INTRODUCTION

The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field Guide

In: Block. N.; Flanagan, O. & Güzeldere, G. (orgs.). The nature of consciousness: philosophical debates.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997, pp. 1-67, 807-16.
Giiveo Giizeldere

There is perhaps no other phenomenon besides This testimonial was one of the many unsettling
consciousness that is so familiar to each of us and personal accounts of "becoming conscious" under
yet has been so elusive to any systematic study, general anesthesia, gathered in response to the
philosophical or scientific. In thinking about con­ following advertisement, which appeared in four
sciousness, the puzzlement one often finds oneself national newspapers in Great Britain in 1 984:
in is rather like St. Augustine's riddle in his con­
templations about the nature of time: When no SURGERY: Have you ever been conscious dur­
one asked him, he knew what it was; being asked, ing a surgical operation when you were supposed
however, he no longer did. (Augustine of Hippo to be anaesthesized? A medical research team
1 96 1 : Book I I .) would like an account of your experiences.
What is at the heart of this puzzlement? Is there Write in confidence.
a genuine difficulty that underlies it? What are the The goal of this advertisement was to gather
specific issues that comprise the problem of con­ firsthand accounts of gaining consciousness under
sciousness? ( Is there really a "the problem of general anesthesia, in order to investigate the
consciousness"?) And are we facing a phenom­ truth of a number of patients' discomforting post­
enon the understanding of which lies forever be­ surgery reports and to provide legal guidance for
yond our intellectual capacities? These are the the accumulating court cases. 2
questions that I will pursue below. Whatever philosophical problems may be as­
The overarching goal of this introduction is to sociated with the term consciousness, it might be
provide a field guide (with a particular perspec­ thought that it would be a straightforward matter
tive) for anyone interested in the history and to specify an operational definition of being con­
present status of philosophical issues in the study scious for anesthesiologists to work with. Can
of consciousness. Part One is a preliminary over­ consciousness simply not be detected on the basis
view of the current philosophical positions in the of the patient's being alert and responsive? What
literature, as well as a discussion of the unique is in question, after all, is neither the notoriously
difficulties inherent in the concept and nature elusive problem of phenomenal experience nor
of consciousness. Part Two is an account of the the concept of the evanescent Humean self.
study of consciousness in the history of modem A brief look at the anesthesiology literature,
psychology. Finally, Part Three is an exposition brimming with terms like real awareness and in­
of the mosaic of philosophical puzzles of con­ cipient consciousness, quickly proves otherwise.
sciousness, as well as an exploration of their in­ (Cf. Rosen and Lunn 1 987.) If anything, the con­
terrelations. 1 sensus is that "with the spectral edge of the EEG
[electroencephalogram] or median frequency,
PART ONE or any other processed EEG signal, there does
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS not seem to be a clear cut-off, without overlap,
between consciousness and unconsciousness"
(Vickers 1 987, p. 1 8 2). The phenomenon of con­
The feeling ofhelplessness was terrifying. I tried to let the
staff know I was conscious but I couldn't move even a sciousness does not have clear-cut boundaries,
finger or eyelid. II was like being held in a vice and grad­ and its complex structure does not admit any
ually I realized that I was in a situation from which there easy formulations. (See, for instance, the Roche
was no way out. I began to feel that breathing was im­ Handbook of Differential Diagnosis on "Coma"
possible, and Ijust resigned myself to dying. [1 979] and on "Transient Loss of Consciousness"
-Patient: Male, aged fifty-rour, bronchoscopy, 1978. [1 989].) Even if it is in principle possible to invent
Guven Giizeldere 2

a "consciousness monitor," a device that would

co�­
I The Puzzle of ConsciolBless
detect the physical signs of the presence of
sciousness in a patient, no such technology IS
These questions do not have any easy, obvious
anywhere in sight, because it is not even known
answers. Nor is there at present anything that
what exactly is to be measured.
could be regarded as a received view on problems
The root of the problem lies deeper than the
of consciousness in the scientific and philosoph­
inadequacy of the technology or the lack of suffi­
ical community. Furthermore, it is common to
cient data, however. What seems to be critically
find serious doubts expressed in the literature
lacking is a solid theoretical framework to ground
about whether there can ever be a complete un­
and facilitate the experimental research. For ex­
derstanding of the phenomenon of consciousness.
ample, there is no established consensus, even in
The gloomy opening lines of Thomas Nagel's
the medical field, as to what should count as the
famous essay, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?"
criteria of consciousness, so as to demarcate the
have become formative for many in thinking
domain of the conscious from that of the uncon­
about consciousness: "Consciousness is what
scious or the nonconscious. The problem with
makes the mind-body problem really intract­
building a consciousness monitor is not confined
able. . . . Without consciousness the mind-body
to a lack of sufficiently fine-grained measuring
problem would be much less interesting. With
instruments; it ultimately has to do with not
consciousness, it seem s hopeless" (Nagel 1974,
knowing where to begin measuring and where to
. . pp. 1 65-1 66).
end up with the measured quantities. 3
The puzzle of consciousness can be regarded
Worse, it is not clear whether everyone
in various ways, all the way from a supernatural
means the same thing by the term consciousness,
mystery that will forever elude naturalist expla­
even within the bounds of a single discipline.
nations to a natural but extremely complicated
There is considerable variation in people's pre­
theoretic intuitions, for instance, regarding the
�
pheno enon about which we know very little.
And some of the time, the blue line that lies in
kinds of creatures to which consciousness can be
between becomes very thin. There are also those
attributed.4
who express skepticism about the existence of
And in the absence of well-grounded theories,
consciousness as a real phenomenon or about the
the lack of robust pretheoretical intuitions be­
coherence of its conceptual grounding, as well as
comes even more importunate. Consider again
others with a much more positive outlook, busily
the case of anesthesia. A person who is totally
constructing their own accounts of consciousness
unresponsive to stimuli can, in one very impor­
to solve the puzzle. A brief look at some of the
tant sense, be said to have lost consciousness.
representatives of these different positions is in
Nonetheless, can she still be said to be conscious
order.
in another sense-in the sense of passively expe­
riencing the sensations caused by the stimuli, for
The Mystery of ConsciolNless and the
instance? Similarly, are we to grant consciousness
Explanatory Gap
to a patient in a vegetative state, even when she
lacks a well-functioning brain stem? Or what
In the opening pages of Consciousness Explained,
would justify granting consciousness to the
Daniel Dennett (1991) remarks:
patient if she did have a functioning brain stem
that maintained the autonomic functions of her Human consciousness is just about the last surviving
body?5 How many senses of consciousness are mystery . . . . There have been other great mysteries: t�e
there anyway, and how are we to taxonomize mystery of the origin of the universe, the mystery of hfe
them? and reproduction, the mystery of the design to be found
Approaching Consciousness 3

in nature, the mysteries of time, space, and gravity. . . . the soul in the same breath, nor does anyone refer
We do not yet have the final answers to any of the to language as "that evanescent thing." So it
questions of cosmology and particle physics, molecular seems obvious that consciousness is perceived
genetics, and evolutionary theory, but we do know how
as special, possibly unique, and not readily ame­
to think about them. The mysteries haven't vanished,
nable to ordinary scientific or philosophical ex­
but they have been tamed. . . . With consciousness,
however, we are still in a terrible muddle. Consciousness
planation.
stands alone today as a topic that often leaves even the Some take this sense of mystery even further,
most sophisticated thinkers tongue-tied and confused. and this attitude is not at all restricted to the
(pp. 21-22) popular press. It is in fact possible to find the
same sentiments expressed in philosophical and
Dennett should not be taken as promoting the scientific circles, by those whom Owen Flanagan
sense of mystery, however. After all, his book is (199 1 ) calls the "New Mysterians." For instance,
entitled Consciousness Explained. Of course, it is Colin McGinn ( 1 989) finds it humanly impossible
hard to say that everyone (or even many) agrees ever to understand "how technicolor phenomen­
with Dennett's conviction. In fact, the general ology can arise from grey soggy matter," and ap­
sentiment among those who work on conscious­ provingly quotes the English biologist Huxley
ness (including philosophers, psychologists, and who famously stated: "How it is that anything so
neuroscientists) seems to be on the "puzzled" side. remarkable as a state of consciousness comes
Moreover, in the wake of a recent rise in inter­ about as a result of irritating nervous tissue is just
est in the study of consciousness, almost each ap­ as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when
pearance of consciousness as a subject matter in Aladdin rubbed his lamp" (p. 349).6
the popular press has been tagged with some ele­ The expression of this sort of puzzlement is
ment of mystery. For instance, Francis Crick and hardly new. Similar perplexity has been expressed
Christof Koch called consciousness the "most by a number of people over the years, especially
mysterious aspect of the mind-body problem" in since the mid-nineteenth century, with the ad­
their article that appeared in a special issue of vancement of neurology and neuropsychology
Scientific American titled Mind and Brain (Sep­ and the consequently well-grounded conviction
tember 1 992). Discover magazine enlisted con­ that facts about consciousness must have some
sciousness as one of the "ten great unanswered explanatory basis in the facts about the brain. For
questions of science" (November 1 992), and instance, in 1 874, physicist John Tyndall made
Omni published a special issue on consciousness the following remark: "We can trace the devel­
but titled it "Science and the Soul" (October opment of a nervous system, and correlate with it
1993). (Perhaps the rather unusual title Francis the parallel phenomena of sensation and thought.
Crick chose for his book that appeared shortly We see with undoubting certainty that they go
afterward was a response to Omni's inquiry: The hand in hand. But we try to soar in a vacuum the
Scientific Hypothesis: The Scientific Search/or the moment we seek to comprehend the connection
Soul.) Finally, Time magazine, in an issue that between them. An Archimedean fulcrum is here
featured consciousness research, put the words required which the human mind cannot com­
"that evanescent thing called consciousness" on mand; and the effort to solve the problem . . . is
its cover (July 1 7, 1 995). like that of a man trying to lift himself by his own
Now, no one refers to other biological or psy­ waistband" (p. 1 95). 7 In contemporary literature,
chological phenomena in such terms. There is Karl Popper, in a similar vein, finds "the emer-
never a special magazine issue that pronounces gence of full consciousness . . . which seems to be
the problem of cell mutation with the question of linked to the human brain . . . one of the greatest
Guven Giizeldere 4

miracles" (Popper and Eccles 1 993, p. 1 29). And established harmony" between the events of the
most recently, McGinn ( 1 989) delivers what he two realms.
considers to be the final verdict on the mind-body More than three centuries after Descartes,
problem: "We have been trying for a long time to John Eccles ( 1 99 1 , pp. 1 90- 191) makes a repeat
solve the mind-body problem. It has stubbornly attempt, although in neurologically sophisticated
resisted our best efforts. The mystery persists. I dress, by postulating psychons (mental units) as
think the time has come to admit candidly that we counterparts of dendrites in brains, to connect
cannot solve the mystery" (p. 349). Popper's mental World 2 to physical World 1 .
There is, however, more than one way to read Another contemporary expression of the view
assertions about the mystery of consciousness. that defends an antimaterialist framework for
Accordingly, it is important not to lump together consciousness is given by Robert Adams (1 987),
everyone who expresses puzzlement about con­ who finds theism theoretically advantageous to
sciousness into the same category. In particular, it materialism in explaining the relation of con­
is important to pay attention to the following two sciousness to bodily physical states. 8
questions: Is the mystery essentially a result of a On the other hand are those who do not cut the
commitment to a materialist framework? Is the bill of the mystery of consciousness to the pre­
mystery essentially inherent in our (lack of) cog­ sumed immaterial ontology of consciousness but
nitive capacities? rather to our lack of cognitive capacities that
As such, these questions constitute an onto­ would enable us to understand the nature of
logical and an epistemic axis, respectively, that the "psychophysical link" between brains and
cross-cut each other. Not every combination in minds. Tyndall seems to be in this group, and
the matrix receives equal philosophical attention. so is McGinn, who states that although "we
A negative answer to both questions essentially know that brains are the de facto causal basis of
leaves one out of the circle of those who find consciousness," we have no idea about how "the
something mysterious in consciousness, and not water of the physical brain is turned into the wine
many defend a view that find consciousness mys­ of consciousness" (McGinn 1989, p. 349). This
terious in both aspects. Rather, the focus is on is an epistemic rather than ontological problem.
views based on an exclusively positive answer to For McGinn, "there is, in reality, nothing mys­
one or the other question. terious about how the brain generates con­
Those who think that consciousness will re­ sciousness," but we human beings are forever
main a mystery in a materialist ontology suggest "cognitively closed" to understanding the nature
that the proper place to pursue investigation is of this process, much the same way the under­
instead an immaterial realm-such as the realm standing of quantum mechanics lies beyond the
of the res cogitans for Descartes, or World 2 of cognitive capacities of monkeys. 9
mental entities for Karl Popper. This move brings The general difficulty involving consciousness
with it a problem perhaps larger than that it was forms a basis for what Joseph Levine (1983, 1 993)
presumed to solve: how to account for the link called the "problem of the explanatory gap." Al­
between consciousness in the immaterial realm most everyone agrees that there is indeed some
and brains (and bodies) in the material realm. explanatory gap in this area; what is controversial
Descartes's notorious solution was to postulate is, as I will note later, whether there is just an
the pineal gland as the gatekeeper of interac­ epistemic or also an ontological lesson that needs
tion between the two essentially different kinds to be drawn from it.
of substances. Alternatively, Leibniz chose to In any case, these positions constitute only a
rely on divine intervention to secure a "pre- fraction of the whole dialectical space. There are
Approaching Consciousness 5

also the skeptics and the naturalists, and to them I The Consciousness Naturalists
now tum.
Finally, there are those who believe that con­
SkepticWn About Conscio�ess sciousness is a real and perfectly natural phenom­
enon and that there will remain no mysterious
The skeptics among philosophers fundamentally unexplained residue about consciousness in a
doubt the coherence of the very concept of con­ completely naturalist, but surely more advanced
sciousness, and the merits of consciousness itself and mature, theoretical framework. Among the
as a phenomenon fit for scientific or philosophical naturalists, however, there is a wide spectrum of
investigation. Patricia Churchland, in one of positions representing different levels of con­
her early papers, compares the concept of con­ fidence in the success of a naturalist program. For
sciousness (under a certain reading that she ex­ instance, one can straightforwardly distinguish
plicates) to such now-defunct concepts as ether, between full-blown naturalists and naturalists-at­
phlogiston, and demonic possession-concepts heart. 1 0
that "under the suasion of a variety of empirical­ Into the first group fall a number of philos­
cum-theoretical forces . . . lose their integrity and ophers who have explicitly defended a naturalist
fall apart" (Churchland 1983, p. 80). framework to explain consciousness, without
In a similar vein, Kathleen Wilkes claims not theoretical reservations. However, some of the
only that "science can dispense with the concept full naturalists, most significant among them Paul
of consciousness and lose thereby none of its Churchland (1 988) and Daniel Dennett ( 1 99 1 ),
comprehensiveness and explanatory power," but have been charged with trying to do away with
"so too could ordinary language." She then sug­ consciousness for the sake of explaining it. Some
gests that "perhaps 'conscious' is best seen as a others have been more careful not to fall under
sort of dummy-term like 'thing', useful [only) for this decree. For instance Owen Flanagan (1 992),
the flexibility that is assured by its lack of specific who proposes what he calls the natural method­
content" (Wilkes 1 984, pp. 241 -242). Along the a triangulated approach for studying conscious­
same lines Georges Rey goes a step further and ness that combines phenomenology, psychology,
suggests that there are "reasons for doubting that and neuroscience-states: "Consciousness exists,
oneself is conscious and . . . thinking that nothing and it would be a mistake to eliminate talk of it
is conscious." Consciousness, Rey suggests, "may because it names such a multiplicity of things.
be no more real than the simple soul exorcised by The right attitude is to deliver the concept from
Hume" (Rey 1 988, p. 6). its ghostly past and provide it with a credible
Notice that this sort of skepticism about con­ naturalistic analysis. . . . It will be our proudest
sciousness is a very different attitude from any achievement if we can demystify consciousness"
form of "mysterianism." In particular, those who (Flanagan 1 995, p. 20).
think that consciousness is mysterious are com­ Among the naturalists who give accounts of
mitted to the existence of some significant phe­ consciousness in terms of causal and functional
nomenon, however elusive it may be in relation to roles (broadly construed) are Armstrong (1 980b,
scientific investigation or philosophical analysis. 1 993), Lewis (1 966, 1 972, 1 980, 1 995), Shoe­
Consciousness skepticism, on the other hand, maker (1975, 1 99 1 , 1 994), Lycan ( 1 987, 1 997b),
embraces an eliminativist stance: the concept of Van Gulick (1 988, 1 989, 1 993), and Rosenthal
consciousness is defunct, and the phenomenon it­ ( 1 986, 1 997).
self may actually be inexistent, at least so far as it Most recently, Fred Dretske ( 1 995) and Mi­
is construed in the literature that the skeptics are chael Tye ( 1 995) came up with naturalist ac­
attacking. counts that explain consciousness in entirely
Guven Giizeldere 6

representational terms. Finally, one can add John I am persuaded of its truth" (Nagel 1 965, p. 1 10).
Searle to this group, who dubs his view "bio­ Later he moves to a position he calls "dual aspect
logical naturalism": theory" -a position that lies between asserting
falsity of physicalism but remaining short of pos­
The "mystery" of consciousness today is in roughly the
tulating nonphysical substances for accounting
same shape that the mystery of life was before the de­
for the ontology of the mind-while admitting
velopment of molecular biology or the mystery of elec­
that "to talk about a dual aspect theory is largely
tromagnetism was before Clerk-Maxwell equations. It
seems mysterious because we do not know how the sys­ hand waving" (Nagel 1 986, pp. 29-30). So per­
tem of neurophysiology/consciousness works, and an haps the early Nagel was a naturalist-at-heart,
adequate knowledge of how it works would remove the and now it is more accurate to characterize him as
mystery . . . . [11here has been no question of "natural­ a half-hearted-naturalist. In either case, Nagel's
izing consciousness"; it is already completely natural. position seems, at least fundamentally, some­
(Searle 1 992, p. 1 02, 93, respectively) where in the naturalist camp, despite the skeptical
and pessimistic undertones that make him some­
Despite Searle's fully naturalist convictions, his
times look closer to the mysterians or skeptics.
views have, as I will point out later, significant
To recapitulate: It is noteworthy that the spec­
disagreements with those of the above on many
trum of disagreements ranges over not only
other (relevant) points. Nonetheless, his position
particular accounts of consciousness but, more
also differs from a position that I call naturalism­
fundamentally, whether any satisfactory natural­
at-heart.
istic explanation of consciousness can in principle
Naturalists-at-heart are those who openly feel
be given. Part of this disagreement owes, no
the pull of naturalism, while not quite being able
doubt, to the difficulty in the nature of the phe­
to find a satisfactory place for consciousness
nomenon of consciousness. But there is also a part
in a naturalist framework. For example, Levine
that stems from a conceptual disarray surrounding
( 1983, 1 993), who thinks that the problem of ex­
the notion of consciousness. It is thus instructive
planatory gap poses ultimately no ontological
to examine these two dimensions that contribute
problems for materialism, nonetheless expresses
to the puzzle of consciousness separately.
the following troubled sentiments: "The absent
and inverted qualia hypotheses are thought ex­
periments which give concrete expression to what n Approaching Consciousness: A Multitude of
I will call, following the Churchlands, the 'pro­ Difficulties
qualia' intuition. This is the intuition that there is
something special about conscious mental life What we are when we are awake, as contrasted with
that makes it inexplicable within the theoretical what we are when we sink into a profound and perfectly
framework of functionalism, and, more generally, dreamless sleep or receive an overpowering blow upon
materialism" (Levine 1 988, p. 272). Short of dis­ the head-that it is to be conscious. What we are less

believing materialism, Levine finds it difficult to and less, as we sink gradually down into dreamless

place consciousness in a naturalist framework. sleep, or as we swoon slowly away: and what we are
more and more, as the noise of the crowd outside tardily
Perhaps the most eloquent proponent of this
arouses us from our after-dinner nap, or as we come out
position is Thomas Nagel, possibly more so in his
of the midnight darkness of the typhoid fever crisis­
earlier writings than his later work. In one of his
that it is to become conscious.
earlier works, Nagel examines and rejects "the
reasons for believing that physicalism cannot This is how George Trumbull Ladd ( 1909),
possibly be true" and concludes: "My attitude noted American psychologist (whose definition of
toward physicalism [is that it] repels me although psychology as the "description and explanation
Approaching Consciousness 7

of states of consciousness as such" was adopted to lay out the foundations of a new theory of
and promoted by William James), characterized consciousness: they need not provide a precise
the phenomenon of consciousness (p. 30). This definition of consciousness since "everyone has
characterization seems straightforward, common­ a rough idea of what is meant by consciousness"
sensical, and familiar to everyone. So familiar (p. 263).
that perhaps, as George Stout (1 899), another On the other hand, it is not uncommon to come
psychologist of the same era, declares in the across statements about consciousness that con­
opening pages of his Manual of Psychology, no vey a conviction opposite to those mentioned
precise definition is necessary, or even possible: above: that not only is there no clear and gen­
"What is consciousness? Properly speaking, erally accepted definition, but we are not even
definition is impossible. Everybody knows what in possession of a stable pre theoretical conception
consciousness is because everybody is conscious" of consciousness. And this view, too, has been
(p. 7). Similarly, William James never attempts around for quite a while, as expressed by Edward
to give a definition of consciousness anywhere in Titchener (1915) who cites two British psycholo­
his two-volume work, Principles of Psychology gists, Alexander Bain and James Ward, ofthe late
(1950a, 1 950b). This is not because James had no nineteenth century: " 'Consciousness,' says Pro­
interest in, or nothing to say on, consciousness; fessor Ward, 'is the vaguest, most protean, and
on the contrary, many of the chapters in his two most treacherous of psychological terms'; and
volumes are about consciousness-its under­ Bain, writing in 1 880; distinguished no less than
pinnings in the nervous system, its function in thirteen meanings of the word; he could find more
evolution, its streamIike phenomenology, and so today" (pp. 323-324).
on. Rather, according to James, consciousness Unfortunately, there is RO hope of receiving
was a phenomenon too familiar to be given a def­ help from antonyms, either. Here is the entry for
inition. James (1950a) was convinced that every­ "unconscious" in a psychology dictionary: "It is
one took themselves to be possessors of conscious said that there are no less than 39 distinct mean­
states that were accessible by introspection, and ings of 'unconscious'; it is certain that no author
he regarded this belief as "the most fundamental limits himself consistently to one. And nearly all
of all the postulates of Psychology." In his refusal meanings are closely linked to debatable theories.
to discuss this postulate any further, James adds Any user of the term therefore risks suggesting
that he would "discard all curious inquiries about agreement with theories he may deplore" (En­
its certainty as too metaphysical" for the scope of glish and English 1958). Finally, Julian Jaynes
his book (p. 185). (1 976) rhetorically asks: "This consciousness that
This somewhat peculiar "all-too-familiar a is myself of selves, that is everything, and yet
phenomenon" attitude toward consciousness has nothing at all-what is it?" (p. I).
indeed been quite common among many other Moreover, not only is there no consensus on
prominent investigators of consciousness. Sig­ what the term consciousness denotes, but neither
mund Freud (1 964), for instance, supports Stout's is it immediately clear if there actually is a single,
and James's convictions in his introductory lec­ well-defined "the problem of consciousness"
tures on psychoanalysis: "What is meant by con­ within disciplinary (let alone across disciplinary)
sciousness we need not discuss; it is beyond all boundaries. Perhaps the trouble lies not so much
doubt" (p. 70). Closer to our times, neuroscientist in the ill definition of the question, but in the fact
Francis Crick and Christof Koch ( 1990) endorse that what passes under the term consciousness as
the same line in the opening paragraphs of their an all too familiar, single, unified notion may be a
article, "Towards a Neurobiological Theory of tangled amalgam of several different concepts,
Consciousness," even though they are attempting each inflicted with its own separate problems.
Guven Giizeldere 8

What exactly, for example, is the problem of proposition that "maybe we should ban the word
consciousness in philosophy, in psychology, and for a decade or two until we can develop more
in the neurosciences? Are philosophers concerned precise terms for the several uses which 'con­
with the same problem, or set of problems, sciousness' now obscures." Nonetheless, he ulti­
as psychologists and neuroscientists who work mately decides against it: "Despite all its faults,
on consciousness? Whereas Thomas Natsoulas however, the term would be sorely missed; it
( 1992), a psychologist, questions: "Is conscious­ refers to something immediately obvious and
ness what psychologists actually examine?" familiar to anyone capable of understanding a
(p. 363), Kathleen Wilkes (1988), a philosopher, ban against it" { p. 25). 1 1
gives the following advice: "Just as psychologists In the end, I find myself in agreement with
do not study 'mind' per se, so they need not Miller's positive conclusion. It is historically ac­
bother with consciousness (because] in all the curate to note that consciousness as a phenom­
contexts in which it tends to be deployed, the tenn enon in need of not only explanation, but also
'conscious' and its cognates are, for scientific definition, has persistently kept resurfacing. It
purposes, both unhelpful and unnecessary" (pp. also seems reasonable to think that further
38-9). attempts to provide carefully constructed con­
An even more pessimistic view is enunciated by ceptual tools could only help the situation, pro­
Stuart Sutherland (1 995) under the entry "con­ viding a common platform of interaction among
sciousness" in his International Dictionary of all who choose consciousness as their object of
Psychology : study. This is not to say that it is not crucial to
proceed cautiously to steer clear of conceptual
CONSCIOUSNESS: The having of perceptions, thoughts,
dead ends, as well as to make sure that one does
and feelings; awareness. The term is impossible to define
not fall into the trap of reinventing the wheel of
except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of
what consciousness means . . . . Consciousness is a fasci­
consciousness over and over. After all, if we hope
nating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to
that anything toward a better understanding of
specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. consciousness will come out of the joint efforts of
Nothing worth reading has been written about it. (p. 95) different disciplines, it is of utmost importance to
minimize crosstalk and make sure that common
Why are there such glaring polarities? Why is terms actually point to the same referents. As a
consciousness characterized both as a phenom­ result, it seems even more imperative to look for
enon too familiar to require further explanation, and try to delineate the specific conceptions and
as well as a source of obscurity that remains typi­ aspects of consciousness under which the different
cally recalcitrant to systematic investigation by problems arise. The next section is a brief attempt
those who work largely within the same para­ to address conceptual issues along these lines,
digm? There is something uniquely peculiar here. before turning to the epistemological and onto­
Is it the phenomenon of consciousness that is logical difficulties that arise from the nature of
more puzzling, one sometimes wonders, or the consciousness.
magnitude of the puzzlement itself and the theo­
retical dissonance surrounding consciousness? Difficulties with the Concept of Consciousness
Could it perhaps be as R. J. Joynt (1981) pre­
dicted: "Consciousness is like the Trinity; if it is Because consciousness is a word whose semantics
explained so that you understand it, it hasn't been has shifted over time, a brief lexical and etymo­
explained correctly" (p. 108)? logical exposition may be of some service as
George Miller (1962), faced with these dif­ a preliminary step. Let us start with present
ficulties, tentatively entertains the interesting definitions. The Oxford English Dictionary {OED:
Approaching Consciousness 9

unabridged second edition), for example, gives transitive and intransitive senses of con­
eight definitions of "consciousness," and twelve sciousness. He calls these two senses "creature
definitions of "conscious." For the purposes of consciousness" and "state consciousness," re­
this chapter, the eight OED entries for "con­ spectively. In taking consciousness as a property
sciousness" can be divided roughly into two of organisms one can talk about a person's being
groups. On the one hand, there is a largely social conscious in the sense of being awake and alert, as
aspect of the term consciousness: joint or mutual opposed to being in a transient state of no con­
knowledge shared by a community of people. sciousness, in a deep coma, or in non-REM sleep.
This was indeed the earliest sense of conscious­ In another vein, one can ask of a bat, or a spider,
ness, derived from the Latin term conscius. 1 2 It is or a stickleback, or perhaps a robot if it is
this sense of consciousness that is used in talking conscious. All of this has to do with creature
about "class consciousness" in Marxist thought, consciousness. In addition, it makes sense to talk
or that appears in titles like Gerda Lerner's recent about whether a particular mental state is con­
book, The Creation of Feminist Consciousness scious. This is not quite the same as someone's
(1993). being conscious. The creature sense of conscious­
On the other hand, consciousness has a largely ness denotes an overall state one is in; the other
psychological (mental) sense which relates to in­ classifies one's (mental) states as of one type or
dividuals, rather than groups, with no particu­ another. Further, a state that is not conscious can
larly ethical or political overtones. 1 3 This sense of be among those that in principle cannot become
consciousness, too, can be subdivided into two conscious (e.g., certain computational states
meanings-it means either "the state or faculty of postulated by cognitive psychology), or those that
being conscious, as a condition and concomitant can be made conscious only by such specific
of all thought, feeling, and volition" or "the state methods as Freudian psychoanalysis. In any case,
of being conscious, regarded as the normal con­ this sense of consciousness which functions as a
dition of healthy waking life" (OED). The former type-identifier for mental states is what I have in
sense is in accord with Descartes's usage of mind by state consciousness. I S (Another impor­
"consciousness," but it is more closely associated tant distinction is that of characterizing creature
with, if it does not originate from, Locke's An or state consciousness in causal versus phenom­
Essay Concerning Human Understanding. It is enal terms. This distinction will be introduced in
also this sense of consciousness that bears an in­ the next section, and used recurrently throughout
tentional component, inherent in the intentional the chapter.)
states it subserves, leading to the transitive usage: In the rest of this discussion, I will largely put
"consciousness of." The latter is the intransitive aside the social conception of consciousness and
usage of "consciousness," something more basic proceed with the psychological conception. This
than, or perhaps a necessary constituent of the move approximately halves the size of the liter­
former, unless one wants to insist that aU con­ ature to be examined; yet there is still plenty that
16
sciousness is consciousness of. The distinction needs teasing apart and sorting out.
between the transitive and the intransitive senses
of the psychological concept of consciousness is Difficulties witb tbe Nature of Consciousness
alluded to numerous times in contemporary phi­
losophy and psychology, and I will accept it here It is often remarked that conscious experiences
as such. 14 are "immediately familiar" to any subject of such
Among the contemporary analytic philos­ experiences. It is also argued that they are "so
ophers, David Rosenthal ( 1 997) has written immediately close" that it is at times difficult, if
substantially about the distinction between the not impossible, to separate their appearance from
Guven Giizeldere 10

