LAW FINDER

Submitted By: Roshni Joshi

J. Ranga Raju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (Andhra Pradesh) Law Finder Doc Id # 1661358

2020(1) Andh LD 26 : 2020(1) Law Summary 8

ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT

Before:- Cheekati Manavendranath Roy, J.

Writ Petition No. 7735 of 2019. D/d. 01.10.2019.

J. Ranga Raju S/o Suryanarayana Raju - Petitioner

Versus

The State of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by Principal Secretary, Dept. of Energy, Velagapudi, Amaravati, Guntur
District and Ors. - Respondents

For the Petitioner:- Sri Challa Ajay Kumar, Advocate.

For the Respondent No. 1:- Government Pleader for Energy.

For the Respondent Nos. 2 to 5:- Sri N. Siva Reddy, Standing Counsel for APSPDCL.

IMPORTANT

While considering whether a particular act committed by an employee is an act involving "moral
turpitude" or not, it has to be considered not only in the legal parlance but also in societal parlance.

Constitution of India, 1950 Article 226 Dismissal from service - Present petition filed against same -
Petitioner submitted that he was dismissed from service without any notice issued to him by the
concerned authorities - Further submitted that execution of sentence imposed against him was
suspended by High Court in revision - Held, offence under Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code for
which the petitioner was convicted is one involving moral turpitude - Mere suspending the execution of
sentence does not mean that conviction i.e. finding recorded by the Trial Court that the accused is
guilty of commission of the offence is suspended - In the present case, as the execution of sentence
alone is suspended and as conviction is not suspended, the conviction still subsists and it is in force
and it attracts the penalty as contemplated under the Regulations - Therefore, the order under
challenge is perfectly sustainable under law - Writ petition dismissed.

[Paras 25 to 32]

Cases Referred :

Guru Basavaraj @ Benne Settappa v. State of Karnataka (2012) 8 SCC 734

Narendra Ramdas Borse v. State of Maharashtra W.P.No.3695 of 2016, decided on 06.8.2018.

P.Rajender v. Union of India 2001 (5) ALD 290 (DB)

Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1996) 4 SCC 17

Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang (1995) 2 SCC 513

Sanjay Prasad v. Union of India WP(C) No.3667 of 2011, decided on 19.9.2011.

Saroj Kumari v. State of Haryana CWP No.8241/2011, decided on 03.12.2013.

State of Andhra Pradesh v. D.Rajakullayappa 2018 (2) ALD 278 (DB)

State of Haryana v. Ved Kaur C.A.No.6066 of 2017, decided on 03.5.2017.

Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn.

ORDER

Cheekati Manavendranath Roy, J. - Assailing the order dated 06-6-2019 of Chief General Manager/HRD
whereunder the petitioner was dismissed from service on the ground that he was convicted in a criminal case, this
writ petition is filed by the petitioner.

2. Facts germane to dispose of this writ petition may briefly be stated as follows:

(a) The petitioner was initially appointed as a helper by order dated 04-11-1993 in the Electricity
Department. Thereafter he was promoted as AE/Operations and at present he is working as
AE/Operations.

(b) There are family disputes between his younger brother Jampana Ramkrishnam Raju and his wife Rama
Devi. Rama Devi lodged a report with I Town Police of Vijayawada alleging that her husband Ramkrishnam
Raju, his parents and his brother, who is the petitioner herein, have been harassing her and subjecting her
to cruelty. The said report was registered as a case in Crime No.568/2008 for the offences punishable
under Section 498-A, IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. After completion of
investigation, Police filed charge-sheet against the above persons and they are shown as accused 1 to 4 in
the said charge-sheet. The same was numbered as C.C. 729 of 2008 on the file of the II Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada. The petitioner herein is accused No.4 in the said criminal case. After
completion of trial, accused 1, 2 and 4 who is the petitioner herein, were found guilty for the offence
punishable under Section 498-A, IPC and accordingly they were convicted for the said offence and they
were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for the said offence. The petitioner herein, who is accused No.4,
who was convicted for the offence under Section 498-A, IPC was sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months for the offence under Section 498-A, IPC as per
the judgment of the trial Court dated 18-6-2016.

