OECD Competition Trends 2025

OECD Competition Trends

2025
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 3

Foreword

The sixth edition of OECD Competition Trends presents unique insights into global competition trends
based on data from 69 OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions. It analyses multi-year data on a large number
of economic and legal indicators in the OECD CompStats database, with a focus on the main
developments in 2023. In doing so, OECD Competition Trends 2025 supports informed policy making and
contributes to improving competition law and policy around the world.
The OECD Competition Committee, which includes representatives of the world’s major competition
authorities, is the premier source of policy analysis and advice to governments on how best to harness
market forces in the interests of greater global economic efficiency and prosperity. For over 60 years, the
OECD and its Competition Committee have taken a leading role in shaping the framework for international
co-operation among competition agencies. The resulting recommendations, best practices and policy
roundtables serve both as models and inspiration for national initiatives and as tools for sharing global best
practices on competition law and policy. Competition officials from developed and emerging economies
are offered a unique platform from which to monitor developments in competition policy and enforcement,
and to discuss innovative solutions for increasing effectiveness.
The OECD CompStats database is the result of an initiative launched in 2018. The database compiles
general statistics relating to competition agencies, including data on enforcement, resources and market
studies. The data are collected annually and currently cover the period 2015-23. The data are presented
at an aggregate level, combining the data of individual jurisdictions to provide totals and averages for all,
OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions. This report also presents a snapshot of the evolution of the most
relevant variables at a regional level, presenting aggregated data for four geographic regions (Americas,
Asia-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East and Africa (MEA)).
As the role and scope of competition law and policy continue to evolve, the tools of competition authorities
must constantly develop and incorporate lessons learned from others. This publication contributes to
helping policy makers and competition enforcers to stay up to date with the different ways in which
competition law and policy is applied throughout the world.
The publication was prepared by the OECD Competition Division, in particular a team composed of Aura
García Pabón, project leader; Greg Jackson; and Caríosa O’Harte. The report benefited from comments
and suggestions by Ori Schwartz, Antonio Capobianco, and Federica Maiorano, with support from Alberto
Noce, also from the OECD Competition Division. The report was prepared for publication by Erica
Agostinho. The authors thank the individual competition authorities in the participating jurisdictions who
provided the information on which much of this publication is based.

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Table of contents

Foreword 3
Executive summary 6
1 In focus: Trends in resources 9
2 The main trends in competition enforcement 17
Snapshot 19
Cartel enforcement 21
Abuse of dominance enforcement 26
Mergers 30
Market studies 36

3 Regional snapshots 38
References 43
Annex A. Sources of CompStats 44
Notes 48

FIGURES
Figure 1.1. Average real competition budget in euros, 2015-2023 10
Figure 1.2. Percentage change in budgets dedicated to competition per jurisdiction, 2022-23 11
Figure 1.3. Average number of staff working on competition, 2015-23 12
Figure 1.4. Percentage change in the number of staff working on competition per jurisdiction, 2022-23 12
Figure 1.5. Percentage change in the number of staff working on competition and in real budget per
jurisdiction, 2022-23 13
Figure 2.1. Coverage of the OECD CompStats Database 2025 18
Figure 2.2. Number of cartel investigations, 2015-23 21
Figure 2.3. Number of cartel infringement decisions, 2015-23 21
Figure 2.4. Number of cartel cases in which settlements or plea bargain procedures for settling infringement
cases were used, 2015-23 22
Figure 2.5. Share of total cartel cases in which settlements or plea bargain procedures for settling infringement
cases were used, 2015-23 22
Figure 2.6. Number of leniency applications, 2015-23 22
Figure 2.7. Number of cartel bid-rigging decisions, 2021-23 23
Figure 2.8. Number of cartel cases in which a dawn raid was carried out, 2015-23 23
Figure 2.9. Fines imposed in cartel cases in 2015 EUR, 2015-23 23

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Figure 2.10. Companies fined in cartel cases, 2015-23 24

Figure 2.11. Cartel cases in which fines on individuals were imposed by the competition authority or by a court
(excluding appeals), 2015-23 24
Figure 2.12. Total cartel cases with imprisonments, 2015-23 24
Figure 2.13. Top 10 industries with cartel decisions as a proportion of all cartel decisions, 2021-23 25
Figure 2.14. Abuse of dominance investigations, 2015-23 26
Figure 2.15. Number of abuses of dominance decisions taken by the competition authority, 2015-23 27
Figure 2.16. Number of abuse of dominance cases in which commitment procedures or other types of
negotiated/consensual procedures were used, 2021-23 27
Figure 2.17. Abuse of dominance cases where dawn raids were carried out, 2015-23 27
Figure 2.18. Top 10 industries with abuse of dominance decisions as a proportion of all abuse of dominance
decisions, 2021-23 28
Figure 2.19. Fines imposed in abuse of dominance cases in 2015 EUR, 2015-23 29
Figure 2.20. Companies fined in abuse of dominance cases, 2015-23 30
Figure 2.21. Number of merger notifications, 2015-23 30
Figure 2.22. Annual change in merger notifications by jurisdiction, 2023 31
Figure 2.23. Annual change in merger notifications in OECD jurisdictions, 2023 32
Figure 2.24. Annual change in merger notifications in non-OECD jurisdictions, 2023 32
Figure 2.25. Average merger intervention rate, 2015-23 33
Figure 2.26. Number of merger decisions, 2015-23 33
Figure 2.27. Share of merger decisions by type, 2015-23 33
Figure 2.28. Number of merger prohibitions, 2015-23 35
Figure 2.29. Number of withdrawn merger notifications, 2015-23 36
Figure 2.30. Share of merger decisions with remedies, 2015-23 36
Figure 2.31. Number of market studies conducted, 2015-23 37
Figure 2.32. Number of market studies by industry, 2023 37

INFOGRAPHICS
Infographic 1.1 Overall Snapshot 8
Infographic 2.1. Snapshot of competition trends in 2023 19
Infographic 3.1. Americas 39
Infographic 3.2. Asia-Pacific 40
Infographic 3.3. Europe 41
Infographic 3.4. Middle East and Africa 42

TABLES
Table 2.1. Total cartel decisions, by industry, 2021-2023 25
Table 2.2. Total abuse of dominance decisions by industry, 2021-2023 28
Table 2.3. Merger decisions in OECD jurisdictions by type, 2023 34
Table 2.4. Merger decisions in non-OECD jurisdictions by type, 2023 35

Table A.1. Competition authorities in the OECD CompStats database 46

BOXES
Box 1.1. Optimal design, organisation and powers of competition authorities 14
Box 1.2. Data screening tools for competition investigations 15

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Executive summary

This report presents the main trends in global competition enforcement in 2023 based on the OECD
Competition Trends annual survey of competition authorities (CompStats).
The report is divided into three chapters:
• Chapter 1 takes an in focus look at the evolution of competition authority resources. It explores the
overall increasing trend for average competition authority budgets and staff. The focus was chosen
because the increasing trend has been one of the most consistent trends in the CompStats
database and links with several broader themes in competition policy. The chapter discusses how
the recent evolution in competition policy may have led to a need for increased resources, how the
overall trend masks a disparity in resource changes between authorities and how, for newer
jurisdictions, resource growth may simply be the result of initial capability building.
• Chapter 2 provides an overview of the evolution of competition enforcement in all, OECD and non-
OECD participating jurisdictions, presenting the aggregated information collected across all
competition enforcement indicators in CompStats, including Cartels, Abuse of Dominance,
Mergers and Market Studies.
• Chapter 3 presents snapshots of the trends in competition enforcement in each of the four
geographical regions (Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East and Africa (MEA)).
The OECD CompStats database currently includes nine years of data across 69 jurisdictions. The
complete list of jurisdictions is included in the Annex, together with the lists of the competition authorities
that provided data for each jurisdiction. An Excel file with a complete set of graphs covering all competition
enforcement indicators, i.e. all indicators on all years (2015-23), can be found on the OECD Competition
Trends publication website.