their reality. This ambiguity between the appear­ to logically separable and therefore independent"
ance versus the reality of consciousness is also re­ ( p. 1 23).
garded as unexampled; presumably nothing else Mijuskovic, in locating this form of reasoning
in the world suffers from it. As such, it tends to in its historical context, also notes the presence of
uniquely blur the line between the epistemology the converse of its inference: "If one begins with
and ontology of consciousness: if all there is to the notion, explicit or implicit, that thoughts or
(the reality of ) conscious states is their appearing minds are simple, unextended, indivisible, then it
in a certain way to subjects, and if they have no seems to be an inevitable step before thinkers
existential status independent of their so appear­ connect the principle of an unextended, immate­
ing, the ontology of consciousness seems to col­ rial soul with the impossibility of any knowledge
lapse into its epistemology. 1 7 of an extended, material, external world" and
Ironically, o n the other hand, the problem ap­ consequently, of the nature of the relation be­
pears to be just the opposite from a different tween them (p. 121). That is, this time an epis­
angle: the appearance of consciousness seems temological conclusion (regarding an epistemic
so different from its "physical reality" that a gap between mind and body) is reached from
comprehensive theory that bridges this gap is a starting point constituted by ontological con­
regarded as a near impossibility. In Sellarsian siderations (regarding the distinctness of their
terms, the scientific and manifest images of con­ natures).
sciousness are considered to embody a theoretical The difficulties inherent in the nature of con­
gap perhaps greater than in any other subject sciousness constitute many of the philosophical
matter. (Cf. Sellars 1 99 1 .) problems that will be discussed in depth in the rest
The view that consciousness (or, in general, the of this chapter. In particular, the nature and
mind) and its physical basis (or, in general, the validity of inferences between matters epistemo­
body) seem essentially so different from one an­ logical and matters ontological, especially those
other that they must have distinct existences that go from the former to the latter, will con­
is based on a deep-rooted idea in the history of tinually appear as a leitmotif. Of course, some of
philosophy. This idea and its variants were" con­ these difficulties may be overcome quite rapidly
stitutive of arguments for the metaphysical in­ as the study of consciousness advances; others
dependence of mind and body throughout early may prove more obstinate. But it may also tum
modem philosophy of the seventeenth and eigh­ out that certain problems that seemed unsolvable
teenth centuries, perhaps most notably exempli­ had appeared that way because of the specific
fied in the work of Descartes. The essential and ways in which they were formulated, or the im­
complete nature of mind, generally speaking, plicit assumptions they rested on. This possibility,
seems to consist solely in thinking, and, as such, it too, will emerge as a relevant concern later in the
must be unextended, simple (with no parts), and discussion.
essentially different from the body, and therefore The best way to gain insight into this sort of a
immaterial. This was Descartes's argument in a difficulty may very well be through locating the
nutshell, ultimately drawing a strong ontological analysis in a broad historical perspective. The
conclusion (regarding the distinctness of mind long history of consciousneS$ research no doubt
and body) from a starting point constituted by contains-hints that can be parlayed not only to
epistemic considerations (regarding the distinct­ draw methodological lessons for further study,
ness of their appearances). As Ben Mijuskovic but also to reveal the constituent fibers of the past
(1974) observes, in this type of argumentation, paradigms which couched persistent core prob­
"the sword that severs the Gordian knot is the lems under different guises over and over. It is in
principle that what is conceptually distinct is on- fact the most striking feature of the consciousness
Approaching Consciousness 11

literature, as I try to exemplify numerous times in often seems to deadlock debates on conscious­
this exposition, that the very same problems, ness, stems from a fundamental and ultimately
analyses, and suggested solutions repeatedly ap­ misleading intuition that I will call the segrega­
pear, and the very same theoretical moves re­ tionist intuition: if the characterization of con­
peatedly get introduced at different times in the sciousness is causal, then it has to be essentially
history of philosophy and psychology with little nonphenomenal, and if it is phenomenal, then it
(if any) acknowledgement of past attempts and is essentially noncausa1. (I call this formulation
failures. In this regard, a historical approach that an "intuition" rather than a "thesis" due to its
exposes the misleading implicit assumptions widely diffused, often implicit and unarticulated,
common to the past failures should prove useful but highly influential nature.)
in illustrating, at minimum, which steps not to In contrast with the segregationist intuition is
take in approaching consciousness at present. what I call the integrationist intuition: what con­
sciousness does, qua consciousness, cannot be
characterized in the absence of how consciousness
m Looking Abead: The Two Faces of seems, but more importantly, that how con­
Coosciousoess sciousness seems cannot be conceptualized in the
absence of what consciousness does. This counter
Before proceeding further, I will offer a brief first intuition underwrites the project of trying to
pass at a diagnosis that will be made at the end of dissolve the stalemate between accounts of
this chapter: a principal reason underlying the consciousness respectively based on the causal
confusion and seeming mystery surrounding the and the phenomenal characterizations, and marry
concept and phenomenon of consciousness lies in them into a single unified account.
the presence of two influential, equally attractive, This introduction is not an attempt towards
pretheoretic characterizations. These two charac­ accomplishing such a project. Nevertheless, while
terizations not only shape the methods with presenting a conceptual mapping of the territory
which consciousness is studied, but more fun­ and locating in it contemporary problems and
damentally, shape the way the problems to be debates that center around consciousness, I hope
studied are defined and delineated. They can to provide support for the integrationist intuition
be summarized in the following mottos: "Con­ that motivates it. In doing so, I also aim to sub­
sciousness is as consciousness does" versus stantiate an antiskeptical position with respect to
"Consciousness is as consciousness seems. " The consciousness: there is a a deep-rooted and con­
former is the causal characterization: it takes the tinuous theoretical thread connecting a set of re­
causal role consciousness plays in the general current problems in the history of philosophy and
economy of our mental lives as basic. The latter, psychology typically associated with conscious­
in contrast, is the phenomenal characterization: it
ness, indicating the presence of a persistent, sig­
takes as fundamental the way our mental livel> nificant, and challenging object of study.
seem (or "feel," for lack of a better term) to us­
that is, the phenomenal qualities that we typically
associate with our perceptions, pains, tickles, and PART lWO
other mental states. A BRIEF IDSTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS:
Most of the time, these two characterizations PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
are taken to be mutually exclusive for explana­
tory purposes, to the extent that accounts of con­ There is possibly no other subject matter in the
sciousness built around one characterization are history of philosophy and science with as fasci­
typically accused of failing to capture the other. I nating a historical record as consciousness. Even
believe that this undesirable consequence, which
Guven Giizeldere 12

within the past one hundred years, consciousness Arnauld). By "thought" Descartes must have had
has more than once been crowned as the most in mind something very similar to one of the
significant aspect of human mentality, to be fol­ contemporary usages of "consciousness," or
lowed by periods of scapegoat treatment for the "awareness," especially given his definition in the
failures of philosophy and science (in particular, Principles ofPhilosophy: "By the term 'thought' I
psychology) to give a satisfactory account of the understand everything which we are aware of as
mind. In either case, consciousness was hardly happening within us, in so far as we have aware­
ever ignored. Explicitly or implicitly, it was an ness of it" ( Descartes 1992, p. 1 74).
ever-present concern for everyone thinking about Locke, coming after Descartes's rationalism
the human mind. from a distinctively empiricist tradition, was
Following is a brief journey through the his­ nonetheless largely in agreement with his prede­
torical path that consciousness research has trav­ cessor with respect to the nature of the relation
ersed in approximately the last hundred years, in between what was mental and what was con­
particular via the schools of introspectionism, scious: they were conceptually tied. In Locke's
behaviorism, and cognitivism in psychology, with words, "thinking consists in being conscious that
early modem philosophy taken as a starting one thinks," and "the idea of thinking in the ab­
point. sence of consciousness is as unintelligible as the
idea of a body which is extended without having
parts" ( Locke 1 959, bk. 2, chap. 1 , p. 1 38).
IV Consciousness in Early Modem Philosophy There is also another sense in which Descartes
and Locke seem to be in agreement: the idea
In accord with the fact that the origins of the of construing consciousness in roughly some­
word consciousness go back to early modem phi­ thing like higher-order awareness. For Descartes,
losophy, it is generally agreed that Descartes gave proper sensations in adults exist only insofar as
the mind-body problem its modem formulation. they are accompanied by a second-order reflective
Descartes's own account respectively charac­ awareness: "When an adult feels something, and
terized mind and body as thinking versus ex­ simultaneously perceives that he has not felt it
tended substances, and postulated that the nature before, I call this second perception reflection,
of their relation was that of interaction between and attribute it to the intellect alone, in spite of its
the res cogitans and the res extensa. But how did being so linked to sensation that the two occur
his notion of consciousness compare with his no­ together and appear to be indistinguishable from
tion of mind? And to what extent does his notion each other" ( Descartes 1 99 1 , p. 357: letter to Ar­
of consciousness capture the notion that presently nauld, 29 July 1 648, AT V, 221 ). Along this the­
figures in contemporary debates? 1 8 oretical line, Descartes concludes, for instance,
Descartes claimed that consciousness was an that "pain exists only in the understanding"
essential component of everything that was men­ ( Descartes 1 99 1 , p. 148: letter to Mersenne, 1 1
tal, and by "consciousness" he meant something June 1 640, AT III, 85).
akin to one's awareness of one's own mental In a somewhat similar vein, Locke famously
states: "As to the fact that there can be nothing in stated that "consciousness is the perception of
the mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing, of what passes in a man's own mind" (Locke 1 959,
which it is not aware, this seems to me to be self­ bk. 2, chap. 1 , §19, p. 1 38). However, it may be
evident. For there is nothing that we can under­ unfair to read too much into the "higher-order
stand to be in the mind, regarded in this way, that awareness" construal and make Descartes's and
is not a thought or dependent on a thought" Locke's views seem more similar than they ac­
( Descartes 1 993b, p. 1 7 1 , fourth set of replies to tually are. For instance, it is not altogether ob-
Approaching Consciousness 13

vious that Locke's second-order "perception" is (James 1 950a, p. 1 85; originally published in 1 890).
as cognitively loaded as Descartes's "reflective But only fourteen years later, James would bit­
perception," although they seem to serve the terly denounce consciousness in an article titled,
same purpose in being responsible for conscious­ "Does Consciousness Exist?" with the following
ness of "first-order" mental goings on. 1 9 There verdict:
are also contemporaries of Descartes and Locke,
For twenty years past I have mistrusted "conscious­
who located the epistemic locus of mind in qual­
ness" as an entity; for seven or eight years past I have
itative conscious states rather than thoughts
suggested its non-existence to my students, and tried to
or reflective perceptions. Most notably, Male­ give them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experi­
branche holds this view. 2 0 ence. It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to be
This brief characterization of the early modem openly and universally discarded . . . .
philosophical thought on consciousness no doubt [Consciousness] is the name of a non-entity, and has no
fails to do justice to the subtleties involved. But right place among first principles. Those who still cling to
for the sake of finding a starting point common it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind
to both philosophy and "scientific psychology" in by the disappearing "soul," upon the air of philosophy.
the study of consciousness, and tracing the issues (James 1971, p. 4; originally published in 1 904)
in double-track to the contemporary debates, I The reasons for this remarkable change of
will leap ahead to the late nineteenth century and, mind may partly lie deep in James's personal his­
skipping over the problem of unity of conscious­ tory, but they also have to do with the unique
ness and Kant's treatment of "unity of appercep­ place of consciousness as a subject matter in phi­
tion," continue with the work of William James. losophy and psychology. 2 1 A somewhat similar,
almost neurotic shift of attitude, though in a
V The Last Hundred Years: William James's much larger scale, spanning the whole discipline
Puzzle of psychology and, to some extent, philosophy,
occurred in a rel atively short period of transition,
William James may be the philosopher and psy­ early in this century. This transition involved
chologist who thought and wrote more about the collapse of the then very established school
consciousness than anyone else in history. Inter­ of introspectionism and the subsequent rise of
estingly enough. the record of his stance(s) to­ behaviorism. 22
ward consciousness is also the most curious one.
James allots a great deal of space to discussing the VI Introspectionism
neural underpinnings, the evolutionary function,
and the phenomenal nature of consciousness in Introspectionism can be regarded as the first off­
his monumental work, Principles of Psychology. spring of the effort of pulling psychology apart
According to James of this book, consciousness is from philosophy and establishing it as an in­
the starting place of all psychology, the most cru­ dependent, "scientific" discipline on its own.
cial aspect of human mentality. In a chapter on Ironically, behaviorism would later denounce in­
the methodology of psychology, he states: "In­ trospectionism as having tangled with meta­
trospective Observation is what we have to rely physics and present itself as the true, alternative
on first and foremost and always. The word in­ scientific school of psychology. In actuality, in
trospection need hardly be defined-it means, of their struggle for identity. both schools borrowed
course, the looking into our own minds and re­ a great deal from the scientific methodology of
porting what we there discover. Every one agrees their times, and neither one's approach was in­
that we there discover states of consciousness" trinsically more "scientific" than the other.
Guven Giizeldere 14

Introspectionism's fundamental assumption make introspectionism appear as a scientifically

was that psychology was the study of the "phe­ baseless enterprise, further burdened with the
nomenology" of the human mind; it attempted to metaphysically dubious cargo of consciousness­
give a full description of the mental landscape as so much so that John Watson, in the opening
it appeared to the subject. The data points con­ pages of his book that served as the behavior­
sisted of discriminations in subjects' sensations ist manifesto, belittled introspectionists' concern
of colors, sounds, sinens, and the like. In doing with consciousness by likening it to witchcraft:
so, introspectionism largely modeled its method­ "Behaviorism claims that consciousness is neither
ology after the modern chemistry of the day, a definite nor a usable concept. The behaviorist,
which was enjoying a high reputation due to its who has been trained always as an experimenta­
successes in having put together the atomic table. list, holds, further, that belief in the existence of
The fundamental belief underlying most of in­ consciousness goes back to the ancient days of
trospectionist research was that a full under­ superstition and magic" (Watson 1970, p. 2).
standing of the mind was possible only after In reality, introspectionism was as much an at­
completing an exhaustive inventory of its "atomic tempt to bring psychology up to par with natural
units," most elemental sensory impressions one sciences-to make it a "science of the mental,"
can discriminate. Introspectionism, in other with ideas and methods inspired largely by chem­
words, was in the business of constructing an istry. Although the founding adherents of be­
atomic table of the human mind.23 (Cf. Killpe haviorism wholeheartedly denied any intellectual
1 90 1 ; Titchener 191 5.) debt to their predecessors and did a good job of
Giving a full inventory of anything is no easy making themselves appear completely detached
feat, and attempting this for the totality of the from their past, they were very similar to the in­
human "sensory space" was a daunting task, even trospectionists in aspiration and professional
in the hands of scrupulous researchers and metic­ policy with regard to methodology. 2 6
ulously trained subjects.24 However, the fall of In any case, it would not be fair to place on
introspectionism did not result from depleted solely external causes all responsibility for in­
patience or the lack of a sufficient number of trospectionism's formidable downfall, which
experiments. The failure had deeper reasons, both brought with it the downfall and disgrace of both
external and internal. consciousness (as a subject matter for research)
The external reason for failure was the overall and introspection (as a method for studying the
changing intellectual climate in Europe and the mind) for several decades. There were serious
United States, especially the rising influence of reasons internal to the paradigm as well. Most
positivism in all sectors of science, as well as important was the apparently irreconcilable
the humanities. The general positivist attitude conflict between results coming out of different
constituted a significant motivation for psycho­ laboratories. The most significant polarity was
logists, who had been trying hard to sever their constituted by two main streams of research pur­
professional ties with philosophers and to move sued in two different continents: the W1lrzburg
away from anything "mental" in an attempt to school, represented by Killpe and his students in
relocate psychology among natural sciences. Leipzig, versus the Cornell school, lead by Titch­
Consciousness was the subject matter of no ener and his associates in Ithaca, New York. For
natural science, so it could not be the subject instance, Titchener's laboratory reported that
matter of psychology either. 25 they discovered a total of "more than 44,435"
The positivist atmosphere further provided a discriminably different sensations, largely con­
context in which it was easier for behaviorists to sisting of visual and auditory elements. In con-
Approaching Consciousness 15

trast, Killpe's published results pointed to a total remained the theoretical knot that i t was until
of fewer than 1 2,000 (Boring 1 942, p. 10). Who introspectionism, as a whole, eventually disap­
was telling the truth? peared against the rising tide of behaviorism. 2 7
Conflicting results are no surprise in any ex­ In sum, the fact that introspectionism ulti­
perimental discipline. What led introspectionism mately located the locus of authority with regard
to a dead end was an additional methodological to the data in the word of the subject, while
shortcoming: the lack of a generally agreed-upon training procedures for subjects were not stand­
method offalsifying any of the results. The nature arclized across laboratories to immunize against
of introspective reports constituting the core of "stimulus-error," brought the death sentence
the data in the introspectionist paradigm was to the movement. When the subjects' reports
colored by the subjects' previous training. Titch­ showed statistical inconsistencies, the whole in­
enerian introspectionists were very careful not trospectionist community found itself up against
to work with "naive subjects," enforcing strict a theoretical wall. This impasse, which surfaced
procedures to avoid "stimulus errors," but this as a result of several years of careful laboratory
policy worked against them in the end. Although work, brought with it a sad ending to a research
a rigorous and careful training program and paradigm of hundreds of experiments and thou­
meticulous repetition of the experiments provided sands of subjects. 2 8
an acceptable degree of statistical consistency
within individual laboratories, the results across
VB Behaviorism
different laboratories were sometimes highly
contradictory. Unfortunately, when individual
"seemings" (of colors, sounds, tactile sensations) In contrast to introspectionism, behaviorism ar­
were what counted as the sole data, each "phe­ rived with an extremely straightforward method­
nomenal" report had to be taken at face value. ology (that would ultimately cut, rather than try
And within such a framework, the degree and to untangle, the knot of consciousness), and it
nature of previous training, which apparently was appeared as a fresh alternative in the troubling
not standardized, made all the difference. times of introspectionism. There was one and
Edwin Boring recounts an anecdote in which . only one element in its research agenda: publicly
Titchener and Edwin Holt debated, in front of an observable behavior. In the natural sciences, be­
audience of other psychologists, whether green haviorists argued, all phenomena under scrutiny
was an "atomic color" or a combination of blue were open to third-party observation. Behavior
and yellow. Each side insisted on his own judg­ was a perfect candidate as a subject matter of this
ment, and there was no means to settle the issue. sort. Moreover, behaviorism was able to avoid
One of the most serious conflicts, somewhat sim­ introspectionism's fatal problem ofirreconcilably
ilar to this but larger in scope, involved a staunch conflicting subjective reports by, in Boring's
disagreement between the followers of Titchener words, shifting "the locus of scientific responsi­
and those of Killpe on the existence of "imageless bility from an observing subject to the experi­
thought." Titchener was convinced that all con­ menter who becomes the observer of the subject"
scious thought involved some form of imagery, at (Boring 1 953, p. 1 84).
least some sensory elements. However, subjects Watson championed this shift of locus and the
change in the subject matter of the new psychol­
from Killpe's laboratory came up with reports of
having experienced thoughts with no associated ogy from "facts of the internal" to "facts of the
imagery whatsoever. The debate came to a stale­ external" in a rather rallying manner in the fol­
mate of, "You cannot experience X," of Titch­ lowing advice to his colleagues:
enerians versus "Yes, we can!" of Killpeians, and
Giiven Giizeldere 16

Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely ob­ trine in its metaphysical claims and weak in
jective experimental branch of natural science. Its theo­ grounding the strong claims it was making on
retical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. what it took the world's constituents to be. The
Introspection forms no essential part of its method nor
ultimate expression of the extreme view behav­
is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the
iorism came to hold about the ontology of con­
readiness with which they lend themselves to inter­
sciousness is reflected in the formula Karl Lashley
pretation in terms of consciousness. (Watson 1 9 1 3 ,
p. 1 58) used to characterize "strict Behaviorism": "Con­
sciousness is the particular laryngeal gesture we
You, as a psychologist, if you are to remain scientific, have come to use to stand for the rest" (Lashley
must describe the behavior of man in no other terms 1 923, p. 240). However, the metaphysical foun­
than those you would use in describing the behavior of dations of behaviorism, what it so passionately
the ox you slaughter. (Watson 1970, p. ix)
tried to detach itself from, turned out to be
The term consciousness had never figured in the its own Achilles' heel, the cracked brick in the
vocabulary of any natural science, and it had to edifice. Even during the heyday of behaviorism,
leave the vocabulary of the scientific psychology when all talk about consciousness was strictly
as well. Watson was confident that behaviorism taboo, consciousness was always present as a
marked the beginning of an era that was also the hidden variable in the minds and research agen­
point of no return for consciousness: das of psychologists. Boring was cognizant of this
fact as early as the 1930s, when he declared:
The time seems to have come when psychology must "Behaviorism owes its ism to consciousness. And
discard all reference to consciousness; when it need no what would it be without its ism? Well, it would
longer delude itself into thinking that it is making men­ be physiology" ( Boring 1963, p. 275). Much
tal states the object of observation . . . . This suggested
later, Julian Jaynes would retrospectively note
elimination of states of consciousness as proper objects
that "off the printed page, behaviorism was only
of investigation in themselves will remove the barrier
a refusal to talk about consciousness" (Jaynes
from psychology which exists between it and the other
sciences. (Watson 1 9 1 3, p. 1 63, 1 77) 1 976, p. 1 5).
This make-believe attitude about the absence
Behaviorism remained a very influential para­ of anything, let alone consciousness, occurring
digm for psychology for over half a century and somewhere between the input impinging on the
managed to have the words consciousness and in­ subject and the subject's subsequent behavior was
trospection disappear from the face of the Anglo­ also precisely what provided cognitive psychol­
American world.29 There were obvious reasons ogy the fulcrum it needed to topple behaviorism.
for the enthusiastic acceptance of behaviorism In Neisser's words, "the basic reason for studying
by psychologists, motivated by its promising, cognitive processes has become clear as the rea­
"trouble-free" methodology. However, behav­ son for studying anything else: because they are
iorism became influential as a doctrine not only of there. Our knowledge of the world must be some­
methodology but also one of ontology. The how developed from the stimulus input" (Neisser
behaviorist line turned into a fundamental belief 1 967, p. 5).30
not only that whatever psychology-the disci­
pline-could study could be studied by observ­
ing behavior, but also that aU there was to vm Cogoitivism (and Beyond)
psychology-the phenomenon-was observable
behavior. Ulric Neisser's Cognitive Psychology became a
This was what made (ontological) behaviorism mark of a new era in psychology and proclaimed
both very strong and very weak: strong as a doc- the name of the new game in its title. Neisser, in
Approaching Consciousness 17

the introduction to his book, mentions the change the keepers o f the jail and t o speak freely o f the
in the intellectual atmosphere among psycholo­ need for a concept of consciousness still ties the
gists in a wry tone: "A generation ago, a book like tongues of not a few cognitive psychologists"
this one would have needed at least a chapter of (Mandler 1 975, p. 229). Of course, Mandler was
self-defense against the behaviorist position. To­ not alone in pointing to the importance of con­
day, happily, the climate of opinion has changed, sciousness in cognitive psychology. Tim Shallice,
and little or no defense is necessary. Indeed, for instance, had observed a few years earlier that
stimulus-response theorists themselves are in­ "theoretical developments in cognitive psychol­
venting hypothetical mechanisms with vigor and ogy and the increasing use of introspective reports
enthusiasm and only faint twinges of conscience" require a rationale, and that this should involve
(Neisser 1 967, p. 5). consideration of consciousness" (Shallice 1 972,
For consciousness research, the era of cognitive p. 383).
psychology was marked with a few timid over­ Interestingly, it was the success, not the failure,
tures. With the advent of cognitive psychology, of information-processing models in explain­
whose fundamental ideas were largely inspired by ing learning, memory, problem solving, and the
computational models, consciousness found a like-actually almost everything except con­
new niche, though in terms completely foreign to sciousness-that brought some attention to
its past: it became a kind of component or aspect consciousness itself. The fact that consciousness
of information-processing models. Although only seemed to be the last remaining unexplained phe­
a small percentage of the models developed at the nomenon in an otherwise successful new research
time secured a role for consciousness, cognitivism paradigm helped highlight old questions about
brought about the first signs of the dissolution of consciousness buried during the behaviorist era.
a taboo. Nonetheless, even these cautious begin­ Furthermore, similar developments were taking
nings were not easy; consciousness would have to place in philosophy. Functionalist accounts,
wait until the current ongoing ascent of neuro­ largely inspired by computational ideas, were
psychology research to come back under the being met with noticeable success in explaining
spotlight. In cognitivism, cognition needed de­ propositional attitudes, whereas consciousness (in
fense over behavior no more, but consciousness the sense of the subjective character of experience,
over cognition still did. or qualia) was largely being regarded as the only
In this context, George Mandler's manifesto aspect of mind escaping the net of functionalist
"Consciousness: Respectable, Useful, and Prob­ explanation. (See, for instance, Ned Block's in­
ably Necessary," even though it was not the first fluential article, "Troubles with Functionalism"
article that came out of the cognitivist literature 1 978, as well as Block and Fodor 1 980.)
on consciousness, and despite being written in Shallice was one of the first to point out the
a somewhat gingerly manner, stands out as a special place consciousness occupied in the prob­
cornerstone. J 1 Mandler opens his article with lem space of cognitive psychology: "The problem
the following historical remarks: "I welcome this of consciousness occupies an analogous position
opportunity to act as amicus curiae on behalf of for cognitive psychology as the problem of lan­
one of the central concepts of cognitive theory­ guage behavior does for behaviorism, namely, an
consciousness. Another statement, however im­ unsolved anomaly within the domain of the ap­
perfect, may be useful to undo the harm that proach" (Shallice 1 972, p. 383). Attempts to find
consciousness suffered during fifty years (ap­ some role for consciousness in a cognitive econ­
proximately 1910 to 1 960) in the oubliettes of be­ omy turned up results that at times exceeded
haviorism. It is additionally needed because so expectations. Mandler, for instance, pointed to
many of us have a history of collaboration with the possibility that consciousness might be the
Guven Gllzeldere 18

missing central element in a cognitivist frame­ A prominent account of consciousness in re­

work, able to tie together several separate lines of cent cognitive psychology, Bernard Baars's
cognitive research: "I hope to show that con­ (1988) A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, is
sciousness is . . . probably necessary because it similarly given in information-theoretic terms
serves to tie together many disparate but ob­ with substantial use of functional diagrams. This
viously related mental concepts, including atten­ trend of diagramming in cognitive psychology,
tion, perceptual elaboration, and limited capacity inspired largely by flowcharts of computational
notions" (Mandler 1 975, p. 229).32 models in computer science, also got imported
Of course, there were others on whose work into philosophy of mind by empirically minded
Mandler was basing his claim. Most notably, philosophers. A primary example is Daniel Den­
Norman (1 968) and Atkinson and Shiffrin (1 968) nett's model in his "Toward a Cognitive Theory
had used consciousness as a property demarcat­ of Consciousness" (1 986). Similar functional
ing processes of different kinds (conscious versus flowchart models are also being used in some of
unconscious processes) in their respective unistore the present day neuropsychological accounts. (Cf.
and multistore models of memory. Treisman Schacter 1 988 and Shallice 1 988, especially chap.
(1 969) and Posner and Boies (197 1 ), among 1 6.)
others, talked about consciousness as a limited
capacity processing mechanism. Shallice's idea
IX The Study of tbe UncomciolM
was to equate consciousness as selector input in
his cognitive model of the dominant action sys­
tem. Johnson-Laird characterized the "contents One important line of thought in the study of
of consciousness" as the "current values of pa­ consciousness that has not yet been addressed in
rameters governing the high-level computations this chapter is the foundation of the crucial dis­
of the operating system" ( 1983a, p. 465; 1 983b). tinction between the conscious and unconscious
All in all, the common presupposition driving aspects of mentality. According to Johnson­
the cognitivist research on consciousness was Laird, "The division between conscious and un­
that "the basic phenomenological concept-con­ conscious processes is the best available clue to
sciousness-can be mapped onto an information­ the structure of the mind" (Johnson-Laird 1983a,
processing concept" (Shallice 1 972, p. 383). 3 3 p. 466). Freud would probably agree. None­
Most of these models came complete with their theless, conceptions of the unconscious have
flowcharts, with each functionally defined ele­ changed from their Freudian origins to their cog­
ment confined to its own black box and arrows nitivist incarnations. Following is a brief histor­
indicating the direction of information flow ical account of the unconscious.
among them. Consciousness, then, became a box
among boxes-a module connected to various The Freudian Unconscious
other modules of processing in which input was
registered, intermediate results were transmitted, Until the time of Freud, there was no proper the­
and output was delivered. This approach to con­ oretical framework in which to reject the Carte­
sciousness has, according to Neisser, a special sian idea of equating the mind with whatever lay
strategical advantage: "It represents a theoretical within the scope of one's consciousness. In other
coup: not only are the facts of attention appar­ words, consciousness was generally taken to be
ently explained, but psychology's most elusive "the point of division between miftd and not
target is finally nailed down to a box in a flow mind" (Baldwin 1 90 1 , p. 21 6)-the mark of the
chart" (Neisser 1 976, p. 103). mental.
Approaching Consciousness 19

