” CONTEMPT BY ADVOCATE”

Subject: Professional Ethics

Submitted to: - Submitted by:-

Dr. ANSUMAN Sir ADHISH

PRASAD
Faculty of Professional Ethics Roll no: - 904

Semester: - 9th

Session: - 2013-18

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. AIMS & OBJECTIVE.......……………………………………….……………………….4

2. REASARCH METHODOLOGY…………………………..……………………….…….4

3. SOURCES OF DATA.........................................................................................................4

CHAPTERISATION
i. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................5-12

ii. ART OF ADVOCACY.........................................................................13,14

iii. DUTY TOWARDS THE COURT.................................................…..15,16

iv. CONTEMPT BY ADVOCATES.........................................................17-27

v. CONCLUSION..........................................................................................28

BIBLIOGRAPHY...............……………………………………………………………………...29

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am very thankful to everyone who all supported me for I have completed my project effectively
and moreover on time. I am equally grateful to my Professional Ethics Law faculty: Dr.
Ansuman Sir. He gave me moral support and guided me in different matters regarding the topic.
He had been very kind and patient while suggesting me the outlines of this project and correcting
my doubts. I thank him for his overall supports. Last but not the least, I would like to thank my
friends who helped me a lot in gathering different information, collecting data and guiding me
from time to time in making this project despite of their busy schedules ,they gave me different
ideas in making this project unique.

Thanking you

ADHISH PRASAD

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 AIMS & OBJECTIVE-

Researcher, by doing this project shall find out the legal provision and punishment for contempt
by advocate

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY-

Researcher shall emphasize and use the doctrinal method to prepare this project topic.

SOURCES OF DATA-

PRIMARY SOURCES:- SECONDARY SOURCES:-

1. Advocates Act,1961 1. Books on Professional Ethics

2. The Bar Council of India Rule 2. Websites

3. The Constitution of India, 1950 3. Journal

4. Magazines

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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The contempt of Court Act, 1971 defines contempt of court for the first time. There is no
statutory definition of contempt of court. Whatever definition provided under this act is
not a definition but only classification of the term contempt of court. Contempt of court
in general means to offend the dignity of the court and lower the prestige of the court.

Halsbury defines as follow “any act done or writing publish which is calculated to bring a
pole or judge into content or lower his authority or to interfere with the due course of
justice or the lawful process of the court is contempt of court.”1

Contempt of court is disobedience to court by acting in opposition to the authority, justice

and dignity thereof. It signifies a willful disregard or disobedience of courts order.
Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 defines contempt of court as civil
contempt or criminal contempt.

4.2 Kinds of Contempt of Court

The contempt of court has been categorized into two categories – civil contempt and
criminal contempt. However, as been stated above, the categories are not closed.

(A) Civil Contempt

Meaning and nature – civil contempt are taken as acts and omissions in procedure
involving a private injury by the disobedience of the judgment, order or process of the
court.

1
http://www.mgutheses.in/page/?q=T%202281&search=&page=&rad Accessed on 1/11/2017 at 20.04 IST.

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According to section 2(b) of the Contempt of court Act, 1971 civil contempt means
willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction order, writ or other process of a
court or willful breach of undertaking given to the court. For civil contempt there must
be disobedience to the order, etc. of the court or breach of undertaking given to the court
and disobedience or breach must be willful. To constitute civil contempt both these
elements must be proved. The purpose of proceeding of the civil contempt is not only to
punish the contemnor but also to exercise enforcement and obedience to the order of the
court. It provides an instant and quick remedy to get the order passed by the court
implement.2 It is a sanction to enforce compliance with the order of court or to
compensate for losses or damages sustained by reason of non-compliance.

Civil contempt, actually serves dual purpose –

 Vindication of the public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct;

and
 Coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the court requires him.

To constitute ‘civil contempt’ the following are required to be proved

 There is disobedience of the order, decree, etc. of the court or breach of

undertaking given to the court; and
 The disobedience or breach is willful

These requirements may be discussed as follow:

Disobedience of the order, decree, etc. of the court or breach of undertaking

given by the court – To constitute a civil contempt there must be a order, decree, etc.
of the court or undertaking given to the court and there must be disobedience thereto or
breach thereof. In civil contempt it is necessary that the order which has been disobeyed
must have been passed by the court having jurisdiction to pass such order. If the order is

2
Dr. G.B.Reddy, http://www.mcrhrdi.gov.in/88fc/Week-12/Contempt%20of%20Courts%20in%20India.pdf
Accessed on 1/11/2017 at 20.14 IST.

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passed without jurisdiction, such order is not having a binding effect on the party against
whom it is passed and so disobedience of such order will not amount to contempt of
court.

