publics
from domestic problems. Moreover, the hard-line politicians within the apartheid
government of South Africa promoted government support of anti-Communist and
reactionary insurgents in neighboring Angola and Zimbabwe as a means to foster a
“siege mentality” and climate of perpetual imminent crisis to outmaneuver moderate
voices and quell dissent (Byman et al. 2001; Price 1992).
Interstate rivalries may also increase terrorist activity in indirect ways. States
engaged in rivalries may not provide direct assistance to terrorist movements but may
encourage terrorist activity against rivals through the general political and security
climate states cultivate. This climate heightens tensions, promotes jingoism in society,
and normalizes extremism. Rivalry between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the
neighboring Arab states has indirectly prompted terrorism by terrorist actors that are
not directly supported by state agents. Another case in point is the highly contentious
relations between the United States and Communist Cuba under Fidel Castro that
helped to nurture anti-Communist, Cuban exile terrorist movements such as Omega
7, Brothers to the Rescue, and Alpha 66 between the 1960s and 1990s. Though there
is some evidence of direct clandestine training and support of right-wing Cuban
exile terrorism by U.S. officials, a large degree of the sustenance enjoyed by armed
anti-Castro groups is derived from the climate of strong hostility against the Castro
regime in the United States (Hewitt 2005; Matthews 2005).

Palestinian Liberation Organization:

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formally established in 1964,
and Fatah joined it in 1968, immediately becoming its dominant organization. In
1969, Arafat was named PLO executive chairman. The Palestine National Council
(PNC) is the highest decision making body of the PLO, and is considered to be the
“parliament” of all Palestinians inside and outside the occupied territories. The PNC
“sets PLO policies,” according to the website of the Permanent Observer Mission
of Palestine to the United Nations. Arafat is also known as Abu Amar. Neither the
PLO as a whole, nor the Fatah movement, has been named by the State Department
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The PLO formally renounced the use of
terrorism in 1988 and committed itself to peace with Israel in several agreements
since 1993. A number of different groups have been part of the PLO coalition; these
groups have their own prominent founders and their own organizational structures.
Some of the leaders of these PLO constituent groups have, at times, been rivals 77
Terrorism
or competitors of Arafat for support among Palestinians. Several are considered
“rejectionist” groups, having opposed the September 13, 1993 Israel-PLO mutual
recognition and subsequent Israeli-Palestinian interim agreements. Major groups,
apart from Fatah, have included:

• The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist group
which suspended its participation in the PLO after the 1993 Israel- Palestinian
Declaration of Principles (Israel-PLO mutual recognition, agreement to seek
a peaceful settlement). It was founded by George Habash.

• The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-

GC), led by Ahmad Jibril, a Damascus based faction that is politically close to
Syria. It also suspended its participation in the PLO.

• The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), led by Nayif
Hawatmeh, also a Marxist organization that resumed participation in the PLO
in 1999.

• The Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a small group, led by Abu Abbas, that
is still participating in the PLO.

Three of these groups – the PFLP, the PFLP-GC, and the PLF – have claimed
responsibility for acts of terrorism since the 1993 Declaration of Principles and
are named by the State Department as FTO’s.4 The DFLP was named as an FTO
when the first FTO list was issued in October 1997, but, because of a degree of
reconciliation with Arafat and apparent acceptance of eventual peace with Israel, it
was dropped when the list was revised in October 1999. Minor groups in the PLO
coalition – none of which is named as an FTO – are: As- Saiqa, a pro-Syrian faction
not currently participating in the PLO; the Arab Liberation Front, a pro-Iraqi faction
that is participating in the PLO; the Popular Struggle Front, which is participating in
the PLO; the People’s Party, formerly called the Palestinian Communist Party and
which is participating in the PLO; and the Democratic Union, commonly known by
its initials “FIDA,” a splinter faction of the DFLP which is participating in the PLO.

Abu Nidal:
The Abu Nidal Organization or Fatah Revolutionary Council was the most prolific
transnational terrorist group in recorded history. These terrorists introduced fledgling
terrorist groups and the widespread use of transnational terrorism to the world. Abu
Nidal appeared as an organization with a single ideology; however, the facts point
to a terrorist organization that conducted political violence not in support of its
own ideology but the ideology of the highest bidder. Transnational terrorism and
al-Qae’da have become media buzzwords of the world at large, spoken by many as
if the tactics used have suddenly become a new phenomenon. This idea is certainly
a mischaracterization of the history of terrorism in this respect. Abu Nidal and his
organization began as a terrorist group, bent on destroying Israel and returning
Palestinian lands to their rightful owners. They metamorphosed into a group focused
78 on destroying the PLO where money directed its actions. Finally, it is questionable
Aviation Safety And
whether Abu Nidal in his later years had become mentally deranged. In the final
Security
analysis, Abu Nidal and his organization are a psychologically complex entity that
has left behind mystery and mayhem whose thorough study can potentially lead to
understanding the al-Qae’da of today.

Establishment of the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO):

In late 1960’s, Jordan was the place where Fatah was organizing Palestinians and
striking out at Israel. Abu Nidal became a firebrand within the PLO’s Fatah, speaking
publicly at every opportunity to continue the terrorist attacks against Israel. As Israel
is prone to do when attacked, it would reach out and punish the Arab nations who
were hosting the Palestinian guerillas, and Jordan was no exception. These actions
quickly resulted in King Hussein of Jordan turning against the PLO and taking control
of his country through armed clashes with the Palestinians whom he had originally
supported as refugees in the West Bank. This failure of the Palestinian resistance
was difficult for Abu Nidal to accept, as it appeared to him to be a losing cause; he
still remained intent on finding a medium in which to lash out at Israel. During the
Jordanian civil war, as these armed clashes are often referred, where was Abu Nidal?
He often stayed inside his office when these clashes were waged as Seale (1992)
writes in the following words: “Abu Nidal carried a pistol but was never known to
have fired it” (p. 70). Convinced of Abu Nidal’s penchant for building international
relationships solely by himself and knowing from his actions that he had no desire
to confront conflict head-on, Fatah’s intelligence chief, Abu Iyad, sent Abu Nidal to
Khartoum as the PLO’s representative. Seale (1992) highlights a further degradation
to Abu Nidal’s ego in the following comment: “[This] move…later earned him the
charge of cowardice” (p. 71). The burden was heavy and Abu Nidal was seething
with desire to be part of striking back at Israel; however, when expected to stand
and fight, Abu Nidal used his cunning and street smarts to negotiate concealment
from the “real” clashes. Watching from a distance, Abu Nidal did not like any of
the infighting now occurring between Yasser Arafat’s PLO and the various factions
vying for control of Palestine’s ‘armed struggle.’ This infighting became more acute
once Jordan prevailed in regaining its country.

Abu Nidal had studied the strategies of the Jewish right-wing groups of the 1930s
and knew that an incoherent effort among the Palestinian groups would mean the
potential collapse of the Worman Palestinian resistance. Seale (1992) confirms this
collapse in the following manner: “None of this was to Abu Nidal’s liking. Early
in 1970, foreseeing the coming showdown with King Hussein, he started to pester
Abu Iyad…to send him once more to represent Fatah abroad this time in Baghdad”
(p. 77). The culminating event of Abu Nidal’s second career as a member of the
Palestinian uprising ended when the clash with King Hussein’s military in Jordan
was so horrific that it split the PLO into disparate, uncoordinated factions having
only one option, namely, to run and hide with hopes of returning some day to fight
again. Thus, Abu Nidal was convinced, in his own mind, that he would stand and
fight, not abandon the cause.
Ideological Goals: 79
Terrorism
Abu Nidal began his life in the world of political violence and subterfuge, believing
in the revolutionary ideals of the Ba’ath party that he first encountered in Jordan.
He initially surmised that this organization would help him regain his homeland.
He discovered the Ba’ath party espousing a soft approach that encompassed the
entire Arab community. It stood for nationalism. However, Abu Nidal was much
more focused on the plight of Palestine itself, and the perpetrator of this destruction,
namely, Israel. Hence, it can be surmised that he joined the PLO’s Fatah, whose
ideology at the time is best described as armed resistance against Israel ultimately
removing the Jews from all of Palestine. The Abu Nidal Organization’s ideological
objective began as one and the same, and appears to have been fairly consistent
throughout the life of his group, in word only, as reported by the Center for Defense
Information in the following passage: “At least until Nidal’s death, the ANO’s
ideological objective was to liberate Palestine via a pan-Arab revolution aimed at
destroying Israel” (Katagiri, 2002, cdi.org website). This perception seems to be the
one Abu Nidal wanted the world to believe and maybe he genuinely did have faith
that this goal was possible. In reality, Abu Nidal, as the leader demonstrated the
ease with which he could change ideological colors to suit the paying patron of his
services. Schweitzer (1998) comments on the following Nidal issues: “Abu Nidal
was for many years the symbol of international terrorism. His organization…[was]
built in his own image [and]…operated under his sole control and authority” (ict.org.
il website). The terrorist activities conducted by the ANO became disconnected from
the group’s, namely Abu Nidal’s, ideology that had united them initially. The fact
that “it carried out indiscriminate attacks against targets of opportunity, as dictated
by political or economic gain, or by order of Abu Nidal’s patrons of the moment”
painted a picture that some other ideology had replaced the original one, possibly
greed (Schweitzer, 1998, ict.org.il website). This argument takes yet another turn
when Abu Nidal massacred more than 150 of his best fighters while in Libya; he was
developing extreme paranoia.
The Economist (2002) presents the reality of this massacre in the following words:
“[In] 1988[,] Abu Nidal feared an attempt to oust him. In a purge of the [Fatah
Revolutionary Council] FRC, 156 of its members were murdered…a bloodletting
from which Abu Nidal and his [O]rganisation never recovered” (p. 65). Therefore,
destroying one’s own organization from the inside demonstrated that the complete
destruction of Israel had been supplanted by a greater hate. The effects the Palestinian
Liberation Organization had on Abu Nidal’s Organization during the time they
fought in Lebanon played strongly into the changes afoot. Was he possibly working
for Israel, given the destruction of the PLO leaders, the evidence might suggest as
such or was he simply a deranged paranoid when it came to human suffering? Many
questions are to be pondered Abu Nidal: Chameleon of Change, A.K.A. Terrorism’s
Free Agent regarding the creed in which the ANO really believed as it conducted
terrorist attacks around the world. The evidence presented would lead one to believe
that the ideology at face value, of the ANO, was something to keep the members
united, whereas the ideology for selecting the targets reflected a hidden agenda of
someone else’s political goals.
80 HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement):
Aviation Safety And
Security HAMAS (in Arabic, an acronym for “Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia” – Islamic
Resistance Movement – and a word meaning courage and bravery) is a radical
Islamic fundamentalist organization which became active in the early stages of the
first Intifada (1987), operating primarily in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank.
Hamas was formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the
Muslim Brotherhood. Various Hamas elements have used both political and violent
means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing a religious Islamic
Palestinian state in place of Israel. Hamas strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip
and a few areas of the West Bank. Hamas uses a three pronged approach to reach
their goal:
1. Social welfare activities that build grassroots support for the organization.
2. Political activity that competes with other Palestinian political organizations
including the Palestinian Authority.
3. Guerrilla and terrorist attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians

Hamas & the Palestinian Authority:

The Palestinian Authority (PA) was run by Yasser Arafat until his death in 2004. In
2006, Hamas participated in the Palestinian elections and took the majority of seats.
In its victory, Hamas obtained the right to name the prime minister and cabinet and
run the PA„s daily affairs. Mahmoud Abbas, leader of the more moderate group,
Fatah, remains as President. With a history of violent conflict between Fatah and
Hamas, tensions escalated as a result of the elections

Terrorists Activities:
Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, the
European Union, Israel, and Japan. Since 2000, Hamas is responsible for 426
terrorist attacks primarily targeting civilians (as of July 2008). Fifty-eight of these
attacks were suicide bombings, resulting in 377 deaths and 2,078 injuries (such as
the Sbarro Pizzeria bombing in downtown Jerusalem on August 9, 2001, in which 15
people were murdered, including six children ranging in age from 2-16 and another
130 were maimed). Rocket and mortar shell fire from the Gaza Strip continues as
Hamas’ preferred form of attack. In 2007, 2313 mortars and rockets were fired at
Israel, compared to 3550 in 2008. The rocket attacks have made life very difficult for
Israelis in the town of Sderot and in other western Negev towns.
CHAPTER

16
IRANIAN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM

In 2012, the State Department reported “a marked resurgence of Iran’s state

sponsorship of terrorism, through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods
Force (IRGC-QF), its Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and Tehran’s
ally Hizballah. Iran and Hizballah’s terrorist activity has reached a tempo unseen
since the 1990s, with attacks plotted in Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa.”6 A year
earlier, Iran was implicated in a plot to murder the Saudi ambassador to the United
States, Adel al-Jubeir, here in Washington, D.C., one of a number of violent missions
Iranian operatives discussed carrying out at the time.

But the uptick in Iranian state sponsorship of terrorism goes back a few years more, to
February 2008, as I detail in the January 2013 Washington Institute report I authored,
Hizballah and the Qods Force in Iran’s Shadow War with the West. That month a
Damascus car bomb killed Hezbollah terrorist mastermind Imad Mughniyah. At his
funeral, Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah promised to retaliate with an
“open war” against Israel. A series of Hezbollah plots were thwarted over the next few
months in places like Azerbaijan and West Africa, but it was a foiled attack in Turkey
in September 2009 that proved to be a watershed event for Hezbollah operational
planners and their Iranian sponsors. Despite the massive logistical support Qods
Force operatives provided for that plot, Hezbollah operatives still failed to execute
the attack successfully. Much finger-pointing ensued between Hezbollah and the
Qods Force regarding where the blame lay for the two years of failed opera-tions,
culminating in the botched attack in Turkey and then another failed plot in Jordan
in January 2010. Meanwhile by late 2009, Iran’s interest in Hezbollah’s operational
prowess focused less on local issues like aveng-ing Mughniyah’s death and more
on the much larger issue of combating threats to its nascent nuclear program.
Malfunctioning components ruined Iranian centrifuges; IRGC officers defected;
and then in January 2010 a bomb killed Iranian physics professor Masoud Ali
Mohammadi outside his Tehran home.

Furious Iranian leaders appear to have reached two conclusions after Mohammadi’s
death: first, that Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) had to revitalize its
operational capabilities, not only to avenge Mughniyah’s death but also to play a role
in Iran’s shadow war with the West; and second, that the IRGC would no longer rely
solely on Hezbollah to carry out terrorist attacks abroad. It would now deploy Qods
Force operatives to do so on their own, not just as logisticians supporting Hezbollah
hit men.
82 Hezbollah:
Aviation Safety And
Security
Since its establishment in Lebanon 30 years ago, Hezbollah has, without interruption,
carried out or planned a variety of terrorist attacks around the globe, using different
methods. Those terrorist attacks are part of Iranian policy, which uses Hezbollah
as its main proxy through the Islamic Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force and other
governmental institutions. The targets and emphases change from time to time
according to Iranian and Hezbollah considerations and interests. The targets include
Israel and the Jewish people, the United States and other The remains of the tourist
bus at the Burgas airport (Website of the ZAKA spokesman, July 19, 2012). The
blast killed seven (including the bomber) and wounded 36.

The American embassy in Lebanon after the blast that killed 63 and wounded
an estimated 120 Americans and Lebanese (Globalsecurity.org website) 2012:
Hezbollah blows up an Israeli

Tourist bus in Bulgaria 1983 : Hezbollah blows up the American embassy in

Lebanon Western countries, Hezbollah and Syria’s opponents in Lebanon, and Arab
regimes hostile to Iran and the “resistance camp” it leads.In recent years Hezbollah
has been involved in terrorist (an occasionally guerilla) activities in different arenas
using various methods against its targets. At the same time, with Iranian and Syrian
support, it has been upgrading its military-terrorist infrastructure in Lebanon, which
far surpasses those of other terrorist organizations in the Middle East and beyond.

A short summary of Hezbollah’s terrorist and guerilla activity and its military buildup
follows.

1. In Lebanon Iran and Syria have enlarged and upgraded Hezbollah’s

militaryterrorist infrastructure since the Second Lebanon War. Its main military
asset is an arsenal of an estimated 60,000 rockets and missiles which threaten
Israel’s civilians. Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, boasted that he had
precise rockets and a bank of targets, and could turn the lives of hundreds
of thousands of Israeli civilians into a living hell. Hezbollah also carries out
personal terrorism against its opponents in Lebanon, mainly senior figures.
The objective is to scare and deter Hezbollah’s opponents, mainly after the
erosion of its status following its support for the Syrian regime.

2. In the international arena, Hezbollah participates in the global terrorist

campaign carried out by the Iranian Qods Force, whose main targets are Israeli
diplomats and tourists. Hezbollah’s most recent attack was on an Israeli tourist
bus in Burgas, Bulgaria, considered successful (by Iran and Hezbollah), after
a series of failed attacks abroad in previous years.

3. In the Palestinian arena, Hezbollah helped Iran upgrade the military-terrorist

infrastructure of the terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip after
Operation Cast Lead, mainly Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. On
the eve of Operation Pillar of Defense the terrorist organizations had many
 thousands of rockets, among them long-range Fajr-5 rockets manufactured in 83
Iranian Support Of
Iran (eight of which hit or were intercepted in the greater Tel Aviv area). In
Terrorism
addition, Hezbollah encourages terrorist attacks against Israel from the Gaza
Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. During the Palestinian terrorist campaign known
as the second intifada, Iran and Hezbollah provided the Palestinian terrorist
organizations with financial and military support and handled terrorist squads
in the Palestinian territories.

4. Inside Israel Hezbollah carries out intelligence and subversive activities.

Hezbollah, with Iranian aid, recently sent an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
to collect intelligence and to send Israel a deterrent message (UAVs could also
be used for offensive purposes). Hezbollah also attempts to smuggle IEDs and
weapons into for terrorist attacks (exploiting its ties to criminal networks) and
to use Israeli Arabs for intelligence missions supporting its terrorist activities.

5. In Syria Hezbollah is part of the Iranian effort (led by the Qods Force) to
prevent the topple of the Syrian regime, the central member of the so-called
“resistance camp.” Hezbollah provides the Assad regime with guidance,
military training, intelligence and weapons, and hundreds of its operatives are
present in Syria. In recent months several Hezbollah operatives died in the
battles and others were taken prisoner by the rebels. However, Hezbollah does
not admit to its military involvement in Syria and claimed that its operatives
died while “fulfilling their commitment to jihad.”