In focus: Trends in resources

On average, staff numbers and budgets increased in 2023 for both OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions
continuing a long running trend. The increase in budgets on average was 4.7% in real terms in 2023 with
a similar 3.1% increase in staff. This, however, is not consistent across all jurisdictions, with 25 seeing real
term budget cuts and 29 authorities seeing staff numbers fall or remain constant in 2023.
There are several possible reasons which may explain the general trend of increasing resources. The
possible reasons include:
• competition authorities receiving additional powers/responsibilities,
• increasing attempts by authorities to pro-actively detect anti-competitive conduct,
• the increasing complexity in proving infringements, and
• the strengthening of the authority whenever the regime is new or under consolidation.

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Further research would be needed to ascertain whether these are the most relevant drivers of resources
and if so, whether the increase in resources will lead to greater future enforcement activity.

Main trends in competition enforcement

This section covers the key developments in 2023 for cartel enforcement, abuse of dominance
enforcement, merger control and market studies. Resources is covered in a standalone chapter.
Cartel Enforcement – Overall cartel investigations increased in 2023 driven by strong growth in non-
OECD jurisdictions. The trend in rising leniency applications has also continued with 383 leniency
applications in 2023, the highest level since 2016. While the number of cartel decisions has fallen, the
share of bid rigging cases has increased in the last two years, and construction ranked as the industry with
the highest number of cartel decisions in 2023.
Abuse of Dominance (AoD) enforcement – The number of AoD investigations increased by 56% in 2023
reversing the sharp decline in 2022 but remains lower than any year prior to 2020. The trend for
increasingly using dawn raids for AoD investigations has also continued, with the highest number of dawn
raids for AoD investigations being in 2023 compared with previous years.
Mergers – Total merger notifications fell in 2023 continuing the decline from 2022 after the sharp increase
in 2021. This represents a return to a more typical level seen over the last 9 years. Total merger
interventions from authorities however, remained high in 2023. There was a sharp increase in withdrawn
mergers and the share of merger decisions with remedies is now at its highest level in the last 9 years,
with 3.2% of mergers decisions requiring remedies. While prohibitions overall decreased in 2023, in OECD
jurisdictions, the last 3 years have all seen higher levels of prohibitions than in any year prior to 2021.
Market studies –There was a 24% decrease in OECD jurisdictions’ market studies concluded in 2023,
but a 22% increase in studies conducted by non-OECD jurisdictions. This meant overall the trend has
remained relatively stable. The most common industries studied were Retail Trade, Information, and
Transportation and Warehousing.

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Infographic 1.1 Overall Snapshot

Note: Data based on the jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for each of the variables for 2022 and 2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database

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1 In focus: Trends in resources

This chapter provides a detailed (in focus) analysis of the evolution of

indicators related to the resources that competition authorities have for
effectively enforcing competition laws.

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This chapter takes an in focus look at the evolution of competition authority resources. It explores the
overall increasing trend for average competition authority budgets and staff and potential reasons that may
have led to this trend. This chapter does not look at sufficiency of resources. This means that none of the
possible conclusions that can be drawn from it imply that competition authorities have sufficient resources
to enforce competition law effectively. The focus was chosen because the increasing trend has been one
of the most consistent ones in the CompStats database and links with several broader themes in
competition policy.
Recent economic developments such as globalisation, increased use of technology, sector-specific
regulations, rising market concentration and climate change, have impacted the way competition
authorities work (OECD, 2023[1]). From the resources they use to detect and investigate anti-competitive
practices, to the way they advocate for a culture of competition, authorities have been trying to adapt as
markets evolve.
In 2023, on average, competition budgets and the number of competition staff increased for jurisdictions
covered in the CompStats database, both within OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions. Nominal budgets
increased by 10.7% on average, while real budgets increased by 4.7%. This follows a longer-term trend
for competition budget increases as shown in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1. Average real competition budget in euros, 2015-2023

40

35
Average real competition budget (millions)

30

25

20

15

10

0
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 60 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for competition budget for nine years. Budgets
are adjusted using exchange rates for 31 December 2015 and inflation rates per jurisdiction.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

However, when looking at budgets by jurisdiction, it is possible to see that financial resources available to
competition authorities have not increased across the board. In 25 jurisdictions there were real term budget
cuts and in 14 of these jurisdictions even the nominal budget decreased.

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Figure 1.2. Percentage change in budgets dedicated to competition per jurisdiction, 2022-23
A. Change in nominal competition budget B. Change in real competition budget
Average, all jurisdictions, 11% Average, all jurisdictions, 4.7%

-40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% -50%-40%-30%-20%-10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

Note: Data based on the 60 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for competition budget for 2022 and 2023. Budgets
are adjusted using exchange rates for 31 December 2015 and inflation rates per jurisdiction.
Source: OECD CompStats database

In 43 of 65 jurisdictions, the number of competition staff increased or remained stable from 2022 to 2023.
The biggest increase was observed in non-OECD jurisdictions (with an increase of 4.9%) than in OECD
jurisdictions (where staff only increased by 2.6%). In 2023, in total, there were 9 224 people working in
competition in those 65 jurisdictions compared to 8 951 in 2022 for the same group. In 2023, the average
yearly growth for competition staff was 3.1%.

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Figure 1.3. Average number of staff working on competition, 2015-23

200
180
Average competition staff 160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 65 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for competition staff for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

As shown in Figure 1.4, the trend of increasing competition staff is not consistent across all jurisdictions in
the database, as 29 authorities have seen staff numbers remain constant or fall. On the one hand, there
are some resource-constrained authorities that may face particular challenges to ensure they have
sufficient and adequate staff to continue to deliver effective competition enforcement in an often
increasingly complex environment. On the other, there are jurisdiction-specific circumstances that may
drive this decrease, which may also be temporary.

Figure 1.4. Percentage change in the number of staff working on competition per jurisdiction, 2022-23
Average, all jurisdictions, 3%

-80% -60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

% change in number of staff working in competition

Note: Data based on the 65 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for competition staff for 2022 and 2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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Looking at interactions between staff and budgets, Figure 1.5 shows that in many jurisdictions (33 out of
58), changes in staff were consistent with changes in budget (either positive or negative). However, in the
remaining 25 jurisdictions, the changes in both resources were not positively correlated. The overall
correlation between the two variables is positive but low (0.33).