If there is any undertaking it must be unconditional, unqualified and expressed. So it is

open to the court to assume an implied undertaking when there is nothing on records of
court. It is the duty of the court to punish a person who tries to obstruct the course of
justice or administration of justice or who brings into his repute the institution of
judiciary but this power has to be exercised not casually or lightly but with great care,
only in such cases where it is necessary to punish the contemnor in order to uphold the
dignity and integrity of court.

Willful disobedience or breach – For civil contempt the disobedience of the order,
decree, etc. of the court or breach of undertaking given to the court must be willful. In
India the Supreme Court has, often pointed out that in order to punish a person or
authority for contempt of court, the disobedience to a judgment or breach of undertaking
to the court must be willful. Thus, mere disobedience is not sufficient to constitute civil
contempt. The disobedience must be willful. The element of willingness is an
indispensable requirement.

The house of lords has made it clear that to establish the disobedience is willful, it is not
necessary to show that it is contumacious in the sense that there is a direct intention to
disobey the order; it is sufficient to show that effective administration of justice requires
some penalty for disobedience to the order of the court if it is more than casual,
accidental or unintentional. The essence of the civil contempt is willful disobedience to
any judgment, decree, direction, order or writ of a court and not mere inaction to give
effect to it.

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(B) Criminal contempt
In India the definition of contempt of court is found in clause (c) of section 2 of the
Contempt of Court Act, 1971. It provides that “criminal contempt” means publication
whether by words, spoken or written or by signs, or by visible representation, or
otherwise of any matter of the doing of any act whatsoever which-

 Scandalizes or tends to scandalize or lower or tends to lower the authority of any

court : or
 Prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial
proceeding ; or
 Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the
administration of justice in any other manner.

Thus, the criminal contempt means publication or doing of any other act which
scandalizes or lower or tends to lower the authority of any court, or prejudices or
interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding or interferes
or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in
any other manner.

The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act of a person which
would tend to interfere with the administration of justice or which would lower the
authority of court.3 The scope of criminal contempt has been made very wide so as to
empower the court to preserve the majesty of law which is an indispensable condition for
the rule of law.

3
Vijay Pal Dalmia
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/549642/Libel+Defamation/Criminal+Contempt+Of+Court+And+Criminal+Defam
ation+Initiation+Of+Simultaneous+Proceedings+Yes+Or+No Accessed on 2/11/2017 at 22.20 IST.

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The essentials of criminal contempt may be discussed as follow:

 Publication or other act – Publication or doing of any other act which has
resulted in any or all of the consequences specified in section 2© (i), (ii), and (iii)
will amount to criminal contempt of court. Thus, the publication or act will be
taken as criminal contempt if it has resulted or likely to result in any of the
following consequences :
I. Scandalizes or tends to scandalize or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any
court ; or
II. Prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial
proceeding : or
III. Interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct the
administration of justice in any other manner.

To constitute criminal contempt, thus first, there must be publication or doing of any
other act and secondly, such publication or doing of the act has resulted in any or all of
the consequences specified in section 2(c)(i), (ii) and (iii). Doing of any other act refers
to something other than publication.

In a case the court has observed that the criminal contempt has been vivisected into two
categories –

I. One is publication of any matter which scandalizes or tends to scandalize the

authority of any court, etc.
II. Second is doing of any act whatsoever which scandalizes or tends to scandalize
the authority of any court, etc.

If an act is not a criminal act merely because there was no publication, such act would
automatically fall within the purview of the other category because the latter consist of
the doing of any act whatsoever. The latter category is thus a residuary category so wide
enough from which no act of criminal contempt can possibly escape. The common
denominator of both is that it scandalizes or tends to scandalize.
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The word publication has been given very wide meaning. The publication may be by
words written or spoken, by signs or by visible representations or otherwise of any
matter. If the newspaper or the broadcasting on the radio or television or the film
exhibited in the cinema hall or theatre or on the television contains the matter which has
or tends to have one or all the consequences specified above, it will amount ot contempt
or court.

Scandalizing or lowering the authority of the court or interfering with judicial

proceeding or administration of justice – to constitute criminal contempt the
publication or doing of any other act must have resulted in any or all of the three
consequences specified in section 2(c)(i), (i), (ii) and (iii), namely

i. It scandalizes or tends to scandalize or lowers or tends to lower the authority of

any court ; or
ii. It prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any
proceeding ; or
iii. It interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the
administration of justice in any other manner.

