Makalintal v. Comelec, GR. No.

15013

Facts: Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal filed a petition challenging provisions of Republic Act No. 9189
(Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003), arguing they were unconstitutional. His petition focused on
voter registration for immigrants, COMELEC’s power to proclaim winners, and Congressional oversight
on COMELEC’s rules. The case went directly to the Supreme Court due to constitutional issues.

Issues:

The Court addressed three main questions:

Whether Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 violated the residency requirement for overseas voters.
Whether Section 18.5 infringed on Congress's role in canvassing and proclaiming presidential and vice-
presidential winners.
Whether Congress’s oversight of COMELEC’s rules violated COMELEC’s independence.

Court’s Decision:

Section 5(d) was upheld, affirming that the affidavit did not violate residency requirements.
Section 18.5 was partially struck down, limiting COMELEC’s role in proclaiming winners for national
offices, except for the President and Vice-President, which is Congress’s responsibility.
Sections 19, 25, and parts of Section 17.1 were declared unconstitutional for allowing undue legislative
interference with COMELEC’s rule-making power.

pg. 1
FPJ v. Arroyo, P.E.T. Case No. 002

Eligibility and Rules for Presidential Election Protests:

Rule 14 of the PET Rules allows only the second and third-place presidential candidates to contest the
election results, with protests filed within thirty days of the proclamation. The Tribunal permits the
application of the Rules of Court in the absence of specific PET rules.

Substitution in Election Protests:

Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court allows substitution by a legal representative, but the Tribunal
rules that public office is personal and cannot be inherited. Substitution by a deceased protestant’s
widow or heirs is denied, as they are not considered real parties in interest.

Death of the Protestant:

The protest continues after a protestant’s death if a real party in interest substitutes. Only those directly
impacted by the outcome, such as a vice-mayor in a mayoral protest, can substitute.

Public vs. Personal Interest in Election Protests:

While public interest is considered, intervention is restricted to parties with direct and immediate
interest. Mrs. FPJ, the widow of the protestant, cannot intervene as she has no direct stake in the
outcome.

pg. 2
Legarda v. De Castro (P.E.T. Case No. 003, March 31, 2005)

Facts:
The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) confirmed jurisdiction over Loren B. Legarda's protest against
Noli L. de Castro and denied de Castro's motion to dismiss. The Tribunal ordered measures for the
preservation of election documents. De Castro filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
Tribunal cannot correct manifest errors in election returns or canvass documents, as it involves a
ministerial function.

Issues:

Can the Tribunal re-canvass election returns despite the availability of the ballots?
Can the Tribunal correct manifest errors in the election returns or certificates of canvass?
Does the protest provide sufficient cause of action to contest de Castro's victory?

Ruling:

While ballots are the best evidence for vote counts, the Tribunal did not need to revise the ballots since
both parties agreed on the vote counts and the protest focused on correcting manifest errors in the
election returns.
The Tribunal has jurisdiction to correct manifest errors in the election returns and canvass documents.
The protest sufficiently alleged a cause of action to contest de Castro’s victory in the May 2004 vice-
presidential election.

pg. 3
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal v. P.E.T., G.R. No. 191618

Facts:
Atty. Macalintal filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET), arguing that its creation violates Section 4, Article VII, of the Constitution. He argued that the
PET’s separate budget, personnel, and seal violated constitutional provisions, and that designating
Supreme Court Justices to the PET contravened Section 12, Article VIII, prohibiting judicial appointments
to quasi-judicial bodies.

Issues:

Does the creation of the PET, with its own budget, seal, and personnel, violate Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution?
Does the PET perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions?
Ruling:

No, the PET is not a separate entity from the Supreme Court. While it has functions specific to the
Tribunal, it is still a constitutional body and part of the Supreme Court, akin to the Senate and House
Electoral Tribunals (SET and HRET).
Yes, the PET performs judicial functions. The Constitution explicitly allocates the resolution of electoral
contests to the Supreme Court, making the PET’s power a derivative of judicial authority. The
involvement of Justices in the PET is exempted by the Constitution itself.

pg. 4
Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988

Facts:
Joseph Estrada, elected President in 1998, ran again in the May 2010 elections. Atty. Pormento filed a
petition to disqualify Estrada, arguing he was barred from running for re-election. The COMELEC denied
his petition, and Pormento appealed to the Court. However, Estrada was allowed to run and finished
second in the 2010 election.

Issue:
Is Estrada covered by the constitutional ban on re-election for the President (Article 7, Section 4)?

Ruling:
The petition was dismissed as moot because Estrada did not win the 2010 election. Without a real
controversy, the Court cannot resolve the issue of "reelection." Any discussion on the matter was
deemed speculative since Estrada was not re-elected, making the case non-justiciable.

Disposition:
Petition dismissed.

pg. 5
Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871

Facts:
Lourdes D. Rubrico was abducted by military personnel in April 2007, detained, interrogated, and
coerced to sign a statement. After her release, she faced continued harassment, and her family
members were also targeted. Rubrico filed complaints for kidnapping and abuse, but investigations were
unfruitful. She filed a petition for a Writ of Amparo seeking protection, legal action against the accused,
and damages.
Issues:
Can President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo be held accountable despite presidential immunity from suit?
Are military officials responsible for Rubrico’s abduction and harassment?
Do military officers have direct responsibility for the incident?
Court’s Decision:
Presidential Immunity: The Court upheld the President's immunity from suit, finding no direct violation
of Rubrico's rights by the President.
Dismissal of Case Against Military Officials: The case was dismissed due to lack of evidence linking high-
ranking military and police officials to the abduction. Command responsibility was deemed inapplicable
in amparo proceedings.
Evidence Insufficiency: Petitioners failed to provide substantial evidence to establish the involvement of
the military or police.
Ongoing Investigation: The Court directed continued investigations by the AFP and PNP and required
regular progress updates.
Doctrine:
Presidential Immunity: The President cannot be sued while in office to maintain focus on official duties.
Burden of Proof: Petitioners must provide substantial evidence to meet the standards for an amparo
petition.
Notes:
Writ of Amparo: Protects rights to life, liberty, and security.
Presidential Immunity: Ensures executive efficacy during the President’s term.
Command Responsibility: Applies in criminal cases where a superior can be held liable for their
subordinate’s actions.

pg. 6
Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805

Facts:
In September 2009, Noriel Rodriguez was abducted, tortured, and coerced into signing a false
confession by military personnel from the 17th Infantry Battalion. After his release, he filed a petition for
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data with the Supreme Court, seeking protection and relief. The Court of
Appeals granted the writs but dismissed the case against former President Arroyo due to presidential
immunity.

Issues:

Can interim reliefs be granted post-writ issuance?

Should Arroyo remain a respondent due to presidential immunity?
Does command responsibility apply?
Did the respondents violate Rodriguez's rights?
Court’s Decision:

Interim Reliefs: The Court ruled that once the writ was granted, interim reliefs were no longer
necessary.
Presidential Immunity: Arroyo’s immunity ended after her presidency. The case against her was
dismissed due to insufficient evidence linking her to the abduction.
Command Responsibility: The Court affirmed the doctrine’s applicability in amparo cases, but no direct
evidence tied Arroyo to the abuse.
Rights Violation: The Court held military officials accountable for violating Rodriguez’s rights to life,
liberty, and security.
Doctrine:

Amparo and Habeas Data: These writs protect fundamental rights and require substantial evidence for
relief.
Command Responsibility: Officials can be held responsible for subordinates’ actions if they failed to
prevent or punish violations.

pg. 7
Lozada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 184379

Facts:
Rodolfo Lozada, a consultant in the controversial NBN-ZTE deal, uncovered irregularities and was
subpoenaed by the Senate. Lozada fled to London, but upon his return, he claimed to be abducted by
government agents to prevent his Senate testimony. His family filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and
Writ of Amparo, asserting violations of his rights. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Habeas Corpus
Petition and ruled against the Amparo Petition, finding no substantial evidence of ongoing threats.

Issues:

Was the dismissal of the Writ of Amparo justified due to lack of evidence?
Was denying subpoenaed testimonies improper?
Was it correct to drop Arroyo as a respondent due to immunity?

Court’s Decision:

Presidential Immunity: The Court upheld Arroyo’s immunity during her tenure, but her immunity ended
after her presidency, and no evidence linked her to Lozada’s rights violation.
Relevancy of Testimonies: The Court agreed with the CA that testimonies about unrelated matters were
irrelevant to Lozada’s abduction.
Affidavits: The use of affidavits without cross-examination was acceptable given the circumstances.
Writ of Amparo Denied: The Court found Lozada’s claims lacked substantial evidence, and the situation
was moot, as any restraint on his liberty had ended.

Doctrine:

Writ of Amparo protects against extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, requiring substantial
evidence.
Presidential Immunity is valid during tenure but not after.
Burden of Proof in amparo cases lies with the petitioners to substantiate their claims.

Class Notes:

Amparo relief requires substantial evidence.

Presidential immunity is applicable only during the president's term.
Subpoenaed testimony must be relevant to the case.

pg. 8
Neri v. Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180643

Facts:

Rodolfo Neri, Director General of NEDA, was subpoenaed by the Senate to testify on the controversial
NBN-ZTE deal. He disclosed a bribery attempt but invoked executive privilege when asked about the
President’s involvement in the project. Despite this, the Senate issued a Show Cause Letter and later a
Contempt Order after Neri failed to appear. Neri argued his refusal to answer was protected by
executive privilege.

