Rev. Bras. Polít. Int.

, 67(2): e018, 2024 Albuquerque; Lima

formtion of Western sttes. With the expnsion of the West, the Est ws subjugted nd
trnsformed into  periphery or semi-periphery of the globl system. Only in the mid-20th
century did some of these countries emerge, prtly due to the disruptions of the Second World
Wr nd the demise of colonil structures nd exhibited noteworthy economic growth rtes.
History hs lso shown tht globl power shifts – s, for instnce, the post-Cold Wr nd the
currently incresing USA-Chin rivlry – cn influence or condition the mrgin of mneuver
of new spiring powers (Flemes 2007).
In this context, one of this specil issue’s objectives is to understnd the effects of globl
politicl nd economic shifts on the gency of intermedite powers. In this pper, our gol is
to nlyze how Indi, one of the most potentilly defining globl plyers, hs implemented its
foreign policy in order to rise. Bsed on the literture on rising powers, we contend tht Indi
hs historiclly perceived itself s  gret power nd hs employed its foreign policy pprtus to
cquire wht it deems s its “rightful” sttus (Throor nd Srn 2020). We rgue tht it benefited
from the loopholes opened by power trnsition periods to connect its mteril cpbilities with
its norm-mker mbition.
Our methodology compres how Indi cted to rise fter the end of the Cold Wr, when
Indi lost its min prtner, the Soviet Union, nd fter 2008, when Chin’s emergence strted to
set the globl gend. These two timefrmes re prticulrly useful due to their impct on power
rerrngements. After the Cold Wr, the US emerged s n undisputed militry, economic, nd
normtive power. With the 2008 finncil crisis, coupled with some questionble foreign policy
decisions, such s the never-ending Wr on Terror, Wshington sw its mrgin of mneuver shrink
s other ctors strted to gin prominence: the Europen Union consolidted its foreign policy
pillr, Russi regined momentum, nd Brzil led inititives like BRICS nd IBAS. Among these
ctors, there is Indi.
Drwing from the frmework originlly proposed by Miller (2021), we compre Indi’s
strtegy through three vribles tht re deeply connected to its rising power spirtion: (i) the
cquisition of enhnced economic nd militry power, (ii) the quest for globlized uthority,
nd (iii) the deliberte pursuit of interntionl ledership beyond its region. The pertinence of
employing these vribles is threefold. First, economic nd militry power hs been historiclly
deemed prmount for  country’s emergence. Second, recognition s  globl uthority is wht
distinguishes n emerging power from  revolutionry power hrboring mbitions of systemic
overhul. Third, the pursuit of ledership beyond its region s  conduit to globl influence hs
grnered incresing ttention within the scholrly discourse on emerging powers (Stewrt-Ingersoll
nd Frzier 2012).
To this end, the rticle is structured in four sections. First, we introduce our theoreticl
underpinnings, highlighting how rising powers usully observe systemic reordering s
opportunities. Subsequently, bsed on the three bovementioned vribles, we nlyze how
Indi behved fter the Cold Wr nd if (nd how) it cpitlized from this globl shift to foster
its ntionl interests. Third, we pply the sme frmework to understnd how nother trnsition

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period, the rise of Chin, ffected Indi’s globl spirtions. By compring Indi to itself in two
different contexts, we im to conclude tht Indi hs embrced  multifceted foreign policy
pproch tht prticulrizes it from other rising powers. Our finl remrks summrize our
min findings.

What does it take for a country to rise? An assessment of the literature

on rising powers

Throughout the history of Interntionl Reltions study nd prxis, the systemic distribution of
power hs stood s  pillr of politicl ction nd cdemic studies. Among the most renowned
contributions is Kindleberger’s (1986) theory of hegemonic stbility, rguing tht the presence of 
hegemonic liberl power is  crucil, lbeit not exclusive, determinnt for the evolution of  globl
mrket economy. Robert Gilpin contended tht t the core of the theory lies the perception tht
“ liberl interntionl economy requires  hegemon committed to liberl economic principles”
(Gilpin 2001, 94). This description lredy shed some light on the moment it spred: the theory
ws useful to rtionlize the role of the United Sttes in the ftermth of the Second World Wr
while cutioning ginst the perceived risks posed by Soviet expnsion.
Although ccepted s  possible explntion for the stte of ffirs of tht prticulr
timefrme, critics strted to proliferte. Among the critique, we identify four spects: i) the
“liberl economy” rgument shdowed  normtive content; ii) outdted focus on the likelihood
of wr; iii) homogeniztion nd generliztion of trnsition processes nd rising countries, lcking
nunced nlysis; iv) bsence of “inside-the-blck-box” elements s domestic politics nd the role
of the leders.
Regrding the first element, critics evolved round the role of the hegemon in benefiting from
the order nd obstructing its chnge. Even Gilpin cknowledged tht the theory of hegemonic
stbility crried normtive implictions, s it legitimizes the role of the hegemon not only s
necessry, but lso s beneficil: “(…) critics ssert tht the theory cn be used nd in fct is used
to support nd rtionlize Americn imperilism nd domintion of other countries” (Gilpin
1987 87-88). Becuse of the dvntges (nd costs) ssocited with the hegemonic position, the
hegemon could shift from benevolent to predtory behvior s its dominnce wnes. As the power
distribution is reltive, if the hegemon erodes, nother country rises. It ws the bsic premise of
Pul Kennedy’s (1987) “The Rise nd Fll of Gret Powers”.
Considering the second nd third critics, if these up-nd-down movements mnge to lter
solidified nd reltively stble institutions nd fundmentl reltionships, the interntionl system
might fce  “structurl chnge”. Therefore, differentil power growth cn provoke the rise of
gme-chnging ctors disstisfied with the globl distribution of goods nd the production of
norms. Rising countries usully combine two chrcteristics, one mteril nd one behviorl:
the increse in mteril cpbilities (especilly economic nd militry ssets) nd  revisionist