The received conception of the transparency of o f the mental was completely unheard o f o r un­
the mind to one's consciousness, found in Des­ acknowledged, however. In other words, Freud
cartes and Locke, was not without exceptions, was not really the inventor (or discoverer) of the
however.34 Most notably, Leibniz, in his vision­ concept of the unconscious in any way. On the
ary reply to Locke in New Essays, can be said to contrary, the general intellectual atmosphere of
have anticipated some very important develop­ the times preceding Freud's appearance allowed
ments to come in psychology two centuries ahead talk about mental activity of various sorts that
of their time, especially those with regard to the occurred without the subject's awareness, at least
nature and role of the unconscious: "There are a in any direct way. For instance, the well-known
thousand indications which lead us to think that metaphor of the mind as an iceberg, consisting of
there are at every moment numberless perceptions consciousness as the tip above the surface and of
in us, but without apperception and without re­ a subsurface unconscious component, constituted
flection . . . . In a word, insensible [unconscious] by hidden currents but nonetheless effective on
perceptions are of as great use in psychology as one's conscious mental life, was generally recog­
insensible corpuscles are in physics, and it is nized and used.
equally as unreasonable to reject the one as the In particular, toward the end of the nineteenth
other under the pretext that they are beyond century, the idea of the unconscious mind had
the reach of our senses" (Leibniz 1 9 5 1 , pp. 374- become operative among many scientists, philos­
378). ophers, and literary scholars, in a lineage trace­
Nonetheless, taking consciousness as marking able back from Rousseau to Goethe, to Fichte,
the boundaries of mind by and large remained an and to Nietzsche (Whyte 1960). Freud apparently
influential maxim until the time of Freud. For acknowledged this, as reported by Ernest Jones,
instance, the ·entry for "consciousness" in the one of the most prominent Freud scholars, in the
1901 edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy following statement he made at his seventeenth
and Psychology reads as follows: "[Conscious­ birthday celebrations: "The poets and philos­
ness] is the distinctive character of whatever may ophers before me discovered the unconscious.
be called mental life" (Baldwin 1 90 1 , p. 2 1 6). What I discovered was the scientific method by
Within this context, the introspectionist convic­ which the unconscious can be studied" (quoted in
tion of the time-that psychology is the "science MacIntyre 1 958, p. 6). There were also attempts
of the mental"-provided an especially strong to study the unconscious empirically. For in­
basis for rejecting the unconscious as part of the stance, Henri Ellenberger credits Gustav Fechner,
mental, and hence as a subject matter for psy­ a pioneer of psychophysics research, as the first
chology. Titchener, for example, was resistant to person who tried to reveal the nature of the un­
the idea of the unconscious, to the extent of de­ conscious by experimental methods, though his
claring it a theoretically dangerous construct for work did not prove fruitful (Ellenberger 1 970,
psychology: "The subconscious may be defined as chap. 5).
an extension of the conscious beyond the limits of However, none of these ideas about mental
observation. . . . [T]he subconscious is not a part of processes going on in one's mind without being
the subject-matter of psychology. . . . In the first conscious were well formulated: there was no co­
place, the construction of a subconscious is un­ herent account to explain the structure, func­
necessary. . . . Secondly, the introduction of a sub­ tional role, or operation of the unconscious, or
conscious is dangerous" (Titchener 1 9 1 5, pp. 326- the modality of its relation to consciousness in
327, emphases in the original text). 3 5 the general scheme of an individual's mental life.
None of this should be taken as claiming that There was consensus regarding neither the nature
the concept of the unconscious as a part or aspect of the unconscious, nor its place in regard to
Guven Giizeldere 20

consciousness, in the intellectual community. To An encompassing account of the Freudian un­

this situation Freud brought a steadily evolving conscious, including its structure and dynamics,
theoretical framework in which, for the first time, is given in Erdelyi (1 985). Erdelyi also makes a
construction of hypotheses to answer each of strong case that Freudian psychology was indeed
these questions became possible. This is the sense very close, in essence, to the cognitive psychology
in which Freud can be said to be the pioneer of of our day-especially in terms of its approach to
the unconscious. 36 understanding mental phenomena, and research
In Freudian theory, the unconscious proper methodology. He even goes on to reconstruct
consists of repressed processes, exerting stress on Freudian schemas of the structure of conscious­
the conscious component of the subject's mind ness, quite plausibly, in modem flowchart style.
and shaping his or her daily life in substantial Neisser ( 1 976) also refers to Freud's diagrams
ways. This is in contrast to the preconscious, depicting the structure of the tripartite division
which includes those processes that only con­ of consciousness, preconsciousness, and uncon­
tingently happen to lie outside awareness. What is sciousness as "flowcharts" (See Freud 1 950,
preconscious can easily become conscious with­ p. 394).37 It is true not only that Freud antici­
out special techniques or effort; what is uncon­ pated some of the developments in cognitive psy­
scious has to be "brought to the surface" through chology but also that the Freudian unconscious,
the psychoanalytic technique with the help of an even if under different names, has played a sig­
analyst. nificant role as an influential construct in cogni­
The Freudian unconscious, although related, is tive psychology.
not the same sense of unconsciousness employed
in the current cognitive psychology research re­ The Cognitive Unconscious
garding unconscious processes-the "cognitive
unconscious." Unconscious processes of both There has also been a whole research industry in
kinds are opaque to introspection, but there is contemporary cognitive psychology involved in
a difference between them. The Freudian uncon­ investigating the nature of the unconscious: men­
scious exists because of past events, explainable tal processes that underlie cognition but are them­
by repression mechanisms and the like, and is not selves not conscious. 3 8 Over the past few decades,
in principle inaccessible. The cognitive uncon­ there has been an enormous wealth of data
scious, on the other hand, exists due to the way accumulated, operative in current psychological
our perceptual-cognitive system is constituted theory, in this area -from rules of Chomskian
and lies in principle outside our access. The universal grammar, to computational mecha­
mechanisms that subserve depth perception, for nisms underlying vision and the 2 1D sketch in­
instance, are taken to be hard-wired: they are not spired by the work of the late David Marr (1 982),
there because of repression, and they can never and to Newell and Simon's work on cognitive
become conscious through any method, psycho­ constraints in planning, problem solving, and
analytic or otherwise. game playing (1 972). Consequently, the classi­
The recognition and study of the cognitive un­ fication of mental processes as conscious versus
conscious goes even further back than Freud, at nonconscious is useful and not unusual (though
least to von Helmholtz's work on perceptual controversial) in psychological practice, espe­
constancy, and spans a substantial period, all the cially in research on psycho linguistics, attention,
way up to the thesis of "unconscious perceptual and perception. 3 9 Furthermore, as evidenced
inference" by Rock ( 1 983). Despite these differ­ from contemporary psychology literature, re­
ences, however, Freud's approach to the uncon­ search on type identifying mental states as con­
scious was very modem and in anticipation of the scious versus nonconscious, and research on the
"cognitive revolution." nature of consciousness of the subjects who have
Approaching Consciousness 21

such states is being pursued on independent con­ to leave out something important: the subjective,
ceptual grounds. In fact, the dichotomy of con­ experiential aspect ofconsciousness. Perhaps there
scious versus nonconscious processes is not the is something about consciousness that makes its
only such ground on which current research identification with specific modules of isolated
in cognitive psychology rests. There are several functions fundamentally inadequate.
other such distinctions, all overlapping i� various Interestingly, it was Neisser who registered
ways in their function to distinguish mental pro­ such a concern about the information-processing
cesses that are directly available to the subject models of consciousness during the heyday of
("introspectable," reportable, etc.) and those that cognitivism:
are opaque and unavailable, as reflected in a re­
cent note by cognitive psychologists Holyoak and The treatment of consciousness as a processing stage is
unsatisfactory in a still more fundamental way. It does
Spellman:
justice neither to the usages of the word "consciousness"
Theorists of diverse persuasions have been led to pro­ in ordinary discourse nor to the subtleties of experience.
pose cognitive dichotomies, which have been given a A better conception of consciousness, which has been
rather bewildering array of labels: unconscious vs. con­ suggested many times in the history of psychology,
scious, procedural vs. declarative, automatic vs. con­ would recognize it as an aspect of activity rather than as
trolled, reflexive vs. reflective, and many others. an independently definable mechanism . . . . Conscious­
These distinctions do not always divide cognition ness is an aspect of mental activity, not a switching
along the same lines . . . [but] there are tantalizing sim­ center on the intrapsychic railway. (Neisser 1 976, pp.
ilarities among the proposed dichotomies. In particular, 104-105)
the first member of each pair is generally viewed as in­
Many people, including philosophers, pro­
volving unconscious mental processes, a topic that has
seen a recent resurgence of interest among experimental ceeded with Neisser's intuitions in the past few
psychologists. (Holyoak and Spellman 1993, p. 265) decades. Something essential to (at least our
commonsense conception of) consciousness; it
In sum, whether or not lohnson-Laird is right was largely believed, was necessarily left out in
in his claim about the distinction between the characterizing consciousness only by specifying
conscious and the unconscious being the most its functional role in the cognitive economy of
important theoretical tool to study the mind, one human mentation and behavior. This some­
can easily say that the investigation of the un­ thing-the phenomenal face of consciousness­
conscious in cognitive psychology has proved to brings us back full circle to the problem of the two
be at least as fruitful as the investigation of the faces of consciousness.
conscious.40 In the last part of this chapter, I will examine
the dialectic of the opposition between the segre­
gationist and the integrationist intuitions, in the
x Status Report: From Information Processing
context of the causal and phenomenal character­
to Qualia
izations of consciousness.

What is the current status of cognitive psychol­

ogy? Information-processing models in psychol­ PART THREE
ogy are still popular, but they do not constitute PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: A
the sole dominant paradigm any more. This is PERSPECTIVE ON CONTEMPORARY
also reflected in models of consciousness. But ISSUES AND CURRENT DEBATES
there are other reasons, too, for the shift in the
research paradigm with respect to consciousness. "Consciousness is a word worn smooth by a mil­
One of them is the recognition that the functional lion tongues," George Miller once said. "De­
diagrammatic depictions of consciousness seem pending upon the figure of speech chosen it is a
Giiven Giizeldere 22

state of being, a substance, a process, a place, an Fodor chooses to stay away from the first, despite
epiphenomenon, an emergent aspect of matter, or his career-long devotion to the latter two (which
the only true reality" (Miller 1 962, p. 25). he takes to be closely related). This attitude is not
The conceptual and historical analyses I have at all uncommon. It is generally accepted as a re­
presented are in agreement with Miller: it is ceived view that the two fundamental aspects of
probably best to regard and treat consciousness mind, consciousness and intentionality, can be
as a cluster concept. There are simply too many studied in the absence of one another-at least
connotations that go under the term, and it seems that intentionality can be so studied with no ref­
futile to try to specify a single concept that would erence to consciousness. Here, "consciousness"
cover all aspects of consciousness or a single "the typically refers to the qualitative aspects of
problem of consciousness." Nonetheless, I have consciousness, and "intentionality" is taken
tried to illustrate, there is a coherent theoretical sufficiently broadly to embrace questions about
thread constituted by certain problems and not semantics, as well as rationality. Fodor's justifi­
others, that one can trace from texts in early cation is the following:
modem (if not ancient Greek) philosophy to the
It used to be universally taken for granted that the
emergence of scientific psychology in the nine­
problem about consciousness and the problem about
teenth century, to the present.
intentionality are intrinsically linked: that thought is
The most troublesome feature of this thread is ipso facto conscious, and that consciousness is ipso
what has been most difficult to explain, and it is facto consciousness of some or other intentional ob­
the topic I arrived at by the end of the historical ject. . . . Freud changed all that. He made it seem plau­
analysis: the qualitative, or phenomenal aspects sible that explaining behavior might require the
of consciousness, or qualia. Of course, the notion postulation of intentional but unconscious states. Over
of consciousness theoretically outstrips the notion the last century, and most especially in Chomskian
of qualia, and there are many fascinating aspects linguistics and in cognitive psychology, Freud's idea
to consciousness that do not necessarily have a appears to have been amply vindicated . . . . Dividing
and conquering-concentrating on intentionality and
qualitative component (e.g., its representational
ignoring consciousness-has proved a remarkably suc­
aspect, its attentive and control components, and
cessful research strategy so far. ( Fodor 1991b, p. 1 2)
mechanisms of the unconscious). But it is also
questionable whether qualitative and nonqualita­ Not everyone agrees, however. In particular,
tive aspects of consciousness can really be under­ John Searle recently argued for what he called the
stood or explained independent of one another. "connection principle": the thesis that conscious­
These are the questions I will focus on and pursue ness and intentionality are immanently linked,
below. and, contra Fodor's thesis, any research strategy
that tries to explain the latter without recourse to
the former is doomed to failure. Searle states the
XI Consciousness and Intentionality: Two
connection principle as follows: "Only a being
Dimensions of Mind
that could have conscious intentional states could
have intentional states at all, and every uncon­
Jerry Fodor once remarked: "There are, I think,
scious intentional state is at least potentially
three great metaphysical puzzles about the mind.
conscious . . . . [T]here is a conceptual connection
How could anything material have conscious
between consciousness and intentionality that
states? How could anything material have se­
has the consequence that a complete theory of
mantical properties? How could anything mate­
intentionality requires an account of conscious­
rial be rational?" (Fodor 1991a, reply to Devitt,
ness" (Searle 1 992, p. 1 32). 4 1 More recently,
p. 285). Having enumerated these three questions,
Approaching Consciousness 23

Strawson (1 994) takes the similar position that Another attempt to characterize (phenomenal)
consciousness is the only distinctive characteristic consciousness and intentionality as the two hall­
of the mind. marks of the mind, though for the purposes of a
The beginnings of this line of thought can be critique, is given by Richard Rorty (1 979, p. 24)
traced back to Brentano's discussion of the rela­ in terms of the diagram in figure 1. 1 . There are in
tion between mental and physical phenomena in fact various ways to fill in such a diagram, and
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Bren­ which elements of the mental are to occupy which
tano is acknowledged as being first to postulate cells is a matter of controversy. For instance, not
intentionality as the mark of the mental in mod­ everyone thinks that beliefs and desires are with­
em terms. For instance, he says: "Every mental out a phenomenal component (Searle 1 992), or
phenomenon is characterized by . . . the inten­ that pains have no representational or intentional
tional inexistence of an object, and what we might aspects (Dretske 1 995, Tye 1 995). And the ad­
call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference herents of panpsychism would probably maintain
to a content, direction toward an object (which is that the cell that holds what Rorty labels "the
not to be understood here as meaning a thing) . . . . merely physical" is bound to remain nil.42 None­
This intentional inexistence is characteristic ex­ theless, this way of depicting the · dimensions of
clusively of mental phenomena. No physical phe­ the mental is useful in terms of illustrating what
nomenon exhibits anything like it" ( Brentano has been the most problematic aspect of the study
1 874, pp. 88-89). And regarding consciousness, of consciousness. In this diagram, it is what Rorty
Brentano states, for instance, that "no mental calls "raw feels."43
phenomenon is possible without a correlative Most of the current debates involving con­
consciousness" (p. 1 2 1 ). Although the connota­ sciousness revolve around the (possible) inhabi­
tions of the terms consciousness and intentionality tants of this particular cell and their nature. Are
have somewhat shifted from Brentano's time to there really such things as nonrepresentational
the present, I think it is fair to note that there is but phenomenal properties? If there are, what is
a great deal of theorizing in his work that lay their ontological nature, what kinds of special
the foundations of an account of the mental that epistemological problems do they present, and
attempts to incorporate these two dimensions of how can their semantics be given? Can they ever
the mind in a principled way. be captured in naturalistic explanatory scheme,

With phenomenal Without phenomenal

properties properties

Intentional, Occurrent thoughts, Beliefs, desires,

representational mental images intentions

Noni ntentional, Raw feels (e.g., "The merely physical"

nonrepresentational pains and what babies
have when they see
colored objects)

Figure I.I
Two dimensions of mind
Guven Giizeldere 24

or are they inherently bound to remain mysteri­ we become confused because whenever we are
ous? These are the questions that constitute the thinking about consciousness, we are surrounded
consciousness debates today. by it, and can only imagine what consciousness is
not. The fish, someone has said, will be the last to
discover water" (Miller 1 962, p. 25).
xn Perspectivity and Episternic Asymmetry Miller's observation is intriguing. One cannot,
in principle, study the minute details of a micro­
Naturally, there can be several different entry scope's outer surface, for instance, by using the
points to the kind of exposition I aim to present very same microscope. This would be impossible
here. The investigation of consciousness is as fas­ simply because of the way the microscope, as a
cinating as it is difficult, and it presents unique tool, is designed and used. Neither can one di­
epistemological and ontological difficulties. Al­ rectly take the picture of a camera by using the
though my overarching goal is to provide an camera itself. But why should these considera­
overview of the contemporary problems of con­ tions apply to the study of consciousness using
sciousness rather than try to present my own sol­ consciousness itself? One can certainly lay the
utions to them, I will start by presenting a brief body of a microscope under another microscope
profile of what I take to be the primarily respon­ for examination or take pictures of one camera
sible component in the consciousness puzzle: the with another. It may be that the sort of recursive
epistemic element of perspectivity. Perspectivity, impossibility involved in the self-study of tools
or the fact that consciousness is a phenomenon applies to the phenomenon of self-conscious­
that admits a distinction between "perspectives," ness-for example, one's study of one's own
or "points of view" in its explication, lies deep at consciousness by introspection. But Miller is
the roots of the common understanding of con­ concerned with the study of consciousness in
sciousness, as well as the attitude of puzzlement. general here, not only self-consciousness, and it is
Furthermore, epistemically based theses about not clear why the analogy should hold. 44
consciousness seem much less controversial than Nonetheless, Miller's point is related to what I
ontologically based theses. I start by sketching a see as the source of what makes consciousness
commonsense conception of consciousness and pUZZling. The difficulty lies in the curious duality
try to reveal just how perspectivity figures in it. inherent in the (epistemic) study of the phenom­
Then I will proceed to examine its possible onto­ enon. This duality does not need to be inherent in
logical ramifications. the (ontological) nature of the phenomenon of
Why does consciousness keep appearing as an consciousness itself or its properties. In fact, as I
unsolved puzzle for philosophy, psychology, and have mentioned, the ontology of consciousness is
neuroscience? There do not seem to be similar an issue open to current debates. But as far as the
puzzles associated with the study of, say, mem­ epistemology of the matter goes, there appears
ory or learning, or biological development and to be a genuine asymmetry between the mode of
growth. What is so special about consciousness? access to facts of one's own consciousness and the
George Miller thinks that perhaps the unique mode of access to facts about others' conscious
difficulty involved in the understanding of con­ states. This asymmetry is what grounds the
sciousness stems from the fact that consciousness important distinction between systematic ap­
is both the phenomenon we try to investigate and proaches to consciousness from the first-person
the very tool we need to use to pursue this inves­ perspective versus the third-person perspective.
tigation. "Turning a tool on itself," he says, "may On the one hand, nothing is more intimately
be as futile as trying to soar off the ground by a known by conscious human beings than the way
tug at one's bootstraps." He continues: "Perhaps the world (including themselves) appears to them.
Approaching Consciousness 25

We are all subjects of a variety of perceptual ex­ respectable account of consciousness that does
periences, thoughts and ideas, pains and tickles, justice to the richness of our conscious experi­
joys and sorrows. Under normal circumstances, ences of sights and sounds within a framework
there is nothing more familiar with the way the based on a monistic materialist ontology? Con­
face of one's spouse looks, the way a favorite sciousness just does not seem to be the kind of
drink tastes, the way the chronic heartburn starts phenomenon that is amenable to the sort of sci­
to make itself felt. We all have, it seems, firsthand, entific explanation that works so well with all
immediate, direct knowledge of the rich phenom­ other biological phenomena, such as digestion
enology of colors, sounds, tastes, aromas, and or reproduction. The facts that would settle the
tactile sensations that embellish our experiences­ question of whether some organism-an animal
the qualia. All these are constituents of a specific or a fellow human being-is digesting do not
mode of being for every individual; they de­ seem to be available in the same way when it
termine, in Thomas Nagel's famous phrase, what comes to the question of consciousness in others,
it is like to be that individual (Nagel 1 974). especially in the case of organisms phylogeneti­
Moreover, we all seem to have a "privileged" cally distant from ourselves. There seems to be no
way of knowing about our own thoughts, feel­ ordinary way to peek into the inner lives of oth­
ings, and sensations. Epistemological problems ers-to feel their pains, go through their sensa­
about knowledge notwithstanding, and even the tions, or directly observe their consciousness.46
question of the incorrigibility of the mental put That is, there seems to be an epistemic impossi­
aside, it seems that there is at least a special mode bility for anyone to have direct access to the
in which one's own experiences are present to qualia of others-literally share their first-person
one, in an immediate, direct way, not available perspective, in short, to partake in the mode of
for anyone else.45 what it is like to be them. These are the limitations
Further, the common wisdom goes, we cannot of the third-person perspective: from the outside,
genuinely entertain the possibility that we may be firsthand exploration of the consciousness of
lacking consciousness; the very fact that we are others just seems to be out of the reach of ordi­
questioning our own consciousness renders the nary scientific methods, others' experiences being
possibility of our not being the entertainer of neither directly observable nor noninferentially
some occurrent thoughts logically contradictory. verifiable. And therein this asymmetry between
If in nothing else, Descartes was perhaps right in the first- and the third-person perspectives lies the
this regard: The mere fact of being the bearer of epistemic duality in the study consciousness.
(these) thoughts is, in the Cartesian sense, un­ But what exactly follows from this asymmetry?
mistakable evidence, for oneself, that one is con­ What do the limitations of the third-person
scious. This is the characteristic of the first-person approach entail, for example? Are there any
perspective; from the inside, consciousness seems insurmountable problems for a systematic study
all-pervasive, self-evident, and undeniable. of consciousness-its nature, underlying mecha­
On the other hand, contemporary science tells nism, evolutionary function, ontological status?
us that the world is made up of nothing over and After all, the third-person perspective is what is
above "physical" elements, whatever their nature and has successfully been operant in the scientific
(waves, particles, etc.) may be. Where does this practice of the past several centuries, and no one
leave us with respect to the place of consciousness doubts that it can provide valuable advances in
in an entirely physical world? "How can tech­ the understanding of consciousness. But the issue
nicolor phenomenology arise from the soggy is whether such an approach is always doomed to
grey matter of brains?" as Colin McGinn asks leave something essential to consciousness out
(McGinn 1989, p. 349). Can one accommodate a of its explanatory scope. In short, is there an
Guven Giizeldere 26

unbridgeable "explanatory gap" inherent in the to describe an experience by stating its qualitative
third-person approaches to consciousness, and if aspects as they seem to the experiencer. The fruity
so, can it be remedied by the deployment of a character is directly experienced only by the per­
crossbred conceptual scheme that embodies a son whose gustatory and olfactory nerves are ex­
first-person approach in the investigation of con­ cited by the wine. As such, the experiencer has a
sciousness? privileged status; she gets to have the experience,
whereas the listener only gets to hear the descrip­
tion. As far as the second method is concerned,
xm First-Person versus Third-Person however, the experiencer and the listener are
Approaches to Consciousness epistemically on a par. The description of the
perturbations in the experiencer's nervous system
The epistemic asymmetry inherent in the study of
is open to public observation and verification,
consciousness can be found as manifested under
and ordinarily, no qualitative terms about the
different names, roughly as variations of one an­
experience (how it feels) need to be involved. In
other and as occupying critical roles in theoretical
other words, whereas the instantiation of the
junctions. The notion of the first-person versus
phenomenal properties of an experience is di­
third-person perspectives is one such contrastive
rectly accessible only to the experiencer, the in­
pair. Yet another similar distinction is that of the
stantiation of its intrinsic neurophysiological
subjective versus the objective, or the "phenom­
properties can be equally observed by many.48 In
enal" versus "physical."
the latter case, what is at issue are the publicly
One way of describing a particular experience,
observable aspects of the experience-not how it
say, of tasting a particular vintage of a certain
feels but what it does.
kind of wine, would be to try to state how the
The important question is to determine
wine tastes to me-that is, what it is like for me to
whether these two methods have distinct scopes
have that particular gustatory experience. This
of explanation and whether they are necessarily
is indeed the ordinary, even if not so easy, way.
committed to distinct ontologies. I have outlined
It involves the usage of qualitative terms such
two general approaches to consciousness, each of
as "fruity," "with a hint of tobacco," or "full­
which respectively takes one of the two above
bodied," and the hope of conveying some sense of
methods as primary. The first of these approaches
what the tasting of that wine would be like had
takes consciousness "as consciousness seems"
it been experienced by the listener.
and, in accord with the phenomenal character­
The other way would be to proceed by way of
ization, regards its qualitative aspects as the pri­
giving a description of the specific ways in which
mary components of any explanatory scheme.
my tastebuds are excited, my olfactory nerves are
The second one takes consciousness "as con­
activated, my blood chemistry has changed, and
sciousness does," and, in accord with the causal
so forth. This would not be the most ordinary
characterization, tries to account for conscious­
way of describing one's gustatory experiences,
ness in terms of what it does and the role it plays
but perhaps one can overhear two devoted neu­
in one's cognitive economy. Put in different
rologists talking this way to one another at a
terms, one can call these the "first-person-per­
conference reception. In any case, in the right
spectival" versus the "third-person-perspectival"
context, it is clear that this alternative method
approaches to consciousness.49 The dichotomy of
would also be informative in conveying something
the "two faces of consciousness" manifests itself
about the nature of one's experience.
in yet other distinctions and under other names,
There is clearly an important difference be­
to which I now tum.
tween the two methods.47 The first one attempts
Approaching Consciousness 27

consciousness could arise from their physiological

XIV The Two Faces of Consciousness Revisited
underpinnings. 5 1 Deep down, this problem is a
manifestation of the gap that separates our direct
The phenomenal and the causal characterizations
understanding of consciousness in first-person
are merely expressions of what seems most im­
terms, versus the objective, physicalist accounts
portant, or primary, in the understanding of the
of consciousness given in third-person terms. The
nature of consciousness. They are not, in them­
roots of this problem are indeed unique; no other
phe�omenon �resents us with two distinct epis­
selves, in opposition with one another. It is only
under the dictum of the segregationist intuition
terruc perspecttves from which it can be inves­
that they are considered essentially antipodal and
tigated. Given this duality, how does the "causal
mutually exclusive. The issue of how to locate the
characterization" of consciousness fare against its
phenomenal and the causal characterizations
phenomenal counterpart?
with regard to each other is central to the dialectic
A causal characterization of consciousness can
of certain ongoing debates surrounding the
be given in many dimensions. One can try to ac­
"phenomenal" versus "access" senses and the
count for consciousness in terms of behavioral
"easy" versus "hard" problems of consciousness.
manifestations, or of its role and place in the
By "phenomenal characterization of con­
general mental economy. The former approach
sciousness" I mean a characterization given
fu�damentally in first-person terms, describing
was behaviorists' failed solution to account for
(or, rather, do away with) consciousness. The
epIsodes of inner life in terms of how they feel
former became a canonical characterization in
or seem to the subject who experiences them.
behaviorism's successor, cognitive psychology
William James was interested in both the tempo­
and in functionalist schools of philosophy.
ral and the spatial structure of consciousness and
his chapter "Stream of Thought" (James 1 50a, 9 Behaviorism, in its explicit form, is no longer
around. But it is worth mentioning again how the
pp. 224-290) provides an excellent example of
most obvious difficulty in relying entirely on ex­
such a characterization. 5 0 Apart from James and
the continental phenomenologist philosophers
� rnal criteria gave way to information-proces­
introspectionist psychologists were paradigmati �
smg accounts of consciousness in particular, and
of mental phenomena in general. Behaviorism left
cally interested in the phenomenal aspects of ex­
no room for the possibility of the presence of
perience, and they relentlessly pursued the project
of "�apping the boundaries of the inner space of
consciousness in the absence of external behavior.
Put differently, the absence of evidence from the
conscIousness." Along those lines, Titchener de­
third-person perspective implied the theoretical
fined consciousness as the occurrent parts of one's
rejection of all experience that is generally char­
mind, accessible by introspection, at any given
acterized in first-person terms. Given that the
moment: "My 'consciousness' is the sum of men­
�al . processes which make up my experience now;
most familiar aspects of consciousness have to do
with its phenomenology (think of James' stream),
It IS the mind of any given 'present' time. We .
thIS result stood out as the most difficult one to
might, perhaps, consider it as a cross-section of
accept. Even many behaviorists balked at biting
mind" (Titchener 1 902, p. 1 3).
the bullet and claiming that a person who is
But there is more to the phenomenal charac­
sitting perfectly still with no vocal cord activity
terization in the way "problem of phenomenal
whatsoever (behaviorists' characterization of
consciousness" is understood today. In particu­
"thinking") would ipso facto be unconscious. 52
lar, the problem has now transformed into the
This claim, it seemed, was readily refutable in
exploration of explanatory laws that would ac­
one's own everyday phenomenology. There
count for how particular phenomenal aspects of
was, after all, an epistemic component to the
Guven Giizeldere 28

