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The Eli Cohen Files

Part II: The Making of a Masterspy

By Wesley Britton

[Abstract: Describes Eli Cohen’s years in Israel from 1956 through his recruitment into the
Aman. Provides an overview of his training, time in Argentina, and his insertion into Syria.
Analyzes his contributions and achievements and explores myths about these accomplishments.]

Israel
During Egypt’s rage over the 1956 Sinai loss, the British and French were declared enemies of
the state. All with those nationalities were forcibly expelled. In addition, the Egyptian
government subjected its remaining Jewish population to arbitrary house arrest, imprisonment,
sequestration of their businesses and assets, expulsion from the country and denaturalisation. To
encourage Jews to leave Egypt, families were bullied, doors were forbidden to be locked, and
arrests were made in the middle of the night. Those deported were allowed to only take their
clothing and the allowed sum of £10 per person.

Naturally, the mukhabarat (Egyptian secret police) focused on known or suspected Zionists and
arrested them on charges of espionage if there had been any involvement in Zionist youth
organizations. “The general procedure was for the authorities to detain one member of each
family and then issue an order of immediate expulsion for all the family. The prisoner would be
released on the condition he would leave the country immediately and was brought directly to
the ship to join his family.” (Barda)
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In the space of just four months, 23% of Egyptian Jewry was forced out of their homeland.
Between November 1956 and March 1957, 14,102 Jews departed for Israel. “When they were
forced out of their familiar surroundings, they experienced not only the material loss of their
possessions but also the emotional loss of the only home they knew.” (Barda) A 1957 statement
at the international conference of Jewish organizations summarized the situation:

Large numbers of Jews of all nationalities have either been served with orders
of expulsion or were subjected to ruthless intimidation to compel them to apply
for permission to depart. Hundreds who have reached lands of refuge have
testified that they were taken in shackles from prison and concentration camps
to board ships. In order to ensure that this deliberate creation of a new refugee
problem should not evoke protests from international public opinion,
documents proving expulsion were taken away from expellees before
departure. Furthermore, they were compelled to sign statements that they left
voluntarily. The victims of this barbaric process were deprived of their
possessions. (Peters)

So, Eli Cohen was far from alone when, in December 1956, the Ministry of the Interior expelled
Eli from Egypt and deported him to Naples, Italy. “There we were received by a representative
of the Jewish Agency, who put us up in a third-class hotel. Later, when all the documents were
arranged, they brought us to Genoa by train, and from there we sailed to Israel.” A man by the
name of Peretz met Eli when he got off the boat and gave him the address of his relatives. (Ben-
Hanan 105) “Before I went to meet my family in Bat-Yam, I phoned my sister Odette. She, of
course, was happy and moved to tears to hear my voice, and to learn that I was safe and sound,
and in the Holy Land. All the time they had been worried that something had happened to me
when I was expelled from Egypt.” (Ben-Hanan 106)

One story from Avraham Cohen shows an insight into the mindset of the new émigré. When Eli
arrived in Israel, he temporarily lived in his parents’ house. For a time, he shared a bedroom with
his youngest brother. Avraham recalls that Eli once left his suitcase on top of a piece of
furniture. Eli placed some papers inside the suitcase when Avraham entered the room. Being
curious, Avraham opened the suitcase to peek at his older brother's belongings when Eli wasn’t
present. “I left everything exactly as I found it.” When Eli came home later he asked his brother
“Did you enjoy the tour of my things?” Avraham, completely awestruck at being found
out, asked how he knew. “When I left, I put a small thread on top of the suitcase,” Eli told him,
“and now it's on the floor.” (A2)

In addition, Avraham says, “Eli knew how to answer a question and tell you nothing. I once
asked him about the Lavon Affair and he said to me: ‘'You're asking me? You live in Israel.’”
(A4) The much younger brother admits getting only glimpses of what Eli was doing in Israel.
“Someone told me that they saw Eli at the Persian Freemason Lodge Eliahu HaNavi in Haifa.”
But Avraham couldn’t explain why Eli would drive to Haifa when the main lodge was located in
Tel Aviv. (A1) (Note 1)
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Sources vary on what happened in the first months of Eli’s experiences in Israel. According to
Maurice Cohen, Eli “moved in with our parents in their apartment in Bat Yam and petitioned for
a position as a translator for Israel Intelligence Operations. Despite his facility for languages, his
extensive intelligence training and his role in the Israeli underground, he was turned down
because he was not proficient in modern Hebrew.” (M2) However, Eli gave different details.
Looking for work, Eli said he was directed to the Egyptian Immigrants Club in Tel Aviv. “The
club director, Sirmano, who studied with me at the Jewish school in Alexandria, gave me the
address of an office in Allenby Street.” The manager, an officer with the rank of captain,
“wanted to know if I was fluent in Arabic. Then he arranged for me to translate Arabic
newspapers. That same officer sent me to an adjacent office, where another officer gave me an
Arabic newspaper.” Learning Eli’s knowledge of modern Hebrew wasn't sufficient, the officer
assigned him the task of indexing newspapers. (Ben-Hanan 106)

At his trial, Eli Cohen maintained these duties included translating classified documents for the
army as well as daily newspapers gathered from Arab countries. He told his questioners he didn’t
put much thought into what material crossed his desk. “I worked to support myself and did not
want to get mixed up in things that didn't concern me.” He said the translators were Jews from
Egypt and Iraq and that he worked in a room with three other translators. “I earned 170 pounds a
month.” But after a few months, he was dismissed for a lack of work. (Ben-Hanan 106)

Whatever led to the change, Cohen himself maintained the Ministry of Labor sent him to one
bookkeeping course and one in cost accounting. With the help of a friend from the Egyptian
Immigrants, he got a job in the auditing department of the Hamashbir Hamerkazi on Salame
Street in Tel Aviv. “My job was to inspect the cooperative [retail] shops.” (Ben-Hanan 108)
Meanwhile, Maurice Cohen had become fluent in Hebrew and “made great strides in both my
personal and professional life. In 1952, I married Hanna Shirazi and took a job as district
substitute for all postmasters who were ill or on leave. A year later, Hanna and I had our first
son, Shaul. Not long after, I became Postmaster of Eilat.” (M2)

Then, after he completed an annual course in officer’s school for Army reservists, Maurice said
his class was asked if anyone wished to join intelligence. No one volunteered. The instructor
asked Maurice, “What about you?” He responded he had a very good job, was now a father, and
had good prospects with the post office. (M5) So he turned down all such requests. (M2) At
least, for the present. In a few short years, Maurice Cohen would indeed become an intelligence
officer for the Mossad.

Nadia
In his trial deposition, Eli made a few remarks about finding his wife. “I met Nadia, through my
sister-in-law. She was a young nurse of Iraqi origin. In 1959 we got married and bought an
apartment on Rehov Hatehiya in Bat-Yam, on the Saving for Building Plan.” They lived on Eli’s
income and Nadia helped out. (Ben-Hanan 107) Maurice Cohen was deeply involved in the
match-making:
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“One day, my wife called me at work asking me if I could stop over at her sister Hela’s on my
way back home, in order to bring the two dresses that her sister sewed for her. My sister in law,
Hela was a salon dressmaker, well known in her neighborhood.

“When I arrived at Hela’s residence to pick up the dresses, I found her giving them the last
finish. She asked me to wait a few minutes until she finished the final press. Meanwhile, a nice
pretty young woman comes to fit up the dress, which Hela is sewing for her.

“The young lady turned to look me over, with a sweet inquisitive gaze and asked Hela oddly,
addressing her in an Arabic language, Iraqi succulent locution, whence your acquaintance of this
nice looking guy? Is he Ashkenazi?