Scandalizing the court or lowering the authority of court –

In other words Publication or doing of any act which scandalizes or tends to scandalize
the authority of court is taken as a criminal contempt, for this purpose actual
scandalization of the court is not necessary. It is sufficient if the publication has tendency
to scandalize or lower the authority of court. Scandalizing the court may be taken to
mean any act done or written in publish calculated to bring a court or judge of court its
contempt or to lower its or his authority. According to Good heart scandalizing the court
means any criticism of the judge, any personal attack upon him unconnected with the
office he holds, it deals with ordinary rules of slander and libel.

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In Rajesh Kumar Singh v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh 4, the Supreme Court has made
it clear that improper motive to a judge or scurrilous abuse of a judge will be taken as
attributing scandalizing the court.

In Rajendra Sail v. Madhya Pradesh High Court 5, the constitution witness made a
statement in public in murder trial, the judge have his disposition to acquit the accuse.
The judge who is going to retire was available for sale and that the judgment was rubbish
and deserves to be thrown in dustbin. This comment made by the witness was publish in
newspaper. It was held that it amounts to gross contempt of court.

Prejudice to or interference with the due course of any judicial proceeding-

The publication which prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of
any judicial proceeding is taken as contempt of court. Actually, media trial or trial by
newspaper is not considered proper because it affects the fairness or trial and is likely to
cause prejudice to or likely to interfere with, due administration of justice in the
particular case. Even in England and America, trial by newspaper is considered wrong
and taken as contempt of court. Thus, whenever the publication or any other act unduly
influences the result of litigation, it is treated as criminal contempt of court and is
published therefore. The power to punish the contempt of court is the means by which
the legal system protects itself from the publication which may unduly influence the
result of litigation.

6
In A.G.V Times Newspaper Ltd. Lord Reid has made it clear that there has been and
there still is in England a strong and generally held feeling that trial by newspaper is
wrong and should be prevented.

4
appeal (crl.) 321 of 2001
5
Appeal (crl.) 398-399 of 2001
6
[2001] EWCA Civ 97

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Interferes or obstruction with administration of justice in any other manner-
The publication or doing of any other act which interferes or tends to interfere with or
obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner is also
taken as contempt of court. This clause is a residuary clause and it covers the cases of the
criminal contempt not expressly covered by sub-clause (i) and (ii) of section 2(c) of the
contempt of courts act, 1971. Thus the publication or doing of any other act which
interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of
justice in a manner otherwise than by scandalizing the court or lowering the authority of
the court or by causing prejudice or by interfering with due course of any judicial
proceeding would fall within the ambit of this sub clause and thus, would amount
criminal contempt under this sub clause.

In J.R. Parashar v. Prashant Bhushan7, the Supreme Court has held that holding a dharna
by itself may not amount to contempt of court, but if by holding a dharna access to the
court is hindered and the officers of the court and members of police are not allowed free
ingress and egress or the proceeding in the court are otherwise disturbed or hampered, the
dharna may amount to contempt because the administration of justice would be
obstructed.

7
(2001) 6 Supreme Court Cases 735

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 CHAPTER 2: ART OF ADVOCACY
Justice Abbot Parry has mentioned several lamps of advocacy – honesty, courage,
industry, wit, eloquence, judgment and fellowship. An advocate should be honest and
man of integrity and character. An advocate who is straightforward and possesses these
three jewels is appreciated by the court and the client alike. Mannerism also plays
important role in getting success in the legal profession. He should be respectful to the
court and try to win the confidence of the judge. He should not interrupt the principles of
natural justice. The principle of natural justice is part of the guarantee of equality.

At present the court gives much emphasis on the concept of fairness. The concept of
fairness requires fairness in action of the administration whether the action is judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative.8 The administrative inquiry and judicial or quasi-judicial
inquiry both intend to arrive at a just decision and, therefore, both are required to observe
the principle of fair play or fairness in action. It is now well established rule that every
power should be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily. Consequently, the
administrative and judicial or quasi-judicial power both are required to be exercised justly
and fairly and not arbitrarily and capriciously. However, the doctrine of fairness cannot
be invoked to alter express terms of contract of statutory nature. The term “fairness” and
“natural justice” are used inter changeably. The idea of natural justice is fair play of
action. However, the concept of fairness is a term having the import wider than that of
natural justice. Fairness includes the natural justice. The doctrine of fairness requires the
observance of the principles of natural justice as well in addition to the principle of
natural justice the doctrine of fairness provides certain procedural safeguards where none
of the principles of the natural justice is applicable.9

8
Hemraj Singh, https://hemrajsingh.wordpress.com/2011/07/12/the-fine-art-of-advocacy/ Accessed on 31/10/2017
at 21.20 IST.
9
Reuben Guttman , https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-art-of-advocacy Accessed on 31/10/2017 at 21.24 IST.

