TC10P

AHILYABAI HOLKAR LEGAL EXCELLENCE

MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2025

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

IN THE MATTER OF

SONAM………………………………………………………………………………. Petitioner

VS.

RAJESH & STATE OF MAHARASTRA ………………………………………. Respondents

UPON THE SUBMISSION BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

MEMORANDUM FILLED ON THE BEHALF OF PETITONER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................................................3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..................................................................................................................6

STATEMENT OF FACTS.................................................................................................................................7

ISSUES RAISED ……......................................................................................................................................9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ....................................................................................................................10

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED …….................................................................................................................12

ISSUE 1. Whether the classification made under Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act,
1971 (MTP Act) is unreasonable and violates Article 14?..............................................................................12

ISSUE 2. Whether denial to DNA test to establish the parentage of the fetus to uphold the dignity of a
woman wherein, she is accused of infidelity, violates Article 21 of the Constitution?...................................21

PRAYER OF RELIEF……..……………………………………………….................................................28

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

[I] STATUTES REFERRED:

1. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

2. THE BHARATIYA SAKSHYA ADHINIYAM, 2023/INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872
3. THE MEDICAL TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY ACT, 1971 (as amended in 2021)
4. THE ABORTION ACT, 1967 (United Kingdom)

[II] LIST OF CASES:

1. Laxmibai Chandaragi v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 3 SCC 360

2. Ramachandra v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 486

3. Nandlal WasudeoBadwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, (2014) 2 SCC 576

4. S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600

5. Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women, (2010) 8 SCC 633

6. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248

7. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3

8. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, UT of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608

9. Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women, (2010) 8 SCC 633

10. BMJ Global Health points out to the grim statistics 2007 and 2011

11. Sharda v. Dharmpal, (2003) 4 SCC 493

12. X v. Union of India MANU/SC/0149/2017 : (2017) 3 SCC 458,

13. Mamta Verma v. Union of India MANU/SC/1055/2017 : (2018) 14 SCC 289,

14. Meera Santosh Pal v. Union of India MANU/SC/0050/2017 : (2017) 3 SCC 462,

15. Sarmishtha Chakrabortty v. Union of India MANU/SC/0813/2017 : (2018) 13 SCC 339

16. Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, (1993) 3 SCC 418

17. Ministry of Health & Family Welfare to the Report on 'Women's Healthcare by the Committee on
Empowerment of Women (2020-2021).

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18. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221

19. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1

20. Navtej Singh Johar (supra),

21. S. Khusboo v. Kanniammal MANU/SC/0310/2010 : (2010) 5 SCC 600,

22. Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal MANU/SC/1056/2022,

23. Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan MANU/SC/0097/1957 : AIR 1957 SC 907

24. Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse MANU/SC/1084/2013 : (2014) 1 SCC 188,

25. Federation of Obstetric and Gynaecological Societies of India v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 531
of 2020,

26. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1,

27. Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1

28. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75,

29. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1,

[III] INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS REFERRED:

1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),

December 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13

2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171

[IV] OTHER AUTHORITIES REFERRED:

1. General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the ICCPR (Right to Life)

2. General Recommendation No. 24 of CEDAW on Women and Health

3. Sec. 116 BSA, 2023

4. Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Presumption of Legitimacy)

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5. Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Expert Evidence and Scientific Methods)

[V] RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION REFERRED:

1. Article 14 – Right to Equality

2. Article 21 – Right to Life and Personal Liberty

3. Article 32 – Right to Constitutional Remedies

4. Article 136 – Special Leave Petition

[VI] JOURNALS:

❖ AIR- ALL INDIA REPORTER

❖ SCC- SUPREME COURT CASES
❖ SCR- SUPREME COURT REPORTER

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 32

read with

SLP(c) Article 136 of the Constitution of India,1 challenging the order passed by the Hon’ble High Court of
Maharashtra, denying the Appellant’s fundamental rights under Article 14 (Right to Equality) and Article 21
(Right to Life and Personal Liberty).

Note: All persons/characters, names and events etc. referred in this moot problem are fictitious and any
resemblance to real life persons, names and events etc. are unintentional. The moot problem has been
drafted purely for the purpose of academic discussion.

1
Article 32 read with article 136 of constitution of India
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Background of the Relationship

Sonam and Rajesh had been working as software developers in an MNC in Mumbai since 2011.They
developed a close relationship and, by mutual consent, moved in together in September 2020, entering into a
live-in relationship.

Assignment to Bangalore and Rising Suspicion

In April 2022, Sonam was assigned to the Bangalore branch of the company to assist Vicky, a Senior
Software Engineer. Due to the strict deadlines of the project, Sonam had to work long hours with Vicky.
Rajesh, feeling neglected and insecure, became suspicious of Sonam’s relationship with Vicky, despite
Sonam’s reassurances.

Return to Mumbai and Paternity Concerns

Sonam returned to Mumbai in April 2023 and distanced herself from Vicky to rebuild trust with Rajesh. In
November 2023, Sonam discovered that she was pregnant and expressed her desire to marry Rajesh.
However, Rajesh’s parents objected to the marriage, alleging that Sonam had multiple illicit relationships
and casting doubts on the paternity of the unborn child.

Refusal to Conduct Paternity DNA Test

Sonam suggested conducting a DNA test to confirm the paternity and remove any doubts. Rajesh, however,
categorically refused to undergo the DNA test, asserting that he could not be forced to do so and alleged that
the child belonged to Vicky or another man.