(c) Aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction, the petitioner along with the other accused preferred an
appeal to the Sessions Court. The said appeal was also dismissed confirming the conviction and sentence
imposed against the petitioner herein along with other accused by the Sessions Judge, Mahila Court,
Vijayawada, by the judgment dated 11-10-2018. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred Crl.R.C.
No.2806 of 2018 to the High Court and this Court in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in Crl.R.C. No.2806 of 2018
suspended only the execution of sentence imposed against the petitioner in C.C.No.729 of 2008 confirmed
in Crl. Appeal No.203 of 2016 and enlarged him on bail.

(d) As the petitioner was convicted in a criminal case by the trial Court and the same was confirmed by the
appellate Court and as the High Court suspended only the execution of sentence and the verdict of
conviction against the petitioner is not stayed or suspended by the High Court, the Chief General Manager/
HRD by the impugned order dated 06-6-2019 after examining the matter in terms of G.O.Ms.No.2, GA
(Ser-C) Department, dated 04-01-1999 as adopted by T.O.O (Addl. Secy-Per) Ms. No.214, dated 11-11-
2002 and T.O.O (GM(IR)- Per) Ms.No.45, dated 22-5-2002, dismissed the petitioner (who is working as
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AE/O/Gudur) from APSPDCL service with immediate effect as penalty as he was convicted in a criminal
case.

(e) Aggrieved by the impugned order of dismissal from service, the petitioner has filed this writ petition
seeking declaration in the nature of Writ of mandamus that the order dated 06-6-2019 dismissing him from
service as illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional on the ground that he was dismissed from service without
issuing notice to him, he is not convicted in an offence involving moral turpitude and as the execution of
sentence imposed against him was suspended by the High Court in Crl.R.C. No.2806 of 2018, dated 12-
10-2018 and thereby sought direction to the respondents to reinstate him into service.

3. When the writ petition came up for hearing, I have heard Sri Challa Ajay Kumar, learned counsel for the
petitioner; learned Government Pleader for Energy appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri N.Siva Reddy, learned
Standing Counsel for respondents 2 to 5/APSPDCL.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the petitioner was falsely implicated in a
criminal case on account of the disputes between his brother and his wife and he would submit that although he
was convicted by the trial Court and the said conviction is confirmed by the appellate Court that as the execution
of sentence was suspended by the High Court in Crl.R.C. No.2806 of 2018, by order dated 12-10-2018, the
Chief General Manager/HRD erred in dismissing the petitioner from service without waiting till the disposal of the
said criminal revision case in the High Court. He then contends that even the offence under Section 498-A, IPC
is not relating to an offence involving moral turpitude and as such the penalty of dismissal from service is legally
unsustainable. He would further contend that the impugned order is bad in law as no notice was given to him
before issuing the order of dismissal from service. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner prayed to
allow the writ petition and declare the impugned order dated 06-6-2019 dismissing the petitioner from service as
illegal and consequently direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service.

5. In oppugnation, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents 2 to 5/APSPDCL would contend that
concurrent findings of guilt are recorded against the petitioner herein, who is accused No.4 in the said criminal
case by the trial Court and the appellate Court that he is guilty of commission of offence punishable under
Section 498-A, IPC for harassing the wife of his brother and subjecting her to cruelty. He contends that the High
Court in the revision preferred by him only suspended the execution of sentence of imprisonment imposed against
the petitioner and the High Court did not suspend the finding of conviction recorded against the petitioner by both
the trial Court and the appellate Court and as such the conviction is in force. He would contend that when the
finding of conviction that the petitioner is guilty of commission of offence punishable under Section 498-A, IPC is
in force, the impugned order dismissing the petitioner from service is perfectly valid under law. He submits that as
per Regulation 5(viii) of Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board Employees' Discipline and Appeal Regulations,
penalty of dismissal from service for the misconduct specified in Regulation 6 can be imposed upon an employee
of the Board. As per Regulation 6(xxvii), conviction in any Court of law for any criminal offence involving moral
turpitude constitutes an act of misconduct and as such the petitioner, who was convicted for the criminal offence
involving moral turpitude, was rightly dismissed from service. He would then contend that even though enquiry is to
be conducted and notice is to be given before imposing any penalty as per Regulation 10 which prescribes the
procedure for imposing penalty, when penalty was imposed on the ground of conduct which led to the conviction
of an employee on a criminal charge, no enquiry is required to be held and no notice before imposing the penalty
as contemplated under rules (i) and (ii) of Regulation 10 is required to be given. Therefore, the impugned order
dismissing the petitioner from service on the ground that he was convicted on a criminal charge involving moral
turpitude is perfectly valid under law. He finally contends that the offence committed by the petitioner under
Section 498-A, IPC in harassing the wife of his brother and subjecting her to cruelty is undoubtedly an offence
involving moral turpitude attracting the penalty of dismissal from service and thereby prayed to dismiss the writ
petition.
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6. I have given my earnest consideration to the above rival contentions made by the learned counsel for the
petitioner and the respondents.

