Arab Transformations Project
Report Part Title: Democracy
Report Title: Political and Social Transformations in Egypt
Report Author(s): Andrea Teti, I. Xypolia, V. Sarnelli, G. Tsourapas, V. Lomazzi and P.
Abbott
Published by: Arab Transformations Project (2017)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep14105.4
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Democracy
Any authoritarian system, regardless of external rigidity, contains traces of pluralism that might
make possible democratic conditions through a series of permutations (and vice versa, of
course). Broadly speaking, the literature on democratization/authoritarianism in the MNEA
region analyses institutional, economic, and cultural factors to identify either causes of or
blockages to democratisation. Transitology, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian resilience models
view elections, identity politics, and rentierism as essential, contingent, or irrelevant to
transitions to democracy or authoritarian retrenchment.
Similar divisions can be identified in literature on the Middle Eastern: some studies treat the
Middle East as an exceptional case, others suggests uniqueness derives from a series of
(contingent) factors, some claim that change away from authoritarianism is impossible either in
principle or de facto, others emphasise the hybridity or the fragility of authoritarianism. Perhaps
the best – and most notorious – example of these disagreements is the debate about the
‘compatibility’ of democracy and ‘Islam’, with eminent figures like Huntington, Lewis, Gellner,
and Kedourie taking one view, and Said, Esposito, Piscatori, and Halliday taking the opposite
position.
This section draws on the BTI Status Index – perhaps the most prestigious indicator of political
(democracy) and economic (social market) transformation – evaluating against survey data on
public opinion preferences on the characteristics of democracy, on the perception of
democratic systems, and on whether democratic systems have positive effects.
Egypt
The literature on Egypt echoes both political science and area studies. The discourse on
democracy was largely absent within the immediate period following the 1952 Free Officers’
Revolution (Gordon 1992; Abdel-Malek 1968), with research identifying political institutions –
namely, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) – but not detecting any move towards democratic
institutions (Baker 1999; Waterbury 1983). Even popular protests like those of university
students against the Nasserite regime or the 1977 ‘January Intifada’, were not framed as
demands for democracy but as material grievances (Abdalla 2008). Sadat’s introduction of
centrist, leftist, and rightist manabir (political platforms) into the ASU in the 1970s (Hinnebusch
1985; Beattie 2000), and their eventual split into three distinct parties, was regarded as
cosmetic, given both the power of the Egyptian military (Kassem 2004; Kandil 2012) and the
dominant role of the ‘centrist’ National Democratic Party (NDP) which Sadat chose as vehicle of
his clientelistic system. For Hinnebusch, Sadat employed the economic liberalisation process of
al-Infitah to lead Egypt into a ‘post-populist’ socio-political formation: the regime remains ‘an
authoritarian one, but […] it has taken on an increasingly conservative face’ (Hinnebusch 1981).
Throughout Hosni Mubarak’s rule, a broader literature tried to identify the role of Islamist
political movements – specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood and the al-Wasat Party – in the
Egyptian democratic process (Wickham 2004; Wickham 2013; Wickham 2005). Most often,
these movements have been examined through discourses on the interaction between Islam
and democracy (Zubaida 1993), or through elite politics, identifying how elites in power
manage, but also manipulate, their political opponents (Lust-Okar 2010). Despite various cracks
in the Egyptian political system (Tripp & Owen 1989), most researchers continued to diagnose a
persistence of authoritarianism, rather than democratic openings – this was the case, for
instance, during the opening of 2005, the so-called “Cairo Spring” (Antar 2006; Meital 2006).
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Kienle suggested that promises of democracy during a previous phase of contestation in the
late 1980s and early 1990s in Egypt was part of a ‘grand delusion’ (Kienle 2001). Democracy
came back to the forefront in the study of Egyptian politics particularly in the post-9/11 era of
‘democracy promotion,’ particularly within the broader context of EU or US efforts towards the
region (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz 2010; Pace 2009; Seeberg 2009; Lazarou et al. 2013).
