1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20036

Anthony H. Cordesman
Phone: 1.202.775.3270

Email: acordesman@gmail.com

Web version:
www.csis.org/burke/reports

U.S Military Spending:

The Cost of Wars
Anthony H. Cordesman
acordesman@gmail.com

Revised July 10,

2017
Burke Chair
John Moore/Getty Images in Strategy
 Table of Contents
Section Page

Introduction and Summary Analysis 3

Summary of Direct Costs of the Afghan War, Iraq War,

and Total OCU in Budget Authority vs. Other Illustrative Estimates 17

Cost of Today’s Wars Compared to Past Wars 26

Comparative U.S. vs. Nth Country Military Spending 30

Size and Cost of the Total U.S. Military Effort

in Recent Wars and Its Impact as a Percent of GDP 38

Size and Cost of the U.S. Military and Civil Effort (DoD and State/USAID)
Overseas Contingency Operations in FY2001-FY2018 46

Cost of the U.S. War Effort as Reported by DoD for Total

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) in FY2001-FY2018 51

Cost in U.S. Casualties: FY2001-2018 69

Shifting Levels of Military Personnel and Contractors in the Wars

in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria: FY2001-2018 72

Funding Civil and Civil-Military Operations 90

The War in Afghanistan: “Decisive Force?” 102
The War in Syria and Iraq: “Decisive Force?” 115
Homeland Defense: The Other War Costs 132 2
 Introduction and Summary Analysis

7/10/2017 3
One of the striking aspects of American military power is how little serious attention is spent on examining the key
elements of its total cost by war and mission, and the linkage between the use of resources and the presence of an
effective strategy. For the last several decades, there has been little real effort to examine the costs of key missions
and strategic commitments and the longer term trends in force planning and cost. Both the Executive Branch and
the Congress have failed to reform any key aspect of the defense and foreign policy budgets to look beyond input
budgeting by line item and by military service, and doing so on an annual basis.

The program budgeting and integrated force planning efforts pioneered towards the end of the Eisenhower
Administration—and put into practice in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations—have decayed into hollow
shells. The effort to create meaningful Future Year Defense Programs seem to have been given a final death blow by
the Budget Control Act (BCA)—legislation originally designed to be so stupid that the Congress could not possibly
accept it. Efforts to integrate net assessment with budget submissions were effectively killed by the Joint Staff
decades earlier, during the Reagan Administration.

Critical Failures by Both the Executive Branch and Congress

What is even more striking, is the failure of both recent presidents and the Congress to properly analyze and justify
the cost of America's wars. If one counts the Cold War, the United States has been at war for virtually every year
since 1941. The United States has been actively in combat since late 2001, and there is little prospect that it can end
the need to use force to check terrorism and violent extremism within the next decade. Moreover, the Cold War may
be over, but the United States still faces strategic challenges from Russia and the emergence of China as a major
global power in what is already a multipolar world.

"War" may not be the normal state of U.S. national security planning indefinitely into the future, but war—and/or
the constant risk of war—is a grim reality of our time. Yet, the Administration and the Congress have tended to treat
warfighting as a temporary aberration—as something to be delt with by supplementals or creating short-term budget
categories like the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account that seem to reflect the cost of wars, but have
become something of a slush fund and a mechanism for selectively avoiding the caps on defense spending set by
the BCA. 4
Reporting by the Executive Branch seems almost designed to obscure the real costs of conflict, and avoid linking
them to an examination of strategy, its effectiveness, and the prospects for conflict termination. Reporting on the
civil dimensions of war is often lacking, and the civil and military budgets of war are developed and implemented
separately by the departments and then reviewed (if at all) by separate Armed Services and Foreign Affairs
Committees in each house and by separate elements in the appropriations committees.

Lip service references to a "whole of government approach" thinly disguise a real-world separation of what should
be a fully integrated civil-military approach, and what is really a "hole in government" approach where the State
Department and USAID often seem at least partially decoupled from the realities of warfighting and the Department
of Defense focuses on tactical success rather than the political, economic, or broader strategic goals in warfare.

The Congress has done no better. Ironically, members of Congress are fond of criticizing the Administration for
lacking a strategy. The Congress, however, can be criticized for failing to insist on adequate reporting of wartime
budgets and examining their costs in detail. Aside from independent efforts by the Congressional Research Service
(CRS), neither the Executive Branch nor the Congress have ever issued an official report on the costs of American's
ongoing wars, examined the trends in these costs, or insisted on meaningful reporting on their effectiveness.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS), and the General Accountability Office (GAO), have provided several
reports that do provide important insights into the cost of America's wars and the problems in the ways in which
they are reported.
• As is discussed in several parts of this report, work by Amy Belasco of the CRS has provided two reports that attempted to cost America's wars. The
latter report—The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, CRS RL33110, December 8, 2014—covered
the period for FY2001-FY2015, and is as close as the U.S. has come to an official estimate of the cost of its wars.

• Another report by Lynn M. Williams and Susan B. Epstein—Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519,
February 7, 2017—provides an in depth examination of the OCO budget requests—and their total cost—through FY2017, but does not examine the
reporting by war, strategy, or effectiveness of U.S. civil and military efforts.

5
• The GAO has examined the way in which the Department of Defense includes and does not include the cost of war in the OCO account—GAO,
OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS: OMB and DOD Should Revise the Criteria for Determining Eligible Costs and Identify the Costs
Likely to Endure Long Term, GSO-17-68, January 2017. This report flagged the need for significant reform in DoD reporting, but largely in a
narrow accounting sense and in an effort to ensure that major expenditures which belong in the Baseline budget are not included in the OCO
account.

The closest the Congress has come to establishing a credible system of formal review is to create limited public reporting
requirements on the Iraq and Afghan wars for the DoD, and the requirement for Iraq lapsed at the end of combat activity in 2011.
These reports never address the costs of war, or planning, programming, and budgeting.

The Congress has also created a Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR) and then a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
(SIGAR). These efforts have accomplished a great deal in terms of improving the aspects of America's war efforts relating to aid
to the Iraqi and Afghan governments and forces. However, SIGIR stopped its operations in 2011. The Special Inspector Generals
also have not been tasked with addressing the overall cost of each conflict, the overall effectiveness of U.S. civil and military
efforts, or the nature and success of U.S. plans and strategies.

The Need for Far Better Accountability in Planning, Programming, and Budgeting U.S. Wars
This report addresses a number of the issues that result from the failure to deal with the cost of America's wars by providing an
overview of the historical trends involved, the broader climate of U.S. defense spending, and the data that have been reported on
each war as part of the Overseas budget for the Contingency Operations (OCO) account. It examines the limits in these data, the
risks they impose, and possible ways of correcting current problems.

This version has been revised to correct some of the terminology used and to make it clear that there is no way to fully reflect the
proposed FY2018 costs of OCO activity because the President has not yet determined the FY2018 level of effort in Afghanistan,
and the current OCO budget data for FY2018 are the cost of extending the FY2017 program.

It is divided into 12 sections, each of which illustrates the need for better planning, programming, and budgeting; as well as the
need for far more transparency and better official reporting:

6
 Summary of Direct Costs of the Afghan War, Iraq War, and Total OCO in Budget Authority vs.
Other Illustrative Estimates
The charts and tables in this section summarize the actual and projected cost of U.S. wars as reported for the
OCO account—drawing heavily largely on earlier work by the Congressional Research Service.
• The Department of Defense's OCO costs of the Afghan conflict since FY2001 will rise to $840.7 billion—if the President's FY2018 budget
request is met. They will be $770.5 billion for Iraq.

• The total costs for all OCO spending between FY2001 and FY2018 will be in excess of $1,909 billion. Given the costs omitted from the
OCO budget, the real total cost will almost certainly be well over $2 trillion, even using OCO data as the only costs of the wars.

These latter estimates update a series of earlier CRS analyses, one of which noted that, "Other observers and
analysts define war costs more broadly than congressional appropriations and include estimates of the life-
time costs of caring for OEF/OIF/OND veterans, imputed interest costs on the deficit, or increases in DOD’s
base budget deemed to be a consequence of support for the war…Such costs are difficult to compute, subject
to extensive caveats, and often based on methodologies that may not be appropriate…"

Three alternative cost estimates are also summarized in this section.

• One by Lina J. Blimes puts the total cost at $4 to $6 trillion by end FY2016.

• A related estimate by the Watson Institute puts the cost at $4.8 trillion through FY2016.

• A third estimate, by Neta Crawford, puts costs at more than $4.8 trillion through FY2017, plus more than $7.9 trillion in cumulative interest
on past appropriations, or more than $12.7 trillion.

It is important to note that separate work by Todd Harrison of CSIS in assessing the overall OCO account—
Enduring Dilemma of Overseas Contingency Operations Funding, Transition45 Series, January 11, 2017—
states that both Congress and the Obama administration moved items from the base budget to the OCO
budget as a way of circumventing the BCA budget caps. Roughly half of the OCO budget ($30 billion) is now
being used for programs and activities that were previously funded in the base budget. These issues are
discussed in more detail later in this study. 7
If these alternative estimates—and many others—are taken into account, it is all too clear that the United
States now has no official estimate of the cost of its wars. Further, without such an estimate, there is no
credible basis for either Executive Branch or Congressional review of the budgets and plans for such wars,
much less of the ability to effectively execute given strategies, and provide credible indicators of the cost
effectiveness and progress of key elements of military and civil activity.
Cost of Current Wars Compared to Past Wars
This section updates part of another CRS study—one by Stephen Dagget—that attempted to cost past
American wars from the American Revolution through the Persian Gulf War, and the early phases of the
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It illustrates just how much the cost and duration of war is changing and how
critical it is to properly plan, fund, and manage wars on an extended basis.

As Mr. Dagget notes, there are serious uncertainties in the cost estimates of past wars, but it is striking that if
the cost to date of the Afghan and Iraq/Syria wars are shown in constant dollars, even the comparatively low
end estimate of $2 trillion through FY2018 would makes these wars more expensive than every other period of
conflict in American history except the American revolution, the Civil War, and World War II.
• The Afghan and Iraq/Syria wars are more than five times more expensive than World War I.

• They are more than five times more expensive than the Korean War.

• They are nearly 2.5 times more expensive than the Vietnam War.

• They are more than 18 times more expensive than the first Gulf War in 1991.

• Given the estimates that the real costs are already well over $4 trillion, these multipliers would be more than doubled if any of the alternative
war costs cited earlier are correct.

8
 Comparative U.S. vs. Nth Country Military Spending
This section compares current total U.S. baseline and war spending with the spending of other states. The size of U.S. military
spending is difficult to estimate in comparable terms. Work by Todd Harrison, for example, shows that total U.S. defense-related
costs totaled some $905 billion in FY2017:
• This was 161% of the $560.7 billion Baseline that include base, defense-related nuclear and other related budget costs.

• It was 146% of the $619.7 billion total ($560.7 Baseline plus the $58.8 billion in OCO costs).

• It was 150% of the IISS estimate of $604.5 billion for 2016.

• OCO costs alone were 10.3% of $560.7 billion and 9.5% of the total of $619.7 billion.

At the same time, if one does use the $619.7 billion total for the U.S., it is:

• 4.3 times the IISS estimate of $145 billion for China, and 2.9 times the SIPIRI estimate of $215 billion.

• 10.5 times the IISS estimate of $58.9 billion for Russia, and 9.0 times the SIPIRI estimate of $69.2 billion.

• More than 10 times the military expenditures of the three leading NATO European states: France. Germany, and the U.K.

• These costs do not address the combat and aid contributions of U.S. allies, and 11 of the other top 15 military spenders are
allies of, or have close security ties to, the United States.

U.S. military spending has risen steadily over time, but without any serious net assessment of the patterns in that growth, the
comparative efficiency of U.S. spending on baseline and war activity, and how allied and potential threat states use their budgets
and resources.

The Size and Cost of the Total U.S. Military and Civil Effort in Recent Wars and Its Impact as a Percent of
GDP

One key aspect of the current cost of U.S. wars is that—despite their high cost—they represent a
comparatively low burden on the U.S. economy in terms of GDP, total federal spending, labor, capital, and use
9
of the U.S. industrial base.
The difficulties in defining military expenditures do create differences in estimates of the percent of GDP, but they are comparatively minor. All
recent estimates show that the burden the Afghan and Iraq/Syria wars placed on the economy did not equal the burden that the peacetime Reagan
build up created, and that the percentage has dropped sharply since most U.S. combat troops left Afghanistan and Iraq.

• If one uses CBO estimates, the burden on the economy moved from 5% of GDP in the 1980s to a low of 2.8% in FY1998.

• The Baseline level has average 2.8% since then, but the total including OCO rose back to a high of 3.4% in FY2010.

• Defense OCO was only 0.3% in FY2016.

• The total defense burden is projected to decline from 2.8% in FY2017 to 2.5% in FY2021 and FY2.3% in 2030.

• Even if one uses the higher estimate of military spending used by Todd Harrison, the total is now under 6.0%.

There are, however, several problems with current projections of FY2018 and beyond. They do not include the
build-up the Trump Administration has said will begin in FY2019. Past estimates of spending have been
consistently wrong, and the inputs have been consistently undercosted.

This illustrates another critical failure in the preparation and review of both Baseline and War budgets. There
have been no serious attempts to develop Future Year Defense Program costs in recent years, largely because
of the Budget Control Act, and DoD outyear budget forecasts have been political placeholders.

Long term budget projections by the CBO and others invariably assume the end to war with one or two years
in the future and no major contingency thereafter. This has been grossly unrealistic since the late 1930s.

It is particularly unrealistic because this assumption is critical to estimating steady reduction in military
spending, sizing the impact of rising entitlement and mandatory budget costs, and the size of the deficit.

Size and Cost of the U.S. Military and Civil Effort (DoD and State/USAID) Overseas Contingency Operations
in FY2001-FY2018
Total estimates of the cost through FY2018 have been made earlier. The status of the FY2018 OCO requests
for DoD and State are now highly uncertain and these charts focus on FY2001-FY2017.
10
Accordingly, the charts in this section summarize CRS reporting on total DoD/State/USAID OCO costs to date. They illustrate
two reporting problems:

• There is no break out in the budget request by war of State/USAID and VA spending for FY2016-FY2018.

• Some war fighting and support costs are not included in the OCO request. The President’s FY2017 budget request included
$1,553.6 billion for contingency operations funded in the base budget. These activities are not designated as emergency or
OCO/GWOT and are subject to the BCA limits.

The Cost of the U.S. War Effort as Reported by DoD for Total Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) in
FY2001-FY2018
The charts and tables in this section focus on total DoD spending by year, and OCO expenditure by war.

• They reflect the acute pressure that the rising cost of the Iraq War put on funding for the Afghan conflict during FY2005
through FY2008;

• They also show that reduction in troop levels did not bring proportionate cuts in total war costs.

• They also reflect the fact that fact that the DoD began to avoid the budget caps established by the Budget Control Act from
FY2014 onwards by including them in the Afghan War OCO account. DoD did so although they were Baseline efforts and
should not technically have been counted as war costs because Congress gave it the option of making such a request.
State/USAID did not have this option.

• Several charts summarize GAO criticism of the way DoD included given costs in the OCO account, and indicate that DoD
may correct its reporting in the future.

• Other charts summarize work by Todd Harrison of CSIS showing the extent to which non-OCO expenditures became
included in the OCO budget accounts.

• The final charts summarize the FY2018 budget submission data for the OCO accounts in the detail provided by the DoD
budget summary. They show the cost by war, by service, and by broad cost category for the entire OCO account. Only
limited break outs of these key data are provided by war.

11
 The Cost in U.S. Casualties: FY2001-2018
The human cost of war is perhaps the most critical single metric of warfighting. One key element of any effective effort to cost a
war should be to assess its casualties.

• Current official U.S. data only include U.S. military and DoD civilians, and the DoD website does not provide a trend
analysis.

• The contribution and sacrifices made by host country and allied forces is not recognized.

• Threat casualties are not reported.

• Civilian casualties are not assessed in spite of the fact that this has become a critical political and operational issue, and
subject of both debate and threat propaganda.

Failing to address casualties does not defuse the issues they raise or the reality that they too are a cost of war.