6. In the Arab states Iran uses Hezbollah for subversion, terrorism and guerilla
activities: in Iraq Hezbollah operatives trained and handled the Shi’ite militias
operated by the Qods Force against the United States and its allies (until
America withdrew from Iraq at the end of 2011). In Yemen Hezbollah helped
train the Iranian-supported Houthi rebels; and in Bahrain Hezbollah was
recently publicly accused by Bahraini authorities of involvement in a series
of explosions in the capital city of Manama. Its objective was to destabilize
the Bahraini regime, against which Iran is waging a years-long campaign
of terrorism and subversion. Hezbollah does not admit to involvement in
terrorism and subversion in Arab countries.

Osama Bin Laden:

Osama bin Laden was the founder of al-Qaeda, the militant organization that
claimed responsibility for the September 11 attacks on the United States, along with
numerous other mass-casualty attacks against civilian and military targets. He was
a Saudi Arabian, a member of the wealthy bin Laden family, and an ethnic Yemeni
Kindite.

Bin Laden was born to the family of billionaire Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden
in Saudi Arabia. He studied at university in the country until 1979, when he joined
mujahideen forces in Pakistan fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. He
helped to fund the mujahideen by funneling arms, money and fighters from the Arab
84 world into Afghanistan, and gained popularity from many Arabs. In 1988, he formed
Aviation Safety And
al-Qaeda. He was banished from Saudi Arabia in 1992, and shifted his base to Sudan,
Security
until U.S. pressure forced him to leave Sudan in 1996. After establishing a new base
in Afghanistan, he declared a war against the United States, initiating a series of
bombings and related attacks. Bin Laden was on the American Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI) lists of Ten Most Wanted Fugitives and Most Wanted Terrorists
for his involvement in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings.

From 2001 to 2011, bin Laden was a major target of the War on Terror, as the FBI
placed a $25 million bounty on him in their search for him. On May 2, 2011, bin Laden
was shot and killed inside a private residential compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan,
by SCPO Robert O’Neill during a covert operation conducted by members of the
United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group and Central Intelligence
Agency SAD/SOG operators on the orders of U.S. President Barack Obama.

RUSSIA:

Overview : Terrorist attacks stemming from instability in the North Caucasus

continued to be committed in Russia. Separatists and violent Islamist extremists
calling for a pan-Islamic caliphate within the Caucasus constituted the main terrorist
threats. Separatism, inter-ethnic rivalry, revenge, banditry, and violent Islamist
extremist ideology were the primary motivating factors for terrorism-related violence
in 2012. Violence similar to that observed in the North Caucasus has also occurred
in other areas of Russia, as seen most notably in July with the bombing in Tatarstan.
Russia continued its efforts to arrest and disrupt militants.

Under the framework of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC), the
U.S. and Russian Chairmen of the Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG) met in
February 2012 to discuss U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation. The Chairmen
discussed cooperation in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), countering
violent extremism, countering terrorist threats to the tourism industry, terrorist
designations, and preparations for the Sochi Olympics. Additional BPC activity in
counterterrorism included several joint military exercises that dealt explicitly with
terrorism-related scenarios, collaboration on nuclear and transportation security, and
joint programs on financial monitoring.

Russia also continued to participate in the yearly Four-Party Counterterrorism

Working Group, which includes the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign
Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). Operational and intelligence information regarding
terrorism-related threats was shared among these four agencies, with senior leaders
meeting in Moscow and in Washington. FBI-FSB relationships at the working level
showed improvement during the year.

2012 Terrorist Incidents : The North Caucasus region remained Russia’s primary
area of terrorist activity. Separatists seeking an Islamic caliphate within the Caucasus
reportedly claimed responsibility for bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and extortion
in Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and Chechnya. Federal 85
Iranian Support Of
and local security organizations conducted counterterrorism operations throughout
Terrorism
the Caucasus, including raids, roadblocks, and larger-scale military-style operations
in rural areas. Media and eyewitness reports suggested that separatism is not the only
factor driving violence in the Caucasus, and that motives such as inter-ethnic rivalry,
business arguments, and revenge were factors involved.

In 2012, almost half of terrorist attacks targeted law enforcement, security services,
and emergency responders, using increasingly sophisticated tactics. For example,
in a May 3 attack, a suicide bomber exploded a vehicle near a police station in
Makhachkala, Dagestan. When the Emergency Ministry and police units arrived, a
second bomb exploded in a nearby vehicle. About 100 people were injured. Thirty-
seven police officers were injured and seven died. Two rescuers were also injured. In
2012, Dagestani authorities approved the creation of ethnic-based internal security
units and have agreed to host additional federal police and regular army units to
combat terrorism.

Across Russia, the press reported 659 killed and 490 wounded in 182 terrorist
attacks in 2012. Of the casualty totals for Russia, 325 of those killed and 365 of
those injured were security personnel. Official terrorism statistics are similar to
those found in open press. In December, Viktor Orlov, the head of the National
Counterterrorism Committee, said over 260 acts of terrorism were committed in
Russia in 2012. Additionally, Alesksandr Bortnikov, Director of the Federal Security
Service, announced that the special services prevented 92 terrorist-related crimes in
2012. In October, President Putin spoke about Russia’s fight against terrorism saying
that within Russia during the past several months, 479 militants were detained, and
313 terrorists who refused to surrender were killed, including 43 leaders.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The National Antiterrorism

Coordinating Committee, organized in 2006, is the main government body
coordinating the Russian government’s response to the terrorist threat.

The Russian Federation uses a machine-readable passport for foreign travel, and
citizens have the option of purchasing a more expensive biometric passport. The
biometric passports contain robust security features and are gaining in popularity.
The latest version of the Russian passport is valid for 10 years. Among Russian
applicants for American visas this year, the majority used the new Russian biometric
passport.

Cooperative efforts are also underway on a project to identify high-risk shipping

containers entering Russia. The goal of the project is to consolidate efforts of U.S.-
based field offices with Russian law enforcement in a cooperative effort to share
law enforcement intelligence and ultimately interdict contraband that could be used
in terrorist acts. The primary focus is the interdiction of smuggling in weapons of
mass destruction, dual use materials, small arms, narcotics, bulk cash, and human
trafficking.
86 Russia was also in the process of implementing a major program to introduce paperless
Aviation Safety And
entrance and clearance systems for cargo. This system, currently operational in
Security
one port of entry (Kashirsky), implements automated risk management and cargo
selectivity procedures. The Russian Federation is expanding this system nationally.

Cooperative relationships continued to develop between the heads of the State

Border Guard Service of the FSB and the U.S. Border Patrol. Similarly the U.S.
Coast Guard enjoyed a close working relationship with the Coast Guard of the FSB
Border Guard Service.

Significant law enforcement actions against terrorists and terrorist groups included:

• On May 17, a court in Vladikavkaz sentenced two men for the 2010 suicide
bombing that killed 19 and injured 230 people at a market.

• On November 28, a man was convicted of plotting a terrorist attack on Red

Square on New Year’s Eve 2010. Four of his associates were previously
convicted, and six more were standing trial at year’s end.

• On December 10, four Russian men from the Caucasus Emirate were
sentenced to 15 to18 years in prison for plotting a 2011 bombing of the high-
speed Sapsan train running between Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Countering Terrorist Finance : Russia is a member of the Financial Action Task

Force (FATF). It is also a leading member, chair, and primary funding source of the
Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG),
a FATF-style regional body. Through the EAG, Russia provided technical assistance
and other resources towards improving legislative and regulatory frameworks and
operational capabilities. Russia is also a member of the Egmont Group, as well as
the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and Moneyval, the Council of Europe
Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and
the Financing of Terrorism, both FATF-style regional bodies.

JAPAN:

There have been a number of terrorist incidents in which Japanese nationals or

Japan’s national interests have been affected abroad. In Iraq in particular, there have
been a series of incidents where Japanese nationals were taken hostage by militant
groups.

An overview of the hostage incidents, murder cases, and the like concerning Japanese
nationals in Iraq is as follows:

1. Murder incident of Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in Iraq In November

2003 two Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials were attacked by an unknown
assailant approximately 30 kilometers south of Tikrit. They were murdered
along with their driver.
 2. Hostage incident of three Japanese nationals in Iraq Three Japanese nationals 87
Iranian Support Of
were taken hostage in Fallujah by a militant group identifying itself as “Saraya-
Terrorism
Al-Mujahedeen” in April 2004. In exchange for the release of the three
Japanese nationals they had taken as hostages, the militant group demanded
the withdrawal of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan. Despite this,
the Japanese nationals were later released safely. In addition, two Japanese
nationals were captured in the same month by an unknown assailant in the
suburbs of Baghdad, but were later released safely.

3. Murder incident of Japanese journalists in Iraq A car carrying two Japanese

journalists and two Iraqi nationals was attacked by an unknown assailant in
the outskirts of Baghdad in May 2004, and both of the Japanese journalists
and one Iraqi national were killed.

4. Hostage and murder incident of a Japanese national in Iraq A militant group

identifying itself as the Islamic extremist organization “Tanzim Qaidat al-
Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Al-Qaeda Jihad Organization in the Land of the
Two Rivers),” which is believed to be led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, issued
a statement that they had taken a Japanese tourist hostage. The militant group
later murdered thehostage.

5. Possible hostage incident of a Japanese national in Iraq A convoy guarded by

a private UK security company was attacked by a militant group identifying
themselves as “Ansar al-Sunnah” in the suburbs of Hit in May 2005, and a
Japanese national working for this company went missing.

PERU:

In the 1960’s, leftist philosophy professor Abimael Guzman started a Maoist guerilla
group at the University of San Cristobal de Huamanga in Ayacucho, Peru. Guzman
named this organization in honor of the most celebrated phrase ever turned by an
early Peruvian Communist and journalist, Jose Carlos Mariategui, who wrote that
“Marxism-Leninism will open the shining path to the revolution.”Little did Peruvians
realize then that the path would turn into a river of blood. Dried up for a time by
Alberto Fujimori, the river has unfortunately begun to rise again.

Shining Path, the Sequel: Starring Hugo Chávez, FARC, and Narco-Terrorism. On
April 9, just days after Fujimori was sentenced to 25 years in prison for being the
intellectual author of two kidnappings and the assassinations of 25 persons by the
paramilitary group Colina, 14 soldiers were ambushed and killed by terrorists in
Peru’s southern Ayacucho region. The attack was led by “Comrade Olga,” who is
close to one of the current leaders of the Shining Path, Victor Quispe Palomino
(“Comrade Jose”).2 The attack occurred in an area of deep jungle known as the
VRAE (Valley of the Apurimac and Ene Rivers). Most of the dead Peruvian soldiers
were 18 and 19 years old. One young man was just 17.3 Shining Path is active again
in the area, providing the locals with such practical help as dental and barber services,
distribution of food, and teaching women manual skills to help their husbands. The
88 group no longer tries to impose its beliefs at gunpoint. They have learned from the
Aviation Safety And
methods employed by the sinister former head of Peruvian intelligence services
Security
Vladimiro Montesinos and the Peruvian army.

Domestic Terrorism In US:

The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do
not officially list domestic terrorist organizations, but they have openly delineated
domestic terrorist “threats.” These include individuals who commit crimes in the
name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white
supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and anti-abortion beliefs.

The boundary between constitutionally protected legitimate protest and domestic

terrorist activity has received public attention. This boundary is especially highlighted
by a number of criminal cases involving supporters of animal rights one area in
which specific legislation related to domestic terrorism has been crafted. The Animal
Enterprise Terrorism Act (P.L. 109-374) expands the federal government’s legal
authority to combat animal rights extremists who engage in criminal activity. Signed
into law in November 2006, it amended the 1992 Animal Enterprise Protection Act
(P.L. 102-346).

Five discussion topics in this report may help explain domestic terrorism’s
significance for policymakers:

• Level of Activity : Domestic terrorists have been responsible for orchestrating

more than two-dozen incidents since 9/11, and there appears to be growth in
antigovernment extremist activity as measured by watchdog groups in the last
several years.

• Use of Nontraditional Tactics : A large number of domestic terrorists do not

necessarily use tactics such as suicide bombings or airplane hijackings. They
have been known to engage in activities such as vandalism, trespassing, and
tax fraud, for example.

• Exploitation of the Internet. Domestic terrorists much like their jihadist

analogues are often Internet savvy and use the medium as a resource for their
operations.

• Decentralized Nature of the Threat : Many domestic terrorists rely on the

concept of leaderless resistance. This involves two levels of activity. On an
operational level, militant, underground, ideologically motivated cells or
individuals engage in illegal activity without any participation in or direction
from an organization that maintains traditional leadership positions and
membership rosters. On another level, the above-ground public face (the
“political wing”) of a domestic terrorist movement may focus on propaganda
and the dissemination of ideology engaging in protected speech.
 • Prison Radicalization : Prison has been highlighted as an arena in which 89
Iranian Support Of
terrorist radicalization can occur. Some prison gangs delve into radical or
Terrorism
extremist ideologies that motivate domestic terrorists, and in a number of
instances, these ideologies are integral to fashioning cohesive group identities
within prison walls. It must be reiterated, however, that even for gangs that
exhibit these ideological dimensions, criminal enterprises such as drug
trafficking not radical beliefs largely drive their activities.

Nuclear Terrorism:

Nuclear terrorism denotes the detonation of a yield-producing nuclear bomb

containing fissile material by terrorists. Some definitions of nuclear terrorism
include the sabotage of a nuclear facility and/or the detonation of a radiological
device, colloquially termed a dirty bomb, but consensus is lacking. In legal terms,
nuclear terrorism is an offense committed if a person unlawfully and intentionally
“uses in any way radioactive material … with the intent to cause death or serious
bodily injury; or with the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the
environment; or with the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international
organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act”, according to the 2005
United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism.

The possibility of terrorist organizations using nuclear weapons (especially very

small ones, such as suitcase nukes) has been a threat in American rhetoric and
culture. It is considered plausible that terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon. In
2011, the British news agency, the Telegraph, received leaked documents regarding
the Guantanamo Bay interrogations of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. The documents
cited Khalid saying that, if Osama bin Laden is captured or killed by the Coalition of
the Willing, an al-Qaeda sleeper cell will detonate a “weapon of mass destruction”
in a “secret location” in Europe, and promised it would be “a nuclear hellstorm”.
However despite some reported thefts and trafficking of small quantities of fissile
material, all low concern less than category III Special nuclear material(< Cat III
SNM) quantities, there is therefore no credible evidence that any terrorist group has
ever succeeded in obtaining Category I SNM/the necessary multi-kilogram critical
mass quantities of weapons grade plutonium, required to make a nuclear weapon.

Incidents Involving Nuclear Material:

Information reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shows

“a persistent problem with the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive
materials, thefts, losses and other unauthorized activities”. The IAEA Illicit Nuclear
Trafficking Database notes 1,266 incidents reported by 99 countries over the last 12
years, including 18 incidents involving HEU or plutonium trafficking: There have
been 18 incidences of theft or loss of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium
confirmed by the IAEA. Security specialist Shaun Gregory argued in an article that
terrorists have attacked Pakistani nuclear facilities three times in the recent past;
twice in 2007 and once in 2008. In November 2007, burglars with unknown intentions
90 infiltrated the Pelindaba nuclear research facility near Pretoria, South Africa. The
Aviation Safety And
burglars escaped without acquiring any of the uranium held at the facility.
Security

In June 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation released to the press the name
of Adnan Gulshair el Shukrijumah, allegedly the operations leader for developing
tactical plans for detonating nuclear bombs in several American cities simultaneously.

In November 2006, MI5 warned that al-Qaida were planning on using nuclear
weapons against cities in the United Kingdom by obtaining the bombs via clandestine
means. In February 2006, Oleg Khinsagov of Russia was arrested in Georgia,
along with three Georgian accomplices, with 79.5 grams of 89 percent HEU. The
Alexander Litvinenko poisoning with radioactive polonium “represents an ominous
landmark: the beginning of an era of nuclear terrorism,” according to Andrew J.
Patterson. In June 2002, U.S. citizen José Padilla was arrested for allegedly planning
a radiological attack on the city of Chicago; however, he was never charged with
such conduct. He was instead convicted of charges that he conspired to “murder,
kidnap and maim” people overseas.
 UNIT III

CHAPTER

17
INTRODUCTION TO SCREENING
Screening has the highest visibility and is the most scrutinized component of the
aviation security system. Of all the layers within the system, screening is the most
personally intrusive but also one of the most effective at deterring attacks. Passenger
and baggage screening has been the cornerstone of the aviation security system for
nearly four decades. The term screening can encompass many different meanings.
The physical inspection of individuals and property using technology is the most
commonly understood form of screening; however, other forms of screening are
routinely used. These may include (depending on which agency’s definition is used)
criminal history record checks (CHRCs) of airport personnel, positive passenger/
baggage matching, and even the known-shipper cargo security program. Security
screening extends beyond the inspection of passengers and their baggage. Cargo
screening, computerized prescreening of travelers, and profiling are all included in
the screening process.

Security screening is intended to prevent hijackings, bombings, weapons,

incendiaries, or other dangerous objects from being brought on board a commercial
aircraft. Screening is carried out on ticketed passengers, visitors in an airport’s sterile
area, certain airport and airline employees, concession employees, and vendors.
Screening passengers and carry-on baggage started in the early 1970s as a way to
deter the numerous hijackings occurring at the time. Through legislation, airlines
were assigned the responsibility for the screening function. This responsibility
remained with the airlines until shortly after 9/11, when it was transferred to the
TSA.

From a regulatory perspective, aircraft operators remain responsible for ensuring

that no person or piece of property (bag or cargo) is allowed onto their aircraft
without proper screening. Federal transportation security regulations specify that it
is the aircraft operator’s responsibility to ensure that the screening has been done.
Therefore, in the United States the TSA or a contract company under the Screening
Partnership Program (SPP; also known as Opt-Out) provides the screening service,
while foreign governments and foreign contractors provide screening for U.S. flights
overseas.
92
Aviation Safety And
17.1. Evolution of Screening
Security
Initial passenger and carry-on baggage screening programs were designed to detect
items commonly used by hijackers. The first passenger and baggage screening systems
were designed to detect guns and hand grenades, carried either on an individual or
in carry-on baggage. In the early 1970s, airline bombings were so infrequent they
were not considered a significant threat, and thus, no programs were implemented to
prevent or deter such attacks.