Sonam’s Attempt to Terminate Pregnancy and Court Denial

Distressed by the allegations and the emotional trauma, Sonam decided to terminate her pregnancy, which
had reached 23 weeks by that time. The doctor refused to perform the abortion, citing restrictions under the
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. Sonam approached the Trial Court seeking permission to
terminate her pregnancy and requested a direction to compel Rajesh to undergo a DNA test. The Trial Court
denied both requests, citing: Lack of jurisdiction over ordering DNA tests in such circumstances,
Restrictions under the MTP Act, 1971, which limits termination of pregnancy beyond 20 weeks except in
certain conditions.

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Appeal to the High Court and Rejection of Sonam’s Plea

Sonam filed an appeal before the High Court, seeking: Permission to terminate her pregnancy beyond 20
weeks, Direction to compel Rajesh to undergo a paternity DNA test.

The High Court rejected her plea on the grounds that: The MTP Act, 1971, does not cover unmarried women
beyond 20 weeks in consensual relationships, A paternity DNA test cannot be ordered merely to prove or
disprove allegations of infidelity as it would infringe on Rajesh’s right to privacy.

Violation of Fundamental Rights and Appeal to the Supreme Court

Aggrieved by the denial of her fundamental rights under Article 14 (Equality) and Article 21 (Right to Life
and Dignity), Sonam has now approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India seeking:

❖ Declaration that the classification in Section 3 of the MTP Act, 1971, is unconstitutional,
❖ Direction to order a paternity DNA test to protect her dignity and establish the truth.

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ISSUE RAISED/QUESTIONS PRESENTED

ISSUE~I

Whether the classification made under Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971
(MTP Act) is unreasonable and violates Article 14?

ISSUE~II

Whether denial to DNA test to establish the parentage of the fetus to uphold the dignity of a woman
wherein, she is accused of infidelity, violates Article 21 of the Constitution?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS/PLEADINGS

[I]

Whether the classification made under Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971
(MTP Act) is unreasonable and violates Article 14?

It is humbly submitted by the counsel that there are discriminatory classification based on Marital Status,
absence of a Rational Nexus with the objective of the MTP Act and Violation of Reproductive Autonomy
and Bodily Integrity such as, Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTP Act), as
amended in 2021, provides for termination of pregnancy beyond 20 weeks only for certain categories of
women, such as married women whose marital status has changed due to divorce or widowhood. However,
the same right is denied to unmarried women who face similar emotional, social, and financial challenges.
This creates an unreasonable classification between married and unmarried women, which violates Article
14 of the Constitution that guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of laws. The objective of
the MTP Act is to safeguard the health and dignity of women by ensuring safe and legal access to abortion.
Denying this right to unmarried women beyond 20 weeks defeats the very purpose of the legislation, as it
pushes them toward unsafe and illegal methods of termination, thereby endangering their lives. The
Supreme Court emphasized that any classification that treats a group of people unequally without reasonable
justification is unconstitutional. Reproductive choices are an intrinsic part of a woman’s autonomy and
dignity. The Supreme Court had recognized that the right to make decisions regarding reproduction is a
dimension of personal liberty under Article 21. Denying unmarried women the choice to terminate their
pregnancy beyond 20 weeks arbitrarily limits their bodily autonomy and personal liberty.

[II]

Whether denial to DNA test to establish the parentage of the fetus to uphold the dignity of a woman
wherein, she is accused of infidelity, violates Article 21 of the Constitution?

It is humbly submitted by the counsel that, denial of DNA test violated Article 21 and right to dignity of
Sonam. The Paternity Test as a Safeguard against character assassination. Sonam has been subjected to
character assassination based on unverified allegations of infidelity. A paternity DNA test is the most
conclusive and scientific method to establish the biological parentage of the fetus, thereby vindicating
Sonam’s dignity and reputation. The Apex court held, DNA tests can be permitted when they are in the
interest of justice and necessary to establish truth. False allegations of infidelity and illegitimacy can have
long-lasting social and emotional consequences. DNA testing serves as a safeguard against the misuse of
legal protections and prevents the perpetuation of injustice through unfounded allegations. There must be
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Judicial Balance Between Privacy and Justice. The apex court had recognized that while privacy is a
fundamental right, it cannot be used as a shield to prevent the emergence of truth in matters where justice
demands it. In this case, ordering a paternity DNA test is essential to uphold justice and protect the
petitioner’s dignity.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED/PLEADINGS

Issue - 1

Whether the classification made under Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971
(MTP Act) is unreasonable and violates Article 14?

1. The counsel submits the present petitions is submitted under jurisdiction of Article 32 and 136 SLP(c). In
the present matter, the classification made under Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy
Act, 1971 (MTP Act) is unreasonable and violates Article 14.