“Hela answered her with pride on her face, ‘he is my brother in law, the husband of my young
sister Hanina, he is Egyptian born, and he understands our Arabic language too.’ The young
woman looked to me with a bit of embarrassment and shyness in her face. ‘If you were a
bachelor, I could introduce you to my sister Nadia, apropos, she lives with her parents opposite
this building, my parents are well acquainted with Hela.’” (M1)

Maurice said he smiled and told her, “If your sister Nadia is as pretty as you are, I will gladly
arrange for her to meet my brother.” We made all the necessary arrangements, and when Nadia
and Eli met, it was immediately clear that they were meant to be together. (M2)

Nadia Magled was born on September 14, 1935, a “shapely nice looking 23 year old Iraqi girl,
slightly taller then Eli, with swarthy hair and skin color similar to Eli. She had pert brown eyes.”
Her family had lived for generations in Baghdad “in the traditional Jewish quarter of extended
family households in the ‘city of rooftops’, as her brother later described it. (Berg 4) Her father,
Menashe, “a revolutionary type,” was a distributor of textiles and largely self-taught. In 1934,
the family moved to the more spacious suburb of Bataween with its English parks, German
avenues, and electricity. Menashe “established their own individual household as nonreligious
and rarely went to services, but took care not to desecrate the Sabbath by smoking.” (Berg 5)

Nadia’s eldest brother, Sami Michael (born 1926 as Sallah Menasse), later to become a novelist
of some renown, was responsible for the family’s ultimate move from Iraq to Israel. As a
student, he’d become a Communist activist seeing the party as a means to address inequities in
his country. In April 1948 the Communists failed in an attempted coup d'etat, so Sami Michael
fled Iraq to avoid his sentence of execution, having been tried in absentia. Almost caught in a
coffeehouse, he initially escaped to his aunt's house in the Jewish Quarter and moved among his
relatives' homes. His father hired a smuggler to help him steal across the border to Iran before he
accepted the Jewish Agency's offer to be flown to Israel. (Berg 6) His father, “whom Nadia
admired so much for his sagacity and good nature, decided to abandon every thing and to
migrate to Israel as well, bringing with him five sons and two daughters.” (M1) Ironically,
Nadia’s older brother “resisted efforts by the Israeli army to recruit him to spy in Egypt or Iraq.”
(Berg 6)

Victoria Magled, Nadia’s mother, tried to discourage her daughter from marrying Eli Cohen,
thinking he was too old for her. “Eli was 7 years older than Nadia, with good looks, deep
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chestnut hair with few lashes of gray hair, brown eyes, with a nice expression line in his face,
very attractive.” (M1) But the couple had many differences. Nadia liked to wear simple sport
dresses, belonged to a hachshara (youth group) kibbutz; she had formal education. She had
completed a nursing course in Tel-Aviv. “Eli was always dressed particularly elegant with fine
bourgeoisie, intellectual, gregarious, and gallant with women.” (M1) Unlike Eli Cohen’s family,
who observed Jewish tradition with strong links to Israel and Zionism, the Magled family did not
observe kashrut and had not been involved in Zionist activities. (Zionism had been outlawed in
Iraq in 1945.) In spite of the essential differences between the two families, Eli and Nadia were
happy to be together. “They were married in August 1959 in a modest ceremony at a Sephardic
shul in Tel Aviv and settled near our parents in Bat Yam. Eli, Nadia and soon their first daughter,
Sophie, comfortably blended into the landscape of middle-class Israel.” (M2)

During this time, there were happy family moments. One occasion when Eli and his family
visited Maurice in his apartment inspired this description:

Eli stood beside the gas range with a thin smile. He is an expert about to
prepare a delicious stew, keeping his distance from the fire, stirring from time
to time a large saucepan, wearing a kitchen apron on his chest. Under the apron
he was dressed particularly elegant, pants, shirt, and necktie, strictly smart,
suitably fitting his body. He wasn’t swank, but he always kept a neat clean
appearance. Eli Cohen – who traversed burning fields, adrift in a dangerous
adventure – he was fanatic about order and sterility. I admired his typical
Egyptian sense of humor. Despite his bashful timidity, he likes to recount
surprising anecdotes or suddenly unsheathes a jest like a magician’s rabbit.
(M1)

Becoming Intelligence Officers

Avraham and Maurice differ on Maurice’s joining Army intelligence. In his notes, Maurice says
it was in 1960 when he took a leave of absence from his post office job to accept an officer’s
commission. Given his knowledge of many languages, he specialized in cryptology. (M3) But
Avraham is certain Maurice’s communications training took place in early 1963. Avraham
remembers that this was the year before he went into the IDF when Maurice “asked me to help
him to practice code.” (A4)

The recruitment of Eli Cohen, like so much else in his story, remains a subject of even more
conflicting stories. According to Samuel Katz, as a new immigrant, “Eli Cohen believed that his
services as an intelligence operative would be urgently required. He offered himself to Israeli
Intelligence twice, and was rebuked both times. He felt that he wasn't even needed in the defense
of the Jewish state, since he wasn't conscripted for military service but placed in a reserve Israeli
Air Force formation as a logistics clerk.” (Katz 163) Another take on these events from Gordon
Thomas’s interviews with Meir Amit, head of A’Man (military intelligence) from 1962 until his
taking over the Mossad in 1963, is that Cohen was recruited into Israeli military
counterintelligence in 1957, but his work as an analyst bored him. He began to inquire how he
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could join Mossad, but was rejected. “Meir Amit recalled, ‘We heard that our rejection had
deeply offended Eli Cohen. He resigned from the army and married an Iraqi woman named
Nadia.’” (Thomas Gideon 59)

However, unknown to Cohen, his background later surfaced in a trawl by Amit through Mossad's
“reject files” when Amit was looking for a “certain kind of agent for a very special job.” With no
one suitable in the “active” files, Cohen seemed the only possibility. He was put under
surveillance. “The weekly reports by Mossad's recruiting office described his fastidious habits
and devotion to his wife and young family. He was hardworking, quick on the uptake, and
worked well under pressure.” (Thomas Gideon 60)

Amit, whose distinguished career as head of the Mossad from 1963 to 1968, can be forgiven on
at least one critical point – he could not have recruited Eli Cohen into Mossad as Amit served in
the Israel Defense Forces branch of military intelligence, known as Aman, first under director
Chaim Herzog in 1961 before moving up to that post himself in 1962. As discussed in Part III of
these files, Amit became head of Mossad in 1963 when that agency took over Cohen’s unit. So
Amit was Cohen’s chief from 1961 to 1965, but Cohen was an agent of Aman before being
shifted to Mossad mid-way through his mission.

It’s also questionable if Amit was involved in the initial screening of Cohen. According to
Samuel Katz, it was in 1960 – before Amit’s known involvement with AMAN – a man whom
Nadia called the “Angel” (because of his handsome and benevolent appearance) knocked on the
door of the Cohens' Tel Aviv home. The “Angel” was an AMAN headhunter, a talent scout
looking to rerecruit Eli Cohen back into the ranks of its special force – Unit 131. (Katz 163)

Eli’s trial testimony included his memories of recruitment. “One day a man named Zalman came
to see me. He told me that they had kept an eye on my work and found that I was suited to a
more responsible task. He asked me if I was willing to work for Intelligence and to go to Europe
or an Arab country . . . I told him that I had just married, and didn't have the urge to travel. My
wife was a nurse before we got married, but she had quit work when she became pregnant and I
had to work overtime.” (Ben-Hanan 108)

One matter seemed certain in all accounts – Eli Cohen suddenly found himself without a civilian
job. Whether this was accomplished by behind-the-scenes maneuverings remains an open
question. However this came about, “Eli, now fluent in Hebrew, was also sought after by Israeli
intelligence,” Maurice learned later. “He was recruited by the Agaf ha-Modi’in, a branch of the
Israel Defense Forces known by the Hebrew acronym AMAN, meaning simply “intelligence
branch.” Enjoying the idyll of home and family, Eli initially refused to enlist. Then, rather
mysteriously, he lost his job at Ha Mashbir and, unable to support his family, finally accepted
the offer from AMAN. Neither of us, of course, was aware of the other’s espionage trade, and
even if we had been, Eli and I could never have discussed our work.” (M2) Ironically, Eli Cohen
later said he felt no pressure to join the AMAN. “I could have left at any time. Zalman himself
told me, ‘Come and try intelligence work for six months. If you like it, stay, if not – you're free
to do as you wish.’” (Ben-Hanan 108)
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According to Samuel Katz, what made Eli Cohen so attractive to AMAN controllers were his
high IQ, photographic memory, unbreachable integrity, and the social qualities that afforded him
acceptance and maneuverability in foreign surroundings. In the words of his handler, “Cohen
was particularly qualified for surveillance: He was, after all, born in an Arab country, had
Oriental features, and was deemed to be ‘intelligent, industrious, quick-witted, and reliable under
pressure.’” (Florsheim and Shilon) He constantly impressed his instructors who observed his
phenomenal memory which had come from memorizing tracts of the Torah as a young man. His
graduate report stated he had every quality needed by a katsa – an agent in the field. (Thomas
Gideon 61)

