SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF DON the courts the power to remove elective

MARIANO MARCOS V. MARTINEZ local officials from office: Section

[G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008] 60.Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An
elective local official may be disciplined,
FACTS: suspended, or removed from office on
any of the following grounds:
Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay is the xxx xxx xxx
legislative body of Barangay Don An elective local official may be removed
Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva from office on the grounds enumerated
Vizcaya, a local government unit created, above by order of the proper court.
organized and existing as such under
pertinent laws of the Republic of the In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en
Philippines. Respondent Martinez is the banc categorically ruled that the Office of
incumbent Punong Barangay of the said the President is without any power to
local government unit. remove elected officials, since the power
is exclusively vested in the proper courts
On November 2004, Martinez was as expressly provided for in the last
administratively charged with Dishonesty paragraph of Section 60 of the Local
and Graft and Corruption by petitioner Government Code.
through the filing of a verified complaint Petitioner contends that administrative
before the Sangguniang Bayan as the cases involving elective barangay
disciplining authority over elective officials may be filed with, heard and
barangay officials pursuant to Section 61 decided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Rep. Act No. 7160. Petitioner filed with or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, which
the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended can, thereafter, impose a penalty of
Administrative Complaint against removal from office. It
Martinez on 6 December 2004 for further claims that the courts are merely
Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and tasked with issuing the order of removal,
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt after the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Practices Act. Sangguniang Bayan finds that a penalty
of removal is warranted.
The Sangguniang Bayan rendered its
Decision which imposed upon Martinez But, the rule which confers to the proper
the penalty of removal from office. The courts the power to remove an elective
trial court issued an Order declaring the local official from office is intended as a
Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan and check against any capriciousness or
the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao partisan activity by the disciplining
void. It maintained that the proper authority. Vesting the local legislative
courts, and not the petitioner, are body with the power to decide whether
empowered to remove an elective local or not a local chief executive may be
official from office, in accordance with removed from office, and only relegating
Section 60 of the Local Government to the courts a mandatory duty to
Code. After MR, appeal by Certiorari implement the decision, would still not
straight to the SC. free the resolution of the case from the
capriciousness or partisanship of the
ISSUE: disciplining authority.
Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan
may remove Martinez, an elective local Moreover, such an arrangement clearly
official, from office. demotes the courts to nothing more than
an implementing arm of the
HELD: Sangguniang Panlungsod, or
The pertinent legal provisions and cases Sangguniang Bayan. This would be an
decided by this Court firmly establish unmistakable breach of the doctrine on
that the Sangguniang Bayan is not separation of powers, thus placing the
empowered to do so. Section 60 of the courts under the orders of the legislative
Local Government Code conferred upon bodies of local governments. The courts
would be stripped of their power of the Court of Appeals (CA) to a certain
review, and their discretion in imposing extent that of the Regional Trial Court
the extreme penalty of removal from (RTC), Branch 12, Laoag City, Ilocos
office is thus left to be exercised by Norte, in a case that originated from the
political factions which stand to benefit Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos
from the removal from office of the local Norte about the boundary dispute
elective official concerned, the very evil between the Municipalities of Marcos and
which Congress sought to avoid when it Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.
enacted Section 60 of the Local
Government Code. The Municipality of Nueva Era was
created from the settlements of
Congress clearly meant that the removal Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden,
of an elective local official be done only Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran,
after a trial before the appropriate court, and Uguis which were previously
where court rules of procedure and organized as rancherias, each of which
evidence can ensure impartiality and was under the independent control of a
fairness and protect against political chief. In the virtue of Executive Order
maneuverings. Elevating the removal of (E.O.) No. 66 5 dated September 30,
an elective local official from office from 1916 united these rancherias and
an administrative case to a court case created the township of Nueva Era. The
may be justified by the fact that such Municipality of Marcos, on the other
removal not only punishes the official hand, was created on June 22, 1963
concerned but also, in effect, deprives pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753
the electorate of the services of the entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality
official for whom they voted. of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos
Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753
The most extreme penalty that the provides:
Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan,
erring elective barangay official is Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas
suspension; if it deems that the removal and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras,
of the official from service is warranted, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby
then it can resolve that the proper separated from the said municipality and
charges be filed in court. constituted into a new and separate
municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following
boundaries:

On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-

Rangay boundary going down to the
barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary
consisting of foot path and feeder road;
on the Northeast, by the Burnay River
which is the common boundary of barrios
Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by
the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary;
on the South, by the Padsan River which
is at the same time the boundary
between the municipalities of Banna and
Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by
the boundary between the municipalities
NUEVA ERA VS MARCOS, [G.R. No. of Batac and Dingras.
169435]
Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva
Facts: The Petitioner Municipality of Era as its own territory until after almost
Nueva Era seek to reverse the decision of 30 years,7 or only on March 8, 1993,
when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Dingras. That it has no factual and legal
Resolution No. 93-015.8 Said resolution basis to extend MARCOS territory beyond
was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Brgys. Agunit (Ferdinand) and Culao
Area which is an Original Part of Nueva (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further
Era, But Now Separated Due to the East, by traversing and disintegrating
Creation of Marcos Town in the Province Brgy. Sto. Niño, and drawing parallel
of Ilocos Norte." lines from Sto. Niño, there lies Abra, not
Mt. Province or Kalinga-Apayao.
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of
Ilocos Norte for its consideration and Held: No part of Nueva Era's territory
approval. In view of its claim over the was taken for the creation of Marcos
middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos under R.A. No. 3753. Since only the
posited that Nueva Era was cut into two barangays of Dingras are enumerated as
parts. And since the law required that the Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's
land areaof a municipality must be territory is, therefore, excluded. Under
compact and contiguous, Nueva Era's the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
northern isolated portion could no longer alterius, the mention of one thing implies
be considered as its territory but that of the exclusion of another thing not
Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it mentioned. If a statute enumerates the
was entitled not only to the middle things upon which it is to operate,
portion of Nueva Era but also to Nueva everything else must necessarily and by
Era's isolated northern portion. These implication be excluded from its
areas claimed by Marcos were within operation and effect.
Barangay Sto. Niño, Nueva Era.
This rule, as a guide to probable
Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos legislative intent, is based upon the rules
through its Resolution No. 1, Series of of logic and natural workings of the
1993. It alleged that since time human mind. Legislature
immemorial, its entire land area was an intended other barangays from Nueva
ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an Era to become part of Marcos, it could
indigenous cultural community. It argued have easily done so by clear and concise
to the effect that since the land being language. Where the terms are expressly
claimed by Marcos must be protected for limited to certain matters, it may not by
the tinguians, it must be preserved as interpretation or construction be
part of Nueva Era. Nueva Era claimed extended to other matters. The rule
R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned proceeds from the premise that the
seven (7) barrios of Dingras to become legislature would not have made
Marcos, the area which should comprise specified enumerations in a statute had
Marcos should not go beyond the the intention been not to restrict its
territory of said barrios. meaning and to confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned.
On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos
Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The Furthermore, this conclusion on the
fallo of its decision. R.A. No. 3753 intention of the legislature is bolstered
expressly named the barangays that by theexplanatory note of the bill which
would comprise Marcos, but none of paved the way for the creation of
Nueva Era's barangays were mentioned. Marcos. Said explanatory note
The SP thus construed, applying the rule mentioned only Dingras as the mother
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, municipality of Marcos. Where there is
that no part of Nueva Era was included ambiguity in a statute, as in this case,
by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos. courts may resort to the explanatory
note to clarify the ambiguity and
Issues: Whether or not, CA erred in its ascertain the purpose and intent of the
appreciation of facts, in declaring that statute. Despite the omission of Nueva
MARCOS East is not coterminous with the Era as a mother territory in the law
Eastern boundary of its mother town creating Marcos, the latter still contends
that said law included Nueva Era. It from an independent component city to a
alleges that based on the description of component city. Petitioner, Jose Miranda,
its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is mayor of Santiago assailed the
within its territory. constitutionality of RA 8528 due to lack
of ratification through plebiscite pursuant
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. to Section 10 Article 10 of the
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is Constitution. Petitioners also contend the
partly REVERSED. The Decision of the petition raises a political question over
Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
Reinstated.
Issue:
SO ORDERED.
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction
on juticiable and political question.