1.1 Discriminatory Classification Between Married and Unmarried Women

2. Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTP Act), as amended in 2021,
allows abortion beyond 20 weeks only for certain categories of women, such as married women
whose marital status has changed due to divorce or widowhood2. This classification excludes
unmarried women, leaving them vulnerable to the same socio-economic hardships, emotional
trauma, and stigma that married women may experience after a change in marital status.
3. The Hon’ble same court emphasized that, laws that perpetuate stereotypes and reinforce unequal
treatment are unconstitutional.3 The Supreme Court struck down Section 377 of the Indian Penal
Code, recognizing that criminalizing consensual same-sex relationships violated the principles of
equality, dignity, and autonomy. The Court acknowledged that maintaining archaic laws based on
societal biases perpetuates discrimination and inequality. Similarly, denying unmarried women the
right to terminate pregnancies beyond 20 weeks based on outdated and stereotypical notions of
morality violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
4. The facts of the present case highlight the discriminatory impact of this classification. Sonam, the
petitioner, was in a live-in relationship with Rajesh since 2020. When Sonam became pregnant after
her consensual relationship with Rajesh, she faced immense emotional distress and trauma due to his
refusal to marry her and his baseless allegations of infidelity. Her sincere attempt to clear her name
by requesting a DNA test to establish paternity was categorically rejected, further deepening her
psychological anguish and social vulnerability. As Sonam’s pregnancy progressed beyond 20 weeks,
she was denied access to safe abortion services solely because she was unmarried, despite being in
circumstances that were equally, if not more, distressing than those faced by married women. The
denial of her right to terminate the pregnancy forced her to continue an unwanted pregnancy,
exposing her to prolonged emotional suffering and societal stigma.

2
Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTP Act)
3
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1
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5. In Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India another instructive precedent where the Supreme Court
struck down a law that prohibited women from being employed in establishments serving alcohol, on
the grounds that it reinforced gender stereotypes and restricted women’s autonomy. The Court held
that laws should not reinforce outdated notions of gender roles and should instead be interpreted in
light of contemporary values of equality and non-discrimination.4 Applying the same principle,
Section 3 of the MTP Act, by differentiating between married and unmarried women, reinforces
societal stereotypes that unmarried women are less deserving of protection and reproductive
autonomy.
6. The exclusion of unmarried women from accessing abortion beyond 20 weeks assumes that only
married women face legitimate hardships or emotional distress in dealing with unwanted
pregnancies. This assumption disregards the lived realities of unmarried women, like Sonam, who
faced emotional turmoil due to her pregnancy and Rajesh’s refusal to acknowledge his responsibility,
compounded by the persistent social stigma attached to unmarried mothers. The classification under
Section 3 of the MTP Act is thus based on an archaic and patriarchal view of morality, which is
neither reasonable nor based on an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the objective of
the Act.
7. In Sonam’s case, the refusal to permit her abortion beyond 20 weeks, coupled with Rajesh’s refusal
to take a DNA test, resulted in an unjust situation where her reproductive autonomy and dignity were
completely undermined. Such a classification perpetuates discrimination against unmarried women
and denies them equal protection of the law, making it violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

1.2 Absence of a rational nexus with the objective of the MTP, Act
8. The primary objective of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTP Act) is to protect
the life and health of pregnant women by ensuring safe access to abortion services and preventing
women from resorting to unsafe and illegal means of terminating pregnancies. The law was designed
to safeguard the physical and mental well-being of women, particularly in situations where carrying
the pregnancy to term would cause grave injury or endanger their lives.
9. However, Section 3 of the MTP Act, by permitting abortion beyond 20 weeks only for certain
categories of women such as married women facing changed marital circumstances, discriminates
against unmarried women by denying them the same protection. This forces unmarried women, who
face similar or even greater emotional, psychological, and social challenges, to seek unsafe and
illegal means of terminating their pregnancies. This exclusion defeats the very objective of the Act
by pushing unmarried women toward risky alternatives that jeopardize their lives and health,
contrary to the legislative intent.

4
Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1,
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10. In the present case, Sonam, an unmarried woman, discovered that she was pregnant after her
consensual relationship with Rajesh. When Sonam informed Rajesh of her pregnancy, he refused to
marry her and accused her of infidelity, casting doubts on the paternity of the child.5
11. Sonam, already grappling with immense emotional and psychological distress due to Rajesh’s
betrayal and public humiliation, decided to terminate her pregnancy to protect her dignity and mental
health. However, by the time she approached the Court seeking permission to terminate her
pregnancy, it had crossed 20 weeks. Her request was denied solely because she was unmarried,
despite her facing circumstances that were equally, if not more, distressing than those faced by
married women.
12. The denial of abortion left Sonam with no alternative but to carry an unwanted pregnancy, which
subjected her to further emotional trauma and social stigma, thereby defeating the very purpose of
the MTP Act. Forced continuation of the pregnancy not only compromised Sonam’s physical and
mental health but also exposed her to the societal stigma and hardships associated with being an
unwed mother.
13. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, provides a strong precedent for striking down
legislative classifications that lack a rational nexus with the objective sought to be achieved by the
statute.6 In this case, the Supreme Court invalidated a law that allowed the trial of certain cases by
Special Courts without adequate safeguards, holding that any classification created by law must be
reasonable and have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation. The
Court emphasized that arbitrary classifications violate the equal protection of laws guaranteed under
Article 14.
14. Similarly, in Sonam’s case, the classification created by Section 3 of the MTP Act — restricting
abortion beyond 20 weeks to married women or women in specific circumstances — has no rational
connection with the objective of protecting the life and health of pregnant women. Both married and
unmarried women face similar health risks, emotional trauma, and social stigma in carrying
unwanted pregnancies. Denying unmarried women access to safe abortion beyond 20 weeks not only
undermines the objective of the MTP Act but also exposes them to greater risks, rendering the
provision unconstitutional.
15. The two conditions for a valid classification, as laid down in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkar, are:
(i) The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group.

5
Moot Prepositions
6
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75,
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(ii) The differentia must have a rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved
by the statute.7

16. The classification made under Section 3 of the MTP Act fails both these conditions, as the distinction
between married and unmarried women is arbitrary and lacks any rational connection with the
objective of safeguarding women’s health and dignity.
17. The irrational exclusion of unmarried women from accessing abortion beyond 20 weeks reinforces
outdated social norms and disregards the real-life hardships faced by women like Sonam, who was
left without any recourse after being denied abortion. This classification is unconstitutional as it fails
the test of reasonable classification and undermines the spirit of equality and dignity guaranteed by
Article 14 of the Constitution.

