Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Non-NPT States: India, Pakistan, and North Korea

The cases of India, Pakistan, and North Korea present strikingly different trajectories of nuclear
proliferation, but are united by their position outside the core framework of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Each state’s decision to remain outside—or withdraw from—the NPT
reflects distinct political, strategic, and normative calculations.

India has consistently rejected the NPT on the grounds of structural inequality. The treaty, in India’s
view, unjustly institutionalizes a nuclear hierarchy by distinguishing between “nuclear weapon
states” (grandfathered in as of 1968) and others, thereby undermining the moral and strategic basis
for disarmament.¹ This normative resistance, as George Perkovich notes, was shaped by India’s self-
conception as a responsible power and its belief in strategic autonomy.² Its 1974 “peaceful nuclear
explosion” and subsequent development of a nuclear arsenal were not abrupt shifts but the
culmination of long-standing concerns about regional threats, particularly from China, and
dissatisfaction with the global nuclear regime.

India’s nuclear doctrine of “credible minimum deterrence” and No First Use (NFU) is relatively
transparent and restrained. The doctrine seeks deterrence without engaging in arms racing.³ Yet
critics have observed that recent political rhetoric, especially under the current leadership, has
increasingly cast doubt on the permanence of the NFU policy—raising concerns about doctrinal drift.

Pakistan’s nuclear program is fundamentally reactive and India-centric. Its tests in May 1998
followed India's Pokhran-II tests by mere weeks, symbolizing a tit-for-tat strategic mindset.⁴ Unlike
India, Pakistan justifies its nuclear arsenal as a necessary counterbalance to conventional inferiority
and an existential deterrent. Feroz Khan argues that Pakistan views nuclear weapons as integral to its
national survival, particularly given its perception of a conventionally stronger India and its troubled
history with the latter.⁵

Pakistan’s nuclear strategy, particularly with the development of tactical nuclear weapons like the
Nasr missile, points toward a first-use posture. The objective is clear: deter India from initiating
limited conventional strikes (as outlined in India's controversial “Cold Start” doctrine) by threatening
early nuclear retaliation.⁶ However, this approach significantly lowers the nuclear threshold,
increasing risks of accidental or unauthorized use during crises.

North Korea offers a third, more extreme model of nuclear proliferation. Unlike India and Pakistan,
Pyongyang initially joined the NPT but withdrew in 2003 following allegations of non-compliance.⁷ Its
pursuit of nuclear weapons, as Siegfried Hecker documents, is not just about external deterrence but
about internal regime legitimacy and strategic blackmail.⁸

The readings on North Korea highlight its deliberate use of nuclear capability as a diplomatic tool—
testing weapons and missiles in response to sanctions or military exercises, and offering
denuclearization negotiations in return for concessions. Unlike the relatively institutionalized control
systems in India and the military-dominated but rationalized posture in Pakistan, North Korea’s
command structure is highly opaque and centralized in Kim Jong-un’s leadership. This centralization
heightens risks of miscalculation or irrational escalation.

All three cases demonstrate the limits of the NPT framework. None of these states trust the treaty to
safeguard their interests. India views it as discriminatory; Pakistan never joined due to India’s status;
North Korea used it instrumentally before walking out.⁹ Their proliferation underscores a common
belief that nuclear weapons are essential to sovereignty, security, and strategic relevance,
especially in volatile or asymmetrical regional environments.
India-Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry

The India–Pakistan nuclear dynamic is often portrayed as the most dangerous bilateral nuclear
rivalry in the world. Unlike the Cold War, where deterrence rested on well-defined red lines and
extensive communication, South Asia's deterrence landscape is muddled by asymmetry,
nationalism, lack of transparency, and the presence of non-state actors.