Issue:

Whether Neri’s refusal to answer the questions was covered by executive privilege, making the Senate’s
arrest order invalid.

Court’s Decision:

The Court ruled that Neri’s refusal was justified under executive privilege, which protects
communications related to presidential powers, particularly in matters of diplomacy. The Senate failed
to show a compelling need for the information, and Neri's claim was valid. Therefore, the arrest order
was nullified.

Held:

The Court granted Neri’s petition, declaring the Senate's arrest order void.

pg. 9
Funa v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 184740

Facts:
Maria Elena Bautista was appointed as Undersecretary of DOTC in 2006 and designated as OIC of
MARINA in 2008. In 2009, she was appointed MARINA Administrator. Dennis Funa, as a taxpayer, filed a
petition arguing that her concurrent positions violated the constitutional prohibition on holding multiple
offices, claiming potential conflicts of interest.

Issue:
Whether Bautista’s designation as OIC of MARINA while serving as DOTC Undersecretary violated the
constitutional prohibition on holding multiple offices.

Court's Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled that Bautista’s designation as OIC was unconstitutional, emphasizing that the
prohibition against holding multiple offices is absolute for Cabinet members. The Court also noted that
temporary designations like OIC are subject to the same prohibition.

Legal Principles:

Cabinet members cannot hold multiple offices unless explicitly allowed by the Constitution.
OIC positions are not ex-officio and are subject to the constitutional prohibition.
Constitutional issues can be resolved even if the specific case is moot if the issue is capable of recurring.

pg. 10
Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658

Facts:

On May 23, 2017, President Duterte declared martial law in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 216,
citing rebellion due to the Maute group's actions in Marawi City. The President submitted a report to
Congress, detailing terrorist activities, including the Maute group's allegiance to ISIS. Despite objections
from the petitioners, who claimed that there was no rebellion, inaccurate reporting, and insufficient
consultation, the Senate upheld the proclamation.

Issue:

Whether the factual basis for Proclamation No. 216 was sufficient.

Ruling:

The petitioners’ motions were denied. The Court ruled that martial law is a matter of urgency, and the
President does not need to fully validate all information before declaring it. The petitioners’ counter-
evidence was based on unverified sources.

pg. 11
Lagman v. Pimentel III, G.R. No. 235935

Facts:

On May 23, 2017, President Duterte declared martial law in Mindanao via Proclamation No. 216 to
address rebellion by the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf. The President submitted a report to Congress
within 48 hours, which led to the Senate and House of Representatives supporting the proclamation.
Three petitions challenging the factual basis of the proclamation were filed, but the Court upheld its
constitutionality. On July 18, 2017, the President requested an extension, and Congress granted it until
December 31, 2017. In December, the President requested another extension, which Congress approved
for 2018. Petitioners challenged the extension, asking the Court to review it under its expanded
jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether a certiorari petition under the Court’s expanded jurisdiction is the proper remedy to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis for Congress’s extension of martial law.

Held:

No, a certiorari petition is not the proper remedy for reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis. The
Court’s review of martial law declarations and extensions is limited to determining the factual basis
under Section 18, Article VII, not via certiorari under Section 1, Article VIII. The Court emphasized that
applying certiorari would undermine its constitutional role in safeguarding against martial law abuse.

pg. 12
IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284

Facts:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President
Ejercito Estrada directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff and Philippine National Police
Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist
the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable
period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void
and unconstitutional. Solicitor General contend that petitioner has no legal standing to assail.

Issue:

Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail constitutionality of calling the AFP to assist PNP to
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion?

Decision:

IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi.
While undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit standing. However, when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. The Court
relaxed the rules on standing and resolved the issue now.

pg. 13
Ampatuan v. Puno, GR No. 190259

Facts:

Following the Maguindanao Massacre on November 23, 2009, President Arroyo declared a state of
emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City through Proclamation 1946. This was
followed by Administrative Orders 273 and 273-A, which transferred the supervision of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to the Department of the Interior
and Local Government (DILG). ARMM officials, the petitioners, argued that this violated the region’s
autonomy under the Constitution and the Expanded ARMM Act (R.A. 9054).

Issues:

Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violated the principle of local autonomy.
Whether President Arroyo improperly exercised emergency powers by calling out the AFP and PNP.
Whether the President had sufficient factual basis for her actions.
Court’s Decision:

The Court ruled that the DILG Secretary did not take over ARMM; the powers were delegated for
supervision, not control. The succession of ARMM leadership followed proper legal processes.
The Court found that the President had the constitutional right to call out the AFP and PNP without
congressional approval and did not unlawfully exercise emergency powers.
The Court upheld the President's actions, deferring to her judgment unless there was clear grave abuse
of discretion. Sufficient evidence of potential violence justified the state of emergency, and petitioners
failed to prove a lack of factual basis.

Doctrine:

The President’s exercise of calling-out powers is subject to judicial review only in cases of grave abuse of
discretion. Delegation of supervisory authority over a local government does not violate autonomy if
proper legal processes are followed.

Historical Background:

The case arose from the Maguindanao Massacre, highlighting tensions between regional autonomy and
the executive’s crisis management powers, reinforcing the President's discretion to manage
emergencies while respecting constitutional frameworks.

pg. 14
Sarmiento III v. Mison, G.R. No. L-79974

Facts:

Petitioners Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla filed a petition to prevent Salvador Mison from
assuming the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, arguing that his appointment was
unconstitutional because it was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Respondents
defended the appointment, asserting that confirmation was not required.

Issue:

Whether Salvador Mison’s appointment was unconstitutional due to lack of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

Ruling:

No, the appointment was not unconstitutional. The Constitution lists positions that require confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, but heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs, were intentionally excluded from this requirement. Republic Act 1937 and Presidential Decree
34 also specify that the President can appoint the Commissioner without confirmation. Therefore,
Mison's appointment is valid.

Dispositive Portion:

The petition is dismissed.

pg. 15
Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636

Facts:

In 1989, RA 6715 amended the Labor Code, requiring the Chairman and Commissioners of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to be appointed by the President with confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments (CoA). The President appointed Carale and others without submitting the
appointments for CoA confirmation. Calderon challenged the appointments, claiming they violated RA
6715, arguing that Congress could require CoA confirmation for positions not explicitly listed in the
Constitution.

Issue:

Can Congress require confirmation by the CoA for presidential appointments beyond those specified in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution?

Ruling:

No. The Court declared RA 6715 unconstitutional insofar as it required CoA confirmation for the NLRC
Chairman and Commissioners. These positions fall under the "third group" of appointments in Section
16, Article VII, which are appointed by the President without needing CoA confirmation, unless
specifically provided by law.

pg. 16
Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, G.R. No. 83216

Facts:

On April 6, 1988, President Corazon Aquino appointed Teresita Quintos-Deles and others as sectoral
representatives under the 1987 Constitution.
The appointments were transmitted to Speaker Ramon Mitra Jr. but faced opposition, with some
arguing they required confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (CA).
Despite attempts by Deles to challenge this, the President submitted the appointments for CA
confirmation on April 25, 1988.
Deles filed a petition arguing her appointment did not require CA confirmation.

Issues:

Does the Constitution require CA confirmation for sectoral representatives?

Does Executive Order No. 198 affect the need for confirmation?
Does historical precedent exempt current appointments from CA confirmation?

Court’s Decision:

The Court ruled that sectoral representatives’ appointments require CA confirmation, as they fall under
the category of positions needing confirmation per Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
EO 198 did not override this requirement, and prior practices did not set binding precedent.
The petition was dismissed.

Doctrine:

Sectoral representatives must be confirmed by the CA as required by Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution.
Only positions explicitly exempted by the Constitution do not require confirmation.

pg. 17
Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439

FACTS:

On December 17, 1988, President Aquino appointed Bautista as Chairman of the Commission of Human
Rights (CHR) to which she later qualified to. On January 10, 1989, she (with the other appointed
members of the CHR) was requested by Commission on Appointments (CA) to appear before it for
deliberation on their appointments. She refused to submit averring their appointments were not subject
for CA’s review. On January 14, 1989, the President apparently submitted an ad interim appointment of
Bautista which the CA disapproved in view of her refusal to submit to its jurisdiction. Pending resolution,
the President designated an Acting Chairman in lieu of her. Meanwhile, Bautista filed this present
petition to declare unconstitutional the actions of, among others, the CA.

ISSUE:

Does CA have the authority to review the appointments made by the President to the CHR?

RULING:

No. Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16, Article VII, it follows that such appointment is to be made without the review or
participation of the CA. The President appoints the Chairman and its members of the CHR pursuant to
the second sentence of said Sec for she is authorized to do so by law (Executive Order No. 163).
Regarding the President’s submission of an “ad interim appointment” to CA on January 14, it was ruled
that neither the Executive nor the Legislature can create power where the Constitution confers none.
The exercise of political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be sustained. Thus,
when the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for the President to make without the
participation of the CA, the executive’s voluntary act of submitting such appointment to the CA and the
latter’s act of confirming or rejecting the same are done without or in excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, it
cannot be impressed that the new or re-appointment of Bautista was an ad interim appointment,
because ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make.
Petition granted. Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman.

pg. 18
Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 113956

Facts:

The Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) was created by Presidential Decree No. 15 in 1966 to
promote Filipino arts and culture. The CCP's Board of Trustees, initially governed by PD 15, underwent
changes influenced by presidential power. In 1998, President Joseph Estrada appointed seven new
trustees, replacing those with still-active terms, which the displaced trustees contested. They filed a quo
warranto petition, arguing that their removal violated PD 15’s process for filling vacancies. The case
escalated to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether Section 6(b) of PD 15, which allows CCP trustees to elect their successors, is unconstitutional.
Whether the President has the constitutional authority to appoint CCP trustees despite PD 15.

Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court declared Sections 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 unconstitutional, ruling that the power to fill
Board vacancies cannot be delegated to CCP trustees. The Court affirmed that the President holds the
authority to appoint CCP trustees, aligning with the constitutional prerogatives over executive
departments.
Doctrine: The Court established that appointment powers are vested in the President and cannot be
delegated to subordinate officers. The President also has control over executive departments, including
government-owned corporations like the CCP.

Class Notes:

The power to appoint is vested in the President, except as specified by law.

Congress can delegate appointment powers to the President or certain entities, but not to co-equal
officers.
The President has control and supervision over executive offices, ensuring laws are executed.
Historical Background: The CCP was established to promote culture, initially insulated from political
influence. However, as political control evolved, the legal dispute reflected the tension between
executive authority and statutory provisions regarding governance of government corporations.

pg. 19
De Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136

Facts:

Conrado L. de Rama, Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, sought the recall of 14 "midnight" appointments made
by former Mayor Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, claiming they violated the 1987 Constitution's restriction on
appointments during the two months before presidential elections. While the recall request was
pending, three employees filed for their salaries, asserting their appointments were permanent. The
Civil Service Commission (CSC) ruled in favor of the employees, affirming the appointments' validity and
denying de Rama’s recall request.

Issues:

Whether the appointments were "midnight" appointments in violation of the Constitution.

Whether the CSC had jurisdiction to uphold the appointments.
Whether de Rama could revoke the appointments without due process.

Court's Decision:

The Supreme Court upheld the CSC's decision, ruling the appointments were valid and could not be
revoked unilaterally by de Rama. It clarified that the "midnight" appointment restriction applies only to
presidential appointments, not to local officials. The Court emphasized that once an appointment is
made and an individual assumes their duties, they acquire a legal right to the position, which can only be
revoked with cause and due process.

Legal Principles:

The "midnight" appointment prohibition applies only to presidential appointments.

Appointees gain a legal right to their position upon assuming duties, which cannot be revoked without
just cause and due process.
Allegations of fraud or procedural violations must be raised in a timely manner.

pg. 20
Arturo de Castro v. Judicial Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002

Facts:
Several petitions were filed questioning whether President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo could appoint the
next Chief Justice of the Supreme Court during the election ban period, following Chief Justice Reynato
Puno’s retirement on May 17, 2010. The petitions addressed the president’s power to appoint, the
application of the election ban on judicial appointments, and the role of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) in nominating candidates.

Issues:

Can the president appoint a Chief Justice during the election ban period?
Does the election ban apply to judicial appointments, specifically the Chief Justice?
Is the JBC required to submit a shortlist of nominees despite the election ban?
Court’s Decision:

Appointment Power: The Court ruled that the election ban does not apply to judicial appointments,
including the Chief Justice, to ensure the continuity of the judiciary.
JBC Role: The Court directed the JBC to proceed with nominating candidates and submit a shortlist to
the president before the outgoing president’s term ended.

Doctrine:

The Court clarified that the election ban on presidential appointments does not apply to the judiciary,
ensuring the independence and functioning of the judiciary, including the appointment of the Chief
Justice.

Class Notes:

The president’s appointment power is outlined in Article VII, Section 15, while judicial appointments are
covered in Article VIII.
Harmonizing constitutional provisions is essential to maintain their full effect.
The JBC plays a critical role in preserving the judiciary’s integrity and independence.
Historical Background:
This case addressed the balance between preventing “midnight appointments” and ensuring the
uninterrupted functioning of the judiciary, especially in appointing the Chief Justice.

pg. 21
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193936

Facts:
Two petitions challenged Executive Order No. 1 (EO 1) issued by President Aquino to create the
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) to investigate alleged corruption under President Arroyo. Petitioners
argued that EO 1 usurped legislative power and violated the equal protection clause by targeting only
Arroyo's administration.

Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled EO 1 unconstitutional. It found that creating public offices is a legislative
function, not an executive one, and EO 1 violated the equal protection clause by unfairly singling out the
previous administration.

Doctrine:

The case emphasized the separation of powers, asserting that creating offices and appropriating funds is
a legislative function and that classifications under the equal protection clause must be reasonable and
apply uniformly.

pg. 22
People v. Patriarca, G.R. No. 135457

Facts:

Jose N. Patriarca, a member of the NPA, was convicted of murder in 1998 for the deaths of Alfredo
Arevalo, Rudy de Borja, and Elmer Cadag. He applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724, admitting
his involvement in the killings. His application was granted in 1999, recognizing his actions were
politically motivated.

Issue:

What is the effect of the grant of amnesty on Patriarca's conviction?

Held:

Amnesty completely extinguishes criminal liability, erasing the offense and its effects. The Court
recognized the amnesty granted to Patriarca, reversed his conviction, and acquitted him. Criminal cases
related to the murders were also dismissed.

pg. 23
Vera v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-18184

Facts:

Petitioners, charged with kidnapping and murder, sought amnesty under Proclamation No. 8, Series of
1946. The Amnesty Commission denied their request, stating they must admit to the crime, which none
of the accused did. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the Commission's
decision, emphasizing the need for an explicit admission.

Issues:

Is an admission of the crime required to invoke amnesty?

Did the Court of Appeals err in applying Administrative Order No. 144?
Should the Court address factual issues regarding the motives behind the crime?
Court’s Decision:

Admission Requirement: The Supreme Court upheld the need for an admission of guilt to claim amnesty.
Administrative Order No. 144: The Court affirmed the order requiring an admission for amnesty claims.
Factual Issues: The Court ruled that factual issues regarding the crime were premature for resolution.

Doctrine:

To invoke amnesty, an accused must admit to the crime as amnesty is a plea of confession and
avoidance.

Class Notes:

Amnesty requires a confession of the crime.

Jurisdiction over cases outside amnesty terms lies with ordinary courts.
Historical Background:
The case addresses the post-WWII amnesty process, aimed at reconciliation for actions committed in
the resistance movement, and sets standards for amnesty eligibility.

pg. 24
In Re: Torres v. Director, Bureau of Corrections, G.R. No. 122338

Facts:

Wilfredo Torres, convicted of estafa, was granted a conditional pardon by the President in 1979. In 1986,
after new charges were filed, the President revoked the pardon, leading to Torres’s reincarceration.
Torres challenged the revocation, claiming violations of due process and the presumption of innocence.

Issues:

Does the President's revocation of a conditional pardon without judicial determination violate
constitutional rights?
Can the President unilaterally decide a breach of pardon conditions?
Court’s Decision:

The Court ruled that the revocation of a conditional pardon is an executive act not subject to judicial
review.
The President’s decision to revoke a pardon is a discretionary act that cannot be interfered with by the
courts.

Doctrine:

The revocation of a conditional pardon is solely an executive function, not subject to judicial scrutiny, as
per previous rulings.

Class Notes:

Conditional Pardon: A pardon with terms; non-compliance can lead to recommitment.

Presidential Prerogative: Acts of executive discretion are not reviewable by courts.

Historical Background:

This case underscores the separation of powers and the President’s discretion in granting, monitoring,
and revoking pardons, as established in past Supreme Court rulings.

pg. 25
People v. Salle, G.R. No. 103567

Issues:

Can the President grant a conditional pardon to someone whose conviction is under appeal?
Does accepting the pardon make the conviction final?
Court’s Decision:

The Court ruled that under Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President can only grant a
pardon after a conviction is final. Since Mengote’s appeal was pending, the pardon was invalid.
The Court clarified that accepting a pardon does not make a conviction final if an appeal is still pending.

Doctrine:

Presidential pardons can only be granted after a final conviction. Acceptance of a conditional pardon
does not end an appeal or make the conviction final during an ongoing appeal.

Class Notes:

Final Conviction: A conviction must be final before a pardon can be granted.

Separation of Powers: The executive cannot interfere with judicial processes before a final decision.

Historical Background:

Clemency provisions evolved, with the Jones Law allowing pardons after conviction but not while
appeals are pending.

pg. 26
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088

Facts:

Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. and others filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Executive
Secretary and the DFA to transmit the signed Rome Statute of the ICC to the Philippine Senate for
concurrence. The petitioners argued that the Senate must concur with treaties, and the executive must
transmit signed treaties. The Solicitor General argued there was no ministerial duty to do so.

Issues:

Do the petitioners have legal standing?

Is the executive required to transmit the signed Rome Statute to the Senate?
Is ratification of the Rome Statute obligatory?

Court’s Decision:

Only Senator Pimentel had legal standing.

The Court ruled that there is no ministerial duty to transmit the treaty to the Senate. The ratification
process is a discretionary executive act.
The Court clarified that ratification is not obligatory; it is a sovereign decision for the President.
Doctrine:
The power to ratify treaties lies with the President, subject to Senate concurrence. Signing a treaty does
not compel ratification.

Class Notes:

Legal Standing: Only those directly affected can file a petition.

Treaty Ratification: Signing a treaty is distinct from ratification, which is an executive act.
Executive Discretion: The President has the authority to decide on treaty ratification.