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The doctrine of fairness also has some weakness. According to jain and jain if “natural
justice” is vague and flexible, the concept of fairness is still more. Though “natural
justice” is a flexible concept, yet it does embody a minimal content, absence of bias, right
to know the other party’s case, duty to give reasons, and to arrive at findings on the basis
of records etc.

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 CHAPTER 3: DUTY TOWARDS THE COURT

The Bar Council of India has made certain rules so as to prescribe duties of an advocate
to the court. Such duties may be explained as follow-10

1) During the presentation the case and while acting otherwise as an advocate before
the court it is required to conduct himself with dignity and self respect. It is his
duty to submit his grievances to the proper authority. The rules empower the
advocate to make complaint against judicial officer but it should be submitted to
proper authority.11

2) An advocate is required to maintain towards the court respectful attitude bearing

in mind that the dignity of judicial office is essential for survival of free
community.

3) Rule has made it clear that no advocate shall influence the decision of the court
by any illegal means. It prohibits the private communication with the judge
relating to pending case. If any advocate attempt to influence the decision of
12
court by illegal means. It prohibits the private communication with the judge
relating to pending case. If any advocate attempt to influence the decision of
court by illegal means then it may amount to misconduct.

4) The rule requires the advocate to use his best effort to restrain and prevent his
client from resorting to sharp or unfair practice opposite from council or parties
which the advocate himself ought not to do.

5) An advocate shall appear in court at all times only in the prescribe dress and his
appearance shall always be presentable.

10
The Bar Council Of India Rules
11
http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/about/professional-standards/rules-on-professional-standards/ Accessed on
30/10/2017 at 22.38 IST.
12
http://ihej.org/views-accross-the-channel/protection-of-the-rule-of-law-through-a-duty-to-the-court-2/
Accessed on 30/10/2017 at 22.40 IST.

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 6) An advocate shall not enter appearance act, plead, or practice in any way before a
court, tribunal, or authority mentioned in section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 if
the sole or any member thereof is related to the advocate as father, nephew,
grandfather, son, grandson, uncle, brother, first cousin, husband, mother, wife,
daughter, sister, niece, sister-in-law, mother-in-law13.

7) The rule requires the advocate not to wear bands or gowns in public place other
than in court except on such ceremonial occasions and at such places as the Bar
Council of India and the court may prescribe.

8) The rule provides that an advocate shall not appear in or before any court or
tribunal or any other authority for or against an organization, institution, society,
or corporation if he is a member of executive committee of such organization,
institution, society, or corporation.

9) An advocate shall not act or plead in any matter in which he himself has some
pecuniary interest.

13
http://cyberadvocate.in/mod/page/view.php?id=1031 Accessed on 30/10/2017 at 23.00 IST.

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 CHAPTER 4: CONTEMPT BY ADVOCATES

The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who
belong to are its honorable members. Although the entry to the profession can be had acquiring
merely the qualification of technical competence, the honor as a professional has to be
maintained by its members, by their exemplary conduct both in and outside the court.

The object and need of the contempt jurisdiction or contempt of Court the Court has held that the
object of the contempt power is not to vindicate the dignity and honor of the individual Judge
who is personally attacked or scandalized, but to uphold the majesty of law and administration of
justice.14 The foundation of the Judiciary is the trust and confidence of the people in its ability to
deliver fearless and impartial justice.

The judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. Hence judiciary is not the third pillar but the
central pillar of the democratic state. Misconduct: it is a sufficiently wide expression: it is not
necessary that it should involve moral turpitude. Any conduct which in any way renders a man
unfit for the exercise of his profession or is likely to hamper or embarrass the administration of
justice maybe considered to be misconduct calling for disciplinary action. It cannot be said that
an advocate can never be punished for professional misconduct committed by him in his personal
capacity.

14
Ashok KM, http://www.livelaw.in/lawyer-sentenced-to-six-months-imprisonment-for-contempt-of-court-
allahabad-hc/ Accessed on 1/11/2017 at 23.20 IST.

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Case Analysis:
Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of Uttar Pradesh15

The present appeal is preferred under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the judgment and order dated 02.12.2005 delivered
by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Contempt Petition No. 16 of 2004,
whereby the High Court found the appellant guilty of Criminal Contempt for intimidating and
threatening a Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah in his Court on 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003 and
sentenced him to simple imprisonment of two months with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default of
payment of the fine, the appellant to undergo further imprisonment of 2 weeks. The High Court
further directed the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to consider the facts contained in the complaint
of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah, and earlier contempt referred to in the judgment and to
initiate appropriate proceedings against the appellant for professional misconduct.