Still, psychological examinations revealed some troubling aspects to his personality. According
to several sources, Eli showed a high IQ, bravery, and the ability to keep a secret. But the test
showed “he had an exaggerated sense of self-importance and a lot of internal tension” and does
not always evaluate danger correctly and was likely to take on risks beyond those that were
necessary (Katz 165). Meir Amit claimed hesitation regarding Cohen. “I asked myself a hundred
times: can Eli do what I want? I always showed him, of course, my confidence was always in
place. I never wanted him for a moment to think he would always be one step from the trapdoor
which would send him to kingdom come. Yet some of the very best brains in Mossad put
everything they knew into him. Finally I decided to run with Eli.” (Thomas Gideon 62)

Eli was quickly sent to an intensive, six-month training course where he was taught high-speed
evasive driving techniques, weapons proficiency (especially with a wide variety of small arms),
topography, map reading, sabotage, and, most importantly, radio transmissions and
cryptography. (Katz 165) During training, he first met his handler, cited as “G” in some sources,
“Gideon” in others. (Florsheim and Shilon) “From the beginning,” recalls G., “Eli was
designated to be what is now called an ‘Arab impersonator’ (mista’arev), someone who travels
on a passport with an Arab name. He was also given training in the principles of Islam, Muslim
prayer, etc.” In a 2006 interview, G insisted Cohen’s training for his assignment was standard –
no longer or shorter than usual. His superiors held him in high regard for his courage, integrity,
and intelligence. Still, G claimed that Cohen was not sent to Syria with any great urgency, or for
a specific task. His assignment was rather to infiltrate gradually into the Syrian power structure.
(Florsheim and Shilon)

One story recounted by Katz seems doubtful. At first, Katz claimed, AMAN wanted Eli Cohen to
go to Egypt rather than Syria. “His controllers attempted to create a new identity for him, that of
a rich businessman whose wealth and prestige would facilitate the flow of intelligence, much like
Max Bennett before his fatal connection to the Susannah spies. Upon realizing that the Egyptians
maintained meticulous registers of their citizens, and that Cohen had, indeed, been under
Egyptian police surveillance, a'man sought new plans for Cohen's espionage future.” (Katz 165)
As it was already well established that Cohen was well known to Egyptian authorities, it seems
unlikely such plans would have had serious consideration. In addition, both Mossad an AMAN
already had a wealth of agents in Egypt. Israel had more than enough targets for its specialized
spies without endangering an agent by sending him where he was already on record as an enemy
subversive.
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Syria
In particular, one arena of critical interest to Israeli intelligence was the government of the
former Cohen family home – Syria. As detailed in a letter dated 25 February 1960 by Yosef
Tekoah, the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel written to the President of the Security
Council of the U.N., Israel had many concerns regarding Syria. Tekoah noted the two countries
had signed a General Armistice Agreement which provided in article I for the establishment of
peace on July 20, 1949. However, “In 1953, Syria started a campaign against the utilization by
Israel of the Jordan waters for the generation of hydroelectric power” and, in 1955, Syria
attacked Israel fishermen on Lake Kinneret (Tiberias), “compelling Israel to take action in self-
defence.” In 1957, “Syrian forces carried out repeated attacks on Israel farmers and workers
pursuing their peaceful activities near the border” and “In December 1958 and January 1959,
Syrian artillery positions in the hills bombarded Israel villages in the Huleh valley.” As recently
as February 12, 1960, two Israelis were killed and one wounded in the Huleh region. (Letter) As
a result of this, the IDF raided Syrian gun positions at Tewfiq in February 1960.

At the time of Cohen’s insertion into the Syrian elite, the country was part of Nassar’s United
Arab Republic, which had come into being on February 22, 1958. For the next three years,
throughout the Middle East, there were two forces jockeying for dominance in the Arab world.
On one side were the old forces of conservatism, including the oil sheikhdoms and Lebanon. On
the other were the new winds of revolution, the Nasserite pan-Arabism and the growing Ba'ath
Party in Syria and Iraq. “Of course, both Arab camps were rent with dissension and rivalry, but
overall, this basic split was becoming the central dynamic of inter-Arab politics.” (Bass 78) But
the union of Egypt and Syria was far from perfect. Knowing this, Nassar played “the perennial
Israel card and exploited Arab fears over Israel's nuclear program and plans to divert the Jordan
River for hydroelectric power.” While the Republic lasted, Nassar’s trump card was that he still
had the only army considered sufficient to take on Israel’s IDF. (Bass 78)

At the same time, the political competition between Syria and King Hussein's Jordan worried
Israeli policy makers. Syria wanted to dominate her southern neighbor by undermining Jordan's
political will by means of terrorism. For example, on August 29, 1960, the Jordanian prime
minister, Haza'ah AlMajali, was assassinated when Syrian Muchabarat agents succeeded in
planting a bomb in his Amman office. With large shipments of Soviet-supplied weaponry,
including MiG-21 "Fishbeds," T-54/55 main battle tanks, and scores of heavy guns, Syria was a
very troubling radical Arab state. A closed society with limited access to the Western and the
Arab worlds, Syria was indeed an enigma to the Israeli intelligence community. (Katz 165) To
add to the danger of any Jewish agent in Syria, persecution of Jews trapped in the country after
1948 was common. They could not own property, and the few Jews permitted to travel for
business purposes could not travel with family members as the government feared that they
would flee and join the Israeli Army. (Roffé)
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So, after deciding Syria would be Eli Cohen’s target, Meir Amit’s focus turned to shaping the
identity of Kamal Amin Ta’abet: Eli Cohen’s new cover. To begin, Eli’s Egyptian accent had to
be changed. “According to several reports, his mentor at the Unit 131 training facility was a
legendary figure named Sam'an, an Iraqi-born Jew who, during the 1948 War, was the shachar's
chief expert on Arabic language and traditions and Moslem customs.” (Katz 165) It was decided
Cohen would first travel to Argentina, infiltrate the Syrian community there to establish his bona
fides, and then return to Syria with a carefully crafted cover identity. The well-researched files in
Unit 131 HQ were used to formulate Eli Cohen's Syrian identity, and, according to Maurice
Cohen, the cover story was created to be as close to Eli’s own background as possible.
Dramatizing the scene, Maurice wrote:

“From now on, your name is Kamel. Your father was Amin Taabet. Your mother’s name was
Sa’ida Ibrahim. You were born in Beirut. Your family immigrated to Alexandria, Egypt when
you were three years old. Don’t forget that your parents are Syrian born. Your father was a
wealthy textile merchant.

“In 1946, your uncle went to Argentina. A short time later he invited you to join him. In 1947,
you came to Buenos Aires with his father, he went into partnership with your uncle in the textile
business. After a while, they went bankrupt. Your father died in 1956. Six months later your
mother also died. You went into business on your own. Naturally you were a great success.”
(M1)

Meir Amit said he spent weeks creating this cover story with Eli. They would sit together,
studying street maps and photographs of Buenos Aires so that Cohen's new background became
totally familiar. Amit told Gordon Thomas, “Eli learned the language of an exporter-importer to
Syria. He memorized the difference between waybills and freight certificates, contracts and
guarantees, everything he would need to know. He was like a chameleon, absorbing everything.
Before my very eye, Eli Cohen faded and Taabes took over, the Syrian who had never given up a
longing to go home to Damascus. Every day Eli became more confident, more certain and keen
to prove he could carry off the role. He was like a world champion marathon runner, trained to
peak at the start of the race. But he could be running his for years. We had done all we could to
show him how to pace his new life, to live the life. The rest was up to him. We all knew that.
There was no big good-bye or send-off. He just slipped out of Israel, the way all my spies went.”
(Thomas Gideon 62)