Shifting Levels of Military Personnel and Contractors in the Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria: FY2001-
2018
Total personnel are another key measure of the cost of war, particularly when high-cost all-volunteer forces are involved, and
casualties are a key political consideration. The charts and tables in this section raise several key points about the need for better
reporting on manpower:

• Active duty strength has gotten far more expensive relative to DoD civilian full time employees and U.S. and foreign
contractors. This inevitably has reduced the number of military in the force mix and made reporting military, civilian, and
contract personnel a critical aspect of reporting on force costs and trends. Reporting that only covers military personnel is
outdated and grossly incompetent.

• This is especially true when the U.S. deploys large ground combat units, where civilians and contractors have become
critical parts of the "tooth to tail" ratio.

• The cost of all-volunteer forces limits the total force pool. The war in Iraq, for example, put serious pressure on U.S.
capability to properly deploy the numbers and skills needed in Afghanistan, as well as helped force use of the Reserves and
National Guard. This, in turn, creates a strong incentive to try to create effective local forces as soon as possible.
12
• Cost and force size pressures also tend to create pressure to rely on sudden and temporary "surges," which may or may not
be effective, and the use of short rotations and temporary duty personnel—affecting levels of experience and capability.

• These pressures—plus political sensitivity over U.S casualties—helped create plans and/or the willingness to withdraw
quickly from Iraq and Afghanistan. These were not linked to progress in stability operations and creating effective host
country forces. The end result in both countries was a resurgence in threat capabilities that forced the U.S. to redeploy—
greatly increasing the marginal cost of the war. It also led to political reluctance to deploy the needed numbers of personnel
except on a "creeping incremental" basis and after serious problems emerged in host country capabilities—extending the
length as well as the cost of the war.

• Throughout both conflicts, reporting has focused on total personnel rather than on the function and capability of the
personnel engaged. Military history is often the history of force quality defeating force quantity, and strategies and dollar
spending need to be validated by explaining the role and function of deployed personnel.

• The budget data created a functionally meaningless pool of theater support personnel with little or no explanation, no
allocation by war, and that make up 65% of all military personnel assigned to both Afghanistan and Syria/Iraq.

• Data on cost per solider warn that efforts to minimize personnel may have sharply raised cost per soldier deployed, creating
major diseconomies of scale.

• The final tables reflect the acute dependence on contractors, and show that the ratio of this dependence has increased over
time. Once again, a valid approach to resourcing and costing the war must look beyond the number of military personnel
and justify the total number of personnel.

Funding Civil and Civil-Military Operations

The State Department and USAID provide virtually no meaningful explanation of their strategy for either war, do not explain the
challenges they face in meaningful terms, and do not link their budget justification to any clear explanation of a civil-military
program.

The DoD semi-annual report now focuses almost exclusively on military activity, and there is no State/USAID counterpart. The
United States however, is fighting what are civil-military wars where the "hold," "stability," and "recovery and development"
effort is critical to winning popular support.

13
The data for FY2018 show that the civil effort is being slashed without any explanation or justification of the cuts—particularly
in key areas like economic growth—where poverty is now steadily increasing and both sets of populations face major
humanitarian crises—and in governance, where all of the host country governments are ranked as some of the most corrupt and
incapable governments in the world and a lack of popular support is a key issue.

Here, simply seeing OCO spending data is essentially useless. Reporting adds up to half a budget at best.

The War in Afghanistan: “Decisive Force?”

This section supplements the OCO cost data with some brief metrics on the overall size of the U.S. effort in
Afghanistan.

It also presents some key metrics developed by SIGAR on the annual and cumulative costs of U.S. aid efforts
in Afghanistan. They make a striking contrast to the total OCO costs.

• The total cost of all U.S. aid to Afghanistan through FY2016 is $115.3 billion, which is 16 percent of the
total OCO cost of $728.9 billion from FY2001 to FY2016.

• The annual cost of all U.S. aid in FY2016 is $5.79 billion, which is 13 percent of the OCO cost of $46.2
billion for that year.

Key metrics are provided for the U.S. use of airpower, showing a major rise in support of Afghan forces in
CY2017. These types of metrics provide a tangible picture of what U.S. OCO spending actually buys.

Key metrics are also provided on the funding profiles of key types of aid.
They all reflect a common pattern of erratic funding and slow reaction to the return of the Taliban. Such
profiles are a key warning of basic problems in planning, programming, and budgeting.

Metrics showing allied funding and aid activity help put the U.S. spending effort in the proper perspective.

Once again, the data on contractors provide a key picture of the actual size of the U.S. effort in country.

14
 The War in Syria and Iraq: “Decisive Force?”
This section supplements the OCO cost data with some brief metrics on the overall size of the U.S. effort in Syria.

The termination of SIGIR after U.S. combat forces initially left Iraq in 2011 has meant that there is now no official regular
public reporting on this war.

The Department of Defense has, however, provided a supplement to the FY2018 budget request that does provide many useful
insights, and the only integrated discussion of civil-military issues in the FY2018 budget submission.

• The $1.5 billion cost of the entire Iraq-Syria train and assist mission is 13 percent of the total OCO budget of $11.9 billion
for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR).

• The functional break out of the cost by theater—Iraq and Syria—helps provide a clear picture of mission focus and
allocation of resources.

• The discussion of how activities link to a strategy is the one example of such a public budget justification in more than 15
years of official reporting on the wars.

The Department of Defense also provides a range of other metrics on U.S. activities, and a costing of air support activity,
although these are not linked to the budget.

Homeland Defense: The Other War Costs

Homeland defense has become more expensive than any ongoing U.S. war or active combat effort.

Official data only exist on federal homeland defense efforts, not state and local ones.

OMB does not report total costs of homeland defense for all departments in the FY2018 budget request for unexplained reasons.

• OMB tables for FY2017 show total cost of homeland defense for all Departments and agencies was $71.8 billion in
FY2015, $72.9 billion with supplemental, $71.7 billion in FY2016, and $70.5 billion in FY2017.

• Total was $43.5 billion in FY2015, $44.4 billion with supplemental, $45.2 billion in FY2016, and $50.4 billion in
FY2017 less DoD.

15
The cost for DHS alone was:

• $65.7 billion in FY2016 total budget authority and $41.2 billion in adjusted budget authority.

• $66.0 billion in FY2017 total budget authority and $41.3 billion in adjusted budget authority.

• $70.7 billion in FY2018 total budget authority and $44.1 billion in adjusted budget authority.

Any full costing of America's wars needs to include these costs.

16
 Summary of Direct Costs of the
Afghan War, Iraq War,
and Total OCU in Budget Authority
vs. Other Illustrative Estimates

7/10/2017 17
 Summary of Direct Costs of the Afghan War, Iraq War, and Total OCU in
Budget Authority vs. Other Illustrative Estimates
• The charts and tables in this section summarize the current size of the cost of U.S. wars as measured in the
OCO account -- based largely on work by the Congressional Research Service.
• The Department of Defense's OCO costs of the Afghan conflict since FY2001 will rise to $840.7 billion -- if the
President's FY2018 budget request is met. They will be $770.5 billion for Iraq.
• The total costs for all OCO spending between FY2001 and FY2018 will be $1.909.7 billion or $1.9 trillion.
Given the costs omitted from the OCO budget, the real total cost is almost certainly well over $2 trillion.
• These estimates update a series of earlier analyses by the CRS, one of which noted that "Other observers
and analysts define war costs more broadly than congressional appropriations and include estimates of the
life-time costs of caring for OEF/OIF/OND veterans, imputed interest costs on the deficit, or increases in
DOD’s base budget deemed to be a consequence of support for the war…Such costs are difficult to compute,
subject to extensive caveats, and often based on methodologies that may not be appropriate…"
• Three of these alternative cost estimates are also summarized in this section. One by Lina J. Blimes puts the
total cost at $4 to $6 trillion by end FY2016. A related estimate by the Watson Institute puts the cost at $4.8
trillion through FY2016.
• A third estimate, by Neta Crawford, puts costs at more than $4.8 trillion through FY2017, plus more than
$7.9 trillion in cumulative interest on past appropriations, or more than $12.7 trillion.
• It is important to note that separate work by GAO and by Todd Harrison of the CSIS in assessing the overall
OCO account --- Enduring Dilemma of Overseas Contingency Operations Funding, Transition45 Series,
January 11, 2017 -- states that both Congress and the Obama administration moved items from the base
budget to the OCO budget as a way of circumventing the BCA budget caps. Roughly half of the OCO budget
($30 billion) is now being used for programs and activities that were previously funded in the base budget.
These issues are discussed in more detail later in this study.
• None of these totals includes the cost of domestic Homeland defense activity.. These costs reached $45
billion a year by FY 2018, less the Department of Defense, and over $70 billion including it.
18
 US DoD and State OCO War Costs: FY2001-FY2018 - II
Estimate in Budget Authority ($US In billions of BA), Less interest.

Category FY2001-FY2014 CRS* FY2001-FY2016 CRS** FY2001-FY2018***

Afghanistan
• DoD 700.7 NA 840.7
• State 36.2 NA NA
• Total 743.7**** NA NA

Iraq
• DoD 753.5 NA 770.5
• State 50.2 NA NA
• Total 819.6**** NA NA

Total
• DoD 1,557.6 1,618.2 1747.8
• State 107.1 123.2 161.9
• Total 1,682.4 1,741.4 1,909.7

Reflects June 2014 amended DOD request, excludes OIR. Totals may not add due to rounding.
*Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, CRS RL33110, December 8, 2014, p.19.
** Lynn M. Williams and Susan B. Epstein -- Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, February 7, 2017
.*** Adds in OCO break out by DoD and state in their annual budget submissions. State does not provide a break out for Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria
**** Includes VA expenses for FY2001-FY2014.

19
 Williams and Epstein CRS Estimate of Total US War Costs: FY2001-FY2016
The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that through FY2016 Congress has appropriated $1.6 trillion to DOD
for war-related operational costs, support for deployed troops, and transportation of personnel and equipment
since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001…When combined with an estimated $123.2 billion in amounts
appropriated for war-related activities of the State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
(SFOPS), these agencies have received an estimated $1.7 trillion for activities and operations related to the broad
U.S. response to the attacks, including extended operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. DOD activities account for
$1.6 trillion—or 93%―of the total enacted funding designated for these purposes. Diplomatic operations and
foreign aid programs of the DOS account for another $123.2 billion, or 7.0% of the total.
For FY2017, the Administration initially requested $73.7 billion be designated as OCO/GWOT funding ($58.8 billion
for DOD and $14.9 billion for DOS). In November 2016, the Administration amended its OCO request, increasing
the total to $85.3 billion ($64.6 billion for DOD and $20.7 billion for State/USAID)

Emergency and OCO/GWOT Funding for Emergency or OCO/GWOT Funding by Agency

War-Related Activities: FY2001-FY2016

Source: Lynn M. Williams and Susan B. Epstein -- Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, 20
February 7, 2017 .
 Amy Belasco CRS Estimate of US War Costs: FY2001-FY2015
Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total $1.6 trillion for military operations,
base support, weapons maintenance, training of Afghan and Iraq security forces, reconstruction, foreign aid,
embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the war operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks.

Of this $1.6 trillion total, CRS estimates that the total is distributed as follows:

• $686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and other counterterror
operations received;

• $815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn (OND);

• $27 billion (2%) for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and

• $81 billion (5%) for war-designated funding not considered directly related to the Afghanistan or Iraq
wars.

About 92% of the funds are for Department of Defense (DOD), 6% for State Department foreign aid programs
and diplomatic operations, 1% for Department of Veterans Administration’s medical care for veterans. In
addition, 5% of the funds (across agencies) are for programs and activities tangentially-related to war
operations.

The FY2015 war request for DOD, State/USAID, and Veterans Administration Medical totals $73.5 billion
including $58.1 billion for Afghanistan, $5.0 billion for Iraq, $ 100 million for enhanced security, and $10.4 billion
for other war-designated funding. These totals do not reflect the new FY2015 request submitted in November
2014 to cover expenses for Operations Inherent Resolve (OIR) that began with airstrikes launched in late August
2014, to aid Syrian insurgents and the Iraq government to counter the takeover of territory by the Islamic State
(IS). The Administration submitted a $5.5 billion FY2015 budget amendment for this operation that Congress is
considering. Including the new request, the FY2015 war funding now totals $79.0 billion.

Source: Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, Congressional Research 21
Service RL-33110 December 8, 2014.
 Belasco on Method of CRS Estimate of US War Costs: FY2001-FY2015

This CRS report defines war costs as those designated as emergency or OCO appropriations for: Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) largely for the Afghan war; Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation New Dawn
(OND) for Iraq; and, Enhanced Security or Operation Noble Eagle. For State Department, and USAID, CRS
includes all appropriations for activities and programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. CRS includes Budget Authority
(BA) for VA Medical costs for OEF/OIF veterans as identified in budget justification materials. Emergency or OCO-
designated funds are exempt from budget caps.

Other observers and analysts define war costs more broadly than congressional appropriations and include
estimates of the life-time costs of caring for OEF/OIF/OND veterans, imputed interest costs on the deficit, or
increases in DOD’s base budget deemed to be a consequence of support for the war…Such costs are difficult to
compute, subject to extensive caveats, and often based on methodologies that may not be appropriate…

For a discussion of war funding issues for the State Department/USAID FY2015 request, see CRS Report R43569,
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2015 Budget and Appropriations, by Susan B. Epstein, Alex
Tiersky, and Marian L. Lawson.

For a description of politico-military developments in Afghanistan and Iraq, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-
Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

For the Islamic State crisis, see CRS Report IF00050, The Islamic State: Q&A (In Focus), by Carla E. Humud,
Christopher M. Blanchard, and Kenneth Katzman and CRS ReportR43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S.
Policy, by Kenneth Katzman et al., and CRS Report R43727, Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In
Brief, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Amy Belasco.

Source: Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, Congressional Research 22
Service RL-33110 December 8, 2014.
 Alternative Linda J. Blimes Estimate : FY2001-FY2016
The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending Decisions Will
Constrain Future National Security Budgets
Linda J. Bilmes
Harvard University
Abstract: The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, taken together, will be the most expensive wars in
US history – totaling somewhere between $4 to $6 trillion. This includes long-term medical care
and disability compensation for service members, veterans and families, military replenishment
and social and economic costs. The largest portion of that bill is yet to be paid. Since 2001, the
US has expanded the quality, quantity, availability and eligibility of benefits for military
personnel and veterans. This has led to unprecedented growth in the Department of Veterans
Affairs and the Department of Defense budgets. These benefits will increase further over the
next 40 years. Additional funds are committed to replacing large quantities of basic equipment
used in the wars and to support ongoing diplomatic presence and military assistance in the Iraq
and Afghanistan region. The large sums borrowed to finance operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
will also impose substantial long-term debt servicing costs. As a consequence of these wartime
spending choices, the United States will face constraints in funding investments in personnel
and diplomacy, research and development and new military initiatives. The legacy of decisions
taken during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars will dominate future federal budgets for decades to
come.

Linda J. Bilmes, The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security,
Budgets Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Harvard Kennedy School, March 2013, RWP13-006,
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=8956&type=WPN
23
.
 Alternative Brown University, Watson Institute Estimate
The United States federal government has spent or obligated $4.8 trillion dollars on the wars in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iraq. This figure includes: direct Congressional war appropriations; war-related increases to the
Pentagon base budget; veterans care and disability; increases in the homeland security budget; interest
payments on direct war borrowing; foreign assistance spending; and estimated future obligations for
veterans’ care.

This total omits many other expenses, such as the macroeconomic costs to the US economy; the opportunity
costs of not investing war dollars in alternative sectors; future interest on war borrowing; and local
government and private war costs.

The current wars have been paid for almost entirely by borrowing. This borrowing has raised the US budget
deficit, increased the national debt, and had other macroeconomic effects, such as raising consumer interest
rates. Unless the US immediately repays the money borrowed for war, there will also be future interest
payments. We estimate that interest payments could total over $7.9 trillion by 2053.

Spending on the wars has involved opportunity costs for the US economy. Although military spending does
produce jobs, spending in other areas such as health care could produce more jobs. Additionally, while
investment in military infrastructure grew, investment in other, nonmilitary, public infrastructure such as
roads and schools did not grow at the same rate.

Finally, federal war costs exclude billions of dollars of state, municipal, and private war costs across the
country – dollars spent on services for returned veterans and their families, in addition to local homeland
security efforts.