1.3 Violation of Reproductive Autonomy and Bodily Integrity

18. Reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity are intrinsic aspects of personal liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution8. The right to make decisions about one’s body, including the
decision to continue or terminate a pregnancy, is central to a woman’s autonomy and dignity. Any
law that restricts a woman’s ability to make such decisions infringes upon her bodily integrity and
personal liberty.
19. In the present case, Sonam, an unmarried woman, discovered that she was pregnant after her
consensual relationship with Rajesh. When she informed Rajesh about her pregnancy, he refused to
marry her and cast doubts on the paternity of the child, causing her immense emotional trauma and
distress.
20. Faced with emotional turmoil and the burden of societal stigma, Sonam decided to terminate her
pregnancy to protect her dignity and mental health. However, by the time she approached the court
for permission to terminate her pregnancy, it had progressed beyond 20 weeks. Her request for
termination was denied solely on the grounds that she was unmarried, even though carrying the
pregnancy to term posed severe emotional and psychological harm.
21. As a result, Sonam was forced to continue an unwanted pregnancy, imposing an undue burden on her
bodily autonomy and mental health, thereby violating her fundamental right to make intimate and
personal choices concerning her body.
22. In Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, a landmark judgment where the Supreme
Court recognized that reproductive choices are an essential part of personal liberty under Article 21
of the Constitution.9 The Court held that a woman’s right to make reproductive choices, including

7
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75,
8
Article 21 of the Constitution of India
9
Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1
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the right to decide whether to continue or terminate a pregnancy, is an integral part of her right to
privacy, dignity, and bodily integrity.
23. The Court emphasized that “a woman's right to make reproductive choices is also a dimension of
‘personal liberty’ as understood under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.” It further observed
that the decision whether or not to have a child is central to the notion of individual autonomy and
self-determination.
24. The principles laid down in Suchita Srivastava case, are directly applicable to Sonam’s case10. By
denying Sonam the right to terminate her pregnancy beyond 20 weeks merely because she was
unmarried, the law disregarded her right to reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity, exposing her
to prolonged emotional distress and physical suffering.
25. In Puttaswamy v. Union of India, the Supreme Court reiterated that the right to privacy, which
includes the right to make intimate decisions, is an essential part of personal liberty protected under
Article 21.11

The Court held that privacy and autonomy extend to a woman’s right to make choices about her body,
including the right to terminate pregnancy. The decision reinforced the idea that reproductive decisions are
personal and intimate choices that cannot be dictated by societal norms or legal restrictions that fail to
account for the lived experiences of women.

26. Forcing Sonam to carry an unwanted pregnancy beyond 20 weeks deprived her of control over her
own body, which is inconsistent with the principles of dignity and autonomy recognized in Article
21.12
27. In Federation of Obstetric and Gynaecological Societies of India v. Union of India,
acknowledged the need to protect women’s mental and physical well-being when deciding matters
related to abortion, especially in cases where continuation of the pregnancy would cause grave harm
to the woman.13
28. Denying Sonam’s request for termination, despite her emotional trauma and social vulnerability,
imposed an unreasonable burden on her mental health and undermined her right to bodily integrity
and reproductive freedom.
29. The State has an obligation to protect and promote reproductive rights, which are an essential aspect
of women’s dignity and equality. In Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1, the

10
Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1
11
Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1,
12
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution
13
Federation of Obstetric and Gynaecological Societies of India v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 531 of 2020,
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Supreme Court held that the State cannot impose moralistic standards that restrict individual choices
in matters of personal intimacy.
30. Applying this principle, restricting the right to terminate a pregnancy beyond 20 weeks based solely
on marital status imposes arbitrary limitations on a woman’s bodily autonomy and reproductive
freedom, violating her constitutional rights.
31. A woman is often enmeshed in complex notions of family, community, religion, and caste. Such
external societal factors affect the way a woman exercises autonomy and control over her body,
particularly in matters relating to reproductive decisions. Societal factors often find reinforcement by
way of legal barriers restricting a woman's right to access abortion. The decision to have or not to
have an abortion is borne out of complicated life circumstances, which only the woman can choose
on her own terms without external interference or influence. Reproductive autonomy requires that
every pregnant woman has the intrinsic right to choose to undergo or not to undergo abortion without
any consent or authorization from a third party
32. The classification in Section 3 of the MTP Act denies unmarried women the right to terminate
pregnancies beyond 20 weeks, despite the fact that they face the same physical, emotional, and
psychological burdens as married women.
33. This classification lacks any rational nexus with the objective of protecting women’s health and
dignity, and therefore, violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution14.
34. Here fore, it is humbly submitted before hon’ble court that in Sonam’s case, her inability to terminate
the pregnancy beyond 20 weeks left her vulnerable to immense emotional trauma and forced her to
bear an unwanted pregnancy. This denial of reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity not only
violated her right to privacy and dignity but also inflicted unjust and disproportionate harm.
35. Therefore, the legal restrictions that prevented Sonam from terminating her pregnancy disregarded
her agency, autonomy, and bodily integrity, which are all protected under Article 21 of Indian
Constitution. By compelling her to continue an unwanted pregnancy, the law perpetuated injustice
and caused her irreparable harm.