Historical Background:

This case reflects the Philippines' relationship with international law, particularly regarding treaty
ratification, and the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches.

pg. 27
Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211

Facts

After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, Ferdinand Marcos and his family were exiled to Hawaii. When Marcos'
health worsened, they requested to return, but the Philippine government denied it, citing national
security concerns. The Marcos family petitioned to challenge this, asserting their right to return. The
Supreme Court initially dismissed the petition, supporting the government's decision. After Marcos'
death, they filed for reconsideration, arguing that the denial violated their constitutional rights.

Issues

Does the President have the power to bar a citizen's return?

Was this power exercised arbitrarily?
Does Marcos' death affect the petition?
Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the denial, stating that the President has inherent powers to safeguard
national interest, including limiting a citizen's right to return. The death of Marcos did not alter the
situation, as the threat to national stability persisted.

Doctrine

The President’s residual powers allow limiting rights, like the right to return, to protect national welfare.

Class Notes

Residual Powers: Implied powers necessary for the President to fulfill duties.
Right of Return vs. National Interest: National interest can override a citizen's right to return in
exceptional circumstances.

Historical Background

This case reflects the political instability in the Philippines after the Marcos era and the challenges of
rebuilding democratic governance.

pg. 28
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193936

Facts:

The case involves two petitions challenging Executive Order No. 1 (EO 1), which created the Philippine
Truth Commission (PTC) to investigate graft and corruption during the Arroyo administration. Petitioners
argued that EO 1 violated the separation of powers, usurped legislative functions, and targeted only the
previous administration, violating the equal protection clause.

Issues:

Do the petitioners have legal standing?

Does EO 1 usurp legislative power?
Does EO 1 infringe on the powers of the Ombudsman and DOJ?
Does EO 1 violate the equal protection clause?
Are the petitioners entitled to injunctive relief?

Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled EO 1 unconstitutional, finding it violated the equal protection clause and
usurped legislative powers to create public offices. The Court held the creation of the PTC was a
legislative function, not an executive one, but found no violation of the Ombudsman’s or DOJ’s powers.

Doctrine:

Creating public offices and appropriating funds are legislative functions. The equal protection clause
requires that all similarly situated individuals be treated equally by the law.

Class Notes:

Legal Standing: Petitioners must show direct injury or interest.

Separation of Powers: Only the legislature can create public offices and appropriate funds.
Equal Protection: Laws must treat similarly situated persons equally, without arbitrary discrimination.

Historical Background:

This case highlights the constitutional limits of executive power in creating bodies like the PTC to
address issues of public concern, specifically corruption.

pg. 29
Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819

Facts:

The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law) was enacted to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor, with access to reproductive health services and family planning methods.
However, various groups challenged its constitutionality, arguing it violated the one subject-one title
rule under the Constitution by concealing its real intent as a population control measure.

Issue:

Does the RH Law violate the one subject-one title rule of the Constitution?

Ruling:

No, the Court ruled that the RH Law does not violate the one subject-one title rule. It found that
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are closely related and align with the law’s goal of
population control. While the law promotes contraception, its title adequately reflects its content, and
the Court adopted a liberal interpretation of the rule.

Conclusion:

The RH Law is not unconstitutional except for certain provisions deemed unconstitutional. The Court
lifted the Status Quo Ante Order for the provisions found constitutional.

pg. 30
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584

Facts:

The case concerns the constitutionality of Section 19 of the Oil Deregulation Law (R.A. No. 8479).
Congressman Enrique Garcia challenged this provision, arguing that deregulation would worsen the
oligopolistic control of the "Big 3" oil companies, leading to price-fixing and overpricing, contrary to
public interest.

Issue:

Is Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 unconstitutional for violating the Constitution's prohibition on monopolies
in the public interest?

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court dismissed Garcia's petition, stating that the issue was a political question best
left to Congress. It emphasized the separation of powers and the presumption of constitutionality of
legislative acts. The Court found no evidence of grave abuse of discretion by Congress in enacting the
law.

Conclusion:

The case reinforces the political question doctrine, limiting judicial review of policy decisions made by
Congress, and upholds the presumption of constitutionality of legislative acts.

pg. 31
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261

Facts:

This case involves the impeachment complaints filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in 2003.
After a first impeachment complaint was dismissed for lack of substance, a second complaint was filed
within one year. The issue raised was whether this violated the constitutional prohibition against
initiating impeachment proceedings against the same official more than once within one year.

Issue:

Does the second impeachment complaint violate the one-year bar on impeachment proceedings?
Does the filing comply with constitutional requirements?
Is judicial review of impeachment proceedings within the Supreme Court's authority?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the second impeachment complaint was unconstitutional because it
violated the one-year bar. It clarified that "initiation" of impeachment occurs when a complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice. The Court affirmed its power to review impeachment
proceedings to ensure constitutional compliance.

Doctrine:

The Court has the authority to review impeachment proceedings to ensure they align with the
Constitution, particularly regarding the one-year bar on initiating impeachment against the same official.

Conclusion:

The case affirms judicial review over impeachment proceedings and clarifies the one-year bar rule in the
Philippine Constitution.

pg. 32
Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738

Issue:

Whether or not Estrada is permanently unable to act as President.

Facts:

Petitioner Estrada sought to stop the Ombudsman from proceeding with criminal cases against him until
his presidential term ended. He filed a Quo Warranto case, asking the Court to declare him temporarily
unable to perform presidential duties, and Arroyo as holding the presidency in an acting capacity.

Decision:

Dismissed.

Ruling:

Section 11 of Article VII gives Congress the ultimate authority to decide the President's incapacity.
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President, implying Estrada's inability was no longer temporary. Even
if Estrada claims he didn’t resign, Congress’s decision that Arroyo is the de jure President is final and
cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

pg. 33
IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284

Facts:

President Estrada ordered the Philippine Marines to assist the PNP in joint patrols to combat crime in
Metro Manila. The IBP challenged the constitutionality of the deployment, arguing it violated civilian
supremacy over the military and the civilian nature of the PNP.

Issues:

Does the IBP have legal standing to file the petition?

Is the President's decision to deploy the armed forces subject to judicial review?
Does the deployment violate constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy and the PNP's civilian
character?

Decision:

Legal Standing: IBP lacked standing, as it did not show direct injury from the deployment.
Judicial Review: The President’s decision is not subject to judicial review as it falls within his discretion as
Commander-in-Chief.
Constitutionality: The deployment did not violate civilian supremacy, as the PNP maintained operational
control.

Doctrine:

The President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces to address lawless violence,
which is a political question not subject to judicial review unless there's grave abuse of discretion.

Class Notes:

Political vs. justiciable questions: Political questions are for the government, not courts to decide.
Legal standing requires direct injury to the party filing the case.
Civilian supremacy ensures the military remains under civilian authority.

Historical Background:

This case emphasizes the President's power in national security matters and limits judicial review,
maintaining the balance between military and civilian authority.

pg. 34
Salonga v. Paño, G.R. No. 59524

Facts:

Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., an American, was arrested after a bomb exploded in his Manila hotel room in
1980. He was linked to several bombings in Metro Manila, including at Rustan’s Supermarket and hotels.
Lovely offered to be a state witness, implicating several individuals, including petitioner Jovito Salonga.
Salonga was placed under custody and later on house arrest. Despite motions to dismiss, charges for
subversion were filed against Salonga, leading to the case reaching the Supreme Court.

Issue:

The symbolic function of the Supreme Court.

Ruling:

The case became moot when the subversion charges were dropped. The Court emphasized its symbolic
function in educating the judiciary on constitutional guarantees and protecting individual rights from
government overreach, even in cases that have become academic.

pg. 35
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457

Facts:

Restituto Ynot transported six carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, violating Executive
Order No. 626-A, which banned interprovincial movement of carabaos. The animals were confiscated by
the police in Iloilo. Ynot filed a suit for recovery and obtained a writ of replevin, posting a supersedeas
bond. The trial court upheld the confiscation, forfeiting the bond, and declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision, leading
Ynot to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Does Executive Order No. 626-A violate due process?

Did the President improperly exercise legislative power under the 1973 Constitution?
Is there a reasonable connection between the executive order’s restrictions and the protection of the
carabao population?

Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court declared Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional. The order failed the test of
due process by imposing confiscation without a hearing and lacked a clear connection between the ban
and the preservation of the carabao population. Additionally, it involved improper delegation of
legislative power without sufficient standards for administrative discretion. The Court recognized that
the police commander acted in good faith based on the presumption of the order's validity at the time.

Doctrine:

The Court reiterated that due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before property
can be taken. Judicial authority is necessary for adjudicating guilt and imposing penalties, which cannot
be assumed by the executive.

Key Points:

Due process guarantees a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

Laws may be presumed constitutional, but this can be rebutted.
Executive orders must have clear standards when delegating legislative powers.
Executive Order No. 626-A violated due process by imposing summary confiscation.

pg. 36
Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267

Facts:

In 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed a petition for a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus Garcia, under Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004), citing his infidelity, abuse, and economic control. The trial court issued several TPOs. Garcia
challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 in the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing violations of equal
protection, due process, and undue delegation of power to barangay officials. The CA dismissed the
petition, finding the challenge improper.

Issues:

Was the petition for prohibition the correct remedy to challenge R.A. 9262?
Does R.A. 9262 violate the equal protection clause?
Does R.A. 9262 violate due process?
Does R.A. 9262 undermine the family as a basic social institution?
Does R.A. 9262 improperly delegate judicial power to barangay officials?