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disposition (which cn be more ggressive or more ccommodtionl) towrds the sttus quo
(Lemke nd Tmmen 2003).
Nonetheless, power trnsition theorists often neglect why different rising powers hve
historiclly dopted different enggement ptterns. Minstrem theories deprt from  binry,
zero-sum reltion of one country emerging to rech the most powerful. Such perspectives my
oversimplify the contemporry globl lndscpe. Even if we hve two mjor powers, it does not
utomticlly equte to trditionl bipolrity, s n rry of plyers now im to utonomously
ssert themselves. As  consequence, we hve been witnessing heightened regionlism, with disputes
incresingly ddressed t loclized levels, nd  different set of dominnt plyers in domin-specific
mtters (Jguribe 2021).
In tht regrd, Milni et l. (2017) underscored severl cvets to the power trnsition theory,
highlighting its emphsis on the high likelihood of  direct wr between the estblished nd the
contending power while ssigning  minor explntory role to peceful trnsitions tht previl
tody1. Furthermore, they contend tht second-tier countries cn lso ply  pivotl role in shifting
power dynmics nd perceptions. Similrly, for Stuenkel (2011), “undecided” countries on the
fringe of the Western World Order cn, to n importnt degree, determine whether institutions
will survive fundmentl power shifts.
Rising powers, therefore, hve different pths. Thus, by overshdowing this diversity, we
consider tht power trnsition theory exhibits tngible limittions. In the trditionl theory, there
is n ssumption tht these spiring, rising powers re gret powers to be. This “evolutionry”
perception msks significnt prticulrities. Some countries, like Brzil, hve been “on the rise”
for decdes without ctively chllenging the previling world order. Others, like Indi, hve
incresed their mteril cpbilities nd hve been progressively dopting n ctive stnce. Both
re, however, considered rising powers. We question, then, wht does it tke for  country to rise?
For Guimrães (1998), lrge peripherl countries – undeveloped countries with  lrge
popultion nd  territory tht could resonbly be exploited economiclly – typiclly spire
to scendncy. While it serves s  foundtionl premise, this definition does not tell the whole
story. We second Milni et l. (2017) in their rgument tht grdution is not n outcome but
 nonliner process of chnge in interntionl hierrchy, scle, nd sttus, including going from
rule-tker to rule-mker, occupying n influentil role in the interntionl politicl economy,
cquiring recognition by its peers, deepening ties with its region, nd hving  project to globl
prominence trnscending short-term impertives.
Likewise, for Miller (2021), for  country to rise it should be perceved s  rising power, s
there is  socil-reltionl spect relted to the recognition by externl ctors. To gin “endorsement”,
s mentioned, it must not only cquire economic nd militry power, but lso globlize its interests,
going beyond regionl confines in the quest for conquering globl uthority. For Miller, countries
tht engge in ll these behviors re ctive rising powers. Those tht engge only in incresing

1 See lso Allison (2017).

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their mteril power re reticent nd ccommodtionl rising powers, s their projection cn only
be prtil without the other two elements.
In this process, ctive rising powers must develop wht Miller (2021) clls “ide dvoccy”,
 nrrtive, predominntly crfted by the elites, delineting the pth to greter power sttus
nd the rtionle underpinning it. We would dd, however, tht the consensus round the “ide
dvoccy” is not constnt. For some countries, s we will rgue in the Indin cse, the domestic
convergence round its interntionl mbitions hs been strongly rticulted. This is not the cse
for other rising countries2.
Connecting this rgument with the fourth critique outlined bove, if rising powers re
diverse, there is theoreticl vlue in cse studies. In this pper, we focus on Indi. Although until
recently the country ws interpreted s being reticent nd inwrd-fced (Amorim nd Silv 2014),
we rgue tht the mteril power is now fully connected to the “ide dvoccy” nd the nrrtive
tht Indi is destined to be  gret power (Throor e Srn 2020). When did Indi chnge its
behvior nd strt to ctively serch for globl uthority?
As we will detil in the following sections, fter the collpse of the Soviet Union, Indi
initilly dopted n ccommodtionl stnce to focus on its economic development. After
building  trustful reputtion, especilly mongst unstble neighbors, Indi strted to ctively
promote its worldview when Chin rose with  different setting of preferences nd norms from the
Western pttern.
The roots re, however, ingrined in the historic nd scred writings tht hve shped the
Indin worldview. Unlike some of the other rising powers nlyzed in this specil issue – thereby
ttesting their plurlity –, whose spirtions re bsed on  recent scendnt trjectory, Indi sees
history in  long-term perspective tht refers to the gretness of its pst. According to Hindu
scred writings, like the Mhbhrt, the Rmyn, nd the Arthshstr of Kutily, Indi is
 vshwa mtra,  prtner nd  well-wisher of the world, whose profile is bsed on the heritge of
 civiliztionl entity, with  morl ethos built on  trdition of globl service (Srn 2017). The
nrrtive, embrced by subsequent politicl leders, including Prime Minister Nrendr Modi,
is tht Indi’s rise mens the resurgence of civiliztion nd is bsed on gret purposefulness
(Juluri 2015).
Although the pst is not  constrint to the future, it hs explntory vlue. In ressessing the
question “wht does it tke for  country to rise?”, Indi’s trjectory underscores n interply of 
strong historicl, culturl, nd politicl bckground to support its intention to be gret (gin).
However, it would be simplistic to ssume tht Indi’s rise ws inevitble, thereby neglecting the
role of context nd ledership.