phenomenon of consciousness that cried for a Once again, it is essential to ask at this stage
characterization in first-person terms. However, whether these two perspectives are mutually ex­
behaviorism, in its attempt to associate con­ clusive regarding their explanatory roles-that
sciousness and behavior conceptually, and thereby is, whether an account of causal consciousness
fully externalize consciousness, left no room for provides us with no understanding of how con­
talking about consciousness as it is experienced sciousness seems to the first-person subject, and
by the subject. Everyone smiled at the joke about whether an account of phenomenal consciousness
one behaviorist's asking another, after having has no elements that figure in the understanding
made love, "It was great for you; how was it of what consciousness does. As I will suggest be­
for me?" but (fortunately) not many took the low, my answer is "not necessarily." A further
scenario as a serious possibility. 53 question along this line would be what onto­
A logical next step in trying to account for logical consequences the perspectival asymmetry
consciousness in causal terms was to reverse the in the epistemology of consciousness entails.
behaviorist direction and, to some extent, re­ There, my answer will be "not very much." But
internalize the causal criteria of consciousness. first let me bring into the picture another dis­
This provided a groundwork for functionalist tinction, proposed by Ned Block, which aligns
philosophy of mind, and cognitive psychology. well with the distinction between the causal and
Under such a more relaxed framework, con­ phenomenal conceptions of consciousness.
sciousness was allowed to be individualized by
the role it played, as an integral component of the Access Versus Phenomenal Consciousness
larger network of mental states and processes.
With the promising application of computational Block ( 1995) distinguishes between "access con­
ideas and information-processing models in psy­ sciousness" and "phenomenal consciousness" as
chology, it was canonically characterized as a follows:
process accomplishing a specific task, a module
Access (A) consciousness: A state is access-conscious if,
with a specific function in a cognitive diagram, or
in virtue of one's having the state, a representation of its
an abstract property of the overall system. Here is
content is (I) inferentially promiscuous, that is, poised
a paradigmatic characterization in the cognitivist for use as a premise in reasoning, (2) poised for rational
framework: control of action, and (3) poised for rational control of
speech . . . . These three conditions are together suffi­
Consciousness is a process in which infonnation about
cient, but not all necessary.
multiple individual modalities of sensation and percep­
tion is combined into a unified multidimensional repre­ Phenomenal (P) consciousness: P-consciousness is ex­
sentation of the state of the system and its environment, perience. P-conscious properties are experiential ones.
and integrated with infonnation about memories and P-conscious states are experiential, that is, a state is P­
the needs of the organism, generating emotional re­ conscious if it has experiential properties. The totality of
actions and programs of behavior to adjust the organ­ the experiential properties of a state are "what it is like"
ism to its environment. . . . The content of consciousness to have it. (pp. 230-23 1)
is the momentary constellation of these different types
Defining A-consciousness is a straightforward
of infonnation. (Thatcher and John 1977, p. 294)
matter. In the case of human beings, A-con­
What is important to note here is that this char­ sciousness is a cognitively interwoven aspect of
acterization is given largely in a third-person per­ mental life, underlain by three crucial capacities
spective. Consciousness is identified with what it centered around rationality: rational cogitation,
does but not necessarily how it feels to the experi­ speech, and action. (For the general case, not all
encing subject. three conditions are necessary for A-conscious-
Approaching Consciousness 29

ness because, Block maintains, animals without definition of A-consciousness is not, strictly
speech can have mental states of the A-conscious speaking, reductive, and it serves its purpose well
type.) Construed as such, A-consciousness fits with no need for ostension. Could there be some­
well in the domain of propositional attitudes in thing inherent in the pretheoretical construal of
philosophy of mind, and it is just the perfect sort P-consciousness such that it does not allow a
of subject matter for cognitive psychology. 54 nonreductive but also nonostensive definition?
P-consciousness is more problematic. Block More importantly, could it be that the particular
starts out his analysis of P-consciousness by way Block's distinction carves out phenomenal
stating the difficulty particular to it: "Let me consciousness, separating it completely from its
acknowledge at the outset that I cannot define causal and functional aspects in accord with the
P-consciousness in any remotely noncircular "segregationist intuition," renders its inves­
way. . . . The best one can do for P-consciousness tigation by means of scientific methods theoret­
is . . point to the phenomenon" ( Block 1 995,
. ically impossible? Put differently, could we be
p. 230). The way Block himself goes about char­ painting ourselves into a corner by a conceptual
acterizing P-consciousness is either "via rough commitment to Block's distinction such that we
synonyms" or by examples. P-consciousness, as end up with a number of straightforward prob­
expected, is what I have been referring to as the lems about A-consciousness and a conjured-up
phenomenal aspect of consciousness. Among the "hard problem" of P-consciousness that in prin­
P-conscious properties that endow a mental state ciple admits no solution?55 This last question
with P-consciousness in virtu� of its having them leads directly into a related debate that has its
are, for instance, the way it feels to "see, hear, roots in the "explanatory gap" problem, re­
smell, taste, and have pains" and more generally, cently dubbed by David Chalmers the "easy and
"the experiential properties of sensations, feel­ hard problems of consciousness."
ings, and perceptions". Furthermore, Block
maintains, P-conscious properties are "distinct The "Easy Problems of Consciousness" and the
from any cognitive, intentional, or functional "Hard Problem"
property" (p. 230).
Block thinks that it is not an embarrassment Chalmers ( 1 995) characterizes the "easy prob­
that he cannot provide a noncircular definition of lems" as those concerning the explanation of
P-consciousness. But why is it difficult to provide various cognitive functions: discriminatory abil­
a straightforward definition of P-consciousness, ities, reportability of mental states, the focus of
and why should this not be considered a cause of attention, the control of behavior. Of course these
disconcertment? According to Block, that there is are not trivial problems at all, and labeling them
no way to give a reductive definition of P-con­ "easy problems" should not be taken as down­
sciousness is not embarrassing given the "history playing their complicated nature. Rather, Chal­
of reductive definitions in philosophy," presum­ mers's point is that "there is no real issue about
ably full offailures. whether these phenomena can be explained
It is still not clear, however, whether the in­ scientifically." They can be. "All of them are
ability to define P-consciousness reductively is straightforwardly vulnerable to explanation in
sufficient reason to think that the only other al­ terms of computational or neural mechanisms"
ternative must be an ostensive definition. Even if (p. 20 1). What makes "the hard problem" of
it is, it may be useful to ask why the definition of consciousness a different kind of problem is,
P-consciousness is, unlike other definitions, thus Chalmers maintains, its resistance to all the
obliged to ostention. In the case of A-conscious­ methods that explain, or have the potential to
ness, there seems to be no such problem. Block's explain, the rest of the problems. Put differently,
Guven Giizeldere 30

there is a different kind of problem about con­ philosophy. The first has to do with how to bridge
sciousness that may evade the successes of all the explanatory gap between physical mechanism
standard scientific advances. Such a problem and phenomenal appearance, or brain and mind,
would be a hard problem indeed. What is it? as discussed in the "Mystery of Consciousness"
According to Chalmers, "The really hard section in section I. The second asks whether all
problem is the problem of experience." More the activity on the "physical" side could go on
specifically, it is the "subjective" aspect of every as usual in the total absence of any counterpart
experience that resists explanation. The notion of phenomenology. The former question is based on
"subjective aspect" is given, as Block does, in Levine's (1983, 1 993) original formulation of the
Nagelian terms: There is something it is like to be problem of the "explanatory gap," which has an­
a conscious organism and have experiences. In tecedents in considerations raised by Saul Kripke
other words, "what it is like to be" constitutes (1980) and Thomas Nagel (1974, 1 986) (though
the subjective character of the experiences of the reaching different conclusions). The latter ques­
organism in question. This much is also in line tion is a version of the so-called absent qualia
with Block's characterization of phenomenal problem. 56 Similar considerations also underlie
consciousness. what William Seager ( 1 99 1 ) calls the ultimate
I will give a sorted-out schema of the theoret­ problem of consciousness. He asks: "Why is it so
ically interwoven notions of "phenomenal as­ hard to think about consciousness, to formulate
pect," "subjective character," and "what it is like reasonable models of the relation of particular
to be" in section XVI below. For now, it is useful modes of consciousness to their physical bases?"
to observe that the line that separates Chalmers's The answer Seager offers, in agreement with
"easy" and "hard" problems is the counterpart of Nagel, has to do with the uniqueness of conscious­
the line that separates "access" and "phenom­ ness as a phenomenon: "There is no model by
enal" consciousness in Block, which also mirrors which we can satisfactorily understand the rela­
the distinction between the causal versus phe­ tion between conscious experience and subvening
nomenal characterizations of consciousness out­ physical state since this relation is absolutely
lined earlier. Given these distinctions Chalmers unique in nature" (pp. 223-234).
states the "hard problem" as the problem of Before discussing the status of the hard prob­
bridging the explanatory gap between accounts of lem further, let me first sketch a larger framework
the causal-functional (physical) kind and the oc­ in which a number of relevant questions can be
currence of specific phenomenal aspects. He asks: located and pursued. This framework will also
be useful in revealing just how much explanation
Even when we have explained the performance of all the
along one question-path can be useful in explain­
cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of
ing issues in neighboring problems.
experience-perceptual discrimination, categorization,
internal access, verbal report-there may still remain a
further unanswered question: Why is the performance of
XV The Four W Questions and the Further-How
these functions accompanied by experience? . . . This fur­
Question
ther question is the key question in the problem of con­
sciousness. Why doesn't all this information-processing
go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel? (Chalmers It is true that the enterprise of approaching con­
1995, p. 203). sciousness within a scientific discipline has tradi­
tionally been very problematic, largely due to the
There are two related questions Chalmers inadequacy of the scientific third-person perspec­
raises, and the roots of both go back at least a tive all by itself as a penetrating tool for the study
hundred years in the history of psychology and of the phenomenal character of consciousness.
Approaching Consciousness 31

The most influential assumption about conscious­ Notice that the How question seems to be a
ness, as evidenced by the diversity ofthe literature, further question, the answer to which may not be
is that what makes it a tough nut to crack is in completely revealed even if all the previous four
some crucial way related to those properties of W questions are already adequately answered.
consciousness that have to do with its phenomenal The answer to the How question may involve the
aspect. Problems such as the irreducibility of con­ postulation of, in Chalmers's terms, an extra in­
sciousness, its imminent subjectivity, the status of gredient, which makes the question difficult in a
its relation to its physical underpinnings, and so on unique way. Even when all the underpinnings
all relate to the phenomenal side of consciousness. of consciousness, including its medium, locus,
In order to get into some of the inner structure and mechanism, are revealed, and conscious and
of this difficulty, consider the following five ques­ nonconscious things are, at least according to
tions, which I will call the four W questions and some operational definition, properly categorized
thefurther-How question of consciousness: and explained, a further question may remain:
Just how is it that one experiences the particular
1 . What are the media and mechanisms of con­ sort of phenomenal quality that one does, rather
sciousness? Can consciousness occur in any type than a different quality, or even none at all?
of material substance, or does it have to have a Or, more generally, how does any physical
specific kind of underpinning (e.g., a carbon­ mechanism give rise to any kind of phenomenal
based molecular structure)? And what are the experience? Because of this extra ingredient
underlying mechanisms that facilitate conscious­ seemingly inherent in the How question, I call it
ness? the further-How question.
2. Where is, if anywhere, the locus of conscious­ As must be clear from the formulation of the
ness? Can consciousness be localized in a specific further-How question, the difficulty surrounding
organ, the brain (or a module in the brain), or is it the extra ingredient, the gap that remains not
endemic to the whole of the nervous system? bridged, owes its difficulty to the phenomenal as­
Where is the seat of consciousness? pect of consciousness. The further-How question
3. Who can be said to be a conscious being? is generally considered to be categorically more
Using consciousness as a type-identifying pred­ difficult compared to the other four-hence the
icate, one can ask: Is a chimp, a spider, a pro­ dubbing: "the hard problem of consciousness"
tozoan, or a robot conscious or nonconscious? versus the rest, the "easy problems."
(In a slightly different sense of consciousness, one It is important to notice that the term extra
can also ask of a person in a coma, or in sleep. or ingredient can carry greatly different theoretical
in a petit mal seizure whether she is conscious or weights. For instance, the missing extra in­
unconscious.) gredient may be merely explanatory, due to an
undeveloped concept, or some other theoretical
4. Why is there consciousness at all, and what is
tool. That would raise only an epistemological
the role it plays in the general scheme of mental
problem. But it may also mean a missing in­
life and behavior of an organism? To put it in
gredient in the part and parcel of the world, in its
evolutionary terms, which function does con­
ontology. It has been suggested that the missing
sciousness serve such that it was selected as a trait
ingredient is indeed ontological, and conscious­
in the phylogeny of certain classes of living
ness should be added to the list of fundamental
things?
physical elements of the universe. For instance,
5. How does consciousness arise in, or emerge Chalmers ( 1 995) claims that "a theory of con­
from, its underlying substance, structure, and sciousness requires the addition of something
mechanism, in the way it does? fundamental to our ontology" and suggests we
Giiven Giizeldere 32

take experience as fundamental "along-side mass, quantum-mechanical conceptualization of na­

charge, and space-time" (p. 2 1 0; see also Chalm­ ture" (Stapp 1 996, p. i).
ers 1 996). Nagel and Searle have respectively The study of consciousness can take any one
made the same point in terms of the subjective of the above five questions as its entry point to
properties of consciousness, in, for instance, the investigation. Indeed, various people have made
following passages: attempts to approach the phenomenon of con­
sciousness by respecfive\y addressing each of
The subjectivity of consciousness is an irreducible fea­
these issues. But the further-How question has
ture of reality-without which we couldn't do physics
typically generated less success than others. As a
or anything else-and it must occupy as fundamental a
place in any credible world view as matter, energy, matter of fact, it led to grim diagnoses about the
space, time, and numbers. (Nagel 1986, pp. 7-8) "explanatory gap," thought by some, such as
Colin McGinn ( 1989), to lie possibly forever be­
Conscious mental states and processes have a special yond the grasp of human understanding.
feature not possessed by other natural phenomena, The seeming uniqueness of the further-How
namely SUbjectivity. It is this feature of consciousness question, given the lack of apparent promising
that makes its study so recalcitrant to the conventional
directions to pursue it in any existing method­
methods of biological and psychological research, and
ology, led McGinn ( 1989) to take its conclusions
most puzzling to philosophical analysis. . . . The world
. . . contains subjectivity as a rock-bottom element. . . . perhaps too seriously. The very same consid­
In the sense in which I am here using the tern, "sub­ erations, on the other hand, can lead one to think
jective" refers to an ontological category, not to an that there is perhaps something fishy about the
epistemic mode. (Searle 1992, pp. 93, 95)57 whole setup. The way the problem is presented
relies obviously on a set of presumptions about
The same idea has also been favored among the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, as
those who try to find fundamental theoretical well as the nature of scientific explanation. Could
connections between consciousness and quantum it be that the reason we seem to have no clue
physics, as well as those who popularize on this about how to explain the further-How question is
theme. For instance, an interview with Nick that there is really nothing there to explain?58
Herbert, the author of Elemental Mind: Human This brings up a metalevel issue: whether a com­
Consciousness and the New Physics, outlines plete explanation of the four W questions will in
his position as arguing that "consciousness itself fact leave some further aspect of consciousness
must be considered a 'fundamental force' of the unexplained, such that the further-How question
universe, 'elemental', on a par with such irredu­ will remain untouched, unscathed, and in need of
cible phenomena as gravity, light, mass, and explanation as ever? To take up a favorite exam­
electrical charge" (quoted in "The Consciousness ple of the Churchlands from the history of scienti­
Wars," Omni, October 1993, p. 56; see also Her­ fic explanation, what can assure us that the further­
bert 1 993). In a somewhat similar spirit, theoret­ How question will not evaporate in time just as
ical physicist Henry Stapp claims that "an did questions about elan vital and phlogiston?
analysis of the measurement problem of quantum Note that this sort of skepticism against the
theory points to the need to introduce conscious­ further-How question need not entail a defla­
ness, per se, to physics," stressing as well that a tionary attitude toward consciousness in general.
complete account of consciousness can be given One can remain convinced that consciousness
not in an "ontologically and dynamically mon­ presents fascinating and real problems for philos­
istic conceptualization of the world provided by ophy and science and that this is already justified
classical-mechanics" but only "within a dualistic in the history of its study, while not believing that
Approaching Consciousness 33

there is a further-How question in the way it is or their causal (but not necessarily functional)
formulated, isolable from the four W questions equivalents, because of the "special powers of the
such that no degree of understanding there will brain," which cannot be matched by, for exam­
shed any light on it. ple, digital computers. 59 Notice that the question
I do not know if there is a decisive way to settle here is different from those in the various absent
the metaissue at this stage of our understanding qualia arguments. The possibility being ques­
of consciousness, and thereby decide the fate of tioned is not one of non-emergence (i.e., absence)
the further-How question. I do not know if it is of consciousness in functional equivalents of hu­
useful, or even yet possible, to settle it at present. man brains or in human brains themselves.
It seems that the opposing attitudes toward Rather, somewhat symmetrically, it is the possi­
consciousness stem largely from pretheoretical, bility of the emergence of consciousness in non­
though (or perhaps, hence) deep-rooted and very brains.
strongly held, intuitions. Of course, it is crucial What about mechanism? Regarding the un­
to try to systematically examine and uncover the derlying mechanism of a very important compo­
often implicit presumptions that these intuitions nent of consciousness, the binding of the various
embody, but doing that also requires under­ sensory features into a coherent whole in experi­
standing what is currently known and accepted ence, the most promising recent results come
about consciousness at the present theoretical from the work of Christof Koch and Francis
level-that is, understanding what is known Crick. In "Towards a Neurobiological Theory
about the four W questions. Each of these of Consciousness" (1 990), they hypothesize that
W questions is interesting in its own way, and what underlies the phenomenon of binding is
each has generated some fruitful thinking in­ the pattern of synchronous oscillations in the
dependently in different fields. Thus, I now tum brain within the 40 to 70 Hz range during visual
to a brief exposition of their current status, pri­ experience. 60 (See also Llimis and Ribary 1 994, in
marily the What and the Where questions. support of the 40 Hz hypothesis in the context
of dream experiences. Metzinger 1 99 Sa explores
The What Question how the binding problem relates to the integra­
tion of phenomenal content.)
With regard to functionally characterized vari­ Now, let's examine this hypothesis in light of
eties of access consciousness, there is hardly any the distinctions introduced so far. Does it, for
suspicion that consciousness is medium indepen­ instance, explain the access or the phenomenal
dent. But regarding phenomenal consciousness, senses of consciousness (or both)? Since Crick and
this question is open to speculation. The func­ Koch do not have such a distinction, it is hard to
tionalist intuitions suggest that if the existence of know what they think. According to Block, the
all mental phenomena, including P-conscious­ hypothesis is designed to explain P-consciousness;
ness, is a matter of the functional organization of failing that, it can explain, if anything, only A­
the elements in the nervous system, then the pos­ consciousness. A true explanation of P-con­
sibility that consciousness is a trait that is not re­ sciousness, Block maintains, has to explain fur­
stricted to carbon-based animal brains of this ther questions about why, for instance, it is the 40
planet should be allowed. Denying this possibility to 70 Hz range and not some other. The discovery
would be "neural chauvinism." of an empirical correlation does not suffice to
Perhaps Searle comes closest to claiming that bridge the explanatory gap between the phenom­
consciousness, and actually the mind in general, enon as it appears to the subject and what its un­
can occur only in human and animal brains, derlying mechanism does.
Guven Giizeldere 34

This formulation is just another expression of But regardless of whether the further-How
the "hard problem" and, as such, falls in the pur­ question is a well-formed formulation of inquiry,
view of the further-How question. Thus, while the there is a lot of work to be done in explairiing
Crick-Koch hypothesis (so far as it is correct) the mechanism of how and where consciousness
can be considered to explain successfully the What emerges in a given organism. lames was perhaps
question of consciousness for some, it remains es­ one of the first "consciousness modularists" by
sentially incomplete for the defenders of a Block­ proposing that it was only a certain component
ean conception of phenomenal consciousness. of the brain that subserved consciousness. 6 1 Al­
though it has always been in the scientific agenda,
The Where Question the belief in modularity in brain function has
gained particular popularity over the last decade,
Is there a seat of consciousness? This question in especially due to the results coming from neuro­
its various incarnations has been discussed from psychology. Recent discoveries involving certain
the time of the ancient Greeks. What was once the types of brain damage, such that the subjects be­
question of the organ of reason in humans (e.g., come deprived of only very specific, encapsulated
the brain versus the heart) has now transformed perceptual or cognitive abilities (e.g., prosopag­
into the question of the whole brain or a module nosia--the deficit of recognizing faces while
in it, and if the latter, which? almost all other visual capabilities remain intact),
As early as the late nineteenth century, lames have provided support for theses of modular
had discussed the question of the seat of con­ architecture. 6 2
sciousness and declared that the cortex, and not Extending this idea, one can transform the
the rest of the brain, is what is responsible for question of the modularity of mental function in
consciousness: general into the question of whether phenomenal
consciousness in particular may be subserved by a
For practical purposes, nevertheless, and limiting the
module of some sort. Tim Shall ice (1988) puts
meaning of the word consciousness to the personal self
forth such a view, and a modularity hypothesis
of the individual, we can pretty confidently answer the
question prefixed to this paragraph by saying that the
seems to lie behind Daniel Schacter's DICE
cortex is the sole organ of consciousness in man. If there model, where consciousness is depicted as a sepa­
be any consciousness pertaining to the lower centres, it rate, functionally individuated box in the wiring
is a consciousness of which the self knows nothing. diagram sketch (roughly speaking) of a nervous
(James 1 950, pp. 66-67) system (Schacter 1 988). Block is also sympathetic
to these models and calls the view "that treats
lames's view was based on the experimental consciousness as something that could be accom­
results of his day, which showed a significant plished by a distinct system in the brain" Carte­
correlation between cerebral processes and sub­ sian moduiarism, in contrast to Dennett and
jective reports of conscious experience. Note that Kinsbourne's Cartesian materialism.
lames does not attempt to give an explanation of Cartesian materialism is the name Daniel Den­
how the brain can possibly subserve conscious nett and Marcel Kinsbourne (1 992) give to the
experience any further than outlining the relevant general belief that there is literally a place in the
mechanism. In other words, lames does not seem brain "where it all comes together" -something
to be after anything beyond the ordinary W like a spatial or at least a temporal finish line that
questions. Clearly this sort of explanation does determines the outcome of various brain pro­
not satisfy those who are after the further-How cesses as a coherent, unitary, single experience.
question. Dennett ( 1 99 1 ) calls this the "Cartesian Theater"
Approaching Consciousness 35

model of consciousness.63 The idea of such a could be, in nomological or just logical possi­
logical line in the brain makes it possible to ask bility, human replicas who nonetheless lack phe­
questions about the temporality of certain events nomenal consciousness. I come back to this issue
that take place inside the brain against the mile­ in the discussion of epiphenomenalism.
post of the phenomenology of experience. Deny­ Regarding the Why/Which question, the liter­
ing that such a line exists makes it logically ature is somewhat barren. Perhaps this is partly
impossible to impose a fine-grained order on brain as a result of the fact that it is nearly impossible
processes as having occurred prior to or folIowing to find any evolutionary role for phenomenal con­
a particular experience. Dennett and Kinsboume sciousness to play under the decree of the segre­
present a forceful argument against Cartesian gationist intuition, whereas the evolutionary
materialism; for them it is the whole brain, if any­ contribution of consciousness, when it is taken as
thing, that is in some sense the seat of conscious­ causally efficacious in accord with the causal
ness. Today, the Where question, just like the characterization, is just too obvious. In other
What question, remains a hotly debated issue.64 words, so long as consciousness is characterized
as essentialIy noncausal and nonfunctional, ren­
The Who and the Why/Which Questions dered an epiphenomenon that makes no difference
in the world, it drops out of the pool of factors
The question of who can be classified as a con­ that have survival value, and thus becomes ex­
scious being is largely subordinate to the question planatorily irrelevant to evolutionary theory.
of what the underlying medium and mechanism This is the conclusion Frank Jackson ( 1 982) de­
of consciousness are, at least in a materialist fends (using the term "qualia" for phenomenal
framework. Roughly speaking, those beings consciousness): "[Qualia) are an excressence.
whose physical constitution (medium) allows the They do nothing, they explain nothing, they serve
instantiation of those properties that indicate merely to soothe the intuitions of dualists, and it
the working mechanism of consciousness can be is left a total mystery how they fit into the world
safely allowed into the "charmed circle" of view of science. . . . Epiphenomenal qualia are
consciousness (barring difficulties inherent in the totally irrelevant to survival" (p. 1 35)65 On the
What question itself). It is also common practice other hand, if consciousness is taken as a genus
in medicine to have a more or less circumscribed for different modalities of perceptual awareness
set of behavioral and psychological criteria to under a causal-representational characterization,
determine the occurrent presence or absence pace Dretske (forthcoming), there remains no
of consciousness in patients (e.g., see the Roche philosophically puzzling question about its evo­
Handbook ofDifferential Diagnosis on "Transient lutionary role. It would clearly be somewhat dif­
Loss of Consciousness," 1 989). ficult for any creature to survive without sight,
Of course, the issue is not so straightforward, hearing, touch, smell, and so forth. (See also
especially when it comes to phenomenal con­ Dretske 1 996 for a discussion of what kind of
sciousness. Is there anything it is like to be a bat differences qualia make vis-a.-vis judgments and
catching prey with its sonar system, or a dogfish beliefs.) Similarly, Armstrong ( 1 980) attributes to
detecting electromagnetic fields in the ocean, or introspective consciousness the biological func­
a robot clumsily walking about in an artificial tion of making us aware of current mental states
intelligence laboratory? The answers and, more and activities of our own mind, such that it be­
important, the advice on how to obtain these comes "much easier to achieve integration of the
answers greatly vary. This question also leads states and activities, to get them working together
to the discussion on "zombies" -whether there in the complex and sophisticated ways necessary
Guven Giizeldere 36

to achieve complex and sophisticated ends" In any case, given that the philosophical prob­
(p. 65). See also Van Gulick ( 1 988, 1 989) for at­ lems all revolve around the phenomenal charac­
tempts to locate a functional role for phenomenal terization of consciousness, it is reasonable to
consciousness, and Dennett ( 1 99 1 ), Flanagan focus discussion there. Doing so actually reveals
(1 992), Dretske (1 995), and Flanagan and Polger that what is commonly referred to as "phenom­
( 1 995) for further evolutionary considerations. 66 enal consciousness" is also itself a hybrid. Con­
Finally, Jaynes (1 976) and Crook (1 980) take en­ sequently, it becomes imperative to bring the
tirely different approaches to the idea of the evo­ analytical microscope over there and to dissect
lution of consciousness (characterized in terms the different elements in the tangle of phenomenal
closer to what I called the social sense of con­ consciousness. Here I present a conceptual road
sciousness). Searle (1 992) tries to strike a balance map for locating various different philosophical
between defending a version of the essentialist problems, each associated with phenomenal con­
intuition while assigning an evolutionary role to sciousness in one way or another.
consciousness. Finally, a number of neuropsy­ The term phenomenal consciousness is often
chological accounts identify consciousness with a used interchangeably with a variety of others,
specific information-processing module, in terms such as qualitative character, qualia, phenomenal
of a specific function it serves in the whole system. properties, subjective awareness, experience, and
Although the concern is almost never evolu­ what it is like to be a certain organism. (See, for
tionary in such accounts, they can be mentioned instance, Block 1 994, pp. 2 1 0-2 1 1 .) This is a
here for their effort to find a specific function for bunch. And to make matters worse, each of these
consciousness (see, for example, Schacter 1 988 concepts is known for its notorious elusiveness.
and Shallice 1 988). But on the whole, there is Traditionally, the properties that go under the
much about the Why/Which question that re­ various names of "raw feels," "qualia," "qual­
mains to be written than what is already there. itative character of experience," "phenomenal
Having considered the various characteriza­ aspect of consciousness," and so on have all
tions of consciousness and the various questions proved to be recalcitrant to systematic explana­
one can ask about them, I now turn to the tions. Dennett points out that attempts to give a
examination of questions about phenomenal straightforward account of phenomenal proper­
consciousness in the landscape of current philo­ ties have typically been frustrating; "no sooner
sophical debates. does [the concept of quaJia) retreat in the face of
one argument that 'it' reappears, apparently in­
nocent of all charges, in a new guise" (Dennett
XVI A Road Map for Phenomenal 1 988, p. 42).67
Consciousness and the Unbearable Lightness of This elusiveness actually goes to the heart of
Wluztitisliketobe
the particular and long-standing problem of phe­
nomenal consciousness, which is often labeled
As we have seen, the concept of consciousness is a a mystery. Elusiveness by itself is not what
hybrid that lends itself to several different char­ makes the problem persistent, however. Other­
acterizations. Part of my goal in this chapter was wise, eliminativism could appear as a more
to tease them apart and treat them separately. appealing option. Rather, it is our unique epis­
Having done so, however, one sees that the prob­ temic relation to consciousness: phenomenal
lem of consciousness is like a Chinese box puzzle; consciousness is perhaps the most difficult aspect
for every distinction made, one discovers that of the mind to give up. An eliminativist stance
further embedded distinctions are required. toward the phenomenal aspect of mental life
Approaching Consciousness 37

