Week 12
Week 12
• Tradeoff analysis
Maintaining Land Registry Records
• Historically, land registries were paper-based
• Can be lost, destroyed, falsified, or otherwise manipulated
• Public Blockchain
• Pros: Open network, anyone can
invest or participate as a startup
• Cons: You do not know to whom you
are investing
Public or Private Blockchain
• Private Blockchain
• Pros: The identity of the participants
are known, better security (?)
• Cons: Who will validate the
authenticity? May fallback to a
centralized system
Advantages of using blockchain
• Project Ubin
• Steller Protocol and Network
• Project Ubin
Cross-Border Payments
• Classic use case for which Bitcoin was created and perhaps the
holy grail of cryptocurrencies
• To date, we have over 6000 cryptocurrencies!
• But, what qualifies as a currency. In economics, the following
criteria must be satisfied:
• Medium of exchange: Are merchants willing to accept the
currency in exchange for goods and services
• Unit of account: Is it a measure of the real value of goods and
services (e.g., would a merchant be willing to accept the same
value regardless of relative currency fluctuations)
• Store of value: A mode of investment
Steller Protocol and Network
• Decentralized, hybrid blockchain platform with open membership;
launched in 2014; Lumens as native asset
• Federated Byzantine Agreement (FBA) – quorums formed based on
participants individual trust decisions, followed by agreement within
quorums (Steller Consensus Protocol)
• 2-5 second transaction clearance
• Anchors act as bridges between a given currency and Stellar
network
• Has a distributed exchange: pay in EUR with INR balance
and network will automatically convert it at lowest rate
for you https://www.stellar.org/
Steller Protocol and Network
• The idea got published in a SOSP 2019 Paper --
• Lokhava, Marta, et al. "Fast and secure global payments with
Stellar." Proceedings of the 27th ACM Symposium on Operating
Systems Principles. 2019.
Vote y
Federated Voting in Steller
Vote x
Vote x Vote x
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Vote y
Vote y Vote y
Federated Voting in Steller
Accept x
Vote x Accept x
Accept x
Vote y
Vote y Vote y
Federated Voting in Steller
Accept x
Accept x Accept x
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Vote y Vote y
Federated Voting in Steller
Accept x
Accept x Accept x
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Accept x Accept x
Steller Protocol and Network
• Partially synchronous protocol
• Safety under asynchronous assumptions
• Liveness require a synchronous network
• Performance:
Ripple Protocol and Network
• Protocol for banks to clear and settle payments in real time through a
distributed network
• Consensus (XRP Ledger – XRPL -- https://xrpl.org/ ) allows payment
exchanges and remittance to happen without need for a centralized clearing
house
• Average 5 second confirmations; no mining, custom protocol that hasn’t yet
been validated for correctness and fault tolerance
• Gateway nodes convert fiat currencies to XRP (currency in Ripple)
• Market-makers convert from one currency to another
• Centralized governance, with Ripple still holding a large fraction
of the cryptocurrency
• https://ripple.com
Ripple Protocol and Network
• Five-phase project
• Phase 1: Tokenized SGD
• Phase 2: Re-imagining RTGS
• Phase 3: Delivery versus Payment (DvP)
• Phase 4: Cross-border Payment versus Payment (PvP)
• Phase 5: Enabling Broad Ecosystem Collaboration
Project Ubin: SGD on Distributed Ledger
• Public taxation
• National strategies
Blockchain and Government
• Government needs to maintain (in digital or in paper form)
• Daily operations and activities
• Government assets (land records, buildings etc.)
• Details of people, organizations and institutions
• Records of people
• Business transactions
Multi-institutional and Multi-Organizational
• Different levels of governance
• Note
• Directly store the data on blockchain?
• The data cannot be altered without colluding majority of
the blocks
• Data access as transactions - can check or verify who
has accessed what
Government and Cyber Crime
• Government database is a major target for
hackers
• In 2020, there are 1001 cases of data breaches that
affected 155.8 million individuals
(Source: https://www.statista.com/)
Passport
Data
Ministry of foreign
Affairs - Passport
data management
Sharing of Passport Data: An Example
Passport
Data
Ministry of foreign
Affairs - Passport
data management
Sharing of Passport Data: An Example
National Army
Defense Agency
Passport
Data
Ministry of foreign
Affairs - Passport
data management
Sharing of Passport Data: An Example
National Army
Defense Agency
National Police Agency
Airport/ Sea port CBI/CID - Crime department
Custom Check
Public Service
Identity Database
Passport
Data
Ministry of foreign
Affairs - Passport
data management
Sharing of Passport Data: An Example
National Army
Defense Agency
National Police Agency
Airport/ Sea port CBI/CID - Crime department
Custom Check
Public Service
Identity Database
Passport
Data
Ministry of foreign
Income Tax Department Affairs - Passport
National Intelligence data management
National Audit Agency
Sharing of Passport Data: An Example
National Army
Defense Agency
National Police Agency
Airport/ Sea port CBI/CID - Crime department
Custom Check
Public Service
Identity Database
Passport
Data
Ministry of foreign
Income Tax Department Affairs - Passport
Ministry of
National Intelligence data management
Public Service
National Audit Agency
Government Information Sharing System: A
Typical Example
Service
Requester Agency Directory
Service Broker
Service Broker
Organization Service
Service Gateway
Trade Logistics
Ecommerce Platform Network
Seller 1 Seller 3
Ban
k
Seller 2
Existing Consortia -- Centralized
Consumers
Ecommerce Platform
Seller 1 Seller 3
Seller 2
Consumers
Limitations
● Usually governed by a single authority (service
broker / marketplace )
○ Unfair business advantage to the broker
● Only service broker or marketplace provider
is responsible for communicating with end-users.
