Unit-4- India-China
The Panchsheel Agreement served as the foundation for India-China relations. It would
advance economic and security cooperation between the two nations. The implied
assumption of the Fiver Principles was that newly independent states
after decolonisation would develop a more pragmatic approach towards international
relations.
The Five Principles of the Panchsheel Agreement are as follows:
1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful co-existence
The 5 principles were emphasized by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Premier
Zhou Enlai in a broadcast speech made at the time of Asian Prime Ministers
Conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka after signing the Sino-Indian Agreement in Beijing.
The five principles were subsequently modified in a form of a statement of ten principles
issued in April 1955 at the historic Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia.
The conference itself would lead to the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement which
gave shape to the idea that the post-colonial nations had something to offer to the
bipolar world of the Cold War.
It has been speculated that the five principles had partly originated as the five principles
of the Indonesian state. In June 1945 Sukarno, the Indonesian nationalist leader had
proclaimed five general principles, or Pancasila, on which future institutions were to be
founded. Indonesia became independent in 194
Border Disputes:
o Western Sector (Ladakh):
The Johnson Line proposed by the British placed Aksai
Chin in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.
China rejected the Johnson Line and favored the McDonald
Line, asserting control over Aksai Chin.
Though Aksai Chin is administered by China, India’s official
position on the issue is that, by virtue of it being a part of
Jammu and Kashmir (Ladakh), the region remains an
integral part of India.
o Middle Sector (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand):
The Middle Sector has a relatively minor dispute, with India
and China exchanging maps where they broadly agree on
the LAC.
o Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim):
China considers the McMahon Line illegal and
unacceptable claiming that Tibetan representatives who had
signed the 1914 Convention held in Shimla which delineated
the McMahon Line on the map did not have the right to do
so.
Border Incursions:
o The border between India and China is not clearly demarcated
throughout and there is no mutually agreed Line of Actual
Control (LAC) along certain stretches.
o Border confrontations have occurred in different instances,
including Demchok in 2014, Depsang in 2015, Doklam in 2017,
and the Galwan incident in 2020.
Water Sharing:
o China's advantageous geographical positioning creates an
asymmetry that allows it to capitalize on the reliance of
downstream nations, such as India, on hydrological data.
o There are concerns over China's dam-building activities on
transboundary rivers, including the Brahmaputra, which have led
to tensions over water-sharing issues.
Tibet Issue:
o India hosts the Tibetan government-in-exile and spiritual leader
the Dalai Lama, which has been a point of contention with
China.
o China accuses India of supporting Tibetan separatism, while
India maintains that it respects the "One China" policy but
allows the Tibetan community to reside in India.
Trade Imbalance:
o India’s trade deficit with China reached the historically high level
of USD 87 billion in 2022.
o Complex regulatory requirements, intellectual property rights
violations, and a lack of transparency in business dealings
present challenges for Indian businesses seeking access to the
Chinese market.
Concerns over Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):
o India's main objection to the BRI is that it includes the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which passes through
the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), a territory that India
claims as its own.
o India also argues that the BRI projects should respect the
international norms, rule of law, and financial sustainability, and
should not create debt traps or environmental and social risks
for the host countries.
What are the Geopolitics Behind China’s Assertion?
China’s Salami Slicing Strategy:
o In military terms, Salami Slicing refers to a divide-and-conquer
strategy involving incremental threats and alliances to
overcome opposition and acquire new territories.
o In the case of China, Salami Slicing is evident in its approach to
territorial expansion in both the South China Sea and the
Himalayan regions, with the Doklam standoff often seen as a
manifestation of China's salami-slicing tactics in the Himalayas.
Chinese Debt Trap Diplomacy:
o China's debt trap diplomacy refers to a strategy in which
China extends loans to developing countries, often for
infrastructure projects, with the intention of creating economic
dependence
o As a result, China may gain strategic leverage or control over
key assets if the debtor is unable to fulfill its financial obligations.
Critics argue that this approach allows China to expand its
influence globally by exploiting the economic vulnerabilities of
borrowing nations.
China’s Five Fingers of Tibet Strategy:
o The "Five Fingers of Tibet" is a term used to describe China's
territorial claims and strategic approach in relation to Tibet.
o The metaphorical term describes Tibet as the palm, with China
aspiring to control or influence the five surrounding regions,
referred to as fingers.
o The metaphorical "fingers" represent the following areas:
Ladakh: Gaining control over Ladakh would provide China
with unimpeded access to Pakistan.
Nepal: Exerting influence over Nepal would grant China
strategic access to the heartland of India.
