UNIT 34 INDIAN NATIONALISM DURING

THE WORLD WAR II: QUIT

INDIA MOVEMENT AND INA

Structure
34.0 Objectives
34,1 Introduction
34.2 1939 to 1941
34.2.1 Attitude Towards War
34.2.2 Individual Satyagrah
● 34.3 Towards Quit India Movement
34.4 The Movement
34.4.1 Spread of the Movement
34.4.2 Responses and Trends
34.4.3 Repression
34.5 Indian National Army
34.5.1 Fonnation of INA
34.5.2 Actions of INA
34.5.3 Impact
34.6 Let Us Sum Up
34.7 Key Words
34.8 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

34.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this Unit you will be able to:

know about the circumstances leading to the beginning of the Quit India Movement,
explain the attitude of the various sections of Indian people towards this movement,
learn about the response to this movement in different regions of the country,
know about the repressive methods adopted by the British to crush the movement,
understand the characteristics and the significance of this movement, and^
learn about the formation of the Indian National Army and the role it played in India’s
struggle for independence.

34.1 INTRODUCTION

In this Unit an attempt is made to familiarise you with the main political currents in the
freedom struggle during 1939-1945. The emphasis in this Unit is on the Quit India
Movement (QIM) and the role played by the Indian National Army (INA) during the
struggle.
We discuss here the chain of events which led to the launching of the QIM. The
Congress had hardly planned for directing or organising the movement when the
Government unleashed erpression to nip it in the bud. However, the calculations of the
Government were falsified because the people, after the arrest of the Congress leadershtp,
decided their own course of action and challenged the British in a way which to an extent
could be compared to the straggle of 1857. New leadership emerged at local levels and
their role was at variance with the Gandhian form of struggle.
, a- Non-violence
. was no
more a guiding principle and all over there were attacks on Government property.
® ^
Though the Government was
able to crush the xmovement,
r
itsu,intensity had made , it clear
that the British would not be able to arle over Indta for much longer. Thts was also
demonstrated through the fonnation and actions of the Indian National Army under the
commandership of Subhas Chandra Bose. The Indians were not only capable of, but had
actually confronted the British in armed straggle and foraied the Azad Htnd
Government.
5
Towards A Sovereign Slate

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1. ‘-Remove dirt from the country" — A Cartoon on Quit India.

34.2.1 Attitude Towards War

Generally speaking the atti
follows: attitude of Indians towards the World War can be categorised as
i) Since Britain'■
was in trouble. India should
was to be done by: seize the opportunity to gain freedom. This
opposing the British effons
ng a strong movemp T for the war.
● launch]

Th
movement against the British.
were not concerned ‘‘oout
about'theTr'”^
the international situation,
achieve India's freedom and
h) India should not .seek adv
British in their war efforts n'n^^ problems. It should cooperate with the
after the war the British would^*\ 'tionally. Those who supported this view hoped
services, and suitably reward he^r ^ view towards India in the light ol
^ >hnra, ntank,nd, and wan«^
were
,
Jndia S independence in thf^ f. t conditional. The conditions
moment. and an interim government of Indians for the
There '-^■ere also
W3t .
'^duaiion. The - -e^alsot according to the changing
What did the C maintained a neutral position,
were visible . ^0 in such a si A

the Cong a situation? Practically all of attitudes ^mite

defind^
of action. The'■ '^ongress, u: : ^as a difficult task to steer towards a ■- ^ vided
at this
“me son of a responsible 2ov<=. inn in
oifered full cooperation in me
the war,
vv«-».pr AS for
'he luture, the Cong oemanrrT"^^*
ress ir established at the centre immediate ^ of
free India. Th
ag nnsl the British r
that T ^ ^^"■‘^^duent Assembly to frame the
6
section which was in favour of launching
>ned the Rr,,:
“Will ti’o Gandhian leadership- Gan
cr

‘“t rit.i-'- b^vQ unwilling Indi- ■-

or a willing ally co-operating with her in the prosecution .of a defence of true democracy?’ Indian Nationalism During
World War-II: Quit India
He further stated, “The Congress support will mean the greatest morale asset in favour of Movement and INA
England and France”.

Though Gandhi supported the Congress Working Committee Resolution of conditional

support he himself was not for it as he stated later “I was sorry to find myself alone in
thinking that whatever support was to be given to the British should be given
unconditionally.” Gandhi, in his personal capacity, was repeating his attitude towards the
British of the First World War days i.e, cooperation. But now things were different and
one had to come above one’s personal views. Gandhi realised that his silence might turn
out to be a “distinct disservice to both India and England” and he stated:

If the British are fighting for the freedom of all, then their representatives have to
state in the clearest possible terms that the freedom of India is necessarily included in
the war aim. The content of such freedom can only be decided by Indians and them
alone.

How did the Government react? Well, the British were not prepared either to make any
concessions immediately or make promises about the future — except a vague talk of
dominion status. Defence of India Rules were promulgated in order to check defiance of
British authority and exploit Indian resources for the War effort.

34.2.2 Individual Satyagarh

There were two opinions in Congress about the launching of civil disobedience. Gandhi
felt that the atmosphere was not in favour of civil disobedience as there were differences
and indiscipline within the Congress. Those advocating Civil disobedience were attempting
to convince Gandhi that once a movement was launched differences would disappear and
all would work for its success. But Gandhi would not agree. The Congress Socialists and
ihe All India Kisan Sabha were in favour of immediate struggle. N.G. Ranga even
suggested that the AIKS should sever links with Congress and launch and independent
movement. He was, however, checked by P. Sundarayya from doing so. It was in such an
atmosphere that the Congress met at Ramgarh in March 1940 under the presidentship of
Maulana Azad who declared:

India cannot endure the prospect of Nazism and Fascism,

but she is even more tired of British imperialism.

The Ramgarh Congress called upon the people to prepare themselves for participating in a
Satyagrah to be launched under Gandhi’s leadership. But the Socialists, Communists,
Kisan Sabhaites and those belonging to the Forward Bloc were not happy with the
resolution. TTiey held an anti-compromise conference at Ramgarh and Subhas Chandra
Bose urged the people to resist compromise with imperialism and be ready for action.
In August 1940 the 'Viceroy announced an offer which proposed:
● expansion of Governor-General’s Council with representation of the Indians,
● establishing a War Advisory Council.
In this offer he promised the Muslim League and other minorities that the British
Government would never agree to a constitution or government in India which did not
enjoy their support (we should remember here that the Muslim League had demanded.
Pakistan in its Lahore session of 1940). The Congress rejected this offer because:

i) There was no suggestion for a national government,

ii) It encouraged anti-Congress forces like the Muslim League.
The government was systematically putting under preventive arrest many Congress
workers — particularly those with Socialist or Left leanings. All local leaders were under
observation, while many labour leaders and youngmen were taken into custody.
Convinced that the British would not modify their policy in India (Gandhi had long
meetings with the Viceroy at Simla in September 1940), (jandhi decided to start the
Individual Satyagrah. The very reason for confining the movement to individual
participation was that neither Gandhi nor the Congress wished to hamper the War effort
and this could not have been the case in a mass movement. Even the aim of the Satyagrah
was a limited one i.e. to disprove the British claim of India supporting the War effort
whole heartedly.
7
Towards A Sovereign State
On 17 October 1940, Acharya Vinoba Bhave inaugurated the Satyagrah by delivering an
anti-war speech at Paunar — a village near Wardha. Bhave had been personally selected by
Gandhi for this. His two other nominess Vallabhbhai and Nehru were arrested before they
could offer Satyagrah, Between November 1940 and February 1941 many prominent
Congressmen went to jail, but due to the limited nature of participation and restrictions
imposed on Congressmen by Gandhi the movement could not achieve much. In some cases
even the Congressmen were not very willing. For example, in Bihar, many Congressmen
selected to offer Satyagraha were reluctant to relinquish the positions they held in
municipal bodies. They either refused or “were extremely slow to court arrest” (see
Stephan Henningam, Peasant Movements in Colonial India). In December 1941 the
Congress Working Committee decided to suspend the movement. By this time the war had
taken a new turn. The British were facing defeat after defeat and the Japanese forces had
over run South-East Asia. USSR had been attacked by the Nazis and there were pressures
on the Bntish from USSR, USA and China to reconsider their India policy. The
Government released many political prisoners. After the fall of Rangoon to the Japanese
the Bntish decided to send the Cripps Mission to India.
Check Your Pqogress 1
I Discuss in about ten lines attitudes of Indians towards the War.

2 Which of the following

i) Gandhi felt jeatemems are irght ( v/ ) or wrong (x)
support to the British duringtire Wm
ii) Gandhi agreed
*° S'™ unconditional
to give support to the British for the War effort,
111) Defence of India Rules
iv) Congress was were meant to defend the interests
i of the Congress.
VI Cono and Nazism
Congress accepted the August Offer.
VI) The individual Satyagrah continued till 1947. I. ’

3 Fill in the blanks:

>0 o-S::;::;:::; support will

the war e ffOl^'

mean the (greatest/least) i

;

and France) morale asset

in favour of (Germany and Japan/Engl^
Hi) Gandhi (felt/desired)
;i)l

favour of (armed "

^'^ggl^iwi'D^ atmosphere was not i"
'■i
■V) Subhas Chandra
Congress resolution
at was (happy/onhappy) with the
V) Acharya Vinoba (Ramgarhrnampur)
ividli»!
Satyagrah. ave (ended/inaugurated) the

34.3
towards
8 Tt
MOVEMENT
H' unfavourable War situation
si and international
i
pressures had c . iT
j the BOitish P
 .eek an amicable settlement with India and obtain her active support in the War. Sir
Indian Nationalism During
/
Strafford Cripps landed in India with a set of proposals and negotiated with leaders of World War-II: Quit India
various political parties. ' ovement and INA

f .‘t.

( 1

2. A cartoon by Shankar on Negotiations (1942).

34.3.1 Cripps Proposals

Some of the Cripps proposals, embodied in a Draft Declaration were:

● Dominion Status would be granted to India immediately after the War with the rieht to
secede. ^
● Immediately after the cessation of hostilities, a constitution — making body would be
set up. It will consist of members from British India as well as Native States.
● The constitution so framed after the War would be accepted by the British Government
on the condition that any Indian province could, if so desired, remain outside the Indian
Union and negotiate directly with Britain.
● The actual control of defence and military operations would be retained by the British
Government.

This Declaration was rejected by almost all the Indian parties. The Congress did not want
to rely on future promises. It wanted a responsible Government with full powers and also a
control over the country’s defence. Gandhi termed the proposal “as a post-dated cheque on
a crashing bank.” The Muslim League demanded a definite declaration by the British in
favour of the creation of a separate state for the Muslims, and also seats for the Muslim
League on a 50:50 basis with the Congress in the Interim Government. The Depressed
Classes, the Sikhs, the Indian Christians and the Anglo-Indians demanded more safeguards
for their communities.

Thus, the Cripps Mission failed to pacify the Indians. The British had merely taken up this
exercise to demonstrate to the world that they cared about Indian sentiments, rather than to
actually do something concrete.

343.2 Background to the Quit India Movement

The Congress had to decide its course of action in the wake of:

● the failure of the Cripps Mission;

# the arrival of Japanese armies on Indian borders:
# the rising prices and shortages in food supplies, and
# the different opinions within the Congress.
9
Towards A Sovereign State The Congress Working Commiuee adopted a resolution calling for complete non-violent
non-cooperation with any foreign forces invading India (in May 1942). Rajaaopalachari
and a few other Congressmen from Madras attempted to get a resolution passed which
proposed that in case the Madras Government invited lliem the Congress should form a
ministry there. The resolution was rejected, but the very proposal demonstrated that there
were certain Congressmen who wanted to cooperate with the government. Rajasoplachari
was following au independent path. He had favoured the Pakistan demand, and was urging
the Congress to support the War effort.
I

In May 1942 Gandhi told a gathering of Congressmen at Bombay that he had made up his
mind to ask the British to quit India in an orderiy fashion. If they did not agree, he would
launch a Civil Disobedience Movement.

Many of the Congress leaders had reservations about the launching of a movement. Nehru
was particularly concerned about the choice between fighting imperialist Britain and
letting USSR and China down in their struggle against fascist powers. Eventually, he
decided in favour of launching the movement. The Congress made it clear that the quit
India demand did not mean that the British and the allied armies had to withdraw from
India immediately. However, it meant an immediate acknowledgemen t of India’ s
Independence by the British. On July 14 the Congress Working Committee adopted
the Quit India Resolution which was to be ratified at the Bombay AICC meeting in -i
August. *

On 8 August 1942 the AICC passed

. the Quit India Resolution. Alter deliberating at great
lejA on the tnternattonal and nat.onal situation the Congress appealed to the people of
They must remember that non-violence is the basis of this movement A time mav

Gandhi told the British to quit and "leave India in God's hand" He exhorted all sections to' ●I
paiticipate in the Movement and stressed
it must be his own guide". His every Indian who desires freedom and strives for
Movement. message was 'do or die’. Thus, started Quit India

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 Indian Nationalism During
34.4 THE MOVEMENT World War-II: Quit India
Movement and INA

The Congress gave the call for ousting British but it did not give any concrete line of
action to be adopted by the people. The Government had been making preparations to
cmsh the Movement. On the morning of 9 August all prominent Congress leaders
including Gandhi were arrested. The news of leaders’ arrest shook the people and they
came to streets protesting against it. K.G. Mashruwala, who had taken over as editor of
Hatijan published his personal opinion as to the shape the protest should take:
In my opinion looting or burning of offices, bank, granaries etc., is not permissible.
Dislocation of traffic communications is permissible in a non-violentmanner —
s without endangering life. The organisation of strikes is best.... Cutting wires,
removing rails, destroying small bridges, cannot be objected to in a struggle like this
provided ample precautions are taken to safeguard life.
Mashruwala maintained that “Gandhiji and the Congress have not lost all hope of goodwill
being re-established between the British and the Indian nations, and so provided the effort
is strong enough to demonstrate the nations will, self-restraint will never go against us”.
Let us have a look at the spread of the movement and the response it evoked from various
sections.

34.4.1 Spread of the Movement

Before his arrest on 9 August 1942 Gandhi had given the following message to the
country:

Every one is free to go the fullest length under Ahimisa to complete deadlock by
/1 strikes and other non-violent means. Satyagrahis must go out to die not to live. They
must seek and face death. It is only when individuals go out to die that the nation
will survive, Karenge Ya(Marenge(do or die).
But while giving this call Gandhi had once again stressed on non-violence:
Let every non-violent soldier of freedom write out the slogan ‘do or die’ on a piece
of paper or cloth and stick it on his clothes, so that in case he died in the course of
offering Satyagraha, he might be distinguished by that sign from other elements who
do not subscribe to non-violence.

The news of his arrest alongwith other Congress leaders led to unprecedented popular
outbursts in different parts of the country. There were hartals, demonstrations and
processions in cities and towns. The Congress leadership gave the call, but it was the
people who launched the Movement. Since all the recognised leaders—central, provincial
or local—had been arrested, the young and more militant caders—particularly students—
with socialist leanings took over as leaders at local levels in their areas.
In the initial stages, the Movement based on non-violent lines. It was the repressive
was

policy of the government which provoked the people to violence. The Gandhian message
of non-violent struggle was pushed into the background and people devised their own
niethods of struggle. These included:
® attacks on government buildings, police stations and post offices,
● attacks on railway stations, and sabotaging rail lines,
® cutting off the telegraph wires, telephones and electric power lines,
● disrupting road traffic by destroying bridges, and
● workers going on strike, etc.
Most of these attacks were to check the movement of the military and the police, which
were being used by the government to crush the Movement. In many areas, the
government lost all control and the people established Swaraj. We cite a few such cases:
® In Maharashtra, a parallel government was established in Satara which continued to
function for a long time.
● In Bengal, Tamluk Jatiya Sarkar functioned for a.long time in Midnapore district. This
national government had various departments like Law and Order, Health, Education,
Agriculture, etc., along with a postal system of its own and arbitration courts.
● People established Swaraj in Talacher in Orissa. 11
 Towards A Sovereign State
● In many parts of eastern U.P. and Bihar (Azamgarh. Ballia, Ghazipur, Monghyr,
Muzaffarpur, etc.) police stations were over run by the people and government
authority uprooted.

The Movement had initially been strong in the urban areas but soon it was the populace of
rural areas which kept the banner of revolt aloft for a longer time. The Movement got a
massive response from the people of Bombay, Andhra, U.P., Bihar, Gujarat, Orissa
Assam, Bengal, Karnataka, etc. But the responses in Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, etc were
weak.

\
1

I...
/

.1

4. A Poster on Quit India.

34.4.2 Responses and Trends
“Quit India” and “Do or Die were th ,
THe ve
Delhi the '*'«'« Bombay, '"‘●ustrial centres went on sinlt ●
of these cen? * T ^ August was a result Jamshedpur and Poona-
lutT r,?
about 3 months.
O**) "ot C ,on„ *“*«■●* ‘0 the Lets. But in
‘“t long, except in AhmedaL where it continued tiH
In Bihar, Patna was cut off fr
Northern side, the Sub-DivS,*^Officer ^ result of mass actions and on
the

"..the school students started the m of Begusarai reported:

Congress Worke of
control blit k ^ober sectin^T^”^’ were joined by all sections uiid^r
question: the'^^^" aUowed the vin ^ ^°"Sress tried to keep the movemen
- the Door 1 Properties, esoeciaii became an econo ^
outly nTl i railway stations attracted th
12
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PP « but they had no hoTd 'atmkthe time.^t,ngress ... the sober sections did no
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Towards A Sovereign State
This reflects the level of .participation by the rural people and the constraints of Gandhian
leaders (described as sober section) in directing the Movement. A similar situation existed
in eastern U.P. The account kept by R.H. Nibblet of what happened at Madhuban Police
Station in Azamgarh district shows the fury of the revolt in that area. Nibblet has
mentioned how the police station was attacked in an organised manner from three sides.
The people from one side reaching earlier, waited at a distance for the people to reach
from the other sides. The police fired 119 rounds to check the attack which lasted about
two hours.

In Orissa
^ ^
the government used aeroplanes to check the
^ _ advance of
peasant guerillas
towards Talcher town. In Maharashtra the battles were
long drawn in the Satara region
Besides mass action there emerged another trend in the movement. This was the trend of
underground revolutionary activity. On 9 November 1942, Jaiprakash Narain and
Ramnandan Misra escaped from Hazaribagh Jail. They organised an underground
movement and operated from the regions bordering Nepal.