By its very existence, Indi occupies globl mind-spce nd its growing vigor would
only expnd tht pprecition. The questions now re relly of the extent to which

2 In Brzil, for instnce, there is neither politicl nor cdemic consensus on the country’s sttus. See, for instnce, Flemes (2010).

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its revivl is shping the world order nd wht tht portends for the future. This
mens choices, policies, ledership, delivery, nd not lest, n wreness of who we
re nd how we ssert our collective person. (Jishnkr 2024, 197-198)

Therefore, the upwrd movement gined momentum when decision-mkers intentionlly

chose – nd intention is key –  proctive strtegy, expnding the scope of Indi’s interntionl
presence nd mteril cpbilities to mximize systemic permissiveness. It wsn’t the cse fter the
Cold Wr, but it becme  well-plnned nd executed strtegy fter 2008. In the next sections,
we will introduce how Indi hs been fulfilling its mbition of  rising power.

“Reticent” rising power: India after the Cold War

In the ftermth of the Second World Wr, ntions hd to consider the power symmetry nd
geogrphic nd strtegic proximity to the two superpowers in chnneling their foreign policy
options. Indi, for instnce, grvitted towrd the USSR, benefiting from militry ssistnce nd
support on multilterl forums. Despite this convergence, Indi sought  foreign policy free from
ideologicl constrints in some interntionl niches. During the Cold Wr, Indi sperheded
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), highlighting the existence of  longstnding North-South
conflict hindering socio-economic development. Consequently, Indi forged closer ties with Third
World countries (Ross 2013).
With the USSR’s collpse in 1991, the US solidified its sttus s  power without rivls.
Progressively, other centers of power emerged, including the Europen Union, Chin, Jpn, Brzil,
nd Indi. We rgue tht, within this context, Indi dopted  distinct pproch to cpitlize
on the opportunity to rise. This decision ws intrictely woven into Indi’s overrching strtegic
vision, which requires retrospective exmintion to fully grsp the roots of such inclintions.
Before coloniztion, Indi stood s one of the world’s primry trde hubs. Colonil hegemony,
however, engendered negtive consequences, including  focus on rw mteril supply, insufficient
investment in logistics nd infrstructure, nd policies limiting lnd occupncy. The belted
independence of Indi signified  multifceted process involving the resumption of not only
territoril nd mteril dimensions, but lso the sense of stte ownership. The inherent distrust
of Western models nd externl interference, intrictely linked to the trum of coloniztion,
impelled Indi to seek models tht fforded greter utonomy even if contrdicting the Western
nd orthodox plybook. Therefore, Miller (2021) sserts tht, fter the Cold Wr, Indi’s foreign
policy ws grounded in principles tht resonte with its historicl identity s  non-ligned ntion,
diverging from Western-imposed expecttions bout its behvior.
Consequently, it is unsurprising tht in the yers following 1947, Indi opted to embrce 
Soviet-style economic model of centrl plnning, exemplified by Prime Minister Nehru’s Five-Yer
Plns in the 1950s nd 1960s, imed t enhncing self-relince nd reducing externl dependence

