Reservation As A Right
Reservation As A Right
In the past seven decades of constitutional jurisprudence on reservations, the Supreme Court of India has
consistently referred to the notions of ―efficiency‖ and ―merit,‖ while adjudicating the validity of various
reservation policies. The Court has held in several judgments (Indra Sawhney and Others v Union of
India and Others 1993; M Nagaraj and Others v Union of India and Others 2006) that the reservation
policies made under Article 16(4)1 of the Constitution would be limited by Article 335,2 which provides
for ―maintenance of efficiency of administration,‖ while considering the claims of the Scheduled Castes
(SCs) and the Scheduled Tribes (STs) in the making of appointments to public services and posts. This
was done while the Constitution does not define the term ―efficiency of administration.‖ This gap in
interpretation was filled by a two-judge bench in the B K Pavitra (II) v Union of India (2019), as it held
that ―efficiency of administration in the affairs of the union or of a state must be defined in an inclusive
sense, where diverse segments of society find representation as a true aspiration of governance by and for
the people.‖
In this paper, I have analysed the Constituent Assembly Debates to argue that contrary to what the larger
benches of the Supreme Court assumed, the framers of the Constitution did not envisage that Article 16
would be limited by or subjected to Article 335. Furthermore, using B R Ambedkar‘s writings, I have
critiqued the notion of ―efficiency of administration,‖ which has often been employed to cast aspersions
on the concept of reservation. The phrase ―efficiency of administration‖ was used as an exclusionary
construct in the colonial and precolonial eras. This exclusionary understanding, I have argued, was
rejected during the framing of the Constitution, and that thus the term ―efficiency‖ cannot be used
against the idea of reservations to exclude certain communities from public services.
Origins of Articles 16(4) and 335
During the framing of India‘s Constitution, the Constituent Assembly, through a resolution on 24 January
1947, had appointed an Advisory Committee to assist the assembly by drawing upon a ―list of
fundamental rights, clauses for protecting minorities, and a scheme for the administration of Tribal and
Excluded Areas.‖ The Advisory Committee, consisting of the members of the assembly, divided its work
between different subcommittees (Austin 1999: 77–78). When the subcommittee on fundamental rights
prepared a clause on the right to ―equality of opportunity,‖ the subcommittee of minorities recommended
the addition of a proviso to this initial clause, to enable the government to reserve a certain proportion of
posts in public services for the ―minorities.‖ This was suggested to meet the claims of minorities to
special representation in the services (Shiva Rao 1968: 192–93). A redrafted version of the clause, which
then came before the Advisory Committee on 22 April 1947, provided for the state to make ―provision for
reservations in favour of classes not adequately represented in the public services‖ (Shiva Rao 1968: 194).
Ambedkar, who was then a part of the Advisory Committee, supported this clause. He, however,
suggested deleting the words ―not adequately represented,‖ and that the clause be rephrased to provide
reservations ―in public services in favour of classes as may be prescribed by the State‖ (Shiva Rao 1968:
194). He argued that if the words ―not adequately represented‖ were retained, any reservation made by the
state ―would be open to challenge in the court of law on the ground that the classes in whose favour
reservation was made happened to be in fact already adequately represented‖ (Shiva Rao 1968: 194).
Ambedkar was thus opposed to this issue being open to
―judicial interpretation.‖ He later accepted the phrase ―classes which in the opinion of the state are not
adequately represented,‖ as suggested by K M Munshi, who was also in the Advisory Committee.
The clause (numbered 5) was included in the Interim Report on Fundamental Rights, which was tabled by
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (as Chairman of the Advisory Committee) before the Constituent Assembly on
29 April 1947. The clause, listed in the ―justiciable fundamental rights‖ section of the Interim Report, was
discussed, and adopted by the assembly on 30 April 1947. It was later reassigned as Article 10(3) of the
draft Constitution prepared by the Ambedkar-led Drafting Committee with one modification: instead of
the words ―in favour of any particular class of citizens,‖ the words ―in favour of any backward class of
citizens‖ were inserted (Shiva Rao 1968: 194).
A slightly different recommendation for maintaining proper representation of ―minorities‖ in services was
made in a separate report. On 27 August 1947, Sardar Patel placed before the assembly the subcommittee
report on minority rights, which covered the claims made by several minority groups: Anglo–Indians,
Parsees, Plains' tribesmen in Assam, Indian Christians, Sikhs, Muslims, and SCs. Clause 9 of the report
provided that both, in the central and provincial services, ―the claims of all the minorities shall be kept in
view in making appointments to these services consistently with the consideration of efficiency of
administration‖ (CAI 1947). It was noted in the report that an ―appropriate provision shall be embodied in
the Constitution or a schedule thereto to this effect‖ (CAI 1947).
It was from here that the term ―efficiency of administration‖ was brought in the text of the draft
Constitution. It, however, was not defined. The report recorded that the said recommendation was made
in response to a proposal submitted to the subcommittee on minorities, which sought ―a constitutional
guarantee of representation in the public services of the minority communities in proportion to their
population‖ (CAI 1947). While ―such a guarantee‖ was unheard of in ―any other constitution,‖ the report
recommended that there should be ―exhortation to the Central and Provincial Governments to keep in
view the claims of all the minorities‖ in making appointments to public services ―consistently with the
efficiency of administration‖ (CAI 1947). In making this recommendation, Patel stated that there is
―unanimity between us and the
communities whose interests are affected‖ (CAI 1947).
Though ―some administrative posts of a higher level‖ would have to be ―filled by competition, that is, by
competitive examination and competitive tests,‖ Patel noted that ―some concessions‖ have been made ―in
the matter of certain communities which require a little help‖ (CAI 1947). At this point, V I Muniswami
Pillai, an SC member in the assembly, remarked that the majority communities must remove from their
minds that ―those who were chosen from these communities for high offices will not be efficient‖
(CAI 1947). He wished that ―the claims of the SCs will not be forgotten‖ by the majority communities.
Jaipal Singh, a tribal leader from erstwhile Bihar, regretted that the ―most deserving group
of Adibasis [tribals] has been completely left out of the picture‖ of reservation in services at that moment
(CAI 1947).3 The said clause was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 28 August 1947 and was
subsequently renumbered as draft Article 296.
As it is clear, draft Articles 10(3) and 296 were discussed and adopted separately by the Constituent
Assembly. Article 10(3) was included in the chapter on justiciable fundamental rights and did not contain
the term ―efficiency of administration.‖ Article 296, adopted on a later date, did not refer to Article 10(3)
at all. Moreover, Article 10(3) explicitly provided for reservation in services for backward classes, while
Article 296 made only an assurance that the claims of minorities would be taken into consideration. It did
not explicitly guarantee reservation for minorities in the services. It appears that the draughtsperson of the
Constitution had kept the scope of draft Article 10(3) on a higher pedestal in comparison to Article
296. In later days in the assembly, there were several deliberations on the relation between draft Articles
10(3) and 296.