seems the most counter-intuitive of all eliminati­ Given this tangle, let me present the following
vist attitudes. That is why the question of phe­ schema as a conceptual road map to distinguish
nomenal consciousness does not just disappear problems typically associated with phenomenal
out of the philosophical and, in other guises, psy­ consciousness:
chological and scientific landscapes. I thus find it
1 . Qualia: Experiences have phenomenal and
important to lay out properly each conceptual
thus noncausal, nonrepresentational, nonfunc­
component that contributes to the puzzle.
tional, and perhaps nonphysical properties.
It is worth noting, however, that among all
notions that are associated with phenomenal 2. Subjectivity: Certain facts about experiences
consciousness, one has particularly captured are subjective, that is, they cannot be completely
philosophical intuitions more than any other-so understood except from a single kind of point of
much so that it has become the central notion view.
underlying almost any discussion about con­ 3. Knowledge Argument: Certain facts about
sciousness during the two decades since its pub­ experiences are nonphysical.
lication. Unfortunately, it is also the most difficult
to pin down or muster theoretical agreement To this, one can add the "base element" in the
upon. I have in mind Nagel's (1974) notion of formula:
"what it is like to be" a certain creature, or sub­
• Whatitisliketobe: There is something it is like
ject of experience. 6 8
to have experiences for a certain organism (or,
Nagel's notion of "what it is like to be" has
simply, something it is like to be that organism).
been so influential that it seems to have an omni­
presence in several distinct (even if related) prob­ I call whatitisliketobe a wild card, because it
lems with regard to consciousness. In particular, gets alluded to in discussions concerning any of
it gets pronounced in an intertwined way with the the three problems mentioned above. To have
problem clusters that can be grouped under the certain qualia, it is generally presumed, is what­
headings of qualia, subjectivity, and the knowl­ itisliketobe an organism undergoing a certain
edge argument. experience; certain facts about an experience are
Nagel himself presents the issue of what it is subjective because there is somethingitisliketobe
like to be a certain creature as a theoretical basis having that experience; and finally, whatitislike­
for establishing the claim about that creature's tobe having a certain experience constitutes non­
having a certain ontologically irreducible point of physical facts about that experience. I think,
view, which furnishes certain facts about the however, that it can be questioned whether this
creature with subjectivity. For others, however, common denominator is not in fact theoretically
the notion of "what it is like to be" is taken to lay vacuous. Perhaps whatitisliketobe has turned into
the ground for arguing for the reality of qualia, nothing but a wild card-a convenient way of
and for others, for the persuasiveness of the talking about any one of the three problems of
knowledge argument which claims that physi­ phenomenal consciousness, without, due to its
calism, as an ontological doctrine, is false. But the intuitive charm, having to specify anything fur­
nature of the relations among each one of these ther. Then there would be no reason to look for a
problems is hardly ever spelled out in any detail. shared ingredient in need of explanation, above
In fact, it seems that the notion of "what it is like and beyond the explanation of these three prob­
to be" has become the wild card of consciousness lems.69
problems. I will henceforth refer to it simply as Nagel's original intention in introducing the
the notion of whatitisliketobe. notion of whatitisliketobe was, I think, to use it
as an "intuition pump" for instating subjectivity
Giiven Giizeldere 38

rather than as a tool to talk about qualia. Fur­

xvn The Qualia Battles
the�, for Nagel, the scope of applicability of the
notIon of subjectivity greatly transcends the
The problem of qualia is one that surfaced under
problem of qualia, or consciousness in general; it
�
d tIerent gui�s in the philosophy literature during
�lso �der1ies problems about free will, personal
�
Iden ty, and the self, as well as the ontological
dltIerent penods. It is probably fair to state that
qualia was the single most recalcitrant notion that
doctnne of physicalism. 7 0
resisted the rising wave of materialists in their
The knowledge argument, formulated in con­
program of giving an account of the mental by
temporary literature by Frank Jackson, is also
means of identity theory. For example, J. J. C.
�u�h. closer in nature to issues surrounding sub­ Smart mentions in his now-classic "Sensations
JectIVIty than to the problem of qualia. In fact, it
can be seen as a logical conclusion of the diffi­
�
an B�ain Processes" (1959) that among the eight
objectIOns he considers, he feels the least con­
culties Nagel raises about accommodating sub­
fident in his answer to the one about phenomenal
jectivity in a physicalist ontology. In a nutshell,
properties. (This is Objection 3, attributed to
the knowledge argument is based on the claim
Max Black.) Both U. T. Place ( 1956) and B. A.
that certain facts about experiences evade all
Farrell ( 1950), philosophers of the same era, note
physicalist accounts, and no matter how much
that the identification of the so-called raw feels
one learns about the physical (causal, functional,
with the straightforwardly physical properties of
representational, and so on) aspects of an ex­
the nervous system has been the most elusive
perience, some facts about how the experience
component of the overall program of identity
fe�ls (to oneself, but more important, to others)
theory in "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?"
WIll remain in the dark until one actually has that
and "Experience," respectively. Herbert Feigl
experience.
also wrestles with the same problem in his lengthy
Jackson attempts to establish this claim by
manuscript, The "Mental" and the "Physical"
means of a thought experiment that involves an
( 1 967).72
imaginary vision scientist, Mary, who learns
A second wave in philosophy of mind came
"everything physical there is to know" about
about, this time that of functionalism, in the
color experiences without ever having color ex­
1 970s. The problem of qualia was again on stage;
periences herself. Jackson's contention is that
the phenomenal feels were considered the
upon seeing a colored object for the first time in
�
her l fe, Mary will learn something new, belying
.
"Achilles' heel of functionalism" (Shoemaker
198 1 a)-the only aspect of mentality that es­
phYSicalism. The pivotal issue here is whether
caped the net of functional explanations.73 It is
the having of an experience constitutes a special
during this period that the problems of absent
class of irreducible "first-person facts" or whether
qualia and a reincarnation of Locke's puzzle of
what is lacking in Mary has to do with her ex­
inverted spectrum reached celebrity status. Critics
periential "mode of access" to facts that she is
of functionalism argued that a functionalist
�lready acquainted with (in the form of proposi­ framework can provide an account of all compo­
tIOnal knowledge); on this point of contention the
nents of mental life but cannot capture its qualia,
knowledge argument has generated a fair amount .
lacki�g the theoretical tools to settle decisively
of literature.71 The interrelations between these
questIOns about whether any two functionally
problems need to be pursued further, but I will
equivalent systems ditIer (e.g., can be inverted) in
stop and opt for focusing on the most central
their phenomenal aspects, or even whether a
player of the phenomenal consciousness debate:
given system has any qualia at all. Thomas Nagel
qualia. (I will henceforth use "phenomenal con­
gives a concise characterization of the problem of
sciousness" and "qualia" interchangeably.)
Approaching Consciousness 39

absent qualia as follows: "The subjective charac­ phenomenal consciousness has no causal powers)
ter of experience . . . is not captured by any of the and thus to the possibility of "zombies" (human
familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of replicas with all mental and behavioral attributes
the mental, for all of them are logically compat­ present save for phenomenal consciousness), as
ible with its absence. [E.g.,) It is not analyzable in I argue below. The possibility of inverted spec­
terms of any explanatory system of functional trum, on the other hand, simply requires an in­
states, or intentional states, since these could be version of a particular set ofphenomenal qualities
ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like in some sensory domain, such as the hues in one's
people though they experienced nothing" (Nagel color space. 7 5
1974, pp. 1 66- 1 67; my emphasis). 74 But let us pause and ask the same question al­
In a footnote to this passage, Nagel also enter­ ready posed about consciousness: When friends
tains the possibility of the impossibility of absent and foes of qualia disagree about whether qualia
qualia, but rejects it: "Perhaps there could not ac­ exist, are they really talking about the same thing?
tually be such robots. Perhaps anything complex The ontologically rather ordinary fact that phe­
enough to behave like a person would have expe­ nomenal properties of an experience exist only
riences. But that, if true, is a fact which cannot be insofar as they belong to someone's experience
discovered merely by analyzing the concept of ex­ (compare: geometric properties of a shadow exist
perience" (fn. 2, p. 1 67; my emphasis). But what only insofar as they belong to someone's sha­
Nagel merely asserts as true has no argumentative dow), when combined with the epistemologi­
force against certain causal-state identity theo­ cally rather extraordinary fact that experiences
rists and some functionalists. For they take cannot epistemically be shared, and hence every­
exactly the opposite of Nagel's assertion (broadly one can have "direct access" to only his or her
construed to include not only behavior, but also qualia, seem to make it uniquely, even surpris­
causal, functional, and intentional character­ ingly difficult to investigate the ontological nature
ization) as a fundamental assumption. of qualia. As such, it gives rise to a wide variety of
For instance, David Lewis ( 1 966) states: "The positions regarding what qualia are.
definitive characteristic of any (sort of) experi­ In "Quining Qualia," Dennett, one of the
ence as such is [by analytic necessity) its causal staunchest critics of the notion of qualia, tries to
role, its syndrome of most typical causes and establish that "conscious experience has no prop­
effects" (p. 1 7). Similarly, the concept of a men­ erties that are special in any of the ways qualia
tal state for David Armstrong (1 993) is that of a have been supposed to be special." He attempts
"state of the person apt for bringing about certain to show this by laying out what exactly it is that
sorts of physical behavior," where he regards the he wants to deny in denying the existence of
mind as "an inner arena identified by its causal qualia and sets up his target by identifying qualia
relations to outward act" (p. 1 29). As such, the with the "properties of a subject's mental states
relation between experiences and causal (and/or that are: 1 . ineffable, 2. intrinsic, 3. private, and 4.
functional, intentional, etc.) characteristics is directly or immediately apprehensible in con­
taken to be, contra Nagel's assumption, inherent sciousness" (Dennett 1 988, pp. 43, 47). The final
in the concept of experience. This kind of funda­ verdict Dennett arrives at, after an elaborate
mental disagreement where each side is vulner­ chain of "intuition pumps" designed to show that
able to the charge of question-begging against the very concept of qualia is inherently confused,
the other is a typical syndrome of the "qualia is an e1iminativist one: "There simply are no
battles." qualia at all" (p. 74).
The possibility of absent qualia is closely re­ In contrast to Dennett's e1iminativist stance,
lated to the doctrine of epiphenomenalism (that the spectrum of other positions with respect to
Guven Giizeldere 40

qualia extends from taking qualia to be non­ "all mental facts are representational facts" and
physical properties that require a new ontology to hence, a fortiori, all facts about qualia are also
reductively identifying qualia with neurophysio­ representational. Dretske identifies qualia as
logical properties. There are also midway, con­ properties that one's experience represents objects
ciliatory positions. Paul and Patricia Churchland, (or whatever the experience is about) as having.
for example, agree that when qualia are construed As such, qualia do not have to be given a func­
in the way Dennett does, the situation is indeed tional characterization or identified with neuro­
hopeless: "So long as introspectible qualia were physiological properties. Rather, Dretske locates
thought to be ineffable, or epiphenomenal . . . one qualia outside the mind, in accordance with his
can understand the functionalist's reluctance to externalist theory of the mind. This view has the
have anything to do with them" (Churchland and advantage of maintaining a realist stance toward
Churchland 1 982, p. 34). While promoting a qualia while remaining in a perfectly naturalistic
realist attitude toward qualia, they claim that framework. 76
qualia will tum out to be properties intrinsic to Finally, Ned Block brings the qualia issue back
the nervous system, such as spiking frequencies in to the problem of "explanatory gap" and raises
the brain. Construed as such, qualia cease to be suspicions about the conceptual machinery of
elusive, but their investigation also falls into the cognitive psychology to deal with qualia: "On the
scope of disciplines other than philosophy or basis of the kind of conceptual apparatus now
psychology. In the Churchlands' words: "The available in psychology, I do not know how psy­
functionalist need not, and perhaps should not, chology in anything like its present incarnation
attempt to deny the existence of qualia. Rather, could explain qualia" (Block, 1 978, p. 289). Block
he should be a realist about qualia. . . . [But, at is neither as sure as the Churchlands about
the end], the nature of specific qualia will be whether the answer to the nature of qualia will
revealed by neurophysiology, neurochemistry, tum out to be in the domain of neuroscience, nor
and neurophysics" (Churchland and Churchland is he as optimistic as Flanagan in the promise of
1 982, p. 3 1 ). interdisciplinary methods to deliver a successful
Owen Flanagan, who believes that an effort account of phenomenal properties. Nor is he
of triangulation involving phenomenology, psy­ convinced that qualia can be accounted for in a
chology, and neuroscience, which he calls the Dretskean representational framework. On the
"natural method," can penetrate the mystery of contrary, Block actually wants to raise more
qualia and help dispel it, follows suit in promot­ general doubts about the explanatory power of
ing a more positive characterization of qualia: any mechanistic, functionalist, or in general phys­
"Those who would quine qualia are bothered by icalistic schemes to account for the presence or
the fact that they seem mysterious-essentially emergence of qualia. His worry, in other words, is
private, ineffable, and not subject to third-person about how qualia can be accounted for as part
evaluation. Qualia are none of these things." Al­ and parcel of any physical system, including (or
though Flanagan does not necessarily share the rather, especially) a brain, even if one thinks that
Churchlands' conviction that qualia will tum out it must be so accounted. Block states: "No physi­
to be properties in the domain of neuroscience, he cal mechanism seems very intuitively plausible as
too concludes that "there are no qualia in Den­ a seat of qualia, least of all a brain . . . . Since we
nett's contentious sense, but there are qualia" know that we are brain-headed systems, and that
( Flanagan 1 992, p. 85). we have qualia, we know that brain-headed sys­
A recent proposal in accounting for qualia tems can have qualia. So even though we have no
comes from Fred Dretske's representational nat­ theory ofqualia which explains how this ispossible,
uralism ( Dretske 1 995). According to this view, we have overwhelming reason to disregard what-
Approaching Consciousness 41

ever prima facie doubt there is about the qualia of difference whatsoever between persons and their
brain-headed systems" ( Block 1 978, p. 28 1 ). zombie twins except the fact that the latter lack
As a consequence of this kind of general doubt consciousness. Hence, denying epiphenomenal­
about physicalism, the scenario involving beings ism would also block the possibility of zombie­
physiologically and behaviorally similar to us, hood. That is, if we accept that consciousness has
perhaps even identical down to the last molecular causal powers, then my zombie twin cannot exist,
structure and behavioral trait, who nonetheless even as a genuine theoretical creature.
lack qualia altogether, is considered a genuine The doctrine of epiphenomenalism has a deep­
theoretical possibility. This step brings us to the rooted history. The philosophers and the psy­
debate on the notion of zombies and the doctrine chologists of the nineteenth century hotly debated
of epiphenomenalism. whether consciousness was part and parcel of the
causal network that was responsible for the deci­
sions we make, actions we take, and so forth or
xvm Epiphenomenalism and the POSliibility of whether it was just an idle spectator, riding along
Zombies the causal processes, perhaps being caused by
them, but without exerting any causal effect on
Consciousness epiphenomenalism is the view those processes itself. Perhaps, the idea was, we
that (phenomenal) consciousness has no causal are all automata, since all of our mental life and
powers and hence exhibits no effects in the world, behavior seem to be determined by our nervous
though it may be the effect of some other cause systems, in a purely mechanical framework, with
itself. This doctrine and the possibility of zombies no respectable place in it for consciousness. 78
are closely related. If consciousness is an epi­ Thomas Huxley was one of the most influential
phenomenon, that is, not essentially linked to advocates of such a thesis, known as the autom­
causal processes, or is only a recipient of but not a aton theory of consciousness. The thesis was first
contributor to effects in a causal network, then formulated to apply to animals, in perfect agree­
there exists the possibility that the same organism ment with Cartesian intuitions. Huxley put the
that is taken to possess consciousness could be matter as follows: "The consciousness of brutes
going through the very same mentations and be­ would appear to be related to the mechanism of
havior even if it had no phenomenal conscious­ their body simply as a collateral product of its
ness at all. Subtract away the consciousness, and working, and to be as completely without any
you still get the same beliefs, desires, motives, power of modifying that working as the steam
preferences, reasoning capacities, and behavior in whistle which accompanies the work of a loco­
the organism. But what you get is a zombie. Its motive engine is without influence upon its ma­
pains, tickles, and itches are all "ersatz." The chinery" (Huxley 1 90 1 , p. 240). But, of course,
zombie does not feel anything, even if it thinks the real target was human beings and the nature
and acts as if it does. Its experiences lack the of human consciousness. This is where Huxley's
qualitative feels altogether. There is nothing it is automaton theory differed with Descartes's in­
like to be it.77 teractionist dualism. Huxley's account of the
Put differently, zombiehood becomes a pos­ "brutes" was just a lead to make the same point
sibility only under a view that accords with for humans: "The argumentation which applies
epiphenomenalism. If we maintain that con­ to brutes holds equally good of men. . . . It seems
sciousness has causal powers, then the absence of to me that in men, as in brutes, there is no proof
consciousness in my zombie twin, which is iden­ that any state of consciousness is the cause of
tical to me in every other respect, would make change in the motion of the matter of the organ­
some difference. But by stipulation, there is no ism" (pp. 243-244). 79
Guven Giizeldere 42

In Huxley, consciousness plays no contributory a "friend of phenomenal consciousness" to a

role in the causal chains that take place in the reconciliatory middle ground with a "qualia
nervous systems that totally determine the be­ skeptic." Most often, the disagreement between
havior of an organism; it only gets affected by the the two parties comes down, for each side, to the
neural interactions. In contrast, Descartes's idea charge of begging the question against the other.
of consciousness was one of an equally causally The eliminativists charge the defenders of phe­
efficacious parameter in the formula of mind­ nomenal consciousness with believing in a fiction
body interaction. As much as Descartes is and creating a philosophical problem out of it. In
thought to be the founder of interactionism, return, the eliminativists get charged with holding
Huxley can be thought of as having laid out the most preposterous philosophical fancy for
a clear foundation for epiphenomenalism with denying their opponents' characterization of
respect to the mind. The fundamental idea qualia.
about epiphenomenalism remained intact until As an example, consider Daniel Dennett, who
the present day, but what was then dubbed the is convinced that the notion of qualia "fosters
"Automaton Theory" has been transformed into nothing but confusion, and refers in the end to
the "Problem of Zombies" in contemporary lit­ no properties or features at all" ( Dennett 1988,
erature. Of course, it is important to note that p. 49). Ned Block, as a representative of the other
even if we establish that it is the truth of some side of the spectrum, accuses Dennett of begging
version of epiphenomenalism that makes zom­ the question against (the existence of) phenom­
biehood a possibility, there remain important is­ enal consciousness ( Block 1 993, 1 995). Interest­
sues about what the nature of this possibility is, ingly, the dialectic of the debate seems to be at
for example, whether it is empirical, metaphy­ an impossible impasse: the contention is at the
sical, or conceptual. These are subtle issues that I fundamental level of taking for granted versus
cannot do justice to in the limited space here. denying the existence of a feature of mentality
Hence, rather than pursuing this line further, I that can at best be defined ostensively. Friends
will step back once again and examine how the of qualia, as exemplified by Block, claim that
background conditions for bringing the meta­ there is obviously something in their mental life
physical disagreement on the possibility of zom­ that can be theorized about under the name
biehood (just like the disagreement on the status "phenomenal consciousness," while the qualia
of phenomenal consciousness) can be brought to skeptics, as exemplified by Dennett, state that
a settlement. 80 there is no such thing to point at in their own
experience. 8 1
This is unfortunately the kind of philosophical
XIX Stalemate: How to Settle the Phenomenal junction at which most worthy disagreements hit
Comciousoess Dispute? rock bottom. Neither side is willing to concede
their own point, and moreover neither side seems
There are a variety of positions on the ontological
to have any way of demonstrating the validity of
status of phenomenal consciousness in the liter­
their claim. In another statement on the side of
ature, all the way from substance dualism to
the friends of phenomenal consciousness, John
property dualism, to reductionism (via some
Searle satirically asks: "How, for example, would
form of identity thesis), to eliminativism (usually
one go about refuting the view that consciousness
coupled with some kind of anti realist stance), to
does not exist? Should I pinch its adherents to re­
representationalism (maintaining a naturalized
mind them that they are conscious? Should I
realism). However, the literature does not contain
pinch myself and report the results in the Journal
any knock-down argument that would convince
of Philosophy?" (Searle 1 992, p. 8). In contrast,
Approaching Consciousness 43

Dennett declares: "I cannot prove that no such take the idea of phenomenal consciousness seri­
sort of consciousness exists. I also cannot prove ously and use it as a fundamental theoretical tenet
that gremlins don't exist. The best I can do is to to come up with a clarified conceptual network of
show that there is no respectable motivation for terms that all go along with the umbrella term of
believing in it" (Dennett 1 99 1 , p. 406). phenomenal consciousness. On the other hand,
Of course, the situation on the whole (and the there may be good reasons to respect the words of
particular state-of-the-art philosophical under­ the supporters of phenomenal consciousness that
standing of the mind-body problem we have the only definitional way open to them is by os­
arrived at after twenty-five hundred years of tension. Being unable to provide a nonostensive
pondering) is more nuanced than I have just definition is not, by itself, sufficient reason to
sketched. For instance, the eliminativist position pronounce the notion of phenomenal conscious­
has more resourceful ways of undermining belief ness as theoretically illegitimate, and thereby
in qualia, and the "friends of qualia" have in­ promote its complete abandonment. The merits
tuitively appealing conceptual tools on their side, or shortcomings of an ostensive definition in re­
such as the absent and inverted qualia puzzles and vealing the essence of a phenomenon have to be
theknowledge argument. Nonetheless, neither side judged on its own ground, in virtue of its success
can help finding the other's theoretical maneuvers in providing conceptual clarity and theoretical
equally unconvincing. agreement in the relevant discussions.
The eliminativist strategy largely depends on It should be acknowledged, however, that
the deconstruction of the concept of phenomenal the strategy of revealing essences by means of
consciousness, thus revealing theoretical tensions "pointing" has not delivered any kind of agree­
internal to it. In different ways, both Daniel ment with respect to phenomenal consciousness
Dennett and Richard Rorty take this approach thus far. 82 The same problem appears even more
(Dennett 1 988; Rorty 1 979). Dennett does this acutely in thinking about the possibility of zom­
by providing a number of "intuition pumps," de­ bies. How can you tell a zombie from a non­
signed to slww that our pretheoretical intuitions zombie, someone who has absent qualia from
about phenomenal consciousness are far from someone whose qualia are intact? If zombiehood
being reliable and sound. On the contrary, as is a possibility, not only could your closest friend
Dennett attempts to show, our commonsense tum out to be a zombie, without anyone's
grasp of the facts about phenomenal conscious­ knowledge or awareness, so could you, and not
ness can result in such conceptual dilemmas that know it yourself. Zombiehood brings with it not
it might be a better strategy to abandon any talk only the problem of other minds, and thus third­
about phenomenal properties altogether. Dennett person skepticism, but first-person skepticism as
is quite straightforward in this approach; he says: well. If you, the reader of these lines, suddenly
"I want to make it just as uncomfortable for turned into a zombie, no one would notice any
anyone to talk of qualia-or 'raw feels' or 'phe­ difference, and in a significant sense of "notic­
nomenal properties' or 'subjective and intrinsic ing," neither would you. Remember that know­
properties' or 'the qualitative character' or expe­ ing, judging, thinking, and being aware of-in
rience-with the standard presumption that they, a nonphenomenal sense-are all capabilities
and everyone else, knows what on earth they are granted to a zombie, and furthermore, "there is
talking about" (Dennett 1 988, p. 43). no need to invoke qualia in the explanation of
If there indeed is a conceptual disarray sur­ how we ascribe mental states to ourselves [be­
rounding the notion of phenomenal conscious­ cause a zombie] after all, ascribes himself the
ness, it seems only fair to demand from those who same qualia; it's just that he's wrong about it"
Giiven Giizeldere 44

(Chalmers 1 993; Chalmers 1 996 embraces the conception of phenomenal consciousness based
consequences of this result under the title "the on the integrationist intuition-not one that elim­
paradox of phenomenal judgement"). inates phenomenal consciousness but not one
Thus, to the extent that "seemings" of your that renders it completely inefficacious, or opaque
own phenomenal states are constituted by self­ even from the first-person perspective either.
ascriptive judgments, beliefs, thoughts, memo­ Rather, the conception should take the first-per­
ries, expectations, and so forth about those states son characterization of experience seriously and
(and no doubt there is a significant extent to support the commonsense understanding of phe­
which such seemings are so constituted), it would nomenal consciousness.
be warranted to say that your inner life would The bottom line of what seems most unaccep­
continue to seem the same to you, despite the fact table here is the fact that under a framework that
that you would cease to have any genuine phe­ allows for the possibility of zombies, phenom­
nomenal states once you turned into a zombie. enal consciousness is to be regarded as making
Put differently, according to the zombie hypoth­ no difference, in an epistemically significant
esis, you could now be "hallucinating" your own sense, even in the first person. That is, a well­
phenomenology. You would, ex hypothesi, be intended effort to promote phenomenal con­
confidently judging that nothing changed in your sciousness by conceptually separating it from all
inner life, and be mistaken about it, but you causal and representational properties actually
would never be able to find this out. Indeed, for yields a position with the opposite theoretical
all you know, your present existence on earth consequence: the demotion of phenomenal con­
could be continuing in alternating phases of sciousness to a ghostly existence. If it is this sort
hwnanhood versus zombiehood, switching every of a property that we talk about when we con­
other minute. Hmm. . . . sider phenomenal consciousness, would we really
Coming back to a distinction I introduced at lose much (anything) by doing away with it?83
the beginning of this chapter, it is also important And if we are committed to (internal) "pointing"
to note that the segregationist intuition plays into as the only reliable way to verify the existence
the hands of epiphenomenalism and the possi­ of phenomenal consciousness, the knowledge
bility of zombiehood. Characterizing conscious­ of the absence or presence of which is hidden
ness in essentially noncausal (nonfunctional, even from the first-person perspective, that is,
nonrepresentational) terms leaves no epistemic to the person who has it, should we perhaps
hook for making it possible to detect the presence not reconsider our very concept of phenomenal
or absence of phenomenal consciousness, even consciousness?
from a first-person perspective.
But if we are to accept the possibility that any
XX In Place of a Conclusion
one of us can be a zombie and not know it, that is,
if any one of us can be totally lacking phenomenal
consciousness while not being able to find out I would like to leave the reader with the two
questions I just posed above. But let me also give
about it, how can we possibly expect a stalemate
over the ontology of phenomenon consciousness a brief recapitulation and try to tie some of the
loose ends.
to be resolved, while fundamentally relying on
ostention for its presence? I started by noting an epistemological asym­
The stalemate seems unresolvable under the metry in the way one has access to (the facts
about) one's own experiences versus those of
proposed terms. Perhaps, then, there is something
fundamentally misleading here, and it is time to others. This asymmetry leads us to the notion of
start looking for ways of building .an alternative perspectivity, something quite unique to (the
Approaching Consciousness 45

study of) consciousness, and to the distinction tology to include consciousness as a fundamental
between first-person and third-person points of element could indeed relieve one of the nagging
view. This duality between points of view with problem of having to bridge mechanism and ex­
respect to accessing facts about experiences also perience (by emergence, reduction, elimination,
manifests itself in a duality in characterizing con­ and so forth) or vice versa. Others think that the
sciousness, in causal versus phenomenal terms. epistemological nature of the explanatory gap
Taking these characterizations as mutually ex­ does not warrant ontological conclusions. Al­
clusive, based on the presumption that phenom­ though I cannot go into this debate in any further
enal consciousness is essentially phenomenal and detail here, I too would like to lend my support to
essentially noncausal, yields what I called the this latter position. True, in the presence of the
segregationist intuition. Opposing it is the in­ explanatory gap, the link between experience and
tegrationist intuition, which maintains that phe­ its physical underpinnings may seem arbitrary,
nomenal consciousness can only be characterized but I think that the decision to introduce a new
by means of all causal, functional, or repre­ fundamental element into the ontology, based
sentational elements. Given these two intuitions, on the explanatory gap, seems equally arbitrary
I briefly argued that the former plays into the as well. At least I fail to see how the most
hands of the doctrine of epiphenomenalism, steadfast belief in a thus-expanded new ontol­
which, when combined with considerations from ogy would leave one less puzzled about just
the possibility of absent qualia and zombiehood, how consciousness relates to its physical under­
leads us into untenable and noncommonsensical pinnings, hence diminishing the explanatory gap
conceptions of phenomenal consciousness. This is and explaining away the further-How question.
good evidence, on the other hand, to take What seems the most promising direction in
the latter seriously and use it as the pretheore­ reapproaching consciousness and pursuing its
tical basis in reexamining our notion of phenom­ deep-rooted problems in the present era involves
enal consciousness. 84 rethinking epistemology and conceptual schemes
Another domain where the epistemic element (as opposed to a priori postulation of new ontol­
of perspectivity figures in is the problem of the ogy) to yield a cross-fertilization of the first­
explanatory gap and the question of the "hard person and third-person perspectives, which
problem" of consciousness. There seems to be would allow theorizing about how causal efficacy
an unbridged gap in the explanation of how figures in how consciousness feels, and how phe­
physical embodiment and conscious experience nomenal quality relates to what consciousness
are linked. The former is in general given a causal does.
characterization from a third-person perspective, In any case, at present it just does not seem as if
the latter a phenomenal characterization in first­ there is a way to settle the dispute decisively about
person terms. It seems that under our existing the "hard problem" or the consequences of the
conceptual scheme, bolstered by the segregation­ explanatory gap. And given the troublesome
.
ist intuition, the "hard problem" just does not, stalemate over the ontological nature of phe­
and cannot, lend itself to a solution. nomenal consciousness, we seem to be not quite
What is important to note here is that the ex­ near a satisfactory understanding of the phenom­
planatory gap, in the way it is set up, stems from enon. If anything, the survey of the contemporary
an epistemological issue. The further question issues and current debates surrounding con­
that remains is whether its persistence is good sciousness points to a need for a careful re­
enough evidence to yield ontological conclusions. examination of our pretheoretical intuitions and
Some think yes; introducing an "extra ingredient" conceptual foundations on which to build better
into the picture and thus augmenting one's on- accounts of consciousness. It also seems probable
Giiven Giizeldere 46

that an entirely satisfactory understanding of con­ tellectual history and, more specifically, in the analytic
sciousness will be possible, if at all, only when the tradition. Obviously, there is a wealth of fascinating is­

constitutive elements of a more comprehensive sues, questions, and approaches concerning conscious­
ness that lie outside this limited scope. This chapter
framework, in which consciousness needs to be
should not be taken as an attempt to give an exhaustive
theoretically situated, are themselves better un­
survey of all aspects of consciousness even within its
derstood. And these elements include nothing less
own scope, and certainly not as embodying the grander
than causality, representation, indexicality, and ambition of covering all paradigms of the study of
personhood, and especially the deep-rooted di­ consciousness.
chotomies between mental and physical, and sub­ 2. The results of this effort were discussed as part of
jective and objective. As such, it is probably a workshop attended by anesthesiologists, neuro­
reasonable to assume, as Jerry Fodor likes to physiologists, psychologists, and medicolegal experts in
prognosticate regarding a complete account of Cardiff, United Kingdom, in 1986. Rosen and Lunn
rationality, that "no such theory will be available (1987) is an outcome of this workshop.
by this time next week." B s 3. Michenfelder makes the same point in another way,
This being said, I conclude o n a more positive in concluding, "Thus there are a variety of end points
note. Presently, there is an impressive rising tide one might choose to answer the question 'When is

of interest in the study of consciousness, and the brain anesthetized?' and there is no obvious basis
for selecting one over another" (Michenfe1der 1988,
thanks to recent advances in interdisciplinary
p. 36). However, cf. Nikolinakos ( 1 994) for an opti­
research, we are now in a better position to
mistic outlook on the role of consciousness in anes­
penetrate the mysteries of this great intellectual thesia research. See, also, Flohr ( 1 995) for an
frontier. By integrating methodologies and per­ information-theoretic model of anesthesia where the
spectives from psychology, philosophy, neuro­ "threshold of consciousness" is determined in terms of
science, cognitive science, and other disciplines the brain's representational activity.
and by keeping a mindful eye on the successes and 4. Ifwe go down the phylogenetic ladder-for instance,
failures of the past, we should be able to reach a from humans all the way to amoebae-where are we to
higher vantage point and to see more broadly and cut the line and determine the bounds of the charmed
more deeply than has ever before been ·possible. circle to which only those who possess consciousness
These are very exciting times for thinking about can belong? (The metaphor of the "charmed circle" is

consciousness. from Dennett 1987, p. 1 6 1 .) Chimps, dogs, spiders?