Decision:

Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528

is declared unconstitutional and the writ
of prohibition is hereby issued
commanding the respondents to desist
from implementing said law.
The plea that the court back off from
assuming jurisdiction over the petition at
bar on the ground that it involves a
political question has to be brushed
aside. This plea has long lost its appeal
especially in light of Section 1 of Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
defines judicial power as including the
duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. To be
sure, the cut between a political and
justiciable issue has been made by this
Court in many cases.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs.
HON. VICENTE T. BAZ, JR.
MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE [G. R. No. 105746. December 2, 1996]

Facts: FACTS:

On 5 May 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 The Municipality of Sinacaban was
which converted the municipality of created by President Elpidio Quirino
Santiago, Isabela into an independent through Executive Order No. 258,
component city was signed into law. On pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago Administrative Code of 1917. EO 258
ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. On stated that the mother Municipality of
February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. Jimenez shall have its present territory,
8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. minus the portion thereof included in the
7720, it changed the status of Santiago Municipality of Sinacaban.
 the legal standing to question the
Based on the technical description stated existence of Sinacaban, the same being
in the EO, Sinacaban laid claim to a reserved to the State as represented by
portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios the Office of the Solicitor General in a
Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and quo warranto proceeding; that Jimenez
Sinara Alto. In response, the Municipality was estopped from questioning the legal
of Jimenez, while conceding that the existence of Sinacaban by entering into
disputed area is part of Sinacaban, an agreement with it concerning their
nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the common boundary; and that any
basis of an agreement it had with the question as to the legal existence of
Municipality of Sinacaban. This Sinacaban had been rendered moot by
agreement was approved by the Sec. 442(d) LGC
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental in
its Resolution No. 77, which fixed the ISSUES:
common boundary of Sinacaban and
Jimenez. 1. Whether the Municipality of Sinacaban
is a legal juridical entity, duly created in
On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a accordance with law;
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and 2. Whether the decision of the Provincial
mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of Board regarding the boundaries had
Oroquieta City. The suit was filed against acquired finality.
Sinacaban and other government
agencies. Jimenez alleged that, in RULING:
accordance with the Pelaez ruling, the
power to create municipalities is The principal basis for the view that
essentially legislative. Sinacaban was not validly created as a
municipal corporation is the ruling in
Consequently, Sinacaban, which was Pelaez v. Auditor General that the
created by an executive order, had no creation of municipal corporations is
legal personality and no right to assert a essentially a legislative matter.
territorial claim against Jimenez, of which Therefore, the President was without
it remains part. Jimenez prayed that power to create by executive order the
Sinacaban be enjoined from assuming Municipality of Sinacaban. However, the
control and supervision over the disputed Supreme Court had since held that
barrios. RTC, however, maintained the where a municipality created as such by
status quo, that is, the municipality of executive order is later impliedly
Sinacaban shall continue to exist and recognized and its acts are accorded
operate have the legal standing to legal validity, its creation can no longer
question the existence of Sinacaban, the be questioned.
same being reserved to the State as
represented by the Office of the Solicitor This was the ruling in Municipality of San
General in a quo warranto proceeding; Narciso v. Mendez, Sr. Here, the same
that Jimenez was estopped from factors are present so as to confer on
questioning the legal existence of Sinacaban the status of at least a de
Sinacaban by entering into an agreement facto municipal corporation in the sense
with it concerning their common that its legal existence has been
boundary; and that any question as to recognized and acquiesced publicly as
the legal existence of Sinacaban had shown in the following circumstances:
been rendered moot by Sec. 442(d) LGC
as a regular municipality, for the 1. Sinacaban had been in existence for
following reasons: “Sinacaban is a de sixteen years (16) when Pelaez v. Auditor
facto corporation since it had completely General was decided on December 24,
organized itself even prior to the Pelaez 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258
case and exercised corporate powers for creating it had never been questioned.
forty years (40) before its existence was Created in 1949, it was only 40 years
questioned; that Jimenez did not have later that its existence was questioned
and only because it had laid claim to a
certain area.

