KISHAN LAL KALRA v. N.D.M.C.
Submitted by: Ishita Gupta, B.A., LLB (Hons.)
Roll No.:23121
Submitted to: - Mrs. Sushmita Singh
(Teacher Associate)
This final draft of project has been submitted in the
fulfilment of the B.A.LL. B (Hons.) course in Law of Contracts.
Chanakya National Law University, Patna
March, 2024
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my respected Professor Mrs.
Sushmita Singh for giving me a golden opportunity to take up this project regarding –
‘Case commentary on Kishan Lal Mishra v. N.D.M.C.’ and sincere thanks for the
continuous support of my study and related research, for her patience, motivation, and
immense knowledge. Her guidance helped me in all the time of research. I could not have
imagined having a better advisor and mentor for my research.
Thank You
Ishita Gupta
2nd Semester
CNLU, Patna
DECLARATION
I, Ishita Gupta hereby declare that the project work entitled “Kishan Lal Mishra v.
N.D.M.C.” submitted at the Chanakya National Law University, Patna is my original
piece of research work conducted in March 2024.
In instances where the reference of other works has been cited, full acknowledgment has
been given to the original owner. I have not submitted this work elsewhere for any other
degree or diploma. I am fully responsible for the content of this project.
Signature of Candidate
Ishita Gupta
23121
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)
2nd Semester
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.........................................................................................................2
DECLARATION........................................................................................................................3
1. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................5
2. FACTS OF THE CASE......................................................................................................6
3. ISSUES RAISED................................................................................................................8
4. CONTENTIONS BY THE PETITIONER.........................................................................9
5. CONTENTIONS BY THE DEFENDANT......................................................................10
6. ANALYSIS.......................................................................................................................11
7. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................12
1. INTRODUCTION
The case of Kishan Lal Kalra v. NDMC focuses on a situation where the plaintiff claimed he
was forced to give up a disputed site in New Delhi because of threats of MISA during the
Emergency era. Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines "Coercion" as the
committing, or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860) or the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any
person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement.1
This case examines how coercion, which involves using force or threats to make someone do
something against their will, can affect the validity of contracts. By exploring the idea of
coercion outlined in Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act, which defines the concept of
coercion as, this case examines how being coerced can impact whether a contract is valid or
not.2 It highlights the importance of consent and how being forced into an agreement can
make it voidable. This legal dispute brings attention to the key principles governing contracts
in India, emphasising the need for agreements to be entered willingly and without pressure.
1
Indian Contract Act, 1872, § 15, No. 9, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India).
2
IPLEADERS, https://blog.ipleaders.in/directed-coercion-in-contracts-section-15-of-the-ica/, (last visited March
11, 2024).
2. FACTS OF THE CASE
The NDMC granted the plaintiff a license deed for five years starting from June 1,
1968, to operate an open-air restaurant named 'Ramble Open Air Restaurant' in
Connaught Circus, New Delhi. The designated land was approximately 3,000 square
yards, accommodating around 350 people. The monthly lease rental was Rs. 5,104.00
for the land and Rs. 250.00 for the car parking area. In June 1973, the NDMC
extended the lease for another five years (until May 31, 1978) with an increased
monthly rental of Rs. 6,380.00 for the land and Rs. 312.50 for the car parking.
In June 1975, the Emergency was declared under Article 352 of the Constitution 3.
Despite the lease remaining valid until June 1978, on June 21, 1976, the NDMC
initiated eviction proceedings under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 19714. On June 26, 1976, the plaintiff submitted a
detailed representation to the NDMC, explaining their investments and requesting
protection. On July 24, 1976, the plaintiff responded comprehensively to the show
cause notice issued by the Estate Officer. During the proceedings on August 3, 1976,
the NDMC requested time to address the objections, leading to an adjournment until
September 22, 1976, for NDMC's evidence.