1.4 Social Stigma surrounding unmarried women

36. It is submitted by the counsels that, the social stigma that women face for engaging in pre-marital
sexual relations prevents them from realizing their right to reproductive health in a variety of ways.
They have insufficient or no access to knowledge about their own bodies due to a lack of sexual
health education, their access to contraceptives is limited, and they are frequently unable to approach

14
Article 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution
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healthcare providers and consult them with respect to their reproductive health. Consequently,
unmarried and single women face additional obstacles.
37. The social stigma surrounding single women who are pregnant is even greater and they often lack
support from their family or partner. Therefore, it is required to interpret the provisions of MTP, Act
to prevent the prejudice.
38. In Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan, Gajendragadkar, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then
was) opined that "the first and primary Rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature
must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself." But when the words are capable of
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bearing two or more constructions, they should be construed in light of the object and purpose of
the enactment. The purposive construction of the provision must be "illumined by the goal, though
guided by the word."
39. While much of law's benefits were (and indeed are) rooted in the institution of marriage, the law in
modern times is shedding the notion that marriage is a precondition to the rights of individuals (alone
or in relation to one another). Changing social mores must be borne in mind when interpreting the
provisions of an enactment to further its object and purpose. Statutes are considered to be "always
speaking."
40. In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, this Court reaffirmed that the law should be interpreted in
terms of the changing needs of the times and circumstances. A.K. Sikri, J. speaking for a two-judge
Bench of this Court, observed that it is the duty of courts to bridge the gap between law and society
by advancing a purposive interpretation of statutes16.
41. The law regulates relationships between people. It prescribes patterns of behaviour. It reflects the
values of society. The role of the court is to understand the purpose of law in society and to help the
law achieve its purpose. But the law of a society is a living organism. It is based on a given factual
and social reality that is constantly changing. Sometimes change in law precedes societal change and
is even intended to stimulate it. In most cases, however, a change in law is the result of a change in
social reality. Indeed, when social reality changes, the law must change too. Just as change in social
reality is the law of life, responsiveness to change in social reality is the life of the law. It can be said
that the history of law is the history of adapting the law to society's changing needs. In both
constitutional and statutory interpretation, the court is supposed to exercise discretion in determining
the proper relationship between the subjective and objective purposes of the law.
42. In Navtej Singh Johar’s case, this Court emphasized the transformative nature of our Constitution.
Transformative constitutionalism promotes and engenders societal change by ensuring that every
individual is capable of enjoying the life and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. This Court

15
Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan MANU/SC/0097/1957 : AIR 1957 SC 907
16
Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse MANU/SC/1084/2013 : (2014) 1 SCC 188,
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observed that transformative constitutionalism places a duty on the judiciary to "ensure and uphold
the supremacy of the Constitution, while at the same time ensuring that a sense of transformation is
ushered constantly and endlessly in the society by interpreting and enforcing the Constitution as well
as other provisions of law in consonance with the avowed object.17
43. The law must remain cognizant of the fact that changes in society have ushered in significant
changes in family structures. While there can be no doubt that in India, marriage is an important
social institution, we must also keep our minds open to the fact that there are certain individuals or
groups who do not hold the same view. To be sure, there are some indigenous groups within our
country wherein sexual relations outside the marital setting are accepted as a normal occurrence.
Even in the societal mainstream, there are a significant number of people who see nothing wrong in
engaging in premarital sex. Notions of social morality are inherently subjective and the criminal law
cannot be used as a means to unduly interfere with the domain of personal autonomy. Morality and
criminality are not coextensive.18
44. In Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal, a two Judge Bench of this Court (of which
one of us, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. was a part) recognized that family units may manifest in atypical
ways:

The predominant understanding of the concept of a "family" both in the law and in society is that it
consists of a single, unchanging unit with a mother and a father (who remain constant over time) and
their children. This assumption ignores both, the many circumstances which may lead to a change in
one's familial structure, and the fact that many families do not conform to this expectation to begin with.
Familial relationships may take the form of domestic, unmarried partnerships or queer relationships. A
household may be a single parent household for any number of reasons, including the death of a spouse,
separation, or divorce. Similarly, the guardians and caretakers (who traditionally occupy the roles of the
"mother" and the "father") of children may change with remarriage, adoption, or fostering. These
manifestations of love and of families may not be typical but they are as real as their traditional
counterparts. Such atypical manifestations of the family unit are equally deserving not only of protection
under law but also of the benefits available under social welfare legislation. The black letter of the law
must not be relied upon to disadvantage families which are different from traditional ones. The same
undoubtedly holds true for women who take on the role of motherhood in ways that may not find a place
in the popular imagination.19