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(Ogden 2014). However, the economic lndscpe underwent  significnt shift with the externl
ccount crisis triggered by oil shocks in 1973 nd 1979, ultimtely leding Indi to seek  lon
from the Interntionl Monetry Fund (IMF) to void defult in 1981. It ws followed by nother
in 1991, when Indi’s interntionl reserves could only cover three weeks of imports (Rngrjn
nd Mishr 2015). Under contextul pressures, Indi substntilly liberlized its economy in
the 1980s nd 1990s. Additionlly, the collpse of the Soviet Union resulted in the loss of its
principl politicl nd commercil lly, rendering it more susceptible to externl demnds. If power
trnsition contexts provide opportunities to rising powers, the odds seemed to be ginst Indi.
However, Indi still mnged to cpitlize during this criticl juncture to dvnce on Miller’s
(2021) first vrible: cquiring enhnced economic nd militry power. Unlike other developing
ntions, in Indi the stte plyed  prominent role in controlling the liberliztion process, nd
privtiztions did not entil the mngement relinquishment of stte-owned compnies. This
control over economic policy t the ntionl level enbled Delhi to orient its industril strtegy
towrd the militry project.
As it ws the cornerstone of Indi’s behvior – not only but especilly – fter the Cold Wr,
it is noteworthy tht Indi’s militry reforms predted its economic chnges. A crucil turning
point for Indi’s militry endevors occurred with its substntil defet in the 1962 border wr
with Chin. Militry spending in Indi experienced  significnt upswing gin in the 1970s nd
1980s under Prime Minister Indir Gndhi (1966-1977; 1980-1984), whose ssertive policies
incresed militry ctivity domesticlly nd regionlly, including Indi’s nucler progrm.
From this perspective, ccording to Nyr nd Pul (2003), Indi’s nucler tests in 1974 nd
1998 represented the culmintion of  long-term strtegy imed t chieving  more robust sttus
in the interntionl system bsed on the desire to cquire gret power sttus nd correct wht
ws perceived s  “sttus inconsistency”. Indi conducted its inugurl tests in 1974 following
the wr with Chin, which hd become  nucler power in the preceding decde. Chin, in turn,
fcilitted the nucleriztion of Pkistn to curtil Indi’s spirtions for regionl preeminence.
As  result, Indi is situted in the most nuclerized region globlly, longside Pkistn, Chin,
Russi nd, if the perimeter is extended, North Kore nd Isrel.
To counterblnce the influence of Chin nd Pkistn in Asi, Indi hs pursued llinces
with other sttes to reclibrte forces. During the Cold Wr, the USSR stood s its primry security
prtner, nd Indi emerged s one of the lrgest importers of rms from the Soviets (Sennes 2001).
The Soviet Union lso served s  diplomtic lly in interntionl forums, such s the United
Ntions Security Council (UNSC), where the Soviets consistently vetoed resolutions trgeting
Indi mid conflicts with Pkistn (Albuquerque 2022).
In the ftermth of the Cold Wr nd the loss of the Soviet Union s its min lly, Indi
sought n externl prtner, prticulrly the United Sttes, to counterblnce the Chinese presence
in the region. This movement ws not trivil, considering tht since Indi’s nucler tests in the
1970s, the United Sttes hd imposed export controls on dul-use technologies for Indi due
to its non-membership in the Nucler Non-Prolifertion Trety (NPT). Gnguly nd Mukherji

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(2014) ssert tht the shift in the interntionl order fter the end of the Cold Wr hs prompted
 ressessment of some foundtions of Indi’s foreign nd defense policy towrds n pproximtion
with the US, including estblishing full diplomtic reltions with Isrel, mintining  criticl
stnce towrds Irq (previously n lly), supporting the US during the Gulf Wr, nd the cesstion
of support for the Plestinin cuse.
Here, we cn refer to one of the rising power theory rguments: in systemic reordering
contexts, rising sttes cn be more revisionist or more ccommodtionl. Here, Indi opted for the
ltter: it refrined from pursuing globl ledership nd focused on  more inwrd developmentl
pproch (Nrlikr 2009). However, this ws not pssive complcency, s Indi sustined its
mbivlent position on the nucler progrm, citing concerns bout the discrimintory nture of
the regime nd Indi’s vulnerbility in its region. Decided to keep its options open to both defend
itself from  turbulent regionl context nd use nucler energy s  development tool, J. Singh,
Indi’s Senior Advisor on Defense nd Foreign Affirs, clled the NTP  “nucler prtheid” (Singh
1998). On the contrry of the Western’s expecttions, Indi dopted less conventionl strtegies,
such s pursuing nucleriztion outside the bounds of the NPT nd the Comprehensive Test Bn
Trety (CTBT).
Therefore, in nlyzing Indin foreign policy mid  power trnsition context, we summrize
some substntil elements by reclling Miller’s (2021) observtions. According to the uthor, ctive
rising powers usully dopt three simultneous strtegies: enhncing economic nd militry power,
serching for globlized uthority, nd displying egerness to tke on ledership roles. While Indi
engged in the first kind of behvior, it showcsed  certin hesitncy in globlizing uthority nd
shping perceptions of its chnging sttus. In contrst to Chin’s spirtion to tke on ledership
roles, which will be explored in the next section, Indi exhibited reticence despite its significnt
economic clout. Although we consider tht Indi fulfilled one of Miller’s vribles, nmely the
investment in the economy nd militry power, it did not conquer globlized uthority, nd its
ledership ws minly confined to its own development gend. It is, therefore, s per Miller’s
definition,  reticent nd ccommodtionl power.
The quest for economic nd militry power ws undoubtedly there. According to Kpil
(2015), between 1950 nd 1980, Indi’s GDP hd n verge nnul growth of 3,5%. It connects
to the process of structurl trnsformtion tht ccelerted with the economic reforms tht begn
in the 1990s, but  high-productivity nd cpitl-intensive sector coexisted with n griculture
mrked by low productivity. After the Cold Wr, “the shre of its GDP mesured in Purchsing
Power Prity (PPP) s prt of the globl economy more thn doubled during  period of less thn
thirty yers – from 3.6% in 1990 to 7,6% in 2018.” (Mnzi nd Lim 2021, 4).
The increse lso trnslted into militry investments. As mentioned before, the defet by
Chin hd  huge impct: if we consider militry expenditure s  shre of GDP, Indi invested
2% in 1960 nd 4% in 1964, right fter the Sino-Indin Wr. At the dwn of the Cold Wr, in
1990, the percentge ws 3,1%, with  slight decrese to 2,9% in 2000 – s  comprison, in 2000,
Chin invested 1,8%, nd Brzil 1,7% (Stockholm Interntionl Pece Reserch Institute 2024).