In 1973, walk-through metal detectors (WTMDs) were installed at airports to

detect whether an individual was carrying a gun or hand grenade.2 Conventional
X-raymachines, which X-ray an object from only one angle, were used to detect
weapons and explosives in carry-on bags; neither device actually “detected”
weapons or explosives. WTMDs sounded an alarm when metal was detected within
its magnetic field. A security screener then investigated whether the individual
possessed a weapon or had a nonprohibited object such as a belt buckle, steel-shoed
boots, car keys, and loose change. X-ray systems only provided an image of the
objects within a bag leaving the interpretation of the imagery to the X-ray operator.

Often, screeners would use metal detecting hand-wands to conduct a secondary

screening. During secondary screening, passengers were asked to roll up shirtsleeves
(to reveal a watch) or to remove a belt. These secondary screenings were not
foolproof. Additionally,WTMDs do not detect plastic explosives. In the early 1970s,
plastic explosives were available only to themilitary and had rarely been used in any
aircraft bombing; dynamite was the preferred explosive. Regardless, it was assumed
that if an individual attempted to conceal a bomb on his or her person, he or she
would be deterred by a WTMD, assuming the metal detectors would detect the metal
components within a bomb (timer, wiring, blasting caps, etc.). It was thought that
if an individual tried to sneak in a bomb in baggage, it would be detected by the
X-ray operator. Conventional X-ray machines, however, could not detect explosives
or weapons; they showed only the density of objects in the carry-on bags. Screeners
had to judge whether the density of the object posed a threat or whether a physical
search of the bag was warranted.

As mentioned, security screening was an airline responsibility. Airlines usually

subcontracted screening to an approved vendor, often by selecting the lowest bid.
Before 9/11, contract screening companies were notorious for high turnover rates
of staff and for hiring individuals who were less than qualified for the task. Because
of these factors, numerous failures of the system occurred when under airline
control. From 1973 through the 1980s, airline-contracted screening companies using
WTMDs and conventional X-ray machines for passenger screening and carry-on
baggage represented the traditional security screening system. During that period
several aircraft were bombed using checked baggage as the means of introducing
the bomb; undetectable plastic explosives were becoming more available and being
used. Hijackers were also using aviation employees to help bypass screening to
hide weapons on targeted aircraft. Despite new strategies being used by terrorists,
screening processes and technologies remained largely unchanged.
The challenges of passenger and carry-on baggage screening are not new. In a 1987 93
Introduction To
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report, the agency pointed out glaring
Screening
inadequacies including a lack of performance standards set by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and a lack of FAA enforcement authority related to aviation
security screening. This assessment concluded that evaluation of the effectiveness of
the screening programs was inadequate, and wide variations existed in the frequency
with which test weapons were detected at screening checkpoints throughout the
United States (GAO, 1987). In the GAO study, at 34 U.S. airports, the detection rate
ranged from 48% to 99%. The average detection rate of the test weapons was 80%.

Despite 14 years and three major legislative actions (Aviation Security Improvement
Act of 1990, Aviation Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996, and Airport Security
Improvement Act of 2000), the performance of screeners was no better than 1987
levels. The GAOreport went on to note that part of the problem rested with the FAA
and its inability to promulgate regulations to certify screening companies, noting that
it had been two and a half years since the FAA had originally planned to implement
certification standards. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA
2001) transferred screening to the TSA and added checked-baggage screening to the
process.
CHAPTER

18
SCREENING FACILITIES
Almost any person who has travelled recently has probably found the airport security
to be a fairly long process and at some points a tad bit tedious, but overall, for the
most part, necessary so that an individual is assured that he or she is boarded a flight
that is most assuredly safe from any potentially dangerous passengers. While most
people have probably at least at one point gone through the new airport security, there
are some things that even a person who has gone through the airline security might
not be aware of about it. Many people just do what they are told and go through the
motions mechanically without actually thinking about what is being done to ensure
their safety and security. Even for those who know what is done, they might not be
exactly aware of why it is being done or why the measure is even necessary as a
means to ensure their safety on an airplane.
One of the things that a lot of people are probably aware of is that there is now a limit
to the amount of liquids that can be taken on a plane with a person. An individual
cannot take a water bottle through the security line through with him or her, but
can buy one once they get through security at one of the many available dining
establishment inside the airport. A woman should also be sure to check her makeup
to ensure that it is under the limit that liquids are allowed to be. Any person should
definitely check his or her complete toiletry set before even going to the airport as a
means to ensure that everything that he or she brought with him or her as part of the
travelling packing is not over the amount of liquid that is allowed to be brought on
the airplane and will make it through security.
There is also an x-ray machine that will scan every person’s bags and belongings
to ensure that there is nothing dangerous within an individual’s carry-on’s. Most
people should know what they are allowed to bring or not, but it goes without saying
that there can be no dangerous or sharp objects that could be conceivably used as
weapons, such as scissors or something of that sort.
A person will also have to walk through metal detectors as well as a means to ensure
that he or she does not have anything on his or her person that could be used as a
weapon. Many people will have to remove anything that is in their pockets that could
potentially go off in the metal detector and put it through the x-ray machine.
In addition, many times a person will have to take off his or her shoes and the shoes will
have to go through the x-ray machine as well as his or her bags so that it can be ensured
that there is nothing potentially dangerous within the shoes as well, which have been
used as an effective hiding place in the past for potentially dangerous objects.

Screening Check Point Augmentation:

1. The Line Up : The Line Up is simple. It is where passengers begin to line
up to enter the security-screening checkpoint. You only enter the security-
screening checkpoint once you have your boarding pass (I have seen people
 get all the way through the security line only to be turned away because they 95
forgot to pick up their boarding pass). Screening Facilities

2. The ID Checker : This is the security person at the ‘entrance’ to the actual
screening process. This person inspects your photo identification (usually
a passport or drivers license) and your travel documents to make sure your
name/face match those on your boarding pass.
3. The Barker : ‘The Barker’ is the security person who walks up and down
the line ‘barking’ that you should have your boarding pass and valid photo
identification out and available for inspection, that your laptop should be out
of your bag for x-ray inspection and that you are only entitled to only pass
through security with no more than 3oz of liquids in each container (you may
actually have 3.4oz), these containers must be in one single 1-quart bag and
only one bag per person (hence ‘3-1-1′ bag). “The Barker” may also split
a single line into two lines, ask to see you boarding pass and at times just
intimidate inexperienced travelers.
4. The Long Table : The actual x-ray and metal detector process usually begins
with a long table with plastic bins. This is where you remove your shoes (if
required, the TSA does require it everywhere though); your laptop (if required);
your 3-1-1 bag (now virtually universal at all security worldwide). You
also want to start making sure you have no metal on you, this means
place your coins, keys, mobile phone, etc in a secure pocket, or inside
one of your bags.
5. The Bins : Every ‘Long Table’ has ‘The Bins.’ ‘The Bins’ are where you’ll
place your jacket, laptop and other lose items. Some airports require shoes go
in a bin, others do not. When it doubt, toss them in a bin.
6. The X-Ray Scanner : At the end of the ‘Long Table” is the X-Ray Scanner
and its conveyor belt. You want to place your bags and bins in the X-Ray
scanner. Remember that bins go in vertically NOT horizontally. Make sure
you witness your bags entering the X-Ray scanner before proceeding to the
next step, and from that moment never take your eyes off the ‘exit’ of the x-ray
scanner! Also remember to keep your boarding pass out and in your hand, do
not place that through with your bags and bins.
7. The Metal Detector : Once your bags and bins are in the x-ray scanner (and
your boarding pass is in your hand!) you’ll line up for the metal detector.
Always wait outside the metal detector until the security personnel have
motioned for you to pass through the metal detector. Before passing through
pat yourself down to check for any metal items you may have missed. If you
have any loose metal items declare them before you go through the metal
detector.
7(a). The Metal Detector Wand (if you set off the alarm) : ‘The Wand’ is a simple
hand held metal detector used by security personnel to check passengers who
have set off the metal detector multiple times. You are usually hold your arms
out and are ‘traced’ with the wand to find the source of the metal.
8. The Rollout : ‘The Roll-Out’ is the end of the X-Ray scanner where you retrieve
your bags-n-bins. Pay attention that you have all your items and that they have
exited the x-ray scanner before walking off. Take your items methodically
96 from the x-ray scanner and if you must ‘put yourself back together’ do so at
Aviation Safety And the chair or benches away from the x-ray scanner. By moving away from the
Security
x-ray scanner you’re not only allowing other passengers to proceed through,
but you’re also moving to a calmer environment to put your shoes on, put your
laptop away, put your 3-1-1 bag away and retrieve the small metal items you
have placed in a pocket or a bag.
9. The Bag Check (**NOT EVERYONE GETS A BAG CHECK**) : There
seem to be few words dreaded more than hearing “BAG CHECK LANE 7″
(or whatever lane you’re in) for many passengers. Honestly, I know what my
carry on bags look like and I’m personally often more concerned when I don’t
here this being yelled out while the x-ray security operator is viewing my bag.
A bag check is really simple. You collect all your items, just as discussed in
“8) The Rollout” and a security screener carries one of your bags, in your full
view, to a separate table. At that table you must never touch your items unless
instructed to do so, the screener will look through tour bag and possibly wipe
it down with a swab intended to detect explosives. This is not a big deal; when
they are done you repack your bag (unless you have explosives in which case
you have a lot of explaining to do and you’ll be greeted by law enforcement
shortly).
10. Have A Good Flight : Make sure you have all of your possessions and head
off into the terminal to have a good flight.

Law Enforcement Officers At The Gate Officer Duties:

In addition to normal “patrol functions,” officers of the Airport Unit (commonly called
“APO’s”) are trained in the multi-faceted aviation-specific duties required by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Transportation Security Administration
(TSA). Officers are required to become very familiar with City, State and Federal
laws regarding aviation security and operations.
APO’s also perform traditional patrol duties, such as traffic control and enforcement,
taking collision and crime reports, making arrests for crimes and warrants and patrol
of the airport properties. APO’s respond to calls inside the terminal building, on the
airfield, and to business and traffic concerns around the perimeter of the airport.
The primary requirement of the APO, by Federal mandate, is the rapid response to
the Security Checkpoint in the event of a security breach, or prohibited items being
brought through. Officers routinely respond to the checkpoint for found weapons,
drugs and other hazardous items.
In addition to police duties, officers routinely assist with a variety of Airport
Operation functions. APOs may be called upon to respond onto the airfield to assist
with safety inspections, and to respond to in-flight emergencies. They can also assist
with fuel spills, wildlife incursions, debris on the runway; anything that could affect
the safety of the flying public comes into the realm of responsibility of the APO.

Flexible Law Enforcement Response Program:

This program is based on post vietnam military concept of flexible response. Flexible
response was a defense strategy implemented by John F. Kennedy in 1961 to address
the Kennedy administration’s skepticism of Dwight Eisenhower’s New Look and
its policy of Massive Retaliation. Flexible response calls for mutual deterrence at
strategic, tactical, and conventional levels, giving the United States the capability 97
to respond to aggression across the spectrum of warfare, not limited only to nuclear Screening Facilities

arms.
John F. Kennedy won the presidency by claiming that the Republican Party had
allowed the U.S. to fall behind the Soviets into a missile gap. Upon entering office
Kennedy cited General Maxwell Taylor’s book The Uncertain Trumpet to Congress
for its conclusion that massive retaliation left the U.S. with only two choices:
defeat on the ground or the resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Technology had
improved since massive retaliation was adopted. Improvements in communication
and transportation meant U.S. forces could be deployed more effectively, quickly,
and flexibly than before. Advisers persuaded Kennedy that having multiple options
would allow the president to apply the appropriate amount of force at the right place
without risking escalation or losing alternatives. This would improve credibility for
deterrence as the U.S. would now have low-intensity options and therefore would
be more likely to use them, rather than massive retaliation’s all-or-nothing options.
Flexible Response was implemented to develop several options across the spectrum
of warfare, other than the nuclear option, for quickly dealing with enemy aggression.
In addition, the survivability of the retaliatory capability was stressed, leading to the
diversification of the strategic force, development of the strategic triad, and half the
Strategic Air Command force being put on permanent alert status.
The Kennedy doctrine did not include the ability to fight nuclear wars because of
the idea that it would undermine deterrence, was technologically unworkable, would
fuel the arms race, and was not politically feasible.
Importance was also placed on counterinsurgency and the development of
unconventional military forces, unconventional tactics, and “civic action” programs.

Stages in the Flexible Response:

A staged plan was devised to counter any Soviet military action other than a first
strike. It consisted of three stages:
Direct defense: In case of a conventional Soviet attack (meaning non-nuclear or this
would be considered a first strike) initial efforts would be to try and stop the Soviet
advance with conventional weapons. This meant that the foreseen Soviet attack on
West-Germany would be tried to be forced to a halt by NATO’s European forces,
Allied Command Europe.
Deliberate Escalation: This phase was entered when conventional NATO forces
were succumbing under the Soviet attack. This was actually expected as intelligence
indicated Soviet divisions outnumbered NATO divisions by far. In this phase NATO
forces would switch to a limited use of nuclear weapons, such as recently developed
tactical nuclear weapons (like nuclear artillery).
General Nuclear Response: This was the last phase or stage which more or less
corresponded to the mutual assured destruction scenario, meaning the total nuclear
attack on the Communist world. If the Soviets had not already done so, this would
make them switch to all-out attack as well.
CHAPTER

19
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECURITY INTERFACE IN
AVIATION
Security has been an important policy area for private corporations since World
War II, although the industries engaged in defence production have had a traditional
interest in security issues. The areas of particular interest at that time were industrial
espionage, banks and other companies involved in keeping and transporting valuables,
and corporations in socially unsafe and turbulent countries or regions. Corporations
in the industrialized world have relied largely on the host state for the provision of
security. However, the advent of modern international terrorism in the 1960’s and
1970’s, and most dramatically the tragic events of 11 September 2001, have radically
changed this situation. The newer types of threat are posed by guerrilla movements
that have sprung up in Latin America since the 1958 Cuban revolution; organized
Palestinian terrorist organizations; violent groups in Northern Ireland, the Basque
country and Corsica; as well as leftist movements that pursued their objectives by
spreading fear and violence, such as those which were active in Germany and Italy
in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Modern technology, including technological developments
that brought the worldwide establishment of television as the primary information
medium, has also radically changed the situation. Terrorism now has a wide theatre
stage from which to publicize its goals and spread fear.

Until September 2001, there seemed to be some form of restraint on terrorist activities.
Terrorist organizations appeared to be conscious that achieving their goals would
imply one day sitting down at the negotiating table to obtain something in return
for the cessation of terrorist actions: and there is truth in the saying that ‘kidnappers
rarely kill their victims’. Private corporations started to become targets of terrorist
acts because they were seen as symbols. They also came to be seen as a source of
money to be extorted through kidnappings, a crime which started on a larger scale in
Latin America and later spread to Europe.

By the 1980’s one could detect a new pattern in terrorist acts, reflecting more
ideological, but also more ethnic and religious, motives of a fanatical character. There
was a tendency for terrorist incidents to have less of a purely symbolic character,
while lethality increased dramatically. The emergence of the al-Qaeda network has
further reinforced this trend. It is difficult to identify a concrete or measurable goal
that this movement could one day hope to achieve, whether through negotiations or
otherwise. The attacks of 11 September 2001 represented a quantum leap in many
respects. Only in terms of cost, this single attack event has been estimated to have
incurred in direct costs, $40 billion; increased US federal expenditures, $100 billion;
tourism losses, $16 billion; airline losses, $15 billion; financial services losses, $77
billion; and other losses $41 billion a total of $289 billion.1 At the corporate level,
there have been ripple effects: corporations have begun to move from landmark 99
public and private
buildings and city centres, which has resulted in a drop in real estate value.
security interface in
Corporations have further increased their reserve stocks of critical components. aviation
The movement of people and goods has become more complicated and more time-
consuming, and there has been a shift in investment patterns away from the more
‘difficult’ parts of the world, thus hitting the less developed regions.

In parallel with these developments in terrorism activity, the accelerating globalization

process has dramatically increased the speed of financial exchanges. This has in turn
created new opportunities for large-scale fraud and money laundering: hundreds of
billions of dollars in ‘illegal’ money flow annually through the financial system. In
1989 states reacted by creating the

Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) a new type of international
cooperation 2. At the same time, corporations depend increasingly on intellectual
property rights as the fruit of their major investments in research and development.
These intellectual property rights must thus also be protected. The situation today,
compared to just a few decades ago, is radically different. States can obviously
no longer provide adequate protection in all fields, and corporations have limited
resources and ability to reduce this vulnerability.

They need to reassess the risks when deciding on investments and future
developments. A clear trend can also be seen for corporations to place greater focus
on crisis management as a gauge of their increased preparedness in the event of a
crisis.

II. The role of private corporations in the provision of security What is the proper
role for corporations in the field of national security and enhanced protection against
terrorist attacks? In general, corporations are prepared to help and spend resources in
order to prevent those threats that are likely to jeopardize the company in question,
but they are also likely to maintain a rather narrow focus on their own firms and
disregard general threats against society as a whole. In other words, corporations
will continue to monitor a rather narrow perimeter, while leaving responsibility for
society and critical infrastructure to government authorities. At the same time, there
is certainly a greater preparedness on the part of corporations to participate in the
fight against terrorism, for instance, by providing information and technical solutions.
Corporate actors in the financial industry have the potential and the willingness to
improve their cooperation with official bodies on the general problem of money
laundering and on the more specific problem of preventing financial resources from
falling into the hands of terrorist organizations.

The battle against modern terrorism resembles in many respects the fight started
many decades ago against Mafia organizations in the United States and Europe,
where the key to success has undoubtedly been infiltration as a working method.
Corporations and their individual officers could be helpful in this respect as well. A
third way forward would be the worldwide implementation of a new system of secure
individual identity cards. While many may regard this measure as an infringement
100 of personal integrity, in the long run it could provide an efficient method for denying
Aviation Safety And
individuals who lack proper identification access to airlines, official and private
Security
buildings, and so forth. Such a measure would, of course, require a significant
element of cooperation with the private corporate world.

In general, corporations and their trade associations have access to an enormous

amount of information through their customer base. They see and hear a lot
that could be useful for the public sector in the battle against terrorism. Modern
information technology now facilitates both the compilation of and access to such
data in a cost-efficient manner. The private sector might be prepared to share that
information with governments but only, of course, if it receives absolute guarantees
against political and other misuse of the data. Associated with private corporations
are several services, such as those of auditors, lawyers, real-estate agents and even
art dealers, which should also be called upon in the battle against modern terrorism.

An important initiative was taken with the establishment of the Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT) system 3 a network of national and regional teams throughout
the world for the collection and dissemination of information on computer-security
threats, vulnerabilities, incidents and incident response. The CERT system functions
fairly well and has led to the prevention of serious threats against computer and
electronic information systems.