What about infants, fetuses, or comatose patients? On
the other hand, if we insist on experience of sensations,
Acknowledgments itches, and tingles as necessary components of con­
sciousness, is there any principled reason for stoping
short of requiring something further, such as a con­
I would like to thank my coeditors, Ned Block
ceptual overlay that makes possible one's situated
and Owen Flanagan, for many helpful sugges­
awareness of one's own place and relations with others
tions. Special thanks to Fred Dretske, John Perry, (not to talk of the Cartesian res cogitans), as essential to
Roger Shepard, Brian C. Smith, and again to the nature of consciousness? The answers to these ques­
Owen Flanagan, for teaching me what I needed tions are all up for theoretical grabs.
to know to write this chapter, and for their sup­ It is also sociologically interesting to look at patterns
port throughout the preparation of this book. in the common sense attributions of various mental
abilities to various organisms. In contrast to widely
dissenting opinions on the attribution of consciousness
Notes to others, there does not seem to be such a significant
variation in pretheoretic intuitions with regard to attri­
1 . The scope of my work has been limited to the philo­
butions of intelligence, or perceptual capabilities. A
sophical and scientific paradigms rooted in Western in-
preliminary survey study conducted on approximately
Approaching Consciousness 47

one hundred Stanford students and faculty, based on a comes about as the result of irritating nervous tissue, is
two-dimensional matrix of mental attributes (e.g., the just as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin
ability to perceive, the ability to learn, intelligence, when Aladdin rubbed his lamp in the story, or as any
consciousness) versus kinds of organisms (e.g., proto­ other ultimate fact of nature" ( Huxley 1866, 193). In­
zoa, spiders, chimpanzees, humans) seemed to indicate terestingly, Huxley seems to have removed the reference
a bias in our attributions toward reserving conscious­ to the Djin (as well as Aladdin's lamp) in the later edi­
ness most exclusively for ourselves, while being more tions of this book. For instance, in the 1 876 edition, the
generous with the attributions of other mental abilities. same passage appears as: "But what consciousness is,
(Giizeldere 1 993). we know not; and how it is that anything so remarkable
5. This is, it turns out, a very tricky question. On the as a state of consciousness comes about as the result of
one hand, patients with only cortical brain damage irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as any
make a striking contrast with those who further lack a other ultimate fact of nature" (p. 1 88). Too bad the Djin
functional brainstem. For instance, a report on the di­ is no longer around, for we could perhaps have wished

agnosis of death, prepared by the President's Commis­ from it to tell us if we would ever be able to solve the
sion, makes the following statement: mind-body problem.

7. There is a longer passage in Tyndall's "Scientific

The startling contrast between bodies lacking all
Realism" where he addresses the mind-body problem
brain functions and patients with intact brain stems
in length, and concludes, in agreement with McGinn
(despite severe neocortical damage) manifests [a
(though in 1868) that it is "as insoluble, in its modern
tremendous difference with respect to responsive­
form, as it was in the prescientific ages." Because the
ness, and hence the attribute of life]. The former lie
points Tyndall touches upon are so remarkably close to
with fixed pupils, motionless except for the chest
the contemporary formulations of the issues debated in
movements produced by their respirators. The latter
the literature under the labels "explanatory gap" and
can not only breathe, metabolize, maintain temper­
the "hard problem" (e.g., the nature of the explanation
ature and blood pressure, and so forth, on their own,
between mind and body as opposed to other physical
but also sigh, yawn, track light with their eyes, and
phenomena; the prospects for the mind-body problem
react to pain or reflex stimulation.
upon reaching a fully advanced neuroscientific under­
On the other hand, the commission shies away from standing of the brain; and the status of possible corre­

reaching any conclusion with respect to the absence or lation-based accounts of consciousness), I quote this

presence of consciousness in patients of either kind: "It passage here in its entirety. (A more detailed discussion
is not known which portions of the brain are responsible follows in section XIV.)

for cognition and consciousness; what little is known

The relation of physics to consciousness being thus
points to substantial interconnection among the brain
invariable, it follows that, given the state of the
stem, subcortical structures, and the neocortex" (Presi­
brain, the corresponding thought or feeling might be
dent's Commission 198 1 , quoted in Capron 1988, pp.
inferred: or, given the thought or feeling, the corre­
161, 160, respectively).
sponding state of the brain might be inferred. But
Perhaps it is altogether misleading to think of the
how inferred? It would be at bottom not a case of
presence of consciousness in a binary fashion. It might
logical inference at all, but of empirical association.
be necessary to talk about degrees of consciousness,
You may reply, that many of the inferences of sci­
which could allow one to say that normal human beings
ence are of this character-the inference, for exam­
are "more conscious" than those with brain damage,
ple, that an electric current, of a given direction, will
the brain-damaged patients more than those without a
deflect a magnetic needle in a definite way. But the
brainstem, and so forth.
cases differ in this, that the passage from the current
6. Even though McGinn (1989) cites Julian Huxley as to the needle, if not demonstrable, is conceivable,
the author of this by now very popular, colorful quote and that we entertain no doubt as to the final me­
(with no source), the credit belongs to T. H. Huxley chanical solution of the problem. But the passage
(Julian Huxley's grandfather). In full, it reads: "But from the physics of the brain to the corresponding
what consciousness is, we know not; and how it is that facts of consciousness is inconceivable as a result of
anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness mechanics.
Guven Giizeldere 48

Granted that a definite thought, and a definite mo­ the connection becomes clear only when we descend
lecular action in the brain, occur simultaneously; we to the level of molecular description: till then it ap­
do not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently pears as a contingent correlation. In the psycho­
any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us physical case we have no idea whether there is such a
to pass, by a process of reasoning, from the one deeper level or what it could be; but even if there is,
to the other. They appear together, but we do not the possibility that pain might be necessarily con­
know why. Were our minds and senses so expanded, nected with a brain state at this deeper level does
strengthened, and illuminated, as to enable us to not permit us to conclude that pain might be di­
see and feel the very molecules of the brain; were rectly analyzable in physical or even topic-neutral
we capable of following all their motions, all their terms. . . . Even if such a deeper level existed, we
groupings, all their electrical discharges, if such might be permanently blocked from a general under­
there be; and were we intimately acquainted with standing of it. (Nagel 1986, pp. 48-49; my em­
the corresponding states of thOUght and feeling, we phasis).
should be as far as ever from the solution of the
The possibility of a permanent cognitive closure in
problem, 'How are these physical processes con­
humans with regard to the understanding of the mind­
nected with the facts of consciousness?'. The chasm
body relation is an intriguing idea. But when it comes
between the two classes of phenomena would still
to taking this possibility as a statement of certainty, as
remain intellectually impassable.
McGinn does, it seems fair to question what warrants
Let the consciousness of love, for example, be asso­ this conviction, especially in the absence of empirically
ciated with a right-handed spiral motion of the mole­ grounded reasons. In particular, there is a curious ten­
cules of the brain, and the consciousness of hate with sion between McGinn's confidence, on one hand, of his
a left-handed spiral motion. We should then know, own cognitive ability to assert such a sweeping verdict
when we love, that the motion is in one direction, on behalf of all human beings (at present as well as in
and, when we hate, that the motion is in the other; the foreseeable future), and the aim of his argument, on
but the 'WHY?' would remain as unanswerable as the other hand, which ultimately strives to attenuate
before. (Tyndall 1 868, pp. 86-87) confidence in the powers of human cognitive abilities to
solve the mind-body problem.
It is worth noting that equally dissenting opinions
Put differently, McGinn wants his readers to simul­
were also available at the time. For instance, Huxley
taneously believe, as a result of his largely a priori rea­
(1901) states: "I hold, with the Materialist, that the
soning, both that our cognitive abilities are limited to
human body, like all living bodies, is a machine, all op­
forever fall short of bringing a solution to the mind­
erations of which, sooner or later, be explained on
body problem, and that they are nonetheless sufficiently
physical principles. I believe that we shall, sooner or
powerful to foresee the exploratory limits of the human
later, arrive at a mechanical equivalent of conscious­
mind vis-a-vis the very same issue. By the same kind of
ness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent
reasoning, isn't there equally good reason to think, one
of heat" (p. 191).
wonders, that the opposite claim might rather be true­
8. For a materialist response to Adams, see Lewis that it is more likely (or, at least not less likely) that we
(1995). will someday come to a satisfactory understanding of
9. Antecedents of McGinn's view can be found in the nature of the mind-body relation than it is that
Nagel's work in several places, although Nagel only we will ever be able to determine how far the human
points out the possibility of McGinn's position with­ understanding will extend? (For a thorough critique
out committing himself to it. For instance, he says: of McGinn's position, see Flanagan (1992), chap. 6.)
10. It is actually not a straightforward matter to give a
We cannot directly see a necessary connection, if
precise definition of naturalism, and I will not attempt
there is one, between phenomenological pain and a
one here. Roughly speaking, I take "naturalism" to de­
physiologically described brain state any more than
note the view that everything is ' composed of fun­
we can directly see the necessary connection between
damental entities recognized by the natural sciences
increase in temperature and pressure of a gas at a
(ontological dimension), and possibly that the accept-
constant volume. In the latter case the necessity of
Approaching Consciousness 49

able methods of theorizing about these entities are those and Italian (coscienza) that carries both meanings. Out­
commensurable with methods employed in the natural side the boundaries of Indo-European languages, the
sciences (methodological dimension). For a compre­ term corresponding to consciousness in, say, Turkish­
hensive overview of naturalistic approaches in epis­ an A1taic language--carries a political, but not reall y
temology and philosophy of science in the twentieth ethical, connotation, i n addition to the common psy­
century, see Kitcher (1992); for a recent analysis of the chological usage (bilinr or f/Jur, as opposed to vicdan).
present status of naturalism, see Stroud (1996). In any case, this little linguistic excursion gives no evi­
In philosophy mind, naturalism is often regarded as a dence of a semantic taxonomy that systematically re­
close ally of two related but not identical views, materi­ lates to one based on language families.
alism and physicalism, but there are exceptions. See, for 1 3. The following quotation, taken from the circles
instance, Post (1987) for a detailed attempt to lay out a where the concern with consciousness has to do pri­
fully naturalist but nonreductive metaphysics that is marily with the social rather than the psychological
committed to a monism of entities with a pluralism of sense highlights this distinction quite eloquently:
irreducible "emergent" properties. See also Chalmers
(1996) for a somewhat similar view he calls "naturalistic When you speak of "consciousness," you do not re­
dualism." For a thorough examination of the physical­ fer to the moral conscious: the very rigor of your
ist program, compare Poland (1994); for contemporary methods ensures that you do not leave the strictly
objections to physicalism, see Robinson (1993). scientific domain which belong to you. What you

I I. As it happens, Miller is not the first one to think

have in mind exclusively is the faculty of perceiving
and of reacting to perception, that is to say, the psy­
about placing a ban on "consciousness" in order to help
chological concept which constitutes one of the
sort out the tangles in related terminologies. Here is a
accepted meanings of the word "consciousness. "
quote from the turn of the century, by philosopher and
(Pope Paul VI, addressing a gathering o f scientists
William James scholar Ralph Barton Perry (1904):
for the conference Brain and Conscious Experience
"Were the use of the term 'consciousness' to be for­
in Rome in 1964; quoted in Kanellakos and Lukas
bidden for a season, contemporary thought would be set
1 974, p. i)
for the wholesome task of discovering more definite
terms with which to replace it, and a very considerable 14. This distinction is not uncontested, however. Some,
amount of convenient mystery would be dissipated. especially in continental philosophy, think that there is
There is no philosophical term at once so popular and no intransitive sense of consciousness: all conscious­
so devoid of standard meaning. . . . Consciousness com­ ness is consciousness of. Jean-Paul Sartre, for example,
prises everything that is, and indefinitely much more. It is a typical representative of this view: "We establish
is small wonder that the definition of it is little at­ the necessity for consciousness to be consciousness of
tempted" (p. 282). Hence, according to Perry, it is not something. In fact it is by means of that of which it is
(only) the ubiquitous familiarity with consciousness that conscious that consciousness distinguishes itself in its
renders attempts to give it a precise characterization or own eyes and that it can be self-consciousness; a con­
definition unnecessary; the reason is rather the difficulty sciousness which would not be consciousness (of)
of the analytic task involved in doing so. something would be consciousness (of) nothing. (Sartre
12. A related term in Latin was conscientia, which can 1956, p. 1 73). The origins of this kind of an essentially
literally be translated as "knowledge with," which ap­ intentional construal of consciousness goes back to Ed­
peared in English and in French as "conscience." mund Husserl's work from which Sartre adopted his
"Conscience" also had, and still has, a significant eth­ view, most likely Ideas ( Husser! 1913). (I thank Ron
ical aspect, which is reflected in another OED entry: Brady for this pointer.)
"Internal knowledge, especially of one's own innocence, I S. See Giizeldere (1996) for an analysis of how the
guilt, deficiencies, etc." (Cf. Baldwin 1 901). Nonethe­ creature and state senses of consciousness can be con­
less, consciousness and conscience have been separate nected by means of the "Introspective Link Principle,"
words with quite distinct meanings in English, at least yielding various "higher-order monitoring" concep­
since the time of Locke. In contrast, there is only one tions of consciousness. For other recent attempts to
word in Romance languages like French (conscience) distinguish different senses of consciousness and sort
 Guven Giizeldere 50

out some definitional issues, see Lycan (1987, preface; However, this view is not uncontested. For instance,
1 997b, chap. I), Goldman (1993), and Natsoulas (1 983, Alastair Hannay ( 1 990) suggests that in Greek philoso­
1986). phy one can find, contrary to the skepticism expressed
16. My decision to address problems that bear only on above, something like a distinction between the social
the psychological sense of consciousness should not be and psychological senses of consciousness. According to
taken to imply that the two SUbcategories are not related Hannay, Greeks distinguished between syneidesis (pri­
in interesting ways. In fact, it seems a philosophically marily ethical individual or shared knowledge) and
significant task to investigate the nature of the relation synaesthesia (Aristotle's variation of the "unity of ap­
between the social and the psychological senses of con­ perception"), in much the same way as modem philos­
sciousness-is it something more like a genus-species ophy proceeded in the seventeenth and eighteenth
relation, or one of family resemblance, or something centuries. In alliance, Hardie (1 976) argues against
completely unique? It can also be questioned whether Matson, Kahn, and Hamlyn, and states that "it is . . .
one can fruitfully give an analysis of one of these halves paradoxical to suggest that Aristotle was unaware of the
while eschewing the other. Nonetheless, for the pur­ mind-body problem" (p. 410). According to Hardie,
poses of this chapter, I opt for focusing solely on the Aristotle was "the first psychologist, and for him psy­
psychological sense of consciousness. Even if it may hi: chology without the conscious psuche would have been
impossible to fully understand the social sense of con­ Hamlet without the Prince" (p. 405). Ostenfeld (1 987)
sciousness without referring to the psychological sense, goes a step further, and claims that both Plato and
or vice versa, due to the conceptual disarray surround­ Aristotle were dealing with the mind-body problem in
ing the term "consciousness" such an analytic strategy much the same sense Descartes did and we are. This
seems essential as a first step. debate, so far as I can see, is far from resolved at
1 7 . For an exploration of the distinction between epis­ present.
temological and ontological considerations, as well as 19. The debate about whether consciousness consists in
the question of whether a set of criteria to distinguish the higher-order awareness of first order mental states is
the mental in general from the physical can be coher­ very much alive in the contemporary literature. Among
ently formulated, see among others Rorty (1 970a, those who defend this view, some take the higher-order
I 970b) and Kim (1 972). representation to be some form of perception (for ex­
18. The status of the mind-body problem in ancient ample, Armstrong 1980, Churchland 1988, Lycan
Greek philosophy is also worth a visit. It is generally 1 997), and others as some form of thought (for example,
argued that there is no single term in ancient Greek that Rosenthal 1986, 1997; Carruthers 1989, 1 996). For cri­
reflects the counterpart of the Cartesian/Lockean con­ tiques, see Dretske (1993, 1995) and Shoemaker (1 994).
ception of consciousness, and that nothing like the con­ Despite the fact that such higher-order awareness ac­
temporary debates on the mind-body problem or the counts of consciousness have many promising aspects,
problem of consciousness was ever in their horizon. For I have to 'stop short of giving a proper exposition here.
instance, Matson (1 966) claims that "the Greeks had no (A more detailed treatment of this approach can be
mind-body problem" (p. 1 01), and Wilkes (1 995) argues found in Giizeldere 1995b.) I will also leave the dis­
that "[Aristotle) paid absolutely no attention to con­ cussion of "self-consciousness" (which is sometimes
sciousness per se" (p. 1 22). Similarly, Hamlyn (1 968a) underwritten by such higher-order accounts) out of the
states: "There is an almost total neglect of any problem scope of this chapter.
arising from psycho-physical dualism and the facts of 20. For Malebranche, although we can have a "clear
consciousness. Such problems do not seem to arise for idea" of our bodies, we cannot, unlike what Descartes
him. The reason appears to be that concepts like that of believed, have a clear idea of our souls or minds. Put
consciousness do not figure in his conceptual scheme at differently, we cannot know our minds through a clear
all; they play no part in his analysis of perception, idea; rather we know them "only through consciousness
thought, etc. (Nor do they play any significant role in or inner sensation" such as "pain, heat, color, and all
Greek thought in general.) It is this perhaps that gives other sensible qualities" (Malebranche 1923, Elucida­
his definition of the soul itself a certain inadequacy for tion I I : Knowledge of the Soul, pp. 86-87). As such,
the modem reader" (p. xiii). See also Kahn (1 966), Malebranche gives qualitative aspects of the mind a
Harnlyn (1 968b), and Wilkes (1 988) for similar views. much more central place in his theory, in contrast to the
Approaching Consciousness 51

Cartesian view. See Schmaltz (1 996) for a thorough ac­ James's attitude toward the metaphysics of conscious­
count of Malebranche's philosophy of mind. (I thank ness is reflected most accurately in Gerald Myers's fol­
Tad Schmaltz for the relevant material and helpful dis­ lowing remark, from his extensive study of James's life
cussion on this issue.) and thought: "James wanted to hold that in one way

2 1 . Labeling the seemingly opposing views of James of consciousness does not exist, but that in another way it

1890 and James of 1904 simply a "change of mind" is does; yet he was never able, even to his own satisfaction,

probably too superficial a conclusion in terms of histor­ to define the two ways clearly enough to show that they

ical scholarship, and not quite fair to James either. It is are consistent rather than contradictory" (Myers 1986,

important to note that James's denouncement in the p. 64). For related work, see among others Dewey

latter work is of "consciousness as an entity" rather ( 1 940), Lovejoy ( 1 963), and Reck ( 1972). (I thank Denis
than the reality of "conscious states." Regarding con­ Phillips, Imants Baruss, and Eugene Taylor for helpful

sciousness as an "entity" has close connotations to pointers and discussion on William James's views on

Cartesian substance dualism. Even though there is no consciousness. )

straightforward advancement of such a metaphysical 22. The claim of introspectionism's being well estab­
position in the Principles of Psychology, James's posi­ lished here refers not as much to the soundness of its
tion with respect to the ontology of consciousness is not methodology and theoretical grounding as to its perva­
entirely clear there. Hence it might be better to charac­ siveness and preeminence in the field of psychology as a
terize his 1904 article as marking merely the abandon­ whole. To see this, one only needs to survey the mono­
ment of consciousness as a nonmaterial entity, not lithic psychology literature of the few decades roughly
consciousness per se as a subject matter. This inter­ between the end of nineteenth and the beginning of the
pretation is supported by James's own remark that he twentieth centuries: all major psychology journals are
means to "deny that the word [consciousness] stands for edited by the protagonists of the introspectionist school,
an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does all articles report studies involving introspection as their
stand for a function" (James 1 97 1 , p. 4). primary method, and so on. Ironically, the same ob­
Even though this much seems quite straightforward, servation holds of the period that immediately follows
we are by no means faced with an unproblematic ac­ (roughly from late 1 9 1 0s to early 1 960s), except with
count of consciousness. In fact, James never quite works behaviorism substituted for introspectionism.
out the metaphysical presuppositions and consequences It would be interesting to pursue the question of
of his view of characterizing consciousness as a func­ whether the ftuctuation in James's life with respect to
tion, as opposed to an entity. Moreover, the ontological consciousness occurred as a result of, or was inftuenced
tum he takes toward "radical empiricism" at around the by, the general air of dissatisfaction with the internal
same period as the pUblication of his "Does Conscious­ conflicts of the introspectionist school toward the end of
ness Exist?" complicates matters. It is probably well its tenure, which led to behaviorism's rapid rise and
warranted to remark that William James never held takeover of the intellectual landscape. Or was the influ­
a long-standing metaphysical position with respect ence in the opposite direction? These are aU intriguing
to consciousness void of internal tensions. At a cer­ questions, but unfortunately they lie outside the scope of
tain stage in his life, roughly midway between the this chapter.
publication of the two above mentioned works, he 23. This is only one (as it happens, also historically the
went so far as to defend the plausibility of the immor­ most significant) use of the word introspection. A num­
tality of consciousness in an article titled "Human ber of different phenomena have passed under the same
Immortality," in the following words: "And when name. For instance, toward the end of the last century,
finally a brain stops acting altogether, or decays, that Brentano and Comte argued that introspection, as a
special stream of consciousness which it subserved will second-order mental act that gathers information about
vanish entirely from the natural world. But the sphere of first-order sensations, was misconstrued. Mill and
being that supplied the consciousness would still be in­ James agreed and proposed a model of introspection as
tact; and in that more real world with which, even whilst retrospection: the examination of one's own mental
here, it was continuous, the consciousness might, in happenings retrospectively, through the medium of
ways unknown to us, continue still" (James 1 956, pp. 1 7- memory of the immediate past. (For details, see Lyons
18). Perhaps the historical fact of the matter regarding 1986, chap \ .) A second, separate phenomenon that
Guven Giizeldere 52

made its way to the cognitive psychology literature in produce my findings, it is not due to some fault in your
the 1970s under the name introspection was the phe­ apparatus or in the control of your stimulus, but it is due
nomenon of reasoning about the causes of one's own to the fact that your introspection is untrained. The at­
behavior, in terms of one's beliefs, desires, motivations, tack is made upon the observer and not upon the ex­
and so forth. (For a seminal article that piqued most of perimental setting" (Watson 1 9 1 3 , p. 163).
the initial interest in this literature, see Nisbett and Interestingly, approximately two hundred years ear­
Wilson 1977.) In any case, my analysis deals with in­ lier, a similar debate had taken place between two em­
trospection only in the former sense. piricist philosophers, Locke and Berkeley, on almost
24. Edwin Boring notes that no subject left Wilhelm exactly the same issue. The question was whether there
Wundt's laboratory without having provided 10,000 were any "abstract ideas" : ideas that are not of partic­
data points (Boring 1 953, p. 1 72). William James hu­ ular things but of universals-"types" of particular
morously observes that if it had not been for the sus­ things. In the following quotation, notice that Berkeley
tained patience and the inability to get bored of the rests his challenge of Locke's position on this question
leaders of introspectionism who came from the Ger­ on exactly the same grounds that Titchener challenged
manic part of the continental Europe, the enterprise of Kiilpe: personal experience based on introspection.
introspectionism could have never endured. "They
If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind
mean business," James remarks, "not chivalry" (James
such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in
1950, pp. 192-1 93).
vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I
25. The nature of the relation and the degree of influ­ go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully
ence between positivism and behaviorism are not un­ and certainly inform himself whether he has such an
controversial Even though it is generally taken for idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task
granted that the two movements enjoyed a genuine ally for anyone to perform. What more easy than for
status, the details of this received view have recently anyone to look a little into his own thoughts, and
been contested by Laurence Smith. Smith claims, "With there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an
their common intellectual background and orientation, idea that shall correspond with the description that
behaviorism and logical positivism were naturally dis­ is here given of the general idea of a triangle, which
posed to form some sort of alliance. But only after both is "neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equi­
movements were well under way was there any signif­ crural or sca1enon, but all and none of these at
icant interaction between them" (Smith 1986, p. 5; cf. once"? ( Berkeley 1977, pp. 1 3- 14)
the rest of his book for further details).
28. There is of course a third, unmentioned but impor­
26. In all fairness I should add that behaviorism did
tant school of psychology that emerged during the pe­
manage to bring in fresh air to psychology of the late
riod of transition from introspectionism to behaviorism:
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries at a time when
Gestalt psychology. The fact that a separate account of
an uncomfortable sense of containment within the rigid
Gestalt psychology is not being provided here is cer­
introspectionist paradigm was rapidly growing. The
tainly not because it is intellectually unworthy of con­
realization that psychology could employ nonhuman
sideration. Quite the opposite, Gestaltists were very
subjects and pursue research without being solely de­
keen about the reasons for introspectionism's failure,
pendent on the linguistic data to be provided by trained
and they brought a fresh new perspective on the basis of
introspectionists seemed, rightly, to open up new hori­
which a large number of facts in the psychophysics of
zons. This should also explain, in part, the rather im­
perception could be fruitfully reinterpreted. Nonethe­
mediate success and popularity of behaviorism and the
less, Gestalt psychology shared many of the same onto­
symmetrically rapid fall of introspectionism. Unfor- .
logical assumptions with respect to consciousness and
tunately, as I will detail below, behaviorism turned out
the role of phenomenology in studying the mind with
to constrict psychology into an even more rigid cast in
introspectionism. As a result, as far as the history of
comparison to its predecessor.
consciousness in psychology research is concerned, it
27. John Watson would not miss the chance to put a
does not constitute the sort of sharp contrast that be­
nail in introspectionism's coffin by alluding to this con­
haviorism provides. Hence, the brief treatment.
troversy: "Psychology, as it is generally thought of, has
Finally, the emerging clinical wing of psychology, the
something esoteric in its methods. If you fail to re-
psychoanalytic school, also had its disagreements with
Approaching Consciousness 53

introspectionism, and it constituted the third distinct In contrast, the ontological behaviorists were in favor
angle of attack alongside with behaviorism and Gestalt of doing away with consciousness, or any aspect of the
psychology. Unfortunately, I cannot go into a detailed mind, by itkntifying it with some piece of behavior. For
analysis concerning these three movements here. For a example, Lashley ( 1 923) maintained the following the­
well-documented historical account of introspectionism sis: "The conception of consciousness here advanced is,
and the debates and movements that surrounded it, cf. then, that of a complex integration and succession of
the section on "Modem Experimental Psychology" in bodily activities which are closely related to or involve
Boring ( 1 929), as well as chapters I and 2 of Lyons the verbal and gestural mechanisms and hence most
(1 986). frequently come to social expression" (p. 34 1 ).
29. So much so that it is very rare, even today, to come Although the assumptions of these three schools are,
across "consciousness" or "introspection" in any by and large, logically independent of one another,
psychology or cognitive science textbook, or even psy­ Watson ( 1 9 1 3 , 1 970), an indoctrinated behaviorist,
chology dictionaries. See, for example, Corsini ( 1 984) seems to have believed in all of them, arguing that the
or Stillings et aJ. (1 987), which contain no entries for time was ripe for psychology to discard all reference to
"consciousness," "awareness," or "introspection." consciousness. It is no doubt that a Watsonian universe
would make life much easier for philosophers and psy­
30. Naturally, there were internal disagreements, and
chologists. It would, for instance, remove the epistemic
thus different schools, within Behaviorism, and not each
duality in the study of consciousness by collapsing the
brand of the doctrine was as hardheaded. Most notably,
distinction between the first-person and third-person
the analytical (logical) behaviorists (who were mostly
perspectives. Furthermore, by making consciousness
philosophers, e.g., Hempel 1 949) were interested in an­
ultimately an operationalized parameter in the domain
alyzing meanings ofmental terms in a purely behavioral
of behavior, it would allow a set of behavioral criteria to
vocabulary, whereas the methodological behaviorists
settle questions about who or what possesses creature
(who were mostly psychologists) wanted merely to re­
consciousness. But, as is evident from the history of
strict their research to the study of publicly observable
psychology, life is never easy in the domain of mind.
behavior without having to attempt any conceptual
Questions about consciousness remained a nagging
analysis or even deny the reality of the publicly un­
issue during behaviorism's tenure, and they eventually
observable mental phenomena.
led its prominent figures like B. F. Skinner to not only
For example, according to Edwin Holt ( 1 9 1 4), "the
acknowledge the existence of the phenomenon, but also
true criterion of consciousness is not introspection, but
adopt a conciliatory position in his later works. For ex­
specific responsiveness" (p. 206). Since making be­
ample, Skinner ( 1 974), after stating that the common
havior the criterion of consciousness is not quite the
conception of behaviorism as a school of thOUght that
same as itkntifying the two, consciousness thus becomes
"ignored consciousness, feelings, and states of mind"
"externalized" by means of a publicly observable mea­
was all wrong, concedes that the "early behaviorists
sure, but the metaphysical question of identity is left
wasted a good deal of time, and confused an important
open. As such, the two phenomena could be said to be
central issue, by attacking the introspective study of
coexistent, as Holt (19 1 5) acknowledges in a later work:
mental life" (pp. 3-5).
"When one is conscious of a thing, one's movements are
Undoubtedly, consciousness was not the only factor
readjusted to it, and to precisely those features of it of
that brought the demise of behaviorism. A different line
which one is conscious. The two domains are cotermi­
of attack, for example, came from the quarters of new­
nous" (p. 172). Edward Tolman's position in his "A
born modem linguistics on the issue of explanation of
Behaviorist's Definition of Consciousness" ( 1 927) is
verbal behavior. In particular, Noam Chomsky's famous
also similar to Holt's in stopping short of advancing a
metaphysical claim: "Whenever an organism at a given review ( 1 959) of Skinner ( 1 957) is a milestone that
shook behaviorism (in psychology) in its foundations.
moment of stimulation shifts and there from being
For an influential critique of logical behaviorism (in
ready to respond in some relatively differentiated way
philosophy), see Putnam ( 1963).
to being ready to respond in some relatively more dif­
ferentiated way, there IS consciousness" (p. 435). (See 3 1 . Of course, there were a few exceptions who spoke
also Tolman 1967 and note 43 for his position with re­ up while the reign of behaviorism was still tight and
spect to the study of "raw feels" in psychology.) proved to be visionaries. Worth mentioning here is a
Giiven Giizeldere 54

lengthy discussion Miller gave on consciousness in his as the "Chinese room argument," Searle argued that no
excellent survey of psychology as early as 1962. It is amount of information processing could alone provide
possible to recount even earlier attempts to break the a system with original (as opposed to derivative, as­
silence, and directly or indirectly talk about conscious­ signed, etc.) semantics (Searle 1980). Dreyfus's critique
ness, especially in the fields of attention, learning, and never focused on consciousness per se, but Searle, in a
cybernetics. Cf. Hebb (1 949), Abramson (1951 -55), newer work, deals exclusively with the problem of con­
Hilgard ( 1956), and Broadbent ( 1958). See also Hil­ sciousness in cognitive science, and in general compu­
gard's remarks on this issue in his lucid survey, "Con­ tational paradigms (Searle 1 992). In contrast, a rival
sciousness in Contemporary Psychology" (1 980). For account of consciousness built entirely on computa­
an account of the "cognitive revolution" in psychology, tional ideas can be found in Jackendoff's Consciousness
see Baars (1 985) and Hilgard (1 987), chap. 7. and the Computational Mind (1 987). For a predecessor