Draft Articles 10(3) and 296
The draft Article 10(3) then came up for consideration before the Constituent Assembly on 30 November
1948. Few members suggested amendments for the deletion of Clause (3). Lokanath Misra, a Brahmin
from Odisha, argued that the clause puts ―a premium on backwardness and inefficiency,‖ and also
because it was ―not a fundamental right of any citizen to claim a portion of state employment, which
ought to go by merit alone‖ (CAI 1948). Damodar Swarup Seth, a Vaishya from United Provinces, felt
that reservation in services meant the ―very negation of efficiency and good government.‖ The said
amendments and assertions were rejected by the Constituent Assembly.
Some members from the SC community expressed their apprehension regarding the scope of the word
―backward‖ in draft Article 10(3), and sought an addition of the term ―SCs‖ after ―backward classes.‖
One such member, P Kakkan from Madras, expressed disappointment that the SC candidates ―hitherto did
not get proper appointments in government services,‖ and did not get justice ―even in the matter of
promotions‖ (CAI 1948). Muniswami Pillai argued that ―their case must be treated with generosity.‖ H J
Khandekar, an SC member from the Congress party, endorsed the reservation provision in Article 10(3),
as he narrated that the SC candidates ―are not selected for the posts‖ because of the biases of the
recruitment panellists.
Responding to their fears, K M Munshi (now a member of the Drafting Committee) said that
the SCs would always be included within the broader ―backward class‖ category for the purpose of
reservation. He made a reference to both draft Articles 10(3) and 296 to assure that the ―House, as
constituted at present or hereafter, will [never] make a distinction or discriminate against the SCs‖
(CAI 1948). A representation in the state services under draft Article 10(3), Munshi pointed, is necessary
for them, ―for it is realised that state services give a status and an opportunity to serve the country, and
this opportunity should be extended to every community, even among the backward people‖ (CAI 1948).
However, Munshi did not explain the relation or difference between draft Articles 10(3) and 296. Other
members made remarks which are relevant to understanding the scope of draft Article 296, and whether it
has a relation with draft Article 10(3). Jaspat Roy Kapoor argued that the efficiency of the services could
be improved if the persons seeking
employment in the provinces had adequate knowledge of the provincial language, and were aware of the
local conditions. Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru enquired about ―the relationship‖ between draft Articles
10(3) and 296. According to Kunzru, the minority communities would get the benefit of reservations only
if they were found to be ―backward,‖ as draft Article 10(3) used the word ―backward classes,‖ which was
different from the term ―minorities‖ used in Article 296. As if in response to Kunzru, one member Aziz
Ahmad Khan proposed the omission of the word ―backward‖ from Article 10(3), so that the said article
became consonant with Article 296.
Another member, Mohamed Ismail Sahib, pointed out that since draft Article 296 did not speak of
reservation in services for the minorities, the language in the fundamental rights chapter should be
amended to ensure that ―when [Article 10(3)] speaks of reservation, it means also minority communities,‖
including Muslims and Christians (CAI 1948). Sardar Hukam Singh, a Sikh leader from erstwhile East
Punjab, said that the ―fate of the minorities‖ would be ―certainly left in the lurch,‖ as draft Article 10 does
not indicate whether it ―would override Article 296 or article 296 is independent of it‖ (CAI 1948). He
added that if the conflict between draft Articles 10 and 296 is not reconciled, then the safeguards provided
to minorities under Article 296 would ―become illusory.‖
In response to all the queries, Ambedkar clarified the difference in the scope of Articles 10(3) and 296.
He explained that the purpose of draft Article 10(3) is to provide ―reservations in favour of certain
communities which have not so far had a ‗proper look-in,‘ so to say, into the administration‖ (CAI 1948).
The claims of minorities for reservation, Ambedkar said, were provided a ―special reference‖ in Article
296, so that the constitutional scheme does not omit the ―minorities from consideration.‖ Article 10(3)
was then passed in its tabled version and was not made subject to Article 296. As a result, the case for
representation of SCs and backward classes was to be specifically addressed under Article 10(3), while
Article 296 made a reference for the consideration of the claims of minorities for reservations. Both the
draft articles had different purposes.
The emphasis on the representation of SCs and STs emerged once again in the assembly during the
framing of provisions related to the Public Service Commission. On 23 August 1949, Ambedkar moved a
proposal in the form of draft Article 286, defining the scope of the functions of the commission. While
Clause 3a of Article 286 provided that the Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service
Commission shall be consulted on all matters relating to methods of recruitment to civil services and for
civil posts, Clause 4 disallowed any such mandatory consultation regarding ―the manner in which app-
ointments and posts are to be reserved in favour of any backward class citizens in the Union or a State‖
(CAI 1949a). S Nagappa, an SC member from Madras, highlighted the miseries faced by SC candidates
during interviews. Ambedkar noted that the ―real method of protection‖ provided to SCs, STs, and
backward classes, as it was adopted, is to permit the legislature to fix a certain quota to be filled by these
classes.
Dispute over the Language
After the partition of India, the Sardar Patel-led Advisory Committee, as it claimed, concluded on the
consent of the religious minority groups, particularly Muslims and Sikhs, that they would not be
considered for the purpose of reservations. After this development, the Drafting Committee changed the
language of draft Article 296, thereby substituting the word ―minorities‖ with ―SCs and STs.‖ However,
in the Constituent Assembly on 26 August 1949, Naziruddin Ahmad, on behalf on a minority community,
asserted that he had only agreed to giving up the ―question of representation of minorities in the
legislature‖ (CAI 1949b).
In agreement, Sardar Hukam Singh stated the minorities did not agree that ―all safeguards will go or that
the minorities are not to be treated as minorities‖ (CAI 1949b). He pointed that though the original
version of draft Article 296 was neither a fundamental right, nor even a directive principle, its presence in
the draft Constitution was a sort of ―only comfort of minorities,‖ that ―in some respects their interests will
be cared for‖ (CAI 1949b). He added that ―if that is also taken away [then] it will be a violation of a
gentlemen's agreement.‖ What is clear from this speech is that members of minority groups considered
the original draft Article 296 as a form of agreement or a directive, which was never a justiciable right.