17
Navtej Singh Johar (supra),
18
S. Khusboo v. Kanniammal MANU/SC/0310/2010 : (2010) 5 SCC 600,
19
Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal MANU/SC/1056/2022,
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45. Societal reality, as observed by this Court in Deepika Singh’s case, indicates the need to legally
recognize non-traditional manifestations of familial relationships. Such legal recognition is necessary
to enable individuals in non-traditional family structures to avail of the benefits under beneficial
legislation, including the MTP Act.
46. Over the years, the Parliament has enacted legislation bringing about a congruence between the
rights of married and unmarried women. The Maternity Benefit Act 1961 was enacted to provide
maternity benefits to women employed in any establishment. In terms of Section 5 of the Maternity
Benefit Act 1961, the payment of maternity benefits is extended to all women (including unmarried
women) by the use of the phrase "every woman."
47. The Hindu Succession Act 1956 was enacted to codify the law relating to intestate succession among
Hindus. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 pertains to devolution of interest in coparcenary
property. In terms of this provision a daughter, irrespective of her marital status, is a coparcener in
her own right in the same manner as the son by virtue of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act
2005.
48. Section 8 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 stipulates that any female Hindu
regardless of her marital status has the capacity to take a son or daughter in adoption. Sections 7 and
8 of the Guardian and Wards Act 1890 allows for persons to apply for an order of guardianship
without making any distinction between men or women, married or unmarried.
49. Through the above enactments, the law has emphasized that unmarried women have the same rights
as married women in terms of adoption, succession, and maternity benefits. Importantly, these
legislations also signify that both married and unmarried women have equal decisional autonomy to
make significant choices regarding their own welfare.
50. The unamended MTP Act of 1971 was largely concerned with "married women", as evident above
its Statement of Objects and Reasons, which stated that most of the women seeking abortions were
married, and thus "under no particular necessity to conceal their pregnancy." Significantly, the 2021
Statement of Objects and Reasons does not make a distinction between married and unmarried
women. Rather, all women are entitled to the benefit of safe and legal abortions.
51. This is consistent with the Reply of the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare to the Report on
'Women's Healthcare: Policy Options' by the Committee on Empowerment of Women (2020-2021).
The Ministry responded that "to increase the access of safe abortion services to all women, the
provision of abortion services is proposed for all women irrespective of their marital status." The
Committee on Empowerment of Women had recommended a "raise [in] the permissible period of

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abortions to 24 weeks" and the deletion of the word "married" in the legislation, so that "anyone can
get an abortion without having to depend on sham clinics as a last recourse."20
52. Therefore, it is submitted by the counsel, in the evolution of the law towards a gender equal society,
the interpretation of the MTP Act and MTP Rules must consider the social realities of today and not
be restricted by societal norms of an age which has passed into the archives of history. As society
changes and evolves, so must our mores and conventions. A changed social context demands a
readjustment of our laws. Law must not remain static and its interpretation should keep in mind the
changing social context and advance the cause of social justice.

Issue 2.

Whether denial to DNA test to establish the parentage of the fetus to uphold the dignity of a woman
wherein, she is accused of infidelity, violates Article 21 of the Constitution?

53. It is humbly submitted by the counsel in the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the deniel to DNA test to
establish the percentage of the fetus to uphold the dignity of a women wherein, she is accused of
infidelity, violate the Article 21 of the Constitution.

2.1 Violation of Right to Dignity and Reputation under Article 21

54. The refusal to conduct a DNA test on Sonam’s request constitutes a violation of her fundamental
right to dignity, reputation, and privacy, all of which are encompassed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. Sonam’s request was aimed at establishing the paternity of her fetus and
refuting allegations of infidelity, which affected her dignity and reputation.
55. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, The Court held that reputation forms an integral part of an
individual's dignity and that any action that tarnishes reputation without valid justification violates
Article 21.21
56. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, it was reaffirmed that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right protected under Article 21. However, this right is not absolute and may be overridden where
public interest or justice necessitates intervention.22
57. Sonam, who was in a consensual live-in relationship with Rajesh since 2020, was subjected to social
stigma and emotional trauma due to false allegations. Denying her request to conduct a DNA test not

20
Ministry of Health & Family Welfare to the Report on 'Women's Healthcare by the Committee on Empowerment of Women
(2020-2021).
21
Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221
22
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1
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only prevented her from asserting her truth but also perpetuated the emotional distress caused by
baseless accusations.
58. The related circumstances leading to unsafe abortions nowadays. However, despite the enactment of
the MTP Act in 1971, unsafe abortions continue to be the third leading cause of maternal mortality,
and close to eight women in India die each day due to causes related to unsafe abortions. study
published in the BMJ Global Health points out to the grim statistics of unsafe abortions in India:
between the years 2007 and 2011, an estimate of 67% of abortions carried out were classified as
unsafe.23 In view of the serious social malady due to illegal and unsafe abortions, the MTP
Amendment Act 2021 intended to improve the availability and quality of legal abortion care for
women by liberalizing certain restrictive features of the unamended MTP Act and by increasing the
legal limit of the gestational period within which abortions could be conducted from twenty weeks.
But the domain of the amendment lies only to their marital status due to this Sonam’s right to privacy
and dignity under Article 2124 violated.
59. In present matter termination of pregnancy if not be carried out, the continuance of a pregnancy
would involve risk of injury to the mental health of the Sonam.
60. The ambit of reproductive rights is not restricted to the right of women to have or not have children.
It also includes the constellation of freedoms and entitlements that enable a woman to decide freely
on all matters relating to her sexual and reproductive health. Reproductive rights include the right to
access education and information about contraception and sexual health, the right to decide whether
and what type of contraceptives to use, the right to choose whether and when to have children, the
right to choose the number of children, the right to access safe and legal abortions, and the right to
reproductive healthcare. Women must also have the autonomy to make decisions concerning these
rights, free from coercion or violence.