India’s posture has largely remained rooted in NFU and retaliatory deterrence, while Pakistan has
signaled willingness to use nuclear weapons first under certain conventional thresholds.¹⁰ This
asymmetry itself is destabilizing. As S. Paul Kapur explains, the “stability-instability paradox” plays
out acutely in this context: Pakistan, under the nuclear umbrella, engages in low-intensity conflicts
and supports proxy actors, calculating that India will be deterred from retaliating fully for fear of
escalation.¹¹

Historical instances such as the 1999 Kargil War, 2001–02 Parliament attack standoff, and the 2019
Pulwama–Balakot crisis demonstrate the precariousness of deterrence in South Asia. During Kargil,
despite being nuclear-armed, Pakistan attempted to alter the territorial status quo under the
assumption that India would remain restrained.¹² Indian restraint, however, was not necessarily out
of weakness—it was shaped by the strategic need to avoid escalation.

Post-Kargil, India developed the “Cold Start” doctrine, which envisions rapid and limited
conventional strikes into Pakistani territory without crossing the nuclear threshold. In response,
Pakistan introduced tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), specifically to deter such operations.¹³ The
deployment of TNWs—such as the Hatf-IX (Nasr)—has introduced battlefield nuclear weapons into
the strategic calculus, drastically lowering the threshold for use and complicating India’s retaliatory
doctrine, which makes no distinction between tactical and strategic use.¹⁴

Another unique factor in this rivalry is the role of terrorism. The 2008 Mumbai attacks and 2016 Uri
attack were both linked to Pakistan-based terror outfits. These events generated enormous domestic
pressure on India to respond, but always under the looming threat of escalation. The 2019 Balakot
airstrike marked a shift in India’s posture—its first air raid inside Pakistani territory since 1971.
Pakistan’s retaliatory strike and the subsequent capture and release of an Indian pilot exemplified
just how quickly such escalations can unfold under the nuclear shadow.¹⁵

Crisis management is further hindered by the absence of strong CBMs (Confidence Building
Measures). Unlike the U.S.–Soviet context, India and Pakistan lack robust hotlines, early warning
mechanisms, or clear red-line communications.¹⁶ While Track II dialogues and diplomatic
interventions (especially by third parties like the U.S.) have played a role in de-escalation, they are
unreliable substitutes for direct institutionalized crisis-management frameworks.

Finally, there’s a doctrinal gap that remains unaddressed. India’s massive retaliation policy implies a
disproportionate response to any nuclear use, including tactical strikes. But this also creates a
credibility problem—would India truly escalate massively in response to a small-scale tactical nuclear
strike? Would Pakistan believe this threat enough to be deterred? These are unresolved questions,
and they make the India–Pakistan nuclear relationship fragile and unstable.¹⁷

In sum, while both countries claim to pursue deterrence, the structural and doctrinal differences,
compounded by historical hostility and third-party actors, make their nuclear rivalry highly
volatile. Unlike Cold War deterrence, which rested on mutual vulnerability and strategic stability,
South Asia’s nuclear rivalry rests on asymmetrical perceptions, ambiguous doctrines, and the ever-
present risk of miscalculation.

REFERENCES:

1. George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2001), 18–22.

2. Ibid., 27.

3. Rajesh Rajagopalan, India’s Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 108–
111.

4. Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2012), 305.

5. Ibid., 315.

6. S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 143–145.

7. Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts (New York: Pearson, 2008), 153.

8. Siegfried Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex,” Center for
International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 2010.

9. T. V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2009), 165.

10. Rajagopalan, India’s Nuclear Policy, 117.

12. Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 420–423.

13. Feroz Khan, Eating Grass, 343.

14. Ibid., 350.

15. Happymon Jacob, Line on Fire: Ceasefire Violations and India-Pakistan Escalation Dynamics
(Oxford University Press, 2019), 186.

16. Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, eds., Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in
South Asia (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2013).