C*

6- Equipment of Congress
Similarly, in Bombay, the Sociali
leaders like Anina Asaf AM The most^d^ino^^^r.^^^ underground activities under
establishment of Congress Radio with Usha n underground movement was the
broadcasts for
described this a long time. Subhas Bose announcer. This radio carried
movement as “Non-violem f 0^ August 1942)
The object of this ueri a warfare”. He suggested that:
destroy war (0

in the - production in India -i ^^mpaign should be a two-fold one. Firstly

.e country. Keeping these ohie f' ^e British administra^"
Pamcpate in the struggle “ '^very seiion of the community shcul<l
There was massive
role in
guiding the participation by the ed a
poople there. students who spread to the countryside and play
The Movement did not evok
SmSs d'f' n?f '^‘=-hant community. In fad
reader t h govemm/nfrf ‘he War. In certain cases, the
property Thfv""'"'®®'"'" «as that g! ul “> Gandhi and other
attacks on priv if sucl”
14
cor^nunM ^^re |-epo|.,^>^.The'p.MusTn
.
t ^^ey may get converted tnto
kept aloof from the Movement an
Mahasabha condemned M-^menl- Th"
 Indian Nationalism During
World War-II: Quit India
Movement and INA

Berlin Raaio.
7. Bose speaking over
..^pnnle’s war” line did not support the movement.
Communist Party of India due to its p P sympathise with
The princes and the landlords were supporting the War
leaders like Rajagoplach ji who did not
the movement. There were also Congress
the War effort.
participate in the movement and supported
be gauged from the following figures:
However, the intensity of the Movement can
● In U.P. 104 railway stations were
ttacked and damaged according to a government
report. About 100 railway tracks were
‘sabotaged’ and the number in case of telephone
offices damaged was 119.
and telegraph wires was 425. The number of post
● In Midnapore 43 government
● In Bihar 72 police stations were
^^^^luSedT^'Ta'nway stations and 945 post offices
damaged. 664 bomb explosions,
® Throughout the country there had been
How did the government react to this massive upsurge? This is the question which we shall
deal in the following section.

34,4.3 Repression
The Government had geared all its forces to suppress the popular upsurage. Arrests,
offices, etc. were the methods adopted by
detentions, police firings, burning of Congress
the Government.
were arrested. Throughout India the
« By the end of 1942 in U.P. alone 16,089 persons 15
official figures for arrests stood at 91,836 by end of 1943.
Towartis A Sovereign State ® The number of people killed in police firings was 658 till September 1942, and by 1943 .8
it was 1060. But these were official figures. Many more had died and innumerable
wounded.
© In Midnapore alone, the Government forces had burnt 31 Congress camp.s and 164
private houses. There were 74 cases of rape, out of which 46 were committed by the )
police in a single day in one village on 9 January 1943.
© The Government accepted having used aeroplanes to gun people at 5 places. These
were: Giriak near Patna: Bhagalpur district; near Ranaghai in Nadia district; Monghyr
district and near Talcher city.
© There were countless lathicharges, fioggitigs and imprisonments.
® Collective punitive tines were extorted from the residents in the areas affected bv the
upsurge. For example in U.P. the total amoutit involved in such fines was Rs.
28,32.000, and by February 1943 Rs. 25,00,000 was realised. Similarly in North Bihar
fines were imposed to the amount of Rs. 34,15,529 by the end of February 1943, out of
which Rs. 28,35.025 had been realised.

It was tnrough such repressive actions that the British were able to re-establish themselves.
The War situation helped them in two ways:
i) They had at their disposal a massive military force which was stationed here to face the
Japanese, but was promptly used to crush the Movement.
ii) Due to War time censorship they repressed the upsurge in a ruthless manner. They did
not have to bother themselves about any internal criticism of their methods or
international opinion. The Allied countries
were busy fighting the Axis powers, and had
no
time to concern themselves with what the British were doing in India.

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*ne people to Boycott Traito
 The QIM collapsed, but not without demonstrating the determination of the masses to do Indian Nationalism During
World War-n: Quit India
away with British rule. The Congress leadership did not condemn the deviation by the 'vement and INA
people from the principle of non-violence, but at the same time disowned any
responsibility for the violent acts of the people.

Check Your Progress 2

1 Which of the following statements are right ( \^ ) or wrong (x).
i) -Gandhi wanted only a limited section of the people to participate in the QIM.
ii) The leadership of the QIM was taken over by militant youth and socialists,
iii) No parallel governments were formed during the QIM.
iv) The sober section of the Congress attempted to control the moveinent, but failed,
v) There was no underground activity during the QIM.
vi) Capitalists and merchants participated in great numbers in the QIM.

2 Discuss in about ten lines the measures adopted by the people to uproot the British
authority during the QIM.

3 Discuss in about ten lines the measures adopted by the British to crash the popular
Upsurge.

34.5 INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY

The QIM was a struggle fought against the British in India. But equaUy imjmrt^t is the
role of the Indian NaLal >Ly which waged battles against the Bnhsh from foreign
soil.

30.5.1 Formation of INA

There were many Indian revolutionaries working abroad for the country’s cause. Among
these was Rasbehari Bose, living as a fugitive from the British since 1915 in Japan. He 17
Towards A Sovereign State

. r

9. Rasbehari Bose and Mohan Singh Inspecting INA.

seized the opportunity offered by the War to mobilise Indians for
an armed struggle
against the British. Tlierc were
o V , Xt T r . . ^ number of Indian soldiers fighting on behalf of'the
Brmsh. Tl^ Japanese after defeating the British in South East Asia. took
Indian soldiers as prisoners of War Main-- Fniiwnr., ^ ^
a number of
»umuci «ji
Captain Mohan Si'ah - a POW ^risrer o W . 7 .
Japanese for India's^Teedom. In ^Wch 194° 'n
and they formed the Indian Independence League Th
Bangkok (June 1942) where Rashbrari T
decision was taken to raise the Indian Nalion-irr ^ ol the League and a
the Commander of the INA which nnvo h \ \ Mohan singh was appointe
invited Subhas Bose to lid 1 molmel
 Bose had escaped from India in 1941 to Berlin. In June. 1943 he came to Tokyo tmd then rndinn Nationalism During
joined the INA at Singapore in July. Rashbehari Bose handed over the leadership to Subhas V.’: 'd War-II: Quit India
Bose, and an .Azad Hind Sarkar was formed. In November. 1943 the .1: tpanese announced Movement and INA
their decision to hand over the administration of Andamans and Nicobar islands to the INA
Thus, started the heroic struggle of the I.NA for India’s independence.

11. INA in Action.

34.5.2 Actions of INA

The INA m
i a few months time had three fighting,brigades named after Gandhi. Azad and
Nehru. Soon other brigades were raised, namely the Subhas brigade and the Rani Jhansi
brigade. The overseas Indians contributed heavily in terms of money and material for the
^rmy. The slogans of the INA were ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Delhi Chalo’. The most famous was
Subhas’s declaration that “Turn Mujhe Khoon Do Mein Tumhe Azadi Dunga” (you give
blood I will give you freedom).

12. ln>jnpcfinp Rnni Ilmnsi Hriamlc. I O

Towards A Sovereign State
Fighting side by side with the Japanese armed forces the INA crossed the Indian frontier
on 18th March, 1944. The tricolour was hoisted on Indian soil. However the INA failed to
capture Imphal due to two reasons:

i) The Japanese failed to supply the necessary material and air cover to the INA.
ii) The Monsoon prevented their advance.

In the meantime the British were able to regroup their forces and made counter attacks.
The INA fought heroically with tremendous loss of manpower, but the course of war was .
changing. With the collapse of Germany and set backs to the Japanese armies, the INA too
could not stand on its own. Subhas bose disappeared. Some believed he died in an air
crash, while others refused to believe this.

34.5.3 Impact
The INA had failed to achieve its goal but it made a significant impact on the freedom
struggle:

i) It became clear to the British that they could no longer depend on the loyalty of Indian
soldiers and treat them as mercenaries.

ii) '^e struggles of the INA demonstrated that those who waged an armed struggle against
affected by communal division. There were Hindus, Muslims
and Sikhs in the INA who had fought as Indians.
*f f ~ women force — demonstrated
the capabilities of Indian women waging armed struggle against the British,
iv) The INA had also demonstrated the enthusiasm and concern of overseas Indians for the
freedom of their motherland.

In doaUng with the role of Subhas Bose during this period, we have to take note of the fact
that what he did was not due to his support to Fascist Germanv nr ● ● t l

forfromindia-s fmedom. He was deterniine^d^ to mainTarth^rd^Lrn “ f^NA '

he Japanese and while in Berlin he had probiems with the Germa^ regarding the
, use of Indian Ugion against USSR. The British
f
Government martialed the INA
officers and soldiers and put them
about this in Unit 35). on tnal for conspinng against the King (you will read
Check Your Progress 3
1 Discuss in about five lines the
sequence of the formation of the INA.

ort*

●»●●●«**

line,

) The INA reached the Indian soil. on the loyalty of Indian troops.
3 What was the i
lines. impact of the INA
on India’s freedom struggle? Answer in about ten

.P-*

.;●*
20
 Indian Nationalism During
World Wiir-II: Quit India
Movement and INA

34.6 LET US SUM UP

The various sections ot Indian people had different altitude towards the War. and these
were ronec.ed within the Congress.'The Individual Satyagraha launched Gandhi due to
its limited nature of participation, did not get widespread response. It took ' " Gon e^s
almost three years after India was dragged into the War to reach a decs,on |
the Quit India Movement, With the declaration for starting the Movement, the Biitish
arrested
adopted a policy of ruthless repression.noAlltimeprominent
P , P°, f ‘
Congress leaders were
to plan the line of action to be adopted,
overnight and the Congress could get no t .f . , .-rta ti-ipir nwn nrtions
However ’ the ,Movement
● 1-
took its own course w.th the people d.rectmg the, own actions.
r-o ot th(» forefront in directing the Movement. In its initial
The youth and Socialists we ^ involved but soon the Movement
phase ,t were the people m he^urba
spread to the
governments ^; 3,„g„,e adopted by the people surpassed the
confines of Gandhian non- violence and the “sober sections" among Congressmen could not
control them,

m , ,.r„sh the Movement, but underground activities continued for a

The British were able to crush ^^.,1
long time. The and the heroic struggles waged by the INA
to retain their hold on India for a g
further demonstrated this.

13. INA Soldiers.

the residents of an area

Collecting Punitive Fines: Fines imposed by the government
on
21

where ‘riots’ etc. have taken place.

 Towards A Sovereign State Constituent Assembly: A body which performs the task of framing a constitution.
Forward Blocs: Party formed by Subhas Bose in 1940.
People’s War: A term applied to Second World War by the Communists after Hitler
attacked USSR.

34.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

EXERCISES

Check Your Progress 1

1 Your answers should include the four views mentioned in Sub-sec. 34.2.1.
2 1) ii) v/iii) (x) iv) x/ v) (x) vi) (x)
3 i) opposing, ii) greatest, England and France, iii) felt. Civil Disobedience, iv) unhappy,
Ramgarh v) inaugurated
Check Your Progre.ss 2
1
i) (x) ii) v/ iii) X iv) v^v) (x) vi) (x)
2 Base your answer on the write up in Sub-secs. 34.4.1 and 34.4.2. It should take into
account the various acts of people like attacks on police stations, formation of parallel
governments, etc.
3 These were imposing fines, firing on people, arrests etc. See Sub-sec. 34.4.3.
Check Your Progress 3
1
See Sub-sec. 34.5.1 You should be very clear in your answer that Rashbehari Bose
formed the INA aivl not Subhas Bose.
2 i) (x) ii) (x) lii) iv) \/
3 See Sub-sec 34..5.

}'

22

i
 UNIT 35 TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

Structure
35.0 Objectives
35.1 Introduction
35.2 Background: India and the Raj
35.2.1 Second World War: Impact on the Indians
35.2.2 Second World War: Impact on the British Government
35.2.3 End of the War: The British Policy *
3^5.2.4 Congress and the Muslim League
35.3 Attempts at a Negotiated Settlement
35.3.1 The Simla Conference
35.3.2 The Labour in Power
35.3.3 Elections and the Cabinet Mission
35.3.4 The Communal Carnage and Interim Government
●4 The Popular Urges
35.4.1 Direct Confrontations
^3.4.2 Indirect Confrontations
35.5 Ut Us Sum Up
35.6 Keywords
35.7 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises.

35.0 OBJECTIVES
"^his Unit deals with a brief but a very crucial period of Indian Nationali.sm. After reading
‘his unit you will:
the British rulers and the Indian
* become familiar with the impact of the World War on
● k!° ^ f activities undertaken during this period,
● be able to link up the various kinds of political .
● to narrate the popular struggles which break out m f
● evaluate their role in weakening and ultimately thro g

35.1 INTRODUCTION
In ,1 ^ . . .jh the various constitutional processes at
Work “"‘t have been ..j^ation the political maturing of certain
serf ’ P°^hical developments and their cry>t ’ second World War and its
ctr a v“ .'y different political
Seen ^ ‘■osoh o*" this the relationship, mainly conflictual,
betJ*^‘°- tensions and conflicts emerge ' jhe range of political
act- ‘ho acquired new .^gpenjence began taking shape. There
;^hvities became much wider as the P--,^;^"y/„;;ff^ratgotiated settleLt,L a
now on the one hand, new attempts g „ntiatiiig chamber. On the other hand, the
P^;;oeful transfer of power-a politics of looked for
different outlets. These outlets were touund^n various confrontations with the British and
chamber. During this period the
Sena ‘ho pohtics of tine
Pnratist politics also raised its he;ad and the m
g„^ent for Pakistan gathered greater
'"onientum.
— nationalist as well as

^0 situation thus, was very coir.plex. All p^power. But the popular
str^<rr^‘‘"‘~'^®''®. ^ anti-feudal struggles challenged the
British anti-British fights as we attempt to unfold some of the
“"●Plex chamricfll"^^^
1945-47. 23
Towards A Sovereign State
35.2 BACKGROUND: INDIA AND THE RAJ :\n

,li

The period 1945-47 represents a climax of the political events of the preceding decades. It
is important, therefore, to have a look at the background to the developments which took
place in these decisive years. In particular it was the Second World War and its impact on
the British government and the Indian people which shaped the course of some of the ^
events. Let us now look at how the War affected the Government, its policies and various
sections of the Indian population. ‘’

35.2.1 Second World War: Impact on the Indians

From the decline of the “Quit India” movement to the collapse of the Axis powers
(Germany, Italy and Japan) in the Second World War, between 1943 and 1945, the Indian
● political scene was apparently rather quiet. Beneath the surface, however, a disquietude
was building up steadily over the acute War-time sufferings of the people. The Raj could
hardly cope with this disquietude, despite all its show of strength, and only hoped to side-
^ack it by leaning more heavily on diversionary tactics than ever before.

Popular distress was due primarily to an inflation caused by the channelising of Indian
products (agricultural, as well as industrial) to meet the military needs, and through a fall
in imports of consumer goods (from Britain) to the Indian civilians. It was further
accentuated by the British failure to pay for the Indian contribution to the defence
expenditure and the growing volume of their debt to India. For example, if we take 100, as
the base for pnces m 1939 the following figures show the irse during the year 1941-44:
Year Rice Wheat Cotton Manufactures Kerosene
1939 100 100 100
1941 100
172 212 196 140
1942 218 232 414 i!
1944 333 ' 194
381 285 175 . :j

when they did show ud in extranrH- ordinanly available to the public, antj
afford them. While the suppliers to t^ m^t^''""‘th^
and “the black-marketeers” were having aSdTv h - the hoarders ●
l
producers and the industrial workers wpvp f consumers in general, and evq^^®
p-ecarious economic ropedancing could only
● the climate turned harsh and the crops failed-
● overdid
if the foodtheirs’;
procurers' for the Government ’
cmment bungled their work and those for the anpyii
● if the officials mi
and mismanaged the movements of food grains from one place to anothefi
● if the militaty adopted a “searched earth’ policy in a region to the apprehended*
march of an invading army. stem

in Bengal in the later half of 194^ disorders, a gruesome tragedy in fact took P*®
“man-made” or the handiwork of ZT famine-suspected largely to ^
peoplenottomuch
was death.better
Though not actually arvaEed\°*^‘'‘*!‘*°"'~*‘*"'®‘*
than that of Ben , femmes, the condition of the
^ fsfW® ,
the depressed countryside and the oirf^ presented more or less a uniform
reached by 1945 aJost the end sufferingP^P’^
very little to reverse the trend ether, and the so-called all powerful Raj ^ (\U^
1

35.2.2 Second World War ● i it ' in'?

With a World War at hand th n the British Government
with the Indian situation, their eve!! ^ position to fti
they had neither the time nor the O" prosecution of to

ponder over the Indian era-tions .“1'"“'°" >“*er about the plight of the
-lions. And when the war came to a c(p.se. the Raj was ipfl4
24
 exhausted, too much in need for a respite, to start setting its Indian house in order afresh. Towards Independence
The situation had changed considerably:
● The European element in its armed forces was already hankering for demobilisation
for an opportunity to go home — rather than staying on indefinitely in India;
● To many Britons, India did no more appear to be an ideal place for their civil and
military careers or an easy field for their protected expatriate entrepreneurship.
● It was no longer convenient, even possible — in the face of obvious Indian hostility
to make use of India’s economy for furthering Britain’s global trade interests, except by
forcibly silencing all opposition.
● The extent of force that Britain had to use upon India in its desperate bid for survival in
1942 was extremely difficult to repeat at the end of the war in 1945, and that, too, on
an anticipated massive scale. The Raj was not as conditioned mentally and materially
for bulldozing another “Quit India’’ movement — lurking in the horizon — as it had
been in 1942.
● Financially, India was no more a debtor to Britain for meeting the expenses of her
“governance’’, and Britain — on the contrary—had become indebted to India to the tune
of above £ 3,3000 million (the Sterling Balance).
● Administratively, the Indian Civil Service — the famed “steel frame’’ of the empire —
was reduced during the war to a wholly run-down state.
Harassed by such crisis-management duties as holding the prices, ensuring the supplies,
tackling the famines or famine-like conditions, hunting the “fifth-columnists”, sounding
air-raid signals, enforcing “black-outs”, and burdened with the ever increasing weight of
the daily executive and judicial chores, the capabilities of a meagre number of men in the
ICS were stretched so further that they did not seem to be able to carry on for long without
being broken down completely. To make matters worse, the enlistment of the Britons for
the war took precedence over their recruitment in the ICS, and the British entry into the
cadre practically stopped at the height of the war in 1943. Irrespective of its putting up a
brave face, the Raj, had little reason to feel very secure with a minority of loyal Europeans
'in the ranks in the mid-1940 (587 in number) along side an Indian majority (614 in total)
"'■of uncertain proclivities in a rapidly changing circumstance. The days of classical
imperialism had come apparently to an end with the termination of the World War. No
body could sum up the British predicament in India better than the penultimate Viceroy,
i^i-d Wavell eventually did : “Our time in India is limited, and our power to control
events almost gone”.