A sizeable literature has also focused on the importance of rent – particularly oil rent, migrants’
economic remittances, and strategic rent from the United States – that negatively affected the
prospects of democratisation in Egypt (Soliman 2011; Ibrahim 1982). As remittances increase
the flow of foreign reserves into the sending state, economic grievances against the ruling
regime are expected to decrease. Taking this a step further, “rentier state” theorists would
argue that such remittances constitute “rents” that impede democratisation.1 Yet, the “resource
curse” argument is widely discredited from both a number of different perspectives (Dunning
2008; Haber & Menaldo 2011).
Another argument revolves around the re-traditionalisation of Egyptian society from return
migration that further impedes democratisation. Wickham argued that:
Egyptian migration to the Gulf in the 1970s and 1980s had the effect of reinforcing the influence
of Islam in sha‘bi communal life. As noted in the previous chapter, the regional oil boom
dramatically increased private wealth, some of which was channelled—by either Egyptians or
Gulf Arab patrons—into the development of private mosques and Islamic service associations in
sha‘bi neighbourhoods. At the same time, the intensive exposure of Egyptian citizens to the
social mores of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries where Islamic law was strictly applied
pushed their own religious beliefs and practice in a more conservative direction upon their return
home. Indeed, by the early 1990s, critics had begun to openly lament that the influence of
“Wahhabi” Islam (the ultraconservative strand of Islam dominant in Saudi Arabia) had begun to
erode the more flexible and permissive form of popular Islam that had evolved in Egypt
(Wickham 2005).
Similar arguments have been raised by a number of Egyptian intellectuals, and are quite
popular, with good reason: the widespread sense that the Egyptian economy has been
“infiltrated” by Gulf capital, a conspiratorial emphasis on the foreign origins of many Egyptians’
wealth, and the socio-economic empowerment of key figures associated with the Muslim
Brotherhood contributed to the widespread view that Egypt was being ‘Saudised’ (Ibrahim
2001; Aswani 2011).
For centuries Egypt had its own understanding of Islam, a tolerant and open-minded
understanding compatible with the civilized nature of Egyptians. Egypt always managed, in quite
an unusual way, to preserve its form of Islam with its openness to the world [...] at least until the
end of the 1970s, when Egyptian society was subjected to a sweeping invasion of Wahhabi ideas
from Saudi Arabia. One factor that led to this invasion is that President Anwar Sadat used
religion to overcome the leftist opposition, and the Mubarak regime continues to support
Wahhabism in order to benefit from the political submissiveness it installs in people’s minds.
Another is that the price of oil increased several times over after the October 1973 war, giving
Saudi Arabia more influence than it ever had before and enabling it to impose its understanding
of Islam on Egypt and the Arab world. As corruption and despotism added to poverty in Egypt,
millions of Egyptians flocked to work in the Gulf, and came [...] (Aswani 2011).
After 2011 the number of works debating the nature of democracy in Egypt – either in terms of
novel forms of popular participation (Tripp 2013), of the Muslim Brotherhood (Mariz Tadros
2012), or the nature, and precarious future, of political liberalism (Rutherford 2008) – increased,
although experts also focused on what Nathan Brown called ‘Egypt’s Failed Transition’ (Brown
1
This builds on Mahdavy’s (Mahdavy 1970) analysis, which argued that petroleum revenues in states
across the Middle East constituted an external source of rents that was directly captured by
governments, effectively rendering them unaccountable to their citizens.
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2013). The discourse on democratisation has been undeniably affected by the 2013 ousting of
President Morsi by the Egyptian military, with many arguing for a possible reconstitution of the
pre-2011 military regime (Gerges 2013).
Arguably, the coming years will continue the debate on Egypt’s relationship to democracy
across similarly sober parameters.
Survey Indices
Figure 2
Main Characteristics of Democracy
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013
Main characteristics (Socio-Economic) Main characteristics (Civic-Political)
Note: The Main characteristics (Civic-Political) index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of: (1)
Opportunity to change the government through elections; (2) Freedom to criticize the government/ those in power.
The Main characteristics (Socio-Economic) index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of: (1)
Governments intervenes to narrow the gap, taxing the rich and subsidize the poor.