Figure 1.5. Percentage change in the number of staff working on competition and in real budget per
jurisdiction, 2022-23
100%

80%

60%
% change in competition staff

40%

20%

0%
-100% -80% -60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
-20%

-40%

-60%

-80%

-100%
OECD non-OECD % change in real budget

Note: Data based on the 60 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for competition staff and budget for 2022 and
2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

In aggregate terms, there are undoubtedly more resources available globally to enforce competition laws.
This chapter explores some of the main possible reasons that could explain this dynamic. Stronger
pro-active efforts to investigate and find potential infringements, more powers related to competition
enforcement and advocacy, and more complex investigations are possible reasons for this constant
increase.
In the recent roundtable on the optimal design, organisation and powers of competition authorities (OECD,
2023[1]) issues such as changes in required skills and resources of modern competition authorities to react
and adjust to economic developments and challenges were discussed (see Box 1.1). The intensified and
more specialised investigative activity may be one of the reasons for the number of staff working in
competition matters increasing in some jurisdictions in recent years. The number of staff reported in the
CompStats database includes all experts working on competition including whenever competition
authorities have established separate specialised data units or have hired data analysts or IT specialists
to work within other units.

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Box 1.1. Optimal design, organisation and powers of competition authorities

In 2023, the OECD Competition Committee’s Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement
met to discuss about the optimal design, organisation and powers of competition authorities. One of the
first conclusions that OECD authorities reached was the need to have expertise in areas beyond law
and economics. Although the institutional and organisational setting of competition authorities vary
across jurisdictions, competition authorities acknowledged that the new set of skills required for a
competition authority to be able to face the recent challenges and developments included mostly having
experts on business strategy, specialised knowledge of certain sectors and specialised IT staff (focused
on data science and technology).
The OECD background note for the discussion presented multiple examples of how competition
authorities are addressing the requirements for new skills. It showed that in 2023, half of the competition
authorities in OECD jurisdictions established a data unit and over 40% appointed a Chief
Data/Technology Officer. This is consistent with the requirements for additional staff.
Source: OECD (2023[1]) “The Optimal Design, Organisation and Powers of Competition Authorities”, OECD Roundtables on Competition
Policy Papers, No. 304, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/dea26a24-en.

The need for new expertise is also consistent with the increasing use of more sophisticated tools. For
instance, to help in the detection of anti-competitive conduct, competition authorities are using new
investigative tools, although their adoption comes with challenges related to requirements for new
resources or the adaptation of existing ones (OECD, 2020[2]). Competition authorities are using more
complex digital forensics to support the collection and analysis of evidence, requiring methods to collect
information from sources such as online cloud services. This intensified due to new working arrangements
prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Some authorities are also developing empirical methods that use datasets to evaluate firms’ behaviour
and identify patterns (the so-called data screening tools). The development and use of these tools likely
requires specific IT and data knowledge that traditionally competition authorities did not previously have
(see Box 1.2 for recent OECD research on the topic). While for now it seems that their use is requiring
additional staff, in the future, it would be worth monitoring whether successful digital screening tools may
also mean less staff required to detect anti-competitive behaviour.

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Box 1.2. Data screening tools for competition investigations

In 2022, the OECD held a roundtable on data screening tools for competition investigations. It explored
recent developments in digital screening tools developed by competition authorities, mostly aimed at
detecting cartels, as well as adjustments in the investigative processes that are based on those
screenings.
The OECD research to support the discussion found that competition authorities were at different stages
in the development and application of screening tools. It concluded that, while the early development
of screen usually relied on economists, competition authorities are now developing and using more
sophisticated screens that rely on technology specialists that work with economists to analyse data.
Moreover, it identified that competition authorities could benefit from co-operation to save time and
resources, as developing and implementing data screens may imply extensive acquisitions of skills and
datasets which translate in more requirements for resources. This co-operation could take the form of
sharing technical expertise, experiences, as well as code and, under certain conditions, even data.
Source: OECD (2022[3]), “Data Screening Tools for Competition Investigations”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 284,
OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4c5bbb9d-en.

The second possible reason for the generalised increase in resources available for competition
enforcement relates to the growing complexity of the investigations. In the past years, it has become more
evident that the growing importance of technology, digitalisation, and globalisation have also increased the
complexity in enforcing competition laws. Recent OECD work has reflected on the complex issues that
authorities are reviewing. This includes, innovation considerations (OECD, 2023[4]), quality aspects in zero-
price markets, new theories of harm, for example in digital markets (OECD, 2023[5]), and environmental
and sustainability issues (OECD, 2021[6]).
The higher level of sophistication may make it more difficult for authorities to prove infringements,
particularly when authorities are required to prove impact on competition. The use of indirect evidence and
economic analysis to prove infringements also generate additional efforts and requires more technical
expertise. At the same time, judicial review is also adjusting and must now assess more complex and
evolving theories. There have been discussions on whether more intense scrutiny from the judiciary also
implies more resources from competition authorities to be able to meet the standard of proof (OECD,
2024[7]).
To alleviate what seems to be an increase on the evidentiary burden of proof, there are active discussions
on strategies that jurisdictions could follow and that go from changing the balance towards more per se
rules to adopting presumptions or implementing ex ante regulatory approaches (see, for instance, G7
inventory of new rules for digital markets prepared by the OECD (2024[8]). Often, these new rules are then
enforced by the competition authorities. Depending on each of their institutional settings, some competition
authorities create specific teams for the enforcement of new powers, while others opt for strengthening
their existing teams. Other alternatives to tackle the increased complexity in competition enforcement
include strengthening the investigative and sanctioning powers to tackle existing anti-competitive conduct
and increasing resources and time allocated to each case.
For example, until some years ago, only a handful of jurisdictions had regimes where market studies could
result in the imposition of remedies or binding recommendations (such as the United Kingdom, Greece,
Iceland, Israel, Mexico and South Africa). However, more jurisdictions have recently introduced them or
are having discussions to do so. Examples include Germany and Italy, which introduced them in their
regime in 2023,1 and Denmark that did so in 2024.2

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All these new powers that competition authorities are recently acquiring may translate into needing more
resources, including staffing.
Finally, the growth in budget and staff working on competition may simply be the result of newer agencies
building capacity, mostly in non-OECD jurisdictions, or agencies responding to amendments in their
competition regimes by building and re-arranging their teams. In some jurisdictions, competition regimes
underwent significant amendments in 2022 and 2023 that resulted in a strengthening and re-arranging of
the resources required for the authorities and even rearrangements in their institutional design.
In summary, there are several possible reasons which may explain the general trend of increasing
resources. The possible reasons include:
• increasing attempts by authorities to pro-actively detect anti-competitive conduct
• the increasing complexity in proving infringements
• competition authorities receiving additional powers/responsibilities
• the strengthening of the authority whenever the regime is new or under consolidation.
Further research would be needed to ascertain whether these are the most relevant drivers of resources
and if so, whether the increase in resources will lead to greater future enforcement activity.

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2 The main trends in competition

enforcement

This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of competition

enforcement in all, OECD and non-OECD participating jurisdictions,
presenting the aggregated information collected in the CompStats Survey.

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This chapter highlights the time trends of all the metrics included in the CompStats database covering the
9 years from 2015 to 2023 (excluding resources discussed in Chapter 1). It includes figures and tables
relating to the questions in the CompStats survey. An excel file with the aggregated information for all
CompStats variables is available on the website. These focus primarily on the changes in the overall
averages across all jurisdictions as well as highlighting any differences between OECD and non-OECD
jurisdictions.
The 2023 OECD CompStats database includes 69 jurisdictions. Figure 2.1 presents the number of
participating jurisdictions by OECD membership and region. The complete list of jurisdictions in each
region is included in the Annex, together with the lists of the competition authorities that provided data in
each jurisdiction.