Sikkim: Asserting control over Sikkim would offer China a
tactical advantage in severing India's "Chicken Neck"
(Siliguri Corridor), effectively isolating the northeastern
states from the Indian mainland.
Bhutan: Gaining control over Bhutan would bring China in
proximity to Bangladesh, providing a potential route to the
Bay of Bengal and enhancing China's regional influence.
Arunachal Pradesh: Securing control over Arunachal
Pradesh would enable China to dominate the entire
northeastern region of India, extending its military reach and
strategic influence in the area.
Strategic Encirclement of India by China’s “String of Pearls”:
o China's "String of Pearls" refers to a geopolitical and strategic
initiative that involves building a network of Chinese-funded,
owned, or controlled ports and other maritime infrastructure
facilities in strategic locations across the Indian Ocean.
o Some of the notable locations associated with China's String of
Pearls include Gwadar Port in Pakistan, Hambantota Port in Sri
Lanka, Chittagong Port in Bangladesh, and Djibouti in the Horn
of Africa.
How is India Responding to China's Aggressive Measures?
Global Strategic Alliances:
o India actively engages with like-minded nations to collectively
address China's influence in the Indian Ocean Region
o QUAD: It is the grouping of four democracies –India, Australia,
the US, and Japan. All four nations find a common ground of
being democratic nations and also support the common interest
of unhindered maritime trade and security.
o I2U2: It is a new grouping of India, Israel, the USA, and the
UAE. Forming alliances with these countries strengthens India's
geopolitical standing in the region.
India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC):
o Launched as an alternative trade and connectivity corridor,
IMEC aims to strengthen India's presence in the Arabian Sea
and the Middle East.
o Funded by the Partnership for Global Infrastructure
Investment (PGII), it serves as a counter-initiative to China's
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the support of G7 nations.
International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC):
o INSTC, established through an agreement between India, Iran,
and Russia, creates a comprehensive 7,200-km multi-mode
transportation network connecting the Indian Ocean, Persian
Gulf, and Caspian Sea.
o The key node, Chahbahar Port in Iran, strategically monitors
China's activities in the Arabian Sea and the Strait of Hormuz,
providing an alternative to the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor's (CPEC) Gwadar port.
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) :
o It is an intergovernmental organization established to promote
economic cooperation and regional integration among countries
bordering the Indian Ocean.
o IORA member states work on various initiatives related to trade,
investment, and sustainable development in the Indian Ocean
region (IOR).
India’s Necklace of Diamonds Strategy:
o In response to China's String of Pearls strategy, India adopted
the Necklace of Diamonds strategy, emphasizing the
encirclement of China by enhancing its naval presence,
expanding military bases, and strengthening diplomatic ties with
regional nations.
This strategy aims to counter China's military network and
influence in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.
How Shifting International Politics is Affecting India-China
Relations?
USA:
o India has signed four foundational agreements as General
Security of Military Information Agreement
(GSOMIA), Logistics Support Agreement
(LSA), Communications Interoperability and Security
Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), and Basic Exchange
and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation
(BECA) with USA that cover areas of military information,
logistics exchange, compatibility.
o By virtue of these agreements, India and the USA may
collaborate and jointly counter Chinese strategies.
Japan:
o India, in collaboration with Japan and Australia, has initiated the
Supply Chain Resilience Initiative to reduce reliance on China.
QUAD:
o In the global power dynamics, India is actively engaging through
QUAD to counter Chinese unilateralism, while China
collaborates with Russia, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey to
challenge the US-led liberal world order.
o Recently India’s Quad Partners Australia, Japan, and the US
engaged in renewed high-level political discussions with China.
Himalayan QUAD:
o This project involves China, Nepal, Pakistan, and Afghanistan as
a counterweight to the QUAD.
Pakistan:
o Pakistan signed a memorandum in 2013, a landmark agreement
for long-term planning and development of CPEC, the BRI’s
flagship project.
o To China, Pakistan serves not only as a client state but also as a
significant tool to restrain India.
Sri Lanka:
o Sri Lanka has also received massive funding under the BRI. Sri
Lanka provides China with various naval capabilities to function
in the Indian Ocean.
o China has acquired the strategic Hambantota Port from Sri
Lanka bolstering Beijing’s String of Pearls
o The Colombo port city being built by China is being termed a
‘Chinese Colony’ by strategic experts in India and Sri Lanka.
Bangladesh:
o Bangladesh joined the BRI in 2016, and bilateral relations with
China have been growing since, much to India’s dismay.
o Bangladesh is being aided by China, but India–Bangladesh's
cultural and geographical proximity will dominate. India and
Bangladesh have mutual issues and interests that can be used
by India to strengthen relations at any point.