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If the first indictor could hve tken Indi to  prominent role in the interntionl system,
the other two stlled its rise. Bsed on Miller (2021), we offer some explntions. First, during the
post-Cold Wr period nd the consolidtion of U.S. hegemony, opportunities for the emergence
of potentil rising powers rose. Indi’s scent, however, ws timid t best. The primry focus ws
on creting the conditions for its economic growth, nd not on dopting globl responsibilities.
While some recognized its significnce, others highlighted its hesitncy in fully dopting the
behviors expected of rising powers, minly ttributed to its suspicion of externl interference.
As Nrlikr (2011, 1607) put it, “Indi’s record of ssuming globl responsibility hs been
lckluster t best”.
Indin foreign policy ides exhibited continuity from the Cold Wr er, emphsizing
non-lignment, morl ethos, nd utonomy. Indi continued to view itself s  civiliztionl entity
nd n independent ctor, not confined to the Est or West. The persistence of n inwrd-focused
pproch to ntion-building resulted in rective rther thn cretive foreign policy notions.
According to Miller (2021), Indi’s discomfort with new ides bout its globl role, coupled with
 strongly Indo-centric frming of Asi, limited its bility to position itself s  centrl plyer on
the world stge. For Nrlikr (2009), two possible explntions relte: first, to the impertives
of regionl security tht drg Indi’s ttention nd render it suspicious of Western interferences;
second, to its politicl culture highly ssocited with Nehru’s nti-colonilism nd self-sufficiency
nrrtives. One exmple is Indi’s reticent behvior in negotiting reciprocl triffs in the Generl
Agreement on Trde nd Triffs (GATT) debtes:

Such n ttitude ws understndble in the post-colonil euphori of the 1950s nd
1960s when  lrge number of developing countries sought strtegies of self-sufficiency
nd tried to secure their independence through third-world conglomertes such
s the MNA. The persistence in these ctions nd the concomitnt reluctnce to
prticipte proctively in the world, however, mkes it difficult to djust to the new,
more liberl, nd self-confident Indi (Nrlikr 2009, 103 [uthor’s trnsltion]).

Second, Indi held  distinctive sttus in the interntionl community, setting it prt
from Chin. As  robust nd diverse democrcy, Indi presented itself s the only Asin country
rivling Chin in size nd popultion while upholding  commitment to liberl democrtic norms.
It positioned Indi s  potentil nturl prtner for those ligned with the liberl interntionl
order. Despite this, chllenges persisted in gining recognition s  rising power, primrily due
to perceived fluctutions in Indi’s commitment.
As S. Jishnkr (2024, 5) posited, Indi’s “erly diplomcy ws eventully constrined by
the cpbility fctor. (…) But somewhere, there ws lso the indequte projection of  gret
civiliztion”. Therefore, to cquire externl recognition nd prove its vlue, Indi hd to embrce
its “ide dvoccy” nd, “be confident of its own vlues nd beliefs, nd bse its policies on those
convictions. These will drw from the totlity of its culture, heritge nd trditions.” (idem, 9).

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Like Chin, Indi historiclly regrded itself s  mjor power nd  gret civiliztion. However,
unlike Chin, Indi did not immeditely pply these ides to the context of contemporry gret
power competition. The difference of Indi’s behvior from other rising powers, especilly Chin,
lid in its reticence.

