Slander / Oral Defamation, A358 Revised

Penal Code
Updated onNovember 23, 2023

Slander or oral defamation is libel via spoken words.

1. Concept
Slander or Oral Defamation – is “libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in
writing.” It is defined as “the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to
prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood.” (De
Leon v. People, G.R. No. 212623, January 11, 2016, Per Mendoza J.)

a. Legal basis
Art. 358. Slander. – Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prisión correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting
nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000). (As amended by R.A. 10951).
(Revised Penal Code)

2. Modes of commission
The following are the modes of committing the offense:
1) Simple Oral Defamation; or
2) Grave Oral Defamation – when it is of a serious and insulting nature. (REVISED
PENALC ODE, Article 358; De Leon v. People, supra.)

a. Mode 1: Simple Oral Defamation

Elements of the offense of simple oral defamation:
1) There must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, status or circumstances;
2) Made orally;
3) Publicly;
4) And maliciously;
5) Directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead;
6) Which tends to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person defamed. (De
Leon v. People, supra.)

1) Element 1: Imputation
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a
crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in
contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. (De Leon v. People,
supra.)

[I]n Cruz v. Court of Appeals, petitioner and complainant, a Municipal Judge, were next
door neighbors. Animosity grew between their two families because of some disputes.
Petitioner resented the practice of complainant of throwing garbage and animal
excrement into her premises. There was also a boundary dispute between petitioner’s
mother and complainant, which was the subject of a civil suit for “Recovery of
Possession, Ownership, Enforcement of Legal Easement and Abatement of Nuisance”
filed by the mother before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against complainant.
Additionally, petitioner’s mother had previously instituted an administrative complaint
against the complainant before the Supreme Court, but the same was dismissed. There
was a pent-up feeling of being aggrieved, resentment, anger, and vexation on petitioner’s
part, culminating in her outburst against complainants. For having called the complainant
judge “land grabber,” “shameless” and “hypocrite,” petitioner was charged and
subsequently convicted by the Court of First Instance of three separate offenses of Grave
Oral Defamation committed on 5, 6 and 8 August 1976. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the verdicts of conviction. On review, however, we held that although the
abusive remarks may ordinarily be considered as serious defamation, under the
environmental circumstances of the case, there having been provocation on
complainant’s part, and the utterances complained of having been made in the heat of
unrestrained anger and obfuscation, petitioner is liable only for the crime of Slight Oral
Defamation… (Villanueva v. People, supra., citing Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
L-56224-26, November 25, 1982)

Pader v. People, G.R. No. 139157, February 8, 2000, Per Pardo, J.:

The accused shouted “putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo!” at the
gate of Atty. Escolangco, who was then having conversation with his political leaders at
the terrace of his house. As Atty. Escolangco was running for Vice Mayor at that time, he
was dumbfounded and embarrassed by such remark.]

• The issue is whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation. In resolving
the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will
fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical
significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the
special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party
and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.

• Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however, the factual
backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight. The trial court, in arriving at its
decision, considered that the defamation was deliberately done to destroy Atty.
Escolango’s reputation since the parties were political opponents.
• We do not agree. Somehow, the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the parties
were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the defamatory
words; and the fact that petitioner’s anger was instigated by what Atty. Escolango did
when petitioner’s father died. In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or
insulting nature.

• … the expression “putang ina mo” is a common enough utterance in the dialect that is
often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact,
more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one’s expression of profanity. We do
not find it seriously insulting that after a previous incident involving his father, a drunk
[R.] Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words expressing anger. Obviously, the
intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter.
Being a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional gestures and words of disapproval
or dislike of his person are not uncommon.

• In similar fashion, the trial court erred in awarding moral damages without proof of
suffering. Accordingly, petitioner may be convicted only of slight oral defamation
defined and penalized under Article 358, Revised Penal Code…

a) Words used, construed in entirety

To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words used in the statement must be
construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense. (De Leon v. People, supra.)

b) Insulting words, not actionable

It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or
slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or
vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for
defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language
is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. (De Leon v. People,
supra.)

c) “Yabang”
[I]n Jamilano v. Court of Appeals, where calling someone “yabang” (boastful or
arrogant) was found not defamatory, the complainant’s subsequent recourse to the law on
oral defamation was not sustained by the Court. (De Leon v. People, supra,
citing Jamilano v. Court of Appeals, En Banc, G.R. No. L-26059, October 31, 1969)

d) Heat of anger
[I]t is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation
on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony. (De Leon v. People,
supra.)