7. As can be seen from the above factual matrix, it is evident that the petitioner has been questioning the
impugned order of dismissal from service chiefly on three grounds viz., (1) that the offence under Section 498-A,
IPC is not involving moral turpitude, (2) no notice was given to him before passing the impugned order of
dismissal from service and (3) since the execution of sentence of imprisonment is suspended by the High Court
in Crl.R.C. No.2806 of 2018, by the order dated 12-10-2018, that the impugned order dismissing the petitioner
from service during the pendency of the said criminal revision case is not valid under law.

8. Admittedly the petitioner was prosecuted for the offences under Section 498-A, IPC and under Section 3 and
4 Dowry Prohibition Act in C.C.No.729 of 2008 on the file of the II Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Vijayawada, along with his brother and parents and he was convicted for the offence punishable under Section
498-A, IPC and he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine
of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months for
the offence under Section 498-A, IPC. The said conviction and sentence imposed against the petitioner was also
confirmed by the appellate Court. These material facts are incontrovertible facts and they are borne out by the
record.

9. It is now relevant to consider the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board Employees' Discipline and Appeal
Regulations (hereinafter called as Regulations). Regulation 5, 6 and 10 of the said Regulations are relevant in the
context to consider. Regulation 6 deals with acts and omissions which constitute misconduct. Various acts and
omissions are enumerated in Regulation 6 and the said acts and omissions constitute misconduct. Regulation
6(xxvii) ordains that conviction in any Court of law for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude constitute an
act of misconduct. For better appreciation, the said Regulation is extracted hereunder:

"6. Acts and omissions constituting misconduct: The following acts and omissions shall be treated as
misconduct:

(i) to (xxvi): ...............................................

(xxvii): Conviction in any court of law for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude.

(xxviii) to (xlvii): .........................................."

10. Regulation 5 deals with penalties to be imposed upon the employees of the Board for any act of misconduct
of employee as specified in Regulation 6. Regulation 5(viii) contemplates penalty of dismissal from service.
Therefore, as the petitioner was convicted by a Court of law for a criminal offence committed by him which is held
to be an act of misconduct as contemplated under Regulation 6(xxvii), he was dismissed from service as per
Regulation 5(viii).

11. Now the crucial question that arises for determination is whether the offence under Section 498-A, IPC is the
one involving moral turpitude or not?

12. Before adverting to the question whether the offence under Section 498-A, IPC is the one involving moral
turpitude or not, it has to be seen what is meant by 'moral turpitude'.

13. The meaning of the term 'turpitude' and 'moral turpitude' has been given in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition, as follows:

"Turpitude. In its ordinary sense, inherent baseness or vileness of principle or action; shameful wickedness;
depravity. In its legal sense, everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. An action
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showing gross depravity.

"Moral turpitude. The act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties which man
owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man."

14. Therefore, from the above, it is evident that "turpitude" and "moral turpitude" indicate almost the same type of
failing in the man's character or moral make-up.

15. Interpretation relating to the expression "moral turpitude" has also fallen for consideration before the apex
Court and other High Courts on various occasions in many cases. Few of those decisions are relevant in the
context to consider. The Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1996) 4 SCC 17 at paragraph-
12 held as follows:

""Moral turpitude" is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct
which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity."

16. The said judgment is again followed by the Supreme Court in another case of State of Haryana v. Ved
Kaur - C.A.No.6066 of 2017, dated 03-5-2017 and held as follows:

"When competent authority is to invoke its power under Rule 7(2)(b) of the P & A Rules, 1978, the first
question would be as to whether the offences for which the employee is convicted constitute moral turpitude.
If the answer is in the affirmative, it would be open to the competent authority to pass the order of
termination without holding inquiry. However, if the offences for which an employee is convicted have no
shades of moral turpitude, the disciplinary authority has to look into the attendant circumstances leading to
the conduct of such an employee to see whether he is suitable for rejection in government service or not."