Argentina
Finally, Eli Cohen’s marching orders were signed by AMAN’s then director, Major General
Chaim Herzog. On February 3, 1961, Eli Cohen took off from Lod Airport, near Tel Aviv, on an
El Al flight to Zurich, where he switched his Israeli travel documents and became Kamal Amin
Ta'abet. He was driven to the airport in a Ministry of Defense staff car. His wife was allowed to
see him off, told that Eli would be working on a top-secret arms-procurement program for the
Ministry of Defense and would be placed in absolutely no danger. Nadia Cohen believed this
cover story until her husband was captured in Damascus. (Katz 165)
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In Zurich, Eli Cohen allegedly boarded a flight for Santiago, Chile, which had a transit stop in
Buenos Aires. This point provided an undocumented entry into Argentina. As a transit passenger,
Cohen’s passport would not be stamped in the airport, and he would not be required to register
with the police. (Katz 165) This cloak-and-dagger maneuver was vital as, in the politically
volatile period following the May 1960 Mossad/shin bet kidnapping of ex-Nazi Adolph
Eichmann, Argentina was not receptive to the infiltration of Israeli secret agents. Until the U.N.
brokered a peace deal in August of that year, Argentina had loudly denounced Israel for violating
their national sovereignty. (Note 2)

Days later, Cohen met with his local control officer, a man known only as “Avraham.”
According to Katz, “They conducted their briefings in crowded Buenos Aires cafes. Slowly
Kamal Amin Ta'abet developed into a distinctive character.” With careful attention to detail, a
generous budget, and a theatrical ability, Cohen became a prominent and respected “Arab”
businessman in the Argentine capital. (Katz 165) He became proficient in Spanish and began to
establish his connections with the local Syrian community. Cohen opened an account in an Arab
bank, sported the flashy clothes typical of a young Syrian bachelor, drove a luxury car, and
turned up at the favorite haunts of the community’s elite. Cohen befriended Abd a-Latif el-
Hashan, the Ba’athist-inclined editor of an Arabic-Spanish weekly, and Amin el-Hafez, Syria’s
new military attaché in Argentina. This connection became one of Eli Cohen’s most important
relationships. Col. Amin El-Hafaz was a bright officer who had commanded the training section
in the Syrian army General Staff, but had been ousted from Damascus because his Ba'athist party
leanings were not yet in political favor. (Katz 167) As it happened, he was a man destined to
become one of the presidents of Syria two years later.

The Ba'athist Party

Whether by design or good luck, these connections proved ideal for Cohen’s mission. Founded
April 7, 1947, the Baath Arab Socialist Party (spelled variously as Ba'th or Ba'ath – meaning in
Arabic “Resurrection” or renaissance”) was a quasi-socialist party interested in Arab nationalism
in its formative years. But it had been disbanded in 1958 when Syria joined the United Arab
Republic.

At first supporting the UAR but then resenting Egypt’s domination, the Ba'athist members of the
union government resigned in December 1959. At the same time, a handful of unhappy Syrian
Baathist officers stationed in Egypt formed a secret military committee devoted to restore Syria’s
independence from being Nassar’s “junior partner.” Such rumblings would certainly have
interested Israeli intelligence. Likely, no one could have predicted the complete takeover of Syria
by this party but a year later. Certainly knowing their movements would be invaluable
intelligence for Tel Aviv. So Eli Cohen was perfectly placed to express the zealous nationalism
of Kamal Amin Ta'abet to any receptive ear as he professed his desire to visit his native Syria.
Listeners were likely especially receptive to his willingness to invest large sums of his Argentine
money in the Syrian economy. (Katz 167)
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According to Maurice Cohen, Eli had a few minor close calls hiding his new identity. “We have
family in that country,” Maurice said, “and some years later, I met our aunt, our mother’s sister,
who told me she had seen Eli there. Eli had explained that he was merely a tourist who brought
regards from her nephews in the old country. She suspected, but never knew for a fact, that he
was her nephew. What a risk my brother took being cordial with our family members.” (Note 3)
But Maurice believed the family upbringing helped his brother’s mission. “Eli, like the rest of us,
had spent his childhood absorbing the Aleppo-accented Arabic spoken at home and had heard
enough stories about Syria to allow him to appear familiar with its intricate twists and turns.”
(M2)

“Avraham,” Cohen’s AMAN controller in Buenos Aires, was impressed with the abilities of his
agent. Details of his activities were conveyed to Tel Aviv, and arrangements for Kamal Amin
Ta'abet's visit to Syria were accelerated. Kamal Amin Ta'abet announced to his new friends he
was ready for his first visit to his homeland. He left Argentina equipped with letters of
introduction, addresses, and promises of support for any endeavors he might wish to accomplish
in Syria. (Katz 167)

There was now a new sense of urgency in placing Cohen in Damascus as quickly as possible as
events in Syria had taken dramatic turns. When the UAR pushed a sweeping nationalization
program in the summer of 1961, Syrian business leaders and their military allies decided they
had had enough. In late September 1961, a new anti-Nasser regime backed by both Syrian
conservatives and army officers came to power in Syria. Their break from the Republic, known
in Arabic as the infisal, humiliated Nassar and became a situation of international concern. The
White House, for example, worried that Syria's secession might trigger a regional war. If Nassar
attempted to force Syria back into the union, Jordan might come to the aid of Damascus.
Washington wondered if Israel might capitalize on the chaos to seize the West Bank. (Bass
81-82) Within a day or two of the coup, the new Syrian leader, Ma'mun Kuzbari, began
exchanging barbs with Nasser. Still, the war scare quickly dissipated. But factions immediately
put the new Syrian government on shaky ground. In 1961, Syria went through three presidents,
Maamun al-Kuzbari, Izzat an-Nuss, and finally Nazim al-Kudsi, who remained until the next
coup in 1963. While various parties vied for compromise with Nassar, the Ba'athist secret
Military Committee was also planning how to take power.

Before being sent to Syria, however, Cohen again traveled to Europe, where he met with the
handler known as G once again. While G reports having been satisfied with Cohen’s condition,
one conversation stood out in his mind. “When we met,” he recalls, “he had brought along some
of his equipment. I asked him, as usual, if everything was okay. He replied that it was. But I had
a strange feeling about it, and so I persisted, asking, ‘Eli, what’s going on?’” Eli said that he had
had a minor glitch with his equipment. Apparently the weather was exceptionally cold at his
location, and his hotel was extremely well heated. He thought that because of the temperature
difference, one of his instruments had developed a crack. “I asked him why he hadn’t told me
before, but he insisted that it was nothing, that everything would be all right.” (Florsheim and
Shilon)

To G, the conversation provided a telling example of Cohen’s character. In addition to his self-
confidence, Cohen had a fierce will to succeed – even at the risk of his security. “To Cohen, it
 12

was like, ‘Why should I bother you with things like this? It’s only a small crack.’” G had the
instrument repaired on site, “But I was struck that Eli had wanted so much to do well on his
assignment. He kept saying, ‘Everything will be all right.’” (Florsheim and Shilon)

Cohen’s entry into Syria began on a sad and ironic note. Nine months after his secret arrival in
Argentina, Eli Cohen came back to Israel as, in December 1961, his father Shaoul passed away.
Joining the family for the traditional Jewish mourning period of Shiva, Cohen must have
contemplated on the fact he was about to infiltrate the country where both his parents had been
born, unable to tell anyone of what he was about to do. To add to the family grief, Avraham
Cohen remembers that Eli couldn't even stay to finish shivah, leaving for Syria a day before the
normal six-day mourning process ended. As this was most unusual, this stood out in the
family. "He told us that he must leave for a business trip. He is a grown man. We cannot tell him
what to do." (A4)

According to Samuel Katz, most of Eli’s short time was spent in Tel Aviv perfecting his cover
story and being briefed on AMAN's requirements of him in Syria, as well as last-minute
intelligence data needed for his mission. This was the tachlis (“real thing”) of his mission. The
commander of Unit 131 acknowledged the danger, saying that “Not every agent was willing to
travel to Damascus.” (Katz 167) Eli Cohen was armed with his mind and his technology:

A powerful miniature radio transmitter, the most advanced of the its kind in the
world, was hidden in the false bottom of an electric food mixer. The cord of
Eli's electric shaver served as a long-range antenna. Cyanide tablets – for use
on an enemy or, in dire circumstances, on himself – were disguised as aspirin.
Chemicals for making high explosives were stored in toothpaste tubes and
cans of shaving cream. His array of the finest Japanese camera equipment
included facilities for making microfilm negatives. (Aldouby and Ballinger
105)

Our Man in Damascus

On January 1, 1962, Eli Cohen boarded the liner Astoria in Genoa for the short journey to Beirut
and then Damascus. (Katz 167) According to Katz, his first-class quarters and ability to part with
money made him a favorite among the wealthy Arab passengers on board. One of those
influential Syrians was so taken by Kamal Amin Ta'abet's financial resources and patriotic zeal
that he offered to drive him from Beirut to Damascus. Katz maintains this happy accident
allowed Eli Cohen to enter Syria without any scrutiny. (167)