Reference to larger Bench and the Issue

On 27th January, 2006, this appeal was admitted by this Court and that part of the impugned
judgment, which imposed the sentence, was stayed and the appellant was directed not to enter
the Court premises at Etah (U.P.). Keeping in view the importance of the question involved
while admitting the appeal on 27th January, 2006, notice was directed to be issued to the
Supreme Court Bar Association as well as to the Bar Council of India. The matter was referred to
the larger Bench. Learned Solicitor General of India was requested to assist the Court in the
matter.

On 6th March, 2013 restriction on entry of the appellant into the court premises as per order
dated 27th January, 2006 was withdrawn. Thereby, the appellant was permitted to enter the court
premises. The said restriction was, however, restored later. On 20th August, 2015, notice was
issued to the Attorney General on the larger question whether on conviction under the Contempt
of Courts Act or any other offence involving moral turpitude an advocate could be permitted to
practise.

15
AIR 2016 SC 3302,

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Thus following questions arise for consideration:16

(i) Whether a case has been made out for interference with the order passed by the High
Court convicting the appellant for criminal contempt and sentencing him to simple
imprisonment for two months with a fine of Rs.2,000/- and further imprisonment for
two weeks in default and debarring him from appearing in courts in judgeship at
Etah; and
(ii) Whether on conviction for criminal contempt, the appellant can be allowed to practise.

The Facts and The Finding Of The High Court17

The facts of the present appeal discloses that the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah made a
reference under Section 15 (2) of the Act to the High Court through the learned District Judge,
Etah (U.P.) on 7.6.2003 recording two separate incidents dated 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003, which
had taken place in his Court in which the appellant had appeared before him and conducted
himself in a manner which constituted œCriminal Contempt under Section 2 (c) of the Act.

The said letter was received by the High Court along with a forwarding letter of the District
Judge dated 7.6.2003 and the letters were placed before the Administrative Judge on 7.7.2003,
who forwarded the matter to the Registrar General vide order dated 18.6.2004 for placing the
same before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court and on 11.7.2004, the Hon’ble Chief
Justice of the High Court referred the matter to the Court concerned dealing with contempt cases
and notice was also issued to the appellant.

Facts denoting behaviour of the appellant, as recorded by the Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Etah, can be seen from the contents of his letter addressed to the learned District Judge, Etah.
The letter reads as under:-

16
Ibid
17
AIR 2016 SC 3302,

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Sir,

It is humbly submitted that on 16.4.2003, while I was hearing the 6-Ga-2 in Original Suit
No.114/2003 titled as œYaduveer Singh Chauhan vs. The Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation€,
Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate appeared in the Court, and, while using intemperate
language, spoke in a loud voice: œHow did you pass an order against my client in the case titled
as œKanchan Singh vs. Ratan Singhâ? How did you dare pass such an order against my client? I
tried to console him, but he started shouting in a state of highly agitated mind:

Kanchan Singh is my relative and how was this order passed against my relative? No Judicial
Officer has, ever, dared pass an order against me. Then, how did you dare do so? When any
Judicial officer passes an order on my file against my client, I set him right. I shall make a
complaint against you to Hon’ble High Court, and he threatened me:

I will not let you remain in Etah in future, I can do anything against you. I have relations with
highly notorious persons and I can get you harmed by such notorious persons to the extent I
want to do, and I myself am capable of doing any deed (misdeed) as I wish, and I am not afraid
of any one. In the Court compound, even my shoes are worshipped and I was prosecuted in two
murder cases. And I have made murderous assaults on people and about 15 to 20 cases are
going on against me. If you, in future, dare pass an order on the file against my client in which I
am a counsel, it will not be good for you.

Due to the above mentioned behaviour of Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate, the judicial work
was hindered and aforesaid act of Shri Mahipal Singh falls within the ambit of committing the
contempt of Court. In this very succession, on 13.5.2003, while I was hearing 6-Ga-2 in the O.S.
No. No. 48/2003 titled as Roshanlal v Nauvat Ramâ, Shri Mahipal Singh Rana Advocate
appeared in the Court and spoke in a loud voice:

Why did you not get the OS No. 298/2001 title as Jag Mohan vs. Smt. Sumanâ called out so far,
whereas the aforesaid case is very important, in as much as I am the plaintiff therein. I said to
Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate:

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Hearing of a case is going on. Thereafter, your case will be called out for hearing, thereupon he
got enraged and spoke:

That case will be heard first which I desire to be heard first. Nothing is done as per your desire.
Even an advocate does not dare create a hindrance in my case. I shall get the case decided
which I want and that case will never be decided, which I do not want. You cannot decide any
case against my wishes.

Meanwhile when the counsel for Smt. Suman in O.S. No. 298/2001 titled as Jag Mohan vs. Smt.
Sumanâ handed some papers over to Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate for receiving the same,
he threw those papers away and misbehaved with the counsel for Smt. Suman. Due to this act of
Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, the judicial work was hindered and his act falls within the ambit of
committing the contempt of Court. Your good self is therefore requested that in order to initiate
proceedings relating to committing the contempt of Court against Shri Mahipal Singh Rana,
Advocate, my report may kindly be sent to the Hon’ble High Court by way of REFERENCE.