(Page updated as of September 2016)

WATSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 111 Thayer Street, Brown University, Box 1970 Providence, RI
USA 02912-1970, P +1 401 863 2809, costsofwar@brown.edu

24
 Alternative Neta Crawford Estimate : FY2001-FY2016

Neta C. Crawford, US Budgetary Costs of Wars through 2016: $4.79 Trillion and Counting Summary of
Costs of the US Wars in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan and Homeland Security. US Costs of Wars Through 2014: Neta C.
Crawford is Professor of Political Science at Boston University and Co-‐-Director of the Costs of War project. Crawford thanks
contributors to the Costs of War Project, especially Linda J. Bilmes and Catherine Lutz.
httarp://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2016/Costs%20of%20War%20through%202016%20FINAL%20fin
al%20v2.pdf. 25
 Setting the Stage:

Cost of Past Wars

7/10/2017 26
 Cost Compared to Past Wars

This section updates part of another CRS study -- one by Stephen Dagget -- that
attempted to cost past American wars from the American Revolution through the
Persian Gulf War, and the early phases of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
As Mr. Dagget notes, there are massive uncertainties in such cost estimates, but it is
striking that if the cost to date of the Afghan and Iraq/Syria wars are shown in constant
dollars, even the comparatively low end estimate of $2 trillion through FY2018 would
make these wars more expensive than every other period of conflict in American
history except the American revolution, the Civil War, and World War II.
• They are more than five times more expensive than World War I.
• They are more than five times more expensive than the Korean War.
• They are nearly 2.5 times more expensive than the Vietnam War.
• They are more than 18 times more expensive than the first Gulf War in 1991.
• Given the estimates that the real costs are already well over $4 trillion, these
multipliers would be more than doubled if any of the alternative war costs cited
earlier are correct.

27
 Total Cost of Past U.S. Wars 1775- 1991: I

$2017=$2,631
million

$2017=$1,697
million

$2017=$2,597
million

$2017=$65,176
million

$2017=$21,981
million

$2017=$9,874
million

Source: Adapted from Stephen Dagget, Cost of Major U.S. Wars, CRS RS 22926, June 29, 2010, pp. 1-2. FY2017 cost estimates uses DoD FY2017 Greenbook 28
(p.61) deflator to convert FY2011 to FY2917 dollars, using a multiplier of 1.093
 Total Cost of Past U.S. Wars 1775- 1991: II

$2017=$365
billion

$2017=$4,486
billion

$2017=$372
billion

$2017=$807
billion

$2017=$111
billion

$2017=$857
billion

$2017=$351
billion

$2017=$1,254
billion

Source: Adapted from Stephen Dagget, Cost of Major U.S. Wars, CRS RS 22926, June 29, 2010, pp. 1-2. FY2017 cost estimates uses DoD FY2017 Greenbook 29
(p.61) deflator to convert FY2011 to FY2917 dollars, using a multiplier of 1.093
 Setting the Stage:

Comparing U.S. with Nth Country

Military Spending

7/10/2017 30
 Comparative Total U.S. vs. Nth Country Military Spending
This section compares current total U.S. baseline and war spending with the spending of other
states. The size of U.S. military spending is difficult to estimate in comparable terms. Work by
Todd Harrison, for example, shows that total U.S. defense-related costs totaled some $905 billion
in FY2017:
• This was 161% of the $560.7 billion Baseline and defense-related nuclear and other
budget.
• It was 146% of the $619.7 billion total ($560.7 plus the $58.8 billion in OCO costs)
• It was 150% of the IISS estimate of $604.5 billion for 2016.
• OCO costs alone were 10.3% of $560.7 billion and 9.5% of the total of $619.7 billion
If one does uses the $619.7 billion total for the U.S., it is:
• 4.3 times the IISS estimate of $145 billion for China, and 2.9 times the SIPIRI estimate of
$215 billion.
• 10.5 times the IISS estimate of $58.9 billion for Russia, and 9.0 times the SIPIRI estimate
of $69.2 billion
• Morethan10 times the military expenditures of the three leading NATO European states:
France. Germany, and the U.K.
At the same time, 11 of the other top 15 military spenders are allies of, or have close security ties
to, the United States 31
 U.S. Defense Budget versus Total U.S.
Defense Costs

$905 Billion is:

• 161% of
$560.7B
baseline

• 146% of
$619.7B
IISS
Estimate
Source: Todd Harrison, Perspective on the Defense Budget, CSIS, ISP, May 2017 32
 The Comparative Level of U.S. Defense Efforts - IISS

Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2017, p. 18 33

 The Comparative Level of U.S. Defense Efforts - SIPRI

Source: SIPRI, https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-spending/military-expenditure. 34

 The Comparative Level of U.S. Defense Efforts - SIPRI

Source: SIPRI, https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-spending/military-expenditure. 35

 The Comparative Level of U.S. Defense Efforts - SIPRI

Source: SIPRI, , https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-

and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-
spending/military-expenditure

36
 Setting the Stage

Impact of the Total U.S. Military and

Effort in Recent Wars as a Percent of
Total Federal Spending and GDP

7/10/2017 37
 Size and Cost of the Total U.S. Military and Civil Effort in Recent
Wars and Its Impact as a Percent of GDP - I
One of the key aspects of the current cost of U.S. wars is that, in spite of their apparently high
cost, they represent a comparatively low burden on the U.S. economy in terms of GDP, total
federal spending, labor, capital, and use of the U.S. industrial base.
The difficulties in defining military expenditures do create differences in estimates of the percent
of GDP, but they are comparatively minor. All recent estimates show that the burden the Afghan
and Iraq/Syria wars placed on the economy did not equal the burden the peacetime Reagan build
up created, and that the percentage has dropped sharply since most U.S. combat troops left
Afghanistan and Iraq.
• If one uses CBO estimates, the burden on the economy moved from 5% of GDP in 1980s to a
low of 2.8% in FY1998.
• The Baseline level has average 2.8% since then, but the total including OCO rose back to a high
of 3.4% in FY2010
• Defense OCO was only 0.3% in FY2016
• The total Defense burden is projected to decline from 2.8% in FY2017 to 2.5% in FY2021 and
FY2.3% in 2030.
• Even if one uses the higher estimate of military spending used by Todd Harrison, the total is
now under 6.0%.
38
Size and Cost of the Total U.S. Military and Civil Effort in Recent
Wars and Its Impact as a Percent of GDP - II
There are, however, several critical problems with current projections of FY2018 and beyond.
• They do not include the build-up the Trump Administration has said will begin in FY2019.
• Past Estimates of spending have been consistently wrong, and the inputs have been
consistently undercosted.
• There have been no serious attempts to develop Future Year Defense Program costs in recent
years, largely because of the Budget Control Act, and DoD outyear budget forecasts have been
political placeholders.
• Long term budget projections by the CBO and others invariably assume the end to war with
one or two years in the future and no major contingency thereafter. This has been grossly
unrealistic since the late 1930s.
• This is particularly unrealistic because this assumption is critical to estimating steady reduction
in military spending, sizing the impact of rising entitlement and mandatory budget costs, and
the size of the deficit.

39
 Burden of Defense as Percent of GDP in Past Wars: DoD Analysis

https://www.google.com/search?q=us+defense+spending+as+a+percent+of+gdp+graph&tbm=isch&imgil=nJgcXGV-
xOkgUM%253A%253B_lRf9ZMlnxCslM%253Bhttps%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.cfr.org%25252Freport%25252Ftrends-us-military-
spending&source=iu&pf=m&fir=nJgcXGV-xOkgUM%253A%252C_lRf9ZMlnxCslM%252C_&usg=__M5gOHPhzN-
Dh8t0QMxAVrJE8bsk%3D&biw=1134&bih=833&ved=0ahUKEwibt6KLs73UAhVBcD4KHXxYC2cQyjcISw&ei=XzRBWduLKMHg-QH8sK24Bg#imgrc=aJ6XQAgMMLzGbM:
7/10/2017 40
 Burden of Defense as Percent of GDP in Past Wars: Heritage Analysis

John Fleming/The Heritage Foundation; Thaleigha Rampersad , The History of Defense Spending in One Chart, The Daily Signal, February 14, 2015 41
 Burden of Defense as Percent of GDP in Past Wars: CSIS (Todd Harrison)
Analysis
World
War II

Korea

Vietnam Regan
Build- Gulf
Up War Afghan Iraq
War War

Todd Harrison, Perspectives on the Defense Budget, International Security Program, CSIS, 3/2017, p. 4. Labels for time periods added by the author.
42
 No Obama Plan for Future OCO Spending After FY2017

CBO, An Analysis of the Obama Administrations Final Future Years Defense Program, April 2017, p. 2.
43
 CBO Projects Declining Impact on GDP in Final Obama Plans

5% of GDP in
1980s.
2.8% in FY1998
Base averages
2.8% since then
But high of 3.4%
in FY2010
OCDO is 0.3% in
FY2016
Decline from
2.8% in FY2017
to:
2.5% in FY2021
and FY2.3% in
2030
CBO, An Analysis of the Obama Administrations Final Future Years Defense Program, April 2017, p. 15.
44
 Projected Burden of Defense as Percent of GDP versus Other Spending
in FY2018 Budget Request

OMB, BUDGET OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT: A New Foundation For American Greatness Fiscal Year 2018, p. 31.

7/10/2017 45
 Today’s Wars

The Size and Cost of

the U.S. Military and Civil Effort (DoD
and State/USAID) in Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) in
FY2001-FY2018

7/10/2017 46
 Size and Cost of the U.S. Military and Civil Effort (DoD and State/USAID)
Overseas Contingency Operations in FY2001-FY2018
• The charts in this section summarize CRS reporting on total DoD/State/USAID OCO costs to date.

• Total estimates of the cost through FY2018 have been made earlier. The status of the FY2018 OCO
requests for DoD and State are now highly uncertain and these charts focus on FY2001-FY2017.
• There is no break out in the budget request by war of State/USAID and VA spending for FY2016-FY2018.

• Some war fighting and support costs are not included in the OCO request . The President’s FY2107
budget request included $1.553.6 billion for contingency operations funded in the base budget. These
activities are not designated as emergency or OCO/GWOT and are subject to the BCA limits:*

*Source: Lynn M. Williams and Susan B. Epstein -- Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, 47
February 7, 2017 .
 US Estimated DoD, State, USAID, and VA War Funding by War, FY2001-
FY2015 Request (In $US Billions of Dollars of Budget Authority )

Reflects June 2014 amended DOD request, excludes OIR. Totals may not add due to rounding.
Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, CRS RL33110, December 8, 2014, p.19. 48
 US War Costs: CRS Estimate Based on FY2001-FY2015

Reflects June 2014 amended DOD request, excludes OIR. Totals may not add due to rounding.
Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, CRS RL33110, December 8, 2014, p.19.

49
 DoD and DoS OCO Funding: FY2012-FY2017
Q4 FY2007-Q1 FY2016

Williams & Epstein, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, February 7, 2017 p.25.
50
 Today’s Wars

The Cost of the

U.S. War Effort as Reported by DoD
for Total Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) in FY2001-FY2018

7/10/2017 51
 The Cost of the U.S. War Effort as Reported by DoD for Total Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) in FY2001-FY2018
The charts and tables in this section focus on total DoD spending by year, and OCO expenditure by
war.
• They reflect the acute pressure that the rising cost of the Iraq War put on funding for the
Afghan conflict during FY2005 through FTY2008;
• They show that reduction in troop levels did not bring proportionate cuts in total war costs.
• They also reflect the fact that fact that the Department begun to avoid the budget caps
established by the Budget Control Act from FY2014 on wards by including them in the Afghan
War OCO account. DoD did so although they were Baseline efforts and should not technically
have been counted as war costs because Congress gave it the option of making such a request.
State/USAID did not have this option.
• Several charts summarize GAO criticism of the way DoD included given costs in the OCO
account, and indicate that DoD may correct its reporting in the future.
• Other charts summarize work by Todd Harrison of CSIS showing the extent to which non-OCO
expenditures became included in the OCO budget accounts.
• The final charts summarize the FY2018 budget submission data for the OCO accounts in the
detail provided by the DoD budget summary. They show the cost by war, by service, and by
broad cost category for the entire OCO account. Only limited break outs of these key data are
provided by war.
52
 DoD Top Line Funding Since September 11 Attacks: FY2001-FY2018
(in Current $US billions)

Total OCO is $1,748 billion from FY2001-FY2018. This was 16.5% of total Topline
Spending of $10,613 billion (does not include nuclear in DOE and veterans in VA)

OSD Comptroller, FY2018 Budget Summary, DoD, May 2017,. 1-2 53

 U.S. OCO DoD Spending by War: FY2001-FY2016
(Dollars in $US Billions of Budget Authority)

As of July 2016, DOD had obligated

a total of $1.4 trillion for emergency
or OCO/GWOT requirements for
these named operations.
Afghanistan
• OEF -$592.8 billion
• OFS -$60.9 billion
Iraq
• OIF/OND -$732.1 billion
• OIR -$10.7 billion
Enhanced U.S. Security/Noble Eagle
• ONE -$27.5 billion

Williams & Epstein, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, February 7, 2017 p.19, and Department of
54
Defense Cost of War Report, July 2016. .
 OCO Costs and War Costs: FY2016 versus FY2017

Tod Harrison, Perspective on the Defense Budget, CSIS, ISP, May 2017

7/10/2017 55
 Historical trends in OCO Funding and troop Levels: FY2006-FY2018

1/ Iraq/Syria data are for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (CIF), Operation NEW DAWN (OND), Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR), and follow-on Iraq activities. The FY
2017 OCO request amount also included $2.0 billion for the acceleration of the effort to defeat ISIS.
2/ Afghanistan data is for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (OFS).
3/ FY 2017 request for ‘BBA Compliance’ reflects base budget amounts added to the OCO budget to meet the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2015 mandated topline.
56
Source OSD Comptroller, OSD Comptroller, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.,
DoD, May 2017, pp. 1-2, 6-1
 Problems in the OCO Account: The GAO Analysis - I
In 2010 the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in collaboration with the Department of Defense (DOD), issued criteria for
deciding whether items properly belong in the base budget or in the overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding request, but the
criteria are outdated and do not address the full scope of activities included in DOD’s fiscal year 2017 OCO budget request.

For example, they do not address geographic areas such as Syria and Libya, where DOD has begun military operations; DOD’s deterrence
and counterterrorism initiatives; or requests for OCO funding to support requirements not related to ongoing contingency operations.

Further, the amount of OCO appropriations DOD considers as non-war increased from about 4 percent in fiscal year 2010 to 12 percent in
fiscal year 2015. DOD officials agree that updated guidance is needed but note that the Office of Management and Budget has deferred
the decision to update the criteria until a new administration is in place in 2017.

Without reevaluating and revising the criteria, decision makers may be hindered in their ability to set priorities and make funding trade-
offs

DOD officials told GAO that the department had developed an initial estimate of costs being funded with OCO appropriations that are
likely to endure beyond current operations, but has not finalized or reported its estimate outside of the department.

In May and July 2016, OMB and DOD officials said the estimate of enduring costs was between $20 billion and $30 billion—as much as 46
percent of DOD’s total OCO budget request for fiscal year 2017—and indicated that DOD continues to evaluate and revise this estimate,
which might be closer to the higher end of that range.

GAO recommended in 2014 that DOD develop guidance for transitioning enduring costs funded by OCO appropriations to DOD’s base
budget. According to DOD officials, DOD has not finalized and reported its estimate of enduring costs because current statutory spending
caps limit its ability to increase base budget funding.

Without a reliable estimate of DOD’s enduring OCO costs, decision makers will not have a complete picture of the department’s future
funding needs or be able to make informed choices and trade-offs in budget formulation and decision making…

GAO recommends that DOD, in collaboration with OMB, reevaluate and revise the criteria for determining what can be included in DOD’s
OCO budget requests; and that DOD develop a complete and reliable estimate of enduring OCO costs to report in future budget requests.
DOD concurred with our first recommendation and plans to propose revised OCO criteria to OMB. DOD partially concurred with our
second recommendation but identified no steps planned to develop and report its enduring OCO costs.