SP 1 SP 3
● Profit sharing with central broker
SP 2
● Bias of broker towards a particular provider
● Risk of manipulation & unfair dispute resolution
Objective
• Design a transparent decentralized architecture for
service providing consortium, while eliminating any
centralized broker/marketplace.
Objective
• Design a transparent decentralized architecture for
service providing consortium, while eliminating any
centralized broker/marketplace.
SP
SP
broker / marketplace
SP SP SP
SP
SP
Requirements
• While eliminating the central broker/marketplace, all its
functionalities must be preserved in the decentralized
consortium architecture:
● Unified Interface
○ The consortium should have a unified interface to its consumers.
○ The interface should be without any centralized broker or agent.
○ Consumers should be able to view catalog, query prices, request
for resources, get resource access information and credentials,
make payment, etc., through the interface.
Challenges
Consumer Consumers
s SP SP
Service SP SP Service
Request Response
SP SP
SP Process
SP Request SP SP
2
Decentralized Consortium Interface
1. Agreement on each user request and the ordering of user requests.
2. Service response must be verifiable by end-users. Confidentiality of
response must be preserved.
Decentralized Consortium Interface
SP
SP
Consumers
SP
Private SP
Blockchain
Decentralized Consortium Interface
● How user requests reach the Consortium?
● No single spokesperson for the consortium.
- No single web portal or address available for communication.
● Simple solutions like a broadcast from the consumers to the closed
network will not work.
○ Messages might be lost
○ Messages might arrive out of order.
● Consumers might be byzantine faulty and try
to partition the consortium.
Decentralized Consortium Interface
Required Guarantees:
1. Consortium Interface Safety - Non faulty SPs receive
the same set of consumer requests and in the same
order.
Servic ?
e SP
reques SP
Consumer t
s
Public SP Private SP
Blockchain Blockchain
Transferring Consensus to the Consortium
Consortium SPs cannot simply pick requests from the
permissionless blockchain and start processing:
1. Some consortium members might not get the mined
block in time and thus cannot participate in its
scheduling.
2. Malicious consortium members may introduce and
schedule invalid consumer requests that are
not mined at all.
3. Consensus protocol like PoW, often goes
through temporary forks. (Network is partitioned into
two or more parts with different accepted blocks.)
Transferring Verifiable Response
Servic
e SP
reques
SP
Consumer
s
t
Service
response
?
SP SP
Public
Blockchain
Private
Blockchain
Transferring Verifiable Response
A single SP cannot simply post a response of the
Consortium back to the users.
1. Consortium response is always based on a consensus
on the same.
2. The consortium consensus has no manifestation
outside the private blockchain.
3. The consortium consensus on response must be
verifiable by the end-users.
4. Confidentiality of the response has to be preserved
while transferring across the public blockchain network.
Transferring Verifiable Response
A single SP cannot simply post a response of the
Consortium back to the users.
1. Consortium response is always based on a consensus
on the same.
How do consensus
2. The consortium we solve this
has problem?
no manifestation
outside the private blockchain.
3. The consortium consensus on response must be
verifiable by the end-users.
4. Confidentiality of the response has to be preserved
while transferring across the public blockchain network.
Blockchain and its applications
Prof. Sandip Chakraborty
• Consensus on Consensus
Transferring Consensus to the Consortium
Servic ?
e SP
reques SP
Consumer t
s
Public SP Private SP
Blockchain Blockchain
Transferring Verifiable Response
Servic
e SP
reques
SP
Consumer
s
t
Service
response
?
SP SP
Public
Blockchain
Private
Blockchain
Consensus on Consensus
Consensus propagation from public blockchain to private
consortium blockchain
T1
SP 1 SP2 SPk
Initialize Propagation
BFT Consensus Contract & Send
endorsement - E(T1)
E(T1)
BFT Consensus
Private Ledger BFT Consensus
E(T1)
[21] Syta, Ewa, Iulia Tamas, Dylan Visher, David Isaac Wolinsky, Philipp Jovanovic, Linus Gasser, Nicolas Gailly, Ismail Khoffi,
and Bryan Ford. "Keeping authorities" honest or bust" with decentralized witness cosigning." In 2016 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy
Verifiable Response Transfer
● Consortium response is accepted as valid only if it has ≥ ⅔ of the SPs’
signatures.
● For preserving confidentiality, a response to a consumer is encrypted
using its public key.
● Signature Collection:
● Multisignature collection is carried out off-chain to improve latency.
● A communication tree is formed along which the singing request
and the signatures are exchanged.
● Each node of the tree aggregates signatures collected from its
descendants.
● Fallback to smart contract based signature collection in case of
denial of service attack by some SP.
Verifiable Response Transfer
Private Ledger
PB0 PB1 PB14 PB15 PB16 PB17 PB18
E(T1) E(T1) E(T1)
Response S(M)
EC = 1 EC = 2 EC = k R1 SC = 1
B10, O1
M = Encrypt(R1)
B10, O1 B10, O1
Initialize Signature
Scheduling Collection Fallback
BFT Consensus
Contract Contract
BFT Consensus
Aggregated
Public signatures SM
Public Ledger Blockchain
SP1
M
Tx
B0 B1 B9 B10 M
Miner SP2 SP3
M
M M
SM M
SP4 SP5 SP6 SP7
VM
Request
Consume
r VM access
credentials
Cloud federation
consortium
Testbed Setup
Results
Results
Results
Conclusion
● There are interesting research/design problems in the blockchain
space
● You need to think of applying the right technology at the right
place!