1

HALF-LIE

Grigory A. Zavalko

…of course, also a half-truth, and that is where I will begin. It pertains to the resolution

of the question of what fascism is as an ideology. "Fascism is an attempt to create a transcendent

nation-state, using paramilitarism to guide the people through purges." Out of the five terms,

three (nationalism=racism, statism, and purges=terror) do not require detailed explanation

(although the author dedicates a page to each); "transcendent" means "previously non-existent,"

and this radicalism distinguishes fascism from those forms of right-wing ideology whose goal is

to maintain the old order; paramilitarism' means 'militarized,' and if the translators knew Russian,

they would have used this word in the book. But the essence is captured accurately: "The fascist

movement was never merely a party. In essence, Italian fascists existed for many years precisely

in the form of paramilitary units. Fascism always had a form, marched, was armed, and

dangerous. What distinguishes fascism from many military and monarchical dictatorships of the

world is precisely this grassroots and violent nature of paramilitarism" (Mann, 2019, p. 33) – let

us recall the RNE of the early 1990s and the "Right Sector" now; moreover, "the similarity of the

values of militarism and paramilitarism always gave fascism the opportunity to appeal to the

armed forces themselves; not enough to incite a rebellion, but enough to instill in the military a

sympathy that, at a decisive moment, could paralyze the army" (Mann, 2019, p. 47). Where

fascists tried to forcibly remove the army from power (Romania), the army won; Hitler did not

make such a mistake. I note that all this is a cold shower for the left, fascinated by violence: there

have been no victories of left-wing guerrillas over the army since 1979 (Nicaragua), and we will

not bring the officer corps to our side, no matter how much we march (participation in gay

parades with marijuana in your pocket is even worse, but that's beside the point). Fascism was

sympathized among (1) proponents of paramilitarism – in those conditions, young veterans of the
 2

First World War and, a little later, youth who had not seen combat; (2) class peace and (3) a

strong national state. Having won, "most fascist regimes clung to the existing order and

capitalism" (Mann, 2019, p. 31), however, the balance between the old and new right varied.

The "family of authoritarianism" includes, in order of appearance: (1) semi-

authoritarianism (pre-fascist regimes in Greece, Spain, Austria, Germany, Italy) – the "old

regime," repressive but not conducting "purges," manipulating elections but not abolishing them,

keeping nationalism in check because it fears mass activity – (2) partially reactionary

authoritarianism deprives the parliament of any power, creates paramilitarism, promotes

nationalism, but still "from above" (Horthy, Pilsudski, Primo de Rivera, Smetona, Ulmanis, Päts,

Metaxas, Dollfuss, monarchs – Carol in Romania, Zog in Albania, Boris in Bulgaria, Alexander

and Paul in Yugoslavia, the Portuguese junta of 1928-32) – (3) corporatism ("the word conveys

the image of a single hierarchical organization," but the essence was in reconciling the old and

new right, legitimists and nationalists) – statist intervention in the economy, paramilitarism,

increased terror, nationalism – and all this under the influence of fascist organizations (the same

countries by the end of the 1930s (minus the abolished ones and with the addition of figures like

Franco, Antonescu, Salazar) and in the 1940s, when the Vichy regime is added to them, in Asia –

Japan and Chiang Kai-shek) – (4) fascism – "a break in the continuum" with the old regime,

"simultaneously with the strengthening of the repressive functions of the state, corporatism 'from

above' is supplemented by paramilitarism and electoralism 'from below'" (Mann, 2019, p. 77),

active statist intervention in the economy, aggression, terror (Italy and Germany). "Fascism" and

"Nazism" are "variations on a single theme," the fascist one (Mann, 2019, p. 23) – in my opinion,

this is correct and valuable in our conditions, when they are separated to justify Mussolini and
 3

place all the blame on Hitler, not forgetting to emphasize that he is a corporal, a plebeian, a

vatnik1, and almost a sovok2, not a baron like Mannerheim.