Since the changed language of Article 296 created a controversy in the assembly, Ambedkar formally
moved a proposal on 14 October 1949 to substitute the term ―minorities‖ with ―SCs and the Sts.‖ It is
here that one member, Brajeshwar Prasad, moved an amendment to substitute Ambedkar‘s version with a
new language which provided that ―the maintenance of efficiency of administration shall be the only
consideration‖ in relation to ―appointment to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the union
or of a state‖ (CAI 1949c). Prasad‘s argument was that only ―a handful of people, constituting the cream
of the Harijan society‖ clamoured for reservation. His amendment and contention on efficiency were
rejected by the assembly.
Another member, Guptanath Singh, moved an amendment which sought to add the words ―and such other
castes who are educationally and socially backward‖ in the draft Article 296. This amendment, Singh
argued, would protect the claims of ―agricultural and pastoral classes,‖ who were not explicitly covered
under the proposed draft article. The said amendment was also not approved. However, H V Kamath tried
to dispel Guptanath Singh‘s ―misapprehension‖ by explaining that the claims of all backward classes are
covered under draft Article 10(3), which ―is not a [mere] directive principle of state policy,‖ but a
fundamental right. Kamath expressed that ―if there is no representation for [backward classes] in the
services they can take the government to task on that account‖ (CAI 1949c). That right, according to him,
―would be an adequate safeguard for them so far as their share in the services is concerned,‖ irrespective
of draft Article 296, which did not include the word ―backward‖ (CAI 1949c).
The assembly eventually adopted Ambedkar‘s version of draft Article 296, which used the words
―SCs and STs.‖ With this, draft Article 296 became a directive or agreement (as it was already perceived
by the members) with the future governments that the claims of SCs and STs would be taken into
consideration for appointments in services. This directive seemed independent of the mandatory right of
representation prescribed by draft Article 10(3), as demonstrated by Kamath. Furthermore, by rejecting
Prasad‘s amendment, the Constituent Assembly did not allow the notion of efficiency to have an
overriding effect on the claims of SCs and STs. Later, draft Article 10(3) was numbered as 16(4), draft
Article 286 as 320, and draft Article 296 as 335.
The Broad Scope of Article 16(4)
The Drafting Committee had made an amendment in Clause 4 of Article 320. It added the words ―the
members of the SCs or STs or‖ to the effect that it would not be required to consult the Public Service
Commission regarding the manner in which appointments and posts are to be ―reserved in favour of the
members of the SCs or STs or any backward class of citizens in the union or states‖ (CAI 1949d).
When this amended Article 320 came for consideration before the Constituent Assembly during a reading
of the draft Constitution on 14 November 1949, Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava, a Brahmin Congress
member from erstwhile East Punjab, moved a proposal for deletion of the newly added words ―the
members of the SCs or Sts or‖ (CAI 1949d). Bhargava argued that Article 16(4) provided for reservations
for only ―backward class of citizens‖ and would, hence not be applicable to the SCs and STs. For them,
the only safeguard, according to Bhargava, is prescribed under Article 335, which only provides for
taking their claims into consideration, and hence they do not have a right of reservation in their favour.
Bhargava‘s contention was that the Drafting Committee was trying to do ―smuggling‖ of the reservation
for the SCs and STs by the ―back door‖ of the amended draft Article 320(4).
He went on to argue that the amended draft Article 320(4) ―takes away the effect of Article 335,‖ which
imposes a ―positive command‖ that the claims of the SCs and STs ―must be considered consistently with
the maintenance of efficiency of administration‖ (CAI 1949d). With regard to Article 16(4), Bhargava
stated that the ―reservation of posts has not been decided.‖ He added that if the state did not reserve
any posts, then Article 16(4) would ―neither benefit the backward classes nor any other class,‖ and
therefore the Constituent Assembly was not justified ―in having in this clause (4) [of Article 320] a
contingency for which reservation could be made‖ (CAI 1949d). Bhargava was only in favour of a strict
operation of Article 335, which need not necessarily ―be implemented by reservation.‖
Bhargava‘s contentions were contrary to what was already accepted in the Constituent Assembly. As
Munshi had clarified earlier (on 30 November 1948), the SCs and STs were to be always treated as a
special category within the broader ―backward class‖ category for the purpose of reservation. Pillai spoke
against Bhargava‘s amendment, arguing that if it is accepted, ―it will mean that the SCs or Tribes will not
count for reservation in the services‖ (CAI 1949d). P S Deshmukh
demanded that in similarity to Article 320(4), the word ―backward classes‖ be added to Article 335.
Khandekar argued that amendments, such as by Bhargava, ―are being moved at this stage to bury down
the [SCs].‖ R K Sidhwa, a Parsi from erstwhile Central Provinces, opposed Bhargava‘s amendment and
supported the Drafting Committee, stating that ―what [wrongs have] been done during the past 150 years‖
must be undone as soon as possible.
Mahavir Tyagi, a Brahmin member from United Provinces, stated that the ―communal virus‖ in Article
335 was unnecessarily being introduced in another Article 320(4). According to Tyagi, it was a
perception in the assembly that Article 335 was ―only a directive article,‖ which ―directs the policy of
future governments,‖ and thus questioned why a provision related to reservation was introduced in
another article. Responding to Tyagi, Jaipal Singh strongly objected to the accusations against ―the
Drafting Committee and the SCs and the Sts and any other backward classes of aligning ourselves as a
communal group‖ (CAI 1949d). He stated that if reservations are to be provided for the most backward
groups, it must be done ―without any mental reservations.‖ He closed his speech with a simple message
to the Constituent Assembly: ―be generous and mean it.‖ Supporting the amendment proposed by
Ambedkar, K Santhanam (a Brahmin member from Madras) stated that Article 320(4) was just ―purely
consequential to Article 335.‖ He said that reservations should be made ―purely at the discretion and
judgment of either the central or local government‖ and can be done under Article 335.
Kunzru gave the clearest explanation on the scope and relation between Articles 320(4), 335 and 16(4).
He stated that under Article 16(4), it is not necessary for the central government or the state government
to consult the Public Service Commissions with regard to the reservation of posts for any or all of the
backward classes. The article would apply to the SCs and STs. Kunzru stated that the term ―SC and
the STs‖ has been ―specifically mentioned in several places‖ in the Constitution to place emphasis on
their rights, as ―they are believed to be more backward than the classes called backward according to the
official terminology of the Provincial Governments‖ (CAI 1949d).
Thus, Article 335 ―is of limited application‖ than Article 16, and that even if there was no Clause 4
present in Article 320, Clause 3 of Article 320 would be subject ―to the provisions of clause (4) of Article
16 which embodies a fundamental right‖ (CAI 1949d). According to Kunzru, an inference may be drawn
from Article 335 that ―the State has the power to reserve posts for the SCs and the Backward Tribes,‖ but
it is in Article 16(4) that a power is provided to the state in clear and ―express terms‖ to make reservations
in appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens. Article 320(4) ―is in accord with or
that it is consequential to the power given to the state by Article 16‖ (CAI 1949d). Kunzru‘s explanation
implies that both Articles 320 and 335 would be subject to Article 16(4).