“Active” rising power: the “Indian imperative” as an alternative to the rise

of China

After  period of unchllenged dominnce, the reltive decline of the US economy in the erly 2000s
hs not only wekened its commitment to  liberl interntionl order, but hs lso introduced
 new element of uncertinty, ltering expecttions. This vcuum of politicl nd economic
ledership hd the potentil to ignite  new phse of competition. While Indi’s reticence initilly
delyed its rise, Chin seized the opportunity nd emerged s  significnt plyer in the evolving
globl lndscpe.
Although beyond the scope of this rticle, it is worth briefly noting tht Chin’s economic
reforms, initited in the 1970s, propelled it from  poor, developing country to n economic
powerhouse within  spn of four decdes. This rpid scent hs resulted in the uplifting of
300 million Chinese from poverty, nd integrtion into globl supply chins s  producer of
high-vlue goods (Miller 2019). A noteworthy spect of this trnsformtive journey hs been the
strtegic emphsis on reopening Chinese universities, prioritizing the cquisition of knowledge,
nd enhncing humn resources (Srn 2023).
In 1978, ccording to dt from the World Bnk3, Chin’s GDP slightly surpssed tht of
Indi, stnding t US$ 293.6 billion compred to Indi’s US$ 293 billion. Fst forwrd to 2020,
Chin’s nominl GDP reched US$ 15.5 trillion, 17% of globl GDP, while Indi’s GDP for the
sme yer ws estimted t US$ 2.66 trillion. The economic symmetry between the two ntions
is strkly evident, highlighted by the fct tht Chin’s totl nnul exports surpss Indi’s entire
GDP. According to Srn (2023),  key explntion for this divergence lies in the fct tht Chin
strtegiclly estblished  system where foreign-introduced technology ws swiftly ssimilted,
forming the foundtion for locl innovtion nd refrining the “brin drin” phenomenon.
When, therefore, Chin detched from the other peers nd strted to grow unrivled?
In 2005, sttements from Chinese prty ledership strted to emphsize tht its sttus s n
emerging power hd entered  new historicl phse, mrked by the country’s “peceful rise”
(Pinto 2005). Following this nrrtive,  key turning point ws undoubtedly the globl finncil
nd economic crisis of 2008, when the United Sttes, first, nd its Western llies, lter, fced
 severe economic downturn. While the crisis endured in the epicenter of cpitlism, Chin
rebounded nd resumed its high-growth trjectory, due to its substntil holdings of US tresury

3 Avilble t: World Bnk Group – WBG. Chna. Wshington, 2024. Accessed Jnury 6, 2024. https://dt.worldbnk.org/country/chin

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securities nd n bundnt stimulus pckge. It begn to showcse the efficiency of its economic
mngement model, chrcterized by rigorous stte regultion, in contrst to the discredited free
nd self-regulted mrket dvocted by the US (Mour 2021).
Chin’s prominence in the globl economy grdully trnslted into  more ssertive foreign
policy tht impcted reltions to former peers. In the erly 2000s, Chin positioned itself s
n emerging economy longside ntions like Brzil, Indi, nd South Afric. It embrced the
“developing country identity” by, for instnce, promoting the BRICS s  strtegic llince.
However, fter 2005, nd minly following the 2008 crisis, Chin seized the opportunity to
scle-up. It shifted its focus nd incresingly mesured itself in reltion to the United Sttes
(Mhbubni 2021; Breslin 2021).
The expecttion of cquiring  gret power sttus lso influenced how Indi understood
the rise of Chin s either n obstcle or n opportunity to its own rise. As introduced before,
Chin-Indi reltions re somewht turbulent, especilly fter the Sino-Indin Wr of 1962.
After the 2008 crisis, when the symmetry between them begn to widen gin, nother mjor
shift inducted Chin’s diminished sensitivity to Indi’s interests, its quest for economic nd
politicl influence in countries round Indi, nd  reduced tolernce for closer Indi-US reltions
(Srn 2023).
The sitution strted to chnge when the terrorist ttcks of September 11 nd the ttributed
“blme” to Islmic fundmentlism prompted President George W. Bush to portry Indi s 
responsible ctor. This nrrtive imed to neutrlize the influence of Pkistn,  Muslim-mjority
country, nd Chin, chrcterized s undemocrtic nd uthoritrin. Strting in 2005, discussions
on this mtter unfolded in the US Stte Deprtment, culminting in  joint sttement by President
Bush nd Prime Minister Singh in 2008, wherein the US declred Indi to be “ responsible stte
with dvnced nucler technology tht deserves to cquire the sme benefits nd dvntges s
other nucler sttes” (Bhti 2017, 127).
The Indo-Americn Nucler Coopertion Agreement, rtified by both countries in 2008,
signified  shift in the opportunities vilble to Indi within the interntionl system. By forging
closer ties with the US, Indi trnsitioned from nucler isoltion to enggement with interntionl
gencies such s the Interntionl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nd the Nucler Suppliers Group
(NSG). Furthermore, the nrrtive of Indi s  responsible ctor positioned the country s 
trusted entity within its mcro-regionl circle, in contrst to the negtive perceptions of Chin,
Russi, nd Pkistn. This lignment with the US lso grnered officil support for Indi’s pursuit
of  permnent set on the United Ntions Security Council (UNSC), in 2010.
Therefore, Indi, in opposition to its stnce fter the Cold Wr, did not pssively ccepted
the role of specttor. For mny high-level officils, cross the politicl spectrum, the rce with
Chin is not yet over (Throor nd Srn 2020). Reclling the critique outlined in the first section
bout the need to open the blck box, the resurgence of Indi’s spirtion to gret power sttus
hs  lyer of explntion in its domestic politics, s the rise of the Bhrtyi Jnt Prty (BJP)
in recent decdes hs brought bout profound chnges in the country’s behvior. As  prty tht

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Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 67(2): e018, 2024 Albuquerque; Lima

defends Hindu ntionlism, trditions nd culture, the BJP hs dopted policies tht highlight
the inevitbility of the Indin worldview. Bsed on Miller’s (2021) vribles, tble 1 compres
Indi’s stnce fter the Cold Wr nd fter 2008.