2.The State and even the Municipality of

Jimenez itself have recognized
Sinacaban's corporate existence.

a. Under Administrative Order No. 33 and

Section 31 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg.
129), Sinacaban has a municipal circuit
court.
b. For its part, Jimenez had earlier
recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by
entering into an agreement with it
regarding their common boundary which
was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.
c. Indeed, Sinacaban has attained de jure
status by virtue of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution,
apportioning legislative districts
throughout the country, which
considered Sinacaban part of the Second
District of Misamis Occidental.

3. Moreover, following the ruling in

Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v.
Mendez, Sr., Sec. 442(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 must be
deemed to have cured any defect in the
creation of Sinacaban.
Second, the Supreme Court held that the ORDILLO VS COMELEC [192 SCRA 100]
Provincial Board did not have the
authority to approve the agreement There must be at least 2 lgus because
declaring certain barrios part of one or the consti says “units”, so in the case of
the other municipality because the effect Cordillera, it’s not duly created because
would be to amend the technical only 1 province got an affirmative
description stated in E.O. No. 258. plebiscite, which is only the Ifugao
province, and the rest are negative. So,
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in no Cordillera Autonomous Region, but
accordance with the law creating a simply Administrative Region of the
municipality is not the carrying into Cordilleras. No local government powers.
effect of that law but is rather considered Note: Merger of Administrative regions,
an amendment. Since Resolution No. 77 that is not to be done by law, but only by
of the Provincial Board of Misamis an executive act, unlike merger to create
Occidental is contrary to the technical a lgu or an autonomous region, which
description of the territory of Sinacaban, should be done by law.
it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for
opposing the territorial claim of Facts:
Sinacaban. On January 30, 1990, the people of the
provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the
city of Baguio cast their votes in a
plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for
an Organic Act for the Cordillera contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a
Autonomous Region.” province by itself. To become part of a
region, it must join other provinces,
The official Commission on Elections cities, municipalities, and geographical
(COMELEC) results of the plebiscite areas.
showed that the creation of the Region
was approved by a majority of 5,889 It joins other units because of their
votes in only the Ifugao Province and was common and distinctive historical and
overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 cultural heritage, economic and social
votes in the rest of the provinces and city structures and other relevant
above-mentioned. characteristics. The Constitutional
requirements are not present in this
Consequently, the COMELEC, on case.
February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic
2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera
Region has been approved and/or ratified Autonomous Region is to be
by majority of the votes cast only in the administered by the Cordillera
province of Ifugao. government consisting of the Regional
Government and local government units.
The petitioner filed a petition with
COMELEC to declare the non-ratification It further provides that:
of the Organic Act for the Region. The “SECTION 2. The Regional Government
petitioners maintain that there can be no shall exercise powers and functions
valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in necessary for the proper governance and
only one province as the Constitution development of all provinces, cities,
and Republic Act No. 6766 require that municipalities, and barangay or ili within
the said Region be composed of more the Autonomous Region . . .”
than one constituent unit.
From these sections, it can be gleaned
that Congress never intended that a
Issue: single province may constitute the
The question raised in this petition is autonomous region. Otherwise, we would
whether or not the province of Ifugao, be faced with the absurd situation of
being the only province which voted having two sets of officials, a set of
favorably for the creation of the provincial officials and another set of
Cordillera Autonomous Region can, regional officials exercising their
alone, legally and validly constitute such executive and legislative powers over
Region. exactly the same small area.