Court’s Decision:

The Court affirmed the CA’s decision, stating that constitutionality challenges must be raised promptly,
and a petition for prohibition was inappropriate.
The Court upheld R.A. 9262, ruling the law's classification between men and women in domestic
violence cases is not arbitrary and serves a legitimate purpose.
The Court found no due process violation, noting the safeguards in R.A. 9262, including prompt hearings
after the TPO is issued.
R.A. 9262 does not undermine the family but aims to protect it from domestic violence, thereby
strengthening the family unit.
The Court ruled that the issuance of Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) by barangay officials is an
executive function, not judicial, and thus not an improper delegation of judicial power.
Doctrine: The Court upheld R.A. 9262, affirming that the law is constitutional, does not violate equal
protection or due process, and properly delegates power to barangay officials for protective orders. The
law's swift intervention in domestic violence cases is necessary for victim protection.

Class Notes:

Equal Protection: A law must be based on reasonable, substantial distinctions.

Due Process: Procedural fairness, including notice and hearing, must be observed.

pg. 37
Delegation of Power: Delegation is valid if it includes clear standards and limitations.
Historical Background: R.A. 9262 was enacted to combat domestic violence against women, aligning
with international human rights standards like CEDAW and strengthening the State’s protective role in
families.

Funa v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 184740

Facts:

Maria Elena H. Bautista was appointed Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) in 2006. In 2008, she was designated Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime
Industry Authority (MARINA) while still serving as DOTC Undersecretary. Dennis Funa filed a petition
arguing that her holding both positions violated Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which
prohibits Cabinet members from holding multiple offices. Bautista was later appointed MARINA
Administrator in 2009, and she relinquished her DOTC post. Respondents argued that the issue was
moot.

Issues:

Does holding concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC violate the Constitution?
Is the petition moot?
Does the petitioner have legal standing?
Were the positions held by Bautista incompatible?
Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that Bautista’s concurrent positions violated the
Constitution. The prohibition on holding multiple government offices applies strictly to Cabinet
members, deputies, and assistants. The MARINA Administrator position was not an ex-officio role tied to
the DOTC, making the concurrent appointment unconstitutional. The Court decided the case despite
mootness, as it raised important constitutional issues.

Doctrine:

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibits Cabinet members, deputies, and assistants from
holding multiple government offices, with very limited exceptions. This prohibition is absolute and
strictly interpreted.

Class Notes:

Cabinet members and their deputies/assistants cannot hold additional offices unless explicitly allowed
by the Constitution.
Legal standing requires a personal interest, though concerned citizens may be granted standing for
significant constitutional issues.
Cases may be decided even if technically moot if they involve important constitutional principles.

pg. 38
Concurrent positions not expressly authorized by the Constitution are unconstitutional.
Historical Background: This case reinforces the judiciary’s role in ensuring that government officials do
not accumulate excessive power, maintaining constitutional boundaries to prevent conflicts of interest
and ensure dedicated service.

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552

Facts:

Six petitions challenged the constitutionality of RA 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007), arguing that its
definition of terrorism was vague and overly broad. Terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear” and
“coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” were considered unclear, leaving law
enforcement without clear standards for enforcement.

Issue:

Does the doctrine of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth apply to RA 9372?

Ruling:

No, the doctrines do not apply.

Facial invalidation is allowed only in free speech cases, not in criminal law. Criminal statutes regulate
conduct, not speech, and their broad effects are necessary for public safety. Allowing facial challenges in
criminal law could hinder the enactment of laws against harmful conduct. Thus, the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines are only applicable to free speech cases, not penal statutes.

pg. 39
Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819

Facts:

Due to rapid population growth, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354 (RH Law) to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor, access to reproductive health services and family planning methods. After its
passage, various sectors challenged its constitutionality, arguing it violated the one-subject, one-title
rule of the Constitution. Petitioners claimed that the law concealed its true intent to control the
population, while respondents argued that it was primarily about reproductive health, not population
control.

Issue:

Does the RH Law violate the one-subject, one-title rule of the Constitution?

Ruling:

No, the Court upheld the RH Law.

While the Court acknowledged the law’s emphasis on reproductive health, it noted that its primary
objective is population control, particularly through family planning methods. The law aims to reduce
the country's population, which aligns with its focus on contraception. Despite its health claims, the
law’s clear underlying purpose is to prevent pregnancies and reduce births, thus making it a population
control measure. The Court agreed with petitioners that the concept of contraception is central to the
RH Law.

pg. 40
Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566

Facts:

Petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of the PDAF, or "Pork Barrel," due to concerns
about its misuse and corruption. Petitioners argued that PDAF violated constitutional principles such as
the separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, political dynasties,
local autonomy, and accountability. The Malampaya and Presidential Social Funds were also contested
for their executive use.

Issues:

Does the PDAF violate separation of powers?

Does it involve undue delegation of legislative power?
Does it impair the President's veto power?
Does it promote political dynasties or infringe on local autonomy?
Does it allow undue delegation of power over the Malampaya Funds?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court declared the PDAF and related funds unconstitutional for several reasons:

Separation of Powers: PDAF allowed lawmakers to engage in executive functions post-enactment,

violating separation of powers.
Undue Delegation: Lawmakers’ ability to identify projects after the budget's passage was an improper
delegation of legislative power.
Checks and Balances: The system impaired the President's veto power, undermining checks and
balances.
Local Autonomy: PDAF violated local autonomy by overriding local development plans.
Malampaya Funds: The Malampaya Funds’ use for "other purposes" without clear standards was
unconstitutional.

Doctrine:

Separation of Powers: Legislative power to appropriate funds cannot be delegated to individual

legislators or the Executive.

pg. 41
Non-Delegability of Legislative Power: Congress must collectively exercise the power of appropriation.
Checks and Balances: The President must retain veto power over appropriations.
Local Autonomy: National lawmakers cannot override local development priorities.
Class Notes:
Separation of Powers: Legislators cannot intervene in the execution of the budget.
Non-Delegability: Only Congress as a body can exercise the power of appropriation.
Checks and Balances: The President must have veto power.
Local Autonomy: Local development plans should not be overridden by national lawmakers.
Historical Background:
This case was a landmark decision in addressing corruption and misuse of discretionary funds,
reinforcing constitutional principles of separation of powers, non-delegation of legislative power, and
local autonomy. The ruling marked a significant shift towards more transparent and accountable
budgeting processes.

Montesclaros v. Comelec, G.R. No. 152295

Facts:
Petitioners challenged the postponement of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections and the reduction
of the SK membership age from 18 to under 18, claiming it disenfranchised youth aged 18-21. They also
sought a ruling to ensure elections were held by July 15, 2002, and that those over 21 by May 6, 2002,
could still run for office.

Issues:

Did the respondents act with grave abuse of discretion in postponing the elections?
Did reducing the age range unlawfully disenfranchise 18-21 year-olds?
Did respondents intentionally fail to fund the SK elections?
Did incumbent SK officers seek to perpetuate themselves in office?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no actual controversy due to Congress enacting R.A.
No. 9164, which reset the elections and adjusted the age range. The Court ruled the petitioners lacked
standing as they no longer had a personal interest, and Congress acted within its powers. It also stated
that public office is a public trust, not a property right, and the Court cannot compel Congress to enact
laws.

Doctrine:

SK membership is a statutory right that Congress can amend or repeal.

Proposed bills are not enforceable rights and are not subject to judicial review.
Public office is a public trust, not a property right.

Class Notes:

Statutory rights like SK membership can be amended by the legislature.

Courts cannot enforce proposed bills or compel Congress to pass laws.

pg. 42
Public office is a trust, not a vested right.

Historical Background:

The SK, initially the Kabataang Barangay, was reconstituted to enhance youth participation in
governance. The case reflects ongoing debates over youth representation in Philippine politics.

Cutaran v. DENR, G.R. No. 134958

Facts:

The DENR issued special orders for the acceptance and evaluation of ancestral land claims in the
Cordillera region. Petitioners filed for Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC) for land within the
Camp John Hay Reservation, but their applications were denied. They sought to block a competing
application by the Carantes heirs, claiming the DENR orders lacked legislative authority.

Issues:

Were DENR Special Orders Nos. 31, 31-A, and 31-B valid?
Was Special Order No. 25 valid under RA 7586?
Did the petitioners have a justiciable controversy?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the petition was prematurely filed, as there was no actual or imminent
violation of the petitioners' rights. The Carantes heirs' application had not been granted, and the
petitioners failed to show any concrete harm. The Court emphasized that judicial intervention requires a
justiciable controversy and that speculative harm is insufficient.

Legal Principles:

Courts will not entertain speculative or hypothetical cases.

The DENR's authority over ancestral land claims is limited by subsequent laws like the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act.

pg. 43
Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988

Facts:

Joseph "Erap" Estrada, elected president in 1998, ran again in the 2010 election. Atty. Pormento filed a
petition to disqualify Estrada, citing the constitutional ban on presidential reelection. COMELEC
dismissed the petition, and Pormento appealed to the Supreme Court. Estrada, despite the pending
case, ran in the 2010 election but lost to Aquino, making the issue moot.

Issues:

Whether the constitutional ban on "any reelection" prevents Estrada from running again.
Whether the case is justiciable given Estrada's loss.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, stating the case was moot because Estrada did not win the
2010 election. The Court emphasized that there was no actual controversy and the issue was
speculative, thus not justiciable.