Source: GAO, OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS: OMB and DOD Should Revise the Criteria for Determining Eligible Costs and Identify the 57
Costs Likely to Endure Long Term, GSO-17-68, January 2017.
 Problems in the OCO Account: The GAO Analysis - II

Source: GAO, OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS: OMB and DOD Should Revise the Criteria for Determining Eligible Costs and Identify the
Costs Likely to Endure Long Term, GSO-17-68, January 2017. 58
Using the OCO Account to Avoid the Budget Caps from FY2014
Onwards: The Harrison Analysis - I
Beginning in FY 2014... the first OCO budget request submitted after the BCA budget caps went into enforcement...the
Obama administration began requesting roughly $25 to $30 billion more for Afghanistan than historical trends indicate
would be necessary given the level of forces remaining in Afghanistan. The evidence suggests that this additional funding is
not due to operations in Afghanistan but rather is base budget funding that has been re-labeled by the Obama
administration as OCO funding.
...DoD has tacitly acknowledged that roughly $30 billion of the current OCO request is being used for base budget activities,
referring to it as “enduring costs.” In the FY 2016 budget request, DoD stated that “early this year [2015] the Administration
will propose a plan to transition all enduring costs currently funded in the OCO budget to the base budget beginning in 2017
and ending by 2020.” Responding to a question about this in a February 2015 press briefing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob
Work alluded to the magnitude of enduring costs and the difficulty of transferring them back into the base budget where
they once resided using a hypothetical (emphasis added):
“The White House will announce that their intent is to try to move what these enduring base costs that have crept into OCO
over 13 years of war back into the base budget. But we can only do it if the sequestration caps are lifted. Otherwise, if you
took 20 (billion dollars) to $30 billion of enduring costs—or enduring costs and tried to put it into the budget without a
concomitant topline increase, as the vice chairman as said, that, in essence, is a 20 [billion dollar] to$30 billion per year cut.”[
Deputy Secretary Work left it as a broad hypothetical and stopped short of saying that $20 to $30 billion was in fact the
amount of base budget funding in the OCO budget. But more than a year later on September 30, 2016 a DoD spokesperson
confirmed this, saying: “The Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget
request includes requirements associated with a forward presence and readiness that will likely continue after current
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria conclude. The cost associated with these enduring requirements is in the range of
$30billion annually..."
As Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has previously stated, OCO “is funding that is intended to cover the variable costs of
operations that go up and down in the course of a year. The base budget funds the enduring military that will be here 10
years, 20 years down the road..." The enduring requirements DoD references for “forward presence and readiness” are
cornerstones of the base budget that are needed regardless of contingency operations around the world.

Source: Excerpted from Todd Harrison, The Enduring Dilemma of Overseas Contingency Operations Funding, Transition45 Series, CSIS-ISP, January
11, 2017 59
Using the OCO Account to Avoid the Budget Caps from FY2014
Onwards: The Harrison Analysis - II
...The fact that $30 billion of the OCO budget is being used for base budget activities creates several challenges for the new
administration. First, it means that DoD’s current programs and force structure cost more than is shown in its base budget
request. This is particularly problematic in the out-years of DoD’s budget request (FY 2018 to FY 2021) because the budget
projections for these years do not include the roughly $120 billion in “enduring” OCO funding the Department is planning to
use to support its base budget over the next four years. This is on top of the $113 billion the Obama administration’s base
defense budget request exceeds the BCA budget caps over the same period, making a combined shortfall of roughly $233
billion, or nearly $60 billion per year over the next four years.[12] Before the Trump administration can begin to fund its
plans to grow the force it must first fund this shortfall just to maintain the level of forces and readiness projected by the
Obama administration.
It also means that overall federal spending and deficit projections will be worse than the administration’s FY 2017 budget
materials indicate. These additional “enduring” costs would add roughly $120 billion to the $2.6 trillion in deficit spending
the budget already projects for the next five years (FY 2017 to FY 2021..This does not include legitimate war-related costs in
future years, which are also not fully accounted for in the budget request’s deficit projections and will further increase
deficits.
The continued use of OCO funding in this manner could complicate budget negotiations in Congress and within the
Trump administration. Fiscal conservatives within the Republican party, and Rep. Mulvaney in particular, have argued that
any increases in defense should be matched by equal cuts in other parts of the budget. Democrats (and even the Obama
administration) have argued that any increases in the defense budget—base or OCO—must be matched by equal increases in
the non-defense budget. As the Trump administration begins preparations for its FY 2018 budget request, the question of
how to handle the base budget funding in OCO could be a major point of contention among OMB, DoD, and Congress.

Source: Excerpted from Todd Harrison, The Enduring Dilemma of Overseas Contingency Operations Funding, Transition45 Series, CSIS-ISP, January
11, 2017
60
 OCO Funding: FY2016-FY2018
(in Current $US billions)

OSD Comptroller, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. DoD, May 2017,61

pp. 1-2,
6-1
 OCO Budget by Department and Budget Title FY2017-FY2018
(in Current $US billions)

62
OSD Comptroller, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf., DoD, May 2017, p. A-5-A-
6
 Revisions to OCO Funding by Category in FY2017

7/10/2017
OSD Comptroller, Request for Additional FY2017 Appropriations, DoD, March 16, 2017, p. 5 63
 OCO Budget Functions: FY2017-FY2018 - I
(in Current $US billions)

1/ CTEF is a new account and includes the original request of $630 million for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) and $250 million for
the Syria Train and Equip Fund (STEF), plus the additional March budget amendment request of $446.4 million for ITEF related
requirements and $180 million for STEF related requirements.
2/ The FY 2017 request includes $289.5 million requested in the FY 2017/2018 Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) for support to the
Kurdish Peshmerga.
3/ In FY 2017, funding for Security Cooperation was appropriated as the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF). The National
Defense Authorization Act for FY 2017 realigned CTPF funding to Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide and made it available for
a wide range of security cooperation activities, including counterterrorism.
4/ FY 2017 requested ‘BBA Compliance’ includes base budget amounts added to the OCO budget to meet the Bipartisan Budget Act
(BBA) of 2015 mandated topline.

64
OSD Comptroller, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf., DoD, May 2017, p. 6-2
 OCO Budget Functions: FY2017-FY2018 - I
Operations/Force Protection ($11.8 billion): This category of incremental cost includes the full spectrum of military operations
requirements for U.S. personnel operating in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria:
• Personnel special pays and subsistence for deployed forces;
• Personnel pay for mobilized forces;
• Operating tempo (ground vehicles/equipment, combat aviation, Special Operations Forces);
• Communications;
• Pre-deployment training;
• Transportation cost to sustain and support the forces, including the retrograde of U.S. equipment from Afghanistan;
• Various classes of supplies;
• Deployment and redeployment of combat and support forces;
• Life support and sustainment; and
• Additional body armor and personal protective gear.
In-Theater Support ($19.2 billion): Funds requested in this category provide for critical combat and other support for personnel in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria that comes from units and forces operating outside Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. This category also includes
funding to support other operations conducted outside Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.
The types of cost incurred for in-theater operations are similar to those outlined in the “Operations/Force Protection” category.
However, this category also includes incremental costs for afloat and air expeditionary forces, engineers, fire support, and other
capabilities located elsewhere that support operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other important missions. It also includes support
for some activities operating from the United States (such as remote piloted aircraft and reach back intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities).
• Office of Security Cooperation — Iraq (OSC-I) ($42 million): This program is DoD’s cornerstone for achieving the long-term U.S. goal of
building partnership capacity in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The OSC-I conducts the full range of traditional security cooperation
activities such as joint exercise planning, combined arms training, conflict resolution, multilateral peace operations, senior level visits,
and other forms of bilateral engagement. Additionally, the OSC-I conducts security cooperation activities in support of the ISF to
include: CT training, institutional training; ministerial and service level advisors; logistic and operations capacity building; intelligence
integration; and interagency collaboration. The OSC-I is the critical Defense component of the U.S. Mission Iraq and a foundational
element of the long-term strategic partnership with Iraq.
• Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) ($5 million): This program provides a vital resource that allows military
commanders on the ground in Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs within their areas of
responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Afghan people and assist U.S. forces in maintaining security
gains, thereby advancing the counterinsurgency mission.
65
OSD Comptroller, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf., DoD, May 2017, pp. 6-4 to 6-7
 OCO Budget Functions: FY2018 - II
Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Fund ($0.5 billion): These funds will be used to understand, develop, procure, and field measures to
defeat improvised threats to U.S. forces, closing the gap between the enemy's innovation cycles and operational capabilities employed
by the Joint Force.
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) ($4.9 billion): This request funds the sustainment, operations, and professionalization of up to
352,000 members of the ANDSF, including 195,000 members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 157,000 Afghan National Police
(ANP), as well as 30,000 Afghan Local Police. The request funds the sustainment of the ANA and ANP and supports further development
of the capacity of the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior to sustain and command and control their forces. It includes over $700
million for the program to address aviation lift and aerial fires capability gaps and transition from Russian-manufactured to U.S.-
manufactured rotary wing assets. This is in addition to the $814 million requested in FY 2017 ASFF request to begin transitioning the
Afghan aviation fleet.
Support for Coalition Forces ($1.3 billion): Amounts requested finance coalition, friendly forces, and a variety of support requirements
for key foreign partners who wish to participate in U.S. military operations but lack financial means. Such support reduces the burden on
U.S. forces and is critical to overall mission success.
Equipment Reset and Readiness ($9.0 billion): The request funds the replenishment, replacement, and repair of equipment and
munitions expended, destroyed, damaged, or worn out due to prolonged use in combat operations. The major items that will be
repaired or replaced include unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, trucks, other tactical vehicles, radios, and various
combat support equipment. Munitions that will be replenished include the Small Diameter Bombs, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket
Systems (GMLRS), Hellfire, Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, Army Tactical Missile System and ammunition for all the Military
Services. Upon returning from war zones, units restore their equipment to a condition that enables them to conduct training exercises,
achieve required readiness levels, and prepare for future deployments. As personnel and equipment return from theater to their home
stations, the need for equipment reset will continue for several years.
COUNTER-ISIS TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND :The United States Government’s strategy to counter ISIS directed DoD to conduct a campaign
to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIS. The focus of DoD’s efforts is to work by, with, and through the Government of Iraq’s
Security Forces and Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO) forces to build key security force capabilities and promote longer term stability of the
region.
The FY 2018 request of $1.8 billion for the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) consists of requirements
needed to continue the ongoing fight to defeat ISIS. The CTEF appropriation reflects the consolidation of funding sources for the Iraq and
Syria Train and Equip (T&E) efforts, allowing the Department to quickly and effectively provide assistance to foreign security forces,
irregular forces, groups, or individuals participating in activities to counter ISIS. This fund provides timely funding and flexibility to the
Commander while providing the Congress with oversight of the program. The $1.8 billion request includes $1.3 billion for Iraq T&E
activities and $0.5 billion for Syria T&E activities.
66
OSD Comptroller, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf., DoD, May 2017, p. 6-2
 OCO Budget Functions: FY2018 - III
SECURITY COOPERATION The FY 2018 request includes $850 million for Security Cooperation (SC). This funding replaces the
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), which was transitioned in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public
Law 114-328) and in the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017 (Public Law 115-31) to a new, broader authority that includes
counterterrorism, crisis response, border security and other security cooperation support to partner nations. Security Cooperation funds
provide the ability to enable partner nations to deter and defeat existing and evolving terrorist and other transnational threats. Training
and equipping partner nations allows U.S. forces to be more readily available for other contingency operations, build better relationships
with partners, and promote global security in a more cost effective manner.
EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE The FY 2018 budget request enhances the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) by adding new
capabilities to improve deterrence and increase capabilities while continuing to reassure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security
and territorial integrity as members of the NATO Alliance. The FY 2018 budget request of $4.8 billion for ERI provides near-term flexibility
and responsiveness to the evolving concerns of U.S. allies and partners in Europe and helps to increase the capability and readiness of
U.S. allies and partners.
Specifically, the request enhances deterrence by continuing to implement the increased ground force posture while increasing joint
capabilities and activities; continues the build-up of Army equipment stockpiled in theater to increase responsiveness and improve force
effectiveness; maintains and increases the rotational presence of joint forces in theater to participate in exercises and training; increases
the capacity and resiliency of U.S. Air Force strike operations by expanding airbase infrastructure; increases joint enablers to improve
effectiveness of combat forces; and increases U.S. bilateral, and multilateral training and exercises to enhance preparedness of all forces
and improve interoperability with NATO Allies. The figure below provides the allocation of ERI by categories.

Excerpted from OSD Comptroller, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf., DoD,

May 2017, pp. 6-4 to 6-7
67
 OCO Budget Functions: FY2018 - IV

EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE (Continued) DoD will continue several lines of effort to accomplish the purposes of this
initiative, including: (1) increased U.S. military presence in Europe; (2) additional bilateral and multilateral exercises and training
with allies and partners; (3) improved infrastructure to allow for greater responsiveness; (4) enhanced prepositioning of U.S.
equipment in Europe; and (5) intensified efforts to build partner capacity for newer NATO members and other partners. Funding for
ERI is requested in the applicable Component accounts. UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE The FY 2018 budget request for ERI
includes $150 million to continue train, equip, and advise efforts to build Ukrainian capacity to conduct internal defense operations
to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, while also supporting needed institutional transformation efforts. This effort is
focused on developing a sustainable and effective Ukrainian capacity to generate and deploy appropriately manned, trained, and
equipped forces in the near term, while developing a sustainable defense sector and enhancing interoperability with NATO and
other Western forces. This funding will also improve Ukraine’s ability to command and control subordinate forces, understand the
operational environment, and integrate intelligence and operational data into decision making processes.
Support will include Command and Control Capabilities; Counter-battery radars; Training, Equipping, and Employment of Forces;
Comprehensive Logistics; and Advisory Efforts.

Excerpted from OSD Comptroller, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf., DoD,

May 2017, pp. 6-4 to 6-7
68
 Today’s Wars

The Cost in U.S. Casualties:

FY2001-2018

7/10/2017 69
 The Cost in U.S. Casualties: FY2001-2018

The human cost of war is perhaps the most critical single metric of warfighting.
One key element of any effective effort to cost a war should be to assess its
casualties.
• Current official U.S. data only include U.S. military and DoD civilians, and the
DoD web site does not provide a trend analysis.
• The contribution and sacrifices made by host country and allied forces is not
recognized.
• Threat casualties are not reported.
• Civilian casualties are not assessed in spite of the fact that this has become a
critical political and operational issue, and subject of both debate and threat
propaganda.
Failing to address casualties does not defuse the issues they raise or the reality
that they too are a cost of war.

70
 US Military Casualties as of June 2, 2017

71
Source: DoD, https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf, accessed June 2, 2017
 Today’s Wars

The Shifting Levels of Military

Personnel and Contractors in the
Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria:
FY2001-2018

7/10/2017 72
Shifting Levels of Military Personnel and Contractors in the Wars
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria : FY2001-2018 - I
Total personnel are another key measure of the cost of war, particularly when high-cost
all-volunteer forces are involved, and casualties are key political consideration. The charts
and tables in this section raise several key points about the need for better reporting on
manpower:
• Active duty strength has gotten far more expensive relative to DoD civilian full time
employees and U.S. and foreign contractors. This inevitably has reduced the number of
military in the force mix and made reporting military, civilian, and contract personnel a
critical aspect of reporting on force costs and trends. reporting that only covers military
personnel is outdated and grossly incompetent.
• This is especially true when the U.S. deploys large ground combat units, where civilians
and contractors have become critical parts of the "tooth to tail" ratio.
• The cost of all-volunteer forces limits the total force pool. The war in Iraq, for example,
put serious pressure on U.S. capability to properly deploy the numbers and skills
needed in Afghanistan, as well as helped force use of the reserves and National Guard.
This, in turn, creates a strong incentive to try to create effective local forces as soon as
possible.
• Cost and force size pressures also tend to create pressure to rely on sudden and
temporary "surges," which may or may not be effective, and the use of short rotations
and temporary duty personnel -- affecting levels of experience and capability.