On his handlers’ orders, Cohen rented an apartment in the fashionable Abu Romana district, near
the Syrian general-staff headquarters. On the morning of February 25, 1962, the Unit 131
communications officer on duty at AMAN HQ in Tel Aviv received the first broadcast from Eli
Cohen. According to Samuel Katz, “It was met with hugs and cheers in a military office usually
devoid of emotion. A bottle of Israeli champagne was even opened in celebration.” (Katz 167)
Cohen had set up an antenna along a pipe outside his study window; coded signals were tapped
 13

in deliberate bursts to develop a pattern that would become his signature. Any deviation from the
norm would signal danger. Regular transmission schedules were established and Cohen was
ordered not to broadcast long messages; the Syrian Muchabarat might be able to trace a
prolonged electronic signal. (Katz 167)

1962 was a year of such good tidings for Israel. David Ben-Gurion had been working to improve
relations with the U.S., a country that had kept the Zionist state at arm’s length from its
inception. In August 1962, the Kennedy administration decided to sell Hawk surface-to-air
missiles to the Jewish state, marking the end of the embargo on major arms sales to Israel that
had begun under Harry Truman. (Bass 5) Meanwhile, by all accounts, Kamal Amin Ta'abet
became one of the most requested party guests on the Damascus nightlife circuit, in no small
part due to his largess in providing loans to government officials and possible womanizing.
Through letters of recommendation from “friends” in Buenos Aires, he began to cultivate
relationships with the Syrian elites. Among those who smoothed his entry into Syrian society
were George Saif, a radio broadcaster, and Adnan el-Jabi, an air-force pilot. Finally, when el-
Hafez returned to Syria, Cohen was treated as one of the family at the presidential palace.
(Florsheim and Shilon)

Reportedly, “He also held parties at his home, which turned into orgies for high-placed Syrian
ministers, businessmen, and others, who used Eli's apartment for assignations with various
women, including Defense Ministry secretaries, airline hostesses, and Syrian singing stars.”
(Geller) At these parties, he could feign intoxication while picking up loose talk from his guests.
In addition, “husband hunters” among the Damascus rich and influential eyed Ta'abet, “hoping
that their almond eyes, Byzantine beauty, and olive skin would secure a future of wealth and
power: He became the most sought-after bachelor in the Syrian capital.” (Katz 167) While it
would be impossible to verify this claim, Samuel Katz reported that “he had seventeen lovers in
Syria, all dazzling beauties with a fair degree of family power. Eli Cohen and his handlers
believed that these women would help him escape in a time of crisis.” (Katz 167)

However, other accounts point to a very different personality. According to Cohen’s principal
handler, “We grew accustomed to working with agents who occasionally pushed the envelope,
such as including all sorts of things in their expense accounts ostensibly to help maintain their
cover. But Eli wasn’t like those agents. He was straight with us.” In fact, Cohen was remarkable
for being at the opposite extreme: His expense account was quite frugal, and G insists that
Cohen always behaved quietly and modestly and rarely asked for anything. (Note 4) In fact, his
extreme reluctance to make requests of handlers and his insistence on managing on his own was,
to G’s mind, his one flaw. “I wouldn’t call it excessive self-confidence, but he was always one to
say, ‘It’ll be fine, don’t worry, it’ll all work out.’” (Florsheim and Shilon)

In court testimony, Syrian officer and Cohen friend Ma'azi Zaher a-Din provided details
illustrating Cohen’s frugality. “I stayed at his house often and one thing amazed me. Five out of
the seven rooms in the apartment weren't in use at all. Besides that, I didn't understand why
Cohen, who spent money on all kinds of causes, refused to hire a maid, and cleaned the house,
washed the dishes, and cooked his meals all by himself.” (Ben-Hanan 121) The head of Syrian
Intelligence, Colonel Swidani, agreed, telling the court Cohen “didn't keep a maid, a chauffeur,
nor a cook. He did everything himself, washed the dishes, cleaned the apartment, and even did
 14

the laundry. Not only that, he was careful not to meet the same man twice in one day. With
special visitors he instituted a system of special rings on the doorbell.” (121) Well, perhaps the
superspy had his Bondian moments. One unlikely report was that “Eli used to photograph
romantic scenes with hidden cameras, so he could reveal the photos to the high-ranking officials
if their wives would not cooperate with him. But almost all the ladies who were enchanted by his
charm liberally and voluntarily supplied him information of great importance.” (M1)

Achievements and Myths

One important debate regarding the work of Eli Cohen has dealt with the significance of his true
importance in Israeli intelligence. Published accounts vary wildly, and certain myths have
become commonplaces rather than fully explored possibilities.

For example, in their quite reliable Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence
Services (1991), authors Ian Black and Lenny Morris claim Cohen’s contributions to the Israeli
win in the 1967 Six Day War have been overstated. In their view, the most important
contribution for Israel was the capture of a Russian MiG in Iraq which a team of Syrian defectors
flew to Tel Aviv. In their view, Cohen’s observations about the Golan Heights weren't
noteworthy as most of this information was obtained by normal air reconnaissance. And they
point to the fact that his brother Maurice discovered his presence, evidence of obvious fatal
carelessness.

On the other hand, not surprisingly, Cohen’s handler ranks Cohen’s work highly. “From the
beginning, Cohen’s intelligence output was impressive: Among other things, he reported on the
bunkers in which the Syrians stored Russian artillery, passed along a draft of the strategic plan to
cut off northern Israel during a future invasion, and even managed to supply Israel with a report
on two hundred T-54 tanks a few hours after they landed in Syria.” (Florsheim and Shilon) But
his most important achievement, in the handler’s opinion, was undoubtedly the wide range of
contacts Cohen established with key personnel in the Syrian army and government, ties soon to
prove invaluable. All that he had seen was communicated to the Israelis through a secret
transmitter that Cohen kept concealed in his window blind. (Florsheim and Shilon)

Samuel Katz – labeling Eli Cohen a “Super Spy” – agrees, being among those who believe what
Cohen saw and reported to Israel was extremely significant. In particular, he believes Cohen was
able to pass on much information about the Syrian Air Force. “Indeed, Eli Cohen was able to get
‘up close and personal’ with the men and machines of the much-vaunted Syrian Air Force. He
talked to pilots, asked them how they planned to defeat the IAF in air combat, and was even
given technical briefings on their MiG and Sukhoi aircraft, as well as the weapons systems they
carried.” (Katz 167) Hoping to one day secure business dealings with Kamal Amin Ta'abet, Katz
 15

claimed, the pilots explained their tactics and, in some cases, secret tricks they had learned from
the Russians. Katz claims the pilots’ names were also sent back to Tel-Aviv. Other military
officers who befriended Cohen took him to numerous weapons facilities, arsenals, and training
camps. During a party or business meeting (which usually entailed Ta'abet handing over an
envelope filled with cash to a corrupt official or army officer), all Cohen had to do was vocalize
his concern regarding potential Israeli attacks against Syria and he was ushered around top-secret
facilities with the pomp and ceremony of a visiting head of state. (Katz 168)

Beyond reporting on military affairs, Cohen’s connections inside high level politicians was
impressive by any standards. At the beginning of his mission, Cohen had joined the Ba'athist
party in February 1961, promising to become “a true example of the struggling Arab.” (Yarid)
(Note 5) According to the Arab press, Eli became a significant member of the Baa’th Party when
it came to power. He appeared in public assemblies on their behalf and managed a great
campaign for fundraising to support its activities. He allegedly went to great lengths to ingratiate
himself with an old Argentinean friend, President General Amin El-Hafez, supposedly offering a
fur coat to Mrs. El Hafez, the President’s wife. (M1)

Beyond this, Eli allegedly secured a deeper friendship with Al-Hafiz when he was diagnosed
with throat cancer and the new president wished to keep this secret for fear of another coup.
According to Maurice, Eli connected Al-Hafiz with a French Jewish surgeon in Paris on the
condition Al-Hafiz do nothing to hurt the Jew. Thus, Al-Hafiz owed Eli Cohen his life and
thereafter Eli was the president’s “shadow.” (M5) As a result, Maurice maintained, Al-Hafiz
often posed questions to Eli, who always responded he needed the night to sleep on the query.
He’d radio the request to headquarters, they’d process an answer, and Eli would then pass along
the AMAN answer to the president the next morning. The information was so reliable, Al-Hafiz
told other ministers they should pose similar queries to Kamil who would later respond with
what was needed. (M5)