The issue is precisely the degree of break with the past, not cruelty: "Compared to Hitler

and Mussolini, Franco was inclined to carry out a more radical political purge... Unexpected

objections were raised by Heinrich Himmler, who visited Spain in 1940. He was dismayed by

the mass executions and overcrowded prisons; he noted that it was more expedient not to destroy

the working class that had fought on the side of the enemy, but to integrate it into the new order.

Apparently, Himmler could not understand that for Franco, the working class was the same as

the Jews were for him" (Mann, 2019, p. 499).

The break implies not suppression, but the mobilization of the masses, which the

previous right-wing forces were unwilling to do. However, this is known. "The fascistization of

Japan," wrote the orientalist E. M. Zhukov (1907-1980) in 1934, "occurred not in the form of the

transfer of state power into the hands of a politically formed party, nor through the creation of a

dictatorship that overthrew the previous state apparatus, but through the systematic consolidation

of the dominant role of those parts and elements of the existing state system that previously

carried the seeds of an open dictatorship" (Zhukov, 1934, p. 84). Yet M. Mann either ignores

Soviet authors or is simply unaware of them.

Fascism enjoyed the support of the church and "arose in countries where the church had

been used to playing a significant political role, but now this role was weakening; This situation

was used by the fascists, transferring the concept of the 'sacred' from God to the nation-state"

(Melnikov, 2019, p. 132). This aspect of the book is the subject of a substantive review, the title

1
A term used to describe a supporter of the Russian authorities, literally meaning "quilted jacket" –
Translator’s note
2
A pejorative for a Soviet-minded person or someone who respects the Soviet legacy and the USSR; the
word literally means "dustpan"– Translator’s note.
 4

of which is taken from the words of Pius XI (Melnikov, 2019); the author also does not bypass

such an "insufficiently documented" problem as homosexuality among fascists – risking

provoking the wrath of anger from rainbow activists, convincing gullible humanity that only a

fascist can be an opponent of sexual perversions.

At present, the fascism in its original form is now dead; the current "ultra-right" are not

statists themselves, but sometimes neoliberals (Mann, 2019, p. 533), they do not have

paramilitary units (skinheads exist separately from these parties), and "their obsession with

immigration undermines their overall worldview, whether fascist or not" (Mann, 2019, p. 536).

Fascism is reminiscent of the religious movements of the South – Islamist and Hindu: they have

transcendent goals and paramilitarism, but statism is vague, at least among Islamists (the

Caliphate, not current states); therefore, nationalism is also vague.

In my opinion, all these provisions constitute that part of the author's concept that makes

the book half-true. But on the question of why fascism arose, the half-truth turns into a half-lie.

Since the anatomy of humans is the key to the anatomy of apes, I will first sketch the real

picture, then proceed to show how it is distorted in the book.

The modern world is not a collection of parallel developing countries, but a single system

where there are world "tops" and world "bottoms," exploiting states and exploited states, global

classes. The struggle between them reaches particular acuteness in a situation where a particular

country is striving to move from the "bottoms" to the "tops" or, conversely, is being expelled

from the core to the periphery.

This was precisely the case with Germany. Hegemony in the world-system is ensured by

a 30-year "war for hegemony" (1618-1648, 1792-1815, 1914-1945); to lead the world-system

instead of England, either Germany or the USA had to (Wallerstein, 2001, p. 101). After 1918,
 5

the victors – the Entente countries – did everything possible to eliminate Germany as a

competitor, turning it, in the words of E. V. Tarle (1874-1955), "from a subject capable of

asserting and supporting its will by force, into an object, a passive political being" (Tarle, 2001,

p. 711). This pressure caused an unusually powerful protest in all layers of German society and

brought Hitler to power. The influence of the Nazis on the German working class is not limited

to skillful propaganda fooling. No propaganda will help if there is no coincidence of interests.