Another important initiative would be to create a ‘TERT’ a Terrorism Emergency

Response Team for the instant reporting, analysis and monitoring of incidents
throughout the world that affect corporate security in a broader sense. Such a system
is widely felt to be needed and could also lead to further private–public sector
cooperation in the counter-terrorism effort.

Modern terrorism has shown a distinct ability to be ‘creative’ in the way in which
it perpetrates its acts. This creativity must be matched in the fight against terrorism.
There need to be new thinking and acting ‘out of the box’.
CHAPTER

20
AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT SECURITY
An airborne early warning and control (AEW & C) system is an airborne radar picket
system designed to detect aircraft, ships and vehicles at long ranges and perform
control and command of the battle space in an air engagement by directing fighter
and attack aircraft strikes. AEW & C units are also used to carry out surveillance,
including over ground targets and frequently perform C2BM (command and control,
battle management) functions similar to an Air Traffic Controller given military
command over other forces. When used at altitude, the radar on the aircraft allows
the operators to detect and track targets and distinguish between friendly and hostile
aircraft much farther away than a similar ground based radar. Like a ground based
radar, it can be detected by opposing forces, but because of its mobility, it is much
less vulnerable to counter-attack.

AEW & C aircraft are used for both defensive and offensive air operations, and are
to the NATO and US forces trained or integrated Air Forces what the Command
Information Center is to a US Navy warship, plus a highly mobile and powerful
radar platform. The system is used offensively to direct fighters to their target
locations, and defensively, directing counterattacks on enemy forces, both air and
ground. So useful is the advantage of command and control from a high altitude, the
United States Navy operates Northrop Grumman E-2 Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft off
its Super carriers to augment and protect its carrier Command Information Centres
(CIC’s). The designation “airborne early warning” (AEW) was used for earlier similar
aircraft, such as the Fairey Gannet AEW.3 and Lockheed EC-121 Warning Star, and
continues to be used by the RAF for its Sentry AEW1, while AEW & C (airborne
early warning and control) emphasizes the command and control capabilities that
may not be present on smaller or simpler radar picket aircraft. AWACS (Airborne
Warning And Control System) is name of the specific system installed in the E-3 and
Japanese E-767 AEW & C airframes.

Current systems:
Many countries have developed their own AEW&C systems, although the Boeing
E-3 Sentry and Northrop Grumman E-2 Hawkeye are the most common systems
worldwide. The E-3 Sentry was built by the Boeing Defense and Space Group (now
Boeing Defense, Space & Security) and was based on the Boeing 707-320 aircraft.
65 E-3 were built and it is operated by the United States Air Force, NATO, the
British Royal Air Force, France and controversially, Saudi Arabia.

The specially designed Grumman E-2 Hawkeye entered service in 1965 and has
been operated by eight different nations. Over 168 have been produced so far and
new versions continue to be developed making it the most widely used AEW system.
For the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, the E-3 technology has been fitted into the
Boeing E-767.
102 After World War 2, the United Kingdom deployed a substantial AEW capability with
Aviation Safety And American Douglas AD-4W Skyraiders, designated Skyraider AEW.1, which in turn
Security
were replaced by the Fairey Gannet AEW.3, using the same AN/APS-20 radar. With
the retirement of the conventional aircraft carriers, the Gannet was withdrawn and
the Royal Air Force (RAF) installed the radars from the Gannets on Avro Shackleton
MR.2 airframes, redesignated Shackleton AEW.2. To replace the Shackleton AEW.2,
an AEW variant of the Hawker Siddeley Nimrod, known as the Nimrod AEW3, was
ordered in 1974. However, after a protracted and problematic development, this was
cancelled in 1986, and seven E-3Ds, designated Sentry AEW.1 in RAF service, were
purchased instead.
The Russian Air Force is currently using around 15–20 Beriev A-50 and A-50U
“Shmel” in the AEW role. The “Mainstay” is based on the Ilyushin Il-76 airframe,
with a large non-rotating disk radome on the rear fuselage. These replaced the 12
Tupolev Tu-126 that filled the role previously. The A-50 and A-50U will eventually
be replaced by the Beriev A-100, which features an AESA array in the radome and
is based on the updated Il-476.
In 2003, the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) began a study of requirements for developing an Airborne
Early Warning and Control (AEWAC) system. The Indian Air Force operates three
EL/W-2090 systems, the first of which first arrived on May 25, 2009. The air force
is also testing the DRDO AEW&CS.
In early 2006, the Pakistan Air Force ordered six Erieye AEW equipped Saab 2000
from Sweden.[18] In December 2006, the Pakistan Navy requested three excess
P-3 Orion aircraft to be equipped with Hawkeye 2000 AEW systems.[19] China
and Pakistan also signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the joint
development of AEW&C systems Israel has developed the IAI/Elta EL/M-2075
Phalcon system, which uses an AESA (active electronically scanned array) in lieu
of a rotodome antenna. The system was the first such system to enter service. The
original Phalcon was mounted on a Boeing 707 and developed for the Israeli Defense
Force and for export.

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS):

Boeing produces a specific system with a rotating radar dome “rotodome” radome
designed and built by Boeing (Defense & Space Group) using Westinghouse (now
Northrop Grumman) radar. It is mounted on either the E-3 Sentry aircraft (Boeing
707) or more recently the Boeing E-767 (Boeing 767), the latter only being used
by the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force. When AWACS first entered service it
represented a major advance in capability, being the first AEW to use a pulse-doppler
radar, which allowed it to track targets normally lost in ground clutter. Previously
low-flying aircraft could only be readily tracked over water.
CHAPTER

21
INCREASED SUPERVISION: INTRODUCTION

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government
enacted new legislation to increase air passenger safety. On November 19, 2001,
President Bush signed into law the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA). This act established a new Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
which consolidated security efforts inside the Department of Transportation (DOT).
In addition, the ATSA mandated several important changes in civil aviation security
procedures. The two primary changes in airport security visible to passengers were
the federalization of passenger security screening at all U.S. commercial airports by
November 19, 2002, and the requirement to begin screening all checked baggage by
December 31, 2002. The ATSA charged the TSA with overseeing security operations
and implementing the mandates at all 429 commercial airports in the U.S.

While these new security regulations were enacted to ensure passenger safety
and restore confidence in the U.S. aviation system, the overall effect of the new
regulations on passenger demand is unclear. On one hand, greater confidence in the
safety of air travel should spur demand. On the other hand, by requiring additional
time and effort on the part of passengers, the inconvenience of security procedures
may reduce demand for air travel.

Criminal Guards:

Criminal guards are the care takers of security at airport. Class specifications are
intended to present a descriptive list of the range of duties performed by employees
in the class. Specifications are not intended to reflect all duties performed within the
job.

Position Summary:

Under general supervision of the Airport Manager, the Airport Caretaker is responsible
to plan, organize and carry out security and general maintenance operations at the
Mendota Airport; and to perform related work as required.

Principal Duties and Characteristics:

Plans, organizes, and conducts security and general maintenance operations at

the Airport, including: conducting security patrols of airport facilities, checking
for fire, trespassers, unauthorized personnel, lighting, and unsecured locks; report
irregularities to Airport Manager and/or Police Department, depending on severity;
safeguard assigned area including buildings, equipment, property and personnel;
maintaining logs of incoming air and ground traffic, perform minor maintenance;
104 cleaning; yard work; respond to inquiries from the public and general aviators;
Aviation Safety And
must join the Mendota Promotores and oversee the Community Garden, ensuring
Security
protection and control over access; perform other duties as assigned.

Kills, Knowledge, Abilities, And Special Requirements:

Licenses Required:

• Possession of a valid and appropriate California Drivers License and a good

driving record;

Knowledge of:

• General security procedures and practices;

• Minor maintenance practices;

• Appropriate safety precautions and procedures.

Ability To:

• Prepare written reports, logs, and documentation as needed.

• Analyze situations quickly and objectively to determine and take appropriate

action.

• Identify potential hazards and take preventative action.

• Read, write, and speak both English and Spanish fluently.

• Maintain good working relationships with other City personnel, regulatory

agencies, and the general public.

• Pass a medical physical examination, drug test, and background check

• Meet the Citys driving standards.

• Stand, squat, sit, bend, twist, and reach regularly.

• To lift from 0 to 100 pounds regularly.

• Make visual and auditory observations.

• Operate equipment used in the course of duties.

• Work out doors in all weather conditions.

Ergonomic Solutions:

According to data provided by the FAA (1995), operator performance in conducting

passenger screening using current systems and procedures is not uniformly effective.
Applying the principles of ergonomics in the design of screening systems and 105
Increased
procedures is a possible avenue to improving the performance of current and future
Supervision:
systems. The allocation of functions between machine and operator, in particular, will Introduction
have a significant influence on the effectiveness of future systems. This allocation
will dictate the specific tasks to be performed by the operator and the manner in
which the operator must perform them. The goal is to ensure that functions assigned
to humans are compatible with human capabilities. If they are not, then assigned
functions will not be performed well, even if the best personnel selection, training,
and motivation approaches are employed.

The resolution of issues related to ergonomics will be critical to the success of

new passenger screening systems. In an apparent paradox, as screening systems
become more automated, human factors are likely to become even more critical
to success. Human operators will perform the difficult and complex tasks that
cannot be automated. Increased automation will also introduce a host of new human
factors issues that must be addressed (see, for example, Rasmussen, 1986; Wiener,
1987; Reason, 1990). One such issue deals with effectively integrating available
information for screening and alarm resolution decisions. Which of the variety of
techniques available for use in data integration and display will be most effective
for passenger screening? Another issue will be the design of calibration, testing, and
maintenance systems that are likely to be more complex for more highly automated
systems.

Ergonomics issues can be addressed by applying existing knowledge, by conducting

research in laboratory and field settings, and by incorporating appropriate measures
in system test and evaluation programs. To realize the benefits of these efforts for any
specific system, however, these issues must be integrated into the system development
process. The FAA can ensure that system developers address critical human factors
issues by incorporating appropriate and sufficiently sensitive measures of human
performance in suitable system test protocols. These test protocols must be designed
and employed to evaluate and qualify systems prior to their implementation, and they
should be specified in advance to system developers. The importance of ergonomics
in system effectiveness is illustrated by the inadequate design of existing systems.
Current systems for screening carry-on baggage continue to suffer from human
factors issues that were not and have not been addressed properly. In an example
cited by a workshop participant, the effectiveness of current screening systems can
be jeopardized by pressures imposed by management on operators to increase the
rate of passenger screening (Dennison, 1995). Other data from the FAA show that
the overall detection effectiveness of existing human-machine screening systems
is lower than desirable (FAA, 1995). According to an official of one of the largest
providers of screening services in the United States, examples of inadequacies in
existing baggage-screening systems include the following (Dennison, 1995):

• The display does not provide the operator with adequate size reference (i.e.,
all bags, regardless of size, appear about the same size on the screen).
106 • Equipment controls are insufficiently distinguishable by shape and location
Aviation Safety And
coding to permit operation without looking at the control panel.
Security

• Data integration and image-processing techniques have not been sufficiently

exploited to provide enhancements for image interpretation.

• Equipment design forces operators to position themselves improperly to view

the display.

• Work force constraints (e.g., the requirement to rotate personnel among all
positions at specified time intervals) limit the ability of management to assign
security personnel to tasks in accordance with their abilities.

• Passengers, airport staff, air carrier employees, and others sometimes subject
security personnel to abuse.

Important steps have been taken by the FAA to ensure that critical and high-priority
issues related to the enhancement of operator performance in security systems are
addressed systematically. The FAA has initiated a program of ergonomics research
and development that parallels, and is integrated with, the development of new
technologies and systems. The human factors program should remain a high priority
for the general FAA aviation security program because operator performance is
important to the overall effectiveness of security systems. In addition, improvements
in operator performance can result in immediate improvements in the passenger
screening systems themselves.

Operator Selection, Training, And Motivation:

To complement the effective design of systems and procedures and to assure

acceptable levels of operator performance, the following steps are required for
developing personnel selection, training, and motivation methods:

• Develop and apply selection methods to ensure that operators have the
necessary aptitudes for the tasks to be performed.

• Develop and administer training systems that provide operators with the
needed knowledge and skills.

• Incorporate elements into the system (e.g., ongoing performance measurement

and assessment procedures) that enhance rather than degrade operator
motivation and job satisfaction.

Measuring Operator Performance:

• A critical element of an effective program of operator ergonomics, selection,

training, and motivation is a set of techniques for measuring operator
performance. Measurement will also help the FAA and air carriers to determine
the effectiveness of current and future screening systems. The following are
 some areas that require performance measurement methods: 107
Increased
Supervision:
• assessment of the effect of prototype screening systems, equipment, and Introduction
procedures on operator performance

• development of criteria for validating operator selection and placement

methods

• development of criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of operator training

techniques, methods, and programs

• on-line monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of security screening

systems and personnel

• provision of feedback to individual operators on overall performance and

diagnoses of weaknesses

The FAA has initiated a promising research and development program that will
lead to the development of techniques for measuring operator performance. These
techniques include provisions for electronically inserting target objects in operational
screening systems. This program, initiated in 1991, is a focus of the FAA human
factors program in 1996.

Potential Operator Concerns With Specific Screening Technologies:

Imaging Technologies:

Imaging technologies produce images of individuals and objects concealed

under clothing. Operators are required to interpret images using current imaging
technologies. Therefore, the methods used for selecting, training, and motivating
operators should be similar to those used for preparing operators of current x-ray
baggage-screening equipment. The time available for an operator to decide whether
an individual should be allowed to pass or should be held for further screening is
short, perhaps no more than six seconds. This is the approximate time currently
required for clearing a carry-on bag through the screening equipment. The short time
available emphasizes the importance of proper operator selection and training in
obtaining and interpreting images.

For imaging technologies, alarm resolution probably will involve either taking
additional images (e.g., from different angles) or having a more experienced viewer
or supervisor interpret the initial image. Alarm resolution may not require more skill
than that required for interpreting the initial image. In fact, the decision to screen a
passenger further could result in more time for image interpretation and could offer
a chance for less experienced screeners to practice image interpretation.

Trace-Detection Technologies:

The use of trace-detection technologies in passenger screening settings may involve

108 person-to-person contact or direct contact between the detection equipment (e.g.,
Aviation Safety And
trace-chemical sensor) and an individual. As with current screening techniques,
Security
operators may feel intimidated by some people they are required to screen.
Technologies that require even closer interaction between the operator and the
passenger are likely to exacerbate this problem.

Automated trace-detection technologies, where a person is brushed with an air

stream or is required to touch a portion of the equipment, do not impose additional
requirements on operators. As in current passenger screening techniques, operators
generally will become involved only after an alarm is triggered. More skilled
operators are required for maintaining sophisticated chemical-identification systems
in acceptable operating condition than for current airport checkpoints.

Nonimaging Electromagnetic Technologies;

Changes in these passenger screening devices, including improvements to current

technologies and the development of new approaches, are likely to be transparent
to both passengers and operators. Security-screening operators will benefit from
technologies that will allow them to quickly identify the item that caused the alarm
by providing them better information about the type and location of the item.

Ensuring the satisfactory performance of system operators involves applying

ergonomics in the design of screening systems and in developing effective techniques
and procedures for selecting, training, and motivating system operators. The resolution
of ergonomics issues will enhance the capabilities of current technologies and will
be critical to the successful implementation of new passenger screening systems.
Improved personnel selection, training, and motivation methods will complement
the effective design of systems and procedures and will assure acceptable levels
of operator performance. The human factors program of the FAA is a key effort in
improving operator performance.
 UNIT IV

CHAPTER

22
CARGO CARRIER RESPONSIBILITY
Aviation security measures are necessary to safeguard international civil aviation
against acts of unlawful interference. In view of attacks on civil aviation committed
or attempted by concealing improvised explosive or incendiary devices in
consignments, it is essential to remain vigilant and apply measures that secure air
cargo and mail. Vulnerabilities in cargo and mail security can provide perpetrators
with a medium of attack.
There are two main threats: placement of an improvised explosive or incendiary
device in cargo or mail to be loaded on an aircraft, and seizure of a commercial
aircraft which is then used as a weapon of mass destruction. The capacity of the
cargo and mail industries to address such threats in a highly complex operating
environment can be made more difficult by the multiplicity of entities involved in
the air cargo supply chain. This publication identifies the roles and responsibilities of
these various entities and highlights how they can work together effectively to secure
air cargo and mail.
In securing cargo and mail, there was a need for ICAO and the WCO to develop
and maintain regulatory frameworks that provide security, while facilitating the
movement of goods. ICAO, the WCO and industry stakeholders are focused on
enhancing and maintaining these global regulatory frameworks, which serve to
secure air cargo and mail while promoting world trade through the expeditious
movement of goods around the world.
Air cargo SCM:
The air cargo supply chain is initiated by a seller (or ‘shipper’) and buyer (or
‘importer’ in the context of international trade) who wish to exchange goods between
them via air. Many of these terms are used interchangeably in common usage; for
example the term consignor is commonly used to describe the shipper. The shipper
is the entity responsible for manufacturing and/or selling goods, and can be referred
to as the exporter or the trader. The shipper will often engage the services of a broker
or agent to manage the movement of the goods, including meeting the requirements
of regulatory border agencies (e.g. Customs).
The shipper deals in a commercial sense at the other end of the supply chain with the
buyer, or the importer in the case of international trade. The person who initiates the
shipment may manufacture the goods or simply buy them for resale.
The shipper (or ‘exporter’ in the context of international trade) fulfils the procedures
and information exchanges related to the buying and selling of goods. The shipper
will often engage the services of a broker or agent to manage its regulatory business,
110 in particular the preparation of a goods declaration for Customs, but also the many
Aviation Safety And potential licences, permits and certificates that can be required by other border
Security
regulatory agencies.

Figure 1 : Air cargo movement overview

Roles and responsibilities:

Consignors:
This terminology is employed to designate the entity or individual who initiates the
movement or the transport of the goods. In other words, it is the ‘sender’. Whereas
the terminology of ‘shipper’ is employed to designate the entity or individual who
initiates the trade in the goods, the consignor and shipper are separate roles, although
often they can be one and the same party. Brokering functions are often integrated
with forwarding, consolidation and even warehousing functions within a single
entity. Nonetheless, it is useful to think of them as discrete business functions, each
of which has its own unique statutory and administrative relationships with Customs
and other agencies.