17. In Sanjay Prasad v. Union of India - WP(C) No.3667 of 2011, dated 19-9-2011, the Delhi High Court
while considering the delinquency and moral turpitude relating to an advocate held as follows:

"In dealing with this aspect of the matter, however, it is of utmost importance to remember that the
expression "moral turpitude or delinquency" is not to receive a narrow construction. Wherever conduct
proved against an Advocate is contrary to honesty, or opposed to good morals, or is unethical, it may be
safely held that it involves moral turpitude."

18. Thus, it is clear from the above judgments that while considering whether a particular act committed by an
employee is an act involving "moral turpitude" or not, it has to be considered not only in the legal parlance but
also in societal parlance. If the act committed by an employee is found to be unethical, opposed to good morals
and it is illegal, it is to be construed as an act of "Moral turpitude". It is also clear from the ratio laid down in the
above judgments that narrow interpretation cannot be given to the expression "Moral turpitude". So in the light of
the interpretation given to the expression "moral turpitude" as discussed above, it is to be ascertained whether the
acts committed by the petitioner herein in committing the said offence under Section 498-A, IPC for which he
was convicted is an act involving "moral turpitude" both in the legal parlance and in societal parlance. To ascertain
the same, it is essential to consider the allegations made against him in the said criminal case which are found to
be true both by the trial Court and the appellate Court.

19. As can be seen from the copies of judgments of the trial Court and the appellate Court, allegations made
against the petitioner herein, who is accused No.4 in the criminal case, which are proved against him are serious
in nature. The specific allegations against him are that the petitioner used to instigate his brother/accused No.1 to
harass his wife. On 20-6-2007, the petitioner who is accused No.4, went to the house of the parents of the wife of
accused No.1 and abused her in filthy language and he slapped her and abused her on the road. It is also
alleged that the petitioner used to beat the son of the de facto complainant and that the petitioner used to abuse
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the de facto complainant saying that he will see that his brother/accused No.1 would give divorce to her and the
petitioner along with his parents used to instigate accused No.1 to neck out the de facto complainant from the
house. Thus specific overt acts which are serious in nature, in commission of the said offence under Section 498-
A, IPC are made against the petitioner in the criminal case and these allegations are found to be true by both
the trial Court and the appellate Court and both the Courts recorded a concurrent finding that the petitioner is
guilty of commission of offence punishable under Section 498-A, IPC and accordingly convicted him for the said
offence and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment and to pay fine for the offence under Section 498-A, IPC.
Therefore, as the petitioner used coercive methods to harass a woman and indulged in an act of dishonesty
which is contrary to all canons of modesty and good morals, in the said circumstances, offence committed by him
under Section 498-A, IPC for which he was convicted is to be held to be the one involving moral turpitude.

20. In the context, it is also relevant to note that Section 498-A, IPC was newly inserted in the Indian Penal Code
to curb the social menace of harassing a married woman and subjecting her to cruelty by the husband or his
relatives. The object of introducing this Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A, IPC in the Indian Penal Code is
to prevent a woman from torture by her husband or relatives of husband. Therefore, any such offence committed
by a person harassing a married woman and subjecting her to cruelty would certainly be viewed as an act of
unethical and immoral conduct in societal parlance and it would be considered as an act of commission of a
heinous crime in the estimation of members of the society. So viewed from that angle also, an offence under
Section 498-A, IPC is to be held to be an offence involving moral turpitude. Considering the said conviction both
in societal parlance and legal parlance, it is to be held as an offence involving moral turpitude. Therefore, as the
petitioner has committed the said offence punishable under Section 498-A, IPC and as he was found guilty of
commission of the said offence by the Court, he has rendered himself liable for dismissal from service under the
Regulations which are discussed supra.

21. In fact the Division Bench of Bombay High Court had an occasion to deal with the legal position whether an
offence under Section 498-A, IPC involves moral turpitude or not. In the judgment rendered in the case of
Narendra Ramdas Borse v. State of Maharashtra W.P.No.3695 of 2016, dated 06-8-2018, the Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court in no uncertain terms held as follows:

"The conviction under Section 498-A, IPC, certainly amounts to conviction for an offence involving moral
turpitude. In such circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the action under clause (a) of the proviso to
Article 311(2) of the Constitution was not competent. There are GRs to supplement the constitutional
powers, which suggest that action of this nature is permissible."