^5.2.3 End of the War : The British Policy

Evidently after the war, it was no longer convenient for a metropolitan country — and far
‘ess profitable — to rule directly over a colony for the systematised reaping of all the
economic advantages from it. However, the Second World by no stretch of
^agination marked the collapse of imperialism, rather tthad het^ded tts survtval, and
on new lines — neo-colonialism.
opened up the possibility of rejuvenation
A land and its people could still be effectively colonised, satellectically placed,
economically subjugated and militarily utilised even after conceding to them
political independence, if their integrity and solidarity were disrupted and their
weaknesses peipetrated through the setting up of separate, ineffectual, puppet
regimes.

Tl>atthe Indian nationalists would not be willing to play into the hands of the puppeteers,
●m that a battle-weaty and an internally wrecked Britain could not again be in a position
to dominate the world market, did hardly discourage the Bntish to dream on the wild neo-
«0lonialist lines After all, Britain had little alternative but to ho^ against all hopes, and to
"8^'tO ensure its future of some kind in India by diverting *0 ‘"d.ans ^m their goal of
^ob-continental liberation, at any rate, and by disuniting and divniing them if at all
I>ossible. The toad for diversion it may he ercalled, had already been painstakingly laid.
Only the,daffic had now to be successfully guided into it.
up the divergences of a pluralist people was expected by the British to be as useful
■n ffleihaiStical ertreat from India as it certainly had been throughout in fostering the Raj’s
"navatioe. .Qf all the distinctions among Indians that the imperial authorities tried to
■"agmiV, and make use of (such as between the British Indians and the states’ peoples, the
“mattials” and the “non-martials", the urbanites and the non-urbanities and the brahmins 25
Towards A Sovereign State and the non Brahmins), those between the followers of two co-existing religions, Hinduism
and Islam, or between the Hindu majority and the substantial Muslim minority, proved to
be the most effective. On most of the important public matters, the Raj had succeeded in
subtly setting one of these two communities against the other, by acknowledging the
Muslim League as the only representative body of the Indian Muslims, by casting doubts '
on the nationalist character of a “Hinduised” Indian National Congress, and by using the
League as a political force to counter-balance the Congress. The way the Raj utilised the
League’s demand for a Pakistan to thwart all constitutional negotiations with the Congress
at the initial stage of the war, the manner in which it allowed the League practically
through the back door (in the absence of the Congress from the legislative scene on
account of the “Quit India” movement) to take over some of the provincial ministries, and
the sardonic pleasure with which its officials noted the spreading of the League’s sphere of
influence among the Muslims with the aid of intrigues and dispersal of official patronages
—^all clearly point to the careful building of a backlash that could thwart the progress of
the anti-imperialist movement.

35.2.5 Congress and the Muslim League

On their part, the nationalist leaders could do precious little to counter the Pakistan
Movement. Their self-righteous desire to do away with communalism merely through
denunciation, disregard, and their criticism of the retrograde fedual leadership of the
League however failed to check its growth because :
● they made no serious attempts to contact the Muslim masses for wining them away from
the League’s hold;
● the idioms which they spoke in, like Bande Martram, Ramrajya, etc. were used by the
League to propogate against them among the Muslims.
What seemed worst from the nationalist view point — and contrary to all their great
expectations - was not that the League had been benefiting from the exercise of some
political leverage under the Raj’s shadow (which ended any way in North West Frontier
Province Bengal and continued precariously in Sind and Assam when early in 1945 the
Congress N1L.AS decide to erturn to the legislatures), but that its scheme of Pakistan - ■

roSt^X“ g ^ « »een attracting a

Tere" oftlTo?* verted welcoming'
t rneqZcomitiSn 1 where they would not suffer flnm
and professionals. ** * * °''g‘®innding and overbearing Hindu business houses
11) To this possibility of a Muslim hegemony over jobs and business in a region, was beinS
added the anxiety of the Muslim
peasants in Punjab and Bengal for freedom in a fuWi®i
Pakistan, from the Hindu Bania and Zamindari exploitation.
Truly or fancifully, the League’s simnr.rf u
broadening. This afforded its supremo the Indian Muslims was

with unflinching British approval — opportunity to assume — ^

the Congress. Jinnah’s obstinacy was obstinate bargaining posture
Gandhi’s belated initiative for a Conor^*^ '^^'en he set
budge-even at the risk of weakening rapprochement at naught, and i
obsessive demand for a wholesome independence-irom^ ^f
Sind, Punjab, Baluchistan North Wp«t r? f^^omprising the Muslim-majority provm
entirety). The situation admirably suited ir'®' Provinces, Bengal and Assam in their
to penietuate their post-war imp^al m, * interests of the British, who could use it« ,
worst — the Indian empire to their lilt ● — at the best or to break-up *t ,,
common man and woman and dicnrt advantage. Howsoever distasteful to the ^
^gle
1947.
and the Pakistal^Surlt ot° dominate
dor® the Indian proceedings
“P"’ between 1945 an )
The
developments during these
i) level of high politics
rucial years ran on two perceptible lines:' ( '
the
Congress, the League and about a negotiated settlement among ■/

ii) The level of popular ,7 ●"dia’s political future.

26
felt for resistance
against »e
the^Brr"**™*”’®
British and their indigenous collaborators. ^'****
 Although the two lines did hardly ever converge, they nevertheless attracted and distracted Towards Independence
each other and constituted together the history of the three fateful years that culminated in
the partition and independence of India.

Check Your Progress 1

. 1 Read the following statements and mark right ( \/ ) or wrong (X).
i) The World War was followed by a rapid increase in the prices of various
commodities,

ii) Owing to the World War, the British could not deal with the Indian political
situation very effectively.
Hi) The proportion of British officers in the ICS increased after 1940.
.. iv) The British tried to bridge the gap between the Hindus and the Muslims,
v) Muslim business groups supported the demand for Pakistan.
Vi) In Punjab and Bengal the Muslim peasants were exploited by hanias and zamindar.
2 How did the British perpetuate the political hostility between the Hindus and the
Muslims? Answer in five lines.

35.3 ATTEMPTS AT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS

On., ’ L V fovniir the British started realising by the end of
1944e the tide of the war turned in ei allowed to remain where it stood
aft Indian ^ ^j^^t it would be impossible to hold India by
for^*^ India Movement. ^ the imprisoned Congress leaders, if
ce for long. A dialogue .j t^gm in future from taking advantage of an
or for anything else, at least for prevent unemployment. According to
P osive post-war situation of econ fgHow-travellers were required to be directed
ell the energies of the Con|ress profitable channel, i.e. into dealing with the
front the path of agitation into constitutional problems”,
mini^strative
^^nrchill problems
and his of India resisted tips
men stubbornly . j jjline or thinking
tnin May till1945)
the termination of the
and the war-time
^^"^^rrheduled
Coalmen Government in Britain was scheduled to m to make room for a freshly elected one.
35.3.1
p,,„
The Simla Conference to set the ball of negotiations rolling, the
Vice™*'
eroy, Wavell, ordered on
‘iT'toe*945 the release of all the Congress Working
o,hers. notably the League leaders, to
niimttee members, and 14 July 1945) for setting up a new Executive
Coun" f
“ttcil at the Centre — practically
Indian in cLposition-excepting the Commander in
deliberations. The Council would have
and of course, the Viceroy, ^^ by the British and the Uague) ”Caste
hIh
"Wdus” and Muslims,f™""
fw function
and it should
function wiu
within the existing constitutional arrangement
tttithout its being responsible to the legislature.
to discuss the making of a new constitution
British in fact were the conference, the Congress naturally
«the actual end of the war. Wh.le ^"^/^^erting its secular nationalist
to be treated as a “Caste nny community, including
Musi”” J and Abudal Ghaffar Khan presented themselves in
!!!'‘«'tms (Of whom Abul Kalam
Siml membeis respectively, of the
in the capacities of the leaders to the council. The league, which insisted
^®hgress delegation), as the Congress nominees
on Its having the sole agency to speak for every 27
^ore obdurately than with reason
Towards A Sovereign State

. !j:
14. Gandhi at Simla.

j
'Indian Muslim, objected to the Congress stand, and claimed
an absolute jurisdiction for
choosing all the Muslim members of the Council.

The claim even embarrassed the Viceroy who felt that the loyal Unionist Muslims, o<
those m power m Punjab without compromising themselves with the League
deserved some representation. ® '

Not satisfied with this, the League further dprmnHf-H

,. , .... ® ^'Communal veto bv askinc for a
r. ..

two-ihird majority m the proposed Council, instead of t ^ ^ ●«

opposed by the Muslim members (or its own nominppA ^ decision
interests. In his anxiety for encouraging the League’s Muslim
aside the Congress offer to join the Council hv k ■ ■
posture, and brushi g
later, the Viceroy, Wavell, abruptly decided to League to step '
the Simla Conference. Judging by the subspn t^A ®"''dsh proposals and disso
only an official recognition of the Leacue’ ^'^^iopmenls, his action implied nof I
thereby inflated its stature in the Muslitr, ot speak for all Muslims, and M
League in Substance the power to Neeatp seemed to have conceded
convenience. Hereafter, the satisfaction of^d^ i Negotiation that did not suit itso.
settlement. League became a pre-requisite to any [■●;1

35.3.2 The Labour in Power

Following a massive victory in the ge ● o
power in Britain in July 1945 and raised 1 British Labour Party came
Indian question. Known for their symoathir^^ ™ settlement of th^ „r
leaders had already committed themseWesT r ' ™'i°nalist cause in India, tW ^^'to
power. As early as 24 June 1938, in fact m ‘f ™d when they were vo>
Attlee, Aneurin Bevan, Stafford Cripps and I '^‘‘ders (including Cleme^'^^
Knshna Menon at Filkin’s near London an I ">« Jawaharlal Nehru and ,
Government in Britain - to accept the fin case of their forming »
Consittuent Assembly, elected on ‘unTv!rT India as decided bygrant
»n lad'’
.
freedom^by transferring authority from the'n ^ ^ad also agreed to « ivocal d
appeared to be the position of the Labour '"dian hands. So uneqn afi
28
so

complete was its electoral victory C ev^the"

'ne Viceroy of India shuddered at
 possibility of the new British rulers' handing over India “to their Congress friends as soon Towards Independence
as possible”. What Wavell did not know initially, but came to understand soon with some
satisfaction, was that the Labourite enthusiasm for making a promise, without being in
pifice, could not be the same for keeping it when in office. If the Whigs and the Tories in
Britain, or for that matter the Tories an the Liberals there, did not drastically differ in the
past in their attitudes towards the maintenance of the Indian Empire, despite the difference
in ideology, why should the Labours not agree — in spite of their socialist affectation —
ivuh many of the Conservatives, bureaucrats and vested interests on the most advantageous
wkys of dismantling it? After all, the act of freeing an uncontrollable colony would by no
Stitch of imagination be termed as imperialistic, howsoever much the disuniting and
dividing of its people in the process exposed it ever so weakeningly to fresh neo-colonialist
xploitations. Apparently, the Labours had noparticular qualms about it, for they were as
ii'illing as the conservatives and the British officials to .
● let the Communalists, holding all others in India to ransom,
● silence popular out-bursts in the country by the use of brute force,
● become obsessed with the defence of British overseas interests, and . _ .
● actually employ British-Indian troops in Indo-China and Java to prop up the French
and the Dutch imperialists, respectively.
Consistent with the tenor of its over-all approach, the first moves that the Attlee
' .Government made in India were hardly path-breaking, or which a non-Labour
■Wemment couid not make. It asked the Viceroy to announce on 21 Augusr 1945, the
' Molding of new elections for the Indian Ugislatums in the
The elections were not only overdue for the centre (last elected in 1934), as well as for the
.provinces
-th (last eiectea
elated inin 1937), but
uu also essential for eropenirtg
„p„ntiations Viceroy the
wasconstitutional g^eto-
prompted further
the wrangles ^d squabbles in the name of negotia ions viceroy f f
,tenew. on 19 ^epiemoer
September 1945 the Fpromises
. of
. “early full self government for India
discussions with the elected legislators
(refusing carefully to use the term »ndependen ^ Constituent Assembly
Wd the representatives of the IndiM (bypassing conveniently the previous
for undertaking fresh “"^Mtuttonal ^ngemen (by p^ .-universal suffrage”) and efforts
U^pnte assurance to elect a ^ .f^^nnutive Council with nominees from
e made once again for setting up _ Attlee Minisny’s reactionary Indian policy
■he main Indian parties. No body observed the Attlee Minis y
hetterv and more ruefully, than its own ideologue,
. nnlicv of the Coalition Government (under
‘^n all British policy, whether ‘t
Attlee), there is still a marked
j of a realexploitation
will to helpofina making
partly
India free in the full sense of the ■ ™ parUy made and partly
real and partly unreal communa j „^ensely overrated hero-worship of princes,
exploited by ourselves ■ ”'^J^tacXsponsibility”.
for whom we are supposed to hav

^S.3i3 Elections and the Cabinet Mission

ruA. f ■ . 1945-46. By the time the elections took
^e'^lecitions were duly held in aftermath of the Simla Conference, and
League — following the g ^ situation to deal with its separate
^n^irtg the carrot of Pakistan j^e dream of Musalmanon-ki-
electorate. To the Muslim self-determination was added the fervent
^Ukurhat and the Indian Muslim s speci Congress was at the crest of its popularity,
●■^bgious cry of “Islam in danger . A g coming of independence, it was
especially with the people’s anticipa i , frenzied atmosphere to carry the bulk of
^nevertheless not in a position m sucn re g , particularly the respective
nbe-Muslim voters with it. The outcome o brought all these out.
positions of the Congress and the League,
... -e General (non-Muslim) constituencies, secunng
Congress won overwhelmingly m ^ Central Legislative Assembly and
per cent votes, winning 57 out of lU Punjab and Bengal. The spectacular
^ob,taining majorities in all the the'significance that the Government had ●
L^ongress victories, however, could not British point of view, and at the
^!*;eady thrust upon the Muslim electora e. more in 1946 than the massive
o^gotiation table to be presided by t em g,g ability to goad the Muslim voters to
^^tional mandate for the Congress was League attained remarkable
Us side — by hook or by crook. j. ^ winning all the 30 Muslim seats in 29
successes by polling 86.6 per cent of the M.usu
 Towards A Sovereign State
the Central Legislative Assembly and grabbing 442 out of 509 Muslim seats in the
provinces. But despite all its achievement, the League could not establish its Swaraj on
those Muslim-majority provinces which it was demanding for Pakistan. It lost NWFP and
Assam to the Congress and failed to dislodge the Unionists from Punjab. Even the League
ministries'that were set up in Bengal and Sind hinged precariously on official and
European support. The fact was that the League’s claim for Muslim support had hardly
ever been tested in undivided India. The elections were held not only on the basis of
separate electorates, which had been devised to keep the Muslims away from the national
manistream, but also on the strength of severely restricted franchise — barely 10 per cent
of the total population. Had the elections been contested on the adult franchise, it is
difficult to say what would have actually happened, in view especially of the congress
successes in such elections in India in 1952 and the League’s reverses in East Pakistan in
1954, as well as of its failure thereafter to control affairs in West Pakistan.
Once the main parties emerged from the limited elections in their strength, as anticipated
more or less by the British, the Attlee Government lost no time in commencing
negotiations with them. A high-powered mission of three British cabinet members (Pethick
P^"S‘dent of the Board of Trade;
and A.V Alexander, First Lord of Admiralty) was sent to India to find out ways and
*rBri,i!h r As “ been sensed in
idi! hlfre British
India had reached the high point of ferment by March,
hands for all practical purposes, and
intermittent expressions throughout the countrv What 1946 with ^popular
^ . unrest
I, finding
imaing

l^trerlm Man'^vl^tJi^em"® “'--I future of India“ Zld^'upon

Following a series of long-drawn deliberation® *1,..
had often run into stalemates on account of Jitmah's brin^^*'^
t j- ,