Nepal:
o Nepal joined the BRI agreement with China in 2017.
o China aims to build political links, but India's influence remains
strong due to its dominant cultural influence.
Maldives:
o Under President Yameen's leadership, there was a notable pivot
toward China marked by substantial Chinese investments.
Despite the election of Mohammad Muizzu as president, a trend
of increasingly anti-India positions is becoming evident.
o The India-Maldives relationship suffered a setback when
Maldives entered into a Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) with
China in 2017.
o India has provided renewed economic assistance, undertaken
infrastructure projects, and expanded defense cooperation to
strengthen its influence in the region.
Bhutan:
o Bhutan declines BRI partnership, fostering strong political and
economic relations with India.
o India aids Bhutan in hydropower projects and proposes regional
initiatives.
Afghanistan:
o Following the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, the Taliban has
referred to China as the "most crucial partner" in the nation's
reconstruction endeavors.
What Should be the Way Forward?
To secure Peace, Prepare for War:
o India needs to prepare for the possibility of conflict with China
which involves bolstering India's military capabilities.
o The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence has
recommended that allocation for defense should be 3% of GDP
to maintain India's deterrent posture.
o Development of infrastructure along the border, such as roads
and bridges, can help both countries access remote areas and
reduce the possibility of any misunderstandings or conflicts.
Diplomatic Dialogue from a position of Strength:
o Compartmentalization of Issues: By isolating individual
challenges, negotiators can develop solutions tailored to each
particular aspect
o Address Border Disputes: Prioritize resolving ongoing border
disputes through diplomatic means and negotiations.
o Engage in High-Level Talks: Both countries should engage in
high-level diplomatic talks to discuss and resolve existing issues.
The Foreign Ministers of India and China signed a ‘Five
Points’ agreement to reduce the tension on the Ladakh
border at Moscow in 2020.
Implement Confidence-Building Measures
(CBMs): Improve communication channels between the
military forces of both countries to prevent
misunderstandings and accidental escalations.
Strategic Autonomy in Foreign Affairs:
o The geopolitical considerations of India’s China policy have an
independent logic
o India should not be the only QUAD nation or a significant power
not engaged in a dialogue with China.
o Rather than expressing apprehension about potential shifts in
US-China relations, India should prioritize leveraging current
opportunities with the US and the West.
o The strategic focus should seek to hasten India's rise in the
global power hierarchy, diminish the strategic gap with China,
and strengthen military deterrence.
Economic Cooperation:
o Diversify Imports: India needs to reduce its dependence on
Chinese imports by diversifying its imports from other countries
such as Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Indonesia.
o Boost Exports: India can focus on increasing its exports to
China. India should focus on exporting high-value products like
engineering goods, electronics, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals.
o Develop Domestic Industries: India needs to develop its
domestic industries to reduce its reliance on imports. This will
not only help reduce the trade imbalance but also create
employment opportunities in India.
o Review FTAs: India should also consider signing an FTA with
China to increase exports and reduce the trade deficit.
Encourage Cultural Exchanges:
o Encourage People-to-People Contacts: Promote cultural
exchanges, educational programs, and tourism to enhance
understanding between the people of India and China.
o Promote Track II Dialogues: Encourage non-governmental
exchanges, involving scholars, think tanks, and civil society, to
contribute fresh perspectives and ideas.
Collaborate in International Cooperation:
o Collaborate on Global Issues: Work together on global
challenges such as climate change, public health, and counter-
terrorism, showcasing joint leadership on the world stage.
o Joining Multilateral Platforms: Engage in multilateral platforms
to address shared concerns and foster cooperation on regional
and global issues.
High Tech is the new Foreign Policy:
o Joint Research and Innovation: Encourage collaboration in
technology, research, and innovation to benefit both nations
economically and technologically.
o Joint Efforts on Environmental Issues: Collaborate on
environmental initiatives, such as addressing air pollution and
water management, to highlight shared interests.
Emerge as a Net Security provider in the Indo-Pacific Region:
o Maritime Security: India should participate in efforts to ensure
the safety and freedom of navigation in critical sea lanes,
contributing to the overall security architecture in the Indo-
Pacific.
o Humanitarian Assistance: India should keep its commitment to
regional security by actively participating in humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief operations.
Conclusion:
Assessing changes in great power dynamics and formulating responses
constitute a fundamental aspect of any nation's foreign policy. For India, the key
focus should be on capitalizing on emerging opportunities to enhance its
alliances with the US and adeptly navigate complex relations with China. India's
ascension in the international system positions it well to effectively manage any
abrupt shifts in great power relations