From 2011 to 2013, while there is a decline of the perceptions that the essential characteristics
of democracy are civic-political characteristics of democracy, there is a sharp increase of the
perception that the socio-economic characteristics of democracy are the most important. This
increase might be a response to the economic as well as political turmoil of the post-
revolutionary period – tourism, primarily, which fell drastically. Civil and political rights were also
under great pressure in this period, both from the military government of the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces (SCAF) first and later by the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated parliament
and Muhammad Morsi’s Presidency.
In these critical times, the 2015 Freedom House report on Egypt is telling:
Freedoms of assembly and association are tightly restricted. A November 2013 decree gave
police great leeway to ban and forcibly disperse gatherings of 10 or more people. The law also
prohibits all protests at places of worship and requires protest organizers to inform police at least
three days in advance. Protests against the government continued throughout 2014, but they
often ended in violent clashes with police and local residents, and police repeatedly used
excessive force. On the third anniversary of the 2011 uprising in January, authorities responded
to secularist and Islamist demonstrations with tear gas and live ammunition, resulting in at least
49 deaths and more than 1,000 arrests.
The 2002 Law on Associations grants the government sweeping powers over nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), including the ability to shut down the groups, confiscate their funding, and
block nominations to their governing boards. Individuals working with unregistered groups face
prison terms for engaging in “unauthorized activities.” The government has in the past permitted
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NGOs to operate without registration, enforcing the law when it becomes politically expedient.
Under a decree issued in September 2014, members of NGOs that use foreign funding to
commit acts that “harm the national interest” face life imprisonment and fines of nearly $70,000.
If an offender is a public servant or committed the violation for the purposes of terrorism, he or
she could face the death penalty.
Strikes played a significant role in the 2011 uprising, and workers subsequently formed an
independent union federation, ending the long-standing monopoly of the state-allied federation.
The labor movement was dampened somewhat after Morsi’s ouster, as authorities clamped
down on strikes and accused those involved of sympathizing with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Strikes began to increase again in early 2014, particularly around demands for the nationwide
expansion of a new minimum wage that had been granted to some public-sector workers.
Authorities responded with raids, arrests, and intimidation (Freedom House 2015).
However, it seemed that at least during this period, popular pressure was bringing positive
results in this area, with SCAF relenting to anti-military protests by conceding presidential and
parliamentary elections in 2012, and popular pressure against Morsi’s perceived
authoritarianism had put him under pressure, eventually eliciting the army’s coup.
Figure 3
Perception of Democratic Systems
100
77.5
80 66.9
60
40
20
0
2008 2011
Note: The ‘Perception of democratic systems’ index highlights respondents’ perception of importance, suitability or
adequacy of democracy as a political system for their country. It is computed as mean of min-max normalized values
of: (1) A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than others; (2) How suitable is democracy for your
country; (3) most suitable for your country: having a democratic political system.
The magnitude of this drop – just over 10% – appears significant: the 2011 values are based on
a survey that was being carried out just months after the January Revolution, albeit the survey
from which this value is derived was carried out in June-July 2011, as protests against SCAF
military rule were beginning to increase (they would eventually cumulate in the November
protests that would force parliamentary and presidential elections held in 2012). It might be
explained by increasing disaffection with ‘democracy’ such as it was practiced in Egypt by the
regime: as such, the declining measure can give an idea of the declining legitimacy of ‘façade
democracy’ in Egypt, placing the blame for the changing perception of democracy not merely
on the military regime but, as the Economist wrote in 2015, on the opposition movement as
well:
Contrary to his rhetoric, Mr Sisi has set Egyptian democracy back. Yet the forces behind Egypt’s
revolution in 2011—when the previous strongman, Hosni Mubarak, was overthrown in a popular
revolt—have shown scant ability and often little inclination to keep the country on a more
democratic path. Most of Egypt’s so-called liberals supported the overthrow of Muhammad
Morsi, the former president, in 2013 on the grounds that his Muslim Brotherhood was itself
undermining democracy. Many then stayed mum as Mr Sisi’s troops slaughtered protesting
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Islamists. Tarnished by this history, riven by infighting and lacking broad appeal, the liberals now
appear helpless to check Egypt’s slide back to authoritarianism (Economist 2015).