Doctrine:

Actual Case or Controversy: Judicial review requires a real, live dispute.

Mootness Doctrine: The Court avoids deciding issues that are moot and have no practical impact.

pg. 44
Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780

Facts:

This case stems from the issuance of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Proclamation No. 38
declaring that there is a state of rebellion in the NCR (this was in May 1, 2001). Warrantless arrest of
several alleged leaders and promotors of the rebellion were thereafter effected.

Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, et al. filed several petitions against such Proclamation and habeas corpus for
the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as it has no basis both in fact and in law.
Petitioner further contends that said proclamation is being will be used by the authorities to justify their
alleged impending warrantless arrests.

Respondent, Justice Secretary, denies such allegations. R, on defense, said that ordinary procedure
applies (that means, obtaining regular warrants of arrests from courts and thereafter preliminary
investigation will be conducted) for all acts committed during the said state of rebellion.

Issue:

Whether a petition for habeas corpus may be avail of to prevent an impending unlawful warrantless
arrest.

Decision: No. Relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date (May 10, 2001) no complaints or
charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime.

Anent petitioners allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve
petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an vs. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which remains
speculative to this very day.

pg. 45
David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396

Facts:

In 2006, President Gloria Arroyo declared a state of emergency through Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 (PP 1017), citing a threat of a coup. This led to actions like warrantless arrests and military
takeovers, prompting several petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and General Order
No. 5 (G.O. No. 5).

Issues:

Whether the petitions were moot after the lifting of PP 1017.

Whether the petitioners had standing.
Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were constitutional.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court declared parts of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 unconstitutional. It ruled the President
does not have legislative powers, cannot conduct warrantless arrests, suppress constitutional freedoms,
or take over private property without legislative authorization.

Doctrine:

Presidential proclamations during emergencies must adhere to constitutional limits.

The President’s calling-out power does not extend to infringing on rights without legislative delegation.
Government actions during emergencies must have a legitimate basis and are subject to judicial review.

Class Notes:

Legal standing is essential but may be relaxed in cases of significant public interest.
Executive actions in emergencies are not above constitutional scrutiny.

pg. 46
Province of Bantangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774

Facts:

President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 48 in 1998, creating the Local Government Service
Equalization Fund (LGSEF) to enhance LGU capacities. The Oversight Committee issued resolutions
earmarking ₱5 billion from the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for 1999-2001 for the LGSEF, imposing
conditions for its release. Governor Hermilando Mandanas of Batangas challenged the constitutionality
of these provisions, arguing they violated the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

Issue:

Whether the provisos in the GAAs and OCD resolutions violated the Constitution and the Local
Government Code.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the provisos violated the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
The Court emphasized that LGUs have fiscal autonomy, and the earmarking and conditional release of
funds encroached on their guaranteed share of national taxes, which should be automatically released
without restrictions.

Doctrine:

Local government units' share in national taxes is constitutionally protected and cannot be withheld or
conditioned by the executive without violating fiscal autonomy.

pg. 47
Sanlakas v. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085

Facts:
On July 27, 2003, around 300 military personnel led by junior officers staged a mutiny in Makati,
protesting corruption within the Armed Forces. In response, President Gloria Arroyo declared a state of
rebellion under Proclamation No. 427 and issued General Order No. 4, ordering military and police
action. The rebellion ended peacefully by the evening, but the state of rebellion remained until August
1, 2003. Several petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of the proclamation and its
implications.

Issues:

Whether petitioners have standing to challenge the declaration.

Whether the President can declare a state of rebellion under her call-out powers.
Whether the declaration had legal significance, especially regarding warrantless arrests.
Whether the declaration was an unconstitutional exercise of emergency powers.

Court’s Decision:

Standing: Only members of Congress, Rep. Suplico and Sen. Pimentel, had standing to challenge the
proclamation.
Call-out Power: The President can call out the armed forces but does not need to declare a state of
rebellion. Such a declaration adds no legal effect.
Effect of Declaration: The proclamation does not authorize warrantless arrests or override constitutional
rights.
Emergency Powers: The proclamation did not constitute an exercise of emergency powers requiring
congressional approval.

Doctrine:

Presidential Call-Out Power: The President can call out the armed forces without declaring a state of
rebellion.

pg. 48
Limitations on Presidential Authority: A declaration of rebellion does not grant additional powers.
Protection of Rights: Constitutional rights remain protected, even in a state of rebellion, including
protections against warrantless arrests.

Class Notes:

Standing: A direct, substantial interest is required for constitutional challenges.

Separation of Powers: The President’s power to call out forces does not include overriding rights or
bypassing Congress for emergency powers.
Emergency Powers: Must be authorized by Congress for martial law or other extraordinary measures.
Historical Background:
The case emerged amid political instability and military discontent after the People Power II revolution.
It highlights the balance between presidential powers and the protection of constitutional rights during
times of crisis.

Gana-Carait Y Villegas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 257453

Facts:

Mariz Lindsey Tan Gana-Carait Y Villegas filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Biñan, Laguna in the 2019 elections. Rommel Mitra Lim and Dominic P. Nuñez filed
petitions seeking her disqualification, claiming she was a dual citizen due to holding a U.S. passport.
Gana-Carait argued she was a dual citizen by birth, not naturalization, and did not misrepresent her
eligibility. The COMELEC canceled her CoC, citing failure to comply with R.A. 9225, but the Supreme
Court ruled in her favor.

Issues:

Whether dual citizens by birth are required to renounce foreign citizenship and take an oath of
allegiance under R.A. 9225.
Whether Gana-Carait misrepresented her eligibility in her CoC.
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Gana-Carait, stating that dual citizenship by birth does not require
renunciation of foreign citizenship or an oath of allegiance to run for office. The Court also found no
material misrepresentation in her CoC.

Doctrine:

Dual citizens by birth are not subject to R.A. 9225’s requirements (renouncing foreign citizenship and
taking an oath) for public office eligibility. These apply only to naturalized citizens.

Class Notes:

Dual Citizenship: Being a citizen of two countries, either by birth or naturalization.

R.A. 9225: Allows naturalized citizens to retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship.

pg. 49
Material Misrepresentation: False claims in a CoC affecting eligibility.
Birth vs. Naturalization: Dual citizenship by birth is involuntary; by naturalization, voluntary.

Historical Background:

The case highlights the distinction between dual citizenship by birth and naturalization, with R.A. 9225
regulating the rights of naturalized citizens and those who reacquire Philippine citizenship.

Chavez v. PEA, G.R. No. 133250

Facts:

The Philippine government undertakes a reclamation project in Manila Bay, creating the Freedom
Islands.
In 1995, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) signs a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation (Amari) to develop additional land.
In 1998, Francisco I. Chavez challenges the legality of the agreements, claiming they violate
constitutional provisions restricting private corporations from acquiring public land.

Issues:

Did the agreements violate constitutional restrictions on private corporations acquiring public lands?
Should the court's decision be retroactive?
Should Justice Carpio be disqualified due to alleged bias?

Court’s Decision:

Constitutional Violation: The Court rules the transfer of 77.34 hectares to Amari unconstitutional under
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which limits private corporate land ownership.

Retroactive Application: The Court rejects Amari’s argument for prospective application, upholding that
the law at the time of the agreement prohibited the transfer.

Justice Carpio’s Inhibition: The Court denies the motion to disqualify Justice Carpio, ruling there was no
bias.

Doctrine:

Land Ownership Restrictions: Private corporations cannot acquire alienable public lands except through
lease.

pg. 50
Inalienable Lands: Only lands reclaimed and classified as disposable by the government can be
transferred.
Operative Fact Doctrine: Legal decisions voiding contracts or laws are retroactive unless a new legal
doctrine is established.

Executive Secretary v. CA, G.R. No. 131719

Facts:

ARCO-Phil. filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 8042, the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, arguing it discriminated against unskilled workers. The RTC issued a TRO
and preliminary injunction, halting certain provisions. The government petitioned the Court of Appeals,
which upheld the RTC's rulings. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Does ARCO-Phil. have standing to file the petition?

Do the challenged provisions violate the Constitution?
Did the RTC abuse its discretion in issuing the injunction?
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the RTC’s decision?

Court's Decision:

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, ruling ARCO-Phil. had standing. The Court
also found no constitutional violation, noting the challenged provisions had been upheld in prior cases. It
determined the RTC abused its discretion in issuing the injunction without proof of irreparable harm,
and upheld the law’s presumption of constitutionality.

Doctrine:

Associations can represent members in constitutional challenges.

Legislative enactments are presumed constitutional until proven otherwise.
A preliminary injunction requires evidence of likely success and irreparable injury.

pg. 51
Class Notes:

ARCO-Phil. had standing to represent its members.

Laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality.
A preliminary injunction requires proof of entitlement.

ITF v. Comelec, G.R. No. 159139

Facts:

RA 8046 was passed on 07 June 1995 authorizing COMELEC to conduct nationwide computerized
election system. Gloria Arroyo allocated php 2.5 billion fund for the automated election system on 24
January 2003. The bidding process commenced on the same month and out of the 57 bidders it was
awarded to MPC and TIMC. Although DOST’s evaluation report states that the two obtained a number of
failed marks in the technical evaluation. Five individuals and entities protested the matter to COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. Abalos rejected the protest, hence the present petition

Issue:

Whether or not ITF has standing to file the case?