Figure 2.1. Coverage of the OECD CompStats Database 2025

MEA
OECD

39 8
Americas

30 69 34 69 15
Europe Asia-Pacific
Non -OECD

12
Source: OECD CompStats database.

The chapter includes the following sections:

• Snapshot
• Cartel Enforcement
• Abuse of Dominance Enforcement
• Mergers
• Market Studies

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Snapshot

The following infographic presents a snapshot of competition enforcement and market studies activity in
2023, including annual growth rates of the most relevant indicators.

Infographic 2.1. Snapshot of competition trends in 2023

Annual change
Total 2022-2023

356 -12.7% Total

Average 5.7
Cartel
-11.7% OECD
Median 2.5
decisions -15.3% Non-OECD

Annual change
Total 2022-2023

92 5.7% Total
Abuse of
Average 1.5 -35.2% OECD
dominance Median 0
72.7% Non-OECD
decisions

Annual change
Total 2022-2023
9 222 -16.8% Total
Average 151
-19.7% OECD
Merger Median 60
decisions
-4.2% Non-OECD

Annual change
Total 2022-2023

155 -8.3% Total

Average 2.5 -24.3% OECD
Median 2
Market 22.4% Non-OECD
studies

Note: Data based on the jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for each of the variables for 2022 and 2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

As cartel infringement decisions usually lag a few years behind the number of cartel investigations, the
decline in cartel infringement decisions (see Figure 2.3) following the overall decrease in investigation
numbers from 2016 is not surprising. One of the clearer trends in the last two years has been the significant
increase in leniency applications recovering from the steep fall in 2020. This increase was observed in

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most jurisdictions with particularly strong growth in OECD members. Leniency applications remain much
less used in non-OECD jurisdictions. Following the recent uptick in leniency applications, the number of
investigations in infringement decisions may also follow this upward trend in the coming years.
Competition authorities continue to impose fines in cartel and abuse of dominance cases, although the
total fines imposed decreased compared to 2022. In 2023, around EUR 2.9 billion were imposed between
cartels and abuses of dominance, which represents a 13.5% nominal decrease with respect to the EUR 3.4
billion fines imposed in 2022. The average fine per cartel case in 2023 was EUR 9 341 104, which was
lower than the average in 2022 (EUR 11 383 630), while the average fine per abuse of dominance case in
2023 was EUR 15 096 197, higher than the average for 2022 (EUR 5 603 632).
Bid rigging, which in most jurisdictions is a violation per se, remains to be one of the most common hard-
core cartels sanctioned in 2023, representing 44% of the total cartel infringement decisions (from 39% in
2022). Together with administrative fines, director disqualification and bidder exclusion are forms of
debarment sanctions that competition authorities and other relevant agencies in the jurisdictions (such as
judicial bodies and contracting authorities) are using to punish cartelists. Recent OECD research found
that director disqualification as a sanction for competition infringements exists in 23 jurisdictions and it has
started to be applied relatively recently. As for bidder exclusion, over 25 jurisdictions apply this sanction,
typically for bid rigging practices, and it has been used for a longer period (OECD, 2022[9]).
The relevance of enforcement against bid rigging is also reflected in the distribution of cartel infringements
by industry, where construction was the most common one and saw one of the largest increases. Other
relevant industries were retail trade and mining, oil and gas. The top five ranking of industries remain
unchanged as a whole, but there were position shifts within this grouping (Figure 2.13).
Looking at the manner in which cases are concluded, settlements in cartel cases and commitments in
abuse of dominance cases appear to be decreasing recently both in absolute and relative terms (see
Figure 2.4, Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.16). However, this may be a temporary trend as their adoption is
expanding across more jurisdictions. Jurisdictions such as Austria, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Japan, and Türkiye have recently included these tools into their competition law frameworks. 3 Ireland, for
instance, is in the process of implementation and opened in August 2024 a public consultation in this
regard. In Europe, the transposition of the European Competition Network Plus (ECN+) Directive has
facilitated the greater spread of such procedures, and transposition of the directive into national law will
result in greater harmonisation of enforcement mechanisms across EU member states. The increase in
the number of jurisdictions adopting frameworks for early termination of proceeding indicates growing
interest, despite the overall reduction in absolute usage. This could simply be a time delay in cases feeding
into the data, and it will be a trend worth monitoring in future editions of this report.
Turning to mergers, the section shows that overall notification activity is back down in line with the longer-
term average after a 25% drop in notifications following the spike in notifications in 2021 (Figure 2.21).
However the rate of intervention appears to have increased, with the proportion of mergers cleared with
remedies at its highest share since the survey began (Figure 2.30) and a sharp increase in withdrawn
mergers in some jurisdictions in 2023 (Figure 2.29).
Market studies continue to be undertaken across a broad range of jurisdictions and there appears to have
been a particular focus in 2023 on retail trade. This was the sector with the most concluded market studies
followed by the information sector, which covers all inquiries and studies carried out in digital markets.

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Cartel enforcement

This section highlights the trends in cartel enforcement in the period 2015-2023. It includes charts showing
how the number of investigations and decisions have evolved over time. It then provides further details on
the genesis of the investigations (for example, the extent authorities have been relying on leniency
applications) and the outcomes such as changes in fines, settlements and criminal sanctions. In addition,
it examines the composition of cases by industry and the proportion of cases that related to bid-rigging.

Figure 2.2. Number of cartel investigations, 2015-23

A. Total cartel investigations B. Average cartel investigations
1000 20

800
15
600
10
400

200 5

0 0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 52 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel investigations for nine years. For 2023,
for the sample of jurisdictions who provided details on the sources of their investigations, total cartel investigations are the sum between
investigations started after a complaint and investigations started by the authority’s own initiative. This figure does not present information from
the United States competition authorities.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.3. Number of cartel infringement decisions, 2015-23

A. Total cartel infringement decisisons B. Average cartel infringement decisisons
600 12

500 10

400 8

300 6
200 4
100 2
0 0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 62 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel decisions for nine years. This variable
corresponds to Question 2.1. in the survey which asked about the number of cartel infringements.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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Figure 2.4. Number of cartel cases in which settlements or plea bargain procedures for settling
infringement cases were used, 2015-23
A. Total cartel cases with settlements/plea bargains B. Average cartel cases with settlements/plea bargains
160 4.5
140 4.0
120 3.5
100 3.0
2.5
80
2.0
60
1.5
40 1.0
20 0.5
0 0.0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 47 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel cases in which settlements or plea
bargain procedures for settling infringement cases were used for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.5. Share of total cartel cases in which settlements or plea bargain procedures for settling
infringement cases were used, 2015-23
300 70%

250 60%
Total number of decisions

50%
200
40%

Share
150
30%
100
20%
50 10%

0 0%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Year
Total cartel decisions without settlements Total Cartel Settlements Share
Note: Data based on the 47 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel decisions and for cartel cases in which
settlements or plea bargain procedures for settling infringement cases were used for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.6. Number of leniency applications, 2015-23