Taking all these concerns and propositions into consideration, the Drafting Committee moved a revised
amendment to the debated version of Article 320(4). The new version of the amendment provided:
―Nothing in clause (3) shall require a Public Service Commission to be consulted as respects the manner
in which any provision referred to in clause (4) of Article 16 may be made or as respects the manner in
which effect may be given to the provisions of Article 335‖ (CAI 1949e). This amendment came up for
consideration before the assembly on 15 November 1949, where T T Krishnamachari (a member of the
Drafting Committee) made a reference to it. The amendment was adopted by the assembly on 16
November 1949 in the final draft of the Constitution.
The discussion in the Constituent Assembly shows that it was only Article 16(4) which mandated and
empowered the state to make reservations for backward classes of citizens, including the SCs and STs.
Article 320 was consequential to Article 16(4). Article 335, as pointed out consistently by members—
particularly by those opposed to reservation—was being treated as a mere directive. The Constituent
Assembly never made Article 16(4) subject to Article 335 or 320, rather accepted it as a stand-alone and
overriding provision, as can be understood by Kunzru‘s analysis in the assembly. Reservation, as
provided under Article 16(4), was thus not subjected to notion of efficiency mentioned in Article 335.
Debunking the Myth of Efficiency
While the members of the Constituent Assembly congratulated Ambedkar and the Drafting Committee on
the completion of the final draft of the Constitution, Dharanidhar Basu Matari, a member from Assam,
highlighted the plight of the tribals and their expectations from the Constitution (23 November 1949). He
remarked that the ―advanced communities will have to make special efforts, particular sacrifices if the
backward classes are to come up‖ (CAI 1949f). He added that the tribals, who had been neglected and
exploited in the past and would continue to be suppressed, ―unless there is special arrangement made for
their advancement.‖ This can be done, Matari said, only when tribals are recruited: ―to all branches
of service, from the lowest to the highest‖; ―not only in the provinces but also at the centre;‖ and ―not
only should there be a minimum quota fixed for their appointments, but their promotion must equally be
seen to, so that they do not stick where they begin‖ (CAI 1949f).
―For this to happen,‖ Matari further added, ―the advanced classes must make a sacrifice‖ and ―recede.‖
Matari discarded the arguments about ―efficiency of administration‖ as ―just dodges to perpetuate class or
territorial interests.‖ He stated that the so-called upper castes were benefited in the ―jobs, the contacts and
the privileges‖ during the British regime, and that these ―sections that have captured the services will see
to it that their superiority is never threatened or endangered‖ (CAI 1949f). He, however, hoped that the
rights of the tribals would be protected under the new constitutional regime. Matari was not the first one
to bulldoze the argument of ―efficiency of administration.‖ Ambedkar had been already doing that for a
couple of decades.
The notion of ―efficiency of administration‖ was an exclusionary construct in the colonial and precolonial
eras. It was used by the British to exclude Indians from becoming a part of the administration. After
continuous demands, the case for ―Indianisation of services‖ (BAWS, Vol 2, p 393) was accepted by the
Royal Commission on Public Services in India, also known as the Islington Commission, in 1915. The
proportion between the Indians and the Europeans in the different services was then given effect to
(BAWS, Vol 2, p 393). The upper castes, who got the benefit of the opening of the services and became
part of the British administration, thereafter, used this colonial notion of ―efficiency of administration‖
against the inclusion of the lower castes within the services. In his submissions before the Simon
Commission4 in 1928, Ambedkar noted:
It is notorious that the public services of the country in so far as they are open to Indians have become by reason of various
circumstances a close preserve for the Brahmins and allied castes. The non-Brahmins, the depressed classes and the Mohamedans are
virtually excluded from them. (BAWS, Vol 2, p 394)
Ambedkar further noted that ―the Brahmins and the allied castes‖ opposed the inclusion of the backward
classes within the services on the ground ―that the interests of the State require that efficiency should be
the only consideration in the matters of appointment to public offices.‖ They relied upon ―educational
merit‖ and ―competitive examinations‖ as the ―only test which can be taken to guarantee efficiency‖
(BAWS, Vol 2, p 394). Ambedkar rejected this argument, stating unequivocally:
The system of competitive examination relied upon may result in fairness to all castes and creeds under a given set of circumstances. But
those circumstances presuppose that the educational system of the State is sufficiently democratic and is such that facilities for education
are sufficiently widespread and sufficiently used to permit all classes from which good public servants are likely to be forthcoming to
complete. Otherwise even with the system of open competition large classes are sure to be left out in the cold. This basic condition is
conspicuous by its absence in India, so that to invite backward classes to rely upon the results of competitive examination as a means of
entry into the public services is to practise a delusion upon them and very rightly the backward classes have refused to be deceived by it.
(BAWS, Vol 2, p 395)
Questioning Bias, Privilege and Merit
Ambedkar destroyed this myth of efficiency with several arguments. Before the Simon Commission, he
presented a case of ―administrative utility‖ and a ―moral case‖ for the backward classes to have a
―favoured treatment‖ for their inclusion in the public services. Ambedkar gave examples from the past of
how so-called upper-caste officers acted ―to the aggrandisement of their community and to the detriment
of the general public‖ (BAWS, Vol 2, p 396). For this reason, Ambedkar argued:
[The] disadvantages arising from the class bias of the officers belonging to Brahmin and allied castes has
outweighed all the advantages attending upon their efficiency and that on the total they have done more
harm than good.
The remedy, he thus suggested, was ―a proper admixture of the different communities in the public
service‖, which will supply ―a most valuable corrective to the evils of class bias‖ (BAWS, Vol 2, p 396).