32. Years later, Alan Baddeley ( 1993), a prominent of the information-processing accounts of conscious­
psychologist who has devoted his career to the inves­ ness, see Donald Hebb's The Organization of Behavior
tigation of memory, validates Mandler's insight in the ( 1949), a work that came out of the behaviorist era but

following words: "I am rather surprised to find myself anticipated what was ahead with foresight: Hebb argues

writing about consciousness . . . . There are very good to identify consciousness "theoretically with a certain

reasons why the study of consciousness has been dis­ degree of complexity of phase sequence in which both

cretely ignored by cognitive psychology during its early central and sensory facilitations merge, the central act­
years of development. . . . Why, then, have I changed my ing to reinforce now one class of sensory stimulations,
mind? In my own case, the strongest reason has corne now another" (p. 1 45).

from the pressure of empirical evidence; I am an ex­ 34. Note, however, that a curious passage in Des­
perimental psychologist who uses empirical data to cartes's Principles of Philosophy suggests a theoretical
drive theory, and it has become increasingly difficult to commitment to something very much like Freud's un­
have a model of memory that is at all complete, without conscious, which does not sit squarely with his explicit
directly or indirectly including assumptions about con­ commitment to the transparency of the mind:
sciousness" (pp. 1 1 - 1 3). (Note, by the way, that Bad­
The strange aversions of certain people that make
deley I 99O-in many respects a very thorough book on
them unable to bear the smell of roses, the presence
memory-contains no references to consciousness.)
of a cat, or the like, can readily be recognized as re­
33. The information-processing models of conscious­
sulting simply from their having been greatly upset
ness, although not the only game in town, are still very
by some such object in the early years of their life. . . .
much alive today, in psychology as well as in philoso­
And the smell of roses may have caused severe
phy. For instance, Dennett's central claim in his most
headache in a child when he was still in the cradle, or
recent Consciousness Explained is that "conscious
a cat may have terrified him without anyone notic­
human minds are more-or-Iess serial virtual machines
ing and without any memory of it remaining after­
implemented-inefficiently-on the parallel hardware
wards; and yet the idea of an aversion he then felt for
that evolution has provided for us" (Dennett 1 99 1 ,
the roses or for the cat will remain imprinted on his
p . 2 1 8). See also Hofstadfer (1 979), Hamad ( 1 982), and
brain till the end of his life (Descartes 1 992), p. 195:
Sornmerhof (1 990, 1 996) for theorizing about con­
Principles of Philosophy, pI. I, §9, AT, 429)
sciousness in computational and systems-analysis terms.
However, information-processing models of the mind Unfortunately, I have not been able to find any fur­
(and, a fortiori, of consciousness in particular) have not ther elaboration of this idea in Descartes's writings,
always been everyone's favorite. For example Hubert which would surely be relevant in better understanding
Dreyfus, in his well-known critique of the research pro­ the nature of what seems to be an apparent theoretical
gram and methodology of artificial intelligence, brought tension.
the whole information-processing approach under se­ 35. The controversy over the status of unconscious
vere criticism (Dreyfus 1979, 1992, esp. chap. 4, "The mental states is multifaceted. Another staunch critic
Psychological Assumption"). Another line of attack of the unconscious, though for reasons different from
was developed from neighboring quarters by philos­ Titcheners' (that have to do with his stance against
opher John Searle. In an essay that later became known panpsychic views of consciousness), was William
Approaching Consciousness 55

James (1950a). He fretfully remarks: "The distinction partite division of the conscious, the preconscious, and
. . . between the unconscious and the conscious being of the unconscious.
the mental state . is the sovereign means for be­
. .
38. Cf. John Kihlstrom's work for a cognitivist over­
lieving what one likes in psychology, and of turning view of the various forms of the unconscious (e.g.,
what might become a science into a twnbling-ground Kihlstrom 1 984, 1 987).
for whimsies" (p. 1 63). As discussed in section XI, a 39. For a thoughtful discussion of the theoretical issues
different line of objection is also raised, this time in involved, see Reingold and Merilde (1990).
a Cartesian spirit, by Searle (1992) and Strawson
40. Another paradigm in contemporary psychology
(1994).
that makes use of the conscious-unconscious distinction
Note also that in Titchener, talk about the uncon­
is that of implicit learning and implicit memory, as well
scious has switched to talk about the subconscious, but
as implicit perception. The focus of interest in this
there is enough reason to think that nothing theoret­
paradigm is on measuring the amount of learning and
ically significant hangs on this implicit substitution. This
memory possible in the absence of subjects' awareness
terminological variation stems from the fact that Freud
of the stimuli presented to them. A certain branch of this
and his contemporary, Pierre Janet, had an initial dis­
work became sensationalized in the media under the ti­
agreement that left them with two different terms (un­
tle "subliminal perception" in the 1 970s. For a thor­
conscious and subconscious), and each one adopted and
ough and sympathetic account of the nature of this
perpetually owned his own term with a vengeance. But
phenomenon, as well as the history of related research,
this was more a result of personal quarrels between the
see Dixon's Subliminal Perception: The Nature of a
two personalities than a genuine theoretical dissonance
Controversy (1971) and his later Preconscious Proces­
on the nature and structure of that which is not con­
sing (1981). For possibly the most influential recent
scious. And so far as I can tell, there is no evidence that
work in this area (especially in masking studies), see
Titchener's use of Janet's term, subconscious, rather
Marcel (1983a, 1 983b).
than Freud's unconscious is the result of a "conscious
Naturally, there are also skeptics. For instance, Erik­
decision" and a theoretical commitment. For an illumi­
sen stated quite early on, "At present there is no
nating account of the relation between Freud and Janet
' convincing evidence that the hwnan organism can dis­
see Perry and Laurence (1984).
criminate or differentially respond to external stimuli
36. For an interesting discussion of the question of that are at an intensity level too low to elicit dis­
whether the Freudian unconscious is a "theoretical criminated verbal report. In other words, a verbal report
construct" on a par with scientific theoretical entities' is as sensitive an indicator of perception as any other
see Oilman (1972). response that has been studied" (Eriksen 1960, p. 298).
37. Note that over time, Freud grew dissatisfied with More recently, Holender (1 986) presented a negative
his tripartite structure and eventually introduced the and rather controversial statement on subliminal per­
new elements of the id, the ego, and the superego into ception, which also included a comprehensive survey
the picture: of the field. For a collection of contemporary position
papers in this paradigm, see the special issue of Mind
In the further course of psycho-analytic work, how­
and Language on "Approaches to Consciousness and
ever, these distinctions (i.e., conscious, preconscious,
Intention" (Spring 1990).
and unconscious) have proved to be inadequate, and
for practical purposes, insufficient. This has been 4 1 . Searle also has an explanation to offer regarding the
clear in more ways than one; but the decisive in­ motivations underlying the sort of separationist view
stance is as follows. We have formed the idea that in that Fodor promotes with respect to consciousness and
each individual there is a coherent organization of intentionality:
mental processes; and we call this ego. (Freud 1962, There has been in recent decades a fairly systematic
p. 7) effort to separate consciousness from intentionality.
Later Freud (1964) gives a schematic depiction of the The connection between the two is being gradually
structure of consciousness, with the id, the ego, and the lost, not only in cognitive science, but in linguistics
superego being "superimposed" on the classical tri- and philosophy as well. I think the underlying-and
perhaps unconscious-motivation for this urge to
Giiven Giizeldere 56

separate intentionality from consciousness is that we And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer
do not know how to explain consciousness, and we that it is seen by an eye.
would like to get a theory of the mind that will not 5.6331 For the form of the visual field is surely not
be discredited by the fact that it lacks a theory of like this:
consciousness. (Searle 1 992, p. 1 53)

Perhaps a piece of careful Freudian psychoanalysis

would resolve this issue for good. Lacking such ex­
pertise, I choose to leave the question open.
42. Panpsychism is a deep-rooted idea that can prob­
ably be traced, in one form or another, back to Thales
EYO-O
and other ancient Greek philosophers. Nagel (1 988)
presents a contemporary discussion of panpsychism,
characterizing it as the view that "the basic physical (Wittgenstein 1 974, p. 57)

constituents of the universe have mental properties,

Keith Gunderson (1 970) also discusses this issue under
whether or not they are parts of living organisms"
the title, "The Investigational Asymmetries Problem"
(p. 1 8 1). Panpsychism was quite popular as a metaphy­
and makes the similar point that "just as the eye does
sical doctrine among the psychologists (in particular,
not, cannot, see itself in its own visual field, so too, the
the psychophysicists) of the nineteenth century, includ­
self will never, in its inventory-taking of the world, find
ing such prominent figures as Gustav Fechner and Her­
itself in the world in the manner in which it finds other
mann Lotze. William James, in contrast, was never
people and things" (p. 1 27).
sympathetic to this view; chapter VI of James (1 950a)
Again, the point raised is well taken for consciousness
contains a cogent critique of panpsychism (under the
so far as one's own selfuood is involved in it, but it is not
title "Mind-Stuff Theory"). For recent discussions of
obvious just how it generalizes into a difficulty (much
panpsychism in the context of ongoing consciousness
less an impossibility) with the study of consciousness in
debates, see Seager (1 995) and Hut and Shepard (1 996).
general by (other) conscious beings.
43. The origins of the term raw feels goes back, so far
45. This observation is intended to be ontologically
as I can trace, to the work of behaviorist psychologist
neutral. The emphasis here is on the "mode of access"
Edward Tolman. In outlining what falls outside the
part and not on the "facts" themselves. In particular, it
scope of "scientific psychology," Tolman (1 967) char­
does not entail the existence of a special class of facts,
acterizes raw feels (from his opponents' perspective)
"first-person facts," on the basis of an assumption of
as follows: "Sensations, says the orthodox mentalist,
ontological difference between facts of one's own con­
are more than discrirninanda-expectations, whether
sciousness and those of others.
indicated by verbal introspection or by discrimination­
46. Of course, technically speaking, it is not possible
box experiments. They are in addition immediate
to digest food in someone else's stomach either, but
mental givens, 'raw feels'. They are unique subjective
"digestive epistemology" just does not seem to be a
suffusions in the mind" (Tolman 1967, pp. 250-25 1).
fashionable topic these days.
But it is probably Herbert Feigl (1 967) who is responsi­
ble for the introduction and wide acceptance of rawfeels 47. Perhaps the most succinct expression of this dif­
in the philosophical terminology. ference is given in Sydney Shoemaker's question: "If
what I want when I drink fine wine is information about
44. In a short passage in the Trae/a/us, Wittgenstein
its chemical properties, why don't I just read the label?"
makes a similar point regarding the self (or subject­
(quoted in Dennett 1 99 1 , p. 383). There is a ready­
hood):
made answer to this question: It indeed is information
5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject about the chemical properties of the wine that a con­
to be found? noisseur is interested in, but only if that information can
You will say that this is exactly like the case of the be accessed in a certain sensory modality-gustatorily,
eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the not visually. Put in Fregean (1 892) terms, reading the
eye. label and sipping the wine would provide access to the
Approaching Consciousness 57

same referent via different "modes of presentation." sciousness, continental Europe was certainly more of a
Note, however, that Shoemaker's question remains not center than James's Cambridge. See , for instance,
fully addressed until this answer is supplemented by a Brentano's chapter, "On the Unity of Consciousness, " in
satisfactory account of something akin to modes of hisPsychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Brentano
presentation regarding qualia. 1 874), a work that slightly precedes James'sPrinciples
48. Of course, not all publicly observable properties of of Psychology ( l 890). A more detailed analysis of this
an experience are intrinsic. There are often a great many sort was later given by Husserl. See, among others, his
extrinsic properties that detennine what the experience Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology
is about that are equally accessible to the experiencer ( 1 9 1 3) and The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Con­

and the observer. Some think that all important prop­ sciousness (I 928}. A more recent attempt along these
erties of experiences, including those that detennine an lines, which comes from the analytic tradition, can be

experience's phenomenal character, are extrinsic. See found in Searle (1 992, chap. 6).

Dretske (1995). 5 1 . The idea of finding systematical bridging relations

49. There is a spectrum of positions with respect to between the "mental" and the "physical" in order to
these dichotomies that yield deep differences in the establish explanatory hooks on consciousness was also
metaphysics of consciousness. Let me mention a few the driving factor behind the emergence of psychophy­
exemplary positions. Nagel (1 979, 1986) takes the dis­ sics as a research program in the nineteenth century.

tinction between subjective and objective points of view This is exemplified in, for instance, Gustav Fechner's

as fundamental to important philosophical problems, work where he sought ways offormalizing a logarithmic
such as personal identity, free will, and the mind-body relation between the intensity of physical stimuli (mea­
problem. Velmans (1991) posits that first-person and sured in "physical units"), and the magnitude of felt
third-person accounts of consciousness are comple­ sensory experience (measured in "psychological units")
mentary, but not reducible, to one another. In contrast, as reported by the subject. (Cf. Fechner 1966, see also

Dretske (1 995) argues that as a "result of thinking about Boring 1 942 and Hilgard 1 987, chap. 4.) The same idea

the mind in naturalistic terms, subjectivity becomes was also operative in Gestalt psychology in the hy­

part of the objective order. For materialists, this is as it pothesizing of a relation of isomorphism between
should be" (p. 65). This is in accord with an earlier "the structural characteristics of brain processes and

statement by Lashley ( 1 923), who claims that "the sub­ of related phenomenal events" (Kohler 1 97 1 , p. 8 1 ; see

jective and objective descriptions are not descriptions also Kohler 1980 and Boring 1 929, chap. 22).

from two essentially different points of view, or de­ 52. John Searle presents a major attack on behaviorist
scriptions of two different aspects, but simply descrip­ theories of consciousness in his Rediscovery of the Mind,
tions of the same thing with different degrees of arguing for what he dubs "the principle of the in­
accuracy and detail" (p. 338). Papineau (1 993) argues dependence of consciousness and behavior." His thesis
that it is a mistake to think that first-person and third­ is that "the capacity of the brain to cause consciousness
person thoughts refer to different entities on the basis of is conceptually distinct from its capacity to cause motor
an epistemic difference, and calls it the "antipathetic behavior." One consequence he draws from this thesis is
fallacy." Finally, Perry (1 979, 1 993) examines the status that "a system could have consciousness without be­
of the first-person in relation to the role of indexicality havior." Under certain qualifications, I find this view
in mind and language. Also, for two alternative ap­ plausible. However, Searle goes further to claim that
proaches, see Hut and Shepard (1 996) for a prioritiza­ "ontologically speaking, behavior, functional role, and
tion of the first-person over the third-person, and Smith causal relations are irrelevant to the existence of con­
(forthcoming) on how to get to the third-person from scious mental phenomena" (Searle 1992, p. 69; emphasis
the first-person. For a scrutiny of the metaphysical in original). This further and more encompassing claim
foundations of such dichotomies as objectivity versus does not directly follow from the weaker one. More­
subjectivity, see among others Goodman (1 978), Rorty over, it opens up a path the logical conclusion of which
(l 979), Putnam (1981), and Smith ( l996). may turn into "epiphenomenalism": the view that con­

50. For a lucid analysis of James's account of the sciousness plays no causal role itself, though it may be

structure of "fringe consciousness," see Mangan (l 993). the causal effect of other phenomena. I find Searle's
Regarding works on the structure of phenomenal con- second thesis untenable and its consequence very
Giiven Giizeldere 58

undesirable. I will come back to this issue in my dis­ 54. Let me also mention that some philosophers think
cussion of epiphenomenalism and the possibility of that the only legitimate sense of consciousness is phe­
zombies. nomenal consciousness (e.g., Searle 1992, Flanagan
53. There are also scientifically documented cases where 1992), while others believe only in access consciousness
the relation between consciousness and externally ob­ (e.g., Dennett 1991), and still others believe in phenom­
servable behavior breaks down. I briefly discussed the enal consciousness but try to account for it in causal,
phenomenon of "gaining consciousness' while under functional, or representational (i.e. "access-related")
general anesthesia as one example. There are also terms (e.g., Van Gulick 1988, Tye 1 992, Dretske 1995).
several diseases of the nervous system that fall in the 55. Some of these ideas are briefly explored in Gii­
category of demyelinating neuropathies (diseases that zeldere and Aydede (forthcoming).
result from loss of conduction of nerve impulses due to 56. I will discuss absent qualia, an offspring of philo­
the lack of formation of myelin, a fatty substance es­ sophical imagination that was conceived as a result
sential to the insulation of axons in neurons), which re­ of taking the "hard problem" (perhaps too) seriously,
sult in the patient's gradual loss of reflexes and muscular in discussing zombies below. Regarding the explanatory
strength, and hence behavior, while not resulting in gap, here is a surprisingly contemporary expression of
substantial sensory changes (e.g., the Guillain-Barre the problem from the nineteenth-century philosopher­
syndrome). The ultimate state of such a patient involves psychologist Charles Mercier: "The change of con­
very little outward behavior with no loss of conscious­ sciousness never takes place without the change in the
ness, defying the behaviorist dogma. (Cf. Reeves 1 98 1 .) brain; the change in the brain never . . . without the
A moving account of a somewhat related nervous sys­ change in consciousness. But why the two occur to­
tem disorder, encephalitis lethargica (commonly known gether, or what the link is which connects them, we do
as the sleeping sickness) was given in Oliver Sacks's not know, and most authorities believe that we never
popular book, Awakenings. Sacks's description of the shall and can never know" (Mercier 1 888, p. I I).
victims of encephalitis lethargica is worth quoting at Note that the point Mercier is raising is very similar
least for its literary value: to the one expressed by John Tyndall in section I. A
similar but more recent statement, though in a more
Patients who suffered but survived an extremely
determinedly pessimist tone, can be found in a rather
severe somnolent/insomniac attack of [encephalitis
unlikely source. Here is Freud on the "hard problem":
lethargica] often failed to recover their original
aliveness. They would be conscious and aware-yet We know two things concerning what we call our
not fully awake; they would sit motionless and psyche or mental life: firstly, its bodily organ and
speechless all day in their chairs, totally lacking en­ scene of action, the brain (or nervous system), and
ergy, impetus, initiative, motive, appetite, affect or secondly, our acts of consciousness, which are im­
desire; they registered what went on about them with mediate data and cannot be more fully explained by
profound indifference. They neither conveyed nor any kind of description. Everything that lies between
felt the feeling of life; they were as insubstantial as these two terminal points is unknown to us and, so
ghosts, and as passive as zombies: von Economo far as we are aware, there is no direct relation be­
compared them to extinct volcanoes. [However, . . . ] tween them. If it existed, it would at the most afford
one thing, and one alone, was (usually) spared an exact localization of the processes of conscious­
amid the ravages of this otherwise engulfing disease: ness and would give us no help toward under­
the "higher faculties"-intelligence, imagination, standing them. (Freud 1 949, pp. 1 3-14)
judgement, and humour. These were exempted-for
better or worse. Thus these patients, some of whom In contemporary philosophy of mind, Nagel's for­
had been thrust into the remotest or strangest ex­ mulation of this problem has been most influential. The
tremities of human possibility, experienced their difficulties Nagel raises with respect to "bridging the
states with unsparing perspicacity, and retained the explanatory gap" between things physiological and
power to remember, to compare, to dissect, and to things phenomenal are also reflected in Kripke's attack
testify. Their fate, so to speak, was to become unique against identity theory. Even though the latter follows
witnesses to a unique catastrophe. (Sacks 1974, pp. a different path, using tools from philosophy of lan­
9, 12) guage, they arrive at very similar conclusions. (Cf.
Approaching Consciousness 59

Nagel 1974, 1979, 1986, and Kripke 1980.) The follow­ 59. Searle says: "For any artefact that we might build
ing quotation eloquently summarizes Nagel's (and pre­ which had mental states equivalent to human mental
sumably, Kripke's) position: states, the implementation of a computer program
would not by itself be sufficient. Rather, the artefact
We cannot directly see a necessary connection, if
would have to have powers equivalent to the powers of
there is one, between phenomenological pain and a
the human brain" (Searle 1 984, p. 41).
physiologically described brain state any more than
Searle's argument is against functionalist accounts of
we can directly see the necessary connection between
consciousness. Even though he should not be taken to
increase in temperature and pressure of a gas at a
commit himself to a single specific underlying substance
constant volume. In the latter case the necessity of
(i.e., neuronal structures), he nonetheless seems to think
the connection becomes clear only when we descend
that consciousness is not medium-independent, at least
to the level of molecular description: till then it ap­
so far as the causal powers of the medium go. This view
pears as a contingent correlation. In the psycho­
seems to be based on the implicit assumption that there
physical case we have no idea whether there is such a
are causal powers that cannot be captured by functional
deeper level or what it could be; but even if there is,
organization, but it unfortunately leaves the central no­
the possibility that pain might be necessarily con­
tion of causal power unexplicated.
nected with a brain state at this deeper level does not
60. Here is a noteworthy historical fact: Over a hundred
permit us to conclude that pain might be directly
years before Crick and Koch presented their findings on
analyzable in physical or even topic-neutral terms.
the 40-70 Hz phenomena, in 1 879, Payton Spence pub­
(Nagel 1986, pp. 48-49)
lished an essay in which he argued, on purely metaphy­
57. Searle's position is not as straightforward as sical grounds, that the basic form of consciousness
Nagel's, however. Although Searle talks about sub­ consists of a constant alteration of conscious and un­
jectivity as an irreducible ontological property unique to conscious states. But the alteration is so rapid that the
consciousness, he also maintains the following position, subject never becomes aware of the discrete nature of
in a somewhat puzzling way, in the same book: "Con­ her consciousness; she is under the illusion of having
sciousness is, thus, a biological feature of certain or­ a continuous stream. Spence then speculated that
ganisms, in exactly the same sense of 'biological' in there must be an underlying mechanism in the brain
which photosynthesis, mitosis, digestion, and repro­ that is responsiole for this alteration-something like
duction are biological features of organisms . . . . One of a very rapid oscillation of neural tissue. In his own
the main aims of this book is to try to remove that words:
obstacle, to bring consciousness back into the subject
The simplest form of consciousness, or mental life,
matter of science as a biological phenomenon like any
must consist in an alteration of a state of conscious­
other" (Searle 1992, pp. 93, 95; emphasis added).
ness with a state of unconsciousness-a regular
58. As Wittgenstein somewhat sarcastically remarks:
rhythmical revelation of the Affi rmation, con­
The feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between con­ sciousness, by its Negation, unconsciousness, and
sciousness and brain-process: how does it come vice versa. . . . Perhaps it would be safer, for the
about that this does not come into the consid­ present, to call it a pulsation, or an undulation in the
erations of our ordinary life? This idea of a differ­ brain, or a vibration of the molecules of the brain,
ence in kind is accompanied by slight giddiness. . . . paralleled in consciousness. This pulsation or vi­
When does this feeling occur in the present case? It is bration is, of course, very rapid; otherwise, we
when I, for example, tum my attention in a particu­ would not have to infer its existence, but would
lar way on to my own consciousness, and, aston­ know it by perceiving the alterations of one state
ished, say to myself: TInS is supposed to be produced with another. (Spence 1 879, p. 345)
by a process in the brain!-as it were clutching my
The interesting part comes when M. M. Garver, a
forehead. But what can it mean to speak of "turning
neurophysiologist of the same era, finds the idea plau­
my attention on to my own consciousness"? This is
sible and follows up on it on experimental grounds. In
surely the queerest thing there could be! (Wittgen­
particular, he investigates the neural basis of voluntary
stein 1958, §4 1 2, p. l 24e)
action (often associated with or regarded as an aspect of
Guven Giizeldere 60

consciousness in those times, by psychologists including of blindsight against the background of Block's access
William James) and publishes his results in the Ameri­ versus phenomenal consciousness distinction in Gii­
can Journal of Science in 1 880. According to Garver, zeldere (1 995e).
mental activity is subserved by a cerebral oscillatory 63. The precursors to Dennett's Cartesian Theater
mechanism with a frequency range of 36-60 Hz. Garver metaphor can be found in the writings of Gilbert Ryle
hypothesizes that the change in the frequency of the and U. T. Place. Ryle ( 1 949) characterized and criti­
neural oscillations correlates with minimum and max­ cized the Cartesian notion of the mind as "a secondary
imum levels of mentation, which results in voluntary theater in which the episodes enacted enjoy the sup­
action. Garver formulates his hypothesis as follows: posed status of 'the mental' " (p. 1 58). Similarly, Place
"The cerebral portion of the nervous system is con­ ( 1 956) called it a mistake to suppose that "when the
tinually varying in its activity, waxing and waning subject describes his experience, when he describes how
between certain limits, periods of maximum activity things look, sound, smell, taste, or feel to him, he is de­
following periods of minimum activity at the rate of 36 scribing the literal properties of objects and events on a
to 60 times per second" (Garver 1 880, p. 1 90). peculiar sort of internal cinema or television screen,
At the end of his article, Garver claims that this usually referred to in the modem psychological liter­
pattern can be extended to accommodate Spence's ature as the 'phenomenal field' " (p. 1 07). (The view that
hypothesis of alternating states of consciousness and Ryle and Place criticize also constitutes a particular
suggests that the lower and upper limits of the oscil­ family of sense-data theories of perception that were
lation frequency can be taken as the correlates of con­ quite popular at the time.)
sciousness and unconsciousness, respectively. Interestingly, while the metaphor of mind as an inner
While Spence and Garver cannot perhaps be said to theater never occurs explicitly in the writings of Des­
be in pursuit of a solution to the binding problem, and cartes (so far as I could tell), it can be found in a vivid
thus have anticipated the Crick and Koch hypothesis passage in Hume (in his discussion of personal identity):
over a hundred years ahead of its time, I find the sim­ "The mind is a kind of theatre, where several percep­
ilarity in the basic idea of seeking a neural oscillatory tions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass,
basis for consciousness fascinating. Except a passing glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures
remark by William James in his discussion of the con­ and situations." But Hume is also careful not to en­
tinuity of consciousness (James 1950, p. 220, footnote), dorse, in virtue of using this metaphor, the kind of on­
Spence and Garver's work seems to have gone, so far as tological conclusion Descartes is criticized as holding:
I could trace, unnoticed to date. "The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us.
6 1 . The idea of localized functions in the brain precedes They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute
James's work, and goes back at least to the once-too­ the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the
popular phrenology of Franz Gall in early 1 800s (see, place, where these scenes are represented, or of the
for instance, Ackerknecht and Vallois 1 956). Jean Bap­ materials, of which it is compos'd." (Hume 1955, Book
tiste Bouillaud, in 1 825, proposed a hemispheric asym­ I, IV:V, 85).
metry in brain function, but it was Carl Wernicke and 64. Another issue related to the Where question has to
Paul Broca who made the greatest contribution to the do with lateralization of brain function in light of the
idea of modularity in the brain. Wernicke hypothesized "split-brain" research of the last few decades. The per­
that two particular areas in the left hemisphere of the formance of commissurotomy on humans (proposed
brain (roughly, the left frontal lobe and the posterior and initiated by surgeon Joseph Bogen in 1 960) to con­
cortex), which later became known as Broca's and trol interhemispheric spread of epilepsy produced a
Wernicke's areas, were responsible for language pro­ number of patients in whom individual investigation
duction and language understanding, respectively. For of specialized hemispheric capabilities became possible.
an elemental neuropsychological account of aphasias The research on such patients (initially pursued by psy­
that result from damage to these areas and other related chobiologist Roger Sperry and his collaborators) re­
matters, see Kolb and Whishaw (1 990). vealed a number of interesting facts about hemispheric
62. For a comprehensive survey of similar neuro­ specialization and resulted in a sizeable scientific liter­
psychological disorders, see Farah ( 1995). I discuss ature, as well as a huge corpus of popular psychology
some philosophical issues involved in the phenomenon writing on the so-called left-brain versus right-brain
Approaching Consciousness 61