2.2 DNA Test as a Scientific Tool to Establish Truth

61. A DNA test is a scientifically reliable method to determine biological parentage, capable of
establishing paternity with near certainty. The refusal to allow a DNA test deprived Sonam of an
opportunity to clear her name and establish the truth.
62. Sharda v. Dharmpal, the Court acknowledged that a DNA test can be directed by the court where it
is necessary for ensuring justice.25

23
BMJ Global Health points out to the grim statistics 2007 and 2011
24
Article 21 of Indian Constitution
25
Sharda v. Dharmpal, (2003) 4 SCC 493
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63. Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women, the Court emphasized that while
DNA tests should not be ordered casually, they may be permitted in cases where paternity is
seriously disputed, and the reputation of an individual is at stake.26
64. Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, the Court clarified that while a DNA test should not be
directed as a matter of routine, it can be ordered when necessary to prevent injustice or protect the
dignity of an individual.27
65. The allegations of infidelity against Sonam could have been conclusively rebutted through a DNA
test, which would Sharda v. Dharmpal, have established the paternity of her child. Denying this test
resulted in preventing Sonam from proving her innocence and preserving her dignity.28
66. Courts in the country have permitted women to terminate their pregnancies where the length of the
pregnancy exceeded twenty weeks (the outer limit for the termination of the pregnancy in the
unamended MTP Act) by expansively interpreting Section 5, which permitted RMPs to terminate
pregnancies beyond the twenty-week limit when it was necessary to save the life of the woman. In X
v. Union of India, this Court permitted the termination of post twenty-week pregnancies after taking
into account the risk of grave injury to the mental health of a pregnant woman by carrying the
pregnancy to term.29
67. The grounds for approaching courts differ and include various reasons such as a change in the
circumstances of a woman's environment during an ongoing pregnancy, including risk to life, risk to
mental health, discovery of foetal anomalies, late discovery of pregnancy in case of minors and
women with disabilities, and pregnancies resulting from sexual assault or rape. These are illustrative
situations thrown up by cases which travel to the court. Although the rulings in these cases
recognized grave physical and mental health harms and the violation of the rights of women caused
by the denial of the option to terminate unwanted pregnancies, the relief provided to the individual
Petitioner significantly varied.
68. Further, the decision to give birth to and raise a child is necessarily informed by one's material
circumstances. By this, we mean the situational, social, and financial circumstances of a woman or
her family may be relevant to her decision to carry the pregnancy to term. Those who fall victim to
emergencies or disasters may unexpectedly find themselves without a home or separated from their
families. They may have lost loved ones. Their livelihood may be adversely affected and they may
undergo other deeply impactful changes in their lives, both material and psychological. The
possibility that they have suffered grave injuries which alter their mobility or quality of life cannot be
26
Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women, (2010) 8 SCC 633
27
Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, (1993) 3 SCC 418
28
Supra 25
29
X v. Union of India MANU/SC/0149/2017 : (2017) 3 SCC 458, Mamta Verma v. Union of India MANU/SC/1055/2017 :
(2018) 14 SCC 289, Meera Santosh Pal v. Union of India MANU/SC/0050/2017 : (2017) 3 SCC 462, Sarmishtha Chakrabortty v.
Union of India MANU/SC/0813/2017 : (2018) 13 SCC 339
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discounted. The myriad changes that may take place in the aftermath of a disaster, emergency, or
humanitarian crisis cannot be exhaustively listed or envisaged. Each woman's circumstances are
unique and we have merely listed (by way of illustration) some of the many potential repercussions
of the catastrophes accounted for in Rule 3B(g).30
69. The right to reproductive autonomy is closely linked with the right to bodily autonomy. As the term
itself suggests, bodily autonomy is the right to take decisions about one's body. The consequences of
an unwanted pregnancy on a woman's body as well as her mind cannot be understated. The foetus
relies on the pregnant woman's body for sustenance and nourishment until it is born. The biological
process of pregnancy transforms the woman's body to permit this. The woman may experience
swelling, body ache, contractions, morning sickness, and restricted mobility, to name a few of a host
of side effects. Further, complications may arise which pose a risk to the life of the woman. A mere
description of the side effects of a pregnancy cannot possibly do justice to the visceral image of
forcing a woman to continue with an unwanted pregnancy. Therefore, the decision to carry the
pregnancy to its full term or terminate it is firmly rooted in the right to bodily autonomy and
decisional autonomy of the pregnant woman.
70. Importantly, Puttaswamy’s case also deals with facets of reproductive autonomy. Chelameshwar, J.
held that a "woman's freedom of choice whether to bear a child or abort her pregnancy are areas
which fall in the realm of privacy."31 This Court recognized the right to bodily integrity as an
important facet of the right to privacy. In Puttaswamy considered Suchita Srivastava v.
Chandigarh Administration, to reiterate that the statutory right of a woman to undergo termination
of pregnancy under the MTP Act is relatable to the constitutional right to make reproductive choices
Under Article 21 of the Constitution.32

2.3 Rebuttal of Presumption under Section 112 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872

71. Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 presumes the legitimacy of a child born during a
valid marriage. While Sonam and Rajesh were in a live-in relationship rather than a formal marriage,
her request for a DNA test was a valid attempt to rebut the false presumption of infidelity.33
72. Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, The Court held that the presumption of legitimacy under
Section 112 is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence, such as a DNA test.34

30
MTP Rules
31
Puttaswamy (supra)
32
Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration MANU/SC/1580/2009 : (2009) 9 SCC 1
33
Sec. 116 BSA, 2023
34
Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, (1993) 3 SCC 418
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73. Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women, The Court reiterated that a DNA
test may be ordered where there is a serious dispute regarding paternity and where the outcome may
significantly affect the dignity and reputation of individuals.35
74. Sonam’s request for a DNA test was a legitimate exercise of her right to establish the truth and rebut
the allegations of infidelity. Denial of this right resulted in perpetuating a false presumption and
subjected her to undue emotional and societal distress.