22. The Division Bench of Bombay High Court in the above case relied on the judgment of the single Judge
rendered in Saroj Kumari v. State of Haryana (CWP No.8241/2011, dated 03-12-2013), wherein it is
observed as follows:

"The case is clearly distinguishable even on the issue or moral turpitude since the Court found that a person
convicted for misappropriation of his wife's property and demanding dowry by using coercive methods,
definitely indulges in an act of dishonesty which is contrary to all canons of modesty and good morals. In
such circumstances, conviction under Section 498-A read with Section 406 of IPC was held to be an act of
moral turpitude."

23. After considering the above observation of the single Judge in Saroj Kumari's case, the Division Bench of
Bombay High Court further held at paragraph-19 as follows:

"From the aforesaid, it is quite clear that even Saroj Kumari's case relied upon by the petitioner accepts the
position that conviction under Section 498-A, IPC amounts to a conviction for an act involving moral
turpitude. Dilshad Ali's case accepts the position that the dismissal of a government servant consequent
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upon his conviction under Section 498-A, IPC, even without conduct of any enquiry is valid in terms of
clause (a) of the proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India."

24. This Court is in agreement with the ratio laid down by the Bombay High Court in holding that the offence
under Section 498-A, IPC in the one involving moral turpitude.

25. It is relevant to note that G.O.Ms.No.2, dated 04-01-1999, was issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh
stating that in all proved cases of moral turpitude and other offences, penalty of dismissal from service shall be
imposed. Paragraph-2 of G.O.Ms.No.2 reads as follows:

"It is the earnest endeavour of the Government to ensure a clean and transparent administration. To have
this policy transcended to the grass root level it is keenly felt that the officers with doubtful integrity and
involved in criminal offences shall be weeded out in order to ensure efficient functioning. To ensure clean
and efficient administration, the Government direct that in all proved cases of misappropriation, bribery,
bigamy, corruption, moral turpitude, forgery and outraging the modesty of women, the penalty of dismissal
from service shall be imposed."

26. As already noticed supra, Regulation 5(viii) prescribes imposition of penalty of dismissal from service for the
misconduct specified in Regulation 6 and Regulation 6(xxvii) envisages that conviction in any Court of law for any
criminal offence involving moral turpitude constitutes an act of misconduct. Regulation 10(5) ordains that sub-
regulations (1) and (2) which relates to holding enquiry and informing the employee in writing regarding the penalty
to be imposed against him by the competent authority shall not apply while imposing a penalty as mentioned in
Regulation 5, when the penalty is imposed on the ground that the employee was convicted in a criminal charge. In
fact, the Bombay High Court also dealt with the issue that Article 311(2) of the Constitution which also deals with
holding enquiry and giving notice is not applicable to a case where the penalty of dismissal from service is
imposed on the ground of conviction of an employee in a criminal case involving moral turpitude. The Supreme
Court also in the above referred case State of Haryana v. Ved Kaur, held that when the offence committed by
the employee constitutes moral turpitude, it is open to the competent authority to terminate the employee from
service without holding enquiry. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that as no notice in writing was given to
him and as no enquiry was conducted before imposing the penalty that the impugned order is bad in law holds no
water and it is liable to be rejected in the light of the above discussed provisions and the Regulations and in view
of the settled law in this regard as discussed supra.

27. Apropos the last contention raised by the petitioner that since the execution of sentence imposed against him
by the criminal court is stayed by the High Court in the criminal revision case that the impugned order dismissing
him from service is unsustainable, the said contention is again devoid of merit. I have meticulously perused the
order in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in Crl.R.C. No.2806 of 2018 which was passed in a petition filed under Section 397(1)
read with Section 482 Cr.P.C., dated 12-10-2018. The order reads as follows:

"Accordingly, the execution of sentence imposed by the trial Court in C.C.No.729 of 2008, dated 18-6-2018
and confirmed by the appellate Court in Crl.A.No.203 of 2016, dated 11-10-2018 insofar as petitioner
No.2/A4 is concerned, is hereby suspended and the 2nd petitioner/A4 shall be enlarged on bail on his
executing a bond for Rs. 10,000/- with two sureties each for a like sum to the satisfaction of the II Additional
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Vijayawada, Krishna District and also on condition of petitioner paying
the fine amount of Rs. 10,000/- within three weeks from today. Failing which, the suspension of sentence will
be automatically cancelled and the committal court is at liberty to issue NBW against him to undergo the
imprisonment imposed."