And in this case, there was a coincidence. It is caused by the fact that in the core countries, the

entire population is a collective exploiter of the periphery, so the desire to be among the core

countries meets the interests of the "bottoms" of dependent countries. At the same time, the main

responsibility lies with the "tops": both the "tops" of the core countries, who receive superprofits

through the superexploitation of dependent countries, and the "tops" of dependent countries, who

want to take their place. The nation – a class unifying (not non-class) political community

(Semyonov, 2013, p. 70) – turned out to be more important than the class interests of the

working people, as always happens either in a Patriotic or an aggressive war; in Germany to a

large extent (here the question of hegemony was decided), in its satellites, even in Italy, much

less – everywhere there were mass anti-fascist movements (classes did not disappear).

Sometimes European communists are blamed for "preferring street fights with the Nazis to

subversive work in their ranks" – "an alliance with the plebeian wing of Nazism (fascism) and its

separation from the clan of Adolf Hitler", but the reproach is far-fetched – for an alliance, the

negation of capitalism is not enough, more important are positive programs, which were

incompatible (war, hierarchy, nationalism), and in such cases, it is unclear who would end up

pulling whom over to their side. The left wing of the fascists (like the liberals) is closer to its

right wing.
 6

Fascism is a cure worse than the disease, but one should not pretend that there was no

disease. "We are a people in chains," wrote Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (1876-1925) in 1923.

"The narrow space in which we are squeezed is fraught with danger, the scale of which is

unpredictable. This is the threat we represent – and should we not turn this threat into our

policy?" (Lux, 1996, p. 60). If Germany does not conquer dominance, it "will be a colony of

Europe" (Oduyev, 1971, p. 164), asserted Ernst Jünger (1895-1998).

Only our country, thanks to its revolutionary withdrawal from the war, bears no

responsibility for Germany's tragedy and the emergence of fascism, but even now they lie about

this, claiming that Plekhanov was right in demanding war to a victorious end, because otherwise

"Germany will eventually strengthen and again unleash war with Russia. Thus, Plekhanov

predicted the emergence of fascism" (Zhuravleva & Gonda, 2020, p. 25), etc. In fact, it was the

war for hegemony "to a victorious end" that led to its continuation in 1939-45. It is unclear what

exactly is considered an alternative to the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty: the complete destruction of

Germany or the participation of tsarist Russia in its plunder.

Fascism is the policy of the ruling classes of countries seeking to avoid falling into

dependence (or breaking out of dependence) on stronger countries. The economic basis of

fascism was the politarian-capitalist synthesis, which doubled social oppression (Semyonov,

2013, p. 477). Therefore, fascism is not just an open dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, "capitalism

without gloves": this definition better suits the regimes of Pinochet, Saakashvili, and others who

fought against so-called "corruption" — a term neoliberals use to refer to market regulation.

If Soviet politarism was left-wing in the global plan, as it destroyed capitalism in the

country, then fascist politarism was right-wing, as it preserved it. Right and left are determined in

relation to the market, not the state, because it is the market that creates problems, and the state
 7

either mitigates or exacerbates them. The scale of fascization, given above, shows the change of

goals depending on the position in the world-system: the core countries fought for hegemony,

which required the mobilization of the masses and politarian intervention in the economy —

measures that entailed mass terror, were needed, and their (or Anglo-French – Poland, Greece,

Yugoslavia) peripheral satellites maintained the status quo, pacifying the masses with semi-

fascist methods – their own workers, not foreign capitalists, were their only enemy. But even

here, internal reasons do not explain everything: fascization went in imitation of Hitler and

Mussolini, whose success attracted all three (see above) groups of potential supporters.

The "third way" of fascism is a consequence of the historical impasse for which global

capitalism is to blame. It doomed entire countries to impotence and gave rise to a hysterical cult

of strength in them, a doomed attempt by deprived states to "play by different rules," by any

means seeking a redistribution in their favor of long-distributed benefits.