Consignees:
The consignee is the party who is designated on the invoice or packing list as the
recipient of the goods at the end of the transport movement. Similar to the start of the
air cargo supply chain, it is important to differentiate between the roles of consignee
and buyer. The role of consignee relates to the transport of the goods, whereas the
role of buyer relates to the trade aspects. In the international trade context, the buyer
is also known as the importer. The buyer or importer will often engage the services
of a broker or agent to manage its regulatory business, in particular the preparation
of a goods declaration to Customs but also the many potential licences, permits and
certificates that can be required by other border regulatory agencies. Although it is
possible that one entity may combine the roles of buyer and consignee, it is important
to differentiate between these roles because the information generated is different,
becomes available at different times, and is used for different purposes.
Freight forwarders: 111
Cargo Carrier
Freight forwarders are part of the transport logistics process within the supply chain Responsibility
and their main task is to arrange for air shipments to be managed in such a way that
they are ready for transportation by aircraft operators. Such arrangements might include
the consolidation of cargo, as appropriate. A freight forwarder and logistics service
provider may offer a service relating to the preparation, storage, carriage, and final
delivery of goods, including the applicable documentary and facilitation formalities.

A forwarder rarely acts as carrier of the goods in the transport chain. Usually, it is the
organizer of multiple carriages in several modes of transport and other services that
contribute to the building of a supply chain. Such carriage may be performed by single
or multimodal transport means. Multimodal transports occur when air cargo services are
combined with sea, rail, or pre-carriage trucking from the shipper or manufacturer to the
airport of departure and from the airport of destination to the consignee. Services offered
by the forwarder may include consolidation, storage, handling, packing, or distribution
of the goods. In addition the forwarder can provide a range of ancillary and advisory
services in relation to the physical movement of the goods. These services will often
include Customs and fiscal matters, declaring the goods for official purposes, procuring
insurance for the goods, and collecting or procuring payment or documents relating to
the goods.

Freight forwarding services also include logistical services with modern information
and communication technology in connection with the carriage, handling, or storage of
goods and, de facto, total supply chain management. For air cargo shipments, a freight
forwarder normally books and contracts with an aircraft operator in the form of an air
transport service agreement from the airport of departure to the airport of destination.
The freight forwarder will then proceed with the shipment from its warehouse or another
location and deliver it directly to the aircraft operator or its representative. This process
normally starts well before Customs export formalities have been resolved. A forwarder’s
prime responsibility is to safeguard the interests of its customer, the consignor or shipper.
Freight forwarding entails working closely with aircraft operators in order to book space
on aircraft for consignments that are ready for travel, for which air transport contracts
are concluded and air waybills are issued. Freight forwarders are often located landside,
but some may operate, or even own, warehouses that are located airside or at a space
in between.

Ground handlers:

Ground handlers are subcontracted and act on behalf of freight forwarders and/or
aircraft operators. This occurs when the freight forwarder or aircraft operator does
not have the necessary facilities. Ground handling services can include the provision
of warehouses to accept, handle, prepare, and tag cargo and mail, as well as loading/
unloading, transit, and storage of cargo and mail. Ground handlers are responsible for
dealing with operational aspects, based on the instructions of freight forwarders and
aircraft operators. Once a consignment is ready for shipment, the freight forwarder
will release the cargo and instruct the ground handler to deliver it to the aircraft
operator. Ground handlers are often located on airport premises, either airside or at
the frontier between landside and airside, though they may also be located landside.
112 Designated Postal Operator:
Aviation Safety And
Security A Designated Postal Operator is any governmental or non-governmental entity
officially designated by a Universal Postal Union (UPU) member State to operate
postal services and to fulfil the related obligations arising out of the UPU Acts,
including the universal postal service obligation. Mail is defined as all postal
items conveyed by designated postal operators under the conditions of the UPU
Convention, its Regulations and UPU technical, messaging and security standards.
Designated postal operators conduct business with aircraft operators for the
conveyance of mail, and apply security controls to mail, including screening, as
required by the appropriate authority, and in accordance with the Universal Postal
Union Convention. The confidential nature of correspondence is generally protected
by State legislation, which may prohibit the opening of mail receptacles or restrict
the use of some screening methods. It may also require that mail be treated differently
than cargo consignments.
Aircraft operators:
Aircraft operators, also known as airlines and air carriers, provide air transportation
for goods. A transport contract (air waybill) binds an aircraft operator with the
relevant contracted parties for the safe and secure transport of cargo and mail from
one location (e.g. the airport of departure) to another (e.g. the airport of arrival).
The air cargo may be transported on passenger aircraft or all-cargo aircraft. In some
instances, particularly for short distances, aircraft operators may also transport air
cargo by road. The transport contract remains an air waybill, however, and the road
segment is considered as a flight, with a designated flight number. This type of
operation is known as a ‘road feeder service’.
Express carriers:
Express carriers combine the work of a broker, haulier, freight forwarder, ground
handler, and aircraft operator into one single company or group, which is why they
are also sometimes referred to as ‘integrators’.

Figure 2 : The Express Model

Express delivery has thus become a specific business model in the cargo industry.
Express carriers manage end-toend multimodal supply chains spanning 220 States
and territories. They operate sophisticated track-and-trace information technology
systems, which allow them to monitor the progress of an individual shipment through
their chain, from pick up to delivery.
CHAPTER

23
AIR CARGO SECURITY
The ICAO regulatory framework for the air cargo secure supply chain was not
established at once. Rather, ICAO proceeded in a step-by-step manner to develop
the security Standards that constitute the foundation of the current air cargo secure
supply chain.
Aircraft operators:
ICAO has created a set of Standards for determining the security controls, including
screening where practicable, to be applied to all cargo and mail prior to loading on
to an aircraft engaged in commercial operations. In principle, as shown below, the
aircraft operator could bear the entire responsibility of applying security controls,
including screening of 100 per cent of cargo and mail before loading of cargo and
mail onto an aircraft.
While screening all passengers and their baggage at the last moment before departure
is feasible, the same principle does not apply to air cargo and mail because aircraft
operators cannot systematically screen all pieces of cargo and mail immediately before
departure. The challenges are further detailed in the call-out box on the following
page. ICAO, Member States, and industry stakeholders have worked jointly to design
the ICAO air cargo security Standards and to adapt them to operational constraints
and reality. A global secure supply chain approach to air cargo and mail could be
achieved by applying security controls at the point of origin. The implementation of
the secure supply chain is an efficient solution, built on a risk-based approach that
meets the following objectives:
• respect existing obligations of businesses operating in the air cargo supply
chain;
• share costs and responsibilities among all stakeholders and allow cargo to be
secured upstream in the supply chain to reduce the burden of security controls
imposed on aircraft operators;
• facilitate the flow of cargo transported by air and reduce or limit possible
delays generated by the application of security controls;
• apply appropriate security controls for specific categories of cargo that cannot
be screened by the usual means due to their nature, packaging, size or volume;
and
• preserve the primary advantages of the air transport mode: speed, safety and
security.
To offer this secure supply chain approach, ICAO and Member States developed
Standards in Annex17 (Security) to the Chicago Convention introducing the
regulated agent and known consignor regimes. These allow security controls,
including screening, to be applied upstream in the air cargo supply chain, by entities
approved to act as such by the appropriate national authorities, avoiding unnecessary
duplication of security controls.
114
Aviation Safety And
Security

Figure 3 : Security controls applied aircraft operators.

Entities approved by the national authority ensure that cargo and mail to be
carried on commercial aircraft are protected from unauthorized interference
from the point where screening or other security controls are applied until departure
of the aircraft. The implementation of the secure supply chain reduces the burden on
aircraft operators while facilitating the processing of secure cargo when it arrives at
an airport.

Regulated agents:
A regulated agent is a freight forwarder or any other entity, (e.g. ground handler) that
conducts business with an aircraft operator and provides security controls that are
accepted or required for cargo or mail by the appropriate authority. The regulated
agent concept allows aircraft operators to receive cargo already secured from an
entity approved by the appropriate authority, i.e. the regulated agent, that accounts
for the security status of consignments. Once approved as a regulated agent, an
entity may conduct security controls on cargo, including the screening of goods.
Candidates for regulated agent status must meet specific requirements determined
by the appropriate authority. The regulated agent must develop and maintain a
security programme that describes all the security measures implemented on the
premises and during all operations to secure cargo and maintain its security until
delivery to the next entity. Such measures should include, inter alia: access control
to secure areas; monitoring of premises; protection and surveillance of cargo against
unauthorized access; description of the persons entitled to access the premises;
screening processes; delivery and reception processes; security training for all
staff who may access the premises; and monitoring of subcontractors. While the
application of security controls by a regulated agent facilitates the movement of
goods, one issue remains to be resolved: how to render air cargo secure when its
nature or packaging does not allow for efficient security screening with conventional
methods available at regulated agent or aircraft operator premises?
The implementation of the known consignor regime is able to answer this need,
offering the possibility to conduct efficient security controls at the manufacturing/
assembly/packing stage that are adapted to the nature of cargo, including in such
cases where the nature of the goods does not allow for screening later in the supply
chain.
Known consignors: 115
Air Cargo Security

Figure 4 : Security controls applied by regulated agents.

Figure 5 : Security controls also applied by known consignors.

A known consignor is an entity approved as such by an appropriate authority, or an

entity authorized to act on its behalf, which renders it able to confirm and account
for the application of security controls on cargo shipped by air. An entity may act
as a known consignor when it originates cargo or mail for its own account and
when its procedures meet common security rules and standards sufficient to allow
the carriage of cargo or mail on commercial aircraft. Once a known consignor has
accounted for the security status of cargo, the consignment has to be delivered
to another approved entity, such as the regulated agent, or directly to the aircraft
operator in order to ensure and guarantee the secure status of cargo.

In order to be designated as a known consignor, an entity such as a manufacturer

or assembler should demonstrate compliance with the known consignor security
programme under which business will be conducted, as recognized and approved by
the appropriate authority, or by a regulated agent, aircraft operator, or other entity
authorized by the State to act on its behalf. Known consignors should apply for
designation, approval or listing by the appropriate authority at regular intervals that
should not exceed five years.
WCO Regulatory Framework:
The WCO Safe Framework of Standards is the Customs instrument covering all
modes of transport, to secure and facilitate goods moving through international
supply chains. The framework has both national and international implications, and
is composed of distinct standards that call for:
• partnerships to be established between Customs administrations, between
Customs administrations and the private sector, and between Customs
administrations and other government agencies at borders;
• harmonized electronic advance information requirements for conducting risk
assessments to address security threats;
116 • the use of modern, non-intrusive inspection equipment;
Aviation Safety And
Security • the introduction of Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) who, having
satisfied predetermined security standards, receive the benefit of enhanced
facilitation; and
• mutual recognition between Customs administrations of their respective
AEOs and Customs control procedures.
Traditionally, Customs has been responsible for implementing a wide range
of government policies, spanning areas as diverse as revenue collection, trade
compliance and facilitation, interdiction of prohibited substances, protection of
cultural heritage, and enforcement of intellectual property laws. This breadth of
responsibility reflects the fact that Customs authorities have long been entrusted
with administering matters for which other government ministries and agencies have
policy responsibility, such as health, agriculture, environment, trade statistics and,in
some cases, immigration.

Customs has the authority to inspect cargo and means of transport entering, transiting
or exiting a State. It may even refuse entry, transit or exit in certain cases. While
these powers are extensive, a holistic approach is required to optimize the securing
of the international trade supply chain while ensuring continued improvements
in trade facilitation. Customs therefore developed cooperative arrangements
with other government agencies in a so-called coordinated border management
environment. Modern Customs processes are based on the International Convention
on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (Revised Kyoto
Convention). Following the events of 9/11 the WCO Council adopted the SAFE
Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, thereby adopting a
holistic approach to the supply chain. 166 Members of the WCO have signed a letter
of intent to implement it.

It is kept up to date and relevant by the WCO SAFE Working Group. The WCO’s
SAFE Package brings together all WCO instruments and guidelines that support
implementation of the SAFE Framework. The Package includes the SAFE Framework,
the Integrated Supply Chain Management Guidelines, AEO Implementation
Guidance, the AEO Compendium, Model AEO Appeal Procedures, AEO Benefits:
a contribution from the WCO Private Sector Consultative Group, the Guidelines for
the Purchase and Deployment of Scanning/Non-intrusive Inspection Equipment, the
SAFE Data Element Maintenance Mechanism, the Trade Recovery Guidelines, FAQ
for Small and Medium Enterprises, Guidelines for Developing Mutual Recognition
Arrangements or Agreements and an AEO template.

The SAFE Framework is a dynamic instrument that balances facilitation and control
while ensuring the security of the global trade supply chain.

Integrated Customs control procedures:

Everything entering or leaving a Customs territory is subject to Customs control. In
an integrated Customs control chain, the integrity of a consignment has to be ensured
from the time the goods leave the place of origin until they arrive at the absolute
final place of destination. This usually starts with advance electronic transmission 117
Air Cargo Security
of prescribed information by the exporter or its agent. This information should be
lodged with Customs prior to goods being loaded on to the means of transport (or
container) being used for their exportation. A further initial transmission may be
required from the aircraft operator at an agreed later stage. For security purposes,
Customs usually limit their information requirements to those available in aircraft
operators’ normal documentation and based on those set out in Annex II to the
SAFE Framework of Standards. Similarly, there is advance electronic transmission
of prescribed information by the aircraft operator or its agent to the Customs
administration at entry, followed by complementary transmission by the importer at
an agreed later stage.

The WCO SAFE Framework of Standards includes provisions for any business
involved in moving goods through the international supply chain to become validated
by Customs as AEOs if they meet supply chain security requirements. AEOs are
allowed to submit reduced data sets, which must nonetheless contain the minimum
information necessary for Customs to conduct a security risk assessment. These
arrangements can be extended by the concept of an authorized supply chain in which
all operational participants in a transaction are approved by Customs as meeting
specified standards in the secure handling of goods. Consignments passing from
origin to destination entirely within such a chain will be assessed ordinarily as low
risk and can benefit from enhanced facilitation as they cross borders.

Information management:
Electronic systems, which allow the exchange of information between interested
parties (called cargo community systems), have been established at airports by
stakeholders in the transport chain. Customs are usually participants in such systems
in order to access data required for risk assessment. Modern Customs administrations
use automated systems to manage security risks; seek to avoid the burden of different
sets of requirements to secure and facilitate commerce; and, where possible,
recognize other international standards and do not duplicate or contradict other
intergovernmental requirements.

Suicide or Homicide Bomber:

In 2006, a suicide bomber ran into the lobby of the Islamabad, Pakistan, airport, where
he was confronted by police. He shot three officers then dropped a hand grenade he
was carrying, which killed him. Although there have been several cases of suicide
bombers boarding aircraft, this was one of the few attacks in an airport by a suicide
bomber. What makes the suicide bomber one of the most deadly forms of attack used
by terrorists in recent years is that it is essentially a “bomb with a brain.” Unlike
command-detonated IEDs, suicide bombers adjust to the environment, identify law
enforcement and security measures, flee and return another day, or relocate into a
crowd or key infrastructure to increase destruction. A suicide bomber can also quickly
move into position and detonate. An IED has to be positioned by an operative. Then
the operative must move from the IED, leaving the device unattended for at least
several moments before detonation. During this period, there may be enough time to
118 cause suspicion and prompt a law enforcement response. However, remember that a
Aviation Safety And
suicide bomber also does not have to worry about an escape route!
Security
Besides the advantage a suicide bomber has as related to tactics, another advantage
is a common belief that a suicide bomber cannot be stopped. A frequent comment
is, “You cannot stop people who are so dedicated that they will kill themselves to
commit a terrorist act.” This is not true, and to adopt such a belief provides suicide
bombers with their biggest advantage of all the belief that they cannot be stopped.
Suicide bomber operations often involve dozens of individuals; these include those
involved in recruiting and preparing the operative, planners, safe house operatives,
reconnaissance personnel, bomb builders, and others. Throughout this preparation
time, others can become aware of the pending attack and potentially inform law
enforcement agencies or accidentally leak information to friends and family. Suicide
bombers are committed to dying in the attack. However, they do not want the attack
to be a wasted effort and thus will spend considerable time planning for the attack.

Once a suicide bomber is loaded up and walking to the target area, stopping the attack
is very difficult but not impossible. In Israel, police and citizens are trained in tactics
to defeat suicide bombers. These have been shown to be about 80% effective when
employed by someone trained in the proper techniques. Suicide bombers typically
carry 2–30 pounds of plastic explosives attached to a firing trigger kept in their hand,
pocket, or chest area. Pushing a button or toggling a switch completes the circuit and
detonates the bomb. Sometimes, the bomber pushes the button

to arm the device. When the button is released, the bomb explodes. This technology
makes it difficult for law enforcement to stop a detonation. Bombs can be hidden
in backpacks, vests, undergarments, briefcases, musical instrument cases, luggage,
inside vehicles and boats, and on bicycles and motorcycles. For women, sometimes
bombs are placed around the stomach area where it is disguised to make the woman
appear pregnant. Suicide bombers have also used stolen trucks, ambulances, and
police vehicles, and at times, large hazardous material or gasoline trucks have been
stolen and used in suicide attacks. Occasionally, nails and bits of metal are wrapped
with the IED to increase the damage caused by the blast. There have even been
rumors of suicide bombers injecting themselves with the AIDS virus in an attempt to
spread the disease during the blast.

Active/Inactive Baggage Tags:

Work has been done with the government regulatory authorities in both Canada and
the United States to develop a new approach to baggage tags that will permit more
self-service and other channels for baggage tagging. This includes the development
of the Active/Inactive tag concept, which IATA has supported with new standards for
bag tag status and messaging and which was pioneered in Montreal.

Baggage tag lifecycle has three steps: Printing, Application, and Acceptance. In a
traditional process, all steps are completed at the same process point. Self-tagging
and acceptance of the baggage at a common drop-off requires that the steps be done
individually.
In order to do this and meet security requirements, the baggage handling system 119
Air Cargo Security
(BHS) must be able to distinguish between tags correctly applied to the passenger’s
luggage and dropped off and tags printed but not required by the passenger. These
tags must be recognized by the BHS if they are introduced into the sortation system
and segregated from the bags to be loaded onto aircraft.

Within the drop-off process, the air carriers’ responsibility for the baggage begins
at the acceptance point, not at the time of printing. This means that the baggage
tag itself becomes an uncontrolled document that may be discarded if not required.
The assignment of the Active/Inactive status is available for all airlines using the
common drop-off point and is a function of the acceptance application. IATA has
approved this process, and the Inactive indicator has been added to the standard for
bag messages (BSM).