Table 1. India and rising power variables after the Cold War and after 2008

Economic and Globalized

Leadership
Military Power Authority
Post-Cold Wr Present Absent Prtil nd niched
After 2008 Present Present Present
Source: the uthors.

If the first vrible ws lredy present, it intensified. During the first BJP colition
government (1999-2004), investments on militry moderniztion skyrocketed, s defense becme
n sset for Indi to cquire globl prominence. After the greement with the US, even Indi’s
investments on nucler cpcities were portryed s  prgmtic move insted of  thret.
In 2010 nd 2020, respectively, Indi sustined 2,9% nd 2,8% on militry expenditure (compred
to Chin’s 1,8% on both yers) (Stockholm Interntionl Pece Reserch Institute 2024), but
now on  substntilly lrger GDP. In 2019, Indi becme the world’s fifth lrgest economy,
surpssing Frnce nd the United Kingdom, with  projected third plce in 2030 (Europen
Commission 2018). Therefore,

The period mrked by the strongest economic ccelertion cn be dted to the middle
of the 2000s when the globl economy lso registered record rtes of growth. The
Indin performnce is lso distinguished by two spects which revel  higher degree
of mturity of development: 1) contrry to wht hd occurred until the beginning of
the 1990s, the Indin economy presented  more stble nd less voltile economic
performnce, which strengthens the bsis for structurl economic growth, nd 2)
the Indin economic growth performnce showed more resilience to externl shocks
rooted in the different crises which took plce throughout the 1990s in emerging
mrkets nd the globl crisis of 2008. (Mnzi nd Lim 2021, 6)

The remrkble economic performnce ws coupled with intentionlly seeking globlized
uthority nd ledership beyond its neighborhood – which entils the shift from reticent to
ctive rising power. For Prime Minister Nrendr Modi – lthough this nrrtive hs historiclly
crosscut the politicl spectrum –, Indi is bound to ssume the mntle of world ledership nd
occupy its “rightful” plce (Ayres 2018). In the words of Foreign Minister S. Jishnkr (2024,
69), there is  “conscious endevor to shpe globl issues”, nd “Indi hs tody moved out of
the defensive non-ligned posture, engging multiple ntions on  rnge of issues with equl

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Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 67(2): e018, 2024 Albuquerque; Lima

confidence. It is lso  greter contributor to solutions, regionl or globl” (xii). Additionlly, the
Minister contends (xvii) tht “n erly exhorttion within the Modi government ws to get the
world to chnge its thinking bout Indi. This ment building nd demonstrting cpbilities
cross  wide spectrum”, thereby projecting the messge of  New Indi, “perceived more s prt
of the solution thn the problem” (xviii). Therefore, for Indi, it should not be enough to be 
gret power, but, insted,  “leding power” (Throor nd Srn 2020), not merely s n bstrct
mbition but s  strtegy with specific trgets.
The pths to this gol cn be illustrted by  plethor of concrete exmples, for instnce, the
exhorttion of Hindu ntionlism within Indi to reinforce self-confidence. On one hnd, it hs
 convening power, exemplified by the growth of the use of Bhrt, one of the country’s officil
Hindu nmes s per the Constitution. On the other, it hs been undermining one of Indi’s most
vluble interntionl ssets: its democrcy. The Citizen Amendment Act from 2019, for instnce,
hs hindered the cquisition of Indin citizenship by Muslims. Also, Modi’s government hs been
criticized by the rmping uthoritrinism nd censorship of opponents4. Although US leders
still sustin the nrrtive tht US nd Indi re close prtners who shre democrcy s  core
vlue, some ctions tken by Modi hve cused bcklsh on Indi’s perception brod, which cn
pose  thret in the short run5.
Another strtegy is the recognition of its peers (or peers-to-be), bsed on the ide tht Indi
is redy to “engge with Americ, mnge Chin, cultivte Europe, ressure Russi, bring Jpn
into ply, drw neighbors in, extend the neighborhood, nd expnd trditionl constituencies of
support” (Jishnkr 2024, 1). Therefore, one such strtegy ws to redefine nd scle-up reltions
with its extended neighborhood. Regrding Southest Asi, Indi replced the former “Look
Est” policy, formulted in the 1990s, for the “Act Est” policy, symbolized by its closer ties with
the Assocition of Southest Asin Ntions (ASEAN) members. To reinforce its regionl nd
globl footprint, the BJP government hs lso lunched the “Link West” pproch directed to
the Gulf countries, nd the Connect Centrl Asi Policy, especilly fter Indi joined the Shngi
Coopertion Orgniztion, in 2015.
Moving beyond its neighborhood, by becoming n “cceptble” nucler power in the eyes
of the West, Indi hs turned into n lly to be conquered. For this reson, the country hs
mnged to simultneously be  priority to the US, Russi nd Chin. In the cse of the US,
the nucler greement nd the forml support for dmission s  UNSC permnent member re
illustrtive. More recently, in 2017, during the ASEAN Summit, the two countries, longside
Jpn nd Austrli, relunched the QUAD,  qudrilterl dilogue to reinforce democrcy
nd security in Asi. As for Russi nd Chin, despite persistent tensions, the three countries