Ambedkar then argued that the case of exclusion of backward classes from the administrative services
was morally wrong and evil in the same way as exclusion of Indians from public services. He posed
several questions to the opponents of inclusion of backward classes within public services:
Now what one would like to ask those who deny the justice of the case of the backward classes for entry into the public service is whether
it is not open to the backward classes to allege against the Brahmins and allied castes all that was alleged by the late Mr Gokhale5 on
behalf of Indian people against the foreign agency? ... Can [the backward classes] not complain that as a result of their exclusion they
are obliged to live all the days of their lives in an atmosphere of inferiority, and that the tallest of them has to bend in order that the
exigencies of the existing system may be satisfied? Can they not assert that the upward impulses which every school-boy of the
Brahmanical community feels that he may one day be a Sinha, a Sastri, a Ranade or a Paranjpye, and which may draw forth from him
the best efforts of which he is capable is denied to them? ... Can they not lament that the moral elevation which every self-governing
people feel cannot be felt by them and that their administrative talents must gradually disappear owing to sheer disgust till at last their
lot as hewers of wood and drawers of water in their own country is stereotyped? (BAWS, Vol 2, pp 397–98)
The answers to all these questions, Ambedkar said, are in the ―affirmative.‖ What Ambedkar explained
through the above questions was a system of exclusion against backward classes, which was in existence
even before the British regime began in India. The colonial construct of ―efficiency‖ was a repackaging of
the social traditions of stereotypes, prejudices, and subsequent ostracism.
Ambedkar also reminded the so-called upper castes that they had received their privileges and social
advancement not because of any merit (BAWS, Vol 9, p 477).6 They ―acquired their political power not
by force of intellect—for intellect is nobody‘s monopoly—but by sheer communalism‖ (BAWS, Vol 9, p
477), a kind of absolute reservation since the existence of ancient society. Ambedkar stated
that Manusmriti, the ancient sociolegal code, had provided that the important administrative, military, and
ministerial posts ―were all reserved for the Brahmins‖ (BAWS, Vol 9, p 477). Apart from that, laws were
enacted because of which ―education was made the monopoly and privilege of Brahmins,‖ while it was
criminalised for the lower castes ―to acquire learning,‖ and included ―cruel and inhuman punishment such
as cutting the tongue of the criminal and filling his ear with hot molten lead‖ (BAWS, Vol 9, p 478).
While these reservations for Brahmins did not exist during British rule, Ambedkar pointed out that ―the
advantages derived from their continuance over several centuries have remained‖ (BAWS, Vol 9, p 478).
In his view, the argument of ―efficiency‖ was a method of the upper castes to protect their own interests
and structural advantages. Ambedkar stated that instead of making any sacrifice of their interests for an
inclusive India, the upper castes made a ―cry of ‗nationalism in danger‘‖ and ―efficiency‖ against
reservations (BAWS, Vol 9, pp 472, 478). The upper castes left ―no occasion to deprecate and to ridicule
reservations‖ (BAWS, Vol 9, p 472). Ambedkar made a sharp critique of this tendency by stating that:
The governing classes [upper castes] are bent on giving the reservations a bad name in order to be able to hang those who are insisting
upon them (BAWS, Vol 9, 482) … If the governing class in India stands on the principle of efficiency and efficiency alone it is because it
is actuated by the selfish motive of monopolising the instrumentalities of government (BAWS, Vol 9, 481) … Efficiency combined with
selfish class interests instead of producing good government is far more likely to become a mere engine of suppression of the servile
classes. (BAWS, Vol 9, p 480)
Ambedkar reiterated these points during the deliberations on the Constitution. He had written a letter to
Jawaharlal Nehru, charging that ―the administration was unsympathetic to SCs because it was manned
wholly by caste Hindu officers … who practiced tyranny and oppression‖ on the SCs (Austin 1999: 25).
The best way to remedy this situation, Ambedkar argued, was for the SCs to ―become members of the
various governments in India and thereby to ensure that [SCs] also became members of the civil services‖
(Austin 1999: 25). The notion of ―efficiency,‖ as it was invoked by the upper castes, was contrary to the
representation of backward classes in services and the legislature.
Efficient Administration versus Good Governance
Ambedkar had consistently distinguished the colonial construct of ―efficiency of administration‖ with that
of ―good administration.‖ He asserted that a good administration or government is one which is truly
representative. In one of the articles, he had noted:
[The] view that good government was better than efficient government … must also be made applicable to the field of administration. It
was through administration that the State came directly in contact with the masses. No administration could do any good unless it was
sympathetic … As against this the Brahmins have been taking their stand on efficiency pure and simple. They know that this is the only
card they can play successfully by reason of their advanced position in education. But they forget that if efficiency was the only criterion
then in all probability there would be very little chance for them to monopolise state service in the way and to the extent they have done.
For if efficiency was made the only criterion there would be nothing wrong in employing Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans and Turks
instead of the Brahmins of India. (BAWS, Vol 12, pp 723–24)
Ambedkar elaborated on this point by asserting that the ―Indianisation‖ of public services was also based
on the notions of representation and inclusiveness, and not on exclusionary notion of ―efficiency.‖
Therefore, a good government would require the inclusion of backward classes, and that it must not be
opposed. He argued:
The case for Indianisation, it must be remembered, did not rest upon efficient administration. It rested upon considerations of good
administration. It was not challenged that the Indian was inferior to the European in the qualities that go into the make-up of an efficient
administrator. It was not denied that the European bureaucracy had improved their roads, constructed canals on more scientific
principles, effected transportation by rail, carried their letters by penny post, flashed their messages by lightning, improved their
currency, regulated their weights and measures, corrected their notions of geography, astronomy and medicine, and stopped their int-
ernal quarrels. Nothing can be a greater testimony to the fact that the European bureaucracy constituted the most efficient government
possible. All the same the European bureaucracy, efficient though it was, was condemned as it was found to be wanting in those qualities
which make for human administration. It is therefore somewhat strange that those who clamoured for Indianisation should oppose the
stream flowing in the direction of the backward classes, forgetting that the case for Indianisation also includes the case for the Backward
Classes. (BAWS, Vol 2, p 398); (emphasis added)
Ambedkar further noted that ―the question of entry into the public service is … a question of life and
death‖ for the SCs, as they did not have openings for a career in trade and industry because of
untouchability and biases against them (BAWS, Vol 10, p 416). Since ―it is only in government service
that they can find a career‖ (BAWS, Vol 10, p 416), this created, Ambedkar argued, a ―natural idealism of
the backward communities‖ and ―aspirations‖ to contribute to the governance (BAWS, Vol 2, pp 349–
50). In his view, the reservation for the backward communities ―makes available for the national service
such powerful social forces, in the absence of which any Parliamentary government may be deemed to be
poorer‖ (BAWS, Vol 2, pp 349–50). Thus, for Ambedkar, giving due representation would have enha-
nced efficiency. In other words, his conception of ―good government‖ meant that efficiency would be
measured by the test of representation and inclusion of underrepresented social groups.