A. Total leniency applications B. Average leniency applications
600 16
500 14
12
400
10
300 8
200 6
4
100 2
0 0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 47 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for leniency applications for nine years. This
figure does not present information from the United States competition authorities.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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Figure 2.7. Number of cartel bid-rigging decisions, 2021-23

500 45%
450 40%

Share of total cartel decisions, bid rigging

400 35%
350
Number of decisions

30%
300
25%
250
20%
200
15%
150
100 10%

50 5%
0 0%
2021 2022 2023

Total cartel decisions Total bid-rigging cartel decisions Share

Note: Data based on the 63 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data on cartel decisions and bid-rigging cartel
infringement decisions for the years 2021-2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.8. Number of cartel cases in which a dawn raid was carried out, 2015-23
A. Total cartel dawn raids B. Average cartel dawn raids
300 10

250 8
200 6
150
4
100
50 2

0 0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 52 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel dawn raids for nine years.
This figure does not present information from the United States competition authorities.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.9. Fines imposed in cartel cases in 2015 EUR, 2015-23

billions A. Total cartel fines millions B. Average cartel fines
8 200
7
6 150
5
4 100
3
2 50
1
0 0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel fines for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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Figure 2.10. Companies fined in cartel cases, 2015-23

A. Total companies fined in cartel cases B. Average companies fined in cartel cases
1 600 30
1 400 25
1 200
1 000 20
800 15
600 10
400
200 5
0 0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for companies fined in cartels for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.11. Cartel cases in which fines on individuals were imposed by the competition authority
or by a court (excluding appeals), 2015-23
A. Total individuals fined in cartel cases B. Average individuals fined in cartel cases
250 6

200 5

4
150
3
100
2
50 1

0 0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 44 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data or cartel cases in which fines on individuals were
imposed for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.12. Total cartel cases with imprisonments, 2015-23

Number of cases
18
18
16
14
12
12
10 11 11
8 9
6 7
6
4 5
2
2
0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Note: Data based on the 28 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel fines for nine years. Please note, this
only reports the figures at the aggregate level, for all jurisdictions, due to a low data availability for non-OECD jurisdictions.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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Figure 2.13. Top 10 industries with cartel decisions as a proportion of all cartel decisions, 2021-23

25%

20%
% cartel decisions

15%

10%

5%

0%

2021 2022 2023

Note: Decisions by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as
follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33
– manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and
insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and
enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and
social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public
administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the 38 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data
for 2021-2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Table 2.1. Total cartel decisions by industry, 2021-2023

Rank Rank
Sector 2022 2023
2022 2023
2 1 Construction 59 135
4 2 Retail Trade 33 122
1 3 Manufacturing 91 73
3 4 Wholesale Trade 35 38
7 5 Transportation and Warehousing 24 35
6 6 Other Services (except Public Administration) 25 26
5 7 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 26 25
19 8 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 3 25
9 9 Information 16 25
16 10 Utilities 5 24
20 11 Management of Companies and Enterprises 1 13
14 12 Real Estate Rental and Leasing 8 13
10 13 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 16 13
13 14 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 9 12

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Rank Rank
Sector 2022 2023
2022 2023
12 15 Health Care and Social Assistance 14 8
17 16 Accommodation and Food Services 4 6
21 17 Other Code 0 6
8 18 Finance and Insurance 17 6
11 19 Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services 16 5
18 20 Educational Services 3 3
15 21 Public Administration 6 2

Note: Decisions by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as
follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33
– manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and
insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and
enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and
social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public
administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the 38 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data
for 2021-2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Abuse of dominance enforcement

This section highlights the trends in authorities’ activity relating to abuse of dominance cases (“AoD”). It
shows the trend in the number of investigations and decisions over time. It also highlights the extent to
which dawn raids were used, as they remain uncommon for unilateral conduct investigations. It presents
detailed numbers on how cases were concluded in terms of the number of cases where commitments were
accepted, the value of fines and the sectors the cases occurred in.

Figure 2.14. Abuse of dominance investigations, 2015-23

A. Total AoD investigations B. Average AoD investigations
400 9
350 8
300 7
250 6
5
200
4
150
3
100 2
50 1
0 0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 58 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance investigations for nine
years. This variable corresponds to Question 3.1. in the survey which asked about the number of abuse of dominance infringements.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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Figure 2.15. Number of abuses of dominance decisions taken by the competition authority, 2015-23
A. Total AoD decisions B. Average AoD decisions
160 3.0
140 2.5
120
100 2.0
80 1.5
60 1.0
40
20 0.5
0 0.0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 62 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance decisions for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.16. Number of abuse of dominance cases in which commitment procedures or other types
of negotiated/consensual procedures were used, 2021-23
A. Total number of AoD investigations B. Average number of AoD investigations
that ended in commitments that ended in commitments
35 1.0
0.9
30
0.8
25 0.7
20 0.6
0.5
15 0.4
10 0.3
0.2
5
0.1
0 0.0
2021 2022 2023 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 58 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance decisions and abuse of
dominance decisions with commitments respectively, for 2021-2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.17. Abuse of dominance cases where dawn raids were carried out, 2015-23
A. Total AoD dawn raids B. Average AoD dawn raids
45 1.2
40
35 1.0
30 0.8
25
0.6
20
15 0.4
10
0.2
5
0 0.0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 46 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance dawn raids for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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28 

Figure 2.18. Top 10 industries with abuse of dominance decisions as a proportion of all abuse of
dominance decisions, 2021-23

45%

40%

35%

30%
% AoD decisions

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

2021 2022 2023

Note: Decisions by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as
follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33
– manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and
insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and
enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and
social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public
administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the 19 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data
for 2021-2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Table 2.2. Total abuse of dominance decisions by industry, 2021-2023

Rank Rank
Sector 2022 2023
2022 2023
4 1 Utilities 10 62
12 2 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 2 19
9 3 Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services 3 10
1 4 Transportation and Warehousing 19 9
3 5 Information 12 9
14 6 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 1 8
7 7 Finance and Insurance 4 8
17 8 Other Code 0 7
10 9 Health Care and Social Assistance 3 7
13 10 Accommodation and Food Services 2 5

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Rank Rank
Sector 2022 2023
2022 2023
2 11 Manufacturing 14 5
6 12 Other Services (except Public Administration) 4 3
5 13 Retail Trade 9 3
11 14 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 3 2
15 15 Construction 1 2
16 16 Public Administration 0 2
18 17 Real Estate Rental and Leasing 0 1
19 18 Management of Companies and Enterprises 0 0
20 19 Educational Services 0 0
21 20 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 0 0
8 21 Wholesale Trade 3 0

Note: Decisions by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as
follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33
– manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and
insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and
enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and
social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public
administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the19 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data
for 2021-2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.19. Fines imposed in abuse of dominance cases in 2015 EUR, 2015-23
A. Total AoD fines B. Average AoD fines
billions millions
6 160
5 140
120
4
100
3 80
2 60
40
1 20
0 0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 60 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for fines imposed in AoD cases for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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30 

Figure 2.20. Companies fined in abuse of dominance cases, 2015-23

A. Total AoD cases in which B. Average AoD cases n which
companies were fined companies were fined
80 1.80
70 1.60
60 1.40
50 1.20
1.00
40
0.80
30
0.60
20 0.40
10 0.20
0 0.00
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 57 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for companied fined in AoD cases for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Mergers

This section sets out charts and tables demonstrating the latest trends in merger activity. It is the only
section that presents jurisdiction-level information. It shows the changes in merger notifications and
decisions and highlights differences between OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions.
The section also presents charts on the level of interventions across different jurisdictions, showing how
the resolution of cases has evolved over time. It presents number of mergers challenged or prohibited, as
well as withdrawn by the merging parties.