Muslim irght of self determination, the Mission eventi^n^”*^''’ ^

but somewhat plausible plan for wriggling out of the mL
Viceroy and one of its members fAlexanHpr^ u a impasse. Although the
Mission was unable to accept the League’s dema dT towards Jinnah, the
the whole of all the Muslim majority areas) on th,. a full-fledged Pakistan (comprising
determination, if conceded to Muslims had l F°a"tl that the irght of communal self-
formed majorities in West Bengal and *Ea®fP> f to the non-Muslims who
would necessitate such a bifuraction of BenJal Assam proper. This
all regional and linguistic ties, create in®„rrn ’ would go against
problems, and yet might not satisfy the .economic and administrative
opposed to the acceptance of a “truncated stage was unequivocally
both the concepts of a larger and a smaller Pakistan’’). Having thus rejected
loose union of all the Indian territories unde *he plan of a very
defences, the foreign affairs and the cornm,/-^ "merely the
existing provincial legislatures. The Drov^rTr*^”"’ all other subjects to the
Assembly, with each province being allotted would then elect a Constituent
Its population and distributed strength-wi®e f number of seats proportionate to
so elected “will divide up into three sections" various communities. The members'
provinces (Bombay, the United Provinces Bih ^ for the non-Muslim majority
Madms), Section B for the Muslim-maStv to’ Orissa and .
Punjab) and Section C for the same in die "»rth-west (Sind, NWFP
sections would have the authority to Smw uo?‘®“‘ Assam). All these
group constitutions, and setting up thereby ‘constitutions and, if necessary,
executives. As the completion of all these^Lo®‘‘erm
1"“*^arrangements
sectional legislatures and ,
time, the Mission proposed a short.t»r„
measure
would take considetabl®
Interim Government at the Centre enjoying the the formation immediately of an
with the Indians holding all the ’
portfolios. support of the major political parties, and'
The Mission’s plan was intended to be «
the erjection of the Pakistan scheme. anVrrirj“- *e Congress tltioug" .
autonomous Muslim-majority areas in som! <he League through the creation of
30
Conr css and the League were inclined to , P™**™'*!'- At the outset, therefore, both IW
accept the plan. But soon . - r.-lty surfac*'
 Towards Independence
over the.provisions for forming sections or groups of provinces. The League interpreted
the groupings to be compulsory, for that might brighten up the possibility of a future full-
fledged Pakistan by bulldozing the Congress-administered Muslim-majority provinces of
NWFP (in section B) and Assam (in section C) into it (in their respective sections the
Congress majorities from NWFP and Assam would be reduced to helpless minorities). It
was precisely because of the opposition of NWFP and Assam to their being dragged into
Sections B and C that the Congress wanted the grouping to be optional. The Confess was
a^so critical of the absence of any provision for the elected members from the princely
states in the proposed Constituent Assembly, though it appeared to be willing to swallow
the limited and indirect nature of electing the Constituent Assembly — blatantly contrary
to its past demand for such an election on adult franchise. By the end of July 1946 the
Congress and the League decided against trying out the Cabinet Mission plan any further,
mainly on account of their difference over the grouping system, but paitly because of the
Mission’s inability to clarify its intensions. In its anxiety for putting up a disarranged India
under some nominal centre, and with the communally segregated autonomous units almost
as a prelude to ^Balkanisation” (on the sole plea, of course, of papered
disunity)the Mission failed to take note of all the important details. St‘lUhe Cabinet
Mission plan was the most that the British - in their haste to leave the ground to the neo-
colonialists-could really offer. After July 1946, they had not even talked senously of the
necessity for maintaining the pretence of a weak Indian Union.
35.3.4 The Communal Carnage and Interim Government
Tu . .. r.i«n SO exasnereated the League that It wanted forth
The set back over the Cabinet Mission «o P expression to its post-
with to force the situation through
election slogan, Ladke Lenge Pakistan {
have Pakistan by force”). The outcome
was the communal carnage that began ^jher areas of the country, notably in
.Calcutta, and then in a chain of reactions sp ^ ^.
Bombay, eastern Bengal and Bihar, a ce^i P^^^* of Bengal, Suhrawardy,
Culcutta the League rowdies, rLoiting to large scale violent attacks on the
had a field day on 16 August by suddenly r ^he Hindus and Sikh toughs also hit
non-Muslims. Once the element of suipnse .
back. The army, stationed at the very he ^ already been killed in three days,
when it did sluggishly move to restore order 4,uuu na
^d 10,000 injured.
1946, but not so ftenziedly as in Calcutta. Even
Riots erupted in Bombay m September i incidents there. In October 1946,
then, more than 300 persons lost their ^ Tippera, leaving 400 dead and .
communal riots broke out furiously m Noakhali was promptly
resulting in widspread violation of wom^ unsurpassed brutality, massacring more
avenged in Bihar towards the ^ ^ ^^d at Garhamukhteswar alone approximately
^an 7,000. U.P. was not lagging ® U.P. butchery called for retaliatory
1.000 people were slaughtered. The i ^ eventually to funous communal irots,
actions in NWFP (Hazara district ^ p„njab, especially in Lahore, Amritsar,
encompassing the Muslims, about 5,000 by the middle of 1947. These
Saltan, Attock and Rawalpindi, and ot g continued to blaze very high
'^ere, however, the mere beginnings, ° resulting in deaths and injuries to several
^lanughout 1947 and the earlier part o women, immense destruction of personal
lakhs of people, abduction and rape oi . placess. MilUons had to become
properties and innumerable desecration Punjab) a wholesale exchange of population
^■efiigees, and whereas in some ^ tinned to leave their places in waves for a
look place, in others (like Bengal) pe . suffering and dehumanization, and in the
long itme to come. In the sheer extent or the fratricide in the Indian sub
: total upsetting of the country’s social an ^ ^ ays thereafter, perhaps had only a
oontinent between 1946 and 1948, and intermittenUy ai
few parallels in the annals of civilisation.
tbieak of the communal carnage that an Interim
It Was coinciding practically with the ou ^rabinet Mission proposed as a short-term
Ijovemment at the centre — the September 1946. To begin with, the
*iifasure in its plan — came into the same difficulty they faced in the
Viceroy’s attempts at its formation me^ ^ between 5 Hindu nominees of the
Simla Conference, namely Jinnah s msis Government, apart from 1 Sikh
Congress and 5 Muslim nominees o Congress rejected such a proposal of 31
and one Scheduled Caste in it. As anticip
 -fV

vards A Sovereign State “parity”, claimed the right to include any number of Hindus, Muslims and others in its list
of nominees and demanded the new Government to function like a cabinet, and not like a
mere advisory body to the Viceroy. Wave!! would have called off his endeavours on the
ground that nothing was likely to be achieved if the main parties continued to differ —
which he contentedly did in Simla in June 1945, had he not been thoroughly alarmed by
the popular actions at the mass level immediately before and soon after the so joum of the
Cabinet Mission in India (these have been described in Section 35.4). It was the threat to
law and order, either in shape of a mutiny of the forces in the recent past, or in the form of
strikes by the postal and railways employees in their imminence, that Wavell decided to go
ahead with the plan of an Interim Government, constituted, even solely for the time being,
by the Congress — the party which enjoyed the greatest influence over the public mind.
“If Congress will take responsibility they will realise that firm control of unruly elements
is necessary, and they may put down the Communists and try to end their own left-wing”,
wrote Wavell, who also hoped “to keep them (the Congress leaders) so busy with
administration that they had much less time for politics ’’(Wavell to Secretary of State, 31
July 1946).

Elated apparently by the Viceregal gesture of giving them precedence over their League
counterparts, ad expecting the formation of the Interim Government to be to their
● advantage, as well as an advance towards the peaceful transfer of power, the Congress
leaders opted on 2nd September for the making of a cabinet under the leadership of
Jawahylal Nehru. As the situation unfolded later on, the Congress-dominated functioning
of the Interim Government became on the whole an exercise in misadventures. Despite all
tts concerns, it was in effect helpless - in the face of the communal holocaust - to move
the leisurely amy, under a British commander in Chief, into the riot-afflicted areas. Being
presided over by the Viceroy, the Interim Government was also not able sometimes to
withstand his vetoing power. And its position worsened when Wavell persuaded the

Direct Action , and hby “agreeing to balance the Congress-nominate

Persistence with the
d Scheduled Caste
member. Thereafter the Interim Government, obstructed by its League members and
divided sharply into the Congress and the League camps, backed up by therwr^C
0 lowings within the bureacracy, was reduced for all practical put^osL ,o a head
If the Goyemment of a country at the centre was thus tom asunder,
communities of its peop e were led desneratelv tn n.t s \ and the maior
^
to ermain united, and yet be indewnint"^/“ ^
those erndered a haggLhamssernol wL^^H 7 ~
1947—were no longer hopeful. Rather thev werel7 *«8>nn'"g .
any cost, if necessary by buying ftwdom7.r
and by putting their life-long nationalist dreams “u«ion“
The alternative for them was:

● to try to expose the machinations behind thTrimere!"'""'*’

eane
communalists, and organise resistance against both the Muslim and the Hindu
● r° s™u“aneously go all out for launching the fin,i A

to attempt at achieving popular unity on the bawfIhes""***"*''** ■’'0''e>r'e"‘

^e alternative, of course, was bound to be long-dtawn
difficult, but not impossible for those .' °"® hazardous and, indeed, very
of the people. cou rely ultimately on the urges and upsurges;
Check Your Progress 2
1 Read the following statements and mark right ( ) or wrong (x).
i) Simla Conferen
Muslims, ce failed because the Congress did not want to represent the
ii) The Cabinet Mission eri
iii) The “Direct Action rejected the proposal of an interim government,
large scale. aunched by the Muslim League led to communal rioting at a’

32
iv)f position of the Interim Government improved after the Muslim League joined
 Towards Independence "
2 Why did the British make attempts for a settlement ? Write in ten lines.

iff

3 What was the impact of the victory of the Labour Party in England, on the Indian
political situation ? Write in five lines.

'●f

35,4 THE POPULAR URGES

between 1945 and 1947 were broadly of
The symptomatic expressions of the popular urges
t)yo varieties:
„ fhe colonial administration,
i) those which led to direct confrontation . to its
H^miinded colonialism through their opposition to its
ii) and those which indirectly un
deraiin
indigenous upholders—certain capita ists
princelings, most landlords and mahajam.
numerous that one is left
the whole been so
The occurrences on both these lines had on . j.
with little alternative but to highlight on y

35.4.1 Direct
Here we discuss some of the majo
confrontations with the colonial administration:
. nlace over the INA trials, or the prosecutions
i) INA Trials: The initial explosion tooKp have read about the
against the imprisoned members o began in November 1945, the heroic
fole^of INA in Unit 34). By the time nr revealed to the
exploits of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bos ^^^ying their emotions. There was
Indian public, catching their (Sehgal, Shah Nawaz and Dhillon)
countrywide protest when the three communities, and symbolizing the unity of the
belonging to the Hindu, Muslim and iiRn meetings and
people, were put on the docks in the histori everywhere, calling for the
processions, angry outbursts and agitated speeches
immediate release of the INA prisoners.
cnmassed all other places and turned the city into
The developments in Calcutta, however, su^^^^ ^j^g
a storm centre. On 21 November, j^^jg square. The processionists were joined on
towards the administrative quarters in p (Communist student wing) and the .
the way by the members of the Students students tied the nationalist, the League
Lea^uo students’ organisation. gg^j for anti-imperialist people’s solidarity,
and the red flags together police on Dharamtolla Street for the night
The demonstrators were halted ^ Hindu and a Muslim student. The firing
and fired upon the following day, i i of Calcutta went into action by disrupting 33

instantly inflamed the entire city and the people

 Towards A Sovereign State
10")

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,'a WOMEN WARRIORS SHAH

DEFENCE (.OUNSW-

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^-' F OF GUN BAHLES IN

B£T.^'IA CHARGES OF MURDER AND Potent talTrofb
'i' H WARN ANNAMITES OF
REPRISALS
WAGENG WAR AGAINST KING in Mi(^ East
o«

t>b»i
u II, t Mm

K>
Ift *<noiir»Bi I-
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II
defemce asks foT three ^VEEKS' In P**^*^'
...I «nui i« i,f huim.
<>Okt«r<>v*i Nj
l\<; I
adjournment
NEW DELHL ’
»*● >

^TRIkk lnds ^ P«ndi»^w2Sui by th« f»c«

J
on ,NA Trials. "
traffic, burning cars and lo ’
huXedTn'^exc.Wm'' stm^
people repeatedly clashed^' ^2 and -^3
and hit back with whateveTV'^ P^’ice in'^diffr
November 1945 the British ^®‘*P°ns they could 1-,
firings, 33 deaths, B " ■
and destruction of I5Q ^.- ^^^'^red.s of civilians n r'
The Calcutta turmoil in ■50 pohce and amiy vehicit ^ of the ar^iy
issue, did not particular, and the
go altogether i
'tt vain. The
nation-wide aoi
authorities: h in general over the INA
“ deeded ,0 climb down, first by

iS^
\.

●>i|
/
\ ●-

. t
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k
 announcing in December 1945 to try only those IN A members who could be accused of Towards Independence
murder and brutalities, and then by remitting in January 1946, the sentences passed against
the first batch of the accused. After some initial insensitivity, the Government in fact was
quick to read the significance of the INA agitation, in relation to Indian nationalism. It
understood that the agitation “cuts across communal barriers” that the civil disturbances
1

accompanying it could produce disastrous results for the Raj.

Curiously enough, the Indian publicmen, whether of nationalist or of communalist type,
refused to see in the agitation what the British had already seen, and they decided to brand
mass actions as “frittering away” of energies in “trifling quarrels” with the police. As an
antidote to the unified enthusiasm of the people, the Congress Working Committee chose
(in its meeting of 7-11 December 1945) to remind everyone of the need for observing
strict non-violence. The Congress and the League leaders’ restraint over popular outbursts
could only be explained by their pre-determination in favour of a negotiated settlement
with the British, or by their opting for political bargaining rather than for fighting to the
finish. They were willing to take up the INA question, or any such issue, only so far as to
derive advantages from it in the coming elections, and no further. For example the
Congressmen made a promise during Punjab elections that all INA personnel will be
absorbed in the army of free India. Mentally they had already preferred at that point the
electoral politics of the ten per cent of Indians to the desperations of the rest — the ninety
per cent.

Tlie INA agitation was by no means over by the end of 1945, it struck again in February
1946, and at the same epicentre-the volatile Calcutta. The league students of the city gave
a strike call to protest on 11 February 1946 against the sentence of 7 years’ impnsohment,
passed on A. Rashid Ali of the INA. Other students organisations including ^e
Communist-led Students Federation, joined in amidst spontaneous display of in^^r-
communal solidarity. The protestations were-transformed into fierce fights when the
"Militant working c\L youth united with the students. A massive rally (addressed by the
League, the natfonalist and Communist spokesmen) and a geneml st^e on 2 ^
paralysed Calcutta and its industrial suburbs, leading eventually to clashes with the police
and the army, the erection of barricades on the roads ^d street ski^shes
After two days of bloody encounters, resulting in the deaths of 84 and injunes to 300, the
. authorities were able finally to restore “order”. The tension, however, continued ro linger
on, not only in Calcutta and Bengal, but also in other parts.

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Vi asu

RIN ‘Revolt’. 35
17. Newspaper Report on
i
Towards A Sovereign State ii) RIN Revolt: At the heels of the second Calcutta outburst in February 1946 came the
most serious of all the direct anti-imperialist confrontations of the post war phase — the
revolt of the Royal Indian Navy. Having served abroad, and being familiar with the ways
of the world outside, the ratings of the RIN were resentful of the racist behaviour of their
English superiors. Besides, despite their segregation from the people at large, they were
aware on the whole of the unrest building up in the country, especially over the INA trials.
Their own rising tempers suddenly frayed over the poor quality of food, they were served
with. On 18 February 1946 the ratings of “Talwar” in Bombay harbour went into hunger-
strike to protest against bad food and wrose racial arrongance. Others in 22 ships in the
neighbourhood followed suit on the following day, and it soon spread to the Castle and the
Fort Barracks on the shore.

The strikers raised the National, the League and the Red flags together.
They elected a Naval Central Committee headed by M.S. Khan and drew up their
demands, highlighting as much the national ones as their own. They elected:

f» release of the INA prisoners,

● freedom of all other political prisoners,
● withdrawal of Indian troops in Indo-China and Java,
● belter food,
● more civilised treatment, and
● equal pay for European and Indian sailors alike.

On 20 February the ratings in the Barracks were surrounded by anned guards, while their
Comrades in the ships found British bombers threatening them with destruction Fighting
started next day when the beleagured ratings tried to break out of the Barracks and some of
the ships (already taken over by the ratings from their European superiors) preferred gun-
battles to surrenders. There were heroic confrontations, too, in Karachi, spearheaded by the
aaxtrv 7.

Til': iu.vKTmrW. insm.v

the INDIAN NAVAt MUTINY:
SCENES IN THE STREETS OF BOMBAY.

●ft

36
 rebels in “Hindusthan”, By 22 February, the revolt had spread to all the naval bases in the Towards Independence
country, involving 78 ships, 20 shore establishments and 20,000 ratings.
As natural in the electrifying circumstances of 1946, the mutineers evoked unprecedented
popular response. In Karachi, the Hindu and Muslim students and workers demonstrated in
support of the ratings, and engaged the army and police in violent clashes. Bombay
witnessed emotional expressions of public sympathy-people hailing the ratings, rushing in
fopd for them and shopkeepers insisting on their taking whatever articles they liked. The
Communists, with the support of the Congress Socialists, gave a call for a general strike on
22 February. Defying the Congress and the League directives to the contrary, 300,000
workers came out of the factories and mills and took to the. streets on that day. Thereafter
it was Calcutta all the way in Bombay — with clenched fists, barricades and street
fightings, but with more suffering, bloodshed, and greater — almost exclusive
involvement of the working class. Several hundreds died in the delirious two days, and
thousand suffered injuries. The rising in Bombay, however, could not make any further
headway on account of two reasons:
● The overwhelming militaiy might of the Raj which was put in action.
● Vallabhbhai Patel and Jinnah jointly persuaded the ratings to surrender on 23rd
February. An undertaking was given by the Congress and the League that they would
prevent any victimisation of the ratings. But soon this assurance was forgotten. Thus,
ended the Revolt of the RIN.
● Others: Similar direct anti-imperialist confrontations though not of the same magnitude
and significance as those of the INA ad the RIN agitations—also continued to take
place contemporaneously in different parts of the country. Some of these were:
● The popular outcry against the government decision to cut down the rational supplies
to the civilian population was one such example, over which 80,000 demonstrated in
Allahabad in mid-February 1946. .
● Another was the widespread police strike in April 1946 under the aegis of the leftists in
Malabar, Bihar, eastern Bengal (in Dacca in particular), the Andamans and even in
Delhi.
● In July 1946 the pos«l employees decided to defy fte authorities tmd «
work for a itme. Sympathising with their cause, and at the call of *e Commmists, the
people in Calcutta observed a total and peaceful general strike o^91“'y
● Excitement also ran very high in July 1946 throughout the country over the threat of
all-India Railway employees’ strike.
Strikes and industrial actions had in fact become in 1946 the onler of the day.
^5.4.2 Indirect Confrontations

nrA ● ^ capitalists and planters of affecting 1,941,948 workers and

mcords. it resulted in ^629 ^ir economic
dem u*° 12,717,762 self-confident mood all around,
mands, the strikes nevertheless . action in most of the cities and towns. If
. <I created an environment for
the ainst colonialism seemed good in the
urbri®'^* ^ even better in the rural sector-where startling
dev!^ ●’““‘I’llity appeared to be peasantry, more
SDedr’’T"“ “““"S m resist its immediate exploiters, and thereby
P ^en
Ifically the poor section of it, stood up
the hands of their colonial masters, s
^ apparent if some of major
^Ppenings in the countryside are briefly recoun e
On!!?j’i.* „f,heDost-war peasant agitations
Of the earliest, and most intense, of m p ^
was that of the
adivasi peasants—were in
in Thana district, Bombay. The Woriis
sjority in the villages of Umbergaon, ’„assed into the hands of moneylenders and
l/?® poverty-stricken, most of their lands a p . v incurred at exorbitant
'““rilords for their failure to re-pay loans ” ^"e^ntually reduced to the status
Of interest (50 to 200 per cent). ^ held lands on paying half the
enants-at-will who were settled in * P ^ agricultural labourers, working either as

LST lands or as wage-earners cutting grass on their

^-hands in the landlords’ cultivab ’
lands, or as workers for the contractors on m
f ^est lands on paltry payments. In 37
 e

Towards A Sovereign State times of difficulty, they had to continue to take Khwat\ or grain loans from the money ii
lenders and landlords, and on their failure to pay back, they were forced to give Veth- i
Bigar, or to labour for the landlords, without payment. Consequently, many of the Worlis -
whether tenants-at-will ur landless labourers—had to turn life-long serfs for all s
practical purposes.