By now, alas, the victors of the Second World War (not only the USSR but also the

West) have morally bankrupted themselves, having failed to live up to the hopes of nations for a

just world order. As a result, interest in a fascist alternative like Hitler and Mussolini inevitably

emerges, especially in countries that lost the Cold War. The liberal conflation of communism and

fascism also contributes to this trend – it is the best way to promote fascism – and it manifests

itself in everything from pseudo-scientific forms to pop-cultural ones, when someone named

Dmitry Beranger (!) sings to the whole internet "The Ballad of Hitler," informing us that he

"believed in the Grail." In a country where Communist Street has been renamed Solzhenitsyn

Street, this is not surprising: the further from Lenin, the closer to Hitler. The sleep of reason

produces monsters, not spirituality, as we have been assured for the last 30 years. The monsters

have come. Moralizing will not defeat them; one must approach the problem scientifically. The

Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm (1917-2012), who was a Berlin schoolboy when Hitler came
 8

to power, later said: "In Germany, there was virtually no left alternative. If I were not a Jew but a

German, I might have become a Nazi. They sincerely cared about saving the nation". The best

proof of the collapse of German liberalism at the time! An even larger collapse of liberalism on

the periphery – in Russia, Eastern Europe, Arab countries – will yield the same fruits. Those who

have nothing in the past, present, and future but unemployment will follow Hitler, Bin Laden,

etc., and become criminals – but they will NOT be the ONLY ones to blame.

What of this reality is reflected in the book? Virtually nothing. The main idea of the

author runs like a red thread through it – "the means against fascism is institutionalized liberal

democracy" (Mann, 2019, p. 536); the author artificially brought liberalism closer to democracy,

just as artificially separating it from fascism, not noticing that "liberalism has always been an

aristocratic doctrine, preaching 'the rule of the best'" (Wallerstein, 2003, p. 238) (i.e., the more

democracy, the less liberalism, and vice versa), nor that "the justification of inequality is where

liberalism and fascism converge" (Mareev, 2014, p. 54).Similarly, he does not see the world-

system with its hierarchy, replacing the social with the geographical – "northwest" with "liberal

democracy" and authoritarian "southeast."

The author literally serenades the northwest, sometimes banal: "a compromise

combination of capitalism, democracy, and socialism" (Mann, 2019, p. 543), sometimes vulgar:

"Accepting imperfection and compromises is the essence of democracy... liberal democracy

reconciles itself with conflicts of interest, smoke-filled backrooms, 'you scratch my back, I'll

scratch yours' deals, unprincipled and unscrupulous compromises" (Mann, 2019, p. 21).

Sometimes they are frightening: "socialists here did not surrender to communists, conservatives

– to organic nationalists" (Mann, 2019, p. 137). That was the end of compromises. Sometimes

they are at once vulgar and frightening: "liberal and social democracy do not recognize absolute

truth, or a monopoly on virtue. They are anti-heroic... I learned not to expect excessive principles
 9

from our democratic politicians. We need their lack of principles, their dirty deals. But the

fascists were made of different stuff. They perceived politics as an unlimited means of achieving

moral absolutes" (Mann, 2019, p. 21). From a scientific point of view (suppressing emotions!),

we have an example of a person who does not know dialectics falling victim to it. The denial of

absolutes itself turns into an absolute; in this system of anti-values, contradicting not fascism but

universal human experience, anti-heroism is considered true heroism, unprincipledness –

principledness, unscrupulousness – purity, imperfection – perfection. The author defends

compromise with the same uncompromising fervor which he reproaches in his opponents as

"serious emotional involvement": "Fascism saw itself as a crusade... like some Marxists, fascists

believed that evil was embodied in certain social institutions" (Mann, 2019, p. 21). From the way

the author, having exposed others’ illusions but refusing to examine his own, it is clear – we are

dealing not with a scientific but with an ideological creation, containing some empirical material,

but theoretically empty. Nothing is to be changed, everything is just fine, except for the crusade

against evil – the ideology of the privileged, those who need dirty deals.