With regards

On the same day, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) also wrote another letter to the
Registrar-General of the High Court, giving some more facts regarding contemptuous behaviour
of the appellant with a request to place the facts before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High
Court so that appropriate action under the Act may be taken against the appellant. As the
aforestated letters refer to the facts regarding behaviour of the appellant, we do not think it
necessary to reiterate the same here.

9. Ultimately, in pursuance of the information given to the High Court, proceedings under the
Act had been initiated against the appellant.

10. Before the High Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that it was not open to the
Court to proceed against the appellant under the provisions of the Act because if the behaviour of
the appellant was not proper or he had committed any professional misconduct, the proper course

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was to take action against the appellant under the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961. It was
also contended that summary procedure under the Act could not have been followed by the Court
for the purpose of punishing the appellant. Moreover, it was also submitted that the appellant
was not at all present before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah on 16.4.2003 and
13.5.2003.

The Arguments Advanced:18

The learned counsel appearing for the appellant before this Court specifically denied the
instances dated 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003 and further submitted that the appellant had not even
gone to the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah on the aforestated two days
and therefore, the entire case made out against the appellant was false and frivolous. The learned
counsel, therefore, submitted that the High Court had committed an error by not going into the
fact as to whether the appellant had, in fact, attended the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Etah on 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003. The learned counsel further submitted that the High
Court ought to have considered the fact that the appellant had filed several complaints against the
learned Judge who was the complainant and therefore, with an oblique motive the entire
contempt proceedings were initiated against the appellant. The said complaints ought to have
been considered by the High Court. It was further submitted that contempt proceedings were
barred by limitation. The incidents in question are dated 16th April, 2003 and 13th May, 2003
while notice was ordered to be issued on 28th April, 2004.

The learned counsel, thus, submitted that the action initiated against the appellant was not just
and proper and the impugned judgment awarding punishment to the appellant under the Act is
bad in law and therefore, deserved to be set aside. In the alternative, it is submitted that the
appellant was 84 years of age and keeping that in mind, the sentence for imprisonment may be
set aside and instead, the fine may be increased.19

18
http://indianlawcases.com/ILC-2016-SC-CIVIL-Jul-7.aspx, Accessed on 30/10/2017 at 23.00 IST.
19
http://www.livelaw.in/urgent-need-review-regulatory-mechanism-legal-profession-sc/, Accessed on 30/10/2017
at 23.10 IST.

Page | 22
On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh submitted that the
impugned judgment was just, legal and proper and the same was delivered after due deliberation
and careful consideration of the relevant facts. He submitted that looking at the facts of the case,
the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the appellant was not only present in the
Court on those two days i.e. on 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003, but the appellant had also misbehaved
and misconducted in such a manner that his conduct was contemptuous and therefore, the
proceedings under the Act had to be initiated against him. The learned counsel also drew
attention of the Court to the nature of the allegations made by the appellant against the learned
Judge and about the contemptuous behaviour of the appellant. The learned counsel also relied
upon the report submitted to the learned District Judge and submitted that the impugned
judgment is just, legal and proper. He also submitted that the misbehaviour and contemptuous act
of the appellant was unpardonable and therefore, the High Court had rightly imposed punishment
upon the appellant.

In response to the notice issued by this Court on 20th August, 2015 in respect of the question
framed, the learned counsel appearing for the Bar Council of India submitted that Section 24A of
the Advocates Act, 1961 provides for a bar against admission of a person as an advocate if he is
convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, apart from other situations in which such bar
operates. The proviso however, provides for the bar being lifted after two years of release.
However, the provision did not expressly provide for removal of an advocate from the roll of the
advocates if conviction takes place after enrollment of a person as an advocate. Only other
relevant provision under which action could be taken is Section 35 for proved misconduct. It is
further stated that though the High Court directed the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to initiate
proceedings for professional misconduct on 2.12.2005, the consequential action taken by the Bar
Council of the State of Uttar Pradesh was not known.

It is further stated that the term moral turpitude has to be understood having regard to the nature
of the noble profession of law which requires a person to possess higher level of integrity. Even a
minor offence could be termed as an offence involving moral turpitude in the context of an
advocate who is expected to be aware of the legal position and the conduct expected from him as
a citizen is higher than others.