It was in 1945 that the Worlis were first organised by the Maharashtra Kisan Sabha, and
led subsequently by outside leaders like Godavari Purulekar to refuse to give Veth-Bigar. . ?■

In the autumn of 1945 the Worli labourers demanded a wage increase for cutting grass,
and stmck wrk. The landlords retaliated by terrorising them with the help of hirelings and
the police The police even opened fire on 10 October 1945 on an assembly of the strikers ‘:
in Talawada, killing 5 and injuring many. The sufferings, however, bolstered up the spirit
of the Worhs rather than breaking up their morale, and in course of time the landlords had :

increase in the wages for forest work, cutting trees and landing logs for the forest '
contractors. By autumn 1946 they struck forest work for months, !nd in the face of
repressions of the local Government they succeeded in forcing the Maharashtra Timber
Govemmentthatithitvengefullyba^fbvexteraiL rf?
number of their activists and ini, irturing
haonened on 7 Tannarv 1047 c
crimiiTr® ''
^^^^s against many of them. The worst
■ '
laliik. Vie WMli mevemen,

ii) Bakasht Peasants Agitation

Compared to the struggle of the Worlis
Bihar was more extensive, and certainly more H agitation of 1946-47 in
decade or so over the Bakasht lands which were “
Apart from the rayati lands which they settled withT®***’ Zamindars.
lands which they kept for themselves, Md got cultivmedT“'’“‘
Zamindars rented the Bakasht lands to thp f agncultural labourers, the
standing, the Bakasht peassi wem
was profitable to the Zamindars Ifor a L ● ° ejectments, firstly because it
and a higher rent to get possession), and secondr^"^ invariably to pay fresh saloft^^
circumvent the tenancy law (namelv the T i^cause it was convenient for them to
tenants some occupancy rights if they had which gave the Bakasht
regular payment of rent). There was a sudd Position for 12 years at a stretch on
1930s when the authorities contemplated c ^ f ejectments in the latter half of the
Bakashi peasants. Although the contemolat- tenancy rights to the helpless
very serious, the Zamindars decided again Government was proved hardly to be
evictions. The peasants resisted under thp k "®k, and took to large scale
from 1937 to 1939 agtunst the Zamindnrgt^ ^er of the Kisan Sabha, and fought furiously -
police. " the Government officials and the
Hostilities, however, were temporarily halted with .h ,r
— uneasy peace had somehow been maintai d k onset of the second world war, and ^
an

arbitrations and unstable agreements The is °®tween the battle lines through unreliable'
the Congress contested the elections in Biha^^h the forefront in 1946 when ,
system. Faced with the possibility of losing thp^ P^°"'ising to abolish the Zamindari
they should be able to retain at least their nerso^ ^indaris, the Zamindars thought that
all the tenants, and try to turn,these into the Zi^t Bakasht lands of
vigorously resisted fresh attempts at evictions TnH k peasants
was renewed simultaneously in Monghyr GaCa a h L*® of 1946 the agitation' ,
orders (based on fictitious records) and Lathiah th districts. Armed with court
from the Bakasht lands. The tillers, under the lead^ ^indars marched to oust the tillet®^
give up, offered satyagraha and came into violent h u Sabha, refused'to ;
loot, deaths and injuries, and also arrests and imnri ^ were cases of arson and
extended to Darbhanga, Madhubanij Muzaff^ur movement was
bitterest during the harvesting season when the np ^^gnlpur. The conflict became >/.

raised. Women and children also joined in the Mefend the crops already
organised to oppose the invading Zamindars* mpn u , volunteer corps were
the Bihar Bakasht Disputes Settlement Act of 1047 u Government measures
which did not subside till the Congress ministry ensuing battle^
Zamindari Act, 1948. ® ministry was forced to pass the Bihar AboUtion of -
38

L
iii) Travancore Agitation Towards Independence
Unlike the occurrences in Maharashtra and Bihar, those in the state of Travancore in the-
south were neither wholly rural nor exclusively agrarian in their content. Nevertheless the
agrarian issues (like the economic exploitation and social oppression of the Jenmis or
landlords) and the agricultural classes (like the exploited and oppressed poor peasants,
village artisans and agricultural labourers) contributed richly to what had happened there in
1946. The scene of happenings was the Shertalai-Aleppy region of north-western
Travancore, where a strong trade-union-cum agrarian movement developed under the
leadership of the Communists. The movement criss-crossed between the overlapping
villages and small towns, and included in its fold poor peasants, agricultural labourers,
fishermen, tody-tappers, and coir factory workers—^most of whom came from the
depressed agricultural ranks and flocked around towns to eke out precarious existence.
The coir factory workers had already won through their trade-union not only some
economic gains, but also such important concessions as having their say in the recruitment
in the factories, and a irght to run their own ration shops. Being politically articulate, they
and their mentors—the Communists—launched a massive campaign against the “American
model” constitution which C.P. Ramaswamy Iyer, the Dewan, wanted to impose upon the
state people. Through this device the Dewan and the Maharaja were in fact preparing
clandestinely for the establishment of an independent Travancore state at the time of the
foreseeable British departure from India. It was to provide for an irresponsible government
in Travancore with a legislature elected on universal suffrage, but without having any
effective control over the executive, under a Dewan to be appointed by the Maharaja. The
Communist furore against the plan so enraged the state authorities that they unleashed the
forces of teiror on their opponents in the Aleppy region. Police camps were set up, and
indiscriminate arrests, detentions and tortures began. Persecutions eventually forced the
workers to take shelter in places protected by their own volunteer force To counteract the
state violence, they called a general strike on 22 October 1946 m the Aleppy-Sher^m
area, and initiated a irsing by attacking the police camp at (near Aleppy). The ●
authorities promptly clamped martial law on 25 October and ordered Ae army to attack the
workers’ sheltered ^tion at Vayalar (nek Shertalai) on 27th. Wha followed was a
ghastly massacre of 800, whose martyrdom not only swayed the pubhc opinion agams the
state’s independence move, and thereby in favour of its inte»with the nationalist
India, but also inspired a local tradition of anti-fedual radicalism,

movement S swepT 19 districts of Bengal and drew about 6 mdl.on peasants into it,
including a S
n*gn p^™e
percentage of Muslims. The tumult origtnated
exoloitative m the
pattern thatsharecroppmg
it sustained. Insystem
ftat prevailed in most parts of Bengal »nd ot “Pjo‘“ P
ourse of time in the Bengal ^.yitivation, a erlatively new class of rural
^hy and forest tracts . (Zamindars) and the tenants (rayats), known as
P enters emerged between the Ian considerable chunks of land) accumulated
otedars. The Jotedars (owners ? ^ ^ which they—^in their turn—rented out to
ig^estates for which they paid ernt in c , halves, or 50 per cent produce
landless peasants on the basis of f J used to be much less than one-half as he
^ent. In actual practice, the tillers share o implements, seeds and cattle,
imrially to take advance from the sharecropper {Adhiar or
then pay it back at the time of shan"g^ of Jotedars’ illegal exactions,
^agehashi) had also to meet from his /charges for contract) and perform begar in
ncluding nazarana (Presentation) and sa renewable orally every year,
otedars’ own land. The sharecropping its sharecropper for another on
Jotedar could, and invariably d»d, course of time
‘Consideration for higher nazarana and absentee landholders who lived
to be practised not only by the Jotedars, -pj,e rank of the sharecroppers
>n towns as professionals and white collar e p ^ ^ depressionary
swelled by the mid-1930s when many poor pe^ sharecropping. Within a span of another 5
Economic conditions, and were forced to e . r|„rionary war-time situation of the
y^ars, the sharecroppers were struck agi^ by
early 1940s, and then devastatingly by the great f
V . charecroppers started viewing the customary
. . ,

Visibly tense by the end of the war, the sn^ well-being. They, therefore, had no
^vision of crop to be. wtiolly Provincial Kisan Sabha in September
hesitation in ersponding to the for the tillers instead of the one-half. The 39
1^46, demanding three-fourth of the proa
Towards A Sovereign State slogan “Tebhaga Chai” (we want three-fourth share) rent the sky, while the sharecroppers
started taking the harvested crops to their own yards in place of depositing these with the.;!
Jotedars’ as per the common practice. They offered one-third crop share to the Jotedarsm
retaining two-thifd for themsfelves. In those cases where the Jotedars managed some how//
to take the crops with themselves, the sharecroppers forcibly broke open the yards to clahn
their two-third. The contest over crops and grains naturally led to innumerable clashes, V
arrival of armed police on the troubled spots, and arrests, /ar/iZ-charges and firings. Entiret
north Bengal became the hotbed of agitation with certain parts of Jalpaiguri, Dinajpur and|
Ran^ur playing the leading roles. Mymensingh, Medinipur and 24-Parganas were also not
lagging for behind. Despite the communal carnage in Calcutta and Noakhali, the Muslimm
peasants took an active part and threw up militant leaders of the movement. Peasant
women also joined in it in large number, and often came to its forefront. The movement,'' '
however, wilted in the face of a repressive Government, the apathy of the Congress dhd'tf
League, the hostility the erntire Bengali middle classes, and, above all, the worseiied,JX3 ●

communal situation, -^e renewed noting in Calcutta towards the end of March 1947 aiid"
Its erpercussions in otherparts, finally led to the suspension of the movement.
v) Telengana Movement
●■.●bni
Although not as extensive—to begin with ac , . *1,0
.jnpaHna ^ ^ Tebhaga movement, the outburst in tl^^e
the irmStlf Silm iXnf
because: agnations. It was the most enduring and militant movementt
i) the Nizam’s Government failed altogether
to break the rebellious peasantry.
ii) the rebels could mobilise all categories of .
poor in a longdrawn armed struggle against their feudat Jpre"" “
The outstanding developments in Telengana grew out of an agrarian situation which was
dominated, and abused, by such landed magnates as thp / ● the one
hand, and the Deshmukhs and Patel-Patwaris on thp Ijaradars on
were intermediaries like the Zamindars in snecifipH ’7^® Jagirdars and Ijaradars
in practice as their owners, by ^ (sarf-e-khas), but they behaved
● auctioning tenancies,
● subjecting tenants to high rent,
● goading the tenants-at-will among them to nerif^H-
● extrectiug free labour (VclC) and free^^ (Vettichakiri)
evictions, and
from the people.
The condition was intrinsically no better in the st«f o/

kind of landed magnates emerged from among lands {Diwani) where new
proprietors. They were the past revenue farmL or the so called peasant
Patwaris), who lost their jobs in the 1860s when di tax-collectors (Patel'^
collecting the dues from the cultivators directly a H Government started ,, .
as compensation. By using their influence and iLm i h substantial amount of la«°
manipulating survey records and dictating settlemem ^ as revenue officials, by , ,
Patwaris went on a land-grabbing spree. Once th.v the Deshmukhs and Fof
,
started letting these out on exorbitant
ernt, they '"8® amount of lands„an<l
the arbiters of rural society. As arbiters, they belan ' position, and be<^®on
the villagers, and exacted Vetli and Vettichakiri^itiT^^^''^^ ^ number of illegal levies t
simultaneously, they retained their insatiable lust fo discrimination, be
satisfied by fraud, would be fulfilled by all kinds of 'vhich, if it could no longer
Both the periods of depression (early 1930s) and of ? the use of sheer force.-
Deshmukhs, for the poverty-stricken peasants—wh (®arly 1940s) helped ^0*
difficulties—had to surrender their lands for non-na' from them to tide over the
Patwaris’ looting in land was so prolific that by the ^iS^’ ^^^hmukhs’ and the Pfp*' '
cent land in certain districts, and individually held i nionopolised 60 to
. . ^ Pieces 100,000;acres or more. >
It was against this ceaseless land-grabbing, extraction of n

and Vettichakiri—which affected all categories of the leyies and exaction of

Telengana peasantry rose in revolt. Their discontent P^Ptilace alike—^that the; '!
Communists through the organisation of the Andhra concrete expression by
series of demonstrations against Vetli, Vettichakiri and *11^ and with the help of ®
Nalgonda, Warangal and Karimnagar. By 1945 the odd in the districts of. '
excesses turned into resistance against their expropriatio landed magnates;'' .
dispossession. When their legal objections and peaceful evictions and forcible '!'
40
marches were foiled by the ●'
 Towards Independence
landloWs’ hired goons and the pro-landlord state police, the peasants of Telengana,
particularly of Nalgonda, were forced to resort to arms. Although skirmishes of some sort
were already taking place between the peasants and the landlords’ men from the beginning
of 1946, actual fighting really commenced on 4 July 1946 when the armed ertainers of *e
Visunuri Deshmukh of Janagaon (Nalgonda) fired upon a protesting mob of peasants and
killed Doddi Komaryya. Komaryya’s martyrdom was a signal for widespread armed
peasants’ resistance, which the police could not cope with.
●The Nizam’s Government declared the Communist Party and the Andhra Sabha unlawful
in'Hyderabad state, and undertook ful-scale military operations ag^ns the ns‘"g
peasantiy. Following some bloodshed, and a lot of

miles, and covering a population of nearly 3 million - a saga essentially of post

independence Indian history.

Check Your Progress 3

1.1, List the various demands put forward by the ratings of the RIN.

n the direct and indirect confrontations?

2, What was the major difference between

3 Read the following statements and mark irght! n/) the

or wrong (x).
Hindus and the Muslims.
, i) The agitation over INA trials got divided between
related to the question of tenancy.
ii) The peasant agitation in Bihar was
purely agrarian in nature.
' iii) The Travancore agitation was
after independence.
■" iv) The Telangana Movement continued even
vj Patel and Jinnah urged the ratings to su
vi) Communists organised the Telangana ove

35.5 LET US SUM UP

, . 045 and 1947 does reveal on the whole the
^1^i?,suivey of the popular actions between IW india-a-requisite inner
anti-coloniai consciousness of the also displayed, and more impori;^tly so
strength to match any neo-colonial design. y enormous capacity of the Indian
' ■in' the communally devised, divisive circum«‘^" ’ These were the silver
people to rise above their differences, and st^ otherwise gloomy, over cast
‘^iihings in the clouds over India-the rare rays pj^ying the power-game, as
eondition. The Muslim League leaders we demand to observe these positive
conducted by the British, and too invo ve ^ ^ho had sworn all their lives y
traits. It was left only to the nation^ists, e p possibilities that the turbulent
niass mobilisation and an united In ° , therefore, to anxiety for a negotiated 41
days offered. However, given to . partition of India, they had neither the
settlement, even if it meant a religiously based p
Towards A Sovereign State
energy nor the determination to prepare for a titanic struggle. Consequently, the Congress.
ctecided to Ignore most of the popular outbursts of 1945-47, and to obstruct and condemn f
If they seemed to move towards radical lines. What it also overlooked in its obsession for a
^aceful transfer of power was that, in the case of some sort of a partition of the country
however, much the nauonaltsts died to guard their own half, they would be powerless

35.6 KEYWORDS

Balkanisation: division into many parts.

Fifth Columnists: a phrase referring to traitors ’ conspirators involved in underground

activities.

Direct Action: an appeal made to the Muslims hv

1946. It followed the British Government’s d - Ali Jinnah on 16 August
without Muslim Leagues’ particioatinn it i form the Interim Government
Hegemony: control.
Martials and Non-Martials:
population (like Sikhs) as the mUitam sections of the Indian
became ‘Non-Martial’. ’ ^ Martial Race”. Others, by implication,

progress

Check Your Progress 1

i) (N/) ii) (v/) iii) (X) iv) (X) V) .,
1

2 Your answer should include the tenden f ^ ^

as the sole spokesman of the Muslims ot “"““er the Muslim
Muslims, thwart the possibility of any constin.r** Congress the capacity to represent
and to support and the promote the MusZ r ** "egoUations among the Indian:
35.2.3. league i„ a variety of ways See Sub-sec.
Check Your Progress 2
1 i) (x) ii) (x) iii) ( ^
2 You should refer to the

pvemment i^hcy towards *e Congress- aZ?“" «”'<* *ar; a change in *c

unpnsoned Congress leaders to » dialogue with the
35.3.
am from renewing agitation. See Section
3 The victory of the Labour Party raised ho
fulfilment of their demands. For detaUs sZsZZ
Check Your Progress 3
"ationaUsts for the
1
These included the general national demands like ,h»
of polmcal pnsoners »d the withdiawl of I„d,^ INA prisoners, freedom
.

well as their specific demands like better food,ZttT'’‘ Indo-China and Javm as
2
The direct confrontations were aimed agni..,, 1 imatment and equal salary,
confrontations, on the other hand, were not diZuv °°''ammenL The indirect but
against Its indigenous representatives like the ZamLZl government,
also helped m Unifymg the people against the eoveiZ*’ etc. Nevertheless they
3
i)(x)ii)(^)iii)(x)ivH^)
 UNIT 36 COMMUNALISM AND THE
PARTITION OF INDIA

Structure
36.0 Objectives
36.1 Introduction
36.2 Background to Pakistan
36.2.1 Transformation of the Muslim League
36.2.2 Extremist Phase of Hindu Communalism
36.2.3 The British Policy
36.3 Post-War Developments
36.3.1 Simla Conference and Elections
36.3.2 The Cabinet Mission
36.3.3 Formation of Interim Government
36.3.4 Fixing of a Time Limit for British Withdrawal
36.3.5 The Third June Plan and its Outcome
36.4 Congress and Partition
36.5 Congress’s Handling of the Communal Problems
36.5.1 Pitfalls of Conciliation
36.5.2 The Basic Failure
36.6 Let Us Sum Up
36.7 Key Words
36.8 Answer to Check Your Progress Exercises

36.0 OBJECTIVES
After reading this Unit you will be able to.
● explain the nature of communalism in in the
- last decade of British rule.
● get an idea of the background to the deman or ’
● trace the political developments 3„d the Congless in the creation of
* ^sess the role played by Muslim League,
Pakistan.