2) Element 2: Made orally

To constitute slander or oral defamation, the defamatory remark should be done orally.
Otherwise, if it was on writing, it would be covered be libel.

Agbayani v. CA, G.R. No. 183623, June 25, 2012, Per Reyes, J.:

• Agbayani and Genabe were both employees of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)…,
working as Court Stenographer and Legal Researcher II, respectively. On December 29,
2006, Agbayani filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation… for allegedly
uttering against her, in the presence of their fellow court employees and while she was
going about her usual duties at work, the following statements, to wit:

“ANG GALING MO LETY, SINABI MO NA TINAPOS MO YUNG MARVILLA

CASE, ANG GALING MO. FEELING LAWYER KA KASI, BAKIT DI KA
MAGDUTY NA LANG, STENOGRAPHER KA MAGSTENO KA NA LANG, ANG
GALING MO, FEELING LAWYER KA TALAGA. NAGBEBENTA KA NG KASO,
TIRADOR KA NG JUDGE. SIGE HIGH BLOOD DIN KA, MAMATAY KA SANA
SA HIGH BLOOD MO.”

• We recall that in the morning of December 27, 2006 when the alleged utterances were
made, Genabe was about to punch in her time in her card when she was informed that she
had been suspended for failing to meet her deadline in a case, and that it was Agbayani
who informed the presiding judge that she had missed her deadline when she left to
attend a convention in Baguio City, leaving Agbayani to finish the task herself.
According to Undersecretary Pineda, the confluence of these circumstances was the
immediate cause of respondent Genabe’s emotional and psychological distress. We rule
that his determination that the defamation was uttered while the respondent was in
extreme excitement or in a state of passion and obfuscation, rendering her offense of
lesser gravity than if it had been made with cold and calculating deliberation, is beyond
the ambit of our review. The CA concurred that the complained utterances constituted
only slight oral defamation, having been said in the heat of anger and with perceived
provocation from Agbayani. Respondent Genabe was of a highly volatile personality
prone to throw fits (sumpongs), who thus shared a hostile working environment with her
co-employees, particularly with her superiors, Agbayani and Hon. [B.] Maceda, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 275, whom she claimed had committed against her “grievous
acts that outrage moral and social conduct.” That there had been a long-standing
animosity between Agbayani and Genabe is not denied.
3). Element 3: Publicly
De Leon v. People, G.R. No. 212623, January 11, 2016, Per Mendoza, J.:

• Records show that De Leon was charged with Grave Oral Defamation in the
Information filed… the accusatory portion of which reads:

That, on or about April 17, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
with the deliberate intent to besmirch the honor and reputation of one SPO3 [P.L.]
LEONARDO, did and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously publicly proffer against the
latter slanderous words and expressions such as “WALANGHIYA KANG
MANGONGOTONG NA PULIS KA, ANG YABANG YABANG MO NOON. PATAY
KA SA AKIN MAMAYA [,]” and other words and expressions of similar import,
thereby bringing the said SPO3 [P.L.] LEONARDO into public contempt, discredit and
ridicule.

Contrary to law.

• [Version of the Prosecution] The first hearing was scheduled on April 17, 2006 at the
PLEB office on the 5th Floor of the Manila City Hall; At around 1:30 o’clock in the
afternoon, while waiting outside the PLEB office on the 5th floor of the Manila City Hall,
[Complainant] noticed [Accused] and several of his companions approaching. Before
entering the PLEB office, De Leon uttered these words to SPO3 Leonardo, “Walanghiya
kang mangongotong na pulis ka, ang yabang yabang mo noon. Patay ka sa akin ngayon.”

• [Version of the Defense] [T]he defense claimed that there was a prior incident that took
place on the morning of February 27, 2006 when De Leon, with his son John, while
having breakfast with their fellow joggers at the Philippine National Railroad-Tutuban
Station, were approached by SPO3 Leonardo who arrived on his scooter. With his gun
drawn, SPO3 Leonardo walked fast towards the group and at a distance of two meters,
more or less, he said, “Putang ina mo, tapos ka na Ricky Boy, referring to De Leon.” He
pressed the trigger but the gun did not fire, when he was to strike again, De Leon was
able to escape with the help of John… [Next par.] Consequently, De Leon and John filed
an administrative complaint for grave misconduct against SPO3 Leonardo before the
PLEB and the first hearing was set on April 17, 2006. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay sa
Paghahabla filed before the PLEB, De Leon narrated that he and SPO3 Leonardo were
former jogging buddies and that the latter wanted to borrow money from the former in
the amount of P150,000.00, but he declined. SPO3 Leonardo became upset with him,
culminating in the gun-pointing incident… [Next par.] On April 17, 2006, at around 1:30
o’clock in the afternoon, De Leon, in the company of his wife Concepcion, Manalo,
Molera, and several others went to the PLEB office to attend the hearing. When De Leon
and his companions arrived at the PLEB, they saw SPO3 Leonardo seated on the bench
alone; that they were about to pass when SPO3 Leonardo stood up, badmouthed and
threatened De Leon by uttering the words, “Putang-ina mong mayabang ka, pag di mo
inurong demanda mo sa akin, papatayin kita.”