Page | 23
It was further submitted that only the State Bar Council or Bar Council of India posses the power
to punish an advocate for œprofessional misconduct as per the provisions of Section 35 of the
Advocates Act, 1961 and reiterated the law laid down by this Court in Supreme Court Bar
Association versus Union of India20

In addition, the counsel submitted that a general direction to all the Courts be given to
communicate about conviction of an advocate for an offence involving moral turpitude to the
concerned State Bar Council or the Bar Council of India immediately upon delivering the
judgment of conviction so that proceedings against such advocates can be initiated under the
Advocates Act, 1961.

The Learned Additional Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of Union of India,
submitted that normally in case of all professions, the apex body of the professionals takes action
against the erring professional and in case of legal profession, the Bar Council of India takes
disciplinary action and punishes the concerned advocate if he is guilty of any misconduct etc.
Reference was made to Architects Act, 1972, Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, Company
Secretaries Act, 1980, Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015, Indian Medical Council
(Professional Conduct Etiquettes and Ethics) Regulations, 2002, National Council for Teacher
Education Act, 1993, Cost and Works Accountants Act, 1959, Actuaries Act, 2006, Gujarat
Professional Civil Engineers Act, 2006, Representation of Peoples Act, 1951, containing
provisions for disqualifying a person from continuing in a regulated profession upon conviction
for an offence involving moral turpitude. Reference was also made to Section 24A of the
Advocates Act which provides for a bar on enrolment as an advocate of a person who has
committed any offence involving moral turpitude. It was further submitted that if a person is
disqualified from enrolment, it could not be the intention of the legislature to permit a person
already enrolled as an advocate to continue him in practice if he is convicted of an offence
involving moral turpitude. Bar against enrolment should also be deemed to be bar against
continuation. It was further submitted that Article 145 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme
Court to make rules for regulating practice and procedure including the persons practicing before
this Court. Section 34 of the Advocates Act empowers the High Courts to frame rules laying
down the conditions on which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in courts. Thus, there is
20
(1998) 4 SCC 409

Page | 24
no absolute right of an advocate to appear in court. Appearance before Court is subject to such
conditions as are laid down by this Court or the High Court. An Advocate could be debarred
from appearing before the Court even if the disciplinary jurisdiction for misconduct was vested
with the Bar Council as laid down in Supreme Court Bar Association (supra). Thus, according to
the counsel, apart from the Bar Council taking appropriate action against the appellant, this Court
could debar him from appearance before any court.21

Shri Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel and President of the Supreme Court Bar Association
supported the interpretation canvassed by the learned Additional Solicitor General. He submitted
that image of the profession ought to be kept clean by taking strict action against persons failing
to maintain ethical standards. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
have perused the judgments cited by them.

Questions for Consideration22

The following questions arise for consideration:23

(i) Whether a case has been made out for interference with the order passed by the High Court
convicting the appellant for criminal contempt and sentencing him to simple imprisonment for
two months with a fine of Rs.2,000/- and further imprisonment for two weeks in default and
debarring him from appearing in courts in judgeship at Etah; and

(ii) Whether on conviction for criminal contempt, the appellant can be allowed to practise.

Upon going through the impugned judgment, we are of the view that no error has been
committed by the High Court while coming to the conclusion that the appellant had committed
contempt of Court under the provisions of the Act.

21
https://barandbench.com/supreme-court-stresses-urgent-need-review-provisions-advocates-act/, Accessed on
30/10/2017 at 23.20 IST.
22
http://lawtimesjournal.in/sc-suspends-lawyers-licence-two-years/, Accessed on 30/10/2017 at 23.30 IST.
23
Ibid

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We do not agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant
did not appear on those two days before the Court. Upon perusal of the facts found by the High
Court and looking at the contents of the letters written by the concerned judicial officers, we
have no doubt about the fact that the appellant did appear before the Court and used the language
which was contemptuous in nature.

So far as the allegations made by the appellant with regard to the complaints made by him
against the complainant judge, after having held that the appellant had appeared before the Court
and had made contemptuous statements, we are of the opinion that those averments regarding the
complaints are irrelevant. The averments regarding the complaints cannot be a defence for the
appellant. Even if we assume those averments about the complaints to be correct, then also, the
appellant cannot use such contemptuous language in the Court against the presiding Judge.

There is no merit in the contention of the appellant that there was delay on the part of the
complainant Judge in sending the reference and he could have tried the appellant under Section
228 of the Indian Penal Code and the procedure prescribed under Code of Criminal Procedure. It
is for the learned judge to decide as to whether action should be taken under the Act or under any
other law.

The High Court has rightly convicted the appellant under the Act after having come to a
conclusion that denial of the incidents and allegations of malafides against the complainant
Judge had been made by the appellant to save himself from the consequences of contempt
proceedings. The appellant had refused to tender apology for his conduct. His affidavit in support
of stay vacation/modification and supplementary affidavit did not show any remorse and he had
justified himself again and again, which also shows that he had no regards for the majesty of law.

