Universiti Malaysia Terengganu Journal of Undergraduate Research eISSN: 2637-1138
Volume 3 Number 2, April 2021: 69-76 © Penerbit UMT
RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION FOR BETTER SAFETY: CASE STUDY
OF KEMAMAN PORT
MOHAMAD IKHRAM BIN MOHAMAD RAUZILAN AND MOHAMMED ISMAIL RUSSTAM
SUHRAB*
Faculty of Maritime Studies, University Malaysia Terengganu, 21030 Kuala Nerus, Terengganu, Malaysia
*
Corresponding author: m.ismail@umt.edu.my
Abstract: The increase in awareness and responsibilities among stakeholders in a port environment
has made safety evaluation an operational priority. Operating a port is a high-risk activity with
underlying potential for accidents and loss of lives, besides causing massive property and
environmental damage. Kemaman Port has multiple operations and handles volatile chemicals that
may lead to disaster if an accident were to occur due to negligence. Therefore, the safety tools at the
port have to suit a terminal specialized in handling liquid chemicals. To determine risk level at the
port, assessment may be conducted using the hazard identification method (HAZID) to determine
the hazards and risk matrix. The “As low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP) principle should be
adhered to in determining which risk is tolerable or intolerable. In this study, the hazard and risk data
at Kemaman Port were obtained through literature review and engagements with experts. As a result,
eight main hazards were identified and the risk matrix was used to find the highest frequency and
consequences of the hazards, besides the risk probability during operations. The overall results may
demonstrate a significant improvement to the safety of port operations.
Keywords: Port safety, safety, risk assessment, risk matrix
Introduction terminal for chemical cargoes known as the
Kemaman Port is a deep seawater port in the liquid chemical berth (LCB) in the port’s East
east coast state of Terengganu in Peninsular Wharf. As Kemaman Port executes multiple
Malaysia. Figure 1 shows the layout of Kemaman operations simultaneously, there is a high risk
Port that is capable of handling ships with more of a massive accident if safety precautions are
than 150,000 DWT, besides general, dry bulk neglected. There are a lot of possible hazards
and liquid bulk cargoes. The port operator — within the operations and conditions of the port
Konsortium Pelabuhan Kemaman Sdn Bhd itself. Naturally, most of the hazards will be
(KPK) — is capable of running a specialized concentrated on the LCB.
Universiti Malaysia Terengganu Journal of Undergraduate Research
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Mohamad Ikhram Mohamad Rauzilan and Mohammed Ismail Russtam Suhrab 70
Figure 1: Location of Kemaman Port ( Source: Google Earth, 2019)
In modern transport networks and systems, casualties or death, harm to property, mischief to
seaports play an important role and are nature and many others. Risk analysis involves
responsible for processing more than 80 % of hazard identification (Hazid), event probability
international trade flow. Their operations and calculations and analysis of consequences using
activities are fraught with hazards that may the risk matrix. Moreover, risk management
lead to the loss of human lives, besides causing refers to the practice of identifying potential
damage to properties and the environment, risks in advance, analysing them, and proposing
along with a huge economic loss among the mitigatory steps to minimize the adverse effects.
stakeholders. According to the International Seaport safety is an important perspective in
Maritime Organization (IMO), the combination ensuring the efficiency of port operations, thus
of frequency and severity of consequences attracting much research related to its risks, such
may be defined as a risk. Frequency means as the organizational, operational and economic
the likelihood of accidents to occur, while perspectives (Legato & Monaco, 2004). Risk
consequences refer to severity in terms of the analysis persistently involves many aspects,
number of people affected, property damage, such as port competition, efficiency analysis,
amount of chemical spill, environmental geographical analysis, spatial evolution, port
destruction, outage time, mission delay and policy and others (Yang et al., 2014).
money lost.