So, in the Northwest, the finest dreams of humanity have apparently come true. Such is

its aura that Albania could become authoritarian, but Ireland could not, because it is "in the

center of democratic civilization... British democratic institutions were in operation there (but

what about capital? – G.Z.), it spoke the same language as democratic Great Britain and the

USA," etc. (p. 70) Wasn't something said earlier about the "monopoly on virtue"?... Although

there is little funny about this: the book was published in 2004, so the author did not know that

the current Great Recession would confidently point Ireland to its place on the semi-periphery,

next to the South of Europe (PIGS1 in the language of democratic Great Britain and the USA, no

racism, of course – just a matter of linguistic convention); but it would hardly have touched him

– one must pay any price for the absence of "authoritarianism." Otherwise, the whole concept
 10

would collapse. It is no coincidence that he did not mention Finnish fascism – after all,

paramilitarism, nationalism, and purges are very clearly represented in it, the victory of

Mannerheim the Butcher, over his own people with the help of the German army is no different

from the victory of Franco, and even under Horthy, "socialists" were represented in parliament

(Mann, 2019, p. 373).

The philosophical basis of the concept are eclecticism and nominalism, of course,

presented as "overcoming" (which one this time?) the opposition of idealism and materialism

(Mann, 2019, p. 16); social power has four independent sources – ideological, economic,

military, political (Which Mann had previously devoted a four-volume work to). The result of

such an easy victory over Marxism is the psychologization of history: the economic factor means

the desire for profit; other drives have other sources (for example – "ideological power is born

from the human need to understand the meaning of what is happening," etc. (Mann, 2019, p.

120)). Yes, the "classic of modern historical sociology" (as the annotation claims) does not know

that the mode of production determines all spheres of life, determining not only the desire to get

more money but also what we consider valuable. The author conflates the economic with the

mere self-interest, considering all other motives non-economic, and, throwing an unfounded

reproach to Marx: "shared the common delusion that capitalism is driven by a rational desire for

profit" (Mann, 2019, p. 99) (while Marx speaks of classes, collective subjects, to whose actions

the psychological concept of (ir)rationality is inapplicable), reduces "class interest" to the

motives of people constituting a class. The title of the book is not accidental – instead of a social

phenomenon (fascism), the author sees a set of people (fascists), and in search of their motives

(which has nothing to do with the problem of class interest) repeats with the stubbornness of a

broken record: why did the right advance if the left was weak? (Mann, 2019, p. 97), why did the

elites prefer repressive measures instead of "civilized" ones? (Mann, 2019, p. 98), etc.; rejecting
 11

what he deems "class explanation" and "economic motivation," instead seeking answers in

psychology, in "basic emotions" (a rather peculiar sociologist!), and ending with advice worthy

of Jourdain: "Marxists should not be so carried away by bourgeois economics... the main

motivation of capitalists is not profit, but the protection of property" (Mann, 2019, p. 99). What

can I say? Mr. Mann, we know this.

We also know that it is useless to try to establish the class essence of a political

movement based on the questionnaire data of participants, to which almost half of the pages of

the book are devoted. In any mass movement, the majority will not be counts and bankers, but

workers and peasants; the objective class interest (different from the awareness of interest,

partially true, partially false) is determined not by the driving forces but by the result: who won.

In fairness, I note that Marxists who do not recognize politarism and the class of politarists are

also powerless to resolve the issue of the class essence of fascism, which manifested itself back

in the 1920s-30s, but we have a way out – the eclectics do not.