73
Shifting Levels of Military Personnel and Contractors in the Wars
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria : FY2001-2018 - II
These pressures -- plus political sensitivity over U.S casualties -- helped create plans and/or
the willingness to withdraw quickly from Iraq and Afghanistan. These were not linked to
progress in stability operations and creating effective host country forces. The end result in
both wars was a resurgence in threat capabilities that forced the U.S. to redeploy -- greatly
increasing the marginal cost of the war. It also led to political reluctance to deploy the
need numbers of personnel except on a "creeping incremental" basis and after serious
problems emerged in host country capabilities -- extending the length as well as the cost of
the war.
Throughout both conflicts, reporting has focused on total personnel rather than on the
function and capability of the personnel engaged. Military history is often the history of
force quality defeating force quantity, and strategies and dollar spending need to be
validated by explaining the role and function of deployed personnel.
The budget data created a functionally meaningless pool of theater support personnel
with little or no explanation, no allocation by war, and that make up 65% of all military
personnel assigned to both Afghanistan and Syria/Iraq.
Data on cost per soldier warn that efforts to minimize personnel may have sharply raised
cost per solider deployed, creating major diseconomies of scale.
The final tables reflect the acute dependence on contractors, and show that the ratio of
this dependence has increased over time. Once again, a valid approach to resourcing and
costing the war must look beyond the number of military personnel and justify the total
number of personnel
74
 US Defense Spending vs. Force Size: FY1948-FY 2016
(In FY2017 Constant Dollars)

Todd Harrison, Perspective on the Defense Budget, CSIS, ISP, May 2017
75
 US Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria: FY2014 Plan

Notes: Reflects U.S. troops in-country; excludes troops providing in-theater support or conducting counter-terror
operations outside the region. Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, CRS RL33110, December 8, 2014,
76
p.9.
 US OEF and OIF Deployed U.S. Troops In 2000, 2008, 2011, and 2014

Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, CRS RL33110, December 8, 2014, p.9. 77
 US Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria: FY2017 Plan

Williams & Epstein, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, February 7, 2017 p.19. 78
 Failed Plans to Leave Afghanistan
Compared to Iraq, troop strength in Afghanistan grew more slowly but is falling as rapidly. After the initial defeat
of the Taliban in December 2001, the number of U.S. troops gradually doubled from 10,000 in 2002 to 20,000 in
2005 as the mission expanded, although violence remained at a fairly low level. In response to concerns about
the deteriorating security situation raised by U.S. commanding officers, then-President Bush agreed to gradually
double U.S. troop levels to about 40,000 between 2007 and 2008. Before leaving office in 2009, then-President
Bush agreed to increase U.S. troops in Afghanistan to 45,000, initiating what became known as the Afghanistan
surge…

After its strategy review, the new administration decided to continue the surge and add another 20,000 troops
by November 2009. After a second review in December 2009 prompted by pressure from military commanders
for additional troops to combat worsening security, President Obama approved an additional increase of 30,000
troops, bringing the total number of U.S. total to 98,000 by September 2010…At that time, President Obama
committed to evaluate current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in December 2010 to “allow us to begin the transfer
of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.” The total peaked at 100,000 in May 2011.

….On July 22, 2011, President Obama announced the surge would be reversed and the U.S. role would transition
from a combat role to a train and assist role in Afghanistan, stating that by “2014, this process of transition will
be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security.” As Afghan troops gradually took
the lead, U.S. troop levels declined fairly rapidly from the May 2011 peak of 100,000 to about 65,000 in
September 2012. In February 2013, President Obama announced that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan
would halve from 65,000 to 33,000 within a year. The President also announced that the “drawdown will
continue and by the end of next year, our war in Afghanistan will be over.”

After over a year of speculation about future U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan, President Obama announced on
May 27, 2014, that once the U.S. combat role ended by December 31, 2014, some 9,800 troops would remain for
another year to train Afghan security forces and conduct counterterror operations. That number would halve to
about 4,900 by January 2016, and fall to “an embassy presence” by January 2017

Source: Excerpted from Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, Congressional 79
Research Service RL-33110 December 8, 2014.
 Failed Plans to Leave Iraq

Six months after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, U.S. troop levels reached 149,000 troops in country.

By December 2003, troop levels fell to 124,000 and remained at about that level for the next three years.

In January 2007, then-President Bush initiated the Iraq surge in response to growing levels of violence and a
request for assistance in fighting insurgents, referred to as the “Sunni Awakening.” The “Iraq surge” peaked at
165,000 troops in November 2007. As levels of violence fell by July 2008, then-President Bush began to reverse
the surge and troop levels declined

After President Obama took office in January 2009, the Administration conducted a strategy review
of both the Afghan and Iraq wars. In that review, the President decided to shift U.S. forces in Iraq
from a combat to an advisory and assistance role, and reduce troop levels from 141,000 in March
2009 to about 50,000 by September 2010.

The bilateral security agreement at that time required that all U.S. troops be withdrawn by December 31, 2011.

Although the United States hoped to revise that agreement and retain some troops beyond 2011, the Iraqi
government refused to sign a new agreement that would shield U.S. troops from local law, so all U.S. troops
were withdrawn by December 31, 2011.

There (were)100 to 200 U.S. military personnel in Iraq to manage arms sales (in December 2014.)

Source: Excerpted from Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, Congressional 80
Research Service RL-33110 December 8, 2014.
 OCO Military Personnel: FY2015-FY2017
(as of February 2017)

Williams & Epstein, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, February 7, 2017 p.25.

81
 Revised OCO Military Personnel: FY2017
(as of February 2017)

OSD Comptroller, Request for Additional FY2017 Appropriations, DoD, March 16, 2017, p. 5
.
82
 OCO Force Level Assumptions: FY2016-FY2018
(As of May 2017)

In Afghanistan, the FY 2018 OCO request maintains a force posture of 8,448 troops, consistent with the
approved force manning level announced in July 2016. This force level supports the Department’s dual CT
and TAA missions to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). This force level is currently
under review.
In Iraq and Syria, the FY 2018 OCO request maintains a force posture of 5,765 troops, consistent with the
approved force manning level announced in December 2016. The U.S. and coalition partners are focused on
destroying ISIS through active and effective air strikes and enabling local partners on the ground to seize
territory from ISIS and deliver it a lasting defeat. The budgeted force levels in Iraq represent the forces
associated with the counter-ISIS mission as well as Iraq and Syria train and equip efforts.
In-theater and in CONUS, forces provide support for OFS and OIR, and also include Combined Joint Task
Force-Horn of Africa, counterterrorism operations in northwest Africa, and the European Reassurance
Initiative.
83
OSD Comptroller, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf., DoD, May 2017, p. 6-2
 Small Forces Lead to Diseconomies of Scale

FY2015 reflects June 2014 amended request rather than initial placeholder request of $79.4 billion for DOD. Excludes $5.5 billion requested for OIR in FY2015.
Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, CRS RL33110, December 8, 2014, p.45. 84
 U.S. Uniformed Military and Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan
Q4 FY2007-Q1 FY2016

Williams & Epstein, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, February 7, 2017 p.20.
85
 U.S Military and Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan: FY2007-FY2017

Peters, Schwartz, and Kapp, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2017, CRS R44116, April 28, 2017, p. 4.

7/10/2017 86
 U.S Military and Contractor Personnel in Iraq: FY2007-FY2014

7/10/2017
Peters, Schwartz, and Kapp, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2017, CRS R44116, April 28, 2017, p. 8. 87
 U.S Military and Contractor Personnel in Iraq: FY2012-FY2017

DOD ceased publicly reporting numbers of DOD contractor personnel working in Iraq in December 2013, following the conclusion of the U.S. combat mission in Iraq (Operation
Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn), and the subsequent drawdown of DOD contractor personnel levels in Iraq. In late 2014, in response in part to developing operations in
the region, DOD reinitiated reporting broad estimates of DOD contractor personnel deployed in Iraq in support of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). As the number of DOD
contractor personnel in Iraq increased over the first six months of 2015, DOD resumed reporting exact numbers and primary mission categories of OIR contractor personnel in
June 2015.
As of the fourth quarter of FY2016, there were 2,992 DOD contractor personnel in Iraq, compared to a force management level authorizing the presence of up to 4,087 U.S. troops
in Iraq, primarily deployed as part of a U.S.-led coalition advise-and-assist mission in support of the Government of Iraq.13 Contract personnel would thus represent
approximately 42% of the total estimated DOD personnel presence in-country. Approximately 61% of DOD’s 2,992 reported individual contractors were U.S. citizens,
approximately 25% were third-country nationals; and roughly 14% were local/host-country nationals.

7/10/2017 88
Peters, Schwartz, and Kapp, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2017, CRS R44116, April 28, 2017, p. 9.
 U.S Contract Obligations in Iraq: FY2012-FY2017

7/10/2017
Peters, Schwartz, and Kapp, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2017, CRS R44116, April 28, 2017, p. 9. 89
 Today’s Wars

Funding Civil and Civil-Military

Operations

7/10/2017 90
 Funding Civil and Civil-Military Operations
The State Department and USAID provide virtually no meaningful explanation of
their strategy either war, do not explain the challenges they face in meaningful
terms, and do not link their budget justification to any clear explanation of a
civil-military program.

The DoD semi-annual report now focuses almost exclusively on military activity,
and there is no State/USAID counterpart. The U.S. however, is fighting what are
civil-military wars where the "hold," "stability," recovery" and development"
effort is critical to winning popular support.

The data for FY2018 show that the civil effort is being slashed without any
explanation or justification of the cuts -- particularly in key areas like economic
growth -- where poverty is now steadily increasing and both sets of population
face major humanitarian crises -- and in governance, where all of the host
country governments are ranked as some of the most corrupt and incapable
governments in the world and a lack of popular support is a key issue.

Here, simply seeing OCU spending data is essentially useless. Reporting adds up
to half a budget at best.

91
 Correlation Between Aid and Warfighting: FY1979-FY2015

Excerpted from Tarnoff and Lawson, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, CRS R40213, June 17, 2016, p. 17. 92
 Shifts in Civil vs. Military Aid: FY1985-FY2015

Increase in non-military security aid. Since the early-1990s, when anti-terror and counter-narcotics programs represented around 1% of total U.S.
assistance, there has been a significant increase in non-military security programs. As a result of the 1990s Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program, the Andean Counter-Narcotics Initiative launched in FY2000, and the strengthening of counter-terrorism programs following the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, these security programs represented about 10% of total aid in the first decade of the 2000s. Although the relative proportion
drops to 7% in FY2015, funding levels in FY2015 are four times more than those of 1995 in real terms.

Shifts in military aid. Making up about one-third of the aid program in FY1985, military assistance as a share of total aid has declined modestly to about
28% of aid since then. The story behind that figure is the sharp decline—50% in real terms—in traditional FMF military aid between FY1985 and FY2015.
More than making up for that shortfall has been the increase in DOD-funded military aid, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Factoring in that assistance, military aid reached its all-time peak in FY2007 at $18.3 billion. The FY2015 level represents a
34% decrease in real terms from that FY2007 level.

Excerpted from Tarnoff and Lawson, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, CRS R40213, June 17, 2016, p. 11.. 93
 US Estimated War Funding by Agency, FY2001-FY2015 Request
In Billions of Dollars of Budget Authority

FY2015 reflects June 2014 amended request rather than initial placeholder request of $79.4 billion for DOD. Excludes $5.5 billion requested for OIR in FY2015.
Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, CRS RL33110, December 8, 2014, p.19. 94
 DoD and DoS OCO Funding: FY2012-FY2017
Q4 FY2007-Q1 FY2016

Williams & Epstein, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, February 7, 2017 p.25.
95
 Funding for Department of State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs: Enduring vs. OCO - I
dollars in billions

Williams & Epstein, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, February 7, 2017 p.25.

96
 Funding for Department of State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs: Enduring vs. OCO - II
dollars in billions

Williams & Epstein, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, February 7, 2017 p.25.

97
 Cuts in Total Key Areas of State Funding Affecting Security and Stability:
Actual FY2016 versus FY2018 Request ($US Billions)
Category FY2016 Actual FY2018 Request
Total 35.5 25.3 (71%)
Peace and Security 9.0 7.7 (86%
• Counterterrorism 0.4 0.3
• Combating WMD 0.3 0.3
• Stabilization and Security Sector Reform 9.0 6.0
• Counternarcotics 0.5 0.4
• Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation 0.4 0.6
Governing Justly and Democratically 2.3 1.6 (70%)
• Rule of Law & Human Rights 0.8 0.4
• Good Governance 0.9 0.8
• Political Competition & Consensus Building 0.2 0.1`
• Civil Society 0.3 0.3
Investing in People (Health, Education, etc.) 10.8 7.5 (69%)
Economic Growth (ESF/EDDS) 4.5 1.8 (40%)
Humanitarian Assistance 7.4 5.3 (72%)

Foreign military Financing (FMF) * 6.0 5.1 (85%)

Int. Military Education & Training (IMET) * 0.11 0.10 (93%)
Narcotics and Policing (INCLE) * 1.2 0.9 (74%)
State does not report a FY2017 figure. * Included in above totals
State Department: Congressional Budget Justification, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES, Fiscal Year 2018, May 23 ,2017. 98
Illustrative Cuts in Cuts in High Risk and Warfighting Countries: Actual FY2016
versus FY2018 Request (includes FMF) ($US 1,000s) - I
Country FY2016 Actual FY2018 Request

Bahrain 5,816 800

Egypt 1,448,950 1,361,300
ESF/ESDD 142,650 75,000
Iraq 405,353 347,860
Israel 3,100,000 3,100,000
Jordan 1,274,933 1,000,000
Lebanon 212,457 103,820
Libya 18,500 31,000
Morocco 31,735 16,000
Oman 5,416 3,500
Syria 177,144 191,500
Tunisia 141,800 54,600
Yemen 203,397 35,000

Afghanistan 884,138 782,800

India 85,202 33,300
Pakistan 534,697 344,550
* State does not report a FY2017 figure.
State Department: Congressional Budget Justification, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES, Fiscal Year 2018, May 23 ,2017. 99
Illustrative Cuts in Cuts in High Risk and Warfighting Countries: Actual FY2016
versus FY2018 Request (includes FMF) ($US 1,000s) - II

Country FY2016 Actual FY2018 Request

Chad 42,106 1,600

Djibouti 8,320 2,000
Ethiopia 904,711 235,420
Mali 130,036 81,450
Somalia 343,426 177,365
South Sudan 371,737 110,000

Philippines 158,595 70,340

Thailand 5,630 1,870
Vietnam 111,411 82,070

Ukraine 667,099 203,780

Non-Proliferation, Anti-terrorism, 1,012,509 678,606

Demining and Related (Global)
Note: includes OCO. Non-Proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related (Global) shows FY2016 for FY2015. State does not report a FY2017 figure.
State Department: Congressional Budget Justification, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES, Fiscal Year 2018, May 23 ,2017. 100
 The War in Afghanistan:
“Decisive Force?”