Ambedkar strongly asserted his arguments even at the Round Table Conferences in London in 1930–31,
where he stated that a government which did not have representatives from under-represented
communities, would not be a ―responsible government‖ (Bhaskar 2020: 11). The admixture of all castes
and creeds with ―minimum efficiency‖ would make any administration to be a good administration
(BAWS, Vol 12, p 724). ―Minimum efficiency‖ may be measured by certain basic tests, and not as an
abstract criterion (BAWS, Vol 9, p 48). Moreover, he argued that reservations, by providing
representation to backward classes, would act as a system of countercheck to protect the political
democracy from being subverted by particular privileged groups (BAWS, Vol 9, p 171). According to
Ambedkar, reservations ―are only another name for what the Americans call checks and balances which
every constitution must have, if democracy is not to be overwhelmed by the enemies of democracy‖
(BAWS, Vol 9, p 482).
It is for these reasons that Ambedkar made a consistent case before the British government that the moral
wrong of excluding lower castes from public offices and services must be corrected through reservations.
He continuously argued for the provisions of representation in the public services and legislatures to be
included in the future constitution. During the framing of the Constitution, Ambedkar even walked away
from the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, when Sardar Patel had taken a decision to do away
with political reservations for SCs and STs from the Constitution (Vundru 2017: 138). Eventually,
Ambedkar‘s stand on the inclusion of reservation was accepted by the Constituent Assembly.
Conclusions
As narrated in this paper, the arguments of ―efficiency‖ and ―merit‖ were used against reservations even
during the framing of the Constitution. The Constituent Assembly consciously rejected these arguments.
Furthermore, there was a contentious debate among the members on the scope of Article 16(4), which
provided for reservation in services, and Article 335, which mentioned the term ―efficiency‖ while
referring to rights of SCs and STs. Some members had enquired whether Article 335 is independent of
Article 16. The Constituent Assembly Debates show that Article 16(4) has a broader view and would not
be restricted by any other constitutional provision. On the other hand, Article 335 was perceived as a
mere directive to the future governments. It was clarified that references to the rights and claims
of SCs and STs were mentioned in more than one article to emphasise on the importance of their
rights. SCs and STs are a special category within the definition of ―backward classes‖ under Article 16(4).
It is in Article 16(4) that the power is provided to the state in clear terms to make reservations for any
backward class of citizens.
At the same time, it can be inferred that Article 16(4) is not a mere directive, as it was enshrined in the
chapter on fundamental rights. This made Kamath express that if representation is not provided to
backward classes, then the state can be held accountable in a court of law. There was also a view in the
Constituent Assembly expressed in favour of reservations in promotions. As stated by Matari,
overcoming backwardness of certain communities, such as tribals, requires that reservations in services
should be extended to reservation in promotions as well, so that individuals from these communities do
not stick to where they begin.
Furthermore, in the final stages of the drafting of the Constitution, Matari had called the argument of
―efficiency‖ as a method ―to perpetuate‖ class interests. Ambedkar had been writing for several decades
that the term ―efficiency of administration‖ was a colonial and precolonial construct, which was used as
an exclusionary criterion and as an attempt by the upper castes to maintain their structural advantages and
privileges. His writings clearly suggest that in a post-independence era, the notion of ―efficiency of
administration‖ cannot be used against reservations. Instead, ―efficiency of administration‖ would be
measured or enhanced by ensuring due representation.
Article 16(4) thus cannot be understood in the context of any exclusionary notion of ―efficiency of
administration.‖ In that sense, it cannot be used as a ground to cast aspersions on reservations, which are
provided for under Articles 15 and 16. When the term ―efficiency of administration‖ is used in Article
335, it refers to ―representation‖ and ―minimum efficiency,‖ as Ambedkar argued. The 82nd
amendment7 to the Constitution, which provided for a minimum criterion for recruitment in the matters of
promotions, reflects this understanding. Furthermore, Ambedkar‘s understanding has been solidified by
few empirical studies, which show that reservation in services does not dilute efficiency in any way
(Deshpande and Weisskopf 2014; Bhavnani and Lee 2020). Economists have, in fact, suggested that
reservation or ―affirmative action in hiring might improve economic performance—particularly in high-
level jobs‖ (Deshpande and Weisskopf 2014: 177).
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court confused this basic understanding on reservations and erroneously
considered Article 335 to be a limitation to Article 16(4) in several judgments. The B K Pavitra
(II) judgment offers a fresh look in this regard. Both, the Constituent Assembly Debates and Ambedkar‘s
writings, demonstrate that Article 16(4) would have a broader and independent standing in the
Constitution. The concern of Ambedkar that the provision of reservation under Article 16(4) might
become a subject of unjust scrutiny through ―judicial interpretation‖ has come true.
Notes
1 Article 16(4) of the Constitution provides: ―Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making
any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens
which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the state.‖
2 Article 335 of the Constitution provided: ―The claims of the members of the SCs and the Sts shall be
taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making
of appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the union or of a state.‖
3 Later, the Constituent Assembly included Scheduled Tribes for the benefits of reservation.
4 In 1928, the British government sent a group of seven members of the British parliament to India to
study constitutional reforms and make recommendations to the government. The commission was
originally named the Indian Statutory Commission. It came to be known as the Simon Commission after
its chairman, John Simon.
5 Ambedkar was referring to the submissions made by Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866–1915) before the
Welby Commission, which was appointed in 1895 by British government to inquire into the
administration and management of the military and civil expenditure incurred under the authority of the
Secretary of State for India-in-council. Gokhale had submitted: ―The excessive costliness of the foreign
agency is not however its only evil. There is a moral evil, which, if anything, is even greater. A kind of
dwarfing or stunting of the Indian race is going on under the present system. We must live all the days of
our life in an atmosphere of inferiority and tallest of us must bend in order that the exigencies of the
existing system may be satisfied. The upward impulse, if I may use such an expression, which every
school-boy at Eton or Harrow may feel that he may one day be a Gladstone, a. Nelson, or a Wellington,
and which may draw forth the best efforts of which he is capable, is denied to us. The full height to which
our manhood is capable of rising can never be reached by us under the present system. The moral
elevation which every self-governing people feel cannot be felt by us. Our administrative and military
talents must gradually disappear, owing to sheer disuse, till at last our lot, as hewers of wood and drawers
of water in our own country, is stereotyped‖ (BAWS, Vol 2, p 397).
6 Ambedkar stated: ―The governing class does not bother to inquire into the ways and means by which it
has acquired its supremacy. It does not feel the necessity of doing so, partly because it believes that it
acquired its supremacy by dint of merit and partly because it believes that no matter how it acquired its
power it is enough that it is in a position to dictate its policy on the servile classes‖ (BAWS, Vol 9, p
477).