Modernity looks like this. After 1945, "in Western Europe, the economy grew actively, in

the east, a fairly effective communist authoritarianism was established... fascism receded... In

Spain and Portugal, corporatist regimes outlived themselves and disappeared by 1975, causing

no regrets. Since 1989, authoritarianism has been receding in the East as well. It seemed that

fascism had come to an end" (Mann, 2019, p. 531). ...Either this is radical sclerosis within one

paragraph, or M. Mann, in the words of L. Axelrod (Orthodox) about Berdyaev, does not like to

be a banal reactionary, but necessarily original. Admittedly, what follows is rather banal – the

problems of Eastern Europe, including neo-fascism, stem from the fact that "authoritarianism is

receding slowly" (Mann, 2019, p. 537), while liberal democracy remains unstable. What else

could it be – surely not their transformation into a periphery that the center still grips with a
 12

deathlock (as it once did with Ireland), preventing the formation of a self-sufficient economy of

politarism, whether left or right.

The book is crowned with an infantile maxim: "In the southern part of the world, fascist-

like movements will increasingly appear if the North, under the leadership of the USA, continues

to discredit before the South the attractiveness of a soft democratic national state with its

capitalist exploitation, American military imperialism, and the growing inequality between the

North and the South" (Mann, 2019, p. 543). So, can it "not discredit"? Discredit and

attractiveness exist separately, and attractiveness is the main thing. The tragedy threatening to

destroy humanity is replaced by a melodrama. So, one can almost see cheeks puffed up in

indignation: why, oh why, are people so bad that the world does not become a global

Luxembourg – after all, it benefits everyone! However, it turns out that humanity, not

determined, as we remember, by economics, is indeed discreditable: "the human capacity for

cruel murders, purges, and the desire for totalitarian goals can have various sources and take

various forms, to which we must invent various names: fascists, communists (here we go! –

G.Z.), imperialists, religious nationalists..." (Mann, 2019, p. 542) Only in the "northwest" are

people different: "war is now treated very badly (except for the USA and partly the southern part

of the world)" (Mann, 2019, p. 543). War is bad, but "peace enforcement" and "the fight against

terrorism," when engaged in by the peace-loving NATO bloc – with understanding. I note the

ritual condemnation of "imperialists" and the USA in the name of an even greater elevation of

the "northwest" of Europe.

The favorite theme of the defender of the old world – to label all its enemies as fascists –

sticks out like a sore thumb. "In Eastern Europe, the fascists caused enormous damage, and this

was followed by 50 years of abuses by communist regimes. It is unlikely that these labels will

please anyone now" (Mann, 2019, p. 538). Here, both "these labels" and "50 years of abuses" are
 13

noteworthy: after the author complained that the history of fascism was "distorted by communist

historiographers, who hung meaningless labels to fascists" (Mann, 2019, p. 349), he should

remove the bean out of his own eye first. How would he react to a much more accurate statement

that the history of the USA is 200 years of capitalist abuses? However, even that is too abstract

for understanding history.

There are no mentions of the struggle of communists against fascism in the book;

"socialists" or "leftists" fought; when the Nazis came to power in Germany, "the communists

went underground and limited themselves to that" (Mann, 2019, p. 292). Yes, that's exactly what

M. Mann wrote, and this, at the very least, is nonsense. Of course, neither an alien nor an

American will learn from this book who defeated fascism (the rest, it seems, already know).

Finally, some things make one think about, to put it mildly, the incompetence of the

author or translators. On p. 420, we read that in Romania, "student fascism made itself known in

the last days of the communist regime in the early 1990s" (When exactly? And what is it about?),

and on p. 365, the leader of the Slovak fascists, Bishop Tiso, is called Josip Tito, which is

monstrous. I will not speculate on why even the typos (if they are typos) in this book seem to

have an anti-communist slant.