The airline industry is already at the stage where 75-80 percent of check-in activity
could be handled by a common self-service system and supported by a generic
technology, with potentially a common pool of staff to support that technology. This
new traffic split, based on transaction type rather than airline brand, enables the
airport to achieve greater efficiencies for the whole community. A common baggage
drop-off point is therefore an essential element of the new airport design, with
enormous effect on the infrastructure costs.

With such systems, the realization of the benefits from these changes now requires
direct involvement of the airport authority for infrastructure design and coordination
of services. The role of the airport is no longer a simple landlord function on behalf
of airline tenants who define and provide their own individual processes and systems.
Common baggage drop-off is a powerful tool the airport can deploy to benefit the
whole community.
CHAPTER

24
PASSENGER/BAGGAGE RECONCILIATION & BLAST
CONTAINMENT CONCEPTS
According to the rules of most air transportation authorities, such as the U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration and European Union’s Joint Aviation Authorities, should
passengers flying internationally with checked baggage fail to arrive at the departure
gate before the flight is closed, that person’s baggage must be retrieved from the
aircraft hold before the flight is permitted to take off. In the United States, this does
not apply to domestic flights since all bags are required to go through explosive
detection machines (EDS) prior to loading. Making sure passengers board flights
onto which they have checked baggage is called “passenger-baggage reconciliation”
and is accomplished automatically through two commercially available systems.
The security presumption of passenger-baggage reconciliation is that terrorists will
not want to kill themselves, and will not board an aircraft if they have caused a bomb
to be placed in its hold. This presumption does not hold true of suicide bombers.
In recent years, terrorists have increasingly switched tactics from hijacking to the
bombing of aircraft. This has posed a problem to security experts, as there is no
technology currently available that would detect 100% of explosives hidden in
luggage (Wallis, 1993; Oxley, 1993). As most terrorists would not want to be on
the plane when it explodes, and because Air India in 1985 and Pan Am 103 in 1988
were the result of unreconciled luggage on board, one of the strategies pursued has
been a 100% reconciliation of baggage. Thus, if a passenger checks in and his/her
luggage is put on the aircraft, but he/she then fails to board the flight, the luggage is
not carried. This, however, does not deter the fanatic or the suicidal.

Airport Locker:
The instructions for how to use these things are ridiculously easy and convenient,
anyone could figure it out using their basic common sense. If you’re arriving
internationally, you’ll need to scoop your bags from baggage claim, take them
through the watchful eye of customs, finally exiting the customs area. If you’re
flying domestic, you just skip that customs step. Either ask airport information or
check the map to find the closest airport lockers to you and your gargantuan ball-
and-chain luggage. Drag it or cart it over. The best thing to do now is a little bit of
a repack in this generally quiet and low-traffic corner of the airport. Take your time.
Who cares if your stuff is everywhere. The key is to get rid of everything you don’t
need, bringing only the basics. Next up, find a locker or lockers that are suitably
sized for your unwanted luggage. They’re left unlocked, unless there is already
baggage inside of them. So feel free to browse and test fit. 300 Yen, 400 Yen, and
500 Yen respectively (100 Yen = about $1.00 at the time of this article). Don’t be
fooled by the visual size of this 500 Yen (large) locker shown. Inside this thing is
huge. It stowed up that massive black and red bag filled with bag prototypes, plus
the eliminated excess stuff from my messenger.
 121
3.1. Blast Containment Concepts public and private
The following details those designs that have been classified as blast containment security interface in
aviation
concepts. A blast containment design completely suppresses the effects of the
explosion within the container. The container is considered an independent element
within the cargo bay environment, and sufficient venting is allowed only to meet the
minimum IATA venting requirements.

3.1.1. Honeycomb Aluminum Design.

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) is investigating a honeycomb
aluminum design concept. The design consists of three layers of material, as shown
in figure 3.1-1. The purpose of the inner layer is to provide good shock absorption
properties, and a 5052 aluminum Hexcel honeycomb material was selected. The
honeycomb construction reduces the high-peak transient spikes resulting from a bare
charge explosion. The second layer of the container provides a high strength shell.
A SPECTRA 900 fiber was chosen for this layer. This material was selected over
other composites because of its superior strength to weight ratio. The outer layer
of the container is composed of a basic aluminum alloy. This allows for a more
controlled failure of the container if the SPECTRA layer fails. Furthermore, this
layer protects the inner surface from damage that could be incurred during normal
airline operations. The design also incorporates an independent panel concept, where
a single panel could be removed and replaced if damaged. These would be fastened
to the frame with screws or other attachments.

This design concept was verified using a one-dimensional hydrocode model via
the SAIC Adaptive Grid Eulerian (SAGE) code. The preliminary study indicated
that while the design did well in eliminating the shock loads, the quasi-static load
generated by the combustion of the baggage contents was more troublesome, and
could exceed the load due to the shocks.
Grumman Corporation is investigating an integrally hardened luggage container
which incorporates three essential principles: energy (shock) absorption, controlled
pressure reduction, and fragment containment. The design goals are accomplished
via several layers of different materials, each performing a separate function,
as presented in figure 3.1-2. The centermost layer would be a KEVLAR blanket,
sandwiched and supported on both sides by a layer of foam. The innermost and
outermost layers -would be composed of either aluminum or fiberglass, which are
employed in standard containers.
The interior and exterior materials protect the internal layers from becoming damaged
by the luggage and other minor operational impacts. The outer layer further serves
as a base for the KEVLAR straps surrounding the container. The foam layer would
contain a rigid urethane or phenolic foam. The foam provides shock attenuation,
absorbing energy as it crushes, and supports the KEVLAR blanket. It is also fire
retardant. The KEVLAR blanket prevents fragments from progressing through
the container. The blanket is a sandwich of KEVLAR felt between two layers of
KEVLAR fabric which are stitched together. These blankets have been previously
subjected to ballistic tests. Finally, the exterior container walls are constrained and
joined by KEVLAR straps. When the interior pressure of the container reaches
a certain level, the container edges will distort and open between the straps, thus
allowing for a controlled pressure reduction.
122 Hardened Container with Interlocking Joint:
Aviation Safety And
Security Century Aero Products, International (CAPI), is the only current container
manufacturer that plans to design and develop their own hardened luggage container.
Their primary product construction uses a tough, polycarbonate panel (composed
of lexan) clamped to an aluminum extrusion framework. This design handles
the day-to-day loading and unloading of luggage well, and thus container repair
is infrequent, yet easily accomplished when necessary. This is attributed to their
patented interlocking joint, which allows for damaged panels to be removed within
five to six minutes.
Their pursuit of a hardened container design began with testing the blast capacity
of their current lexan containers. The results indicated that a much higher charge
weight could be contained than was previously determined under the FAA testing
(see section 2.1), although still below the present threat level. This was attributed
to the joint design, which allows for spherical expansion of the structure in a blast,
thereby increasing its tolerance to the pressures generated. Because of these findings,
the CAPI design essentially allows an additional layer of composite material to be
added to the current panels. The work is still in the developmental stages, and no test
prototypes have been built as yet. CAPI has the facilities and equipment necessary
to produce hardened containers on site.
Blast Management Concepts:
The following details those designs that have been classified as blast management
concepts. A blast management design considers the container as part of a system
with the aircraft cargo bay. Thus, one type of blast management design may allow a
controlled amount of the explosive products to mix with the cargo bay air, thereby
reducing the loads (and damage potential) to any one component; a second blast
management container may in fact be designed to fail, but in so doing the container
structure would absorb most of the blast energy, making the residual blast effects
upon the cargo bay negligible.
Hardened Luggage Container with Fire and Explosion Suppression Blanket. The
hardened luggage container design at SRI International (formerly Stanford Research
Institute) has been underway since late 1991. In May 1993 SRI was issued a Notice
of Allowance for the patent of their hardened container design. SRI presently is in
the process of teaming with a container manufacturer for commercial purposes.
The SRI design takes advantage of the entire cargo bay of the aircraft. The container
sides (which are adjacent to other containers) are designed to fail under the blast
pressures generated by the explosive event. This allows the high pressure gases
to flow out of the initial container and into other containers along the same row.
Furthermore, the design slowly vents the explosive products into the cargo bay,
increasing the pressure in this area at a reduced rate, and thereby extending the
duration over which the pressure impulse acts upon the aircraft fuselage.

Hybrid Material Container Design:

Royal Ordnance is designing a hardened container that employs hybrid materials.
Royal Ordnance’s background in materials characterization testing and explosives
research led them away from the use of monolithic materials. Their testing also
revealed that the properties of items located behind the charge is important as well
in determining the blast loading upon the structure. Royal Ordnance has also tested 123
their design on a simulated cargo bay floor. public and private
security interface in
The container panels consist of standard materials, and aluminum is heavily employed. aviation
The panels are flat sheet, jointed at the corners, and are composed of several different
materials. The exact amount and configuration of each material used in the panel
construction depends upon the blast pressures (i.e. explosive energy) the design is
intended to mitigate. Certain portions of the container are designed to fail early to
alleviate the QSP. This failure is referred to as “graceful degradation” by the Royal
Ordnance designers, and they identified the joints as the weak point of the container.
Emphasis also was placed on repairability, for although it is difficult to repair a
damaged panel, one can be removed easily and completely replaced. The container
parts (i.e. panels and joints) can be manufactured locally, or centrally at one major
location and assembled at different sites. The container design fits into the current
airline industry structure, and should perform the same as current containers since
they are constructed of materials used in today’s container fleet.

Overboard Venting Design:

Work on this design concept began in 1990 as a joint venture between QSI and
Omega Engineering. A patent was awarded to Omega Engineering in March 1993
(U.S. patent No. 5,195,701), the details of which are summarized below. The design
mitigates blast effects by venting them through the aircraft fuselage to the aircraft
exterior. Fragmentation damage is reduced through the use of composite material
construction. There are two distinct designs which serve the purposes outlined above.
In the event of an explosion, the container sides will expand due to the blast
pressures, causing the latch to fail and the doors to subsequently open. The force
of the explosion will cause the door hinges to come loose, allowing the doors to be
propelled outward, and the blades to slice through the aircraft structure, breaching the
fuselage. This hole enables the high pressure explosive products to vent overboard,
thereby relieving the blast loading and minimizing the damage on the remainder of
the aircraft structure.
The full scale model was estimated to weigh 188 pounds, with a cost of about $2000
per container. The container is composed of 95 percent E-Glass (conventional glass
fiber) and 5% aramid fibers formed in an epoxy resin. The container is manufactured
in a one piece wrapped manner, using basic tooling and mechanization. This choice
of materials and manufacturing processes are believed to increase the container
durability and life cycle.

Woven Integrated Structural Laminate:

Past research by the A.R.A.P. Group of California Research and Technology (CRT)
has included the development of methods for evaluating new armor materials, and
designing weight efficient containment structures to confine the energy absorbing
ceramic elements of metal matrix ceramic armors. This experience led to the
development of Woven Integrated Structure Laminate (WISL) Fabric Reinforced
Plastic (FRP) matrix armor.
WISL’s distinguishing properties (patented by CRT under U.S. Patent No. 4,923,728)
arise from its structural matrix of FRP composite incorporating elements of energy
absorbing material, such as light weight foam. The matrix construction allows for
124 a continuous structure by employing reinforcing fabric interwoven with the energy
Aviation Safety And absorbing elements. Because of these properties, WISL can be used to construct
Security
a lightweight container with a unit body structure (i.e. no supporting frame is
necessary). Furthermore, the WISL container would have rounded corners, thereby
increasing its blast resistance and decreasing its tare weight. Finally, the WISL
structure could be repaired with standard FRP patching methods.

Integrally Hardened Luggage Container:

Fig. container with bladed doors

Hardened Cargo Containers:

In addition to cargo screening technology, hardened cargo container technology is
being considered as a means to mitigate the threat of an explosion or fire caused by
a bomb or incendiary device that makes its way onto an aircraft undetected. The
9/11 Commission formally recommended the deployment of at least one hardened
cargo container on every passenger aircraft that also hauls cargo to carry suspicious
cargo.75 The National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-248) requires
the TSA to establish a pilot program to explore the feasibility of this concept and 125
authorizes the use of incentives to airlines to offset added fuel, maintenance, and public and private
security interface in
other operational costs associated with using hardened cargo containers in an effort aviation
to encourage voluntary participation in the pilot program. The act authorized $2
million for the pilot program.
Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of the Implementing the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act of 2007 (H.R. 1) would require the TSA to evaluate the results
of the pilot program by January 1, 2008, and, based on this evaluation, to develop a
system for deploying hardened cargo containers on commercial flights on a random
or risk-based manner. A slightly modified version of this provision is included in the
conference bill. The conference substitute makes clear that the program to acquire,
maintain, and replace blast-resistant cargo containers will be paid for by the federal
government.
This concept of deploying hardened cargo containers has been a topic of ongoing
research for some time. Following the December 21, 1988 bombing of Pan
Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, the British Air Accident Investigation
Branch recommended that regulatory authorities and airplane manufacturers study
methods to mitigate the effects of in-flight explosions.76 The FAA has had a active
research program in blast-resistant containers for more than 10 years examining the
airworthiness, ground handling, and blast resistance of hardened containers, which is
now overseen by the TSA’s Transportation Security Laboratory. These containers, or
hardened unit-loading devices (HULDs), are seen as a potential means for mitigating
the threat of explosives placed aboard passenger aircraft in either checked baggage
or cargo. These containers must withhold an explosive blast of a specified magnitude
without any rupturing or fragment penetration of the container wall or the aircraft
structure, and must contain and “self-extinguish” any post-blast fire in order to meet
the FAA-established test criteria.

Airmail Security:
Airmail security is an integral component of the services offered by Airmail Center.
Your airmail takes off with our security concept. This is something you can depend
on each and every time.
The need for action in the area of airmail security has increased considerably in
the past few years because of the growing number of worldwide regulations and
the tragic events of 11 September 2001. Key actions include the establishment of
common rules and standards in the European Union.
Two that are applicable to Germany are the Commission Regulation (EC) No
2302/2002 (December 2002) on security in civil aviation and the Aviation Security
Act (since January 2005).
Our spectrum of airmail security activities goes far beyond the regulatory guidelines.
We worked together with the Frankfurt Airport Mail Task Force to plan and implement
our exemplary security standards. The Universal Postal Union evaluates and verifies
the effectiveness of our standards on a regular basis. The result: The Airmail Center
was approved as a regulated agent under the new European Aviation Security Act in
August 2006.
126 Indirect Air Carrier:
Aviation Safety And
Security An indirect air carrier means any person in the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States who undertakes indirectly to engage in the air transportation of package cargo
when that property is to, be or may-be delivered for carriage aboard an air carrier.
Indirect air carrier does not‘mean a corporation that maintains and uses its own
truck(s) to deliver property manufactured by that carriage aboard an air carrier.
Known Shipper:
In response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New
York City, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented
new rules to ensure the safety of domestic and international air travel in the United
States. The rules of this program are administered by the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), who is responsible for the oversight of all transportation
security, including truck, rail and ocean, as well as air.
While the specifics of the security program are restricted, the multi-layered program
effectively eliminates the anonymous shipment of all documents, parcels, counter-
to-counter packages and freight on both passenger and cargo-only flights originating
within the U.S. Such anonymous shipments were frequent in the years prior to 2001
and led to growing concern in Congress and amongst the general public about the
overall security of air travel.
In the post-September 11th era, shippers who have been properly vetted with the
TSA by an air carrier or freight forwarder are considered a Known Shipper with
the TSA. Such shippers may tender their freight for shipment on both passenger
and cargo-only aircraft, with some restrictions. Available alternatives for Unknown
Shippers to ship via air are now very limited. Collectively, this program is known
within the industry as the Known Shipper Program.
Unknown Shipper:
An unknown shipper is a person or business that is not in the Known Shipper database
maintained by the Transportation and Safety Administration (TSA). An unknown
shipper cannot submit cargo to be shipped on an aircraft that carries passengers.
It may only be shipped by cargo only aircraft and the labels and documents
accompanying the shipment should state, “UNKNOWN SHIPPER. Personal effects
are always considered “unknown cargo” even when the shipper is known, and can
only travel by cargo aircraft unless they are travelling on the same passenger aircraft
flight as the shipper.
Vacuum chamber:
A vacuum chamber is a rigid enclosure from which air and other gases are removed
by a vacuum pump. This results in a low pressure environment within the chamber,
commonly referred to as a vacuum. A vacuum environment allows researchers to
conduct physical experiments or to test mechanical devices which must operate in
outer space (for example) or for processes such as vacuum drying or vacuum coating.
Chambers are typically made of metals which may or may not shield applied external
magnetic fields depending on wall thickness, frequency, resistivity, and permeability
of the material used. Only some materials are suitable for vacuum use.
Chambers often have multiple ports, covered with vacuum flanges, to allow 127
instruments or windows to be installed in the walls of the chamber. In low to medium- public and private
security interface in
vacuum applications, these are sealed with elastomer o-rings. In higher vacuum aviation
applications, the flanges have hardened steel knives welded onto them, which cut
into a copper gasket when the flange is bolted on.
A type of vacuum chamber frequently used in the field of spacecraft engineering is a
thermal vacuum chamber, which provides a thermal environment representing what
a spacecraft would experience in space.

Cargo Inspection:
Another issue for air cargo security is the adequacy of cargo inspection procedures
and oversight of cargo inspections at air carrier and freight forwarder facilities.
ATSA established requirements for screening and inspection of all individuals,
goods, property, vehicles, and other equipment entering a secured area of a passenger
airport that assures the same level of protection as passenger and baggage screening.
ATSA, however, did not establish specific requirements for the physical screening of
air cargo. With regard to air cargo, current regulations specify that aircraft operators
must use the procedures, facilities, and equipment described in their security program
to prevent or deter the carriage of unauthorized explosives or incendiaries in cargo
onboard a passenger aircraft and inspect cargo shipments for such devices before it is
loaded onto passenger aircraft. With regard to all-cargo aircraft, ATSA mandates that
a system to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of all-cargo aircraft is
to be established as soon as practicable, but sets no specific deadlines or time frame
for compliance.