Figure 2.21. Number of merger notifications, 2015-23

A. Total merger notifications B. Average merger notifications
14 000 300
12 000 250
10 000
200
8 000
150
6 000
100
4 000
2 000 50
0 0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger notifications for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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Figure 2.22. Annual change in merger notifications by jurisdiction, 2023

Average, all jurisdictions, -18%

CRI
MUS
MLT
HRV
GRC
PRT
VNM
KEN
NZL
MNE
ARG
ROU
CHL
IRL
DNK
DEU
POL
KOR
ROU
SVK
AUT
NLD
COL
NOR
ESP
ISR
SGP
USA
IDN
BRB
TUN
-150% -100% -50% 0% 50% 100% 150%

Annual % change of merger notifications

Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger notifications for 2022 and 2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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Figure 2.23. Annual change in merger notifications in OECD jurisdictions, 2023

Average, OECD -20%
LVA
FIN
PRT
JPN
CZE
BEL
GBR
DNK
DEU
POL
TUR
MEX
ITA
HUN
AUS
ESP
ISR
EST
SVN
-80% -60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140%

Annual % change of merger notifications

Note: Data based on the 38 OECD jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger notifications for 2022 and 2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.24. Annual change in merger notifications in non-OECD jurisdictions, 2023

Average, Non-OECD -10%
PRY
MUS
MLT
HRV
ALB
VNM
KEN
PER
BGR
MNE
ARG
ROU
ECU
ZAF
BRA
ROU
COM
SGP
TWN
IDN
BRB
PAN
TUN
-150% -100% -50% 0% 50% 100% 150%
Annual % change in merger notifications

Note: Data based on the 23 non-OECD jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger notifications for 2022 and 2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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Figure 2.25. Average merger intervention rate, 2015-23

9%
8%
Average merger intervention rate, %
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 56 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger notifications and decisions for nine
years. The intervention rate is the share of mergers approved with remedies, prohibited or challenged over total merger decisions.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.26. Number of merger decisions, 2015-23

A. Total merger decisions B. Average merger decisions
14 000 300
12 000 250
10 000 200
8 000
150
6 000
4 000 100
2 000 50
0 0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger decisions by type for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.27. Share of merger decisions by type, 2015-23

100%

98%

96%

94%

92%

90%

88%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Phase I Clearances Phase I Clearances with remedies Phase II Clearances Phase II Clearances with remedies Prohibitions

Note: Data based on the 60 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger decisions by type for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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Table 2.3. Merger decisions in OECD jurisdictions by type, 2023

Phase I Phase I Phase II Phase II Total
Merger Total merger clearances (or clearances, clearances (or clearances, merger Withdrawn
Jurisdiction
Regime notifications expiration of with expiration of with prohibi- notifications
waiting period) remedies waiting period) remedies tions
Australia Single Phase 296 288 3 - - 5 0
Austria Two Phase 294 290 2 0 0 0 5
Belgium Two Phase 33 6 2 0 0 0 1
Canada Two Phase 188 124 0 59 4 1 1
Chile Two Phase 34 24 5 2 1 0 1
Colombia Two Phase 151 24 - 4 1 0 5
Costa Rica Two Phase 55 39 1 1 1 1 2
Czechia Two Phase 55 54 11 0 1 1 1
Denmark Two Phase 70 65 0 1 2 0 2
Estonia Two Phase 32 26 0 2 2 0 2
European Union Two Phase 356 320 4 2 5 1 5
Finland Two Phase 47 44 0 0 1 0 2
France Two Phase 300 261 4 1 0 0 32
Germany Two Phase 804 798 0 4 2 0 0
Greece Two Phase 25 19 0 2 0 0 0
Hungary Two Phase 52 50 0 1 1 0 0
Iceland Two Phase 42 31 0 6 5 1 0
Ireland Two Phase 68 61 2 2 1 0 2
Israel Two Phase 164 139 0 8 2 2 10
Italy Two Phase 77 69 - 0 1 0 0
Japan Two Phase 356 345 1 0 0 0 8
Korea Two Phase 927 888 0 39 2 0 8
Latvia Two Phase 21 21 0 3 0 0 0
Lithuania Two Phase 36 24 0 5 2 1 0
Mexico Two Phase 153 148 1 4 0 1 0
Netherlands Two Phase 120 115 0 0 2 2 2
New Zealand Single Phase 16 13 1 - - 0 1
Norway Two Phase 113 108 0 4 0 1 1
Poland Two Phase 321 299 0 8 3 0 4
Portugal Two Phase 82 80 1 0 0 1 1
Slovak Republic Two Phase 23 18 0 0 2 0 1
Slovenia Two Phase 30 26 0 0 0 0 1
Spain Two Phase 70 64 3 0 2 0 3
Sweden Two Phase 82 83 1 1 0 0 1
Switzerland Two Phase 33 32 0 0 0 0 0
Türkiye Two Phase 217 214 0 3 3 0 0
United Kingdom Two Phase 44 16 27 4 2 2 3
United States Two Phase 1 735 1 698 2 3 5 4 2

Note: Data based on the 38 OECD jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger decisions, by type for 2023.
Classifications on whether a regime has a single or two-phase regime are done according to what is provided for in the merger laws.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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Table 2.4. Merger decisions in non-OECD jurisdictions by type, 2023

Phase I Phase I Phase II Phase II Total
Merger Total merger clearances clearances, clearances clearances, merger Withdrawn
Jurisdictions
Regime notifications (or expiration of with (or expiration of with prohibi- notifications
waiting period) remedies waiting period) remedies tions
Albania Two Phase 60 60 0 0 0 0 0
Argentina Two Phase 68 30 0 0 1 0 0
Barbados Two Phase 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil Single Phase 594 592 5 - - 0 4
Bulgaria Two Phase 40 28 0 2 0 0 1
COMESA Single Phase 39 26 2 - - 1 0
Croatia Two Phase 17 14 0 1 1 0 0
Ecuador Two Phase 18 5 0 6 1 0 0
Indonesia Single Phase 146 146 0 - - 0 0
Kazakhstan Single Phase 91 61 0 - - 0 4
Kenya Single Phase 133 132 1 - - 0 0
Malta Two Phase 13 12 0 0 0 0 0
Mauritius Two Phase 2 3 0 0 1 0 0
Montenegro Two Phase 75 72 0 1 0 0 0
Panama Single Phase 0 0 0 - - 0 0
Paraguay Two Phase 13 0 0 5 0 0 0
Peru Two Phase 23 17 0 0 0 0 2
Philippines Two Phase 28 26 0 1 2 0 0
Romania Two Phase 101 73 1 0 0 0 4
Saudi Arabia Single Phase 185 172 3 - - 0 0
Singapore Two Phase 6 7 0 0 0 1 0
South Africa Two Phase* 268 4 68 210 80 0 1
Chinese Taipei Two Phase 42 28 0 3 2 0 0
Tunisia Single Phase 0 0 0 - - 0 0
Ukraine Two Phase 564 299 0 13 6 0 252
Viet Nam Two Phase 160 156 0 4 4 0 0