36.1 introduction
, „ . die various forces which led to the emergence and
t> Unit 14 of Block fV you learnt abo already become familiar with the
growth of communalism in modem India. However, the 1940s represent the
*najor developments related to It was in this period that the biggest
"lost crucial and decisive phase of . __was put forward, and popularised by the
communal demand — the demand for coming into being of Pakistan in
Muslim League. This period also imess wi
formation of Pakistan, and gives you
1947. This Unit attempts to explain the process
summary of the major events which led to It.
a

36.2 background TO PAKISTAN

acuum. It was a product of certain political
demand for Pakistan did not L pg^od after 1937 witnessed serious
developments which took place after 193 . , Muslim communal forces. In
changes in the politics of both the British Policy also played a very active role,
Jhe popularisation of the .,itv Let us look at their role separately.
● W giving it acknowledgement and credibility.
36.21 Transformation
rranstormation of the Muslim League communalism. In the elections
year 1937 was a turmng po . t^at year, the League won only 109 out of 43
for the Provincial Legislative Assemblies mat ye
Towards A Sovereign Slate 492 reserved Muslim seats and only 4.8% of the total Muslim votes. The poor election
results showed the League that is must expand its popular base among different sections of
the Muslim population, particularly among the urban lower middle classes. A radical
socio-economic and |X)Iitical programme was ruled out for achieving the purpose, as the
existing social base of the League was among the landlords and loyalist elements.
^ Therefore the League raised the cry of “Islam in danger” and threat from the impending '●
Hindu Raj . To appeal to save one s erligion from the threats being forced upon it soon
turned into a campaign of hatred against the followers of other erligions. According to
W.C. Smith, communal propaganda was full of “fervour, fear, contempt and bitter
hatred". Jinnah and other League leaders declared that the eral aim of the Congress was not
independence but a Hindu Raj which would enable them to fulfil their basic motive - the
domination of Muslims and extermination of their faith. Once the prospect of a Hindu Raj
became a deep-seated fear m the Muslim psyche it was easy to drive home the need for a
separate homeland where the Muslims could live and practise their faith in freedom. The
demand for Pakistan inevitably flowed from the politics of fear and hatred adopted by the
the League passed the'^famous
Uague after 1937 At its L^ore session in March 1940, Muslims
"Uhore resolution demanding a sovereign stale for the
Hindus and Muslims were two nations. on the ground that

36.2.2 Extremist Phase of Hindu Communalism

I he hindu coinmiinalists on the other hand had fared even u .

counterparts in the 1937 election. The same choice fared ‘

the support of the masses or face extinction Their °
when Congress disallowed communalists from worUn aggravated in 1938
They needed a new basis and a new proaramme and ^ Congress organisation-
whipping up of fear and hatred, like the Muslim L appeals to religion and the
Madan Mohan Malaviya’s place was now taken bv leader* u

parties in a ‘fascist’ direction — V.D. Savarkar of th u- willing to take thetr

Golwalker of the Rashtriya Swayanf Sevak Sangh Mahasabha, and M.S.
manifesto of Hindu communalism. The Muslims w ° We, becamewere
the
condemned for supporting “our most inveterate ene^^^ and Congressmen ,

could stay on in India with re . ect if they ceased to"h^ f' ^“slims were told that they
Otherwise they would not be given citizen’s irghts l , i.e.-become Hindus.
' >
treatment as minorities. Asserting that the Hindus ’ ^ privileges or special
and that Muslims should either leave or live as seconditi ^ nation living in India
communalists’ version of the two nation
homeland”.
separate

The language of Hindu communalists became extr

riots spread and Congress was unable to stall them 1946-47 As communal
Hindu communalists expanded their influence bv^i “rif* towards Pakistan,
accused the Congress leadeis of emasculating the
“ ** *»''iours of Hindus. They
communal unity and exhorted Hindus to erbate ^ *eir talk of non-violence and
stance became even more a^ressive after paititio“« 'o the Muslims. Their
provided fem e soil for thejr growth. The demand atmosphere
Islamic state India should be declared a Hindu Rar^”'“^ since Pakistan was an
government (by creating a state of genetal disorder hope of overthrowing **
they turned to slander of Congress leaders. Even O, L riots) was not eralised
treason to the Hindu nation (because of hit: »ii was nm c j of
cries of "Death to Gandhi" were S at “ “f^iess to iTs fr
Gandhi was assassinated on 30 January 1948.11,^4?***'“»bha meeting anfM^aU

36.2.3 The British Policy of Pakistan.

The growth of Muslim communalism was consid

backing given to it by the British Government bv u . ^ rr.cial
really amounted to keeping the Hindu-Muslim P^hey c
techniques had virtually become non-viable at ti» “"*^*^dgeabll
authorities had pitted the landlords and the backw juncti. .
Mationai Movement and tried to split the Congms?^ ®^hedule
8*^ss into Riohr f against the
^
"'Bht and Uft wings, but withoul
n
Communalism and the
success. The elections of 1937 showed that the only weapon left in the armoury of the Partition of India
British to devide Indian nationalism was communalism.

^ Xfter the outbreak of the Second World War the Muslim League was assiduously fostered
by Viceroy Linlithgow. The Pakistan demand was used to counter the demand of the
Congress that the British should promise that India would be free after the War and as
proof of their sincerity, transfer actual control of the government to Indians immediately.
TTte British pointed out that Hindus and Muslims must come to an agreement on how
power was to be transferred before the process could begin. The League was officially
recognised as the representative voice of Muslims (even though its performance in the last
elections hardly substantiated this claim) and promised that no political settlement would
' be made unless it was acceptable to the League. This was a blanket power of veto, which
;Jinnah was to use to good effect after the War had ended.
The Cripps Mission: March-April 1942
In March 1942 Stafford Cripps, (a Labour Party leader with friendly links with m^y
leaders of the Congress) headed a mission to India whose declared intention was “the
earliest possible realisation of self-government in
in India”. However, the actual provisions of
the offer belied this declaration by Cripps. Dominion status, not full independence was
„ „ . . .

promised and that too after the War. and the people of the pnncely states were to be
represented in the proposed Constituent Assembly by nominees of the pnnces.
It was clear that the British would ertain control over defence in the new Executive
Council. The Congress could hardly have accepted °
State Ametv a conservative, eractionary and limited offer. But above all the Cnpps,
proposals brought in ‘Pakistan’ through the backdoor via the
Provinces were given the irght to that would be framed,
future status should they choose to reject the new
j nrrmncak savc a fillip to the activities of the
Though the Cripps Mission fai e , npp pa^igtan demand by accommodating it in
Muslim League and ^ ,ime when the demand had hardly been taken
heir provision for provincial au by officialdom was a great service to
senously by Indians, its sympathetic consideration y
, the cause of Pakistan.

Check Your Progress 1 „f rdam in danger? Answer in ten lines.

I) Why did the Muslim League raise the cty of Islam oa g

r..

If

V ●

^ J V riaht ( ^ ) or wrong (X)

2)j,R,ead the following statements and 1937-38.
\ i) Hindu communalism took a’fascist
ii) The Cripps proposals were a milestone on
1..

iii) The British Government tried to check the growth of Muslim communalism after
1940.

pftgT-WAR developments
ll: Ul.-’lf,
of events from the end of the war till the 45
In this Section we will give you a sequence
Jii'jf,’.
Towards A Sovereign State making of Pakistan. The conditions tor partition and the ultimate shape of Pakistan
depended almost entirely on developments in these two years.

36.3.1 Simla Conference and Elections

At the end of World War II, at the initiative of the Viceroy, Wavcll. the Congress leaders
were released from jail in mid June 1945 and invited to Simla to work out an interim
political agreement under which Indians would be re.sponsiblc for running the countr>'. The
Congress was willing to cooperate and gave in its list of nominees but Jinnah decided to
test the power of veto given to him by the British. He insisted that the Leacue alone had
the right to nominate
,. , Muslims
. to the Executive Council. This was embarassins for the
government as this denied representation to the Muslims of the Unionist Part\- of Punjab,
w ich had supported the British staunchly through out the War. But the present and future
mterests were considered more important than pa.st loyalty and Wavell preferred to
toto vTtL 'o" 1° rather than bypass the Leauue. Jinnah's power
veto the constitutional progress had been upheld.

V
>●

Elections
The Watershed
The elections held in the wi
^ , - and Provincial Le^;gislative“A
O ,I

^ forward communal slogan

to ^ Islam”. Mosq ues were used for electio’’^vol®
between the Gita and the
issue
'cen Congi-e^^ (directives)^ that Muslims choice
mus
sweep of the Muslim
Koi It Was
Mnali
and the League was portrayed as a
clean
seats,
46 ''Vender then, that the League made a
 Communalism and the
36.3.2 The Cabinet Mission Partition of India

By early 1946 the British authorities had come to the conclusion that a graceful withdrawal
from India was the best option for them. The Cabinet Mission was sent to India in March
1946 to establish a national government and work out a constitutional arrangement for
transfer of power. Now when the British had decided to leave it was believed that the old
policy of divide and rule would no longer be suitable. British strategies in the Indian
subcontinent after independence, it could be argued, would be better sensed if India was
was friendly with Britain, could be an
united. It was believed that a united India, which
active partner in the defence of the Commonwealth, whereas a divided India’s defence
potential would be weak and conflict between India and Pakistan would frustrate the joint
defence plans.
The change, in the British attitude towards the Congress and the League around this time
reflects this understanding. The British Prime Minister, Attlee, declared on 15th March
1946 that “a minority will not be allowed to place a veto on the progress of the tnajonty .
This was in sharp contrast to the Viceroy Wavell’s attitude during the Simla Conference in
June-July 1945 when Jinnah had been allowed to wreck the Conference by his insistence on
nominating all Muslims. The Cabinet Mission also believed that Pakistan ^ould not
viable as a separate entity. Therefore the plan that was otwn up^by the Mission w^to
safeguani the interests of the Muslim minority within the overall, framework of unity of
the countty. three sections were planned which would have separate meetings to wto out
their constitutions The Congress provinces like Madras, Bombay, U.P., Bih^, Central
Provi~^0«^^ A; Punjab, N.W.FT and Sind would go tnro
Group B and Bengal and Assam would make up Group C. The “"T®"
lifter defence, foreign affairs and communications. A province could leave group to
Which it was asrigled after the first general elections and after ten years it could demand
modification of both the group and union constitutions.
Ambivalence over Grouping
Disagreement arose between the Congress Md h U g ^ ^

Congress demand was that provinces sho^^

nning, rather than wait till general electro
j x^e Congress raised this '
^ N.W.F.P., which
tad r" ‘r ^TI'rhe™Uague demanded that provinces be given
tad been placed in sections C and B. The ^ g
the
Thus, the
ght to modify the Union Constitution im whether grouping was
basic problem was that the Cabinet Mission deliberately refused to clarify its
compulsory or optional. In fact the die hope that their ambivalence
even when asked to do so. This was
might reconcile the irreconcilable position o
congress and the League, but in effect, it
°aly complicated matters. .
Snrs ● the Congress were at cross-purposes in their
con it was obvious that the League and t it as a confirmation of their stand.
Interpretation of the Mission Plan. Both s picture and
bardar Patel drew satisfaction from the fact that ^
Iff ^^grie’s power of veto had been withdrawn- Pakistan was implied by
t^46 statement) that it accepted the Plan in so far A.I.C.C. (on 7th
e clause of compulsory grouping. Nehru e’^P ^ decided th it the Congress
J^ne 1946) that the Congress Working ^le Assembly was a sovereign body,
ould participate in the Constituent AssemWy- . ^ ^as that the rules laid down by
"'^ould formulate the rules of procedure. ™ ...eptance of the Plan had in any case,
® Mission could be amended. The League, w o withdraw its cceptance of the
qualified, quickly took advantage of Nehru s speech
'^‘ssion Plan on 29th July 1946.
^*●3-3
Th Formation of Interim Government H I mma — should it wait till the League
® British Government was now placed in a i e plan, and set up an

L?" around or should it implement the short't^ j;, was for the first option
Government with the Congress alone. congress cooperation was
Wis Majesty’s Government was of the OP^” Accordingly the Congress was invited to
“^oly necessary for their long-term mtere . September 1946 with
W U®" Government which came '"W a sharp departure from mher
Brir Nehru functioning as its *{‘'® ®.. (, willing to defy Jmnah s stand tha
"sh practice, as, for this first time, the B <.eptable to the League.
®«ns,itu,io„al settlement be made unless it was
 r-i

Towards A Sovereign State

20. Member,, of Interim Government.

League launches Direct Action
tirw^eTte BrUi’sh'p''''™ 'm"'’ “"tinue with their old po'“^5''
league had already accepted the proLf*T "° n’"^c\ Actio"
was given in Calcutta on 1 fifh a ^ ^ ‘^mme of Direct Action. The call for Dire
(we will fight and get Pakistn ^ slogan was Larkc Leng^ ^ j
groups with the league’s Bengal provoked by Muslim jf
not actively abetting it. Hindu commt Sithrawardy looking on pas* ^J^,j,y,
and 5000 people were killed in what retaliated, perhaps with ‘ ^^j„ings'-
The trouble broke out in Noakh r ■ c* known as the ‘Great Calcut
sparked off widespread auact : ” “riy October 1946 and Noak^^
months saw riots
everywhere in U P “Bbmb‘" ^^could
cou noi
be
stemmed. Bombay, Punjab and N.W.F.P. The tide
British revert to Conciliating the I e tiH
Jinnah’s ability to unleash ’ ^ ^^ague . of
placating the Muslims. Thev British authorities back to their
assumed the shape of a “eommun f ‘ '’’““S'’ the league was their creation, d "" „p
his effort to bring the league into Waved h"d
Lawrence, supported him on th pr^'" and now the Secretary of State,
league stayed out. On 26th Octoh “o become inevitable if "
Interim Government — AnOctober 1946 the league joined the Interim Government.
However, the League’s entrv Struggle if only
opened up another arena of strll”! Government did not end conflict; d
Furtr™™' forsaking the to join the Interim
SioTpT’ “i ttocepffe ; ‘be plan of Direct Action-
was merel boasue leaders inclnrr'^^ ‘b® *0"8 term aspects of the ernin®"
exclusive ^ '‘“"‘‘"tiation of civil ^'toab, publicly said that the Interim “ ^at t*
fnnrhnld whi u the Leapn,:, u ^^ngress was not in the League
foothold Which would help the Tbe Interim Government
Conflict between Congr ° ^*^vance towards its goal of Pakistaf-erupt"‘‘ very
Ali
Liatl‘^^
48
1.... «t” "S; the

k
 responsibility for running the Government. On the other hand, the intention apparently was Communalism and the
Partition of India
to demonstrate that cooperation between the two was impossible. The League ministers
made it a point to disagree with actions taken by their Congress colleagues. They refused
.to attend the parties at which Congress members would arrive at decisions before the
jftgirfial meeting of the Executive Council so as to sideline Wavell.
Government—^Threat of Breakdown
The Congress leaders had raised the objection (right after the League members were sworn
ih) :&at the League could not join the Interim Government without accepting the Cabinet
^SMon Plan,
ii^er, when non-cooperation of the League both inside and outside the Government
|h^ame clear, the Congress members demanded that the League either give up Direct
I^Ojipri or leave the government. Further, the League refused to participate in the
i^iistituent Assembly which met on 9th December 1946 even though the statement made
Majesty’s Government (on 6th December 1946) upheld the League s stand on
Itipping. The breaking point came when the League demanded that the Constituent
l^lembly be dissolved because it was unrepresentative. On 5th February 1947 the
^gress members of the Interim Government sent a letter to Wavell with the demand that
League members should be asked to resign. A crisis was imminent.

pte.4 Fixing of a Time-Limit for British Withdrawal

fte; situation was saved by Attlee’s announcement in Parliament on 20the February 1947
that the British would withdraw from India by 30th June 1948 and that lord Mountbatten
would replace Wavell as Viceroy. This was no answer to the constitutional crisis that was
at hand but it showed that the British decision about leaving India remained unchanged.
The Congress responded with a gesture of cooperation to the League. Nehru appealed to
Liaqat Ali Khan:
The British are fading out of the picture and the burden of this decision must rest on
all of us here. It seems desirable that we should face this question squarely and not
speak to each other from a distance.

Bw Jinnah-s eraction to Attlee's statement was entirely different He was eonfident *at
"OW he only needed to stick ftnnly to his position in order to achieve h.s goal of ^t^.
After all, the declaration made it clear that power
authority if the Constituent Assembly did not become a fully representative body, i.e. if
^ 6 Muslim majority provinces did not join it.
Governor of Punjab had warned in this ergard that “
P-lude to the final showdown", with C al^B
tiisobedinecessaiy by foree”. He was ^oo" J^e collapse of the coalition
can,if

lence campaign in Punjab which brought

^^’tnistry headed by Khizr Hayat Khan of the Unionist Pa y.
ThtiWha. . , f on his arrival in India was a fairly intractable
one n Mountbatten showed, and Jinnah was obdurate that he
W6till^^accept nothing less than a sovereign piistm The Cabinet Mission
be j
Plan British
had clearly
cou?r f ‘irLhlTnie «.le of mediators
^^old maintain unity was by throwing all their we^ht ^ad to be
^●,7" the Congress and Uague had to be * UppoL- Despite Atffee's
elaim'*'^" '^*'o wetited unity a P wouldn’t get it, though
WeTri "Tu" P’^-^rholTo pUy safe and take both sides along
Witho^^ ^ u/hen the Jituation demanded this type of
Without exercising any check or restraint even when the
^?ortion of authority.
Tl» .nd IV ... .. «!. ..
“pppm
“<=00101!“^'“ '’y Stace Sn^as was making the bigger
Petic^^®*® Congress stand
"PheIrtT ' ®' “ giving up its i^'
India, all its other stands were I
supported the Congress stand that
PftPtilv states must not be given the option oof indepe^ndence.
F Mountbatten realised that it 49
 Towards A Sovereign State

c»* ^

2l. Nehru
was vital to
Moumbatten on Arrival (March 1947).
the Commo f«ain the goodwill of then rernni'’
in
"wealth. Dominion
Commonwealth, hoped to persuade India to
would be handed et'en if for ^ " chance of keeping India in the
Pakistan. by 15th AuEusTiQa^"“ 2'''* ■’ft'" Plan declared that po^
™ the basis of dominion status to Ind.»
The Congress was wiiu
hand^ruSTom? lion i’
deteriorating funher ‘^^^f'hearted communally explosive
won’t ' comnmnal situatto ^
responsibility and . and you wn ’ f situation in his statement to t
more apparent '●le advancing of thJda” ^ govern”. The British had
withdrawal to 15th August 1947
The speed with

complicated processe Both tran.f^^'^ forsake responsibility for t ,g]iy

August 1947'^Some !; '’.‘'-iud uub division of the countl^.^^,;
Governor were of the officials 11!” ^^venty two days from 3rd June
effect a peaceful divis’ ^ minim Commander-in-Chief and the
Moumbatten be a com°‘'‘ compIinT^^!? ^ few years was necessary
institutional structure *^°^^mor-Gpn *^^**®fs further by refusing to let
the joint defence mach° Pmblems Pakistan. There was " . ia
Kashmir. ^'^^ry broke down ' division could be referred 1
Massacres that
'"December 1947 as a fall-out of the hosb>
The speed with which divi J'artition
Boundary Com mission t Vision Was affected ,fii.«
ards
L 50 'UU'-uvuted the ti- delay in announcing tiic aW‘
^c V of Dartition. These werp Mounfb
 decisions. Mountbatten delayed the announcement of the Boundary Commission Award Communalism and the
(even though it was ready by 12th August 1947) to disown responsibility for further Partition of India

complications. This created confusion for ordinary citizens as well as the officials. People
living in the villages between Lahore and Amritsar stayed on fn their homes in the belief
that they were on the right side of the border. Migrations necessarily became a frenzied
affair, often culminating in massacres.
The officials were busy arranging their own transfers rather than using their authority to
maintain law and order. This was conceded by none other than Lackhart, who was
Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army from 15th August to 3rd December 1947:
Had officials in every grade in the civil services, and all the personnel of the armed
servicjes, been in position in their respective new countries before independence Day,
it seems, there would have been a better chance of preventing widespread disorder.

Check Your Progress 2

1) Read the following statements and mark right ( ● ) or wrong (X).
i) Muslim League contested the elections on the basis of a socio-economic programme,
ii) The Interim Government could not work because the Congress workers were
unwilling to cooperate,
iii) Jinnah wanted Mountbatten to became the Common Governor General of India and
Pakistan.

2) What were the basic merits and flaws in the Cabinet Mission Plan? Write in five lines.