7 The 82nd constitutional amendment inserted a proviso to Article 335 of the Constitution to the effect:
―Provided that nothing in this article shall prevent in making of any provision in favour of the members of
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes for relaxation in qualifying marks in any examination or
lowering the standards of evaluation, for reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes of
services or posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State.‖
Kiran Kumbhar, ‘The Myth of the Mysterious Doctor’ (The Indian Forum 2nd
December 2021)
The current chaos regarding admissions in postgraduate medical courses through NEET,
although primarily a result of the incompetent and authoritarian working style of the union
government, has nevertheless given rise to vicious commentaries against caste-based
reservations. A particularly atrocious aspect of these commentaries, most recently heard in a
monologue by a TV presenter, Palki Sharma, is the claim that reservations have ―encouraged
mediocrity‖ in our country.
This is a claim frequently made by persons and groups opposing caste-based reservations, and
implicitly suggests that the presence of candidates from underprivileged caste communities in the
medical profession, the engineering profession, and elite educational campuses has led to a
reduction in the 'quality' of graduates and professionals in India. This is because, according to
them, reservations mean that most of those persons are able to enter these spaces despite
insufficient 'merit'.
Such claims are as old as the policy of reservations itself. Many of the underlying assumptions
are as old as the caste system itself, through which, around the turn of the first millennium, an
artificial hierarchy in the worth of human beings was reified by those who put themselves in the
'higher' varnas.
There is also a smaller proportion of privileged-caste people who do not subscribe to the
hierarchical ideas of the caste system, but argue that due to reservations, persons with inadequate
'merit' receive 'unfair' advantages at the expense of 'meritorious' individuals. Both these strands
of opinion converge in the assertion that in the absence of reservations, only the 'best' candidates,
with the most 'merit', irrespective of their caste and other backgrounds, would become doctors
and engineers and administrators and scientists. If some of the more passionate anti-reservation
claims are to be believed the country will 'prosper' again under this state of affairs.
There is no evidence, however, that in the absence of reservations, only (or even mostly) the
best-suited and the most capable persons will enter campuses and professional spaces. The belief
that once we dismantle reservations only the 'best' will advance, is based on a misplaced faith in
the screening power of conventional examination and testing systems — for which the shorthand
of 'merit' is used.
Those who vehemently argue that reservations have encouraged 'mediocrity' in the medical
profession ignore the historical fact that mediocrity actually flourished and thrived in the
profession when 'merit' was ruling the roost.
Even after the adoption of the Constitution, the medical profession continued to be dominated by
persons who entered it based on “merit”.
Even after Independence, although the Constitution mandated reservations for Dalits and
Adivasis, privileged-caste groups successfully resisted their proper and complete
implementation. These obstructionist attempts are best exemplified by the Champakam
Dorairajan case. The verdict of this case offered dominant caste groups the privilege of claiming
'castelessness' (and later the apparently casteless 'General Category') ,even as they continued to
enjoy the enormous privileges of their caste identities. In 1970, a report of the Parliament‘s
Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes expressed displeasure with
the unsatisfactory way medical colleges implemented reservations. Some had not yet introduced
the quotas, some reserved a much lower percentage of seats than mandated, and most failed to
fill the reserved seats with the appropriate number of Adivasi and Dalit students. This meant that
even after the adoption of the Constitution, the medical profession continued to be dominated by
persons who entered it based on 'merit'.
The dominance of 'merit' was all the more acute in leadership positions. A quick look at the list
of the presidents of the Indian Medical Association, established in 1928, shows that almost
everyone who helmed it (and indeed occupied other prominent positions) hailed from non-
Adivasi and non-Dalit backgrounds. It was the same story with the organised associations for
specialists, which began to come into being not long after the IMA was established, like the
Association of Otolaryngologists of India and the Federation of Obstetric and Gynaecological
Societies of India.
Then there were the various State Medical Councils, which theoretically worked to maintain
discipline in the profession and punish erring doctors. Since their membership entailed the
possession of substantial social and economic capital, it is highly unlikely that the few newly
minted Adivasi and Dalit doctors would have been able to enter those spaces, which too thus
continued to be dominated by privileged caste 'merit' doctors. Besides, the 1970s and 80s saw a
proliferation of private medical colleges that rarely implemented any reservations policy, except
what could be described as a nearly 100% quota for those who could pay enormous capitation
fees or make ‗donations‘.
In 1980, the report of the Mandal Commission confirmed the near-complete monopoly that
continued to be held by privileged-caste groups in educational campuses, professions, and
services, despite their total share of the population being less than a fifth. Reservations, thus,
played a miniscule role in the overall composition of the medical profession (and possibly all
other elite professions), at least until the implementation of the Mandal recommendations began
in the 1990s.
A dark underside
What was the quality of this 'meritorious medical profession'?
In privileged circles, heart-warming stories from this period abound. For example, of kind family
doctors who would visit the home whenever grandma had an illness or the little one ran high
fever; or of the committed doctor and his 'lady doctor' wife who ran the neighbourhood nursing
home where everyone went with their illnesses and where 'papa' was born, delivered by the
doctor‘s father decades ago; or of the doctor with a public image who often gave radio talks, or
lectures on family planning, or arranged free medical check-up camps in nearby villages with the
Rotary Club or the Lions Club. Apart from these local doctors there were also those who were
showing their talents on national and global stages by performing complex procedures and doing
important research, and those who were being actively courted by the US and the UK. Doctors in
popular movies were also, almost always, kind, skilled, and venerable.
“What shall one say about the inhumanity of the doctor who being an educated man […] treated
an ailing [Dalit] woman lying in for two days worse than a dog or a cat?”
These stories about the meritorious medical profession are indeed based on reality.
But when we scratch the surface of history, many unpleasant stories also tumble forth. A
doctor in a Gujarat village in 1927 who, when asked by a Dalit man to come see his seriously ill
wife, said ―I will not come to the untouchables‘ quarters. I will not examine her either.‖ When
pressured by a local official, he only ―examined‖ the woman from a distance, prompting the
husband to eventually wonder, after her death: ―What shall one say about the inhumanity of the
doctor who being an educated man […] treated an ailing woman lying in for two days worse than
a dog or a cat?‖ Or the story of the doctor in Patiala who ―crudely‖ treated and ―forcibly
expelled‖ a Dalit woman from a public dispensary. From contemporary newspaper articles,
government files, official reports, and legislative proceedings, we come to know of doctors in
government hospitals who patients found to be ―callous,‖ ―careless,‖ ―rude,‖ and ―indifferent‖,
and those in private practice who were considered to be ―impersonal,‖ ―lacking the human
touch,‖ ―businesslike,‖ and ―serving only the affluent society‖.