What else comes to mind while reading these half-lies pages? The confusion in the minds

of fascists. On p. 215, we find the responses of those joining the SA in 1930. All speak of love

for Germany, the unity of the people, and hatred of the Weimar government, although one does

not want to support the bourgeois (in the text – "burzhui," but this is a purely Russian word, here

doubly inappropriate) Jewish government, and another declares: "the Marxist government does

not understand how to provide people with work and bread." Both are lost to the KPD, and now

it is too late to convince them – they must be killed. To this day, the image of a "Marxist
 14

(communist) defending capitalism" is one of the clichés of right-wing propaganda: "The

organizers of the 'March of Independence' association reported that the motto of the march on

November 11 will be 'Our civilization, our principles.' At the same time, a poster of the event

was demonstrated: a hussar knight, breaking with a sword one of the symbols of communism –

the red five-pointed star. Moreover, it is half in the colors of the rainbow, depicted on the flag of

the LGBT movement". "Rupert Murdoch was born on March 11, 1931, in Melbourne, into the

family of a newspaper owner. Even as a child, he was trading horse manure and rabbit skins

while secretly betting on horse race... Studying politics, economics, and philosophy at Oxford,

Rupert caught the socialist fever. He kept a bust of Lenin on his desk, published an underground

newspaper...".

The author's position is to "take fascists seriously," and judging by the reviews floating

around the internet, many readers, upon encountering this "new" approach to the topic, were

thrilled. This reveals how deeply people's minds are infected with liberal ahistoricism and the

mythology of a battle between absolute good and absolute evil. For a Marxist, there is nothing

new here—all social phenomena are historical. Yes, one must take fascists, liberals, and

everyone else seriously, rather than dismissing them with labels like "crazy" or "paid-off" (let

them be the ones to do that instead); yes, they believe in what they proclaim; yes, they all must

be understood, though not forgiven. It is relatively straightforward to understand those outraged

by capitalism's injustices, even if they want to fix the situation by slaughtering half of humanity

or, conversely, by resurrecting the dead. It is harder to understand those who are in awe—like

Michael Mann. If liberalism is the cure for fascism, then we are but a step away from (and this,

evidently, is meant in all seriousness): "...science has become one of the most archaic institutions

of humanity. To overcome the crisis of science, the scientific community will have to move from

the mindset of 'a scientist who thinks differently than me is a pseudoscientist and/or ignorant,'
 15

which is a projection onto science of the pre-industrial mindset of 'man is a predator and foe to

man,' to the mindset of 'a scientist who thinks differently than me is the scientific norm, they are

useful both to me and to science,' which represents the projection of the post-industrial mindset

of 'man is a buyer and brother to man' (yes, really! – G.Z.)". Compared to such an understanding

of history, any talk about Aryans persecuted by Judeo-Bolsheviks seems a model of rationality.

...In Sinclair Lewis's (1885-1951) dystopia It Can't Happen Here, a liberal, sitting in a

fascist prison cell with a communist, thinks—guess what? —that after the overthrow of fascism,

he will still be sitting in the same cell, and the communist will be his jailer. And not the other

way around! Neither the hero nor the author (a decade before McCarthyism) explicitly

acknowledges the contrary. Liberals, despite the illusion of tolerance, are as uncompromising as

everyone else, and any alliance with them—even against fascism—is a hopeless endeavor. "The

people who these days call themselves liberals, whatever they have in mind... are supporting one

of the most totalitarian systems humanity has ever suffered from..." (Zhukov, 1934, p. 229).

M. Mann's book is ideal reading for a liberal convinced that the world is destined to move

toward anti-heroic happiness along the only correct path, from which bad guys—fascists (to

whom communists are subtly equated)—occasionally divert certain nations, taking advantage of

unfortunate but not inevitable—this is the key point—mistakes of democracies. However, a

scientifically inclined reader will encounter a towering Everest of fascinating facts—though,

alas, after such passages, one can't help but feel a tinge of skepticism, along with the definition

of fascist ideology with which I began this review.

 16

References

Mann, M. (2019). Fascists: The sociology of fascist movements [Фашисты. Социология

фашистских движений]. Moscow: Pyaty Rim.

Chomsky, N. (2003). Классовая война [Class war]. Moscow.

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