7/10/2017 101
 The War in Afghanistan: “Decisive Force?”
This section supplements the OCO cost data with some brief metrics on the overall size of
the U.S. aid effort in Afghanistan in FY2018. These cost and force data do not yet reflect
the President’s decisions regarding the future size of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan
fromFY2018 onwards, and are largely an extension of the FY2017 program as of May 2017.
It also presents some key metrics developed by SIGAR on the annual and cumulative costs
of U.S. aid efforts in Afghanistan. They make a striking contrast to the total OCU costs.
• The total cost of all U.S. aid to Afghanistan through FY2016 is $115.3 billion, which is 16
percent of the total OCO cost of $728.9 billion from FY2001 to FY2016.
• The annual cost of all U.S. aid in FY2016 is $5.79 billion, which is 13 percent of the OCO
cost of $46.2 billion for that year.
Key metrics are provided for the U.S. use of airpower, showing a major raise in support of
Afghan forces in CY2017. These types of metrics provide a tangible picture of what U.S.
OCO spending actually buys.
Key metrics are also provided on the funding profiles of key types of aid. They reflect a
common pattern of erratic funding and slow reaction the return of the Taliban. Such
profiles are a key warning of basic problems in planning, programming and budgeting.
Metrics showing allied funding and aid activity help put the U.S. spending effort in the
proper perspective.
Once again, the data on contractors provide a key picture of the actual size of the U.S.
effort in country. 102
 Afghanistan: FY2018 Aid Program (May 2017 Placeholder Data) - I
(in $US Thousands)

The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) is the center of gravity of the Department of Defense mission in Afghanistan. This
funding provides the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) with the majority of the financial resources they
need to combat a resilient insurgency and be a reliable counterterrorism partner with the United States (U.S.). The ASFF enables the
ANDSF’s development as an effective and sustainable force and is central to the U.S. strategy to achieve and sustain the overall
objective of preventing Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for terrorists to plan and stage attacks against the United
States homeland, U.S. allies, and partners. The FY 2018 ASFF budget request supports the overall U.S. objective and provides $4.94
billion to resource an authorized end-strength of 352,000 ANDSF personnel comprised of 195,000 Afghanistan National Army (ANA)
personnel and 157,000 Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel. The request also supports 30,000 Afghanistan Local Police (ALP) for
a total force level of 382,000. The total amount required to support the ANDSF during FY 2018 is $6.2 billion of which it is
anticipated that the Afghan Government will fund $500 million, international contributors $789 million, and the U.S. $4.94 billion
through the ASFF. The $6.2 billion in total funding will keep the ANDSF on a path to increasing professionalism, effectiveness, and
self-sustainability.
The FY 2018 ASFF request will enable the Secretary of Defense to continue to provide assistance, with the concurrence of the
Secretary of State, to the security forces of Afghanistan for the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and
infrastructure repairs and renovation, as well as sustainment and operations. The ASFF provides the Afghan Ministries of Defense
(MoD) and Interior (MoI) and their respective forces with the resources needed to continue to develop into an effective and
independent ANA and ANP that is capable of securing Afghanistan, protecting the Afghan people, and contributing to regional and
international security.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), , DEPARTMENT
103
OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 Afghanistan: FY2018 Aid Program (May 2017 Placeholder Data) - II
(in $US Thousands)
This request continues efforts to enhance ANDSF long-term sustainability by building institutional capacity in critical systems and
processes (e.g. budget, procurement, personnel management, and logistics); refining maintenance training and compliance
conditions; and rebalancing sustainment and procurement activities to ensure effective integration and use of ANDSF capabilities. A
portion of this budget request is provided to the Afghan Government as a direct contribution and includes conditions to instill fiscal
discipline, accountability, and transparency.
The ASFF enables U.S. efforts to develop and sustain the Afghan MoD and MoI and their forces as part of OPERATION FREEDOM’S
SENTINEL, which provides U.S. forces to support the NATO-led Resolute Support (RS) train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission. RS
focuses on developing Afghan capacity from the ministerial level down to the Corps level. U.S. forces also provide tactical advising
and assistance to the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) and Afghan Air Force (AAF). RS advisors serve in a variety of roles at the
MoD and MoI and their institutions, and at the Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs) across Afghanistan. They also support
the AAF. This advisory network focuses on making the ANDSF self-sufficient and prepares the ANDSF for long term sustainment
based on eight essential functions; (EF): EF1 - Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute (PPBE); EF2 -Transparency, Accountability, and
Oversight (TAO); EF3 – Civilian Governance of Afghan Security Institutions, including adherence to rule of law (ROL); EF4 – Force
Generation (FORGEN); EF5 – Sustain the Force (Sustainment); EF6 – Plan, Resource and Execute Effective Security Campaigns and
Operations (Camp & Ops); EF7 – Sufficient Intelligence Capabilities and Processes (INTEL); and EF8 – Strategic Communication
(STRAT COMM). The FY 2018 ASFF request will continue to build on the progress achieved to date and further develop self-
sustaining systems and processes in key Afghan security institutions so that Afghanistan can effectively leverage its own resources
and assistance from the international community.
The ASFF is a manifestation of the United States commitment to Afghanistan. In addition to U.S support, thirty-nine other nations
provide financial assistance and approximately 6,000 troops to the RS mission. At the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, these
nations reaffirmed their commitment to Afghanistan by pledging roughly $900 million annually to fund the Afghan security forces
through 2020. In October 2016, international donors met in Brussels and expressed their intent to commit another $15.2 billion in
support of economic development needs in Afghanistan. At the peak of the “surge,” the United States and other coalition nations
had 140,000 troops in Afghanistan conducting a wide-ranging counterinsurgency mission. Today, the Afghan forces have full
responsibility for conducting that mission at a fraction of the cost with limited enabler and other support from our advisors.
President Ghani is implementing a restructuring of the ANDSF to increase their offensive capabilities, particularly by doubling the
number of personnel in the ASSF over the next four years and recapitalizing the AAF and Special Mission Wing (SMW). The plan
includes restructuring ANA and ANP forces to increase the ANA’s ability to “hold” operations to secure the population while
enabling the ANP to focus on civil policing functions. The soldiers in the ASSF, arguably the best in the region, conduct about 70
percent of the Afghan Army's offensive operations and conduct 80 percent of their operations independently. The ASSF also
includes the SMW, which provides all of the ASSF’s nighttime helicopter support. The FY 2018 funding request includes ASSF
growth, accomplished by converting existing, vacant general-purpose forces billets into ASSF with no accompanying increase in the
total authorized ANDSF force structure of 352,000 personnel.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), , DEPARTMENT
104
OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 Afghanistan: FY2018 Aid Program (May 2017 Placeholder Data) - III
(in $US Thousands)
This request includes $709.8 million for the second year of the ANDSF aviation recapitalization program to address shortfalls in the
AAF and SMW and to continue the transition from Russian-manufactured rotary wing aircraft to U.S.-manufactured rotary wing
aircraft. The current fleet of Russian helicopters is increasingly difficult to sustain and in a steady decline due to higher than
anticipated attrition and utilization rates. The request also includes funding to procure additional close air support (CAS) aircraft to
address the CAS capability gap, which is the single greatest operational challenge for the ANDSF.
The request funds procurement of 27 U.S. Army UH-60 helicopters that will be upgraded to a modern configuration of lift and armed
variants; modification of 30 UH-60 helicopters that were procured using FY 2017 funding; procurement of 5 AC-208 armed Cessna
Caravan fixed wing aircraft; and training for aircrew and maintenance personnel. This capability provides needed overmatch against
insurgents and terrorists to improve the ground forces’ effectiveness and mitigate the high casualty rates of the ANDSF.
International financial support and limited enabler support will remain critical to the ANDSF’s ability to continue to maintain control
of all major population centers and support U.S. counterterrorism efforts. U.S. military, civilian and contractor personnel play a
central role in developing MoD and MoI systems and processes to enable the ANDSF to become more integrated and better
sustained. With continued assistance from the international community, and continued emphasis on counter-corruption,
accountability, and fiscal discipline, the Afghan Government will be able to better budget, equip, and sustain the ANDSF.
ASFF Reoccurring Requirements
Direct Contributions (DC):
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) began providing direct assistance funding in February 2011 to assist
the Afghan Government in building fiscal discipline, acquisition capacity, and financial management competencies. CSTC-A provides
direct assistance to GIRoA based on direction from OUSD(C) in the memorandum “Interim Guidance on Afghanistan Security Forces
Fund (ASFF) Contributions to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA),” dated February 4, 2011. GIRoA uses
direct contributions primarily for ANDSF salaries, base operating support, ANDSF equipment maintenance support, information
technology systems management support, as well as facility sustainment, restoration, and modernization. MoD and MoI
commitment letters outline funding threshold parameters and spending caps for the Afghan Government, which impose conditions
of compliance and fiscal discipline based on accountability and transparency requirements.
International Contributions:
International donors provide funding for sustainment of the ANDSF on a bilateral basis or through one of two multi-lateral channels,
the NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF) or the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).
NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF):
DoD manages the NATF on behalf of international donors who contribute national funds to provide operational support to the ANA.
Since its establishment in 2007, 26 nations have contributed more than $1.7 billion to the NATF. As in previous years, donors will
continue to provide international funding in accordance with the “Revised Funding Arrangements for non-Article 5 NATO-led
Operations and Missions” and as defined in NATF Board decisions regarding specific funding arrangements.

105
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), , DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 Afghanistan: FY2018 Aid Program (May 2017 Placeholder Data) - IV
(in $US Thousands)
Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA):

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) established the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) in 2002 as a
mechanism to enable the international community to mobilize resources to strengthen Afghanistan’s law enforcement capabilities.
UNDP uses LOTFA funds to pay the salaries of police officers and Central Prison Department guards through direct electronic
transfer systems. LOTFA also pays to build infrastructure such as police checkpoints and to support the professionalization of police
officers with an emphasis on the recruitment and retention of female ANP personnel. LOTFA also supports the operational capacity
of Family Response Units, Gender and Human Rights Units, and provides funds to the Ministry of Interior Affairs and other partners
to ensure a safe and equitable working environment for both male and female police officers.

Women in the ANDSF:

The FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included a provision that established a goal that $25 million (but not less
than $10 million) of the ASFF be available for programs and activities to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training,
and treatment of women in the ANDSF. The development of credible, legitimate, and professional Afghan security forces requires
the promotion and implementation of equal human rights for men and women. Any progress toward gender equality depends on
the protection and empowerment of women, along with the encouragement of greater female participation in Afghanistan’s
government and society. Under the RS mission, U.S. forces continue to promote gender equality within the ANDSF and the Afghan
government, while carrying out TAA at the ministerial, institutional, operational, and tactical levels. The FY 2018 request continues
to resource various gender initiatives that encourage greater female representation in the ANA and ANP.

106
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), , DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017
 Afghanistan: FY2018 Aid Program – Force Structure Summary

Force Structure Summary

The FY 2018 request fully funds the ANDSF based on the FY 2015 Tashkil1. The request is based on projected requirements that
support improvements needed for the ANDSF to be more effective. The rank structure of the Tashkil used to project the FY 2018
funding requirement is not expected to change. Tashkil adjustments in FY 2018 consist of repositioning of authorizations in the
current force structure to meet changing operational requirements without significantly changing the cost to fund a full Tashkil
force.

107
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), , DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 Afghanistan: FY2018 Aid Program – FY2018 End Strength Summary
End-Strength Summary

The FY 2018 budget funds the full Tashkil (by unit) for an ANDSF end-strength of 352,000. The ANA is funded to 195,000; the ANP is
funded to 157,000; and the ALP is funded to 30,000, totaling 382,000. Additionally, the guards at the Afghan National Detention
Facility (ANDF) are ANA members who receive specialized training as corrections officers. Their force structure numbers are captured
in the ANA force structure summary..

108
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), , DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 Afghanistan: Annual Reconstruction Funding FY2002-FY2017
(in $US billions)

SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30, 2017 https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-04-30qr.pdf, pp. 65-67.
109
 Afghanistan: Cumulative Reconstruction Funding FY2002-FY2017
(in $US billions)

SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30, 2017 https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-04-30qr.pdf, p. 66

110
 U.S Military and Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan: FY2007-FY2017

Peters, Schwartz, and Kapp, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2017, CRS R44116, April 28, 2017, p. 4.

7/10/2017 111
 Afghanistan: US Forces as of March 2017

• DOD reported 8,300 U.S. forces serving in Afghanistan as part of Operation

Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) this quarter.
• Most are assigned to support the NATO RS mission to train, advise, and
assist Afghan security forces. That mission consisted of 6,941 U.S. military
personnel and 6,518 from 39 NATO allies and non-NATO partners, totaling
13,459 as of March 2017.
• The remaining U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan conduct counterterror
operations under OFS.
• Between the start of OFS on January 1, 2015, through March 30, 2017, 19
U.S. military personnel were killed in action, in addition to 13 non-hostile
deaths, for a total of 33 U.S. military deaths. During this period, 161 U.S.
military personnel assigned to OFS were wounded in action.
• RS reported one additional fatality on April 8, when a U.S. Special Forces
soldier died from wounds sustained in combat while conducting counter-IS-
K operations with Afghan forces in Nangarhar Province.

SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30, 2017 https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-04-30qr.pdf, p. 89.

112
 U.S. Airpower in Afghanistan: 2012-2017
(as of February 28, 2017)

This month, the NATO Resolute Support Mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan Air Force saw significant results. The AAF centralized control of their Mi-17 helicopter
fleet, through their higher headquarters, allowing for aircraft to be sent out on missions where they are needed most for operations within Afghanistan. AAF also assumed
control of air mobility requests from the Afghan National Army. Three Afghan A-29 Super Tucano pilots returned to Afghanistan after completing training at Moody Air Force
Base, Georgia. In Operation Freedom's Sentinel, Bagram Air Base welcomed the "Triple Nickel," the 555th Fighter Squadron from Spangdahlem AB, Germany, to take over the
ongoing F-16 Fighting Falcon counterterrorism air support mission. The 455th Air Expeditionary Wing used the MQ-9 Reaper platform to provide overwatch to the wing's TAA
mission through precision ISR and attack capabilities.
113
Source: AFCENT (CAOC) Public Affairs – afcent.pa@afcent.af.mil
 Afghanistan: AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND : FY2010-FY2017
(in $US billions)

SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30, 2017 https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-04-30qr.pdf, pp. 70.
114
 Afghanistan: COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM: FY2010-
FY2017
(in $US billions)

SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30, 2017 https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-04-30qr.pdf, pp. 70. 115
 Afghanistan: Economic Support Funding : FY2010-FY2017
(in $US billions)

SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30, 2017 https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-04-30qr.pdf, pp. 76. 116
 Afghanistan: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: FY2010-FY2017
(in $US billions)

SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30, 2017 https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-04-30qr.pdf, pp. 76. 117
 Afghanistan: Total ARTF Economic Aid as of February 19, 2017
The largest share of international
contributions to the Afghan
operational and development
budgets comes through the ARTF.
From 2002 to February 19, 2017,
the World Bank reported 34 donors
had pledged over$10.20 billion;
more than $9.64 billion had been
paid in.
The World Bank says, donors
pledged $697.52 million to the
ARTF for Afghan fiscal year 1396,
(December 22, 2016, to December
21, 2017).
As of February 19, 2017, the
United States had pledged more
than $3.17 billion and paid in more
than $2.95 billion since 2002.
The United States and the United
Kingdom are the two biggest
donors to the ARTF, together
contributing 48% of its total
funding,

SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30, 2017 https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-04-30qr.pdf, pp. 78. 118
 U.S Military and Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan: FY2011-FY2017

As of the fourth quarter of FY2016, 25,197 DOD contractor personnel were located in Afghanistan, compared to 9,800 U.S. troops, with contract personnel representing
approximately 72% of the total DOD manpower in-country.12 Approximately 36% of DOD’s 25,197 reported individual contractors were U.S. citizens, approximately 23% were
third-country nationals, and roughly 41% were local/host-country nationals.
Of the 25,197 DOD contractor personnel, about 3% were armed private security contractors.

7/10/2017
Peters, Schwartz, and Kapp, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2017, CRS R44116, April 28, 2017, p. 5. 119
 U.S Contract Obligations in Afghanistan: FY2012-FY2017

Peters, Schwartz, and Kapp, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2017, CRS R44116, April 28, 2017, p. 9.

7/10/2017 120
 The War in Syria and Iraq:
“Decisive Force?”

7/10/2017 121
 The War in Syria and Iraq: “Decisive Force?”
This section supplements the OCO cost data with some brief metrics on the
overall size of the U.S. aid effort tin Iraq and Syria and the size and nature of the
U.S. military role in each country.
The termination of SIGIR after U.S. combat forces initially left Iraq in 2011 has
meant that there is now no official regular public reporting on this war.
The Department of Defense has, however, provided a supplement to the FY2018
budget request that does provide many useful insights, and the only integrated
discussion of civil-military issues in the FY2018 budget submission.
• The $1.5 billion cost of the entire Iraq-Syria train and assist mission is 13
percent of the total OCO budget of $11.9 billion for OIR.
• The functional break out of the cost by theater -- Iraq and Syria -- helps
provide a clear picture of mission focus and allocation of resources.
• The discussion of how activities link to a strategy is the one example of such a
public budget justification in more than15 years of official reporting on the
wars.
The Department of Defense provides a range of other metrics on U.S. activities,
and a costing of air support activity, although these are not linked to the budget.
122
 Train and Equip Funding in Iraq and Syria: 2017 Revisions

Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) ($0.6 billion): Formally consolidates and increases the funding requests for the Iraq Train and
Equip Fund (ITEF) and the Syria Train and Equip Fund (STEF), creating a new appropriation to provide support to the military and other
security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq's and the VSO forces' operations against ISIS.
In addition to the pending FY 2017 request of $880 million for ITEF and STEF efforts, the request for additional FY 2017 appropriations
includes an additional $626 million above the original FY 2017 request for ITEF and STEF to accelerate the Department’s train-and-equip
efforts in Iraq and Syria as partners fight to retake the cities of Mosul and Raqqah.