distinction with regard to personality types, social be­ statement (largely in agreement with Herbert Spencer
havior, and so on. One of the major results that came 1891, 1 898) in support of the causal construal and the
out of the commissurotomy research is the hypothesis evolutionary relevance of consciousness:
proposed and defended by (among others) Michael
It is a well-known fact that pleasures are generally
Gazzaniga (1993), that human cognition as well as
associated with beneficial, pains with detrimental ex­
consciousness (in the sense of awareness of experience)
periences. . . . These coincidences are due, not to any
are subserved by special brain circuitry normally lo­
pre-established harmony, but to the mere action of
cated in the left hemisphere. For an account of the early
natural selection which would certainly kill off in the
work on commissurotomy, see Gazzaniga (1970). Galin
long-run any breed of creatures to whom the funda­
(1974) explores the implications of hemispheric special­
mentally noxious experience seemed enjoyable. An
ization for psychiatry. For a comprehensive collection
animal that should take pleasure in a feeling of suf­
of current research results in human neuropsychology,
focation would, if that pleasure were efficacious
including articles on modularity of mental function and
enough to make him immerse his head in water, en­
hemispheric specialization, see Gazzaniga et al. (1 995).
joy a longevity of four or five minutes. But if the
65. It is interesting to note that this is a junction at pleasures and pains have no efficacy, one does not
which some upholders of the "pro-qualia intuition"
see why the most noxious acts, such as burning,
meet on common ground with the most indoctrinated
might not give thrills of delight, and the most neces-
qualia skeptics, such as the behaviorist psychologists for
sary ones, such as breathing, cause agony . . . . The
whom exorcising qualia out of the scope of psychology conclusion that [consciousness) is useful is . . . quite
was a primary goal. Notice, for instance, the similarity justifiable. But, if it is useful, it must be so through
between Jackson's ( 1982) position (who characterizes its causal efficaciousness.
himself as a "qualia freak," p. 1 27), and the position
defended by Edward Tolman: "[Regarding visual per­ James's conclusion is that "the study a posteriori of
ception in others) we never learn whether it 'feels' like the distribution of consciousness shows it to be exactly
our 'red' or our 'green' or our 'gray', or whether, indeed, such as we might expect in an organ added for the sake
its 'feel' is perhaps sui generis and unlike any of our of steering a nervous system grown too complex to reg­
own . . . . Whether your 'raw feels' are or are not like ulate itself" (pp. 1 4 1 , 143-144).
mine, you and I shall never discover. Your color 'feels' 67. See also Kitcher (1979) and Revonsuo (1 994) for
may be the exact complementaries of mine, but, if related points.
so, neither of us will ever find it out, provided only 68. Precursors to Nagel's thinking on this issue can
that your discriminations and my discriminations
be found in the writings of B. A. Farrell and Timothy
agree . . . . If there be 'raw feels' correlated with such Sprigge. Even though it was made famous by Nagel, the
discriminanda-expectations, these 'raw feels' are by very original formulation of the question "what is it like to be
definition 'private' and not capable of scientific treat­ a bat?" goes back to Farrell's somewhat neglected essay,
ment. And we may leave the question as to whether they "Experience" (1950). In discussing the issue of experi­
exist and what to do about them, if they do exist, to ential knowledge, Farrell imagines a Martian visitor
;
othe disciplines than psychology-for example, to about whose sensory capacities we obtain all the in­
logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. And whatever the formation there is. According to Farrell, "We would
answers of these other disciplines, we, as mere psychol­ probably still want to say: 'I wonder what it would be
ogists, need not be concerned" (Tolman 1967, pp. 252- like to be a Martian.' " He continues: "There is some­
253). thing more to be learned about the Martian, and that is
Whether this surprising "meeting of minds" between what his experience is like." Farrell then extends the
such arch-opponents as behaviorist psychologists and a question to babies and mice, as well as an opium
certain brand of qualia defenders on presumably the smoker, and finally a bat: "I wonder what it would be
very point of contention between them speaks in favor like to be, and hear like, a bat" (pp. 34-35).
of the former or the latter party (if either), I leave open The lessons Farrell draws out of his ruminations are
to the judgment of the reader. quite the opposite of Nagel's conclusions, however. It is
66. William James (I 950a), who characterizes con­ rather Sprigge (1971) who makes the connection be­
sciousness as a "fighter for ends," makes the following tween the "what it is like" aspect of experience and
Guven Giizeldere 62

physicalism's difficulty with accommodating it in the of Nitrogen; it is a gas readily soluble in water, and
particular way Nagel problematizes the issue: "When possessed of a pungent and characteristic smell." If
one imagines another's conscious state, there is no con­ the mechanistic theory be true the archangel could
clusive way of checking up whether one has done so deduce from his knowledge of the microscopic
correctly or not. . . . Presuming that the object (that is, at structure of atoms all these facts but the last. He
least normally, the organism) with which one is con­ would know exactly what the microscopic structure
cerned, is indeed conscious, then being that organism of ammonia must be; but he would be totally unable
will have a certain definite complex quality at every to predict that a substance with this structure must
waking moment. . . . Physical science makes no refer­ smell as ammonia does when it gets into the human
ence to qualities of this kind. Thus consciousness is that nose. The utmost that he could predict on this
which one characterises when one tries to answer the subject would be that certain changes would take
question what it is or might be like to be a certain object place in the mucous membrane, the olfactory nerves
in a certain situation" (p. 1 68). and so on. But he could not possibly know that these
69. Lycan (1 997b) also makes a similar point: "The changes would be accompanied by the appearance
phrase 'what it's like' is more sinning than sinned of a smell in general or of the peculiar smell of am­
against; nothing whatever is clarified or explained by monia in particular, unless someone told him so or
reference to it, and it itself is not only badly in need of he had smelled it for himself. (Broad 1 962, p. 71)

explanation, in general, but at least three-ways ambig­

Similarly, an early formulation of the knowledge ar­
uous in particular" (p. 1 76).
gument, as well as an antecedent of the Nemirow-Lewis
70. See Nagel (1 974, 1979, 1 986) for a full range of critique, appears in Feigl's discussion of "cognitive roles
problems that involve SUbjectivity. See Lycan (1 990), of acquaintance." Feigl asks: "What is it that the blind
Biro (1991), Akins (1 993), and Dretske (1 995), man cannot know concerning color qualities?" and
among others, for deflationary responses. See also proposes the following answer:
Nagel (1983) for a discussion of how subjectivity figures
in the problem of self, without ever touching on qualia, If we assume complete physical predictability of hu­
and Perry (forthcoming) for a penetrating analysis and man behavior, i.e., as much predictability as the best
critique of Nagel's account. developed physical science of the future could con­
ceivably provide, then it is clear that the blind man
7 1 . For Jackson's formulation, see Jackson (1982,
1 986). For various critiques, see Nemirow (1 980),
or the Martian would lack only acquaintance and
knowledge by acquaintance in certain areas of the
Churchland (1 989), Lewis (1 990), Dennett (199 1 , chap.
realm of qualia. Lacking acquaintance means not
10), Van Gulick (1 993), Loar ( 1 990), Harman (1 993b),
having those experiential qualia; and the consequent
Dretske (1 995, chap. 3), and Perry ( 1 995). For a related
lack of knowledge by acquaintance simply amounts
empirical study on the conceptual representation of
to being unable to label the qualia with terms used
colors in the blind and the color-blind, see Shepard and
previously by the subject (or by some other subject)
Cooper (1 992).
when confronted with their occurrence in direct ex­
One of the earlier formulations of the knowledge
perience. Now, mere having or living through is not
argument can be found in C. D. Broad's thought ex­
periment about the archangel who knows all about
knowledge in any sense. "Knowledge by acquaint­
ance," however, as we understand it here, is propo­
chemistry but lacks the sense of smell. Broad sets up the
sitional, it does make truth claims.
problem as follows:
Feigi then goes on to suggest, anticipating many of
Would there be any theoretical limit to the de­
the present-day critiques of the knowledge argument,
duction of the properties of chemical elements and
that the blind person (or Jackson's fictional color scien­
compounds if a mechanistic theory of chemistry
tist, Mary) does not lack any knowledge per se; all he or
were true? Yes. Take any ordinary statement, such
she lacks is a particular mode of knowing the same facts
as we find in chemistry books; e.g., "Nitrogen and
Hydrogen combine when an electric discharge is
as do normally sighted people: "What one person has
and knows by acquaintance may be identical with what
passed through a mixture of the two. The resulting
someone else knows by description. The color experi-
compound contains three atoms of Hydrogen to one
Approaching Consciousness 63

ences of the man who can see are known to him by supervenient properties ontologically distinct (auton­
acquaintance, but the blind man can have inferential omously emergent) from physical properties, for in­
knowledge, or knowledge by description about those stance? Or (otherwise) does supervenience boil down
same experiences" (Feigl I967, p. 68). A related puzzle, to old-fashioned identity? How are we to explain the
based again on a thought-experiment, was posed as a nature of the supervenience relation itself? Given the
"jocose problem" to John Locke by William Molyneux, wide variety of possible supervenience relations (for ex­
an amateur philosopher, in a letter dated 1 693: "Sup­ ample, weak versus strong, local versus global), there is
pose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his a vast and technically complicated literature in this area,
touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the but there exist no clear-cut received views that are taken
same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, to unanimously answer all these questions. For a sys­
when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which tematic and thorough exploration of the supervenience
the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on thesis in all its different characterizations, see Jaegwon
a table, and the blind man be made to see: quaere, Kim's essays collected in Kim (1993). Two other useful
whether by his sight. before he touched them, he could collections that contain representatives of contem­
now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the porary theorizing on supervenience are Beckerrnann,
cube?" (Quoted in Locke (1959), Book II, Chapter IX, Flohr, and Kim (1992), and Savellos and Yal�m (1995).
pp. 186-1 87.) As such, Molyneux's question transfonns See also Mclaughlin ( 1989) for a discussion that relates
the inquiry of whether non-experientiaI facts can yield supervenience to the question of epiphenomenalism,
knowledge of experiential facts (in the knowledge argu­ and McLaughlin (1 992) for a thorough exposition of the
ment) into a puzzle about intersensory translation­ thought of British emergentists in which one can find
whether tactile facts can yield knowledge of visual facts numerous clues for the present supervenience debates.
("facts" taken broadly). Locke's negative answer to this In addition to philosophy of mind, notions of super­
question was in agreement with Molyneux's opinion. venience, emergence, and different kinds of reduction
But others disagreed, and Molyneux's question became have been central to discussions in philosophy of biol­
one of the central topics of contention among such phi­ ogy, particularly during the first half of this century. See
losophers as Berkeley, Leibniz, Reid, Diderot, and Brandon ( 1996) for an exposition of these issues that
Voltaire, in the greater context of the controversies over also ties them to debates in contemporary biology, and
innateness and abstract ideas. See Morgan (1977) and Harris ( 1 993) for an exploration of the relations be­
Sanford (1983) for further exposition and discussion of tween the natures and the study of mind and life in phi­
the related issues. losophy, psychology, and biology.
72. For a classical treatment of the identity theory, see 73. It is interesting to note, by the way, that the word
Sellars (1964). For recent arguments in its defense, see consciousness was hardly ever present in the philosoph­
En� (1983) and Hill (1991). A thus far unmentioned but ical literature around the time of functionalism, which
related concept that has played a significant role in the was instead brewing with the tenn qualia and, to a lesser
philosophy of mind over the past few decades is super­ extent, tenns like raw feels and phenomenal aspect of
venience (presumably imported from Rom Hare's work consciousness. In the 19905, in contrast, many of the
in ethics [1952] by Donald Davidson 1 970). The thesis same old problems have gained new interest and im­
that the mental supervenes on the physical is put forth as petus (perhaps from slightly but essentially similar
a better materialist solution to the mind-body problem perspectives) within a terminology populated with the
than the identity thesis. The supervenience thesis is magic word consciousness and its derivatives. The rea­
roughly that the mental character of a state or event is sons for this terminological change probably lie partIy
wholly determined by its physical profile, such that there outside philosophy, for example in the wide acceptance
cannot be a change in the fonner without a change in of the tenn consciousness into other fields with which
the latter. Put differently, sameness in the (subvening) philosophy interacts.
physical properties is hypothesized to guarantee same­ 74. There is a sizeable literature regarding the absent
ness in the (supervening) mental properties. qualia argument. Some of the most influential thought
But the status of the supervenience thesis vis-a-vis experiments that support the possibility of absent qualia
the mind-body problem, especially with regard to are due to Block (1978, 1980b) and Block and Fodor
phenomenal consciousness, remains controversial. Are (1980). See Shepard (1993) for a recent discussion in the
Giiven Giizeldere 64

context of color vision and evolutionary theory. Shoe­ all these particles brought together into one system, so
maker (1975, 198 1 a) presents an eloquent defense of as to touch one another; will they thereby, or by any
functionalism against the absent qualia arguments. See motion or composition whatsoever, become any whit
also Dretske (1995) who raises the possibility of absent less truly distinct Beings, than they were at the greatest
qualia in an extemalist context in relation to Donald distance? How then can their being disposed in any
Davidson's (1987) "swampman" argument, and Tye possible system, make them one individual conscious
(1995) for a representationalist critique of absent qualia. being?" (Clarke 1 707, p. 82)
For further discussion, see Lycan (1981), Levin (1985), 75. The origins of this problem go back indeed to
Graham and Stephens ( 1985), White ( 1986), Fox (1989), a puzzle about visual experience, described by John
Levine (1989), Horgan ( 1987), and Hardcastle (1996). Locke a few centuries ago:
One of the most commonly cited absent qualia argu­
ments is based on Block's ( 1978) "Chinese Nation" Neither would it carry any imputation of falsehood
scenario, designed to "embarrass all versions of func­ to our simple ideas, if by the different structure of
tionalism" by showing that functionalism is guilty of our organs it were so ordered, that the same object
"classifying systems that lack mentality as having men­ should produce in several men's minds different ideas
tality" (p. 275). Block asks us to imagine the functional at the same time; e.g. if the idea that a violet pro­
simulation of a human brain by the Chinese nation by duced in one man's mind by his eyes were the same
connecting each of the billion inhabitants of China in that a marigold produced in another man's, and vice
appropriate ways through radio links, and having them versa. For, since this could never be known, because
communicate from a distance like neurons in a brain one man's mind could not pass into another man's
and thereby animate an artificial body for a certain pe­ body, to perceive what appearances were produced
riod of time. According to Block, while this China-body by those organs: neither the ideas hereby, nor the
system is "nomologically possible" and "it could be names, would be at all confounded, or any falsehood
functionally equivalent to [a human being] for a short be in either. For all things that had the texture of a
time," it is doubtful "whether it has any mental states at violet, producing constantly the idea that he called
all-especially whether it has . . . 'qualitative states', blue, and those which had the texture of a marigold,
'raw feels', or 'immediate phenomenological qualities' " producing constantly the idea which he constantly
(pp. 276-278). Block's point is to establish the short­ called yellow, whatever those appearances were in
comings of functional characterizl!tions of qualia, by his mind; he would be able as regularly to distin­
appealing to intuitions that he takes as common sens­ guish things for his use by those appearances, and
ical, such as the intuition that such "distributed minds" understand and signify those distinctions marked by
are absurd. the name blue and yellow, as if the appearances or
A similar intuition was commonly employed in dis­ ideas in his mind received from those two flowers
cussions regarding the unity of mind versus the divisi­ were exactly the same with the ideas in other men's
bility of matter with the aim of embarrassing all forms minds (Locke 1959, bk. II, chap. 32, §15, p. 520).
of materialism in early modem philosophy. For exam­
There are also several positions with respect to the
ple, the eighteenth century English theologian Samuel
inverted spectrum argument. Here is a simple set: Block
Clarke appeals to the absurdity of the distributed-minds
(1978) and Block and Fodor (1980) raise the possibility
intuition in a piece of hypothetical reasoning, similar to
of inverted spectrum against functionalism, and Block
Block's, to make a case for the "immateriality and nat­
(1990) presents an original twist on the same problem as
ural immortality of the soul" as follows: "That the soul
a reply to Harman (1990), who argues against inverted
cannot possibly be material is moreover demonstrable
spectrum on extemalist grounds. Shoemaker (1975,
from the single consideration even of bare sense and
1 98 1 b, 1991) is more lenient toward accepting the pos­
consciousness itself. For suppose three, or three hun­
sibility of inverted spectrum compared to his rejection
dred, particles of matter, at a mile, or at any given dis­
of the possibility of absent qualia, but he presents an
tance, one from another; is it possible that all those
argument on how to accommodate qualia inversion
separate parts should in that state be one individual
within a broadly functionalist framework. However,
conscious being?" But Clarke then takes his argument a
see also Levine ( 1988), who argues that absent qualia
step further to apply it to human beings: "Suppose then
and inverted spectrum stand or fall together as logical
Approaching Consciousness 65

possibilities against functionalism. Dretske (1995) re­ cause the essence of pains, the reasoning goes, is not at­
gards inverted spectrum as a problem for functionalism tributable (by a third party) but rather accessible in a
but not for representationalism (and hence, not for privileged way (through the first-person perspective).
materialism in general). Tye (1995) argues for the There is something it is like to have pains, but there is
conclusion that is somewhat similar to Shoemaker's: nothing it is like to believe that there is no greatest prime
spectrum inversion is possible in narrow functional number (or even that one is in pain). It is this difference
duplicates, but this does not constitute a problem for that warrants epiphenomenalism, in the present liter­
wide functionalism (that Tye defends). ature, as a possibility with respect to pains, but not be­
76. A similarly externalist theory is put forth by Gilbert liefs (about prime numbers, one's pains, or anything
Harman (1990) where qualia are identified with inten­ else).
tional properties, as well as by Michael Tye (1995). Accordingly, under the stipulation of appropriate
David Armstrong had earlier suggested identifying environmental and historical conditions, it is generally
qualia (what he called "secondary qualities") with regarded as a possibility that a physical replica of a hu­
properties of physical objects in his discussion of "Re­ man being can lack all qualia, while not lacking beliefs
alist Reductionism" (Armstrong 1 993, chap. 12, 270- or judgments (or other such intentional states). This is
290). Clues for these positions can be found in Elizabeth the possibility of the modem zombie that has center
Anscombe's discussion of the intentional nature of sen­ stage in debates about phenomenal consciousness. Ned
sations (Anscombe 1965). Block (1995) calls such replicas phenomenal zombies:
77. Perhaps a caveat about the particular brand of "the familiar . . . robots that think but don't feel"
epiphenomenalism and zombiehood I am referring (p. 234). Or, as David Chalmers (1 996) describes: "My
to is in order here. Epiphenomenalism about phenom­ zombie twin . . . will be psychologically identical to me.
enal consciousness is, of course, different from epi­ He will be perceiving the trees outside, in the functional
phenomenalism about the mind in general. Discussions sense, and tasting the chocolate, in the psychological
about epiphenomenalism earlier this century generally sense [similar to its ordinary twin modulo qualia] . . . . He
assumed the latter kind (see, for instance, Broad 1 962). will be awake, able to report the contents of his internal
In the contemporary literature, however, the focus has states, able to focus attention in various places, and so
somewhat shifted. Probably largely due to the advent of on. It is just tliat none of this functioning will be ac­
functionalist and computational-representational theo­ companied by any real conscious experience. There will
ries of mind in a materialist framework, many today be no phenomenal feel. There is nothing it is like to be a
take intentional states, such as beliefs and judgments, as zombie" (p. 95).
contentful internal structures in the brain (see, for ex­ It is important to notice that zombies, construed as
ample, Fodor 1987). As such, no one thinks that beliefs such, are taken to be in possession of all sorts of beliefs,
qua such physical structures, lack causal properties. Th � thoughts, and judgments that their human twins typi­
cally have, including the self-ascribed ones. As Chalm­
controversy is rather on whether their content (seman­
tics) has a causal role in the explanation of behavior (cf. ers (1993) states: "Zombie Dave's beliefs may not be
Dretske 1988). colored by the usual phenomenological tinges, but it
But the real hot spot of the epiphenomenalism debate seems reasonable to say that they are nevertheless
has to do with phenomenal consciousness-whether beliefs. Beliefs, unlike qualia, seem to be characterized
qualia play any role in the otherwise causally charac­ primarily by the role that they play in the mind's causal
economy." Accordingly, the zombie twin, too, takes
terizable economy of our mental lives. Note, after all,
that while there is a vast literature on the possibility of aspirin because he thinks he has a headache, wants an­
absent qualia, no one seems to be worrying about the esthetics at the dentist chair because he believes the root
canal will hurt, and so on. It is just that all his beliefs and
possibility of "absent beliefs" or "absent judgments."
There seems to be a crucial difference between beliefs judgments about his own qualia are systematically false.
Nothing hurts in him, even ifhe sincerely believes he has
and pains: while it is considered legitimate to attribute
beliefs to someone who behaves in ways that can be ex­ a splitting headache. Accordingly, we should not be
plained by belief-attributions of the relevant sort, it is motivated to put him under anaesthesia when his tooth
is being drilled, despite all his screams, if it is the pain
considered very problematic to so attribute pains, be-
quale that matters.
Giiven Giizeldere 66

Put differently, what distinguishes this kind of a JOUTfUlI of Consciousness Studies (2:4, 1995) for a sym­
zombie from its human twin is the stipulated ever­ posium on zombies based on Moody 1994).
presence of a gap between the "appearance" and "re­ 8 1 . Here is Dennett ( 1979) on describing the phenom­
ality" of the zombie's qualitative states-what qualia enology of one's own experience: "We are all, I take it,
he judges himself to have versus what qualia he really unshakably sure that we are each in a special position to
has-and nothing much else. (Note that something like report, or to know, or to witness or experience a set of
an "appearance-reality" distinction is required in order something-or-others we may call, as neutrally as pos­
to coherently conceptualize the possibility of a zombie.) sible, elements of our own conscious experience. . . .
As such, there is a psychologically significant and ex­ Propositional episodes . . . comprise our streams of
planatorily important sense in which things seem (i.e., consciousness by embodying our semantic intentions of
are judged, thought, believed, expected, noticed, . . . to the moment, by being the standards against which we
be) a certain way to the zombie twin. correct, or would correct, any failures of execution were
Consequently, to the extent that nonqualitative in­ we to utter anything at the time . . . . These are . . . think­
tentional states, (including self-ascribed beliefs about ings that p. . . . I call them judgments. . . . Such judg­
one's own qualitative states) are constitutive of a first­ ments exhaust our immediate consciousness, that our
person perspective (cf. Chisholm 1 98 1 ), the zombie can individual streams of consciousness consist of nothing
be said to have such a perspective (albeit a systemati­ but such propositional episodes. My view, put bluntly,
cally misguided one). A zombie's life is not, after all, is that there is no phenomenological manifold in any
completely devoid of all mental elements. He only lacks such relation to our reports. There are the public reports
an important component of an otherwise intact epis­ we issue, and then there are the episodes of our propo­
temic perspective. After all, it is in virtue of having such sitional awareness, our judgments, and then there is-so
a perspective that receiving anaesthetics at the dentist far as introspection is concemed-darkness" (pp. 93-
chair seems to matter to the zombie twin, even if his 95).
preferences are entirely on the basis of false self-ascribed This quotation probably represents a position at a
beliefs (about his own non-existent pain qualia). It is this far end of the spectrum of views on the nature of inner
characterization of zombiehood that is typically in­ experience. There are, of course, many midway views
voked in contemporary debates, and I will confine my between the positions that occupy the two endpoints.
discussion accordingly throughout the rest of this For instance, one can agree with "friends ofqualia" that
chapter. there is something crucial to theorize about under the
78. Notice that this view, as such, does not deny that we term "phenomenal consciousness" distinct from "epi­
are conscious. It comes close, however, in positing that sodes of propositional awareness and judgments," but
our being conscious, in itself, makes no difference­ maintain that the way they choose to theorize about it is
hence the path to zombiehood. misguided.

79. James (1 879) is a vigorous response to Huxley. See 82. The disagreement is not only between those who
also Capek (1 954) for a commentary on this exchange. believe in phenomenal consciousness and those who

80. As far as I could trace, the term zombie enters the deny it; it pervades the community of the supporters of

philosophical vocabulary with Kirk ( 1974) in an argu­ this very notion. For instance, Block claims that Searle,

ment against materialism. For other arguments that in an attempt to point to consciousness, confounds too

defend the intuition in favor of the possibility of zom­ many senses of the term. As Block says, "It is important

biehood, see Block (1 978), Block and Fodor (1 980), to point properly. " But who has the omniscient pointer?
Searle ( 1992), and Chalmers (1996). For counterargu­ 83. Jaegwon Kim ( 1 996) makes a similar point with re­
ments, see Lewis ( 1972) and Shoemaker ( 1975), as well spect to mind in general: "Saving mentality while losing
as Kirk ( 1 994). For an expression of philosophical in­ causality doesn't seem to amount to saving anything
tolerance for epiphenomenalism and the possibility of worth saving. For what good is the mind if it has no
zombies, see Dennett ( 1 99 1 , chp. 10). Giizeldere ( 1995d) causal powers?" (p. 237). Or, to transform a point Fred
distinguishes among physiological, functional, and Dretske (1 988) makes with respect to the explanatory
merely behavioral zombies, and briefly examines their role of content into one about phenomenal conscious­
respective underlying metaphysical assumptions. (See ness (with apologies), "if having a mind is having this
Approaching Consciousness 67

kind of qualia (which don't do anything), one may as nothing-zilch-worthy of being called a research pro­
well not have a mind" (p. 80). gram, nor are there any substantive proposals about
However, this position should be distinguished from how to go about starting one. . . . Researchers are
eliminativism about consciousness, defended, for in­ stumped. . . No one has yet come up with a theoretical .
.

stance, by Rey ( 1 988). Rey's suggestion is to do away perspective that uses these data to narrow the explana­
with the largely folk-theoretic notion of consciousness tory gap, even a little bit" (p. 2 1 1).
because it contains Cartesian elements and plays no My ultimate conclusion, expressed in the last para­
useful causal-explanatory role. I am suggesting (and graph of this chapter and hopefully substantiated by the
probably Kim and Dretske would agree), in contrast, exposition presented thus far, differs from both.
that because we do not want to do away with our com­ References to the Introduction appear on pages 807-
mon sense notion of consciousness (or, at least, a sig­ 8 1 6.
nificant part of it), we need to seek to secure a genuine
role for it in the causal web of the world.
84. Put differently, I am essentially in agreement with
David Lewis (1 980) on a point he makes regarding the
status of pain that I take as an objection to the segrega­
tionist intuition: "Only if you believe on independent
grounds that considerations of causal role and physical
realization have no bearing on whether a state is pain
should you say that they have no bearing on how a state
feels" (p. 222). Along these lines, see Humphrey (1 992);
see also Hardin (1987, 1988) for an important attempt
to deftate the explanatory gap between the causal and
phenomenal aspects of consciousness in the case of vis­
ual perception and color qualia.
85. The Fodor quote is from Fodor 1987, p. 1 56. Fodor
holds a much more pessimistic opinion regarding the
prospects for a theory of consciousness in comparison to
a theory of rationality, however. Regarding rationality,
he thinks that "certain residual technical difficulties"
notwithstanding, "we are (maybe) on the verge of solv­
ing a great mystery about the mind: How is rationality
mechanically possible?" (Fodor 1987, pp. 1 56, 21). Re­
garding consciousness, here is what he says: "Nobody
has the slightest idea how anything material could be
conscious. Nobody even knows what it would be like to
have the slightest idea about how anything material
could be conscious. So much for the philosophy of con­
sciousness" (Fodor 1 992, p. 5).
Perhaps then, one thinks, Fodor should consider
starting to think about consciousness and give those
working in the field a helping hand. But similarly
gloomy sentiments are expressed by Block (1 994), a
prominent figure in the consciousness literature, as well:
"The notable fact is that in the case of thought, we ac­
tually have more than one substantive research pro­
gramme, and their proponents are busy fighting it out,
comparing which research program handles which phe­
nomena best. But in the case of consciousness, we have
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