During the ongoing proceedings and at the point where NDMC was supposed to
present evidence, on August 7, 1976, the NDMC unlawfully took action. They
dispatched a demolition team accompanied by the police to forcefully seize the
premises without following due process of law, disregarding the fact that proceedings
before the Estate Officer were already underway. The NDMC, under the threat of a
blank warrant of arrest under MISA, demolished the structures and forcibly took
possession, leading to the plaintiff's unlawful dispossession.
On September 22, 1976, the hearing before the Estate Officer was postponed to
October 19, 1976, and later to December 4, 1976, at the request of NDMC. However,
NDMC was absent on the latter date, leading to another adjournment to December 13,
1976, for evidence recording. On December 13, 1976, Mr P.R. Gupta, Head Assistant
of NDMC, appeared and stated that possession of the premises had been "recovered"
3
INDIA CONST. art. 352, cl. 1.
4
The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,1971, § 4, No. 40, Acts of Parliament, 1971
(India).
from the plaintiff. NDMC expressed no further interest in pursuing the case, resulting
in its dismissal.
The Proclamation of Emergency was lifted in March 1977. Despite the plaintiff's
statutory notice to NDMC in May 1977 under Section 49 of the Punjab Municipal
Act, 19115, and subsequent efforts, no resolution was achieved. In July 1979, the
plaintiff initiated the current lawsuit seeking damages for wrongful dispossession and
loss of profits for the remaining lease period.6
3. ISSUES RAISED
5
The Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, § 49, No. 3, Acts of Punjab State Legislature, 1911 (India).
6
Kishan Lal Kalra v. N.D.M.C., 2001 SCC OnLine Del 411 ¶ 2.
The issue raised for consideration is whether the plea regarding possession of the disputed
site was surrendered by the plaintiff voluntarily or was taken from him forcibly and whether
the defendant is liable for the damage caused to the plaintiff by the sale of his furniture and to
what amount of damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?7
4. CONTENTIONS BY THE PETITIONER
7
Kishan Lal Kalra v. N.D.M.C., 2001 SCC OnLine Del 411 ¶ 4.
The primary assertion made by the petitioner revolves around the unlawful eviction from the
premises without following the correct legal procedures. It is stressed that the defendant did
not comply with the stipulations outlined in Section 4 of the PUBLIC PREMISES
(EVICTION OF UNAUTHORISED OCCUPANTS) ACT, 1971 and failed to allow the
petitioner to present their case, thereby violating fundamental principles of natural justice.
The learned senior counsel also submitted that once the machinery under the PP Act was set
into motion, the defendants were entitled to evict the plaintiff only after following the
procedures contained in Section 4 of the said Act and only after giving opportunity to the
plaintiff in consonance with principles of natural justice. Once the procedure laid down by
Section 4 of the Act was not followed by the defendant and no opportunity was given to the
plaintiff such dispossession was clearly illegal, contrary to law and also contrary to the
principles of natural justice. 8
The learned senior counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in support of
the proposition that the occupant in possession cannot be dispossessed without recourse of
law.9
The petitioner's argument gains backing from legal precedents, including judgments from the
Supreme Court and relies on well-established legal principles concerning eviction and
possession rights. The unchallenged statements of the petitioner's witnesses further reinforce
the case against the defendant.
Moreover, the petitioner is seeking redress for various losses incurred as a result of the
sudden closure of the restaurant. This encompasses reimbursement for the sale of assets,
compensation and gratuity for staff, and the loss of profits for the remaining period of the
license. The petitioner has provided supporting evidence, highlighting the financial
repercussions stemming from the wrongful dispossession.
5. CONTENTIONS BY THE DEFENDANT
8
Wire-Netting Stores and Anr. v. The Delhi Development Authority & Ors., 1969 (3) SCC 415.
9
Krishna Ram Mahale (Dead), by his LRs. v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131.
They opted not to cross-examine any of the plaintiff's witnesses, leaving the plaintiff's
evidence unchallenged. Furthermore, the defendant failed to provide any supporting evidence
to counter the plaintiff's claims. Notably, the defendant's legal counsel focused primarily on
disputing the monetary amount asserted by the plaintiff rather than presenting substantial
arguments.