• Considering the factual backdrop of this case, the Court is convinced that the crime
committed by De Leon was only slight oral defamation for the following reasons:

• First, as to the relationship of the parties, they were obviously acquainted with each
other as they were former jogging buddies. Prior to the purported gun-pointing incident,
there was no reason for De Leon to harbor ill feelings towards SPO3 Leonardo.

• Second, as to the timing of the utterance, this was made during the first hearing on the
administrative case, shortly after the alleged gun-pointing incident. The gap between the
gun-pointing incident and the first hearing was relatively short, a span of time within
which the wounded feelings could not have been healed. The utterance made by De Leon
was but a mere product of emotional outburst, kept inside his system and unleashed
during their encounter.

• Third, such words taken as a whole were not uttered with evident intent to strike deep
into the character of SPO3 Leonardo as the animosity between the parties should have
been considered. It was because of the purported gun-pointing incident that De Leon
hurled those words. There was no intention to ridicule or humiliate SPO3 Leonardo
because De Leon’s utterance could simply be construed as his expression of dismay
towards his actions as his friend and member of the community.

• The defamatory remarks were not in connection with the public officer’s duty

• Finally, the Court finds that even though SPO3 Leonardo was a police officer by
profession, his complaint against De Leon for oral defamation must still prosper. It has
been held that a public officer should not be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of
criticism. The doctrine, nevertheless, would only apply if the defamatory statement was
uttered in connection with the public officer’s duty…

4) Element 4: Maliciously
The imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
status or circumstances, should be done maliciously, as opposed to remarks which may
have for their purpose as a joke or humor, which carry no malicious intent.

5) Element 5: Natural or juridical persons, or dead persons

The defamed person may be natural persons or juridical persons.

Natural persons refer to individuals or human beings, and they either be living or dead.
Juridical persons refer to artificial persons created by law, such as a corporation,
partnership, association, and so on.

6) Element 6: Dishonour, discredit, or contempt

The imputation should tend to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of the defamed
person, such as casting doubt or suspicion on their honor or reputation.

a) Called gangster in the middle of a sermon

In the case of People v. Arcand, a priest called the offended party a gangster in the
middle of the sermon. The Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for slight slander
as there was no imputation of a crime, a vice or immorality. (De Leon v. People, supra,
citing People v. Arcand, G.R. No. 46336, September 29, 1939)

b) “Putang nia mo”

In Pader v. People, the Court ruled that the crime committed was only slight oral
defamation as it considered the expression, “putang ina mo,” as expression to convey
anger or displeasure. Such utterance was found not seriously insulting considering that he
was drunk when he uttered those words and his anger was instigated by what the private
complainant did when the former’s father died. (De Leon v. People, supra, citing Pader
v. People, G.R. No. 139157, February 8, 2000)

b. Mode 2: Grave Oral Defamation

Elements of the offense of grave oral defamation:

1) There must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or

any act, omission, status or circumstances;

2) Made orally;

3) Publicly;

4) And maliciously;

5) Directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead;

6) Which tends to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person defamed.

7) Serious and insulting nature (REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 358; See De Leon v.
People, supra.)
1) Element 1: Imputation
See earlier discussion.

2) Element 2: Made orally

See earlier discussion.

3) Element 3: Publicly
Seeearlier related discussion.

4) Element 4: Maliciously
Seeearlier related discussion.

5) Element 5: Natural or juridical persons, or dead persons

Seeearlier related discussion.

6) Element 6: Dishonour, discredit, or contempt

Seeearlier related discussion.

7) Element 7: Serious in nature

Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only
upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, like the social standing or the advanced age of the offended
party. (De Leon v. People, supra.)

Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one
or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted
ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the
case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which
might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. (Villanueva v. People, G.R.
No. 160351, April 10, 2006, Per Chico-Nazario, J.)

a) Factors
The gravity depends upon:

1) the expressions used;

2) the personal relations of the accused and the offended party; and

3) the special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the
offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at
the time. (De Leon v. People, supra.)

b) Scurrilous epithets, imputing unchastity

In U.S. v. Tolosa, where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous
epithets including words imputing unchastity against a respectable married lady and
tending to injure the character of her young daughters, the Court ruled that the crime
committed was grave slander. (De Leon v. People, supra, citing G.R. No. L-12696,
November 19, 1917)

c) Imputed estafa
In Balite v. People, the accused was found guilty of grave oral defamation as the
scurrilous words he imputed to the offended party constituted the crime of estafa. (De
Leon v. People, supra, citing Balite v. People, En Banc, G.R. No. L-21475, September
30, 1966)

3. Things to note
The following are some additional things to note about this offense.

a. Social standing
[T]hat the social standing and position of the offended party are also taken into account
and thus, it was held that the slander was grave, because the offended party had held
previously the Office of Congressman, Governor, and Senator and was then a candidate
for Vice-President, for which no amount of sophistry would take the statement out of the
compass of grave oral defamation. (Villanueva v. People, supra.)

b. Extemporaneous over radio

Is it libel or oral defamation if a person shouted defamatory remarks through an amplifier
system? This was the novel question posed in the case below.

People v. Santiago, En Banc, G.R. No. L-17663, May 30, 1962, Concepcion, J.:

• The information herein alleges that defendant Isauro Santiago has committed the crime
of “libel” as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of October 1959, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, for the evident purpose of injuring the name and reputation of [A.H.] Lacson,
and of impeaching and besmirching the latter’s virtue, honesty, honor and reputation, and
with the malicious intent of exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, did
then and there wilfully, feloniously, maliciously and publicly call said Mayor [A.H.]
Lacson, in the course of a political speech delivered at 392 Fraternal, Quiapo, in said city,
thru the medium of an amplifier system and before a crowd of around a hundred persons,
the following, to wit: “Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang Alkalde, Mayor
Lacson raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in Shellborne
Hotel”, which are false, malicious and highly defamatory statements against Mayor
[A.H.] Lacson, delivered with no good intentions or justifiable motive, but solely for the
purpose of injuring the name and reputation of said Mayor [A.H.] Lacson and to expose
him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.

• Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged
therein is, not libel, but oral defamation, which has already prescribed…

• The prosecution maintains that “the medium of an amplifier system”, thru which the
defamatory statements imputed to the accused were allegedly made, falls within the
purview of the terms “writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph,
painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means”,
appearing in said Article 355, in the sense, at least, that in “amplifier system” is a means
“similar” to “radio”.

• This pretense is untenable. To begin with, as correctly stated in defendant’s brief, “radio
as a means of publication is ‘the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves
without conducting wires intervening between transmitter and receiver” (Library of
Universal Knowledge)’” (see, also, 18 Encyclopedia Britanica, p. 285), “while
transmission of words by means of an amplifier system”, such as the one mentioned in
the information, “is not thru ‘electromagnetic waves’ and is with the use of ‘conducting
wires’ intervening between the transmitter… and the receiver…”

• Secondly, even the word “radio” used in said Article 355, should be considered in
relation to the terms with which it is associated — “writing, printing, lithography,
engraving… phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition or cinematographical exhibition”
— all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a means
of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral
defamation. Thus, it has been held that slanderous statements forming part of a
manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel…, whereas the rules
governing such offense were declared inapplicable to extemporaneous remarks of
scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio broadcast by a person hired to
read a prepared text, but not appearing thereon…

• IN SHORT, the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral
defamation…
4. Distinguish from other offenses
This offense is distinguished from other offenses or crimes below.

a. Slander vs Slander by deed

Factors Slander or Oral Defamation Slander by Deed

Offended Party Any person Any person

Offender Any person Any person

Overt Acts Defamation via spoken words Defamation via conduct or behavior
Thus, slander is defamation via spoken words. On the other hand, slander by deed is
defamation via conduct or behavior.

For more information, see: Slander by Deed

b. Slander vs Libel
Factors Slander or OralDefamation Libel

Offended Party Any person Any person

Offender Any person Any person

Defamation via printed means, including

Overt Acts Defamation via spoken words electronic
means thru Cyberlibel
Thus, slander is defamation via spoken words. On the other hand, libel is defamation via
printed words.