Note: Data based on the 26 non-OECD jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger decisions by type for 2023.
Classifications on whether a regime has a single or two-phase regime are done according to what is provided for in the merger laws.
* Second phase refers to the mergers where an extension certificate for the review of the merger is issued.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.28. Number of merger prohibitions, 2015-23

A. Total merger prohibitions B. Average merger prohibitions
40 1.0
35
30 0.8
25 0.6
20
15 0.4
10
0.2
5
0 0.0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 60 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger prohibitions for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

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Figure 2.29. Number of withdrawn merger notifications, 2015-23

A. Total withdrawn merger notifications B. Average withdrawn merger notifications
120 3.0

100 2.5

80 2.0

60 1.5

40 1.0

20 0.5

0 0.0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 59 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for withdrawn merger notifications for nine years.
The increase in the 2023 figure is driven by one jurisdiction, France.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.30. Share of merger decisions with remedies, 2015-23

14 000 3.5%

Share of merger decisions with remedies

12 000 3.0%

10 000 2.5%
Total merger decisions

8 000 2.0%

6 000 1.5%

4 000 1.0%

2 000 0.5%

0 0.0%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Total merger decisions Share of merger decisions with remedies

Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger decisions for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Market studies

This section shows the level of market studies activity across OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions and the
trend over time. It also shows the sectors where a sample of these studies were carried out in 2023.

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Figure 2.31. Number of market studies conducted, 2015-23

A. Total number of market studies B. Average number of market studies
200 4.0
180 3.5
160
3.0
140
120 2.5
100 2.0
80 1.5
60
1.0
40
20 0.5
0 0.0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

All OECD Non-OECD All OECD Non-OECD

Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data on market studies for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.

Figure 2.32. Number of market studies by industry, 2023

Retail Trade 21

Information 16

Transportation and Warehousing 10

Utilities 7

Health Care and Social Assistance 6

Manufacturing 6

Mining and Extraction 6

Public Administration 5

Finance and Insurance 5

Professional Services 4

Construction 4

Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 4

Real Estate Rental and Leasing 2

Wholesale Trade 2

Other Services 1

Educational Services 1

0 5 10 15 20 25

Note: Market studies by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as
follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33
– manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and
insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and
enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and
social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public
administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the 40 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided detailed data on
the industry of market study for 2023 or provided detailed information of market studies on their annual reports to the OECD.
Source: OECD CompStats database and OECD Annual Reports on Competition Policy Developments.

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3 Regional snapshots

This chapter presents regional snapshots of the most relevant indicators in

the CompStats Database for (i) Americas, (ii) Asia-Pacific, (iii) Europe, and
(iv) Middle East and Africa (MEA). The snapshots contain information on
totals, averages and medians to account for heterogeneity across
jurisdictions, covering trends over the previous five years (2019 – 2023).

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Infographic 3.1. Americas

Source: OECD CompStats database.

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40 

Infographic 3.2. Asia-Pacific

Source: OECD CompStats database.

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Infographic 3.3. Europe

Source: OECD CompStats database

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42 

Infographic 3.4. Middle East and Africa

Source: OECD CompStats database.

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References
OECD (2024), “G7 inventory of new rules for digital markets”, [8]
https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-issues/competition/g7-inventory-of-
new-rules-for-digital-markets-2024-update.pdf.

OECD (2024), “The standard and burden of proof in competition law cases”, OECD Roundtables [7]
on Competition Policy Papers, No. 318, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/0199f63f-en.

OECD (2023), “The Optimal Design, Organisation and Powers of Competition Authorities”, [1]
OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 304, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/dea26a24-en.

OECD (2023), “The Role of Innovation in Competition Enforcement”, OECD Roundtables on [4]
Competition Policy Papers, No. 301, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/6599e020-en.

OECD (2023), “Theories of Harm for Digital Mergers”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy [5]
Papers, No. 293, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0099737e-en.

OECD (2022), “Data Screening Tools for Competition Investigations”, OECD Roundtables on [3]
Competition Policy Papers, No. 284, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/4c5bbb9d-en.

OECD (2022), “Director Disqualification and Bidder Exclusion in Competition Enforcement”, [9]
OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 291, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/fe39ea1a-en.

OECD (2021), “Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement”, OECD Roundtables [6]

on Competition Policy Papers, No. 266, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/2616c43c-en.

OECD (2020), “Digital Evidence Gathering in Cartel Investigations”, OECD Roundtables on [2]
Competition Policy Papers, No. 251, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/95df5383-en.

OECD (2016), “Commitment Decisions in Antitrust Cases”, OECD Roundtables on Competition [12]
Policy Papers, No. 190, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/bf426e05-en.

OECD (2016), Commitment Decisions in Antitrust Cases - Note by Israel, [11]

https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2016)49/en/pdf.

OECD (2016), Commitment Decisions in Antitrust Cases - Note by Singapore, [10]

https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2016)46/en/pdf.

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Annex A. Sources of CompStats

In 2018, under the guidance of the Bureau of the Competition Committee, the OECD Secretariat launched
an initiative to develop a database of general statistics relating to competition agencies, including data on
enforcement and information on market studies.
Some statistics related to competition authorities’ activities are already publicly available. However, this
information is often dispersed, lacks consistency across time and jurisdictions, and is currently not used
systematically to identify overall trends from which to draw policy lessons. This initiative fills this gap.
The OECD Secretariat collects data annually from competition authorities in: (i) OECD jurisdictions;
(ii) non-OECD jurisdictions that are Participants or Associates in the OECD Competition Committee; and
(iii) jurisdictions that are neither OECD member nor a participant or associate in the OECD Competition
Committee but have expressed an interest to join the database.

Jurisdictions

The OECD CompStats database currently covers data from competition agencies in 69 jurisdictions, of
which 38 jurisdictions are OECD jurisdictions (including the European Commission).4
There are four geographic regions used in Chapter 3: Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East
and Africa (MEA). The 69 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database are allocated to these geographic
regions as follows (jurisdictions with an asterisk (*) are considered as OECD members for the data
analysis):
• Americas (15): Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Canada*, Chile*, Colombia*, Costa Rica*, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Mexico*, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and United States*.
• Asia-Pacific (12): Australia*, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan*, Kazakhstan, Korea*,
Malaysia, New Zealand*, Philippines, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, and Viet Nam.
• Europe (34): Albania, Austria*, Belgium*, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia*, Denmark*, European
Commission*, Estonia, Finland*, France*, Germany*, Greece*, Hungary*, Iceland*, Ireland*, Italy*,
Latvia*, Lithuania*, Luxembourg*, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands*, Norway*, Poland*, Portugal*,
Romania, Slovak Republic*, Slovenia*, Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland*, Ukraine, and the
United Kingdom*.
• MEA (8): COMESA, Israel*, Kenya, Mauritius, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Tunisia, and Türkiye*.

Period

The OECD CompStats database contains nine years of annual data for the period 2015 to 2023. Given
that not all the jurisdictions provide data for all variables for all years, totals and averages presented in this
report are calculated using the information of the jurisdictions that provided data for the variable for the
entire period.