17. Scott D. Sagan, “The Problem of Redundancy Problem,” Risk Analysis 24, no. 4 (2004): 935–
946.

References (APA Style)

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Non-NPT States: India, Pakistan, and North Korea

When one critically engages with the global discourse on nuclear proliferation, it becomes
immediately clear that much of the anxiety surrounding the issue does not stem solely from the
five recognized nuclear powers under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), but rather from the actions and policies of those states operating outside its formal
framework. India, Pakistan, and North Korea exemplify this trend, each representing a unique
trajectory of nuclear development while collectively undermining the normative strength of the
NPT.
India's nuclear journey has been closely linked to its strategic autonomy and regional security
considerations. It has consistently rejected the NPT on the grounds that the treaty is inherently
discriminatory—legitimizing the nuclear arsenals of a select few while denying the same
capabilities to others (Perkovich, 2001). Instead, India has chosen to build a nuclear doctrine
centered on credible minimum deterrence and No First Use (NFU). Although India conducted its
first test in 1974, it did not formally declare itself a nuclear weapon state until the 1998 Pokhran-II
tests. These actions triggered international condemnation but also tacit recognition, as India began
to forge nuclear agreements with countries such as the United States, France, and Russia
(Rajagopalan, 2008).

India’s integration into global nuclear commerce despite its NPT non-signatory status is often
justified by its responsible record of non-proliferation and strict export controls (Perkovich, 2001).
The 2008 Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Agreement marked a turning point, allowing India to access
civilian nuclear technology and fuel while maintaining its weapons program independently—a
special concession that many critics argue weakens the integrity of the non-proliferation regime
(Hecker, 2010).

In contrast, Pakistan's nuclear program has developed more overtly in response to India’s
capabilities. Following India's 1974 test, Pakistan pursued its own nuclear ambitions with urgency,
culminating in the 1998 Chagai tests that officially declared its nuclear status. Unlike India,
however, Pakistan has rejected a No First Use policy, citing strategic asymmetry and the perceived
need to deter conventional Indian superiority (Khan, 2012). Pakistan's posture includes the
controversial development of tactical nuclear weapons, which some scholars argue lowers the
threshold for nuclear conflict (Kapur, 2007).

There are also lingering concerns about the institutional control and security of Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal. Although the country has made significant strides in nuclear command and control
structures, the presence of extremist elements and the legacy of A.Q. Khan’s proliferation network
continues to cast a long shadow over its commitments to nuclear responsibility (Khan, 2012;
Sagan, 2004).

North Korea presents a far more alarming case of defiance and isolation. It joined the NPT in 1985
but withdrew in 2003 amid rising tensions with the United States. Since then, it has conducted six
nuclear tests and developed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities that have raised
concerns far beyond the Korean Peninsula (Hecker, 2010). Unlike India or Pakistan, North Korea
views nuclear weapons as essential not just for deterrence, but as bargaining chips and tools of
regime survival. Its strategy combines nuclear coercion with strategic opacity, making it extremely
difficult to assess intentions or de-escalate tensions through traditional arms control mechanisms.

Repeated diplomatic initiatives—such as the Six-Party Talks and summit diplomacy under the
Trump administration—have failed to curb Pyongyang's ambitions. The regime's erratic behavior,
reliance on provocative missile tests, and rejection of international norms continue to undermine
both regional stability and global non-proliferation architecture (Hecker, 2010).

Taken together, these three cases underscore the challenges posed by non-NPT nuclear-armed
states. While India may be seen as a reluctant outsider with an arguably responsible record,
Pakistan represents a reactive power entrenched in a deterrence-based rivalry, and North Korea
remains a norm-violator with few constraints. Their continued possession and modernization of
nuclear arsenals risk eroding the NPT’s normative authority, inviting further proliferation and
weakening efforts at disarmament.
India–Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry

The India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry is a deeply entrenched, complex, and dynamic conflict that
brings into sharp focus the dangers of regional nuclear deterrence in the absence of robust
confidence-building and arms control measures. Reading through the works of scholars such as
Sumit Ganguly, S. Paul Kapur, and Feroz Khan, it becomes clear that while nuclear deterrence has
arguably prevented full-scale wars between the two countries, it has not diminished the risk of
conventional or sub-conventional conflict escalation.