While many of Maurice Cohen’s notes regarding these years must remain questionable, one
matter confirmed in various sources is that, by accident, Eli became somewhat of a radio
personality. This unusual project began when Salem Saif, the Director of Foreign Broadcasting
for Radio Damascus, approached Cohen to review propaganda material for foreign broadcasts.
This led to a new show, The Emigrant's Hour, on which Cohen interviewed Syrian emigrants
about themselves and their doings abroad. “The Israeli Intelligence Services, following Elie's
activity in Damascus, began listening regularly to the program. Elie incorporated information in
the program” including news of his progress. “When he wanted to notify Headquarters in Tel
Aviv that everything was going well, he would insert the last sentence from Robinson Crusoe,
which he gave in French, and in inverted order.” (Ben-Hanan 58-59) None of this information,
however, was considered essential. With a touch of humor, Maurice Cohen claims, Eli read over
the air The Three Musketeers, the very same text used to code and decode his transmissions.
(M3)

One “side mission” Eli took on wasn’t directly related to the Syrian government, but rather dealt
with the discovery of a Nazi war criminal in Damascus. In the words of Maurice Cohen – who
described the mission as “beyond the call of duty” – in 1962, Eli received a telegram asking him
 16

to locate and deliver an exploding letter to Nazi criminal Adolf Eichmann's negotiator, Franz
Rademacher, who was in hiding in Syria. According to the trial transcripts, Rademacher was
using the name John Rosalie, and Eli asked his friend Majd Sheikh ElArd, a well-known
merchant and businessman, to help find him. (Ben-Hanan 112-113) Eli reportedly told the court,
“It was found that he had been responsible for the destruction of a considerable number of Jews,
and it was decided to assassinate him. When I got the telegram, I turned to my friend Majd and
asked him about Rosalie. He led me to him.” According to Eli Ben-Hanan, the job of disposing
of the Nazi was then turned over to an unknown criminal, possibly for the cost of one thousand
dollars. (Ben-Hanan 60-62)

However, Zwy Aldouby and Jerrold Ballinger’s account adds details that point to Cohen
performing the assassination himself. In this version, after finding Rademacher, Cohen’s second
report concluded “Offer myself to liquidate R.” He was, at first, told “Avoid any action on R.
which could jeopardize principal mission.” In a later message, Eli suggested that Rademacher be
disposed of by means of an “explosive letter” (a deadly incendiary device developed by Israeli
intelligence). According to Aldouby and Ballinger:

One evening, following an affirmative answer from Mosad headquarters, he sat

at his dining room table mixing chemicals. After liquefying a fine powder by
heat, he thoroughly coated the inside of an envelope with the substance,
inserted a tiny detonator and sealed it by a special process. That same night, he
dropped the letter-bomb addressed to Thorn Rosello into the “Damascus Only”
slot at the main post office near the Serail. (187)

The following morning, he got confirmation the bomb had worked. If this account is true, then
this is the only known situation in which Eli Cohen was involved in any operation specifically
designed to kill an enemy of the Jewish people. While the Mossad would later become best
known for assassinations of terrorists, especially after the Munich massacre in 1972, Eli Cohen
remains one of the names recognized for intelligence work, not murder.

Beyond this strike of revenge, in 1963, Cohen’s associations with the Ba'athist party reaped
unexpected dividends for Tel Aviv. On March 8, 1963, after the Syrian party's military
committee persuaded Nasserist and independent officers to make common cause with them, they
successfully carried out a military coup. From 1963 on, the Ba'ath was the only legal Syrian
political party. But it would not be a stable entity for some time. Factionalism and intra-party
splintering led to a succession of governments and new constitutions. At first, a National
Revolutionary Command Council took control and assigned itself legislative power. Salah al-Din
al-Bitar became head of a “national front” government and Luai al-Atassi became Chairman of
the Council. In July of that year, Amin al-Hafez – Cohen’s friend from Argentina – replaced
him and remained until February 23, 1966.

It’s believed Eli Cohen was invited to attend the historic Sixth National Convention of the Ba’ath
Party in March 1963. As a highly respected member of the Syrian National Council of
Revolutionary Command and a volunteer for Radio Damascus, Eli no doubt had intimate access
to both open and closed sessions at the convention. (M2) According to Hani Yarid, Eli may have
met Michael Afflaq, the founder of the party, at this convention. (Yarid)
 17

Thus, Cohen witnessed the important shift in power at the convention when the far-left
hardliners gained control. The dominant Syrian and Iraqi regional parties joined forces to call for
more worker control over farm and industrial production based on the Soviet model. At the same
time, in March and April 1963, this leadership hammered out a tripartite agreement in principle
on a new and expanded United Arab Republic including Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Still uneasy
about Nassar, the Syrian Ba'athists looked to Baghdad to provide a regional counterpoise to
Cairo, and as time progressed, the two Ba'ath states worked to compete to match Nasser’s
military strength. (Bass 124)

Before the collapse of this union, Israel greatly feared the resurging Pan-Arabism that might
have swelled to include Egypt, Syria, and Iraq as well as a new government in Jordan, all of
whom were staunchly opposed to the existence of Israel. Into the mix, Syria quashed a late-July
1963 coup attempt by local Nasserites, prompting Nasser to excoriate his Ba'athist partners in
Syria, whom he denounced on July 22 as “secessionist, inhuman and immoral,” and “fascist.”
(Bass 191) Shortly after, minor border incursions between Syria and Israel began. On November
5, 1963, a Syrian infiltrator was killed by the Israelis near the Galilee town of Kfar Ha'nassi; in
November, two Israelis were shot and wounded by Syrians near Kibbutz Dan, close to the
Syrian-held Golan Heights. (Bass 240)

The Myths
While “Our Man in Damascus” undoubtedly fed his controllers considerable and detailed
information about all these twists and turns, certain myths and legends have sprung up that are
impossible to verify. Detractors can point to the episodes on which Cohen’s reputation stands
and see likely discrepancies between the plausible and the unlikely. For example, according to
accounts published in several Lebanese newspapers, Kamal Amin Ta'abet was, after the 6th
Congress, being considered for the post of Syria's deputy defense minister. (Katz 169) As has
been repeated in many sources ever since, this put Eli Cohen in line to become the third-highest
ranking member of the Syrian government. While it’s clear Cohen was intimately familiar with
those who could have elevated him to this position, there’s one problem with the notion. The
Lebanese reports appeared in the spring of 1963 and Cohen’s cover wasn’t blown until January
1965. For almost two years, Kamal Amin Ta'abet was not given any such post nor any similar.

In addition, much has been made of Cohen’s reports over control of the waters of the Jordan
River. The major claim is that Eli exposed Syria’s plans to cut off Israel’s water supply by
diverting the headwaters of the Jordan in 1964. (Katz 169) Maurice Cohen was among those
convinced that his brother was deeply involved in ferreting out the secret plans for the water
diversion project. Maurice believed that at a celebration Eli threw on behalf of the 1963 coup, Eli
devoted special attention to Ibn Laden, a Saudi Arabian public works contractor and engineer
whom Salim Khatoum had introduced as the man in charge of the Jordan River deviation project.
According to Maurice, this contractor turned out to be brother to Assama Ben-Laden, the future
terrorist. Eli was able to talk with Ben-Laden, see the maps and the time schedule for the project.
 18

(M5) Later, Maurice asserts, Eli accompanied the head of the United Arab commandant, the
Egyptian General Ali Ali Amer, during the expedition to survey the project. (M1)

While in Syria, the story goes, Eli transmitted full details of the deflection program and was de-
briefed on it in Israel in October 1964 by different army officers in Zahal. “He spoke behind a
curtain so none of them could identify him. The Israeli experts examined the Arab program and
came to the conclusion that the Arab plan would keep 100 million cubic meters of water from the
country, a quantity equal to the third of the water flowed in the national conduit. This loss would
be enough to increase significantly the percentage of salt in the Kineret Sea.” (M1)

Certainly, learning what Syrian planners were up to regarding Jordan waters would have been an
important aspect of Cohen’s original assignment. For years, Israel had been watching Arab
interests in this crucial matter. “Israel's defense planners urgently needed reliable intelligence on
the scope of the water diversion project – engineering plans, diagrams, maps, and other data –
and up-to-the-minute assessments of Soviet influence in the Syrian capital, as well as detailed
information on plans for the modernization, equipping, and retraining of Syrian forces.” (Geller)
But it’s important to note there was nothing covert in the Syrians’ plans to divert water from the
Jordan – indeed, it had been very publicly published after a 1964 Arab Summit by 13 nations and
heatedly debated in the U.N.

