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Language-Games for Peace!

Calla Cowan

Department of Philosophy, Concordia University

PHIL 216: Philosophy of Language

Dr. Natalie Helberg

October 11, 2022

Ludwig Wittgenstein is known for being one of the 20th century’s most obscure philosophers. His

opposing ideas on how language means have been either disregarded as senseless philosophical

ponderings or considered to be some of the most meaningful works in the philosophy of language. On

Certainty (1951) and Philosophical Investigations (1953) derail the theories laid out in Tractatus Logico

Philosophicus (1922) and mark a clear shift in Wittgenstein's stance on the proper philosophical methods

of uncovering how language means. His most formidable idea from the later texts is the theory of

‘language-games.’ Using excerpts from Philosophical Investigations, and On Certainty, I shall argue that

Wittgenstein's language-games lay the necessary framework for understanding how personal experience,

social conditioning, and custom determine meaning in language. By understanding this fact, we can

engage in more productive interpersonal and interdisciplinary communication.

Wittgenstein grappled with the “right method of philosophy” (Tractatus, 6.53) throughout his career, and

it is the point I believe is what made his later work so influential in the discourse of how language means.

Within the infamous obscurity of the final passages of the Tractatus one thing is clear: Wittgenstein was

indeed concerned with the metaphysical (Tractatus, 6.53). It was believed by some that through

dissecting language one could answer life's metaphysical questions, and this notion is one that plagued

Wittgenstein. “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world,” (Tractatus, 5.6). Throughout the

work, he makes attempts to determine the components of language in hopes that modifying it will remove

its limitations. But as his later works show, this is not an effective method to reveal the meaning of

language.

In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein appears to be unconcerned with the problem of the

metaphysical and instead investigates the philosophy of language from a more wholistic point of view. He

notes that the value in philosophical discoveries arises from the uncovering of “plain nonsense” and the

bumps in the understanding that come from “butting its head up against the limits of language,” (P.I.
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119). In other words, the limits of language are no longer what prevent us from uncovering meaning, they

are precisely what make philosophical works important. Philosophy rarely reveals a concrete answer, and

so he suggests instead that its purpose comes from the thought invested in searching for meaning.

The other key difference in Wittgenstein's new method of philosophy is that he denounces the prospect of

changing language, stating “Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in

the end only describe it” (P.I. 124). Deconstructing language into its fundamental parts, such as words or

predicates, implies that language only has meaning when one divine set of rules is followed. Therefore,

one cannot apply a single set of rules to all forms of language as it would define all but one form of

language meaningless, regardless of its ability to communicate. All other forms of language which do not

adhere to these divine rules can still communicate meaningfully, can they not? (P.I. 18). What defines

language is its ability to communicate, no matter if it follows an arbitrary list of definitions. To

encompass this broad spectrum, Wittgenstein develops language-games. They are a solution to the

problem that arises from constricting language to only the meaning of single words (P.I. 13). According

to Wittgenstein, a language-game is “the whole process of using words” as well as the “the whole,

consisting of language and the actions unto which it is woven” (P.I. 7). He is no longer examining the

configuration of words to decipher meaning, he is concerned with the whole of language and the

multiplicity of its use.

Words do not simply attribute themselves to an object in the world, they provide us with tools to carry out

different activities. As Wittgenstein declares, “the meaning of a word is its use in language” (P.I. 43).

Language-games distinguish the diverse array of meanings a word or bit of language may hold depending

on the context it is used in. The “Slab!” example Wittgenstein provides demonstrates how a change of

context can change the meaning of a language-game. If given the correct context, life experience and use,

that one exclamation can communicate a full thought such as, “You there, construction worker! Bring me
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the slab to your right.” (P.I. 19). If “Slab!” is exclaimed in the middle of a symphony, one might question

the sanity of the individual exclaiming the phrase. When we are not familiar with the use of the phrase

uttered, or if it is being used in the wrong context, it appears nonsensical.

To legitimize this theory, Wittgenstein establishes that language is an ever-changing “life-form” (P.I. 23).

It “may be seen as an ancient city,” built upon crumbling structures, nevertheless meaningful to the

people of the city (P.I. 18). If language is a city, then language-games are the structures. New structures

are built, and ancient ones develop new meaning according to the necessity of their use. Simultaneously,

other language-games have been forgotten and without knowledge of them ever having existed, one could

say they are senseless. A language-game may be meaningful to a unique time, place, or person, but if it is

not used in a context where the word is useful, it loses its meaning. Recognizing language as having a

multitude of activities and environments which determine meaning, no matter how senseless they may

seem, brings us to the question: If all parts of language can have meaning under certain circumstances,

where is the line between meaning and senselessness? (P.I. 142).

For example, an oracle and a physicist enter a debate to decide if water boils at 100°. In On Certainty

Wittgenstein exemplifies this situation to examine how meaning and senselessness can be determined.

The physicist argues that it is true, water boils at 100° and the oracle wants to challenge it (On Certainty,

604). So, what then determines who is right if they are both simply using their own language-games to

“combat” the other? (On Certainty, 609). It must be a matter of how the fact is used in each language-

game. The fact that water boils at 100° may not be necessary for the oracle to communicate clearly or to

carry out the activities of her life. For a physicist on the other hand, it is necessary for the fact to be true

so that the work she does is consistent. “Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning,” (P.I.

198) but rather “to know the rules of a game is to know the custom” (P.I. 199). The physicist is part of a

community where, to abide by the rules of the language-game of physics, she must follow the custom that
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water boils at 100°. The oracle is simply interpreting this custom from a different community and

therefore is using the wrong language-game.

When confronted with a situation such as the above where a word or phrase of a language-game is

uttered, and one does not comprehend the language-game being used, it means that two language-games

are mixing. Without an understanding of what it takes to understand a language-game, this argument of

meaning and senselessness hinders the progress of communication. Rather than dispute which language-

game is meaningful, and which is senseless, it is better to either separate the two language-games or

attempt to learn the opposing one. This way the two parties can come to understand the experience and

knowledge that influenced these language-games and perhaps why they came to mix in the first place.

According to Wittgenstein, “To understand language means to be master of a technique” (P.I. 199). The

way each person uses language is a craft that was practiced through countless hours of life experience and

social conditioning. So, should we not respect this craft regardless of if it is the same as ours? Looking at

language through this lens shows us when it is time to either take a step back or open our minds to the

complex nature of a language-game.

On Certainty and Philosophical Investigations make no attempt to modify or define language. They serve

as a description of the infinite applications of language and allow us to understand the mixing of

language-games. Once we can determine when a disagreement is a mere linguistic misunderstanding, we

are able to spend more time having productive conversations. Whether it be a person or an entity, without

understanding the experience that arises from learning a language-game, communication in its truest form

ceases to exist. Dialogue becomes only a matter of waiting to speak or to combat another with one's own

ideas, rather than gaining knowledge through listening. Recognizing each separate language-game as a

craft that involves mastery lays a crucial foundation for respect and understanding in every form of

communication.
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Bibliography

Wittgenstein, L. (1951). On Certainty. Basil Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Macmillan Publishing Company

Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Kegan Paul.