• An additional $446.4 million is requested to provide continued maintenance and sustainment support to the ISF as they fight to retake
the city of Mosul. These funds will address critical requirements generated by the protracted operations to seize Mosul and the higher-
than-anticipated battle losses and operational costs that diverted funding and material intended for the post-Mosul reset and follow-on
operations. These funds will also address support for future counter-ISIS operations in Iraq.

• An additional $180.0 million is requested to sustain the momentum of SAC and VSO forces as they fight to retake the city of Raqqah.
These funds will address critical weapons, training, ammunition, and equipment requirements necessary to outfit the 16,000
supplementary partner forces from the SAC. These funds will also provide support for future counter-ISIS operations in Syria.

7/10/2017
OSD Comptroller, Request for Additional FY2017 Appropriations, DoD, March 16, 2017, p. 5 123
 Cost of U.S. Iraqi Train and Assist Efforts: FY2016-FY2017

The United States Government (USG) strategy to counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh, directed the Department of
Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) to conduct a campaign to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIL/Daesh. The focus of DoD’s
efforts is to work with and through the Government of Iraq (GoI) to build key security force capabilities, help professionalize its security forces, and promote
longer term stability of the country and the region. Because the U.S. does not have direct operational control over these forces, the campaign is progressing at a
pace that is driven by the GoI. This creates a more fluid and less predictable future that makes projecting funding requirements extremely challenging. For
identification of the funding required, crucial assumptions must be made, and for FY 2017, these key assumptions are:
1. In FY 2017, the costs for equipping and training existing and new Iraqi units will decline, but the logistics requirements for supporting ongoing operations,
including resupply and replacement of combat losses, will increase as compared to previous fiscal year justifications.
2. Iraqi security forces will be involved in continuing major operations to isolate, clear, hold, and stabilize territory currently occupied by ISIL, to include major
population centers such as Mosul.
3. Using the operations in Ramadi and elsewhere in Anbar as a reference, it is expected that Mosul clearing operations will be slow; there will be a significant
need for ammunition, anti-armor weapons, and counter-IED equipment; and the Iraqi forces will lose a significant amount of equipment to combat losses. (As an
example, Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) has seen over 200 HMMWVs destroyed in Ramadi operations between August and November 2015.)
4. The effectiveness of hold forces made up of federal police, local police/security forces, and border police/security will be critical to holding liberated territory
and improving security for the population and achieving U.S. objectives. Budget estimate assumes procurement of equipment to supply 20,000 of this hold force.
5. Current Building Partner Capacity (BPC) sites will continue to operate while new sites will be established as Iraqi security forces (ISF) moves north to and
through Mosul.
6. The Iraqi economy will continue to be weak and their government will find it difficult to fund counter-ISIL/Daesh operations. U.S. and coalition support will
continue to be important in paying for costs associated with the current crisis to achieve U.S. objectives.
7. Strong U.S. and coalition support, particularly highly visible support such as training and equipping, will be necessary for ISF
to maintain sufficient combat power to accomplish assigned and future missions.

124
OSD Comptroller, Justification for FY2017 OCO ASFF Funding, DoD, November 2016, , p. 1
 FY2018 DoD Budget Request: Iraq and Syria -I

Iraq Train and Equip

Iraq Train and Equip

Syria Train and Equip

DoD, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND
125
(CTEF), May 2017. pp. 3, 5, 16
 FY2018 DoD Budget Request: Iraq and Syria -II
Summary
The request makes it clear that the U.S. is not cutting back on future commitments in spite of what is expected to be a significant
level of victories in CY2017. The FY 2018 President’s Budget request totals $1.1769 billion, including $1.269 billion for Iraq T&E
activities and $0.5 billion for Syria T&E activities. (Excludes $289.5 million requested in the FY 2017/2018 Iraq Train and Equip
Fund (ITEF) for support to the Kurdish Peshmerga.) This compares with $1.176 billion for Iraq T&E activities and $0.430 billion for
Syria T&E activities.
The document conspicuously does not propose military personnel levels for either Syria or Iraq. The OSD Comptroller did
however, propose a rise in average annual troop strength to 5,765 in the FY2017 revised request versus 3,500 in the original
FY2017 request in the Request for Additional FY2017 Appropriation. The actual figures for Iraq alone were 3,180 in both FY2015
and FY2016.

Iraq Train and Equip

There are practical and political limits to what a budget request can cover. The section on Iraq does not address any form of
new arrangements between Sunni and Shi'ites or the central government and the Kurds, but it does recognize that the defeat
of ISIS in Mosul will not end ISIS or the terrorist threat, that sectarian and ethnic tension present critical issues, that Iraq's
border with Syria will be unstable, that Russian and Iranian interference will be serious issues, that Central Government control
over the security forces needs to be strengthened, and that achieving any lasting stability will take several years and require
both DoD and State support. Implied U.S. train and equip (T&E) commitment for at least 3 years.
U.S. advisors will remain deployed forward -- near or in the combat forces they support,
Will Fund and arm Iraqi Kurdish Pesh Merga seeking coordination between them and government forces." The level of
cooperation between the GoI and KRG is unprecedented, and the KRG has been a critical partner in counter-ISIS operations.
The Peshmerga played a key role in isolating Mosul and enabling the ISF to stage for the Mosul offensive.
Turkish interests in the Kurdish issue are not addressed.
"The July 2016 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between DoD and the Ministry of Peshmerga – which facilitated DoD
support to approximately 36,000 Peshmerga – greatly enabled the Peshmerga’s success in Mosul and KRG cooperation with
the GoI.

Syria Train and Equip

Excerpted from DoD, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)TRAIN
126
AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), May 2017.
 FY2018 DoD Budget Request: Iraq and Syria -III
The cost estimate for FY 2018 assumes DoD and the Ministry of Peshmerga will extend the MoU, laying out the framework and
parameters of sustainment support for Peshmerga forces involved in achieving key counter-ISIS objectives. Along with stipends, this
MoU will also facilitate DoD provision of weapons, ammunition, food, fuel, mobility assets, and sustainment support to the
Peshmerga. The DoD may also use these funds for other requirements that support the strategic objective of GoI-KRG cooperation."
Recognizes post Mosul/Raqqa/ISIS armed stability missions. " Other violent and radical groups are prepared to fill the void created
by the decline of ISIS and exploit perceived Sunni and Kurdish grievances with the central government in Iraq. Many of these groups
will manipulate religious, tribal, or local identities to exploit them for their advantage. This U.S. support is critical not only in dealing
ISIS a lasting defeat in Iraq, but also in enabling the ISF to posture for the post-ISIS challenges, such as enabling the rule of law,
establishing border security, securing critical infrastructure, and addressing future extremist threats."
" The spread of violent extremism and terrorism by ISIS will continue to pose significant challenges to the future of Iraq as well as to
U.S. national security. ISIS remnants and thousands of their followers remain and are committed to their cause"
"As the GoI stabilizes territory liberated from ISIS, the ISF will require capabilities that fill the gap between demonstrating a show of
force, include the use of deadly force in fighting ISIS, and stabilizing Iraq. With the ISF and other security elements operating in close
contact with non-combatants in liberated areas, it is essential to control the level of violence and prevent collateral casualties and
damage while conducting counter-ISIS operations. Non-lethal weapons are intended for use in situations where the use of lethal
force would be unacceptable."
..." require continued DoD support for repairing and replacing ISF equipment lost in battle, advising and assisting ISF units, providing
key enabler support to ISF operations, assisting the GoI in reestablishing its border with Syria, and building partner capacity (BPC) to
develop ISF capabilities for full spectrum combat operations, to include wide area security and counterinsurgency."
"Beyond FY 2018, DoD costs are estimated to decrease as Iraqi sustainment capabilities continue to improve, or FMS/FMF funded
programs are implemented and/or expanded to meet this enduring requirement. This outcome is contingent on continued funding
for the Department of State. Moreover, the program is intended to complement existing mechanisms for maintenance and
sustainment funded by the GoI to help develop a sustainable supply and maintenance program focused on U.S.-provided ITEF
equipment by training ISF maintainers."
"Within DoD support to the ISF, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will require further DoD assistance to enable the lasting
defeat of ISIS and set the conditions for continued cooperation between the KRG and GoI. Finally, a key component of support will
be a continued partnership with the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS) as it transitions from its current role as an elite
conventional force to a more traditional special operations role."

Excerpted from DoD, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)TRAIN
127
AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), May 2017.
 FY2018 DoD Budget Request: Iraq and Syria - IV
Calls for restructuring and rebuilding of Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service -- which has suffered 40% losses -- under new Ministry to
20,000 men with hold, counterterrorism, border security, and police ties.
"Without the necessary support to ISF counter-ISIS operations, the ISF will be challenged to address terrorist threats, maintain
sufficient border security, protect the population, and provide for the Iraqi national defense. This deficiency could result in an
environment that fuels Iraqi instability, exacerbates sectarian divisions, contributes to extremism, and allows outside actors to
destabilize the country."
"Without this funding, there could be greater opportunities for other states, including the Russian Federation and Iran, to expand
their influence in Iraq. By increasing the capacity and capabilities of the ISF, the GoI will be capable enough to maintain security and
set the conditions for long-term stability, self-defense, and governance. Assisting the GoI in the development of a sustainable
counter-ISIS defense force is a means of defeating ISIS, while providing lasting improvements to the security and stability of Iraq and
thereby, the region."
"Assistance to the GoI and support to the ISF will also provide a political and physical counterweight to Iranian and Russian
influence, and reassure Iraqi Sunnis of their importance to the fight against ISIS, while gaining GoI acceptance. The FY 2018 budget
request will provide security solutions in support of improved governance in Iraq and implement steps for the framework needed to
ensure the lasting defeat of ISIS and deny other terrorists safe haven in Iraq."
Syria Train and Equip

The document focuses more exclusively on aid, does not address any form of conflict resolution or peace settlement, and does
not discuss the need to deal with the conflicting interests of Iran, the Hezbollah, Russia, and Turkey, does not address the impact
of Assad's gains, the role of Russian forces, the fact that the Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO) is largely Syrian Kurds, Turkish
claims that these Kurds are link to the PKK and terrorism, and the fact the vast majority of Arab rebels are not part of the VDO
and are increasingly tied to Islamist extremist factions with links to Al Qa'ida.
It does, however, cover several key aspects of the U.S. military mission in Syria:
• U.S. advisors will remain deployed forward -- near or in the combat forces they support,
• "One element of the DoD strategy to defeat ISIS is to train, equip, sustain, and enable the Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO)
including the Syrian Arab Coalition (SAC). There are approximately 25,000 VSO with an additional 5,000 in growth projected,
for a total FY 2018 end strength of approximately 30,000."

Excerpted from DoD, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)TRAIN
128
AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), May 2017.
 FY2018 DoD Budget Request: Iraq and Syria - V
"The relationship between VSO and U.S. forces is transactional and relies heavily on DoD’s ability to provide weapons,
ammunition, and equipment. DoD supports the VSO development into a legitimate and effective force by creating increased
capability to effectively defeat ISIS in the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA)."
• "The DoD must recruit, vet, train, and equip additional Syrians comprised of related tribes of different sects and ethnic groups
of the population to enable them to engage ISIS throughout the battlespace. Success in these efforts helps set the conditions
to prevent ISIS from re-taking territory in Syria."
As noted earlier, Funding is raised from $430 million in FY2017 to $500 million in FY2018.
"The VSO’s combat effectiveness, movement, and operational tempo are directly linked to U.S. trainers and enablers that advise,
assist, and accompany the partner forces. This transactional relationship is reliant upon the DoD’s ability to provide weapons,
ammunition, and equipment required for planned objectives. The DoD equips the VSO for immediate counter-ISIS objectives,
which mitigates risk that VSO use materiel support for actions beyond U.S. intentions."
Arms supplied to the VSO will be relatively light. "Weapons and ammunition estimates are based on operational requirements
coupled with lead time for items. Estimates are based on both training and equipping the VSO forces to include resupply during
operational mission support. Combat loss estimates are included in quantities required. Estimates are based upon training and
equipping the VSO forces to include resupply during operational mission support. Ammunition resupply during tactical missions
is essential to defeat ISIS.
"Lethal equipment sets may include AK-47s, PKM medium machine guns, and DShK heavy machine guns, as well as mortar
systems. This request includes first station destination costs where equipment is palletized for lift into theater.... The majority of
vehicles are variants that are widely available in the local market. This availability ensures that most can be maintained or
repaired from commercial sources inside Syria and from spare parts delivered to the VSO."
" The FY 2018 Syria Train and Equip Program request furthers critical efforts accomplished since FY 2015 and is a key component
of the strategy to counter ISIS operations in both Syria and abroad. The request provides resourcing to retain the flexibility to
support VSO in a very dynamic evolving Unconventional Warfare environment. If the funding for the VSO forces is not provided,
U.S. security and stability goals and momentum against ISIS in Syria and the surrounding areas will slow and falter."
"There will be a loss of credibility and reluctance of opposition forces and neighboring nations to rely on or trust the United
States to meet commitments. It is critical to build on the successes that capable and aggressive VSO forces have already
demonstrated to counter ISIS. If not countered, ISIS will continue to recruit extremist elements, including foreign fighters, and
export terror to peaceful nations outside of Syria, to include the United States."
Excerpted from DoD, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)TRAIN
129
AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), May 2017.
 U.S. Uniformed Military and Contractor Personnel in Iraq
Q4 FY2007-Q1 FY2016

Williams & Epstein, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, February 7, 2017 p.20.
130
 U.S Military and Contractor Personnel in Iraq: FY2007-FY2017

7/10/2017
Peters, Schwartz, and Kapp, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2017, CRS R44116, April 28, 2017, p. 8. 131
 U.S. Troop Levels in Iraq: June 2003-FY2017

4,400+
as of August 2016

5,000+ as of
September 2016

5,262 PCS, 6,000

w/TDY, as of
October 2016

If only PCS are

counted, OSD
Comptroller
proposed a rise in
average annual
400 more troop strength to
added for 5,765 in FY2017
Mosul revised request
campaign in versus 3,500 in
August the original. The
2016 actual PCS figures
for Iraq alone
were said to be
3,180 in both
FY2015 and
FY2016.
Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/us-troops-are-getting-closer-to-the-fight-against-the-islamic-state-in-
iraq/2016/05/02/8c6f8c68-07d9-11e6-bfed-ef65dff5970d_story.html
132
 Land Precision Strike: HIMARS
The HIMARS carries six rockets or one MGM-140 ATACMS
missile on the U.S. Army's new Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicles (FMTV) five-ton truck, and can launch the entire
Multiple Launch Rocket System Family of Munitions
(MFOM). HIMARS is interchangeable with the MLRS
M270A1, carrying half the rocket load.

The Extended Range MLRS Rocket (ER-MLRS) is a

derivative of the M26 with a longer motor and only 518
grenades. This improves the range to more than 45 km
(28 miles).