Inspection and Oversight of Air Cargo Facilities:

Current regulations specify that all air carriers and freight forwarders must allow the
TSA to conduct inspections and to review and copy records in order to determine
compliance with applicable laws and regulations pertaining to aviation security.
The Homeland Security Appropriations Act for FY2005 provided the TSA with $40
million to hire an additional 100 inspectors and carry out oversight and enforcement
activities related to air cargo security. The TSA has responded by launching focused
inspections of air cargo operations and conducting monthly “blitz” audits or
“strikes” of selected air cargo facilities. In FY2006, Congress again provided the
TSA with a $10 million set-aside to hire 100 more air cargo inspectors and for travel
related to carrying out regulatory oversight and inspections of air cargo shipping and
handling facilities, but the TSA has been slow to obligate funds for air cargo security.
For FY2007, appropriations report language directed the TSA to hire additional
permanent staff to enhance TSA’s analytic air cargo security capabilities.
The ability to establish and maintain increased oversight of air cargo facilities
is likely to be highly dependent on the continued availability of resources and
funding. The effectiveness of this oversight will also likely be highly dependent on
the adequacy of available tools and procedures to track needed corrective actions
and ensure compliance among air carriers and freight forwarders. Therefore, the
adequacy of TSA’s oversight of air cargo security could be a significant area of focus
for congressional oversight during the 110th Congress.
CHAPTER

25
IRELANDS AIR CARGO SECURITY PROGRAM
As a contracting state to the Chicago Convention, Ireland is committed to
implementing the security standards and recommended practices developed by ICAO
at a global level and, as a member of the European Union, Ireland must implement
EU legislation pertaining to civil aviation security. These rules shape the aviation
security framework within which all entities in the aviation security chain in Ireland
must operate. The international regulatory framework is also incorporated into
Ireland‘s National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) which is developed
in consultation with the industry and which all entities must comply with.
A high quality national aviation security system requires not only strong work by the
State but also from all key players in the sector including airports, airlines, and other
regulated entities involved in the secure supply chain.
The role of the State in aviation security involves ensuring that the current set of
internationally set rules and regulations are adhered to by all those entities involved
in the aviation sector. It also requires work at international level to ensure that the
rules in place are justified, aligned with actual needs and proportionate to the level
of risk.
In 2013, responsibility for monitoring compliance by all entities in the State with
EU and international aviation security requirements was allocated to the IAA. The
development of aviation security policy, including the NCASP, and engagement at
international level continues to be led by the Department of Transport, Tourism and
Sport.

Issues:
The global threat to aviation remains real. It is also becoming more complex as new
methods of attack are conceived by terrorists and others with an aim of unlawfully
interfering with aviation. A global threat requires a global response – no one state can
tackle this threat on its own.
Given the nature of air traffic operating into and out of our island, Ireland must be
always ready to adapt, anticipate and respond to this evolving threat. Security rules
are set internationally in fora such as ICAO and the EU. Ireland will continue to play
our part in shaping the global response to the ever-present and evolving international
threat and to ensure that this global response takes account of the impact of aviation
security measures on the industry and on passengers and businesses.
Our approach will continue to be one of partnership with industry. Resources are
always limited and new approaches to achieving the best security outcomes are
essential. We know this can be achieved by building on the good work already
being done by industry and we will encourage this further through the introduction
of a Security Management System (SeMS) approach. Allowing industry greater
freedom in how precisely it complies with security rules has the potential to leverage
the innovative skills inherent in the sector so that a risk-managed approach to 129
Irelands Air Cargo
security can be delivered focussing resources where the risk is highest. We will
Security Program
make progress in this area by initiating an outcome-focussed risk-based approach
to the regulation of security in Ireland and through encouraging the greater use of
technological solutions where possible. Our overall aim will be to deliver a more
effective security outcome that facilitates a smoother experience for both passengers
and business. We will move progressively towards this objective by advancing our
research into the feasibility of applying an appropriate best international practice that
balances the needs of security with facilitation.

Policy Proposals:
2.2.1 Ireland will ensure that sustainable aviation security solutions are delivered
nationally. In designing future security procedures to be incorporated into our
NCASP, a central consideration will be the perspectives of cost, efficiency and
acceptability by passengers and air transport operators.
2.2.2 Ireland will introduce a more targeted and comprehensive approach to
compliance monitoring developing requirements for a Security Management System
(SeMS), similar to the successful approach already implemented in the field of safety.
2.2.3 Ireland will allow greater flexibility to industry through the introduction of the
concept of an outcome-focussed risk-based approach to security regulation.
2.2.4 Ireland will expand our regulatory suite of measures to take account of new and
emerging threat issues. In the period 2014-2016, our research efforts will focus on
issues such as cyber, landside and ATM security.
2.2.5 Ireland will place a risk-based approach to security at the heart of our thinking
and of our future research. As a first step in this direction we will undertake a
feasibility study, in conjunction with other key stakeholders, on the concept of a ―
Trusted Traveller Programme in 2015.
CHAPTER

26
TSA INSPECTION OF AIR PORT
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is an agency of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security that has authority over the security of the traveling
public in the United States.

The TSA was created as part of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
sponsored by Don Young in the United States House of Representatives and Ernest
Hollings in the Senate,passed by the 107th U.S. Congress, and signed into law by
President George W. Bush on November 19, 2001. Originally part of the United
States Department of Transportation, the TSA was moved to the Department of
Homeland Security on March 9, 2003.
Employees:
Among the types of TSA employees are:
Transportation Security Officers : The TSA employs around 47,000 Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs), often referred to as screeners or agents. They screen people
and property and control entry and exit points in airports. They also watch several
areas before and beyond checkpoints. TSOs carry no weapons, and are not permitted
to use force, nor do they have the power to arrest.

As of September 2014 the starting salary for a TSO is $25,773 to $38,660 per year,
not including locality pay (contiguous 48 states) or cost of living allowance in Hawaii
and Alaska. A handful of airports also have a retention bonus of up to 35%. This is
more than what private screeners were paid.

Behavior Detection Officers : In 2003, the TSA implemented the Screening of

Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT), which expanded across the United
States in 2007. In this program, Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs), who are TSOs,
observe passengers as they go through security checkpoints, looking for behaviors
that might indicate a higher risk. Such passengers are subject to additional screening.

This program has led to concerns about, and allegations of racial profiling. According
to the TSA, SPOT screening officers are trained to observe behaviors only and not a
person’s appearance, race, ethnicity or religion.

Federal Air Marshals : The Federal Air Marshal Service is the law enforcement
arm of the TSA. FAMs are federal law enforcement officers who work undercover to
protect the air travel system from hostile acts. As a part of the Federal Air Marshal
Service, FAMs do carry weapons. The FAM role, then called “sky marshalls”,
originated in 1961 with U.S. Customs Service (now U.S. Customs and Border
Protection) following the first US hijacking. It became part of the TSA following the
creation of the TSA following the September 11 attacks, was transferred to the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement in 2003, and back to the TSA in fiscal 2006.
Transportation Security Inspectors (TSI’s) : They inspect, and investigate 131
Tsa Inspection Of
passenger and cargo transportation systems to see how secure they are. TSA employs
Air Port
roughly 1,000 aviation inspectors, 450 cargo inspectors, and 100 surface inspectors.
VIPR team working cars waiting to board a ferry in Portland, Maine National
Explosives Detection Canine Teams Program: These trainers prepare dogs and
handlers to serve as mobile teams that can quickly find dangerous materials. As
of June 2008, the TSA had trained about 430 canine teams, with 370 deployed to
airports and 56 deployed to mass transit systems.
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams : VIPR teams started
in 2005 and involved Federal Air Marshals and other TSA crew working outside of
the airport environment, at train stations, ports, truck weigh stations, special events,
and other places. There has been some controversy and congressional criticism for
problems such as the July 3, 2007 holiday screenings. In 2011, Amtrak police chief
John O’Connor moved to temporarily ban VIPR teams from Amtrak property. As of
2011, VIPR team operations were being conducted at a rate of 8,000 per year.

Conclusion - A slippery slope:

The TSA also oversees the Federal Flight Deck Officer program, which gives
some pilots permission to carry firearms in the cockpit as a defense against
hijackers. A CBS telephone poll of 1137 people published on November 15,
2010 found that 81% percent of those polled approved TSA’s use of full-
body scans. An ABC/Washington Post poll conducted by Langer Associates
and released November 22, 2010 found that 64% of Americans favored the
full-body X-ray scanners, but that 50% think the “enhanced” pat-downs go
too far; 37% felt so strongly. In addition the poll states opposition is lowest
amongst those who fly less than once a year. A later poll by Zogby International
found 61% of likely voters oppose the new measures by TSA. In 2012, a poll
conducted by the Frequent Business Traveler organization found that 56%
of frequent fliers were “not satisfied” with the job the TSA was doing. 57%
rated the TSA as doing a “poor job,” and 34% rated it “fair.” Only 1% of those
surveyed rated the agency’s work as excellent.
 UNIT V

CHAPTER

27
TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS
Aircraft provide a fast, reliable mode of transport with no comparable alternative
for long distance travel. Throughout the years, technology improvements have been
made to aircraft and engines to make them more fuel efficient. Today’s aircraft are
designed for more than 15% improvement in fuel burn than comparable aircraft of a
decade ago, and will deliver 40% lower emissions than aircraft previously designed.
On a per-flight per passenger basis, efficiency is expected to continue to improve
through 2050.

ICAO projections show that the commercial aircraft fleet is expected to increase
to about 47,500 by 2036, of which more than 44,000 (94%) aircraft will be new
generation technology. Even under the most aggressive technology forecast
scenarios, the expansion of the aircraft fleet, as a result of air traffic demand growth,
is anticipated to offset any gains in efficiency from technological and operational
measures. In other words, the expected growth in demand for air transport services,
driven by the economic needs of all ICAO Member States, is outpacing the
current trends in efficiency improvements. As a result, the pressure will increase
to deliver even more ambitious fuel-efficient technologies – both technological and
operational – to offset these demand-driven emissions, thus creating the need for
new technologies to be pursued.

Core commission:
That one word sums up both the challenges in aviation safety and security, and the
means by which government and industry must respond. Change is nothing new in
this field. The first powered flight, covering 120 feet in twelve seconds, took place
just over ninety years ago. Today, planes cross the Atlantic Ocean in a matter of hours,
as hundreds of passengers watch movies and dine. An industry that essentially did
not even exist before World War I now occupies a central position in our economy.
Today, commercial aviation generates over $300 billion annually, and accounts for
close to one million American jobs.

The changes taking place in aviation today are as profound as any this industry has
seen before. Since 1992, sixty new airlines have started service, opening up new
markets, attracting new passengers, and impacting the economics of the industry
significantly. The number of passengers flying in the United States over the last
decade has grown to more than half a billion. The FAA has certified twenty new
134 aircraft models in the last ten years, and plans are under consideration for a new
Aviation Safety And
High-Speed Civil Transport.
Security
As dramatic as these changes have been, even more significant change looms on the
horizon. Information technology presents opportunities that will again revolutionize
the industry, in ways as significant as the introduction of the jet engine forty years
ago. Air traffic today is still controlled through ground-based radar, and on a point-
to-point basis. Satellite-based navigation will bring a fundamental change in the
way that air traffic is directed, and may make the notion of “highway lanes in the
sky” as obsolete as the bonfires that used to guide early fliers. Digital technology
will replace analog systems, making communications with and among aircraft
dramatically faster, more efficient, and effective. These and other new technologies
offer tremendous opportunities for improved safety, security and efficiency, and
will transform aviation in the same way that the Internet and World Wide Web are
transforming the way the world does business.

Other changes are even more imminent. By the end of the century, the commercial
fleet serving the United States will have been completely overhauled, with aircraft
that make a fraction of the old noise and emit far less pollution. Continuing success
in the United States’ efforts to open up foreign markets to competition by our
airlines likely will mean more airlines, serving more markets, carrying more people.
A continuation of the trend toward greater competition and lower fares will make
flying even more available to average Americans than it is today. In fact, the FAA
projects that, in 2007, more than 800 million passengers will fly in the United States
three times the number who flew in 1980.

This is a time of change for government, as well. President Clinton’s declaration that
“the era of big government is over,” coalesced a bipartisan drive to make government
work better and cost less. The Administration’s commitment to government reform
resulted not just from a desire to bring down government spending, but from a
recognition that the same types of changes facing industries such as aviation face
government, as well. Like the private sector, government must change with the
times. The question is, how?

Establishment of the Commission on Aviation Safety and Security:

President Clinton created the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security to address that question, and assigned it three specific mandates: to look at
the changing security threat, and how we can address it; to examine changes in the
aviation industry, and how government should adapt its regulation of it; to look at
the technological changes coming to air traffic control, and what should be done to
take best advantage of them. In the wake of concerns over the crash of Trans World
Airlines Flight 800, President Clinton asked the Commission to focus its attention
first on the issue of security. He asked for an initial report on aviation security in 45
days, including an action plan to deploy new hightechnology machines to detect the
most sophisticated explosives.

On September 9, 1996, the Commission presented that initial report to the

President. It contained twenty recommendations for enhancing aviation security
which are presented again in Chapter 3 of this report. The response to the initial 135
Technological
report was unprecedented. In October 1996, at the request of President Clinton, the
Improvements
Congress appropriated over $400 million, in direct accord with the Commission’s
recommendations, for the acquisition of new explosives detection technology
and other security enhancements. In the five months since they were presented,
implementation has begun on virtually all of the initial recommendations.

>From its inception, the Commission took a hands-on approach to its work.
President Clinton announced the formation of the Commission on July 25, 1996. A
few days later, Vice President Gore led a site visit to Dulles International Airport,
where he and other Commissioners saw airport and airline operations first-hand,
and discussed issues with front line workers. This was the first of dozens of such
visits. Over the next six months, the Commission visited facilities throughout
the United States and in various locations abroad. Seeking to reach the broadest
possible audience, the Commission established a homepage on the Internet (http://
www.aviationcommission.dot.gov), both to make the Commission’s work available
and to receive input. The web site has had almost 7,000 contacts, many providing
valuable insights. The Commission held six public meetings, hearing from over
fifty witnesses representing a cross section of the aviation industry and the public,
including families of victims of air disasters. Recognizing the increasingly global
nature of aviation, the Commission co-sponsored an International Conference on
Aviation Safety and Security with the George Washington University, attended by
over 700 representatives from sixty-one countries.

Out of this extensive process, the Commission compiled the recommendations

presented in this final report.

A Vision for the Future:

To compete in the global economy of the 21st Century, America needs a healthy,
vibrant aviation industry. In turn, the health and vibrancy of aviation depend on
improved levels of safety, security and modernization. For the last fifty years, the
United States has led the field of aviation. But, that position is being challenged, both
by competition from abroad and by weaknesses in our own systems.

These weaknesses can be overcome. The Commission believes that it should be a

national priority to do so. This report outlines steps that can set government and
industry on a course to achieve that goal together. Heading into the next century, our
activities, programs, and results should define aviation safety and security for the
rest of the world.

Leadership in aviation goes far beyond having strong, competitive airlines. It means
assuring leadership in communications, satellite, aerospace, and other technologies
that increasingly are defining the global economy. It means more than the highest
possible levels of safety and security for travelers.

The Commission’s report reflects a focus on this vision: to ensure greater safety
and security for passengers; to restructure the relationships between government
136 and industry into partnerships for progress; and to maintain global leadership in the
Aviation Safety And
aviation industry.
Security
Key Recommendations:
In the area of safety, the Commission believes that the principal focus should be on
reducing the rate of accidents by a factor of five within a decade, and recommends
a re-engineering of the FAA’s regulatory and certification programs to achieve that
goal.

In the area of air traffic control, the Commission believes that the safety and efficiency
improvements that will come with a modernized system should not be delayed, and
recommends that the program be accelerated for to achieve full operational capability
by the year 2005. In addition, a more effective system must be established to finance
modernization of the National Airspace System and enhancements in safety and
security.

In the area of security, the Commission believes that the threat against civil aviation is
changing and growing, and that the federal government must lead the fight against it.
The Commission recommends that the federal government commit greater resources
to improving aviation security, and work more cooperatively with the private sector
and local authorities in carrying out security responsibilities.

Although not specifically directed to do so, the Commission also took up the issue
of responding to aviation disasters. In this area, the Commission believes that
a better coordinated and more compassionate response is necessary, and that the
responsibility for coordinating the response needs to be placed with a single entity.
The Commission is pleased with the progress made to date in this area, including the
designation of the National Transportation Safety Board as that single entity.

Many of the Commission’s recommendations apply equally to each of the three major
areas of focus, including those relating to regulation and certification. Primary among
these recommendations is the call for greater use of partnerships in meeting goals.
Regulatory and enforcement agencies such as the Customs Service, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, and the Food and Drug Administration have
put new emphasis on partnerships with industries, and are achieving tremendous
results: seizing more drugs while expediting travel for legitimate travelers; reducing
workplace accidents while increasing productivity; and getting important new AIDS
and cancer-fighting drugs to market in a fraction of the time it used to take.

The premise behind these partnerships is that government can set goals, and then
work with industry in the most effective way to achieve them. Partnership does not
mean that government gives up its authorities or responsibilities. Not all industry
members are willing to be partners. In those cases, government must use its full
authority to enforce the law. But, through partnerships, government works with
industry to find better ways to achieve its goals, seeking to replace confrontation
with cooperation. Such partnerships hold tremendous promise for improving aviation
safety and security. A shift away from prescriptive regulations will allow companies
to take advantage of incentives and reach goals more quickly.
Transportation Secretary Peña’s cooperative program with airlines to establish a 137
Technological
single level of safety is an example of innovative government-industry partnership.
Improvements
Another is Vice President Gore’s January 15, 1997 announcement that Boeing, in
concert with government agencies, had developed a plan to modify the rudders on
hundreds of its 737 aircraft. By acting without waiting for a government mandate,
Boeing will complete many of these safety-enhancing modifications before the
government could complete a rule requiring the action.

Partnership must extend not only to regulated entities, but also to the various federal
agencies involved with aviation safety and security. A number of agencies outside
the Department of Transportation have expertise and resources that can have a direct
impact on improving safety and security. The Commission urges the Administration
to continue to work to expand and improve these intergovernmental relationships.

In the last few years, the FAA has begun to recognize and respond to the tremendous
changes it faces. Reviews such as the Challenge 2000 report examined ways of
improving the way the FAA regulates operators and manufacturers. Now is the time
for the FAA to build on that work, and aggressively reengineer itself to adapt to the
demands of the 21st Century.

It is important to note that the FAA, alone among federal agencies, has been given
some critical new tools to help shape its own future. A new Management Advisory
Council will provide valuable input to the agency’s decision-making process. In
1995, the Congress granted the Clinton Administration’s request for unprecedented
reforms of the FAA’s personnel and procurement systems. These reforms give the
FAA almost unlimited latitude to design new systems to meet the agency’s unique
and particular needs. The first phases of these reforms were implemented in April
1996, and are already producing dividends. The FAA used to have 233 procurement
documents, and today there are less than 50. Using its streamlined process, the FAA
recently completed a billion dollar procurement in six months, with no protests.
Under the old system, it would have taken three times as long, and likely would have
been delayed by costly protests. A stack of personnel rules that used to be one-foot
high has been reduced to 41 pages, and will allow the agency to hire people where
they’re needed and when they’re needed.