The rivalry is rooted in historical animosity, territorial disputes—especially over Kashmir—and

India’s doctrine, emphasizing No First Use and credible minimum deterrence, was initially seen as
stabilizing. However, evolving threats and domestic pressure have pushed Indian officials to adopt
a more assertive nuclear posture in recent years, including hints at doctrinal revision (Rajagopalan,
2008). On the other hand, Pakistan's doctrine is more ambiguous and arguably destabilizing. Its
refusal to commit to NFU, coupled with the deployment of short-range tactical nuclear weapons
such as the Nasr missile, has significantly lowered the nuclear threshold in the region (Krepon &
Thompson, 2013).

The 2019 Balakot airstrikes and subsequent aerial dogfights highlighted how easily conventional
engagements can escalate under the shadow of nuclear deterrence. Although both countries have
functioning command and control mechanisms, the possibility of miscalculation, unauthorized use,
or accidental escalation remains a serious concern, especially in high-pressure situations where
time for decision-making is limited (Paul, 2009).

Furthermore, the rivalry is complicated by domestic political factors and the influence of
nationalist sentiment, particularly in India, where election cycles sometimes coincide with
escalatory posturing. Similarly, the military’s dominance over national security policy in Pakistan
ensures that the nuclear arsenal remains a central element of statecraft and strategic signaling
(Khan, 2012).

Another emerging dimension is the introduction of new technologies, such as MIRVs (Multiple
Independently targetable Reentry Vehicles), hypersonic missiles, and cyber capabilities. These
advances may undermine second-strike capability, compress decision times, and render traditional
deterrence strategies obsolete (Jacob, 2019).

Despite these threats, bilateral arms control or risk-reduction agreements have remained minimal.
Confidence-building measures, such as the hotline between the Director Generals of Military
Operations or the agreement on pre-notification of missile tests, while useful, have not been
sufficient in mitigating deeper distrust and doctrinal divergence (Krepon & Thompson, 2013).

The lack of third-party mediation, due in part to India's consistent rejection of external
involvement and Pakistan's international isolation, further exacerbates the deadlock. The failure to
institutionalize arms control regimes in South Asia contrasts sharply with the Cold War experience,
where U.S.-Soviet mechanisms, though imperfect, provided crucial channels of communication and
crisis management.
Finally, there is growing concern among scholars and practitioners about the impact of climate
change and water disputes on nuclear stability in the region. With tensions surrounding river
sharing under the Indus Waters Treaty and increasing water scarcity, there is potential for new
sources of conflict to intersect with nuclear deterrence in unpredictable ways (Nye, 2008).

Thus, the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry continues to be a volatile and under-managed security
dilemma, made worse by the absence of mutual trust, the presence of non-state actors, and the
risk of inadvertent escalation. While nuclear weapons may have deterred large-scale wars, they
have also allowed space for risky strategies that keep the region perpetually on edge.

References

 Ganguly, S., & Kapur, S. P. (2007). India, Pakistan, and the bomb: Debating nuclear stability
in South Asia. Columbia University Press.

 Hecker, S. S. (2010). A return trip to North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex. Center for
International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. Retrieved from
https://fsi.stanford.edu

 Jacob, H. (2019). The evolving India–Pakistan nuclear dynamic: How India’s doctrinal
changes may increase instability. The Nonproliferation Review, 26(5-6), 487–504.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2019.1702961

 Khan, F. H. (2012). Eating grass: The making of the Pakistani bomb. Stanford University
Press.

 Kapur, S. P. (2007). Ten years of instability in a nuclear South Asia. International Security,
33(2), 71–94. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.33.2.71

 Krepon, M., & Thompson, S. (2013). Deterrence stability and escalation control in South
Asia. The Stimson Center. Retrieved from https://www.stimson.org

 Nye, J. S. (2008). The future of power. Public Affairs.

 Paul, T. V. (2009). The tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons. Stanford University Press.

 Perkovich, G. (2001). India’s nuclear bomb: The impact on global proliferation (Updated
ed.). University of California Press.

 Rajagopalan, R. P. (2008). Second strike: Arguments about nuclear posture. Observer

 Sagan, S. D. (2004). The problem of redundant nuclear command and control systems. The
Nonproliferation Review, 11(1), 145–153. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700408456809