The M30 GLMRS rocket uses a guidance system with an

IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit) and a GPS receiver, and
has four small additional control fins in the nose. To make
full use of the much improved accuracy of the weapon
over long distances, only 404 M85 DPICM bomblets are
In November 2015, the United States Army carried for a range of more than 60 km (37 miles).
revealed they had deployed the HIMARS to Iraq, Minimum effective range for the GMLRS is about 10 km (6
firing at least 400 rockets at the Islamic State since miles).
the beginning of summer.[8] HIMARS detachments The XM31 is a variant of the M30 with a 90 kg (200 lb.)
were sent to Al Asad Airbase and Al-Taqaddum Air unitary high-explosive warhead. The XM31 is a variant of
Base in Anbar province. On 4 March 2016, Army the M30 with a 90 kg (200 lb.) unitary high-explosive
HIMARS systems fired rockets into Syria in support warhead. In January 2006, the U.S. Army announced that
of Syrian rebels fighting ISIL for the first time, with the majority of (possibly all?) future purchases of tactical
the launchers based in neighboring Jordan.[9] On MLRS rockets will be M31s with unitary warhead.
April 26, 2016, it was announced that the U.S.
would be deploying the HIMARS in Turkey near the
border with Syria as part of the battle with ISIL.[11]
133
 Attack Helicopters

AH-64

AH-Z

134
 IHS/BBC Map Coalition Air Strikes, May 31, 2017

Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034, June 5,, 2017 135

 U.S. Coalition Airpower in Iraq and Syria
(as of April 30, 2017)

As of May 31, 2017, the U.S. has conducted 17,417 strikes in Iraq and Syria (8,659 Syria / 8,758 Iraq).
The rest of the coalition has conducted 4,460 strikes in Iraq and Syria (412 Syria / 4,048 Iraq).
The U.S. and coalition combined have conducted a total of 21,877 strikes (9,071 Syria / 12,806 Iraq).
The countries that have participated in the strikes include:
In Iraq: (1) Australia, (2) Belgium, (3) Canada, (4) Denmark, (5) France, (6) Jordan, (7) The Netherlands, and (8) UK
In Syria: (1) Australia, (2) Bahrain, (3) Canada, (4) Denmark, (5) France, (6) Jordan, (7) The Netherlands, (8) Saudi Arabia, (9) Turkey (10) UAE and (11) UK
Between Aug. 8, 2014, and May 22, 2017, U.S. and partner-nation aircraft have flown 154,237 sorties in support of operations in Iraq and Syria.
136
Source: AFCENT (CAOC) Public Affairs – afcent.pa@afcent.af.mil and OSD Public Affairs, https://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve/, accessed 11.5.17
 Cost of All Operations in Syria and Iraq (as of April 30, 2017)

As of April 30, 2017, the total cost of operations related to ISIS since kinetic operations started on August 8, 2014, is $13.1 billion
and the average daily cost is $13.2 million for 997 days of operations.
137
Source: OSD Public Affairs, https://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve/, accessed 4.6.17
 The U.S. Train and Assist Program in Iraq and Syria in FY2018 - I
The United States Government (USG) strategy to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) directed the Department of
Defense (DoD) to conduct a campaign to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIS. The focus of DoD’s efforts is to work by,
with, and through the Government of Iraq’s (GoI) Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Iraq and Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO) forces in
Syria to build key security force capabilities, help professionalize their security forces, and promote long term stability of the country
and the region.

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Budget Request for the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) consists of
requirements needed to continue the ongoing fight to defeat ISIS. The CTEF appropriation reflects the consolidation of funding
sources for the Iraq and Syria Train and Equip (T&E) efforts, consistent with the Administration’s direction to defeat ISIS “by, with,
and through” partners in the region and allows the Department to quickly and effectively provide assistance to foreign security forces,
irregular forces, groups, or individuals participating in activities to counter ISIS. This fund provides timely funding and flexibility to
the Commander while providing the Congress with oversight of the program.

The FY 2018 President’s Budget request totals $1.769 billion, including $1.269 billion for Iraq T&E activities and $0.5 billion for
Syria T&E activities. The following is a summary of the FY 2018 CTEF budget request:

II. REQUIREMENTS IN IRAQ:

Iraqi forces, with the support of the Coalition, have made significant progress in degrading and dismantling ISIS. Since the purported
caliphate declaration in the summer of 2014, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have liberated large portions of territory and populations
from the grasp of ISIS; however, the underlying root causes for violent extremism and ethno-sectarian division remain. Other violent
and radical groups are prepared to fill the void created by the decline of ISIS and exploit perceived Sunni and Kurdish grievances with
the central government in Iraq. Many of these groups will manipulate religious, tribal, or local identities to exploit them for their
advantage. This U.S. support is critical not only in dealing ISIS a lasting defeat in Iraq, but also in enabling the ISF to posture for the
post-ISIS challenges, such as enabling the rule of law, establishing border security, securing critical infrastructure, and addressing
future extremist threats.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , 138
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 The U.S. Train and Assist Program in Iraq and Syria in FY2018 - II
PROGRAM SUMMARY:

The DoD and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) require continued funding to work by, with, and through the GoI to defeat
ISIS, deny terrorists safe haven, and develop ISF capabilities. The U.S. and Coalition assistance to the GoI has proven effective in
liberating approximately 60 percent of the Iraqi territory once controlled by ISIS. The FY 2018 budget request reflects a critical year
to continue this momentum, sustain these hard-fought gains, and deny ISIS the opportunity to regenerate itself. The ISF will need
continued support to become the efficient, professional, responsive, and accountable security force that Iraq needs to defeat ISIS to
stabilize Iraq.

This will require continued DoD support for repairing and replacing ISF equipment lost in battle, advising and assisting
ISF units, providing key enabler support to ISF operations, assisting the GoI in reestablishing its border with Syria, and building
partner capacity (BPC) to develop ISF capabilities for full spectrum combat operations, to include wide area security and
counterinsurgency.

Within DoD support to the ISF, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will require further DoD assistance to
enable the lasting defeat of ISIS and set the conditions for continued cooperation between the KRG and GoI. Finally, a key
component of support will be a continued partnership with the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS) as it transitions from its current
role as an elite conventional force to a more traditional special operations role.

The following is a summary of the train and equip requirements in Iraq by category:

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , 139
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 The U.S. Train and Assist Program in Iraq and Syria in FY2018 - III
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION/JUSTIFICATION:

Counter-ISIS Hold, Border and Local Security Forces Training and Equipping. Equipping efforts in FY 2018 focus on the full range
of military operations of Iraqi security partners countering ISIS with a national security mission. These forces will need training and
equipment to make them more effective in maintaining security in the liberated territories and combat further ISIS attacks. Funding
calls for equipment to supply an approximately 20,000 man force (less what is already on hand or on order) that will include hold
forces, police, and border forces.

The sustained partnership between the U.S. Government and the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), Iraq’s premier fighting force, that
continued through the 2011 U.S. drawdown in Iraq has been critical in enabling the CTS’s consistent success against ISIS. Requested
funding will be essential in rebuilding CTS combat power that suffered 40 percent battle losses in Mosul. These funds will be used to
replace combat loss vehicles and equipment, while training and equipping the personnel to rebuild this force amidst continuing
casualties. In addition, these funds allow for the CTS to redevelop its more traditional counterterrorism capabilities that have
atrophied during the counter-ISIS campaign. While CTS will continue to serve as an elite infantry force, it will also function as
special operations force to eliminate terrorist organizations – both those that seek to conduct attacks in Iraq and those that plan
external operations. This requested amount will increase CTS mobility and self-sustainment as its own Ministry within the GoI.
Allowing CTS the ability to further expand its functions as the premier fighting force will not only enhance Iraq’s ability to fight
terrorism threats internally, but will serve as a deterrent to external threats to Iraqi sovereignty. Currently, having been established as
an independent ministry but not yet receiving a portion of the Iraqi budget, the CTS will be reliant on Coalition support through CTEF
to continue building its non-sectarian force to 20,000 personnel over the next three fiscal years.

The spread of violent extremism and terrorism by ISIS will continue to pose significant challenges to the future of Iraq as well as to
U.S. national security. ISIS remnants and thousands of their followers remain and are committed to their cause. These ISIS and
related violent extremists will continue to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers if left unchecked. By incorporating training and
equipment requirements for counter-ISIS operations, Iraq can employ diverse technologies to enable persistent intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance and conduct necessary operations in a deliberate manner. Because of the complex nature of the Iraq
operational environment, it may also be necessary to conduct comprehensive military efforts simultaneously to defeat and contain an
insurgency while also conducting counter-ISIS efforts.

As the GoI stabilizes territory liberated from ISIS, the ISF will require capabilities that fill the gap between demonstrating a show of
force, include the use of deadly force in fighting ISIS, and stabilizing Iraq. With the ISF and other security elements operating in
close contact with non-combatants in liberated areas, it is essential to control the level of violence and prevent collateral casualties and
damage while conducting counter-ISIS operations. Non-lethal weapons are intended for use in situations where the use of lethal force
would be unacceptable.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , 140
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 The U.S. Train and Assist Program in Iraq and Syria in FY2018 - III
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION/JUSTIFICATION:

Counter-ISIS Hold, Border and Local Security Forces Training and Equipping. Equipping efforts in FY 2018 focus on the full range
of military operations of Iraqi security partners countering ISIS with a national security mission. These forces will need training and
equipment to make them more effective in maintaining security in the liberated territories and combat further ISIS attacks. Funding
calls for equipment to supply an approximately 20,000 man force (less what is already on hand or on order) that will include hold
forces, police, and border forces.

The sustained partnership between the U.S. Government and the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), Iraq’s premier fighting force, that
continued through the 2011 U.S. drawdown in Iraq has been critical in enabling the CTS’s consistent success against ISIS. Requested
funding will be essential in rebuilding CTS combat power that suffered 40 percent battle losses in Mosul. These funds will be used to
replace combat loss vehicles and equipment, while training and equipping the personnel to rebuild this force amidst continuing
casualties. In addition, these funds allow for the CTS to redevelop its more traditional counterterrorism capabilities that have
atrophied during the counter-ISIS campaign. While CTS will continue to serve as an elite infantry force, it will also function as
special operations force to eliminate terrorist organizations – both those that seek to conduct attacks in Iraq and those that plan
external operations. This requested amount will increase CTS mobility and self-sustainment as its own Ministry within the GoI.
Allowing CTS the ability to further expand its functions as the premier fighting force will not only enhance Iraq’s ability to fight
terrorism threats internally, but will serve as a deterrent to external threats to Iraqi sovereignty. Currently, having been established as
an independent ministry but not yet receiving a portion of the Iraqi budget, the CTS will be reliant on Coalition support through CTEF
to continue building its non-sectarian force to 20,000 personnel over the next three fiscal years.

The spread of violent extremism and terrorism by ISIS will continue to pose significant challenges to the future of Iraq as well as to
U.S. national security. ISIS remnants and thousands of their followers remain and are committed to their cause. These ISIS and
related violent extremists will continue to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers if left unchecked. By incorporating training and
equipment requirements for counter-ISIS operations, Iraq can employ diverse technologies to enable persistent intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance and conduct necessary operations in a deliberate manner. Because of the complex nature of the Iraq
operational environment, it may also be necessary to conduct comprehensive military efforts simultaneously to defeat and contain an
insurgency while also conducting counter-ISIS efforts.

As the GoI stabilizes territory liberated from ISIS, the ISF will require capabilities that fill the gap between demonstrating a show of
force, include the use of deadly force in fighting ISIS, and stabilizing Iraq. With the ISF and other security elements operating in
close contact with non-combatants in liberated areas, it is essential to control the level of violence and prevent collateral casualties and
damage while conducting counter-ISIS operations. Non-lethal weapons are intended for use in situations where the use of lethal force
would be unacceptable.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , 141
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 The U.S. Train and Assist Program in Iraq and Syria in FY2018 - IV

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , 142
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 The U.S. Train and Assist Program in Iraq and Syria in FY2018 - V

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , 143
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 The U.S. Train and Assist Program in Iraq and Syria in FY2018 - VI

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , 144
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 The U.S. Train and Assist Program in Iraq and Syria in FY2018 - VIII

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , 145
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 The U.S. Train and Assist Program in Iraq and Syria in FY2018 - IX
REQUIREMENTS IN SYRIA:

The DoD and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) are conducting a campaign to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIS in
Syria. One element of the DoD strategy to defeat ISIS is to train, equip, sustain, and enable the Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO)
including the Syrian Arab Coalition (SAC). There are approximately 25,000 VSO with an additional 5,000 in growth projected, for a
total FY 2018 end strength of approximately 30,000. These forces are holding areas liberated in FY 2017 and continue to seize and
clear additional territory from ISIS. To accomplish U.S. military objectives, the VSO combat losses must be replaced and new VSO
must be appropriately equipped with weapons, ammunition, vehicles, equipment and sustainment to maintain operational
momentum and security. The relationship between VSO and U.S. forces is transactional and relies heavily on DoD’s ability to
provide weapons, ammunition, and equipment. DoD supports the VSO development into a legitimate and effective force by
creating increased capability to effectively defeat ISIS in the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA). The DoD must recruit, vet,
train, and equip additional Syrians comprised of related tribes of different sects and ethnic groups of the population to enable
them to engage ISIS throughout the battlespace. Success in these efforts helps set the conditions to prevent ISIS from re-taking
territory in Syria.

PROGRAM SUMMARY:
The FY 2018 request fully funds the Syria Train and Equip (T&E) program based on requirements to sustain a 25,000 partner force
while training and equipping an additional 5,000 to liberate, secure and defend territory previously controlled by ISIS. The following
is a summary of the train and equip requirements in Syria by category:

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , 146
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 The U.S. Train and Assist Program in Iraq and Syria in FY2018 - X
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION/JUSTIFICATION:
The VSO’s combat effectiveness, movement, and operational tempo are directly linked to U.S. trainers and enablers that advise,
assist, and accompany the partner forces. This transactional relationship is reliant upon the DoD’s ability to provide weapons,
ammunition, and equipment required for planned objectives. The DoD equips the VSO for immediate counter-ISIS objectives,
which mitigates risk that VSO use materiel support for actions beyond U.S. intentions.
Weapons and Ammunition. Weapons and ammunition estimates are based on operational requirements coupled with lead time
for items. Estimates are based on both training and equipping the VSO forces to include resupply during operational mission
support. Combat loss estimates are included in quantities required. Estimates are based upon training and equipping the VSO
forces to include resupply during operational mission support. Ammunition resupply during tactical missions is essential to defeat
ISIS. Lethal equipment sets may include AK-47s, PKM medium machine guns, and DShK heavy machine guns, as well as mortar
systems. This request includes first station destination costs where equipment is palletized for lift into theater.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , 147
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 The U.S. Train and Assist Program in Iraq and Syria in FY2018 - XI

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , 148
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 The U.S. Train and Assist Program in Iraq and Syria in FY2018 - XII

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , 149
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 The U.S. Train and Assist Program in Iraq and Syria in FY2018 - XIII

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2017 , 150
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
 The Other War Cost:
Homeland Defense

$70 billion a year and counting

7/10/2017 151
 Homeland Defense: The Other War Costs
• Official data on homeland defense costs only exist on Federal efforts, not state
and local ones.
• After years of previous reporting, OMB does not report total costs of Homeland
Defense for all departments in FY2018 budget request for unexplained reasons.
• OMB tables for FY2017 show total cost of homeland defense for all
Departments and agencies was $71.8 billion in FY2015, $72.9 billion with
supplemental, $71.7 billion in FY2016, and $70.5 billion in FY2017.
• The total -- less DoD --was $43.5 billion in FY2015, $44.4 billion with
supplemental, $45.2 billion in FY2016, and $50.4 billion in FY2017 less DoD.
• Cost for DHS alone was:
• $ 65.7 billion in FY2016 total budget authority, and $41.2 billion in adjusted
budget authority after revenues are subtracted.
• $ 66.0billion in FY2017 total budget authority and $41.3 billion in adjusted
budget authority after revenues are subtracted.
• $70.7 billion in FY2018 total budget authority and $44.1 billion in adjusted
budget authority after revenues are subtracted.

152
OMB, Budget 2017, Homeland Security Funding Analysis, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/budget/Analytical_Perspectives
 Total Homeland Security Cost by Agency: FY2017 – I
(BA in $US Millions)

OMB, Budget 2017, Homeland Security Funding Analysis, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/budget/Analytical_Perspectives

153
 Total Homeland Security Cost by Agency: FY2017 - II
(BA in $US Millions)

OMB, Budget 2017, Homeland Security Funding Analysis, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/budget/Analytical_Perspectives

154
Total Homeland Security Cost: Prevent and Secure Terrorist Attacks: FY2017
(BA in $US Millions)

OMB, Budget 2017, Homeland Security Funding Analysis, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/budget/Analytical_Perspectives

155
 Total Homeland Security Cost: Protect the American People,
Critical Infrastructure, and Key Resources: FY2017
(BA in $US Millions)

OMB, Budget 2017, Homeland Security Funding Analysis, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/budget/Analytical_Perspectives

156
Total Homeland Security Cost: Respond and Recover from Incidents: FY2017
(BA in $US Millions)

OMB, Budget 2017, Homeland Security Funding Analysis, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/budget/Analytical_Perspectives

157
 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – By Organization: FY2018

* Gross Discretionary, Mandatory, Fees, and Trust Funds,. Source: Department of Homeland Security, FY2018 Budget in Brief,www.dhs.gov 158
 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – Total Budget Overview: FY2018

Department of Homeland
Security, FY2018 Budget in
Brief,www.dhs.gov

159