It is a well settled proposition of law that in deciding whether contempt is serious enough to
merit imprisonment, the Court will take into account the likelihood of interference with the
administration of justice and the culpability of the offender. The intention with which the act
complained of is done is a material factor in determining what punishment, in a given case,
would be appropriate. In the case at hand, the High Court has rightly held that the appellant was
guilty of criminal contempt. We are however, inclined to set aside the sentence for imprisonment

Page | 26
in view of advance age of the appellant and also in the light of our further direction as a result of
findings of question No. (ii)

Re: (ii) Courts jurisdiction vis a vis statutory powers of the Bar Councils

This Court, while examining its powers under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the
Constitution with regard to awarding sentence of imprisonment together with suspension of his
practice as an Advocate, in Supreme Court Bar Association (supra), the Constitution Bench held
that while in exercise of contempt jurisdiction, this Court cannot take over jurisdiction of
disciplinary committee of the Bar Council6 and it is for the Bar Council to punish the advocate
by debarring him from practice or suspending his licence as may be warranted on the basis of his
having been found guilty of contempt, if the Bar Council fails to take action, this Court could
invoke its appellate power under Section 38 of the Advocates Act7. In a given case, this court or
the High Court can prevent the contemnor advocate from appearing before it or other courts till
he purges himself of the contempt which is different from suspending or revoking the licence or
debarring him to practise .

Page | 27
 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
Contempt of court is a serious challenge to the majesty of law. Sometimes it is
committed in ignorance i.e, the contemnor has no knowledge as to the meaning of the
contempt. Consequently, a definition of the expression ‘contempt of court’ is of much
utility, but unfortunately there is no clear and definite definition of this expression. The
Contempt of Court Act, 1971 defines it as a civil contempt or criminal contempt.
Actually, it is not definition but classification of contempt of court. Actually, contempt
of court cannot be defined exhaustively but a workable definition is possible. It is an act
or omission which interferes or tends to interfere with the administration of justice,
provided that if the interference with the administration of justice is in the form of
disobedience to the order of the court or breach of undertaking given to the court, it will
amount to contempt o court only when the obedience or breach is willful.

The Supreme Court is vested with the right to punish those guilty of contempt of Court
under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The power to punish
contemners is also vested with the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution and
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 also governs the punishments given by the High Court.
This act in no way controls the jurisdiction of the Apex Court.

In the Supreme Court Bar Association case the court took a very objective view and
taking the help of law and construing it in the right way came to the conclusion that the
power to punish for any professional misconduct rests with the Bar, whereas to punish for
contempt only it has jurisdiction for itself and subordinate courts. No statute can take
contempt jurisdiction away from the Supreme as well as the High Court.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Page | 28
 PRIMARY SOURCES
 The Advocate’s Act, 1961
 The Contempt of Courts Act,1971

SECONDARY SOURCES

 http://www.mgutheses.in/page/?q=T%202281&search=&page=&rad Accessed on
1/11/2017 at 20.04 IST.
 Dr. G.B.Reddy, http://www.mcrhrdi.gov.in/88fc/Week-12/Contempt%20of%20Courts
%20in%20India.pdf Accessed on 1/11/2017 at 20.14 IST.
 Vijay Pal Dalmia
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/549642/Libel+Defamation/Criminal+Contempt+Of+Co
urt+And+Criminal+Defamation+Initiation+Of+Simultaneous+Proceedings+Yes+Or+No
Accessed on 2/11/2017 at 22.20 IST.
 Hemraj Singh, https://hemrajsingh.wordpress.com/2011/07/12/the-fine-art-of-advocacy/
Accessed on 31/10/2017 at 21.20 IST.
 Reuben Guttman , https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-art-of-advocacy Accessed on
31/10/2017 at 21.24 IST.
 Ashok KM, http://www.livelaw.in/lawyer-sentenced-to-six-months-imprisonment-for-
contempt-of-court-allahabad-hc/ Accessed on 1/11/2017 at 23.20 IST.
 http://cyberadvocate.in/mod/page/view.php?id=1031 Accessed on 30/10/2017 at 23.00
IST.
 http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/about/professional-standards/rules-on-professional-
standards/ Accessed on 30/10/2017 at 22.38 IST.
 http://ihej.org/views-accross-the-channel/protection-of-the-rule-of-law-through-a-duty-
to-the-court-2/ Accessed on 30/10/2017 at 22.40 IST.
 http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,927764,00.html Accessed on
31/10/2017 at 23.30 IST.
 http://www.mkgandhi.org/law_lawyers/24contempt_court.htm Accessed on 1/11/2017 at
18.10 IST.

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