Another critical aspect of the defence's position is the assertion that the plaintiff willingly
surrendered the premises, rendering the lawsuit invalid. Despite the burden of proof on
crucial issues lying with the defendant, they did not present any evidence or arguments in
their favour. Additionally, the defence did not address the matter of res judicata, and the
decision on this issue went against them.
The defendant admitted responsibility for the loss resulting from the forced sale of the
plaintiff's assets. However, their legal representative contested the plaintiff's entitlement to
the claimed amount, emphasizing the importance of a proper assessment and supporting
evidence.
There was lack of cross-examination 10, the absence of presented evidence, emphasis on
contesting the claimed amount, the argument of voluntary surrender of premises, issues with
the burden of proof, neglect of addressing res judicata, acknowledgement of liability for the
forced sale of assets, dispute over damages calculation, and contestation of the legality of the
plaintiff's premature dispossession.
10
Kishan Lal Kalra v. N.D.M.C., 2001 SCC OnLine Del 411 ¶ 5.
6. ANALYSIS
The court rightly decided to award damages to the petitioner, Kishan Lal Kalra, on the
basis of lack of due process of law and arbitrary action taken by the authorities against
him during the Emergency period. The court’s decision for the wrongful dispossession
and loss of profits caused by the defendant was rightfully based on the principles of
contract law, natural justice and compensation of harm. The court held that the actions of
the defendant was not appropriate under the Section 4 of PP Act. The deed made by the
plaintiff under the threat of MISA was also held to be invalid.
While holding the signing of possession letter by the plaintiff as illegal in accordance
with Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act, the court also relied on the judgment of the
Privy Council.11 Various judgments were also relied on while calculating and justifying
the damages awarded to the plaintiff. 12 The court aligned itself with the well-established
legal principles regarding the burden of proof, assessment of damages and also lack of
evidence from the defendant. It followed the principles of natural justice and legal
procedures.
While holding that the defendant obtained the receipt by exercising pressure or coercion
and it was not a voluntary surrender by the plaintiff the court adequately justified its
reasoning and interpreted law as to make sure there is not yet another person who is
affected by the excesses of the emergency period.13
The court reviewed arguments from both sides and also rejected the defendant’s claims of
res judicata, voluntary surrender and licence revocation. It ensured to address all relevant
points, no crucial matter or argument was disregarded while determining the decision.
11
Barton v. Armstrong & Ors., (1975) 2 All England Law Reports 465; Kishan Lal Kalra v. N.D.M.C., 2001
SCC OnLine Del 411 ¶ 6.
12
Frederick Thomas Kingsley v. The Secretary of State for India, AIR 1923 Calcutta 49; Union Carbide
Corporation Etc. v. UOI, AIR 1992 SC 248.
13
Kishan Lal Kalra v. N.D.M.C., 2001 SCC OnLine Del 411 ¶ 13.
7. CONCLUSION
The court carefully examined the evidence, statutory regulations, and legal precedents. It
concluded that the NDMC's actions violated both the terms of the license agreement and
procedural norms. The damages awarded were deemed justified due to the measurable
losses suffered by Kalra. The judgment underscored the importance of natural justice and
adherence to due process. It restated established principles concerning contractual rights,
wrongful dispossession, and the granting of compensation. The ruling managed to
achieve equilibrium between the rights of the licensee and those of the public body,
fostering fairness and accountability.
The impact of the judgment goes beyond the specific case, influencing future disputes and
acting as a discouragement against arbitrary actions by public bodies, thereby protecting
the concerns of licensees. Furthermore, it underscores the judiciary's duty to uphold
justice, safeguard contractual rights, and promote accountability in administrative actions.
The judgment serves as a guiding principle for ensuring fair and unbiased treatment of
licensees, underscoring the vital importance of due process in our legal system.