Historically, between 1953 and 1955, a number of plans regarding sharing Jordan waters had
been proposed, resulting in the 1955 Johnston Plan which the Arab states accepted unhappily.
Between 1959 and 1964, Israel unilaterally diverted Jordan water as part of its National Water
Carrier plan. (Murakami) Then, in 1964, as the work progressed, Arab governments met in two
summit conferences to consider ways of combating the scheme and of eliminating Israel. The
January 1964 gathering laid the groundwork for the PLO, the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The second Arab conference, held in Alexandria on Sept. 13, 1964, declared a number of goals,
including diversion of the Jordan River. Signers of this resolution included Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan,
Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, and Syria.
They let it be known:

The Council adopted resolutions for the implementation of Arab plans,

especially in the technical and military fields, including embarking on
immediate work on projects for the exploitation of the waters of the River
Jordan and its tributaries. (Isseroff)

Israel was quite alarmed by this resolution, and a series of letters were exchanged between the
Arab League and Israel at the U.N. (Isseroff) Political considerations cited by the Arabs in
rejecting the 1955 Johnston Plan were revived to justify the diversion scheme, pointing to the
advantage Israel would gain at the expense of Palestinian refugees. In response, Israel stressed
that the National Water Carrier was within the limits of the Johnston Plan. (Murakami) The
Arabs started work on the Headwater Diversion project in 1965, after the capture of Cohen. After
Israel declared that it would regard such diversion as an infringement of its sovereign rights, in a
series of military strikes, Israel hit the diversion works. The attacks culminated in April 1967 in
air strikes deep inside Syria. The increase in water-related Arab-Israeli hostility was a major
factor leading to the June 1967 Six Day War.
 19

Maurice was correct in one detail – Eli was in Israel in October 1964 when the de-briefing
allegedly took place – the month after the Arab League made its proclamation known and
protests from Israel in the U.N. began. What Cohen provided most likely gave the Israeli air
force precise targets for the bombings that took place in November 1964, responses to the Syrian
artillery attacks on three Kibbibutzum. These were not, as has been reported elsewhere, pre-
emptive strikes against Syrian water diversion construction. Whatever Eli Cohen said that aided
this successful air raid, he clearly did not expose any secret schemes.

The incident which seems to most define Cohen’s legacy was his visit to the Golan Heights
which has led to his being remembered for helping pave the way for Israel’s quick victory in the
1967 Six Days War. Were it not for this idea, it’s possible the name Eli Cohen would not have
risen so highly in espionage lore.

Without question, the Golan Heights were and are of central importance in Middle Eastern
history. In 1965 when the Syrians occupied the territory, the impregnable volcanic plateau
“hovered majestically above northeastern Israel, from which the Sea of Galilee and much of
central Israel could be easily seen in artillery gunsights . . . The Syrians had established a series
of heavily fortified gun emplacements and forts, which would create a gauntlet of cannon and
machine-gun fire against attacking Israeli forces; the artillery trap was so overwhelming, the
Syrians believed it was deterrence enough to any Israeli military move.” (Katz 164) While the
Syrians held the Heights, their 130mm guns and mortars subjected the kibbutzim and moshavim
to incessant and murderous artillery barrages.

So it was no small matter for Kamal Amin Ta'abet to visit every position in this “Maginot Line”
of Syrian defense. With senior staff officers acting as guides, Eli Cohen was provided an in-
depth intelligence briefing of monumental proportions. “He was even photographed with his
Syrian military friends at a top-secret defensive position on the Heights, looking into Israel. He
also photographed, in his mind, the positioning of every Syrian gun, trench, and machine-gun
nest in each Golan Heights fortification; tank traps, designed to impede any Israeli attack, were
also identified and memorized for future targeting.” This is the core of the legend of Eli Cohen –
the information he gathered was said to be used to construct three-dimensional models of the
Syrian positions. They would be used on June 9, 1967, to seize the Golan in an awe-inspiring
blitz. (Katz 169) It seems few doubt Eli Cohen was able to acquire this important information
and transmit it to Tel-Aviv. But the story expanded in the years after the Six Day War to the
point many believe Cohen suggested the planting of eucalyptus trees to allegedly provide shade
but also secretly serve as markers for Israeli bombers.

A romantic notion, but one that makes little sense. The attack on the Golan was far more
complex and hard-fought than the idea of the IDF having easy targets in their bombsights. And
other factors favored the Israelis. Perhaps Doron Geller’s online lecture, “Israeli Intelligence in
the 1967 War” best puts Cohen’s contributions in context. Geller states Cohen’s labors in Syria,
alongside those of Wolfgang Lotz in Egypt, laid the intelligence groundwork, “but many other
spies, both Israelis and Arabs – and sometimes European or American non-Jews – also worked
on behalf of Israel.” During the lead-up to the war, Meir Amit, who believed one field agent was
worth a division of soldiers, had a network of informants that permeated the entire Egyptian
 20

military, providing key details for Israel's pre-emptive strike. (Thomas Gideon 62) In addition,
they had accurate knowledge of Jordanian political and military installations as well. For
example, after the war, Samir ar-Rifai (an assistant to King Hussein), “told Western reporters
that a lone IDF Super Mystere had attacked King Hussein's office in the Royal Palace in Amman
on the afternoon of 5 June. The Israeli plane ‘machine-gunned the king’s office at point-blank
range with a precision and knowledge of its target that was stupefying.’” (Geller)

Electronic eavesdropping devices also played pivotal roles. Most significantly, one conversation
between Nasser and King Hussein was tapped “by two veteran Aman (Military Intelligence)
officers using Second World War vintage equipment” that revealed the lies Nassar was telling
the King. While AMAN Chief Aharon Yariv opposed the publication of the conversation,
fearing that it would reveal the extent of Israel’s eavesdropping capabilities, Defense Minister
Moshe Dayan and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol overruled him, counting on a huge political
bonanza. Which they got. (Geller) As it happened, such Arab mistakes helped the Israeli victory
on a number of counts.

For example, while Israel didn’t know it at the time, they benefited from the Soviet Union’s
bungled disinformation campaign pushing Egypt to join Syria against Israel. On May 13, 1967, a
Soviet parliamentary delegation visited Cairo and told the Egyptian leaders that Israel had
concentrated eleven to thirteen brigades along the Syrian border in preparation for an assault
within a few days, with the intention of overthrowing the revolutionary Syrian government. This
was a complete fabrication designed by the Soviets to destabilize the Middle East. (Bard) In fact,
during the first two days of the war, Israeli leadership was divided over attacking the Golan
Heights at all. Defense Minister Dayan, at first, feared Soviet intervention if Israel made any
such move. Dayan changed his mind, apparently when intercepted communications revealed that
the Egyptian army had collapsed and that the Syrian army could not offer serious resistance.
(“Six Days, Definition”) The Syrians were handicapped by another lie when Nassar falsely
broadcast he’d been successful defeating Israeli forces in his ill-fated Sinai campaign. Knowing
he could turn his full attention to Syria, on the morning of June 9 Dayan authorized “Operation
Hammer.”