Port traffic risks follow a particular pattern,
Risks may be defined as the potential for and ship collision is the most common accident
uncontrolled loss of something of value, or (Yip, 2008). Accidents have been increasing
rewards gained from exposure to a hazard or a among chemical and petrochemical tankers,
result of an event (Clack, 1997). On the other and cargo ships over the past decade. This has
hand, Kuo (1997) stated that risks are things pressured policymakers to improve safety and
that lead to an undesired result in the process protect people and the environment. The risks
of meeting an objective. This may include have been analyzed in terms of vessel traffic at
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RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION FOR BETTER SAFETY: CASE STUDY OF KEMAMAN PORT 71
sea to establish safe ship operation and develop iii. Nurul Syuhada Rani, executive planner;
new strategies. In the approach to safety and loss iv. Saufi — firefighter and mooring handler;
prevention, it is clear that many ports and policies
are evolving towards better risk management as v. Asyraf — marine service staff; and
opposed to technical solutions. The reason for vi. Ammar — marine service staff
this evolution is because the safety management
system is prone to failure even after the design Furthermore, a survey via questionaire
standards and technical solutions have been was conducted to observe the risk of hazards
improved. Failure analysis has identified main that existed in Kemaman Port operation. The
causes in safety management system, even when questionnaire was distributed to selected
the accidents are caused by frontline technical respondents, who were experts on hazards in the
and human control systems. port. The questionnaire was constructed to collect
the respondents’ demographic information and
The international shipping industry has
risk matrix data after the hazards had been
now moved to a proactive approach to safety
verified. Additionally, journals, books and
methods through what is known as the Formal
reports were also used as references to produce
Safety Assessment (FSA). FSA is introduced
relevant questions for the interview and to obtain
by the IMO as a rational and systematic method
details on the hazards that existed in Kemaman
to process risk related to maritime safety. FSA
Port. For this part, it was mostly secondary data
is a structured and systematic methodology,
that was used to gather the information.
aimed at enhancing maritime safety, including
protection of life, health, property and maritime
environment by using risk analysis and cost- Second Objective
benefit analysis (IMO, 2002). The basic The second objective was to evaluate the risk
philosophy of the FSA is that it can be used as a of hazards in Kemaman Port operations. Based
tool to facilitate a transparent decision-making on the hazards obtained in the first objective, a
process, and also provides a means of being questionnaire on risk matrix that consisted of
proactive and enabling potential hazards to be frequency and severity of hazards was distributed
considered before a serious accident occurs among among experts and staff in the Marine
(Montewka, 2014). Service Department, Operation Department and
Safety Department of KPK.
Materials and Methods
Data Collection Third Objective
First objective The third objective was to propose risk
The first objective was to identify the hazards mitigation in Kemaman Port operations. Risk
in Kemaman Port operation. To achieve this, mitigation and control options would be derived
port experts were interviewed for their opinion. based on the results of the second objective,
According to Adam (2007), talking to people Interviews with Kemaman Port experts were
might be an important element to obtain research conducted to obtain possible risk mitigation or
data. The experts were from three departments of risk control options.
KPK, namely the Marine Service Department,
Operation Department and Safety Department. Data Analysis
The expert representatives were:
First Objective Analysis
i. Captain Mohd Kamarul Mamat, marine
The first objective intended to identify the
manager;
hazards that existed in Kemaman Port operations.
ii. Syed Ahmad Hasbullah, health safety From the interviews conducted, the hazards
officer;
Universiti Malaysia Terengganu Journal of Undergraduate Research
Volume 3 Number 2, April 2021: 69-76
Mohamad Ikhram Mohamad Rauzilan and Mohammed Ismail Russtam Suhrab 72
in Kemaman port were determined through where R is the risk, P is probability and C
quantitative analysis. Together with secondary represents the consequence.
data from journals and books,the most suitable
port hazards were identified. According to the
Third Objective Analysis
HAZID method, frequent and high severity were
factors that were given priority in determining The third objective was to propose mitigation
the port hazards. steps to overcome the risks in Kemaman Port
operations. The qualitative problem-solving
approach was used to analyze the data from port
Second Objective Analysis staff interviews. Data from the interviews were
The second objective was a risk assessment on analyzed based on risk level, needs and cost to
the hazards in Kemaman Port operations. Based evaluate risk mitigation.
on the questionnaire answers, the risk for every
hazard would be calculated using the risk matrix
Results and Discussion
formula. The calculated risks were analyzed
based on the ALARP principle to finalize the risk First Objective
level. The formula for the risk matrix is stated in From literature review and interviews, eight
Equation 1 (Eq. 1). main hazards were identified in Kemaman Port.
Table 1 shows the existing hazards and risks that
had been verified.
R = P x C (Eq. 1)
Table 1: Hazards and Risks identified in Kemaman Port
Hazards Risks
Inner Harbor Ships may collide with the berth, damaging the hull.
1 (Ship contact with jetty or quay during berthing
operations)
Cargo transfer between ship and wharf Ropes may break and cargoes may drop while being
2 (Equipment failure, human error) loaded, causing damage to goods and ships, besides
endangering workers.
Mooring hazard Backlash if the mooring rope snaps on the dock or jetty.
3 (Failure of ship mooring, lead-based mooring This may cause damage to machines and equipment
equipment, shattered ropes) around the docking area, besides endangering workers.
Falling objects Damage to goods and ship structure.