'Vhy did .he Congress accept Partition? It was one th.ng for the League to demand
P<*istan and the Iritish to concede it because it was in hamony with the politics they had
Pursued in -.athe part
give .m uifc poll.
. .
But why
wii_y did theOnp
● .1 I
Congress, which had fought for unity for long yeai.
r’rmorpss IpaHers fsiiccumhe.d to th
view IS that the Congress leaders succumbed to the
8*ve up its ideal of

What
'^hat was^ involved was not
P"^®
the °personal
P , failings
failings or
of me
the toph leaders but a basic failure of the
entire organisation,
ronseauence of its failure over the years to
Congress acceptance of Partition was th 1937^ to stem the
the Muslim masses into the nationalist clear to the Congress leaders that
1^
Muslims were behind the League as h
won'so per cent
^j j
Muslim seats inbattle
the for
;^ct.ons. However, the point of no be fought on the streets,
^istan was no longer confined to the ba
communal irots engulfed the country and the uongic
j concluded that Partition was
® lesser evil than a civil war. .
Tk , * * rnnfiimed the inevitability of Pakistan,
breakdown of the Interim ° an arena of struggle and Sardar, Patel, in
hru remarked that the Intenm ^^^vemm® attention to the fact that Pakistan
2 'P^ech at the AICC meeting on 14th j but also in the Interim
s actually functioning not only m bad no power to intervene in the
^ernment! Moreover, the Intenm Gove . ^^3 g^bty not only of inaction but
com
>hcity in the irots in Calcutta and
d N^hali) Nehru realised that^^^bies
there wasarenoindulged
point ‘ in

ih bv^K “murder stalks j ^i^te transfer of power would at least bnng

^ hy both the individual and the mob^ Immema^
a government that would have the power to tultii
responsibilities,
p
51
 Towards A Soverei{>n State

-*● Millions,
^'Pn)oted-_j.l„ ’‘oyruphs
52
of Partition days.
L
 . Another consideration in accepting partition was that it firmly ruled out the specter of the Communalism and the
‘balkanisation’ of the country. The Congress had the support of the Viceroy, and behind Partition of India

him His Majesty’s Government, in refusing the option of independence to the princely
states. Through persuasion or force, they were made to join either the Union of India or.
Pakistan.

Gandhi and Partition

It is common knowledge that Gandhi was so distressed when partition became an imminent
-reality that he no longer wished to live for 125 years, as he had stated earlier. One popular
interpretation is that Gandhi’s advice was ignored by his disciples, Nehru and Patel, who
wanted power at any cost and though he felt this betrayal acutely, he did not wish to
condemn them publicly because they had been his faithful followers.
Gandhi’s own statements, however, suggest that the main reason for his helplessness lay in
the communalisation of the masses. The Muslims began distrusting the Hindus and then the
Hindu and Sikhs also got convinced that mutual co-existence was impossible. It was the
Hindus’ and Sikhs’ desire for Partition that made him a mass leader without any masses
behind him in his struggle for unity. The Muslims had already declared him to be their
enemy. When different segments of people wanted partition, what could be or the
Congress do but to accept it? At his daily prayer meeting on 4th June 1947 Gandhi said:
“The demand has been granted because you asked for it. The Congress never asked
for it.... But the Congress can feel the pulse of the people. It realised that the Khalsa
as also the Hindus desired it”.

Socialists and Gandhians appealed to Gandhi to launch a struggle for unity bypassing the
Congress leadeis. Gandhi pointed out that the problem was not that he was unwilling to go
“head without the Congress leaders. After all, few had agreed with his assessment in 1942
●hM the time was irght for a struggle of the Quit India type, and yet he had defied their
counsels and he had been proved irght. The crucial lacuna in 1947 was *at there were no
“forces of good" upon which he could “build up a programme”. He confessed - Today I
see no sign of such a healthy feeling. And, therefore, I shall have to wait until rhe time
comes”.

The time never came, for political developments were moving at too fast a pace. Partition
Was announced on 3rd June and implemented on 15th August 1947. Gandhi s advice to
Congressmen, conveyed in his speech to the AICC meeting on 14th June 947, was to
accept Partition as an unavoidable necessity for the present, but not accept it in their hearts
fight to reverse it later, when passions would subside.

CONGRESS’ HANDLING OF THE COMMUNAL

PROBLEMS
It is ' , ,A h»v<. been avoided if the Congress had been willing
to“conciliate
c„f 1 Jinnah, not only before he ^ine
came UD
“P with the
“ demand
for a separate state in
even in 1946 when the Cabinet
MiM-Sion Plan was put forward. Maulana Am
^"aTin hirautobiography
hi
India Wins Freedom
impossible
c?„H ,h me Sngr^^ only if it declared itself
Hind k" he was willing to neptiate wi ^^8 erpresentative of the Muslims.
Had “e Congress acceptedi'’,h‘^I!!'mLd
this demand, it would have had Muslims
to give upwho
its secular character,
had resolutely
«ood^k“ cL, but betrayal of the Indian people and
their *e Congress at great per . ’ jinnah’s demand would have been the
cieati!!'*^' culmination of acc p ^ ^
it h-
In a’ ^^h^Coneress “would be denying its own past, falsifying
Prasad’s words, the Congress
^ history, and betraying its future”.
36.5.1 Pitfalls of Conciliation with Jinnah on his terms, it made
.^t, though the Congress erfused to negotiate Jinnah’s intransigence. The Congress
“cce^"? concessions to Muslim nrovinces during the negotiations with the
“^cepted the autonomy of Muslim majority provinces uu g 53
 Towards A Sovereign State
■Hn;
i.iH

.11

2.1.
Maiilana Azad
Cripps Mission in 1942 In 1 ●
’^44 Gandhi recognised that Musli"’
ConstoLrA^ "’“jority prov' “"^'‘'‘='=™'nation. When the Cabinet M'ss‘
-hey Wishedahe Co“ C) would set up a separa«e.d
not wish to in' i ^*^^cause it would fn oppose this. Congress opp°may
intlmreMon ‘"f or^d Assam mto groups they ^
Accordingly, wh» the'fi”'
grouping would h
whe^h ’r,''“‘“^"'‘ was compulsory or option* ■
Cabinet clar'f j
IV i;

Majesty’s Government ^PPealed ^^“^^pted the nevv interpretation- ^

Hb
1947. So when the On a time limT Khan for cooperation wh ● M ii

only the final act of finally accenteH * withdrawal on 20th February .'J!

Of reconcilement to rh Leare ^1- and Partition — I*”® ;es«

championing of the d ^ realities of a ^'^'*‘^rid. It was the culmination of a P*"
'he demand of a sovereln^ mMuslim majority state.
Thus, the policy of can
,1(1-^
iJ \3l
●it

protected, ended up as ‘
●ntended to
Congress conceded lo extrem reassure Muslims that their interests.The.’'
"0“ ''fjid
It but rather use it to sheifm ^^^^ssion in the demands. For example stexcj#
communalism was no In fears”, pj,; d^at ‘‘the Muslims would not linl^
assertive “Muslims nalion”^H assi^ur*^^/^^ thinking as by the 1940s ^
time the Congress made on a sen^ ^^^ning of minority fears, but
that Congress
every round of
wa. yje,.. ^^'^eession, Jinnyh ^ sovereign state. Consequently- ■-
a notch higber- fe^t
their ranks, i
inipressed by”th their ^™m under the communa i_ j
communalism also regil*""' ^“ccess A^o ‘ ""’''e and more MusIin-sJ'”
'hcm^elves as ,he onlf^h?^ gcowtl, ‘'ll communalism. Hindu
betraying in the hopt T'”"* °f Hindu in,^'’ “mmunalists projected
36.S.2 The Basi ^ °P "'inning over Mu^m'**’ charged, the Cou= -.1

-. i \)P

This lack of
nndersi ,tt.

symptomatic of the of the In ●

54 general fail of
communalism in the 1940s was only
of the .Hi

t-ongress m
i
contending with commum
 Though the Congress was committed to securalism and though Gandhi staged his life for Communalism and the
Hindu Muslim unity, the Congress was not able to formulate a long term strategy to fight Partition of India
communalism in its different forms at the level of both gplftics and ideology. The
Congress leaders naively believed that reassurances, generous concessions and willingness
to reach a compromise would solve the communal problem. As Prof. Bipan Chandra has
said:

“The fact is that communalism is basically an ideology which could not have been,
and cannot be, appeared; it had to be confronted and opposed ... The failure to do so
was the real weakness of the Congress and the national movement. (India’s Struggle
for Independence).

Check Your Progress 3

0 Read the following statements and mark right ( \/ ) or wrong (x).
0 Congress accepted partition because the congress leaders succumbed to the
temptation of power,
●i) British Government accepted partition because it was in keeping with its policies
pursued in the past,
jii) The Congress policies of concessions and concilations contributed in the making of
Pakistan,
iv) The real failure of the Congress lay in not being able to evolve a long term strategy
to fight communalism.

2) Why did Gandhi feel so helpless regarding the partition of India? Wnte in five lines.

36.6 LET us SUM UP

The
, partition of India was primarily the ersult of the persistent efforts of the Muslim
^ague f.om 19W oL^LTobJn a separete homeland for the Mushms. Tlrrough an

SatSr'""”",”! "’Idtre^ the politieal situation into a deadlock.

Cwh f “ Bm PaWsM could not have been created
'vithn k Partition was the only esc^ ■ . -jjgg used the communal card in their
T" ^ ^''^teTwhich "wing
Tv. ®*To counter the national movement whicn & j iftom strength to strength.
-flane as the sole

gave credibility to the Pakistan demand, ,eto%gress in political

4lem"*“'''® ^“^cliMd *em towards leaving behind a United
T" '"h no "o Inah and tamely sunendered to the
wLin*? Standing up o “ ^ deteriorating
ktnail of direct action. Official inaction in ® appeared preferable to civil war.
a‘‘“ation reached a point from whic p long-standing
aoitifcS- '●* *iav on two fronts. It failed to draw i
^●£1 ® “ted India. Its weakness lay o^ ^
suT “"asses into the national movement and was not
'j j fight communalism.

36.7 Key words

Indi * ^ which refers to the British policy of creating divisions in the

^ society so as to perpetuate their rule in India.
‘Local n .. ● rrioos Proposal, which recognised the right of any
Part of ?**‘*®"’ Clause: a clause in the PP provided the much needed
hi Indian Dominion, to refuse to join it. This 55
^‘hmacy to the demand for Pakistan.
Towards A Sovereign State

Victims.
36.8 — —

exercises your progress

Check Your Progress 1
' Your answer should
' i
1937, ii) the - include j) the in til® elec»
consolid'itin ^^pand its of the Muslim League m
iv) to drive “f different bn V"^ religious slogans in ■ an

^ See
‘1
Sub-sec. 3slT
) n) (,/ j j
“ ^^P^rate hometad" for Muslims.
1) (X)
Check Your Progress 2
'
^ The
h)(x) ii (x)
was that u
i
clarity regarding '‘accepted the D ● ■ of
the lack
36.3.2 grouping of Cnity. The,/7aw was a Suh
''●nces to be compulsory or optional. S®c

i 21;;’^liclplessneV^^
« *
h) his i Was
inability to -
Dartik- ^ "'""‘II With him^- '^'^rnmunalisation of the
ion by the Muslim '^^ruggle for unity; and iii)
’ Hindus and Sikhs alike.

56
 UNIT 37 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
DEMOCRATIC POLITY IN INDIA

Structure
37.0 Objectives
37.1 Introduction
37.2
The Concept of Democracy: A History
37,2.1 The Early Liberals
37.3
37.2.2 Limits of Liberal Democracy ● t j-
The Evolution of Democratic Ideas and Institutions in India
37.3.1 The Impact of the British Rule
37.3.2 The Perception of the Constituent Assembly
37.4 The Question of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles
37.5 Towards a Democratic State Structure
37.5.1 Parliamentary System at the Centre
37.5.2 The State
37.6
The Electoral System
37.6.1 Towards a Democratic Representation
37.6.2 Limits
Federal Polity Vs. Centralism: Options of a Democratic State
37.7
37.7.1 Historical Background to Federalism
37.7.2 The Partition and Federalism ctmcture
37.8
37.T.3 The Consminls of the Aditiinisttalive and Financial Strnctnie
37.9
Let Us Sum Up
Keywords
'●^0 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

37.0 OBJECTIVES
After
reading this Unit you will learn about:
● fte evolution of the concept of democracy , in India,
e evolution of democratic ideas and function.
● 'he limte wiftin which these ideas and inst.tut.ons function

37.1 INTRODUCTION
H. ● nations today. All shades of political
niocfggy is the watchword of the developing ju practice, it might mean quite
inions equally proclaim their adherence to i ● there is no one agreed
J'llent things to different classes, gfO“P® institutions of democracy grew up m
J'h.uion of democracy. In India too “^ses, groups and parties. The context of
context of .lifferent perceptions of developments gave these perceptions a
?h-colo„ial struggle and the post-independence deve
"iite direction.

: A HISTORY
^?!?the concept
As — Hfiblv in the fifth century B.C. to describe
the , 'oncept, the word democracy *^0^1. City Smtes. "'o"
a

Gre!!'®'®"' of government found ®"'°"®f.®j,jt,n of democracy as rule y

pe^ '''ord provides us with a basic de i
P'®’- .„_d and articulated in the early modem
L" 'he mod,.™ . . .n.... views were f.is‘ f®''' ,, c-venteenth and eighteenth century
“'“P® as a crZe of precapitalist ideologV ""jZ erosion of the existing feudal order.
Wi,„es: 7r mergence of-pto^^Zdlas acquired their conceptual apparatus
^ “oring this period that revived dem^« ,.^„,i„n.
57
3nd
“ Practical social meaning in the pnnciplea
 Towards A Sovereign State
37.2.1 The Earty Liberals

S that society constituted natural hienuchy. They 0i' '

« divine riaht of kinffs'^Th * *?-k and government based on the principle of
human development But^h* property were considered fundamental for
rights could be enioved h k any blue-print for a society in which
principle, and ermains so wTate "as'a kind fr f
with the exception of Rousseau uL^ f. 1
overwhelming concern for the ^wth ofth ®"‘* Propeny was of ,
Whereas in Locke’s and Mill’s nhii individual personality and social pros^nW
the essence of bourgeois demnrrorv consent based authority could be interpreted^
popular sovereignty and direct dpnf °“sseau’s thought it implied the Utopian notidW
y and direct democracy under a small state system. Jfi *.

37.2.2 Limits of Liberai Democracy

Liberal democracy in practice has h d * ● ●
democratic model where all peonle *‘"'|*ations. It does not provide us with a ,ji (i
Staunch protagonists of liberal dLo™,-*’‘7o “ "Sht to vote. One of the^ „
plural voting for less numerl advocated the sys®«''
numencal balance in favour of *e rUml “■ landed to maintain a p^'C i! ,5.

Mnti^^thT*ll* ●*' the introd*"*"*'*' “ opposed to the strength 8?

devel^"*.*^ democracy acquirer"°" “"●''ersal adult suffrage in this
system of goveml°f democracru
tnstalled in power thmuli, f***““®'*^ identified today with,
and fair elections.
\h

Of V^ Si^.Oamocr^y ^^ voting irght made d.» |

?///■

parliamentary or PiesiiW . ^ '"aUtutions of! “ when we study the

political power and the n!,^ govemm democracy, (i.e.- pf^
●n modem polities °f ftancLe “"‘taty or federal structu^ n;v

^Stem. The growth of the ® determined ^‘"d that their actual off i
most signmeant politic^ P“‘;“oal PanieT!! m ^ "ature of the prevalent pa<S#
S *! in two hundred yeLs or so haagiP^
of electoral system that “>o Poli&'‘“'^ ">°dem democracies. B ‘^3^
PoBtlcal Parries and n “ auppo^ for political power by the mJ,1J5
invariably, fl,em,!l"“*«nocracy ^i^malized. ib?

=« baaed on the pri«cipla%

“ng to^idr peo^l!''‘“als acqZ arrangement for an^«^. S

I'beral democraci.* 'ntetests The str.** ‘o decide by means '|jceJ||
to function in thi * ''Present h, an ordin. bP®®'® for the people’s vote tah^
The politic r “ ia S S' voL. arther the rul«g
*®ir own l!ljf“'a dothen^"‘®'‘ as a tl^St7“ '
●ii*’
^/i"

social force of ra ^ Vao ‘iiS'''

«» cCj* «io- "« o-^ated just for
altem*^’ ‘'“'''P- Pro!! 'vident?^ ’’"'tests ,!!®'“‘a*iy survive with the
“‘"nately or erMlT"’’’nte ai!,'? ‘heir n! Protect and further. In «»'Sgf
ca to ^ programmes. It is by
of th ^ ^ttdersr^''"®*'* that th^ dominant political pa^t ^
of the voters. by ^^^|^ooc. bigbiy n actual natum of Loci^Y
testifies that rulii'S
J’arHcipatory y populist strategies for the mass h' ; | ,i£ .
I" the foregoing
authors have sn^::^xt Of
58

pM
and
populist distortion
Purtici way
*patory democracy’ as
 The Establishment of
According to them, the real essence of democracy can be captured only if there exists an Democratic Polity in India
institutional arrangement of decision-making, based upon various levels of people’s
participation. Such political framework of democracy is possible, only if the people realize
that they are equally enjoying the fruit of socio-economic development. In other words the
actual democracy can exist only under a participatory socialist polity, where people
hefcotho their own .political master or genuine sovereign voters.
Check Vour Progress 1
ij^^iberal democracy’s theorists (Locke, Rousseau etc.) said that,
i) society was divided into various classes and groups because one group or class was
, biologically more fit than the others,
riii) ..authority to rule came from the consent of the people,
^'^iii) authority to rule was given by God
iv) none of these

2) Politics in majority of the modem day democratic states

0 is determined by the nature of the prevalent party-system
lij), is, determined by ‘participatory democracy’
iii) is determined by divine right of the king
*v) None of the above

37.3 THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRATIC IDEAS AND

INSTITUTIONS IN INDIA ^
ttemocratic ideas and institutions grew up in the context
. of the impact
of British arle, the
jj,„
"“ional movement and the development of post independence pomy

37-3.1 The Impact of the British Ri^

” the evolution of the modem democratic ideas
^
jg was decisive. It was only
● Irtish Colonial mle and of the anti-coloni ree — pot of colonial rule that the
'hen the pre-Colonial Indian Society was put m beginning of nineteenth
●'ajj 6f democracy and nationalism starte to administrative infrastructure,
^entury. Colonial exploitation required a new eco ^^^g ^ new
in turn set new social forces of nationalist, liberal and democratic
ideas.
mobility, which allowed the growth of reformist.
Renaissance and Democracy reoresentative institutions in India
2® demand for the introduction of democratic ^ F Renaissance. However
to the days of Raja Ram Mohan R^^ ^ democracy. It
in India marked only a half;he^^ a^ et value system,
I, ., a nulical self-critical appraisal of India s sociatne movement lacked the support of
Ws h.tif-hearted advance section of educated people. Th^ it
^fiWminent social class. It was ^ ^ ideological
a ervclutionaty will and the power " evolution in the west imd
' society Unlike the social movements ^ bre^
to caoitalism the democratic movement mm always.rem^ed
iifi-capitai’st ideologies. Thus dem^ ^ „i* local parochial traditions of caste,
I^W^^afed wiui a strong sense of ervivalism a.
region and religion. ihe most significant development in
the "'‘toduction 0.'Western education ^„.b“lding in the

the early nationalists, the 59

^hrendranath Banerjee).
Towards A Sovereign State The Early Nationalists and Democracy
The success of the early nationalists lay in the spread of the messace of democracy and
nationalism among educated Indians. In the beginning, they demanded the introduction of
representative institutions within the framework of British overlordship over India.