By any standard, the battle was a major achievement in military history, accomplished with
considerable coordination of air and land forces. The tank assault began after two days of heavy
bombardment by the air force as the attacking force would face very difficult topographical
conditions. The Israeli brigades had to scale steep, rugged and rocky heights and open a line for
transportation while under constant fire from above. At first, the Syrian army sat safely in its
strong fortifications consisting of cement pillboxes, six infantry brigades, five National Guard
battalions and approximately 200 tanks. (“Six Days, Weapons.”) In a complex engineering
operation, IDF soldiers from the Engineering Corps cleared the way of mines. Bulldozers then
leveled a route for the tanks on the rocky face, suffering heavy casualties (“Six Days,
Definition.”). At the same time, a force consisting of infantry and paratroopers purged a series of
other posts overlooking the Hula valley in the southern sector of the Heights. (“Six Days,
Weapons”) After several other assaults that evening and then on the 10th, the Syrian defenses had
completely collapsed and a cease fire was imposed from international pressures. The victory
came at a very high cost. In storming the Golan Heights, Israel suffered 115 dead – roughly the
number of Americans killed during Operation Desert Storm. (Bard)
 21

While this summary only hints at the achievement of the invading army, it should demonstrate
that a single line of eucalyptus trees would have been of small benefit. As Black and Morris
noted, finding the positions of Syrian fortifications would not have been a difficult matter for
normal Ariel reconnaissance. Nonetheless, while two years old, Cohen’s intel regarding specific
weaponry, ordinates, command structure, and decision procedures would have been
immeasurably valuable. It would be interesting to know what changes had been made in the
Syrian defensive lines after Cohen’s capture when the Syrians realized the extent of what he had
provided Israel. Still, so many other factors were involved that it seems, as Black and Morris
suggested, that mythmakers have given too much credit to but one participant in this lop-sided
victory.

None of this – in the slightest – diminishes the numerous and extraordinary contributions Eli
Cohen provided in his unquestionably self-sacrificing and, yes, heroic, tenure inside Syria from
1961 to 1965. Rather, knowing what he did and likely didn’t do simply separates the man from
the myth and allows for a more complete vista of his accomplishments. For example, Meir Amit
didn’t mention the Golan in his summation of Eli’s work but said that Cohen’s main contribution
to Israeli intelligence was the fact that his finger was always on the Syrian pulse. “The
information Cohen provided was largely cautionary. His flat was opposite the general-staff
headquarters, and he would report on how many people were there at night, when the lights went
out, and when motorcades left. He had all kinds of indications that something was about to
happen. In my opinion, this was the most important information: The material about the
disposition, intentions, and preparations of the Syrian officials at headquarters and the mood of
the political and military echelons at any given time.” (Florsheim and Shilon)

As Amit noted, in a country like Syria this is an especially difficult task, since “when they’re all
dictators, the country’s plans are in the head of one man, and no more than two or three
assistants. If you can get close to the decision maker, it is of enormous importance.” (Florsheim
and Shilon) In the end, Eli Cohen loses nothing by not being the man who alerted his country to
water diversion plans or suggested trees as an unusual bombing target. Instead, he should be
known as a spy who provided almost daily intelligence on his enemy for an intense and historic
four year period.
 22

Notes

1 – lodge in Israel: Perhaps there were distinctions made for Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews; it
could be that Haifa – a model of diversity even by today's standards – had an Arabic-speaking
group while Tel Aviv did not. (Note from Helene Fragman Abramson)

2 – Argentina: As it happened, Cohen wasn’t the only spy working in South America involved
in Middle Eastern matters. Toward the end of 1960, Yco Bwoan was an Armenian-born Egyptian
who became an agent for Egypt and went to Rio de Janeiro to establish his bona fides as a Jewish
refugee. "A mirror image, curiously, of what Israeli spy Eli Cohen . . . was doing in the Arab
community of Buenos Aires at exactly the same time in preparation for his mission to Syria."
(Black and Morris 144-145.

3 – Meeting aunt: In a slightly different version of the story, Maurice told Helene Fragman
Abramson that Eli visited the Aunt saying he was a friend of Eli's from university and brought
regards from the family.

4 – expense accounts: Maurice recalls talking to Eli about filing expense reports (am unsure
about which job this referred to but speaks of his integrity). “There was an allowance for
breakfast and lunch which Eli didn't take. I told him he needed to add it. Eli told me ‘I have
breakfast at home and bring my own lunch.’” (M2)

5 – “True Arab”: In Maurice Cohen’s files was the following note: “We can say with
confidence that Eli was not active member of the Baa’th party, because his operators instructed
him to keep his Argentina’s passport and not to accept Syrian citizenship to assure his escape
from Syria in case of forthcoming danger. It was suggested that Eli remain in Syria as a tourist
and not to identify himself with any political party, lest there will be a revolution resulting in Eli
being purged by the opposite party.” While the source of this was not identified, it’s clear the
purpose was to diminish Cohen’s presence in the ruling circles and defend the heads of the
Syrian government in 1964. This is explored further in Part III of these files.
 23

Works Cited (Part II)

Books
Aldouby, Zwy, and Jerrold Ballinger. The Shattered Silence: The Eli Cohen Affair. New York:
Coward, McCann, & Geoghegan, 1971.

Bass, Warren. Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel
Alliance. A Council on Foreign Relations Book. Oxford Univ. Press, 2003.

Ben-Hanan, Eli. Our Man in Damascus. A.D.M. Pub. House. 1968.

Berg, Nancy. E. More and More Equal: The Literary Works of Sami Michael. New York:
Lexington Books. 2005.

Black, Ian and Lenny Norris. Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services.
New York: Grove Weidenfeld. 1991.

Katz, Samuel M. Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence. Novato, CA: Presidio. 1992.

Murakami, Masahiro. Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East: Alternative Strategies.
Tokyo – New York – Paris: United Nations University Press. 1995. Available online, retrieved
July 23, 2007.
www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80858e/80858E00.htm

Thomas, Gordon. Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad. New York: St. Martin's.
1999.

Articles
Bard, Mitchell. “The 1967 Six-Day War.” Retrieved, July 27, 2007.
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/67_War.html

Barda, Racheline. “Modern Exodus of the Jews of Egypt.” Retrieved, Aug. 6, 2007.
www.nebidaniel.org/documents/Whence%20_%20Hence%20by%20R.Barda.doc

Florsheinm, Ella and Avi Shilon. "The Handler." Azure. Winter 5766 / 2006, No. 23. Retrieved,
July 23, 2007.
 24

Geller, Doron. "Inside the Israeli Secret Service: A History of its Growth and Missions."
Retrieved, Aug. 13, 2007.

Isseroff, Ami. “Arab Summit of September 1964.” MidEast Web Historical Documents.
Retrieved July 27, 2007
www.mideastweb.org/arabsummit1964.htm

“Letter dated 25 February 1960 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security
Council.” DOCUMENT S/4271. Retrieved online, July 21, 2007.
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/f45643a78fcba719852560f6005987ad/cbf1b65e5de19c1c0
52564e30046d1b3!OpenDocument

Peters, Joan. “Arab-Jewish Refugees, the other Middle Eastern Refugee problem.”
EretzYisroel.Org. 1984. Retrieved, Aug. 7, 2007.
www.eretzyisroel.org/~peters/arabjew.html

Roffé, Sarina. “The Jews of Aleppo.” Retrieved, Aug. 13, 2007.

www.jewishgen.org/Sephardic/AleppoJews.htm

“Six Day War – Definition, History.” Zionism and Israel – Encyclopedic Dictionary. Retrieved,
July 27, 2007.
www.zionism-israel.com/dic/6daywar.htm

“Six Day War.” Israeli Weapons. Retrieved, July 27, 2007.

www.israeli-weapons.com/history/six_day_war/SixDayWar.html

Yarid, Hani. “Eli Cohen: Spy Within Parts I & II.” Culture of Arabia Online. Retrieved July 27,
2007.

Maurice Cohen Manuscripts and Tapes

M1. “Reminiscences: Maurice Cohen's Reminiscences on his brother Eliahu Cohen, Most
Famous Spy.” A 47-page collection of notes written by Maurice with material gathered from
unknown sources, apparently between 1998-2001.

M2. Cohen, Maurice as told to Carla Stockton. “Am I My Brother’s Keeper?” Retrieved, June 5,
2007.
www.spywise.net

M3. From conversations between Helene Fragman Abramson and Maurice Cohen throughout
2006.

M4. Discussions with Maurice Cohen, Harvey Chertok, and Wes Britton in the home of Helene
Fragman Abramson, Oct. 8-9, 2006
 25

M5. Television interview. ??

Interviews with Avraham Cohen

A1. Avraham Cohen interview with Helene Fragman Abramson, Tel Aviv, November 15, 2006.

A2. Avraham Cohen interview with Helene Fragman Abramson, May 2007.

A3. Avraham Cohen phone interview with Helene Fragman Abramson, July 31, 2007

A4. Avraham Cohen telephone interview with Wes Britton and Helene Fragman Abramson,
Aug. 2, 2007.