2.4 Violation of Right to Equality under Article 14

75. The refusal to conduct a DNA test in Sonam’s case also amounts to a violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, which guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of laws. By
denying her the opportunity to establish the truth through a scientifically reliable method, Sonam was
treated unfairly and subjected to arbitrary decision-making.
76. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, The Supreme Court held that equality is a dynamic concept that
ensures fairness, reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness in state action.36
77. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, The principle of arbitrariness was held to be antithetical to
equality, and any state action that is arbitrary is violative of Article 14.37
78. The decision to deny Sonam the right to a DNA test, despite its potential to exonerate her and protect
her reputation, was arbitrary and lacked reasonable justification. This denial created an imbalance,
where Sonam’s right to seek the truth was sacrificed despite the availability of a scientifically sound
method.

2.5 State’s Duty to Protect Dignity and Prevent Injustice

79. The State has a constitutional obligation to protect the dignity of individuals and prevent injustice.
This duty extends to ensuring that individuals are not subjected to societal prejudice and unwarranted
accusations without the opportunity to defend themselves effectively.
80. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, UT of Delhi, The Court emphasized that the right to
dignity is intrinsic to the right to life and includes protection from arbitrary state actions that
undermine this dignity.38
81. Laxmibai Chandaragi v. State of Karnataka, The Court reiterated the importance of recognizing
the autonomy and dignity of individuals in making life decisions and ensuring that societal bias does
not infringe upon these rights.39

35
Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women, (2010) 8 SCC 633
36
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248
37
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3
38
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, UT of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608
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82. The refusal to allow a DNA test not only undermined Sonam’s dignity but also allowed false
accusations to persist, thereby perpetuating injustice. The State’s failure to facilitate the
establishment of truth through scientific means reflects a disregard for its constitutional duty.

2.6 Role of Scientific Evidence in Preserving Judicial Integrity

83. Scientific evidence, particularly DNA testing, plays a critical role in ensuring the integrity of judicial
outcomes by eliminating ambiguity and preventing wrongful assumptions. In cases involving
paternity or infidelity, DNA evidence serves as a conclusive tool to ascertain the truth.
84. Ramachandra v. State of Maharashtra, The Court acknowledged the role of scientific evidence in
aiding the judicial process and ensuring that decisions are based on factual accuracy.40
85. Nandlal WasudeoBadwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, The Court emphasized that in cases where
paternity is disputed, DNA evidence is the most accurate method to determine the truth, and its
denial may lead to perpetuation of falsehood.41
86. The denial of a DNA test in Sonam’s case compromised the integrity of judicial proceedings by
preventing the court from accessing the most conclusive evidence available. This failure not only led
to injustice but also undermined the public’s confidence in the judiciary’s commitment to truth and
fairness.

2.7 Denial of DNA Test Perpetuates Societal Prejudice

87. The denial of a DNA test in Sonam’s case further perpetuated societal prejudice and moral policing
associated with women in live-in relationships. By refusing her the opportunity to clear her name, the
system reinforced patriarchal biases that stigmatize women who assert autonomy over their personal
choices. In S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) The Court held that consensual relationships
between adults are protected by law and cannot be subjected to moral scrutiny or societal prejudice.42
The refusal to allow a DNA test left Sonam vulnerable to societal prejudices and reinforced
stereotypes that women in live-in relationships are morally suspect. This denial perpetuated societal
bias and deprived Sonam of her right to seek justice on equal terms.

2.8 Miscarriage of Justice Due to Denial of DNA Test

88. Refusing to conduct a DNA test in Sonam’s case amounted to a miscarriage of justice by preventing
her from establishing the truth and disproving false accusations. The judicial system is tasked with

39
Laxmibai Chandaragi v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 3 SCC 360
40
Ramachandra v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 486
41
Nandlal WasudeoBadwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, (2014) 2 SCC 576
42
S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600
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ensuring fairness and preventing injustice, and in this case, denial of a scientific tool to establish the
truth undermined these principles. In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, The right to privacy is
subject to limitations in situations where the interests of justice or the dignity of another person are
involved.43 In Sharda v. Dharmpal, The Court held that while the right to privacy is important, it
cannot be used to protect falsehood or obstruct the emergence of the truth.44

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that, the refusal to allow a DNA test not only deprived
Sonam of her fundamental rights but also perpetuated societal biases, exposing her to emotional trauma and
reputational damage.

43
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1
44
Sharda v. Dharmpal, (2003) 4 SCC 493
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PRAYER OF RELIEF

WHEREFORE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AND

AUTHORITIES CITED, IT IS HUMBLY PRAYED THAT THIS HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA MAY BE PLEASED,
1. To DECLARE that Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, insofar as it denies
unmarried women the right to terminate pregnancies beyond 20 weeks, violates Article 14 and is
unconstitutional.

2. To GRANT permission to the Petitioner to terminate her pregnancy of 23 weeks in accordance with the
principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.

3. To DIRECT the Respondent No. 2 (Rajesh) to undergo a DNA test to establish the paternity of the fetus
to protect the dignity and reputation of the Petitioner.

4. To RECOGNIZE that a woman’s reproductive autonomy, irrespective of her marital status, is an

essential facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

5. To DIRECT the Respondent State to ensure that necessary guidelines are framed to guarantee equal
access to reproductive healthcare services for unmarried women.

Pass any other order(s), direction(s) or relief that this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India may deem fit and in the
interest of justice, equity and good conscience.

DATED:
Sd/-

APPELLANT/ PETITIONER

Sd/-

Through COUNSEL of Petitioner

TC10P

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