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Data
The following areas are currently covered in OECD CompStats database.

1. General information

• Budget
• Number of staff
• Number of competition staff

2. Cartels and other anticompetitive agreements

• Number of decisions (infringement and other decisions)
• Number of decisions per industry
• Number of decisions related to bid-rigging
• Number of decisions on vertical agreements
• Number of cases with settlements or plea bargain
• Number of cases with negotiated/consensual procedure for settling cases
• Number of leniency applications
• Number of investigations launched
• Number of cases that used a dawn raid
• Total amount of fines imposed
• Number of companies fined
• Number of cases with fines on individual
• Number of cases with imprisonment of individual

3. Abuse of dominance/unilateral conduct

• Number of decisions (infringement and other decisions)

• Number of decisions per industry
• Number of cases with settlements or plea bargain
• Number of cases with negotiated/consensual procedure for settling cases
• Number of investigations launched
• Number of cases that used a dawn raid
• Total amount of fines imposed
• Number of companies fined

4. Mergers and acquisitions

• Number of notifications
• Number of Phase One (or single phase) clearances
• Number of Phase One (or single phase) clearances with remedies
• Number of Phase Two clearances (after an in-depth investigation)
• Number of Phase Two clearances with remedies
• Number of prohibitions (or trials)
• Number of withdrawn notifications by merging parties

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5. Market studies

• Number of market studies

6. Additional public data

To enrich the database and allow for better and in-depth analysis, the Secretariat has added the following
variables to the database:
• Gross domestic product (GDP, current prices, purchasing power parity), inflation and population
data from the World Bank development indicators database. For some jurisdictions (Japan and
Chinese Taipei), GDP data is from the International Monetary Fund (GDP, current prices,
purchasing power parity). It is relevant to note that for 2023, the World Bank adjusted its
methodology to calculate the purchasing power parity conversion factor, thus, adjusted variables
are not comparable with previous versions of the report.
• Year of implementation of competition law
• Year of establishment of competition agency
• Year of adoption of merger control
• Year of establishment of a leniency programme
• Characteristics of merger control regimes in CompStats (mandatory vs. voluntary merger
notification, filing-fee requirements, selected criteria for establishing merger-notification threshold,
use of simplified merger regime, and one-phase vs. two-phase approaches)

Competition Authorities in the OECD CompStats Database

The following competition authorities contributed with the information for the OECD CompStats Database.

Table A.1. Competition authorities in the OECD CompStats database

Jurisdiction Acronym Competition authority (name in English)
Albania ALB Competition Authority of Albania
Argentina ARG National Commission for the Defense of Competition
Australia AUS Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
Austria AUT The Federal Competition Authority
Barbados BRB The Barbados Fair Trading Commission
Belgium BEL Belgian Competition Authority
Brazil BRA Administrative Council for Economic Defence
Bulgaria BGR Commission on Protection of Competition
Canada CAN The Competition Bureau Canada
National Economic Prosecutor
Chile CHL
Tribunal for the Defense of Free Competition
Colombia COL Superintendence of Industry and Commerce
COMESA COM COMESA Competition Commission
Costa Rica Commission for the Promotion of Competition
CRI
Costa Rica Telecommunications Superintendency
Croatia HRV Croatian Competition Agency
Czechia CZE Office for the Protection of Competition
Denmark DNK Danish Competition and Consumer Authority
Dominican Republic DOM National Commission for the Defence of Competition of the Dominican Republic
Ecuador ECU Superintendency for Economic Competition
Estonia EST The Estonian Competition Authority

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Jurisdiction Acronym Competition authority (name in English)

European Union EU European Commission Directorate-General for Competition
Finland FIN Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority
France FRA French Competition Authority
Germany DEU Federal Cartel Office
Greece GRC Hellenic Competition Commission
Hong Kong, China HKG Competition Commission (Hong Kong)
Hungary HUN Hungarian Competition Authority
Iceland ISL Icelandic Competition Authority
Indonesia IDN Indonesia Competition Commission
Ireland IRL Competition and Consumer Protection Commission
Israel ISR Israel Competition Authority
Italy ITA Italian Competition Authority
Japan JPN Japan Fair Trade Commission
Kazakhstan KAZ Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition
Kenya KEN Competition Authority of Kenya
Korea KOR Korea Fair Trade Commission
Latvia LVA Competition Council of the Republic of Latvia
Lithuania LTU Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania
Luxembourg LUX Competition Council
Malaysia MYS Malaysia Competition Commission
Malta MLT Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority – The Office for Competition
Mauritius MUS Competition Commission of Mauritius
Federal Economic Competition Commission
Mexico MEX
Federal Institute of Telecommunications
Montenegro MNE Agency for Protection of Competition
Netherlands NLD Authority for Consumers and Markets
New Zealand NZL New Zealand Commerce Commission
Norway NOR Norwegian Competition Authority
Panama PAN Authority for Consumer Protection and Competition Defense
Paraguay PRY National Competition Commission
Peru PER National Institute for the Defence of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property
Philippines PHL Philippine Competition Commission
Poland POL Office of Competition and Consumer Protection
Portugal PRT Portuguese Competition Authority
Romania ROU Romanian Competition Council
Saudi Arabia SAU General Authority for Competition
Singapore SGP Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore
Slovak Republic SVK Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic
Slovenia SVN Slovenian Competition Protection Agency
South Africa ZAF Competition Commission of South Africa
Spain ESP The Spanish National Commission of Markets and Competition
Sweden SWE Swedish Competition Authority
Switzerland CHE The Competition Commission
Chinese Taipei TWN The Fair Trade Commission of Chinese Taipei
Trinidad and Trinidad and Tobago Fair Trading Commission
TTO
Tobago
Tunisia TUN Competition Council of Tunisia
Türkiye TUR Turkish Competition Authority
Ukraine UKR Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine
United Kingdom GBR Competition and Markets Authority
Department of Justice Antitrust Division
United States USA
Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition
Viet Nam VNM Viet Nam Competition Commission

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Notes
1
Introduced in Germany in November 2023 with the 11th amendment of the German Competition Law
(GWB). See: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/index.html; In Italy, introduced in August
2023 through Decree Law No. 104.
2
The Amended Competition Act entered into force on July 1, 2024.
3
For example, Luxembourg introduced a settlement procedure for cartels in 2021, as did Slovenia in 2023.
The Dominican Republic also established procedures for commitments and settlements in 2021.
4
The European Commission takes part in the work of the OECD, in accordance with the Supplementary
Protocol to the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2025 © OECD 2025

OECD Competition Trends 2025
This 2025 edition of the OECD Competition Trends report highlights worldwide competition enforcement trends during
the calendar year 2023 based on 69 jurisdictions. Similar to previous editions, this year’s report identifies trends over
time. Analyses focus on enforcement activity in cartels, abuse of dominance cases, mergers and advocacy activity.
Moreover, this year’s edition includes a special chapter on the evolution of competition authorities’ resources, exploring
potential reasons for the overall increasing trend for average budgets and staff dedicated to competition. The report
contributes to continuously improving competition law and policy around the world.

PRINT ISBN 978-92-64-39632-6

PDF ISBN 978-92-64-51535-2

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