Held:
LEAGUE OF CITIES vs COMELEC
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly
constitute the Cordillera Autonomous FACTS:
Region. These cases were initiated by the
consolidated petitions for prohibition filed
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the by the League of Cities of the Philippines
1987 Constitution. The keywords — (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and
provinces, cities, municipalities and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the
geographical areas connote that “region” constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,
is to be made up of more than one each converting the municipality covered
constituent unit. The term “region” used thereby into a component city (Cityhood
in its ordinary sense means two or more Laws), and seeking to enjoin the
provinces. This is supported by the fact Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
that the thirteen (13) regions into which from conducting plebiscites pursuant to
the Philippines is divided for the subject laws.
administrative purposes are groupings of
In the Decision dated November 18, However, Congress deemed it wiser to
2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, exempt respondent municipalities from
granted the petitions and struck down such a belatedly imposed modified
the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for income requirement in order to uphold
violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, its higher calling of putting flesh and
and the equal protection clause. In blood to the very intent and thrust of the
another Decision dated December 21, LGC, which is countryside development
2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6- and autonomy, especially accounting for
4, declared the Cityhood Laws as these municipalities as engines for
constitutional. On August 24, 2010, the economic growth in their respective
Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by provinces.
a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad Cautelam
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to R. A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the
Annul the Decision of December 21, Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009
2009. through the exemption clauses found
therein. Since the Cityhood Laws
ISSUE: explicitly exempted the concerned
municipalities from the amendatory R.A.
FIRST ISSUE -- Whether or not the No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are,
Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section therefore, also amendments to the LGC
10 of the Constitution itself.
SECOND ISSUE -- Whether or not the
Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 Second Issue:
and the equal protection clause of the Substantial distinction lies in the capacity
Constitution and viability of respondent municipalities
to become component cities of their
respective provinces. Congress, by
enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized
HELD: this capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become the State’s
The petition is meritorious. partners in accelerating economic growth
and development in the provincial
First issue: regions, which is the very thrust of the
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is LGC, manifested by the pendency of
an exercise by Congress of its legislative their cityhood bills during the 11th
power. Legislative power is the authority, Congress and their relentless pursuit for
under the Constitution, to make laws, cityhood up to the present. The
and to alter and repeal them. The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is
Constitution, as the expression of the will REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood
of the people in their original, sovereign, Laws are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
and unlimited capacity, has vested this
power in the Congress of the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress
through its law-making powers. Congress MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO,
has the power to alter or modify it as it QUEZON vs. HON. ANTONIO V.
did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. MENDEZ, SR.

Such power of amendment of laws was FACTS:

again exercised when Congress enacted On August 20, 1959, President Carlos P.
the Cityhood Laws. When Congress Garcia, issued Executive Order No. 353
enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for creating the municipal district of San
quantifiable indicators of economic Andres, Quezon, pursuant to the Sections
viability for the creation of local 68 and 2630 of the Revised
government units —income, population, Administrative Code. Subsequently, the
and land area. municipal district of San Andres was later
officially recognized to have gained the with greatest imperativeness, be timely
status of a fifth class municipality. raised. Public interest demands it.

On June 5, 1989, the Municipality of San Granting the Executive Order No. 353
Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto was a complete nullity for being the
with the Regional Trial Court against the result of an unconstitutional delegation
officials of the Municipality of San of legislative power, the peculiar
Andres, which sought the declaration of circumstances obtaining in this case
nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and hardly could offer a choice other than to
prayed that the local officials of the consider the Municipality of San Andres
Municipality of San Andres be to have at least attained a status closely
permanently ordered to refrain from approximating that of a de facto
performing their duties and functions. It municipal corporation.
was argued that EO 353, a presidential
act, was a clear usurpation of the Created in 1959, by virtue of Executive
inherent powers of the legislature. Order No. 353, the Municipality of San
On December 2, 1991, the lower court Andres had been in existence for more
finally dismissed the petition for lack of than six years when Pelaez v. Auditor
cause of action on what it felt was a General was promulgated. The ruling
matter that belonged to the State, could have sounded the call for a similar
adding that whatever defects were declaration of the unconstitutionality of
present in the creation of municipal Executive Order No. 353 but it did not.
districts by the President pursuant to
executive orders were cured by the On the contrary, certain governmental
enactment of RA 7160, otherwise known acts all pointed to the State's recognition
as Local Government Code of 1991. This of the continued existence of the
prompted the Municipality of San Narciso Municipality of San Andres, such as the
to file a petition for review on certiorari. following:

ISSUE: 1. After more than five years as a

Whether or not the Municipality of San municipal district, Executive Order No.
Andres is a de facto municipal 174 classified the Municipality of San
corporation. Andres as a fifth class municipality.
2. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
RULING: 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
When the inquiry is focused on the legal 1980 constituted Municipality of San
existence of a body politic, the action is Andres as covered by the 10th Municipal
reserved to the State in a proceeding for Circuit Court.
quo warranto or any other credit 3. Under the Ordinance adopted on
proceeding. It must be brought in the October 15, 1986, apportioning the seats
name of the Republic of the Philippines of the House of Representatives, which
and commenced by the Solicitor General was appended to the 1987 Constitution,
Executive Order No. 353 creating the the Municipality of San Andres has been
municipal district of San Andres was considered to be as part of the Third
issued on August 20, 1959 but it was District of the province of Quezon.
only after almost thirty (30) years, or on
June 5, 1989, that the municipality of San Finally, equally significant is Section
Narciso finally decided to challenge the 442(d) of the Local Government Code
legality of the executive order. which states that municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential
In the meantime, the Municipality of San issuances or executive orders and which
Andres began and continued to exercise have their respective sets of elective
the powers and authority of a duly municipal officials holding office at the
created local government unit. A quo time of the effectivity of this Code shall
warranto proceeding assailing the lawful henceforth be considered as regular
authority of a political subdivision must, municipalities. The power to create
political subdivisions is a function of the being claimed by the Municipality of
legislature. And Congress did just that Alicia based on certain exhibits. If
when it incorporated Section 442(d) in allowed, the Municipality of Candijay will
the Code. Curative laws, in essence, are not only engulf the entire barrio of
retrospective. They are aimed at giving Pagahat, but also of many other barrios.
validity to acts done that would have
been invalid under existing laws. All Candijay will eat up a big chunk of
considered, the de jure status of the territories far exceeding her territorial
Municipality of San Andres in the jurisdiction under the law creating her.
province of Quezon must now be CA also found, after an examination of
conceded. the respective survey plans both plans
are inadequate insofar as identifying the
monuments of the boundary lines. It
decided the case based on the rule on
equiponderance of evidence. Hence, the
Municipality of Candijay now files a
petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of Alicia
THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, has a juridical personality to claim its
BOHOL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and territory.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA,
BOHOL RULING:
The Supreme Court finds that the issues
FACTS: of fact in this case had been adequately
The case revolves around the passed upon by the Court of Appeals
controversy on territorial jurisdiction of with the application of the
the Municipality of Alicia, Bohol. During equiponderance doctrine which states:
the proceedings, after presentation of “When the scale shall stand upon an
evidence by the Municipality of Candijay, equipoise and there is nothing in the
the latter asked the trial court to bar the evidence which shall incline it to one side
Municipality of Alicia from presenting its or the other, the court will find for the
evidence on the ground that it had no defendant.” The determination of
juridical personality. It was adjudged by equiponderance of evidence by the
the lower court that Barangay Pagahat is respondent Court involves the
within the territorial jurisdiction of the appreciation of evidence by the latter
Municipality of Candijay. Therefore, said tribunal, which will not be reviewed by
barrio forms part and parcel of its this Court unless shown to be whimsical
territory. The Regional Trial Court of or capricious; here, there has been no
Bohol permanently enjoined defendant such showing.
Municipality of Alicia to respect plaintiff's
control, possession and political As to the issue on the personality of the
supervision of Barangay Pagahat and Municipality of Alicia, it is noteworthy
never to molest, disturb, harass its that the Municipality of Candijay
possession and ownership over the same commenced its collateral attack on the
barrio. juridical personality of respondent
municipality on January 19, 1984 or
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed some thirty five years after respondent
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. municipality first came into existence in
It ruled that the trial court committed an 1949. The Municipality of Candijay
error in declaring that Barrio Pagahat is contended that Executive Order No. 265
within the territorial jurisdiction of the issued by President Quirino on
Municipality of Candijay because the September 16, 1949 creating the
lower court rejected the boundary line Municipality of Alicia is null and void ab
initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code constituted
an undue delegation of legislative
powers, and was therefore declared
unconstitutional in Pelaez vs. Auditor
General.