Decision:

The case at bar is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest, it is of paramount public
interest and transcendental importance. Taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of “illegal
disbursement of public funds” or if public money is being “deflected to any improper use,” or when
petitioner seek to restrain “wasting of public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional
law.”

pg. 52
Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334

Facts:

In January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as Vice-
President, leaving a Senate seat vacant. The Senate passed Resolution No. 84, requesting COMELEC to
hold a special election alongside the May 14, 2001, regular elections. Twelve senators were elected for
six-year terms, and the 13th highest vote-getter was to serve the remaining three years of Guingona’s
term.

After the elections, COMELEC initially proclaimed 13 senators, with Ralph Recto ranked 12th and
Gregorio Honasan 13th. This proclamation was finalized on July 20, 2001. Petitioners Arturo Tolentino
and Arturo Mojica challenged the election, claiming procedural lapses, including lack of voter
notification, invalidated the special election.

Issues:

Are the petitions constitutional in nature?

Is the petition moot?
Do petitioners have standing?
Was the special election validly conducted?
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling:

It had jurisdiction to resolve the issue as it wasn’t a quo warranto case.

The petition wasn’t moot since the legal issues could recur.
Petitioners had standing due to the public interest involved.

pg. 53
The special election was valid despite procedural lapses, as voters were broadly aware and participated
meaningfully.

Doctrine:

Strict compliance with election procedures is ideal but not mandatory if voters are well-informed and
meaningfully participate. Procedural lapses do not invalidate an election that fulfills democratic
principles.

Key Takeaways:

Public awareness and participation can compensate for procedural deficiencies in elections.
The Court may relax standing requirements for issues of public interest.
Electoral laws balance procedural rules with democratic principles to reflect the electorate’s will.

PCA v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105

Facts:

In 1993, Congress passed the 1994 General Appropriations Act (GAA). President Ramos signed it into law
but vetoed or conditioned several provisions. Four petitions challenged the vetoes and related aspects
of the GAA.

Issues:

Do petitioners have legal standing? Yes.

Can legislators propose projects for funding without violating executive authority? Yes.
Is realignment of operational expenses constitutional? Yes.
Is prioritizing debt service over education constitutional? Yes.
Can the President veto the debt ceiling provision? Partially.
Are the vetoes on SUCs, AFP, DPWH, and NHA valid? Mixed rulings.

Court’s Decision:

The Court upheld most of the President's vetoes but declared some unconstitutional when they
overstepped executive powers.

Doctrine:

The separation of powers allows Congress to appropriate funds, while the President implements them,
with limited veto power over items but not general provisions.

pg. 54
Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685

Facts:

President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308 in 1996, establishing a National Computerized
Identification Reference System to streamline transactions with government services. Senator Blas Ople
challenged the order, claiming it usurped legislative power and violated the right to privacy. The
Supreme Court temporarily halted its implementation in 1997.

Issues:

Does A.O. No. 308 require legislative enactment? Yes.

Does A.O. No. 308 violate the right to privacy? Yes.

Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court voided A.O. No. 308 for overstepping executive powers by addressing matters
requiring legislation and failing to safeguard privacy.

Doctrine:

Administrative orders cannot substitute for laws on matters requiring legislative action.
The right to privacy is fundamental and government actions intruding on it must have a compelling state
interest and clear safeguards.

pg. 55
People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685

Facts:

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted of a crime in 1934. After failed appeals, he applied for probation
under Act No. 4221 in 1936. The application was denied, but the court's handling raised jurisdictional
and constitutional issues.

Issues:

Can Act No. 4221’s probation provisions apply to Manila? No.

Does Act No. 4221 delegate legislative power unconstitutionally? Yes.
Does the Act violate the equal protection clause? Yes.

Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled:

Probation provisions of Act No. 4221 excluded Manila and improperly applied.
Section 11 of the Act was unconstitutional for delegating legislative power to provincial boards without
clear guidelines.
The Act violated the equal protection clause by allowing unequal application based on discretionary
provincial board decisions.

pg. 56
Doctrine:

Non-Delegation Doctrine: Legislative power cannot be delegated without clear standards.

Equal Protection Clause: Laws must apply uniformly and not result in discriminatory treatment.

Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083

Facts:

Minors, represented by their parents, filed a class action against the DENR to cancel existing timber
license agreements (TLAs) and stop issuing new ones. They claimed these agreements violated their
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, as well as the rights of future generations.

Issues:

Legal Standing: Do the minors have standing to sue for their generation and future ones? Yes.
Cause of Action: Does their claim assert a valid legal right? Yes.
Class Suit: Is this a valid class suit? Yes.
Political Question: Is the issue justiciable or a political question? Justiciable.
Contracts Clause: Do TLAs qualify as contracts protected by the non-impairment clause? No.

Court’s Decision:

Minors have standing based on intergenerational responsibility for environmental rights.

Their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is self-executing and enforceable.
The suit is valid as it concerns a matter of general interest for all Filipinos.
The issue is subject to judicial review, not a political question.
TLAs are licenses, not contracts, and are subject to regulation under the state's police power.

pg. 57
Doctrine:

Intergenerational Responsibility: Each generation must preserve natural resources for future
generations.
Judicial Review: Courts can review executive actions for grave abuse of discretion.
Police Power: The state can regulate or revoke privileges like TLAs to protect public welfare.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary

Angelo Reyes, G.R. No. 180771

Facts:

Two petitions challenged Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed petroleum exploration in Tañon
Strait, a protected area. Petitioners sought to nullify SC-46 and the Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) issued by the DENR, alleging violations of the 1987 Constitution, environmental laws,
and international commitments.

Issues:

Locus Standi: Do the petitioners have standing to file the case?

Constitutionality of SC-46: Did SC-46 violate the Constitution?
Environmental Commitments: Was oil exploration inconsistent with international environmental laws?
Legality of ECC Issuance: Was the ECC validly issued?

Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court nullified SC-46 for constitutional and environmental law violations:

Locus Standi: The Court allowed human petitioners standing but excluded Resident Marine Mammals.
Constitutionality: SC-46 violated Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution for lacking safeguards,
Presidential approval, and congressional reporting.

pg. 58
NIPAS Act: SC-46 breached the law by undertaking activities in a protected area without congressional
approval or an ECC for such activities.
ECC Issuance: The ECC was improperly granted without compliance with legal prerequisites.

Doctrine:

Constitutional Safeguards: Service contracts involving foreign entities must meet strict constitutional
and statutory requirements.
Environmental Protections: Protected areas require congressional approval and compliance with the
NIPAS Act before resource exploitation.
Locus Standi: Courts recognize liberalized standing in environmental cases to safeguard public interest.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association, Inc. v. ERC, G.R. No. 174697

Issues:

Does CREBA have legal standing?

Was a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 the correct remedy?
Does Section 2.6 violate the Constitution, EPIRA, or result in unjust enrichment?
Is the provision a valid exercise of police power?

Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition due to:

Lack of standing: CREBA and its members, being non-residential end-users, were not directly affected by
Section 2.6.
Wrong remedy: A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was not appropriate for challenging a quasi-
legislative act like the DSOAR. A petition for declaratory relief should have been filed instead.

Doctrine:

Locus Standi: Petitioners must demonstrate direct injury from the challenged act.
Proper Remedy: Rule 65 applies to judicial or quasi-judicial acts, while declaratory relief is the correct
remedy for quasi-legislative acts.

pg. 59
Class Notes:

Legal Standing: Only parties directly affected by a law or rule can challenge its validity.
Distinction of Remedies: Rule 65 for jurisdictional errors in adjudication; Rule 63 for statutory
interpretation.

Historical Background:

The case highlights regulatory challenges in balancing the costs of expanding electricity infrastructure
with ensuring fairness for residential consumers and real estate developers under the EPIRA framework.

Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360

Facts:

Before 1971, the Philippine oil industry was unregulated and dominated by multinationals. In response
to the oil crisis, the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) was established in 1971, followed by the Philippine
National Oil Corporation (PNOC) in 1973 and the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) in 1984. By the
1990s, steps toward deregulation included the privatization of Petron in 1993 and the passage of R.A.
No. 8180 in 1996 to foster competition. Full deregulation was implemented in 1997 through E.O. No.
372.

Petitions challenged provisions of R.A. No. 8180, including Section 5(b) on tariff differentials, claiming
violations of constitutional principles like equal protection, anti-trust laws, and proper delegation of
legislative power.

Issues:

Do the petitions raise justiciable controversies, and do petitioners have legal standing?
Do Sections 5(b), 6, and 9(b) of R.A. No. 8180 enable monopolistic practices?
Does Section 15 involve undue delegation of legislative power?

Decision:

The Court upheld the petitions as justiciable and affirmed the petitioners' standing.

pg. 60
Section 5(b): Violated equal protection by favoring existing refineries and restricting competition.
Sections 6 & 9(b): Imposed entry barriers, creating an oligopoly instead of promoting competition.
Section 15: Passed delegation tests but was misapplied by considering factors not in the law.

Doctrine:

Anti-Trust Principle: Laws must ensure competition and prevent monopolies (Art. XII, Sec. 19).
Delegation Doctrine: Implementation requires clear legislative standards to avoid invalid delegation.

Notes:

The case emphasizes aligning deregulation policies with constitutional mandates to ensure fair
competition and prevent monopolistic practices.

Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036

Facts:

Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag, appointed to various roles in the Education and Information Department
(EID) of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from 1999 to 2001, was reassigned by COMELEC
Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo in 2001. This reassignment followed Benipayo’s ad interim appointment
as COMELEC Chairman and the designation of Velma J. Cinco as Officer in Charge of EID. Matibag
challenged this reassignment, questioning its legality.

Issues:

Does the petition meet the requisites for judicial review?

Are the ad interim appointments permanent, or do they violate constitutional prohibitions on temporary
appointments?
Does the renewal of these appointments violate reappointment restrictions?
Is Benipayo’s reassignment of Matibag legal without COMELEC en banc approval?
Are the disbursements of salaries and emoluments lawful?

Court’s Decision:

The petition met the requirements for judicial review and had legal standing.

pg. 61
Ad interim appointments are permanent unless disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or the
next adjournment of Congress.
Renewals of ad interim appointments do not violate reappointment prohibitions.
Benipayo’s reassignment of Matibag was legal as COMELEC Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.
The disbursements to appointed officials were lawful.

Doctrine:

Ad interim appointments are permanent unless disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or the
next adjournment of Congress. The independence of constitutional bodies, like COMELEC, allows them
to manage internal affairs, including personnel reassignment.

Class Notes:
– Ad Interim Appointments: Permanent unless disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or the
next adjournment of Congress. – Reappointment Prohibitions: Does not apply to renewed ad interim
appointments if the Commission on Appointments has not acted. – Transfer and Reassignment
Authority: Heads of government, including the COMELEC Chairman, can reassign personnel within legal
bounds. – Judicial Review Requirements: Requires an actual controversy, personal and substantial
interest, timely constitutional issues, and constitutional issues being the primary focus of the case.

Umali v. Guingona, G.R. No. 131124

Facts:

Osmundo Umali, appointed as Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, faced a confidential
memorandum leading to an investigation by the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC). Despite attending hearings and not raising clarificatory questions, PCAGC found prima facie
evidence and President Ramos issued AO 152 dismissing Umali. His appeal to the Office of the President
was denied, and the case was brought to the RTC, where his petition for certiorari was denied. The CA
reversed the decision, and the case was elevated to the SC. Umali raised the constitutionality of PCAGC,
but it was only posed in a motion for reconsideration before the RTC, making it too late.

Issue:

Was Umali’s contention of PCAGC’s constitutionality raised at the earliest opportunity?

Decision:

AO 152 was lifted due to supervening events. The issue of PCAGC’s constitutionality was raised only in a
motion for reconsideration before the RTC, which was too late.

pg. 62
Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde, G.R. No. 217456

Issues:

Whether the petitioners’ failure to comply with the three-day notice rule and secure the Public
Prosecutor’s concurrence justified the denial of their motion.
Whether Pemberton’s custody should reside with Philippine authorities under the VFA.
The constitutional question regarding the VFA’s implications on the Philippine Supreme Court’s rule-
making authority.

Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of grave abuse of discretion by the trial court judge,
stating:

The failure to comply with procedural requirements justified the denial of the motion.
The custody arrangement under the VFA, allowing Pemberton to be detained at Camp Aguinaldo, does
not constitute a grave abuse of discretion.
The constitutional challenge to the VFA was not the main issue of the petition.

Doctrine:

pg. 63
Adherence to procedural requirements like the three-day notice rule ensures due process for all parties
involved.
The VFA permits custody of U.S. military personnel with U.S. authorities during judicial proceedings
without infringing on Philippine sovereignty or the Supreme Court’s authority.

Class Notes:

Procedural Due Process: The three-day notice rule ensures due process by giving the opposing party
time to respond to motions.
Role of Public Prosecutor: Their concurrence is necessary for filing motions affecting the prosecution.
VFA and Custody Issues: The VFA allows U.S. personnel to be held in U.S. custody while facing trial,
respecting both nations’ legal frameworks.

Historical Background:

This case reflects the complexities of U.S.-Philippines relations under the Visiting Forces Agreement,
highlighting issues of national sovereignty, international agreements, and individual rights.

De Agbayani v. PNB, G.R. No. L-23127

Facts:

Initial Loan and Mortgage: In July 1939, Francisca Serrano de Agbayani obtained a P450.00 loan from
PNB secured by a real estate mortgage, maturing July 1944.
Commencement of Foreclosure: By November 1959, the balance due was P1,294.00. PNB initiated
foreclosure on July 1959.
Legal Action by Agbayani: Agbayani filed a suit in August 1959 claiming the mortgage had prescribed due
to over fifteen years since its maturity. A preliminary injunction was issued, later made permanent by
the court.
PNB’s Defense: PNB argued that unconstitutional moratorium periods (EO 32 and subsequent Act)
should extend the prescriptive period.
Lower Court Decision: Agbayani won; unconstitutional acts could not extend the prescriptive period.
Supreme Court Appeal: PNB appealed; the case was brought before the Philippine Supreme Court.

Issues:

Should the periods of moratorium under unconstitutional acts be considered in the prescriptive period
calculation for mortgage foreclosure?

pg. 64
Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, favoring PNB. It ruled that:

Unconstitutional acts, prior to annulment, had legal consequences and were to be considered in the
prescriptive period calculation.
The periods under these laws suspended the prescriptive period, allowing foreclosure action by PNB.

Doctrine:

The Supreme Court established that unconstitutional laws should still be treated as operative facts
impacting legal calculations, such as prescription periods.

Class Notes:

Operative Fact Doctrine: Legal consequences flow from a statute’s existence before it is nullified.
Prescriptive Period: Time limit for initiating legal action, potentially paused by moratorium laws.
Moratorium Laws: Suspend debt payments and can affect prescriptive periods.

Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287

Facts:

The Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) was implemented by the Philippine government under
President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, aimed at accelerating economic growth by utilizing savings and
unprogrammed funds for priority projects.
Petitioners, including public officials and concerned citizens, challenged the constitutionality of DAP,
arguing it violated the Constitution by using unprogrammed funds without meeting revenue targets and
involving cross-border transfers of funds.
The case proceeded from the RTC, to the Court of Appeals, and finally to the Supreme Court, where it
was consolidated for review.

Issues:

Was the use of savings and unprogrammed funds unconstitutional under DAP?
Were cross-border transfers of funds illegal?
Did the release of unprogrammed funds comply with revenue targets?
Does the Doctrine of Operative Fact apply to DAP’s prior acts?
Court’s Decision:
Savings and Unprogrammed Funds: The Court found DAP’s use of these funds did not meet the statutory
definition of “savings,” making the disbursement unconstitutional.
Cross-Border Transfers: These were deemed unconstitutional, violating constitutional limits.

pg. 65
Use of Unprogrammed Funds: The release was invalid without meeting revenue targets as certified by
the National Treasurer.
Doctrine of Operative Fact: Allowed certain DAP effects to remain effective in good faith to prevent
unfair prejudice.

Doctrine:

Strict Construction of Savings: Only real savings qualify for augmentation.

No Cross-Border Fund Transfers: The Constitution limits transfers within branches.
Unprogrammed Funds: Conditional on exceeding revenue targets.
Doctrine of Operative Fact: Allows effects of unconstitutional acts to remain valid to avoid inequity and
injustice.

Class Notes:

Savings: Funds free from any obligation, arising from project completion or discontinuation.
Cross-Border Transfers: Prohibited under the Constitution, limiting transfers within respective branches.
Unprogrammed Funds: Releases contingent on revenue targets being met.
Operative Fact Doctrine: Validates effects of unconstitutional acts to prevent unjust results from
subsequent declarations of unconstitutionality.
Historical Background:
This case underscores the judiciary’s role in checking executive overreach in the Philippines,
emphasizing adherence to constitutional provisions related to public funds and the separation of
powers.
Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360

Facts:

Prior to 1971, the Philippine oil industry was unregulated, dominated by multinational companies.
In 1971, the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) was created to regulate the industry.
Further Developments:

1973: PNOC was established by President Marcos.

1984: OPSF was created.
1987: ERB was formed.
1992: DOE was established.
1996: R.A. No. 8180 commenced deregulation.
1997: E.O. No. 372 fully deregulated the oil industry.
Procedural Posture:
Petitions Filed:
Francisco Tatad challenged Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180.
Other petitioners challenged Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372.

Issues:

Procedural Issues:

Did the petitions present a justiciable controversy? (Yes/No)

pg. 66
Did the petitioners have legal standing? (Yes/No)

Substantive Issues:

Section 5(b): Did it violate the one-subject-one-title rule and the equal protection clause? (Yes/No)
Section 15: Did it constitute an undue delegation of legislative power? (Yes/No)
E.O. No. 392: Was its implementation arbitrary? (Yes/No)
R.A. No. 8180: Did it enable monopolistic practices? (Yes/No)

Court’s Decision:
Procedural Issues:

The petitions were found justiciable, and petitioners had standing.

Substantive Issues:

Section 5(b): Violated the equal protection clause.

Section 15: Passed the tests but misapplied the OPSF depletion factor.
Deregulation provisions impeded market entry, resulting in an oligopoly.
Section 6: Imposed prohibitive inventory requirements.
Section 9(b): Failed to protect against predatory pricing.
Doctrine:
Anti-Trust Principle: Policies should promote true competition and prevent cartels.
Delegation Doctrine: Implementation must be guided by specific standards to avoid an invalid
delegation of legislative power.

pg. 67