28. Thus as can be seen from the aforesaid order passed by the High Court, it is only the execution of sentence
imposed against the petitioner that was suspended. The finding of conviction recorded against the petitioner by
the trial Court, which was confirmed by the appellate Court, was not suspended. Therefore, the finding of
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conviction is still subsisting against him. In this context, it is relevant to note that conviction and sentence are two
different components. There is a subtle distinction between conviction and sentence. In Black's Law Dictionary,
Eleventh Edition, "conviction" and "sentence" are defined as follows:

"conviction 1. The act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; the state of having been
proved guilty. 2. The judgment that a person is guilty of a crime."

"sentence The judgment that a court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty; the
punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer."

29. Thus, it is evident that conviction is a finding recorded by the Court finding the accused in the case as guilty
for commission of the offence. Sentence is relating to the punishment aspect after finding the accused guilty and
passing a judgment of conviction. The legal position relating to the distinction between sentence and conviction
has also been considered by the Supreme Court. In the case of Guru Basavaraj @ Benne Settappa v. State
of Karnataka (2012) 8 SCC 734. At paragraph-15 of the judgment, the Apex Court held as follows:

"It is apposite to state here that there is a distinction between conviction and sentence. A conviction is the
proof of the offence committed by an accused. It is the proof of guilt of the offence. The punishment
component is the sentence."

30. In arriving at the said conclusion, the Apex Court has placed reliance on the judgment of the earlier three-
Judge Bench of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang [(1995) 2 SCC
513], wherein the three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, after referring to Section 354 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, held that every judgment referred to in Section 353 of the Code, shall, inter alia, specify the
offence of which the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced. This Court, while dealing
with the power of the High Court under Section 389(1) of the Code, has observed that ordinarily an order of
conviction by itself is not capable of execution under the Code, but it is the order of sentence or an order
awarding compensation or imposing fine or release on probation which are capable of execution and which, if not
suspended, would be required to be executed by the authorities. It has been further stated that in certain
situations, the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense, that it may incur a disqualification."

31. From the conspectus of law laid down by the Apex Court as discussed supra, the legal position is manifest
that conviction is different from sentence. Therefore, mere suspending the execution of sentence does not mean
that conviction i.e. finding recorded by the trial Court that the accused is guilty of commission of the offence is
suspended. In the instant case, as the execution of sentence alone is suspended and as conviction is not
suspended, the conviction still subsists and it is in force and it attracts the penalty as contemplated under the
Regulations as discussed supra. Therefore, the impugned order is perfectly sustainable under law. In fact, the
Chief General Manager/HRD, who issued the impugned order, clearly held in his order in paragraph-3 as follows:

"The Hon'ble High Court in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in Crl.R.C. No.2806 of 2018, dated 12-10-2018, suspended
the sentence of imprisonment only and granted bail to him on condition of payment of fine by him. As such,
the conviction of the said Ranga Raju is not stayed by the Hon'ble High Court."

32. So taking into consideration the correct legal position, the impugned order of dismissal from service is
passed as the conviction of the petitioner is still in force. Therefore, the said contention of the petitioner is also
liable to be rejected.

33. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in P.Rajender v. Union of India
2001 (5) ALD 290 (DB) and State of Andhra Pradesh v. D.Rajakullayappa 2018 (2) ALD 278 (DB) have
absolutely no application to the present facts of the case. They are the cases dealing with the suspension of an
employee on account of pendency of a criminal case. So the ratio laid down in the above judgments cannot be
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made applicable to the present facts of the case. The other judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the
petitioner reported in Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn. has absolutely no relevancy to the present facts of
the case.

34. In fine, it is to be held that the impugned order dismissing the petitioner from service is perfectly sustainable
under law and it calls for no interference in this writ petition. Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed. Pending
applications, if any, shall stand closed. No costs.