Even the political message of the slogans like 'Sw-araj' and ‘Swadeshi* did not 20 beyond
the confines of British rule.

In the beginning, therefore, the Indian National Congress lacked the militancy and
programrne essentia! for a decisive struggle for independence and democracy in India. The
ng ish educated elite was too deeply drawn into the charm of the colonial ethos and its
value-system m seek any real radical break with the British rule. In the process, early
Congress politics, during the moderate
era, were hampered by its incapacity to seek mass
support for its policies and action,
outside the narrow circle of the English educated elite.
achievrthk'on ^^otigln to be overcome by the extremist leadership. They tried to
ai nst coLi!l e"° ™ socio-economic policy of ma.ss-niobilizalion
?eviva,i“ ,nl!7n? religious Lology of Hindu ,
a common socio econo'^ a democratic consenses of all communities on the basis of
division between Hindus anSMTsHmT The religious extremists therefore strengthened the
Muslim fear that Congress was an
from Congress led to the es.sentially Hindu party. Thus the alienation of Muslims
India. ea ening of the movement of democracy and nationalism in
Democracy in the Age of Mass Movements
In the twentieth ceniurv thp rrw-» - 1
advances. The Minto-Morlev nationalism and democracy registered signi^'^^"
members to the central legislativc^'^*^'^ Permitted a minority of indirectly
enter the provincial council. The icnoT' majority of directly elected members lo
1935 Act was passed in the affprm- n mtroduced the system of dyarchy in Intli‘>-
Disobedience Movements During H ^ ° the Non-cooperation and the Civi
drawn in the struggle for democrLJ^''^T''^'^^"^"
class, the middle classes, the workin "Phis included a section of capi^P-'’^
people in these movements immen.H i Peasantry. The participation of the worKi cf
movement and its leadership Fin.ih^ ^"^i^nced the stature and strength of the nationali^^ .
World War II social situation nowe Movement and post'
independence of India witnessed th! ^'‘^"■^ferred to the Indians. However, the
“■^munal holocaust and the partition of the
OLDSM^StLE
urn Kni-K I~1MA
'■-DITIof*
U.MlEfMlll*

it
TOl
r»(i:a ncTia at et. iti.

ONLV
\>IL. C'MIl Ml. tiui. t,
KtU. .SO. CIB.
CALCUTTA

INAUGURATION
neutf.
Hit-

Midnight Session Of fWcTl Op

Assembly In New
PLEIKJE oi- 1 SCENES OF SPLENOOUP
lAUOOM fpl LOlO I 52 Jfe ■ j KARACHI
MQUNTVATTEN
MOUNTBATrEN’S
T i
PAKISTAN .
SWEARINC-IN
Cr NEW -V I i "THIS IS A PARTING
SWKU..XOaX.K„,,...„^ I fRISNOS"
I

GOVERNORS 1 .. ^
T ● i
M ^ -- ●
u
f A it?.-

{
«»»»-—*^T

^ MM »● vu% M
,>nii ●

●●● r»-«

MiRtUAt*
n**.f*rt
1

f^ksTSI = ...
-Ji WtMOBAiU SCIMM .u
-- »«tA1^c5.Tlg
●»r.
rt
1
a
mi

25. New y— *● .. visr-l-r

«

60 Rep„„
Partition
and Independence.
 TJie Kstablishment of
37.3.2 The Perception of the Constituent Assembly Democratic Politv in India

The e.slablishmcnt of the 385 members Constituent Assembly by the colonial government
in 1946 was the culmination of the struggle for democratic government and independence
in India. It represented various shades ol opinion including Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs.
But this body of Constitution-makers was not tully representative in character. 292
members of it were chosen by the legislative assemblies of 11 provinces (ruled directly by
British) elected on a restricted franchise of about one-tilth of the adult population. 93
members were nominated by tlie rulers of the native slates under the overall hegemony of
the Briti.sh. The partition of the country in August 1947 reduced the size of this body to
298 of which 208 owed their loyalty to the Congress party.
The Constituent Assembly gave direction to the establishment of democratic institutions i
Ill

India. It functioned, both a.s the Parliament as well as the Constiuition making body unti
lanuary 19,10. The Comtres.s Party being the most inlluential section, naturally had a direct
impact on the philosophy of the Indian Constitution. The real shape ol tlie Indum
Constitution was detennined not by an autonomous body of legal expert.s, but by tie
liberal creed of the Conaress party. The Constitution was, above all, a icg.d loim o
political philosophy upheld by the Congress party. And. all lire decisions abou
establishment of liberal-democratic inslitution.s in India: The fomi '
lee^ralism,
ffd Its high secnralism
command. and
Thisdemocratic rightsm “
was confessed the floor of the Asset y y
Of the Drafting Committee of the Indian Constitutmn Dr. AmbedU °
'I'tit: "They had to go to another place to obtain a decision and come Assemb y .
1, -in r»vf.rwhelming influence of ifie Congress per
However, there
- in the makin;':;rc:;:^:^t:'^sti.u.ions ate ne;er ™de emi^ S.d,in a
'^Holistic framcLrk.
^«embly of 1778-91 Both the Pbila^elpltm
also went far eyon
However,
Constituent Assembly. They
there
was a major difference between them situation while this was not the
a radical liberal revolutionary break i ^opipromise with the social situation
.n India. The independence of India appeared beyond the
has imposed the reality of Partition . T! ● ^jyision of the country, however,
onirol of the Congress party and its leaders Assembly to evolve a
a free hand to the Congress party m the ons freedom while
^°n.stiiutional framework of its own choice. Earlier it had
^^gotiating with the Muslim League.

●^

61
. the Constitut"'"
26. Nehru Signing
Towards A Sovereign State
37.4 THE QUESTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND
DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES

Both the leadership of the Congress party and an overwhelming majority of the ConsliW^''’
Assembly members were deeply influenced and impressed by the western liberal traditio''
of democracy. From the beginning of the freedom struggle itself, their advocacy of basic
human rights and political freedom of individual citizens epitomized the liberal democfa"^
creed. The Congress Party was duty-bound to incoiporate these promises in the Indian
Constitution. The Fundamental Rights were therefore declared as the most sacred part o
the Constitution. The individual, rather than the villaEe, family, caste or communitj was
regarded as the basic legal unit. In the background of a highly'communal structure
loo^n sn 1^ 'ocal-parochial particularistic ties and an inwnrd'
i
and equ^t^ ” ' '
and association, occupation and L^ .“‘‘.^’‘Presston, religion and faith, assembywere
made enforceable by L system of disposing off property
system of courts was thpr f Judiciary were regarded as sacred. A hierard at ii'
apex. The oyecti; of Supreme Court of India standing ■
defend the irghts and property of inT ‘.'^'^^P^'^dence of judiciary was to
absolute
India.
powers to interpret the Cons'Ih^^ citizens. The courts were vested wi
nstitution in this context of bourgeois democ
in

On the other hand the Directive Pri„ ■ . ■ .hp

of the Indian Constitution) were derH Constitution (as enunciated m "
court, in the governance of the m fundamental, but not enforceab ^
in practice. In fact recent trends Therefore, these directives have not been
the reversal of these directives pr'ogramme of the Indian state pn'^
Check Your Progress 2
Tick(V/
1) ) the correct statement-
The early nationalists
i) were able
take democratic i
ii) were
not able to take ideals and values to the people,
id) tried to take demo cratic democratic ideals and values to the people,
values iaioUS
revivalism,
iv) None of the above.
to
the people through the vehicle of rehS'
2)
The hall mark of the
t achiev
was that dene® f
nt of Indian democracy in the post indep^n
community came to be -
‘he individual came to be recognized
regarded as the basic legal units.
no both (i) & (ijx - as the basic legal unit.
iv) None Of the above.

37.5

Indian Renaissance
familiar with the woT’' '"‘'^Pendenre'- "7 ^°‘'s«‘uent Assembly. From u- ■ ofU''
-perience with thTw "'u® vs^ ^dian political elite had
.
“/ *e state s.ruclte'^r^S the BritXr P' g-‘=ntance. The influence of
ssembly was entrusteri®”^®*^ '"dian pnih "‘““rally overwhelming ^0^* -
P wer m India, they task of ^ future. Therefore, wheh [/
62
™ W-‘minst?'^:‘"7gly
model,
"Pled for'r:' institutional ne.wO*^*“
the Parliamentary system of goveP”"
 . j! 37.5.1 Parliamentary System at the Centre The Establishment of
Democratic Polity in India
The Parliamentary system of governance envisages the collective responsibility of the
executive (i.e. the Council of Ministers) to the Legislature. The decision-making authority
here rests with the Council of ministers led by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is
not only the leader of the majority party or coalition of parties in the Parliament, but he is
also the spokesman of the nation and the state. His influence is overwhelming in shaping
the policy of the state and government. Therefore, it is argued by some that it is neither the
■ Parliamentary nor the Cabinet form of government that is in operation in the contemporary
period. According to many political scientists and commentators (in India and Britain),
what exists in reality is the Prime Ministerial form of Government. The institution of
presidency is merely nominal. It is created for five years by an electoral college consisting
of the members of both houses of the Union Parliament and the legislative assemblies of
the states. The President of India acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers led
the Prime Minister.

37.5.2 The State

Like the Centre, at the state level also the real executive power is vested in the Chief
Minister by virtue of his position as the leader of the majority party in the state
legislature. The role of the Governor has been the major bone of contention from the
'’eginning. It has become very controversial, as on the one hand he acts as the nominee of
Centre by virtue of his being appointed by it. and on the other hand accordmg to the
[institution he is supposed to act in accordance with the will of the majonty party and its
'»«ership in the state legislature. Thus, there always exists a conflict in his role as centre s
iyal nominee vis-a-vis his ioyalty to the Constitution. This conflict becomes far more
, prominent if the ruling party at the sute level happens to be in polibcal opposition to the
'“ling party at the Centre.

^7.6 THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Thei j anvemment based on universal adult
introduction of the representative system of g Hpmocratization of the
^^^i. was one Of the m^ost significan^v^-—^
InHj .
Towards a democratic representation
I Lac oositive. They have become the
chiS ^ elections on Ae ® ^ party is tested. Although, the
strength of any le established caste-class authority
in of universal suffrage strengthene ^ authority, but it also gave a voice
, Of economic power, social position and pohucd
ceriH.^ ^‘dierto disenfranchised sections of soci jl^gy (.ggse to be the key
legitimacy of political authority in threatened,
"'tents of political legitimation the po 11 .. ^ly important in the health of
d electoral choices were seen as being franchise with wisdom.
'^*"«cracy. the Indian voters have utilized their nght to Iran
El ^ nfircel of India’s political They are
^ tions, in this way, have become a part an ^ .„y crisis. This is evidr- -v ^eof
^®ss taken for granted for the solution or
^*^ti and Kashmir, Assam, and Tamil Nadu, i n
Mi ^g^o^ratic -ording to
has been central for the continued ne ^ __
%es. therefore, miraculously the elections are
”'^6,2 I ●
'Hms find that elections have not
within the context of Indian ^uced with any revolutionary aim either.
C“'rohized the situation. They were not m^« and economic power of
utilised as a vehicle for legf"'“fai efw exceptions, they have n^ot eten
h^4'7«nant castes and classes. Therefore ^ ^ socio-economic and ^litical hold
‘“'rog P«oP'« “ “ JZ Panchayat Samitis m Andhra ftadesh m
th,';^ interests. For example a Ifoaste. more land, more money and more
!!■

eduo-. 'IPSOs, for instance showed Aa political succ<

63

""'Of’ continued to be “the requisite for po

 f
Towards A Sovereign State Finally, it can be said that in certain cases the vested interests have manipulated the.iii luodc
institution of elections to maintain their hold. This was sought to be done even by resortidff
to caste, communal, linguistic and regional chauvinism. There is also an ongoing'debtUeiflB)
the use of radio, television and electronic media for meeting political ends. No small paj^t
or individual social workers can easily reach to the mass of the voters without adequate
media network and the funds to fight elections. " '

37.7 FEDERAL POLITY VS. CENTRALISM: OPTIONS

OF A DEMOCRATIC STATE 2-LfT-gl

One of the sfrongest features of democracy in the contemporary world is the .

decentralization of decision-making, resource mobilization and its allocation. This is ni
requirement of any modem large-scale society, its politics and economy. Federalism
proyi es an a ^uate organizational structure for the administration of the large-scale^osri'J
societies of modem nation-states.
iT (>
37.7.1 Historical Background To Federalism
■ -..fl

medtm°Sl"in^®thl^ diverse society like that of India, federalism exists as the sol^
first major democratic ccm^ cultural aspirations of its distinct communities-,'^®
Ss Pa^r^d was taken in 1916, whenbothfe
The basis of this consensu«i^ h an accord known as the Lucknow Pact
this consensus was not followS^pont^the^T^^'
From the very beginning therefore^ while^h ^ necessity for Indian unity f /r

achievement of maximum extent of ^°"gtess Party was motivated by

utmost possible decentralization. ^^^zation, the Muslim League worked for the
debated. While'^ftTcon^el! natio^n r ^“®^don of residuary power was
for vesting these powers with the Cenfre
wanted them within the orbit of the st ’ League and other minority
demarcation of powers between centr ^ ^ governments power. This debate about the
Parties Committee headed bv Pandit sa*"' ® stumbling block facing the AU
subsequent negotiations, leaine to th t Tabl« Conference aiin.^
India between 1942- 47. While,he ",.™° ™ssi«ns sent by the British Governtnerit
compromise to avert the partition of T *®‘‘ *’5' Congress made compronu®®
partition of India rather than for a league stood finally for CiltA.
or a strong federal polity
37.7.2 Federalism after the Partiti on ● If‘dfi
'It;
After the partition of India, i
centre was therefore made byfeco!,!™"® P°«ly a stumg case of a upi^ ,
along federal principles could not
of government with unitary ess^ce ^ we have in India is a federal
™onT* “"be and ““’f Pi°''ided innumerable -
~ f*<*“«ing uX ® "''”8 P"«y at <he cenue could easily infflU^
ZZl f K ("""imated by^“ «>e<«amiss
Constitution empowers the
power of the centre to give di^,* the elected state gover"'"^
also tended to strengUten thl forces 'centralism.
^ ^ “a Power to declare emerge"j|«l '' ^
37.7.3 The Constraints of th a . ”"Viii^
The administrative and financial and Financial
fso leads to the strengthening state its economy and its org^lji
agricmr‘“^ PP«‘ieal structure in India. Tbe ib^l)
process the Plann‘^"*V'^^^^ Planning Cn^’ ^**dustry, education and health had ^ ^
Ses of"oI ® ^"""belon b^”mer"“”" “biblished in March I950;^l^i®"
activitres of socio-economic develop^^®,‘""“d favour of centralization and the
Finally, bureaucracy in inHi, . central subjects.
l,OOOICSOfficerss» ● Pt^tedasaleoi. . imate'lirl
policy makers of I„h "® the time of inrt^ eolonial state. Of appre^^e^
64
P y Indian state. Not etr^2!'!~nce, 453 were Indians and be^l
the Constituent Assembly was
J
 about their overwhelming importance to the independent Indian state. Many democrats, The Establishment of
Democratic Polity in India
i^ftjfmers and the nationalists even wanted to get rid of them. But, the votaries of the
cfeftttaliised state prevailed ultimately. Patel, for example, defended their utility by saying
thattr/; :

‘i have worked with them during difficult period ... Remove them and I see nothing
but a picture of chaos all over the country”. Even the radical Nehru concurred in
their continuance by saying that: “the old distinction and differences have gone... In
the difficult days ahead our service and experts have a vital role to play and we invite
them to do so as comrades in the service of India”.

In addition to the bureaucracy, the role of para-military forces like the Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF), the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Central Industrial Security
Force (CISF) is also instrumental in strengthening the centralized political power structure
in India.

Check Your Progress 3

Tick ( \/ ) the correct statement:
I) The weakness of the electoral system in India is that
i). it has come to be manipulated by national and regional elite by using caste.
communal and regional chauvinism.
,.*.0 it has no weakness at all.
■M) it has given effective erpresentation to the toiling poor and depressed classes.
● iv) None of the above.
What are the constraints in making India a truly federal structure?

I'i:

il/:

LET us SUM UP

^Hcr reading this unit you were able to know.

● about a brief history of the concept of institutions have shaped up i in

● 'India,
about the way in which the idea of democracy and its
well its practise, mainly
the limits of both the concept of liberal democracy
“trough the Indian experience.
:

37.9 key words

more than one vote,
I^Iurai
Voting : A system of voting in which one personwhogetsdo not have the franchise i.e.
ri‘j>^f^anchised sections: Those sections
^ote and elect a representative.
of a society

Complete agreement on an issue. for every individual,

Suffrage: right to vote and elect represent idea is legal.

.f "Si »
vfd >0 look after his subjects as a father looks which existed prominently before
ie worldviews
cart,/pl*'^l*st ideologies: ideologies ‘ rdentified as religion or caste. These world views 65
■
in In Indian context they can were local in nature.
’^b’ast to capitalism’s global sprea
Towards A Sovereign State
Concept of natural hierarchy: a concept which talked of society being divided into irch'
and poor because of natural reasons i.e. reasons of biology. So biologically the fittest mani
became rich and the unfit became poor.
Westminster Model: The parliamentary form of government which has evolved in
Bntain. Westminster is the place where the British Parliament is located.

37.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

EXERCISES

Check Your Progress 1

1) iii) 2) i)

Check Your Progress 2

1) iii) 2) ii)

Check Your Progress 3

1) i) 2)

b) <=°nstraintsofadministratiive and financial structure.

SJlMEOSEFlJySKs otr THIS BLOCK

Amit K. Gupta (ed)
and Reality,
Bipan Chandra
(Manohar. New Delhi-1987)
D.N. Panigrahi (ed) ^Vikas, New Delhi, 1986)
Sumit Sarkar (Vika«”^M Politics in Modem India
t Vikas, New Delhi, 1984)
Modern India

Denfr (NCERT)
Democracy in Practice (NCERT)