This survey index corroborates the expectations of the ‘cyclical authoritarianism’ model that the
Arab Transitions projects puts forth, mirrored in the initial espousal of, and later discontent with,
democratic systems in Egypt.
Figure 4
Positive Effects of a Democratic System
100
90 81.1 80.7
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013
Note: The Positive Effects of a democratic system index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of: (1)
Under a democratic system, the country’s economic performance is weak; (2) Democratic regimes are indecisive and
full of problems; (3) Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability.
Although there is a drop-in value from 2011 to 2013, the drop itself is merely 0.4% and
therefore not significant. The index is computed based on ArabBarometer data, which for Egypt
was collected in June-July 2011 (ABII) and in early April 2013 (ABIII), suggesting there is little
drop over the first two years of the revolution in support for the positive effects of a democratic
system. Note that although the ABIII data is collected before the coup in which the army
removed Muhammad Morsi on July 3rd: during this period there was increasing and significant
dissatisfaction from specific sectors of society – mostly middle and upper class nationalist,
liberal and/or secular elites portions of which had supported the Revolution – with the
government of Muhammad Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood: in December 2012, the
Brotherhood had forced through a new constitution through an alliance with Salafist groups in
Parliament while marginalising other political groups, and was increasingly perceived as
ignoring other groups who had taken part in the revolution and attempting to repress any
opposition, as its predecessors had done. The changes observed in the perception of
democracy between 2005-2010 take place after what was then called the ‘Cairo Spring’, i.e.
the reforms from above Mubarak introduced partly in response to internal pressures due to his
attempt to impose his son Gamal as successor (tawreeth) and partly due to US policy which in
the wake of the invasion of Iraq accepted the then-hegemonic view amongst US neo-
conservatives that ‘democratisation’ could afford Washington strategic leverage in the region.
These ‘reforms’ were widely criticised as being ultimately hollow attempts at preserving the
Mubarak family’s authoritarian grip.
In this context, the changes in indicators above suggest what appears to be a drop in the
perceived legitimacy of the formal aspects of democracy and an increase in demand for
delivery of substantive aspects of democracy. At the same time, it is also likely to lend further
credence to expectations of ‘cyclical authoritarianism’ scholars, in their prediction of the
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gradual popular disappointment with democratic ideals, or authors theorising a model around
the remarkable resilience of authoritarian regimes.
Macro Indicators
Figure 5
BTI - Status Index
10
6
4.88 5.08
4.82 4.76
5 4.29 4.4
1
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015
Note: The BTI Status Index is the most prestigious international index that attempts to grasp transformation. It has
two analytic dimensions, one assessing the state of political transformation (Democracy Status), the other the state of
economic transformation (Market Economy Status). It identifies where each of the 129 countries stand on their path
toward democracy under the rule of law and a market economy anchored in principles of social jus-tice. The BTI
focuses on the quality of governance.
The BTI Status Index is calculated every two years, and as such it is unfortunately ill-placed to
provide a fine-grained account of the impact of the Egyptian Revolution. However, it is
noteworthy that the 2010 and 2012 are so similar, indeed showing a slight decline, despite the
fact that Egypt’s 2010 elections were the most unfree of the late Mubarak period, while the
2012 presidential and parliamentary elections are instead considered the most open and
competitive in the country’s history. In fact, between Morsi’s removal in 2013 and Sisi’s 2014
choreographed election, there is an increase of the index, by roughly 0.5. This could be due to
an increase in the economy status. In its change over time, the BTI Status Index suggests
fluctuations between political openings and clampdowns.
While the BTI Status Index suggests patterns that seem to initially correspond closely to
expectations of the democratic transition model, the post-2014 calculations are more likely to
underline the resurgence and empowerment of a versatile authoritarian regime.
Political Preferences and Attitudes towards Different Political Systems
Political Science inherits a normative and ‘evolutionary’ hierarchy between political systems
from modernization theory (see Section 4, D1.1) which provides an analytical lens through
which MENA regimes’ approximation to democracy or authoritarianism is evaluated. Indicators
such as the Polity IV measures of institutionalised autocracy and institutionalised democracy
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