4
(Occurs during stacking and stowing)
Exposure to hazardous agents Causing adverse effects on health like breathing
5 (Dust and respiratory irritants, flammable difficulties and possibility of fires.
cargo)
Slipping, tripping or falling down at port areas. May cause injury or death to port workers, especially
6 (Uncovered drains, slippery floors, during if they fall overboard.
mooring of ships)
Working at heights Falls may end up fatal, while those injured in the neck
(Carrying out trimming, sheeting, container and spinal cord may become disabled.
7
lashing, securing loads, accessing the hold and
working onboard)
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RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION FOR BETTER SAFETY: CASE STUDY OF KEMAMAN PORT 73
Fatigue Affects the workers’ ability to concentrate and make
(Lack of job rotation, unpredictable ship decisions, thereby increasing errors in judgment and
8
arrivals, high temperatures, high noise levels, affecting productivity and performance.
long, repetitive and difficult working hours)
Second Objective calculate the risk of every hazard. The risks
Table 2 shows the ranking of hazards in were ranked based on the ALARP principle as
Kemaman Port based on the questionnaires shown in Table 1. The probability and severity
answered by port representatives. The risks data containing safety assessments as per the
matrix formula in Equation 1 was used to questionnaire were calculated and the results are
also shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Risk Matrix Results
Risks 1 2 3 4 5
Hazards
Inner harbour quays (1-5) (6-10) (11-15) (16-20) (21-25)
Cargo transfer between ship and wharf (1-5) (6-10) (11-15) (16-20) (21-25)
Mooring hazard (1-5) (6-10) (11-15) (16-20) (21-25)
Falling object (1-5) (6-10) (11-15) (16-20) (21-25)
Chemical agents (1-5) (6-10) (11-15) (16-20) (21-25)
Slips, trips, falls at port (1-5) (6-10) (11-15) (16-20) (21-25)
Work at height (1-5) (6-10) (11-15) (16-20) (21-25)
Fatigue (1-5) (6-10) (11-15) (16-20) (21-25)
Third Objective incidents. These risks mitigation or risks control
Risk mitigation or risk control options were options stated in Table 3 were recommended by
proposed for Kemaman Port to avoid untoward Kemaman Port experts themselves.
Table 3: Risk mitigation recommendation by Kemaman Port Experts
Hazards Risk Mitigation
Inner harbour quays Proper and clear instructions from pilot to mooring gang, two-way communication
between pilot and mooring gang. Tug master needs to be familiar with local callsigns
in berthing operations, besides having good competency.
Cargo transfer Loading and unloading management plan needs to be implemented together with
emergency response plans.
Mooring hazards Regular check on mooring line before berthing, maintenance plan schedule for
mooring line, proper and clear instruction from the pilot, wearing personal protective
equipment (PPE), standing clear of lines being thrown and ready to pick up, staying
out of snapback zone, working in a group (mooring gang), and staying out of bights
or eyes of the mooring line.
Falling objects Loads must be secured, especially during movement around the dock. Working in a
safe system to ensure that pre-slung and lose loads may be lifted safely. All securing
equipment must be adequately inspected and maintained, such as twist locks and
lashing bars.
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Mohamad Ikhram Mohamad Rauzilan and Mohammed Ismail Russtam Suhrab 74
Hazardous agents A safe system of work must be adhered to before entering the cargo hold; grabs must
be properly maintained and used in accordance with safety regulations to reduce dust
generation; and vehicle exhaust inside a ship’s hold should be monitored.
Slipping, tripping All port areas need to be clean and in good condition at all times, all operational areas,
and falling at port emergency routes and port access should be free of clutter that may result in accidents.
The port supervisor or person in charge must ensure safe access and egress.
Working at heights Working at heights should be avoided whenever possible. If workers need to work
at high places, they should use proper equipment to avoid falls. The working height
should be mitigated to reduce the impact of a fall (Need to be instructed or supervise
by others, and proper training or other means).
Fatigue Management is responsible for preventing excessive wake periods at work and
formulating well-planned schedules. Work should be avoided at places with extreme
temperatures, or the exposure being minimized with job rotations.
To summarize, most of the hazards in Kemaman Port were controllable and could be mitigated
Conclusion ports: Empirical evidence from container
Safety is a very important factor in the port terminals in Greece. Journal of Shipping
environment. To ensure operations could run and Ocean Engineering, 2(April 2017),
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be aware of risks which could potentially harm Cho, H. S., Lee, J. S., & Moon, H. C. (2018).
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study was to identify the hazards in Kemaman country empirical analysis with theoretical
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