4 See, for instnce,  Journl of Democrcy issue on Indi, vilble t https://www.journlofdemocrcy.org/news-nd-updtes/is-indi-still-

-democrcy/ . Accessed on 18th Mrch 2024.
5 Arundhti Roy hs published n op-ed in the New York Times covering this topic. Avilble t: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/13/

opinion/indi-us-diplomcy-chin-biden-modi.html. Accessed on July 4 th 2024. A survey from the Pew Reserch Center published in 2023
lso shows some dt on interntionl views of Indi nd Modi. Avilble t: https://www.pewreserch.org/globl/2023/08/29/interntionl-
views-of-indi-nd-modi/. Accessed on July 4th 2024.

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Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 67(2): e018, 2024 Albuquerque; Lima

coordinte within the BRICS, nd in the Shnghi Coopertion Orgniztion (SCO). Russi
remins  strtegic militry prtner, from which Indi imports high-end defense technologies
s nucler submrines.
Other exmple is Indi’s ctive stnce t multilterl for. At the World Trde Orgniztion
(WTO), Indi hs development s  core belief nd is n ctive demnder of developing countries’
specil sttus nd governments’ right to protect sensitive sectors (Mhrenbch 2013). In the
G20, Indin presidency in 2023 ws n unequivocl disply of its diplomtic cpbilities nd
vilble resources, especilly fter Indi mnged to negotite  consensul declrtion midst
the Russi-Ukrine conflict, nd convened the Globl South Summit, to reinforce the role of
developing countries in economic nd finncil forums like the G20. The Indin presidency ws
lso successful in pproving the dhesion of the Africn Union to the G20 fter yers of intense
negotitions (Rkhr 2023).
At the United Ntions, together with Brzil, Germny nd Jpn, Indi is prt of the G4,
 group tht ims to reform the membership of the UNSC, especilly its permnent members’
current configurtion, to dpt globl governnce bodies to the ctul configurtion of power
(Albuquerque 2022b). Even s  non-permnent member, Indi hs been showcsing its desire to
promote its ntionl interests nd worldviews. In 2011, for exmple, Indi expressed opposition
to the exclusion of non-permnent members from the negotition process regrding resolutions
on Liby nd Syri fter the Arb Spring (Puri 2016). In 2022, when Russi invded Ukrine,
Indi did not implement snctions imposed on Moscow by mny Western countries, nd contested
Russi’s suspension from multilterl institutions (Albuquerque 2023).
If, in the 1990s, Indi ws reticent, it is now nothing but ctive.

Conclusion

Bsed on the literture on rising sttes, we rgued tht shifts in the systemic distribution
of power hve historiclly presented opportunities for emerging countries. The literture on
power trnsitions, however, hs showcsed limittions, such s the sttionry view of zero-sum
trnsitions nd the lck of focus on the rising power’s diversity. Regrding the ltter, Indi
is, undoubtedly,  rising power to be reckoned with. It hs not only  strtegic geopoliticl
position nd remrkble economic indictors, but lso  civiliztionl pst tht supports its
future endevors.
Therefore, we nlyzed Indin foreign policy in two trnsition contexts, nmely the end
of the Cold Wr nd the rise of Chin. We pplied  frmework consisting of three vribles to
compre the Indin behvior in these pivotl contexts: economic nd militry power, globlized
uthority, nd interntionl ledership. When  country only meets the first criteri, it is considered
n ccommodtionl rising power, s there re still some conditions to be fulfilled in order to
enble it to shpe globl issues. It ws precisely the cse fter the Cold Wr. Due to its colonil

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Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 67(2): e018, 2024 Albuquerque; Lima

legcy nd prtition trums, Indi ws reticent to engge with Western gret powers nd focused
its strtegy to either inwrd-looking development strtegies or to llinces imed t reducing
symmetries, such s Third World colitions nd the MNA.
After 2008, however, Indi strtegiclly plnned to chieve globlized uthority nd
interntionl ledership, especilly fter the BJP cme to power with the nrrtive of retking
Indi to its “rightful” plce. The “Indin impertive” is intrinsiclly linked with the country’s
self-ssessment s  civiliztion entity, n “ide dvoccy” tht hs been crfted by the elites nd
hs cquired broder cceptnce within society. Therefore, our nlysis leds us to the conclusion
tht while Indi only prtilly met the requisites in the ftermth of the Cold Wr, it hs now
fully embrced its desire to be recognized s  gret power.
As this is  process in the mking, future reserch gends will be required to complement
our findings. One is the current chllenges to Indin democrcy following BJP policies nd its
possible impcts on how Indi is perceived brod. Another topic tht requires further reserch
is the development of comprtive nlysis between rising powers to simultneously highlight
their diversity nd better ssess how they strtegize their pth towrds scendncy. Connected
to both, the role of the elites nd the domestic convergence round foreign policy lso deserve
more in-depth ccounts.

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