However, the factual milieu of the

Municipality of Alicia is strikingly similar
to that of the Municipality of San Andres
in the case of Municipality of San Narciso
vs. Mendez. The latter case, in
appreciating the de jure status of the
municipality, considered the peculiar
circumstances supporting its juridical
existence. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE
In the case at bar, respondent v. PROVINCE OF QUEZON
Municipality of Alicia was created by
virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in FACTS:
1949, or ten years ahead of the
Historical records disclose that the
municipality of San Andres, and
therefore had been in existence for all of
Camarines region in the Island of
sixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor Luzon had been divided
General was promulgated. And various originally into the two (2) separate
governmental acts throughout the years provinces of Camarines Norte and
all indicate the State's recognition and Camarines Sur, which
acknowledgment of the existence division was maintained until 19 May
thereof. For instance, under 1893, when the two (2) provinces
Administrative Order No. 33 above- were consolidated by
mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia was the Spanish colonial administration to
covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit constitute a single entity, the
Court.
Province of Ambos
Likewise, under the Ordinance appended Camarines. Adjacent to Camarines
to the 1987 Constitution, it is one of Norte in the northeast (i.e., the
twenty municipalities comprising the northern portion of Ambos
Third District of Bohol. Camarines), upon the other hand, lay
the Province of Tayabas. At the time
Inasmuch as respondent municipality of of arrival of the
Alicia is similarly situated as the United States flag in the Philippines,
municipality of San Andres, it should there was thus existing the Province
likewise benefit from the effects of of Ambos Camarines.
Section 442(d) of the Local Government The opposition of respondent Quezon
Code, which states that municipal
Province to the boundary line claimed
districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive and sought to be
orders and which have their respective enforced here by petitioner
sets of elective municipal officials Camarines Norte Province is
holding office at the time of the anchored on two (2) arguments. First,
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth it is contended by Quezon Province
be considered as regular municipalities that the boundary separating the old
Province of Ambos
Camarines from Quezon Province had
already been established and defined
in Section 42 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Second,
Quezon Province argues that the
Chief of the Executive
Bureau had no authority to alter or
re-define that statutorily-defined
boundary through his
decision of 16 June 1922.

ISSUE:
WON boundary was already "defined"
and, therefore, in no need of further THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG,
definition. LANAO DEL SUR vs. PANGANDAPUN
WON there was legal authority for the BENITO
16 June 1922 decision of the Chief of
the Executive Bureau. FACTS:
Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor
of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while
RULING: Pangandapun Benito is the mayor of the
Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition municipality of Balabagan. Balabagan
is GRANTED. was formerly a part of the municipality of
1. the SC considers that to a limited Malabang, having been created on March
extent, the Ambos Camarines-Quezon 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 of the
boundary line was then President Carlos P. Garcia. Mayor
"undefined" and that there was thus Balindong filed an action for prohibition
necessity for the 16 June 1922 to nullify Executive Order 386 and to
decision of the Chief of the restrain the municipal officials of
Executive Bureau to provide more Balabagan from performing the functions
of their respective offices. He argues that
specific guidance that would permit
Section 23 of Republic Act 2370 [Barrio
actual identification or Charter Act] is a "statutory denial of the
location of the Basiad Bay-Mt. Cadig presidential authority to create a new
portion of the boundary line between barrio [and] implies a negation of the
Ambos Camarines bigger power to create municipalities, as
and Quezon Province. held in the prior case of Pelaez vs.
2. The Chief of the Executive Bureau, Auditor General.
in rendering that decision, did not, as
he could not, On the other hand, the officials of the
purport to act with unlimited municipality of Balabagan argue that the
rule announced in Pelaez is not
discretion. He did not, therefore,
applicable because unlike the
"alter" or "re-define" or "amend municipalities involved in Pelaez, the
an existing provincial boundary," the municipality of Balabagan is at least a de
boundary line between Ambos facto corporation, having been organized
Camarines and Tayabas. All under color of a statute before this was
that the Chief of the Executive declared unconstitutional.
Bureau did was to implement, upon
the authority of the Its officers have been either elected or
Secretary of Interior, Section 42 of appointed. The municipality itself has
Act No. 2711. discharged its corporate functions for the
past five years preceding the institution
of this action. It is contended that as a de
facto corporation, its existence cannot be
collaterally attacked, although it may be
inquired into directly in an action for quo
warranto at the instance of the State.
 to give color of authority to its creation.
ISSUE: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it
Whether or not the Municipality of confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
Balabagan is a de facto municipal affords no protection; it creates no office;
corporation. it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been
passed. Therefore, Executive Order 386
created no office. This is not to say,
however, that the acts done by the
RULING: municipality of Balabagan in the exercise
While it is true that an inquiry into the of its corporate powers are a nullity
legal existence of a municipality is because the existence of Executive
reserved to the State in a proceeding for Order 386 is an operative fact which
quo warranto or other direct proceeding, cannot justly be ignored. Therefore,
the rule disallowing collateral attacks Executive Order 386 is declared void,
applies only where the municipal and the municipal officials of the
corporation is at least a de facto Municipality of Malabang were
corporation. If it is neither a corporation permanently restrained from performing
de jure nor de facto, but a complete the duties and functions of their
nullity, the rule is that its existence may respective offices.
be questioned collaterally or directly in
any action or proceeding by any one
whose rights or interests are affected
thereby.