This flexibility will be critical to meeting the challenges of the next century. As former
FAA Administrator David Hinson recently noted, this type of reform is “the seed for
what needs to happen at the FAA.” The incoming leadership at the Department of
Transportation and the FAA must utilize fully the flexibilities that have been granted
if the agency is to keep pace with the rapidly changing industry it regulates.

Microwave holography:
Holography was invented in 1947 by the Hungarian-British physicist Dennis Gabor,
for which he received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1971. SAR (Synthetic Aperture
Radar) techniques were developed independently at about the same time and were
described in terms of a range-Doppler approach. The holographic approach was first
applied to a side-looking synthetic aperture radar by Leith and Ingalls. Although
138 optical holography and SAR technology were developed independently, they
Aviation Safety And resemble each other to a certain degree. One of the common factor between the
Security
two is that both use the o®-axis reference wave principle. The SAR technique was
termed by Leith as quasi-holography as it utilizes pulsed radiation to measure range
and doppler shifts to measure azimuth, which differs from the true holography, in
which image coordinates are two orthogonal distances, both orthogonal to the radial
direction.

The first published demonstration of microwave holographic imaging was given by

Dooley in 1965, A letter “A” of 2m in height was illuminated by a X-band source.
The transmission through the target formed an on-axis Fresnel hologram held and it
was mapped by an intensity probe. The reconstruction is optical, in which process a
spatially-sampled representation of the x-band diffraction pattern, i.e. the hologram
is scaled photographically to the appropriate optical hologram size which gives
the desired focal length in the reconstruction. Since then, the two-step microwave
holography evolved in both the hologram recording stage and the reconstruction
stage. The recording of the holographic combination of the field scattered from
the target with the reference field is directly received in amplitude and phase. The
microwave image reconstruction stage based on optical distraction reconstruction
evolved to the digital processing method based on the Fast Fourier Transform
algorithm that Gooley and Tukey published. Originating from visible holography,
microwave holography has evolved into a technique in its own right. It differs from
visible holography in both of the recording step, using direct recording of amplitudes
and phases instead of interference pattern recording, and the reconstruction step,
using digital reconstruction instead of optical diffraction reconstruction.

Two system configurations of Microwave holography: receiver only scan vs

transceiver scan For the microwave holography based MMW imaging system, the
recording sensors can have two configurations, i.e. receiver only scan and transceiver
scan. As summarized in, the latter configuration can have an enhanced resolution
over the former one. In the case of receiver only scan, if the number of transmitters
are more than one, the averaged image of all the images by all the transmitters would
have an improved resolution. However, this is pending validation. For the

94 GHz MMW holographic imager designed in this thesis, the transmitter and
receiver simultaneous scan mode is used.

Body Orifice Scanner Overview:

This oral cavity detection scanner is designed to limit weapon entry in detention
facilities. It targets objects such as razor blades, paper clips, knives, and other
potentially dangerous items that are particularly difficult to detect with basic walk
through metal detectors, let alone manual physical searches. Also, by eliminating
the liability and safety concerns associated with strenuous manual pat-downs and
searches, the body orifice security scanner is deemed extremely non-intrusive.

Reduce Violence:
B.O.S.S. (Body Orifice Security Scanner) is also a powerfull tool in reducing the
amount of correctional facility violence. With staffing levels either stagnate of
decreasing, a major concern in many of our nations correctional facilities is the 139
Technological
overcrowding of most prisons and detention centers. With the use of the oral cavity Improvements
chair, authorities can limit the weapons that enter the facility and thus cut down the
amount of inmate violence.

Fast, Safe, and Efficient Body Screening:

The oral cavity screening procedure is safe, fast and efficient. The person being
screened simply positions his/her chin near the oral sensor and then sits momentarily
in the chair. The entire procedure takes just a few seconds. Magnetic field sensors
housed in the seat of the body orifice scanner’s chair and the oral sensor assembly
automatically interrogate for the presence of metal. Audio and visual alarms are
activated when metal is carried into the magnetic field. An alarm remains activated
for the duration that an object is within the low intensity magnetic field.

A Unique Measurement Technique:

The oral cavity detector’s method is unique in so much that it detects ferrous and
non-ferrous objects that are either stationary or moving. Eddy current field detection
sensors are installed within the chair assembly. The geometry of the body orifice
scanner chair and oral sensor configuration provides tight magnetic coupling
between the sensor and a concealed metal object. Because of the geometry and the
combination of dynamic and non-motion detection techniques, small objects are
more reliably detected than with a walk-through or hand held detector.

1. Oral

2. Abdomen

3. Anal/Vaginal

4. Leg/shin

5. Feet

In a recent article in the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology

Centre’s ‘TECH beat magazine” it was reported that B.O.S.S’s oral cavity scanner
detected contraband objects and shrapnel that was completely undetected by hand
held scanning.
CHAPTER

28
FLIGHT VU™ AIRCRAFT DATA SCANNER
Current air traffic control (ATC) systems based on primary radars hardly distinguish
aircraft targets and background clutter at a low altitude. In most cases, in the ATZ,
radars cannot determine the height to the needed accuracy. In the SKY-Scanner project,
it has been proposed to use the lidar (laser radar, LIght Detection And Ranging) for
the aircraft detection and tracking. Lidar is installed on ground and, unlike other
surveillance systems (such as secondary surveillance radar or automatic dependent
surveillance broadcast), does not require additional equipment to be installed on the
aircraft. The lidar is more precise than the primary radar when directed to the target.
An approximate position received from the radar can help direct the lidar.
When the target is found, the lidar switches to the tracking mode and provides the
exact target position for the SKY-Scanner system (Lapin, 2010).
The work package of the Vilnius University encompasses the design and development
of the decision support system (the SKY-Scanner DSS) for air traffic controllers. Air
traffic control (ATC) is a service provided by the ground-based controllers for the
purpose of preventing collisions and maintaining an orderly flow of traffic (Procedures
– Air Traffic Management, 2007, Chapter 1). The overall aim of the SKY-Scanner
DSS is to improve the controller’s situational awareness by providing the adjusted
aircraft position and evaluating risks for the aircraft. The requirement of the project
is to render threatening classification in terms of accident potential risk for each
tracked aircraft (SKY-Scanner D1…, 2007). The SKY-Scanner DSS is based on lidar
and radar data fusion. The system receives radar and lidar measurements in real time
as a series of aircraft position coordinates (x, y, and z) and other parameters (e.g.,
speed) at a given moment (Fig. 1). Lidar and radar data are fused in order to evaluate
the risk and to propose corrective actions to the controller. Lidar and radar data are
fused in order to evaluate the risk and to propose corrective actions to the controller
(Fig. 2).

The movement of the aircraft in the ATZ is regulated by the normative rules defined
in various flight rule documents and procedures (e.g., Procedures – Air Traffic
Management, 2007). The air traffic controller has to ensure that aircraft follow these
regulations. Thus, the SKYScanner DSS has to facilitate the controller in evaluating
and resolving issues related to the norm adherence. Currently, three problem areas
are addressed: (1) aircraft trajectories (collision risk, path violation), (2) wake 141
turbulence avoidance, and (3) avoidance of dangerous substances in the atmosphere. New Generation
Of Video Security
Each of these areas has a respective set of normative rules. In the SKY-Scanner Systems
project, these norms are explored to determine the decision support opportunities
created by the use of the lidar. If the precise aircraft position data from the lidar
enable the SKY-Scanner DSS to check that the rule is followed, it should be checked
and reported to the controller. As a result, a set of indicators is created. Each indicator
shows the risk of violating an individual normative rule.

The SKY-Scanner DSS presents its results to the air traffic controller and not to the
pilot. The controller then takes the final decision on what instructions to give to the
pilot. There is no feedback loop from the pilot to the SKY-Scanner DSS (Fig. 3). This
assumption accords with the
SESAR ATM Concept, which states that humans should constitute the core of the
future ATM operations (The ATM Target Concept, 2007). So, the main focus should
be detecting possible violations and informing the controller.
CHAPTER

29
NEW GENERATION OF VIDEO SECURITY SYSTEMS
To overcome the aforementioned limitations, the FAA has introduced the NextGen
upgrade, a comprehensive strategy to overhaul the air traffic control system. The
strategy includes transformational programs for data communications, collaborative
air traffic management technologies, and network enabled weather information.
One of the most significant changes is the inclusion of the ADS-B system. ADS-B
enhances surveillance capabilities and nearly eliminates the need for voice
communications. Once it is fully implemented, the ADS-B system will enable the
inclusion of more automated control systems, reducing the impact of human error
and optimizing aircraft safety margins and efficiency. The concept of automatic
dependent surveillance (ADS) was introduced in the 1980s. The International Civil
Aviation Organization has proposed the use of ADS technology in the future air
navigation system (FANS), which is focused on improving the communications,
navigation and surveillance techniques employed in air traffic management. The
vision includes improved navigation techniques using accurate satellite-based
technology (i.e.,GPS) and enhanced surveillance achieved by downlinking satellite-
derived positions.
The term “automatic” in ADS means that pilot action is not required, “dependent”
refers to the reliance on GPS technology to derive aircraft position and “surveillance”
denotes the primary intended functionality. ADS messages consist of data fields that
specify information about aircraft position (i.e., latitude, longitude and altitude) and
identification (i.e., aircraft-specific call sign). These messages are transmitted by
aircraft at random intervals averaging two messages per second.
The e-enabled aircraft will use the Asynchronous Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
(ADS-B), based on the Global Positioning System (GPS) and digital links ranging
up to 100 miles, to automate and decentralize Air Traffic Control (ATC) tasks.
Each aircraft periodically broadcast a beacon as frequent as once or twice every
second. The beacon contains an identifier and the current state of the aircraft, i.e.,
position, altitude, intent, velocity, time and other information. These beacons can be
utilized at the ground controllers and navigating aircraft for highly accurate ground
and airborne surveillance, respectively. Ground controllers can also send traffic
information to aircraft even in remote mountainous and oceanic regions. The overall
gain in situational awareness can help to optimize air travel time and costs. En-route
aircraft can engage in Free Flight, i.e., self-optimize by choosing its route, altitude,
or velocity, traffic flows at a congested terminal area can be optimized, and ground
delays at the gates, taxiways and runways can be reduced see Fig. 1.
Figure 1 : Illustration of a future air transportation system with e-enabled aircraft, 143
New Generation
aircraft-to-infrastructure & aircraft-to-aircraft communications and applications. Of Video Security
Before their wide-scale deployment, any airborne or ground-based technology must Systems
be ensured to have no impact on safe and expected operation of the system.

Today however there is lack of a clear understanding of how emerging cyber-world

technologies, such as ADS-B and radio frequency identification (RFID), with their
vulnerabilities can impact airworthiness and aircraft operator business impeding
their beneficial application. As a recent example, the FAA regulated only the use of
passive RFID tags for aircraft-on-the-ground scenarios, until the impact of active
tags on other onboard systems is clearly determined. Similarly the beneficial use of
ADS-B is currently limited to some ground surveillance tasks. ADS-B will openly
broadcast identifiable aircraft positions as well as utilize aircraft positions received
over a shared link, hence requiring a full assessment of threats from unauthorized
access and unanticipated disruptions before it can potentially inform more critical
navigation tasks such as in airborne surveillance.
Bio Simmer™ Quadruple Resonance Device:
The technology has been developed by Morpho with funding from the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) and the Department of Defense
(DOD). Advanced QR technology utilizes radio frequency magnetic fields to excite
and detect specific atoms of explosive materials. The detection system also identifies
hidden weapons in shoes without removing them.
Person-borne IED Detection:
Main Features of the QR Portal:
Demonstrated High probability of detection for plastic explosives : QR technology
uses low frequency magnetic fields to excite and detect the nitrogen14 nuclei
commonly found in explosives. Detection performance depends mainly on mass of
material and scanning time.
Demonstrated Low false alarm rates: QR is a chemically specific spectroscopic
technique and does not rely on trace sampling or anomalies detection; thus resulting
in very low false positives.
144 Provides operator-friendly visual/audible alarm notification: Automatically reports
Aviation Safety And its scanning results with a red light and an audible alarm if a threat is detected, or
Security
a green light if no threat is detected. Alternatively, the results from the scans can
be directed to a remote terminal to be viewed by an operator. Ability to detect and
identify explosives concealed anywhere on the body: The system detects explosives
regardless of the configuration and location of the threat on (or in) the person’s body,
clothing, and footwear.

QR Technology:
QR is a chemically specific detection technology used to identify the presence
of certain solid explosive compounds. QR detects Nitrogen-14 present in many
commercial, military and improvised explosives. Each solid material containing
nitrogen-14 has several unique quadrupole resonance frequencies in the range 0.5-
5MHz that allows the specific detection of individual explosive compounds with a
very high confidence level and a low false alarm rate. The materials that can most
effectively be detected by QR are plastic high explosives, and solid oxidizers like
Ammonium Nitrate (AN) and KNO3, which are common ingredients of commercial
explosives.
QR uses non-ionizing radio frequency (RF) magnetic fields to excite magnetic
resonance signals. When QR is used to detect explosives, the RF signals emanate
from the actual explosive crystals. QR technology is simple, inexpensive and
accurate when compared to other explosive detection techniques.

Portal Operation:
The QR Portal has been configured to safely scan humans for explosives. The person
being scanned follows a system of traffic lights and is required to stand still during
the duration of the scan of less than 10 seconds. The scan and data analysis is
completely automatic and the results of the screening are displayed as a simple red/
green light indicating an alert/clear status.

Detection Performance:
In October 2008, DHS TSL conducted a 2-week evaluation of the QR portal with
subjects carrying live explosives simulating person-borne IEDs at Idaho National
Lab (INL). In December 2008, the QR portal participated in a 3-week evaluation
conducted by the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) during which about 70 PB-IEDs
events were interrogated. The test subjects were screened for plastic explosives in
various configurations concealed under clothing, including threats composed of live
explosives with shrapnel. The QR system performed reliably throughout these trials 145
and delivered high detection rates for relevant threat masses of plastic explosives New Generation
Of Video Security
with a total interrogation time of 6 sec. Systems
Extending Portal Detection Capabilities:
QR Technology Combining QR and vapor-mode ITMS™ provides chemically
specific detection of a broad range of military, commercial, and home-made
explosives (HME)
Shoe Scanner:
Quantum Magnetics, Inc. (QM, a wholly owned subsidiary of Morpho Detection,

Inc./ SAFRAN Group) is developing a new shoe scanner dev ice (SSD) that provides
improved security and passenger convenience at airport checkpoints. The SSD
consists of three proven integrated detection technologies providing broad coverage
for both metal and explosive threats. Passenger’s shoes are screened while on their
feet, thereby reducing the number of per-passenger items divested and screened by
X-Ray. The SSD also eliminates the time consuming task of taking off (and putting
on) passenger’s shoes. The result is faster throughput, better security, and greater
passenger convenience.

Concept of Operation Example:

• Passenger enters Shoe Scanner
• Exit doors are closed to block thoroughfare
• Operator initiates scan protocol
• System scan occurs and logs results
146 Detection:
Aviation Safety And
Security

Technologies:
Quadrupole Resonance (QR):
Chemically-specific bulk explosives detector. Highly effective on low vapor pressure
explosives
Ion Trap Mobility Spectroscopy (ITMS™)”:
Chemically-specific trace explosive detector, Vapor mode sampling effective on
high, vapor pressure explosives
Electro Magnetic Differential (EMD):
Metal Detection, Discriminates between shoe shanks and irregular metal objects
about the shoe region.
CHAPTER

30
INTELLISCAN
IntelliScan is a next-generation document processing suite that redefines speed
and produces superior, higher resolution images. IntelliScan offers unparalleled
performance for a wide variety of business applications with its intelligent design,
advanced technology, ease of operation, fl exible confi guration options and multiple
speed/higher resolution scanning capabilities. IntelliScan USC (Universal Scanner
Control) software combines with IntelliScan XDS (eXtreme Document Scanner) to
complete the solution suite.

IntelliScan USC:
Forming the software core of the IntelliScan solution set is IntelliScan USC a
completely new, fully integrated capture and transport control application. Real-
Time Document Identification IntelliScan USC provides real-time identification and
processing of documents. This dynamic feature allows scanned documents to be
identified by type using barcode (1D and 2), true 313B MICR and OCR technology.
Once a document type is associated to a form, decisions for inkjet print, sorting,
capture settings, or item sequencing can be assigned. This technology saves an
enormous amount of time from document preparation to capture.

Graphical Job Setup:

IntelliScan USC includes a graphical user interface tool to create and edit job parameter
files without the need to understand the format, structure or syntax. Users can easily
configure jobs that image, read and classify documents to control sequencing, sorting
and endorsements. The Job Setup tool can be used on the IntelliScan controller or
as a standalone application on any PC workstation which means that job setup can
be accomplished at remote locations. There is also a test simulator tool that allows
administrators to ensure that new jobs function properly prior to handling live work.

Multiple Device Support:

IntelliScan USC can operate on multiple devices which enables reuse of existing
hardware, including smaller devices for lower volume locations. This fl exibility is
essential in today’s environment. In addition to IntelliScan XDS, other supported
capture devices include BancTec’s full line of transports, TWAIN scanners, NCR
transports and remote capture devices.

Inline Image Quality Assurance Monitoring:

USC provides the XDS and SDS transports the ability to perform in-line
Image Quality Assurance (IQA) testing for various document and image flaws
including folded or torn corners, irregular or fl awed edges, too dark or too light
images, excessively skewed documents, or undersized or oversized documents.
By automatically analyzing images against a baseline of user-defined quality
148 metrics, you are able to detect and repair defects and resolve issues early in
Aviation Safety And the scanning process. Efficiency is increased while ensuring greater levels of
Security
customer satisfaction so you can return your focus to core operational tasks

Auto-Color Save:
IntelliScan USC has incorporated an Auto-Color Save feature that identifies the
presence of color images and saves these in JPEG format in color but saves your
other documents such as forms in bitonal reducing the amount of allocated space
required.

Video-Based Help:
IntelliScan USC provides videos to help operators easily learn job setup. Video-
based help for subjects such as creating document types, defining OCR and barcode
zones, managing pocket groups, and selecting color dropout makes implementation
and operator training fast and simple.