Although popular Hindi-Urdu films produced in Bollywood seldom depicted such stories, there
were exceptions. In the 1971 film Anand, one of the two featured doctors was a private
practitioner who often prescribed unnecessary investigations and medicines (although he
rationalised his malpractice by saying that he channelled his excess profits to the benefit of his
low-income patients). Chetan Anand‘s Tere Mere Sapne, from the same year, went far
beyond Anand in portraying the state of day-to-day medical practice in India. It documented the
prevalence of incompetence and negligence, and the presence of practices like cuts and
commissions, and underhand agreements between doctors and pharma agents, a full four decades
before the TV show Satyameva Jayate discussed them in 2012. A contemporary review in
the Times of India was titled ―‗Tere Mere Sapne‘: Doctors in the Dock‖. The movie seemed to
suggest, the reviewer wrote, that ―the incidence of the moral violation of the Hippocratic Oath is
rising, lucrative prospects […] are bringing about increased disregard of medical ethics, and the
medical profession, too, has been infected by the rat race.‖ A reviewer for the Illustrated Weekly
of India wrote that the film succeeded in ―drawing pointed attention to what ails the medical
profession,‖ but nevertheless touched ―no more than the fringe‖ of what was a ―very live
problem‖ of the day.
Awachat discussed how it was difficult for decent doctors to engage in “ethical” practice, and
how the medical councils had done precious little to halt the spread of unethical practices.
While most leaders of the profession tended to brush away instances of malpractice, negligence,
and corruption as the work of a ―few black sheep,‖ it was widely known within medical circles
that these were actually widespread. A 1975 article by physician Anil Awachat, also titled
―Doctors in the Dock,‖ provided a discomforting glimpse into the world of contemporary
medical practice. This article, in some ways, was the non-fiction counterpart of Tere Mere
Sapne. Awachat discussed how it was difficult for decent doctors to engage in ―ethical‖ practice,
and how the medical councils had done precious little to halt the spread of unethical practices.
Three years later another doctor, Arun Limaye, penned an eloquent Marathi
memoir, Chloroform, in which he discussed (among other things) the banality of corruption,
incompetence, and negligence in medical practice at that time. Displaying an honesty which is
still rare in Indian medical writing, he candidly talked about the prevalence of both genuine
medical errors and avoidable mistakes, providing several hair-raising examples from his
experience.
A backlash
There were indeed doctors who were appalled at the overall state of affairs in the profession, as
is evident from the writings of Awachat and Limaye. Some came together to form local activist
and social work organisations. Others devoted themselves to research, advocacy, and health
reform. Yet others, propelled by a strong commitment to social work and perhaps even the desire
to keep their distance from the ―rat race‖, migrated to rural and tribal areas and established
practice over there, often facing many social and economic challenges. And some established
private practice in cities or worked in government hospitals, creating little, though often well-
known, islands of ethical medical practice around them. But such doctors and doctors‘ groups
remained (and continue to remain) a minority in the larger medical profession.
“An enormous rise in the number of complaints against doctors went on to show the extent of
latent public distrust in the “meritorious medical profession.”
The generally positive public image of doctors had undergone substantial emaciation by the
1980s. This was most apparent in the public response to the Consumer Protection Act. Soon after
the Act was passed in 1986, many people, who had either lost a family member or suffered
serious injury due to what they believed to be negligence and avoidable mistakes by doctors,
began to take them to the Consumer Courts. An enormous rise in the number of complaints
against doctors went on to show the extent of latent public distrust in the 'meritorious medical
profession'. Years later, a functionary with the advocacy group Medico Friend
Circle recalled how ―between 1988 and 1994, the Medico Friend Circle (Bombay Group) was
literally flooded with cases of medical malpractice, as if there was an explosion of public anger
against a system substantially alienated from people's needs, […] the growing arrogance of
providers, and their refusal to be socially accountable and sensitive.‖
A dangerous myth
This forgotten history of the work and legacy of the ―meritorious medical profession‖ helps us
inspect the claims around reservations and merit in new, better light. The above survey makes it
clear that claims purporting a direct relationship between reservations and ―mediocrity‖, and an
inverse relationship between ―merit‖ and ―mediocrity‖, are simply myths.
The absurdity of the claim that scores in exams and interviews are sufficient to help us identify
the “best” doctors, scientists, or bureaucrats has often been called out in the past.
It is not reservations which bring mediocrity into a campus or a profession, but a host of other
factors: for example, individual traits and socialisation processes which
normalise abusive behaviour towards patients or religious hatred in health facilities, and systemic
issues like the profit motive in private hospitals which pushes doctors to incorrect and
unnecessary diagnoses and treatments. Such factors are unrelated to one‘s station in the
conventional meritocracy or in the caste hierarchy—except when a supposedly ―higher‖ station
socially sanctions one to engage in discrimination, harassment, and unprofessional behaviour.
Philosophically, this is not a spectacular revelation. The absurdity of the claim that scores in
exams and interviews are sufficient to help us identify the ―best‖ doctors, scientists, or
bureaucrats has often been called out in the past. The Mandal Commission report, for example,
said that ―what we call merit in an elitist society is an amalgam of native endowments and
environmental privileges.‖ The political theorist Kancha Ilaiah Shepherd dubbed conventional
merit as a brahminical version of merit, ―based upon imported textbooks and mugged up
reproduction [and] recitation, as a Hindu priest does in a temple.‖
Myths around reservations and “merit” have caused the institutional murders of many of India’s
young, including medical students and resident doctors.
But myths are frequently more powerful than facts; so powerful they even kill people. Myths
around reservations and 'merit' have caused the institutional murders of many of India‘s young,
including medical students and resident doctors who were stigmatised, taunted, and harassed by
seniors and professors. Despite plenty of real-world evidence to the contrary, many influential
persons from privileged-caste groups continue to exclusively equate Dalits, Adivasis, and
Shudras (the 'reserved category') with ineptitude and incompetence. Among the many insults
which the colleagues of Payal Tadvi — a resident doctor from an Adivasi background who died
by suicide in 2019 — subjected her to was the barb: ―People like you are only worthy of being
clerks‖ (my translation). What is most worrying is that many privileged-caste adults socialise
kids and teenagers into assuming this false equation as the ―natural‖ order of things. Such
deplorable socialisation was evident last year when a privileged caste college student felt they
were doing the right thing in ranting against an Adivasi professor and saying that people like her
were 'meritless idiots'.
Considering the persistence and power of these myths, and the influence and power of those who
believe in them, it is unlikely that the demeaning and entirely false claim about reservations
'encouraging mediocrity' is going to go away any time soon. However, one hopes that at least
now people will stop using that common anti-reservation gibe: ―Would you trust a doctor who
has come through reservation?‖ One also hopes that now when someone curses the medical care
system in India, they would at least be aware that its floundering foundations were laid by
professionals who came 'purely through merit'