The municipality of Balabagan was

organized before the promulgation of
Pelaez vs. Auditor General. Can the
statute creating Balabagan lend color of
validity to an attempted organization of a
municipality despite the fact that such
statute is subsequently declared
unconstitutional? Supreme Court held
that the color of authority may be:

1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.

2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its
face, which has either (a) been upheld
for a time by the courts or (b) not yet
been declared void; provided that a
warrant for its creation can be found in
some other valid law or in the
recognition of its potential existence by
the general laws or constitution of the
state.

In the case at bar, what is important is

that there must be some other valid law
giving corporate vitality to the
organization. Hence, the mere fact that
Balabagan was organized at a time when
the statute had not been invalidated
cannot conceivably make it a de facto
corporation, because, aside from the
Administrative Code provision in
question, there is no other valid statute
 adjudicate the same, unless otherwise
expressly withheld from its plenary
powers.

SEMA VS COMELEC

KANANGA VS ORMOC CITY FACTS:

On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional
FACTS: Assembly, exercising its power to create
A boundary dispute arose between the provinces under Section 19 of RA 9054,
Municipality of Kananga and the City of enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
Ormoc. By agreement, the parties No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
submitted the issue to an amicable Kabunsuan. On May 10, 2007, the
settlement between the City and COMELEC issued Resolution 7902
Municipal Councils of both local renaming the legislative district
government units. However, no amicable combining the said provice with Cotabato
settlement was reached. Thus, the City as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
of Ormoc filed before the Regional Trial Cotabato City." Sema, here petitioner,
Court (RTC) the dispute. The Municipality questioned the Resolution combining the
of Kananga filed a Motion to Dismiss the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato CIty into
complaint on the ground that the RTC a single legislative district.
has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter. The RTC denied the motion by ISSUE:
holding that it has jurisdiction under Whether or not the Congress can
Batas Pambansa 129 (BP 129). delegate to the Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction DECISION:
over the settlement of the boundary Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
dispute. UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants
to the Regional Assembly of the
RULING: Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
YES. The Supreme Court held that the power to create provinces and cities.
jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot Thus, SC declares VOID Muslim Mindanao
be conferred or waived by the parties. Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the
Further, BP 129 expressly provided that Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. COMELEC
the Regional Trial Courts shall have Resolution 7902 is VALID.
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of RATIO DECIDENDI:
any court, tribunal, person, or body SC ruled that Section 19, RA 9054,
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial insofar as it grants to the Regional
functions. Assembly the power to create provinces
and cities, is void. Only Congress can
Thus, the RTCs have the power not only create provinces and cities because the
to take judicial cognizance of a case creation of provinces and cities
instituted for judicial action for the first necessarily includes the creation of
time, but also to do so to the exclusion of legislative districts, a power only
all other courts at that stage. Since there Congress can exercise under Section 5,
is no law (Local Government Code does Article VI of the Constitution.
not provide for such) providing for the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court or
agency over the settlement of boundary
disputes between a municipality
(Kananga) and an independent
component city (Ormoc), the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case and it can