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Responsibility to Protect or Trojan

Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and
Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq
Alex J. Bellamy*

T
he world’s failure to prevent or halt unanimous vote by the U.S. Congress in July
the Rwandan genocide was described 2004, Colin Powell took the unprecedented
as a “sin of omission” by UN secre- step of labeling the violence “genocide.”
tary-general Kofi Annan.1 British prime min-
ister Tony Blair promised that “if Rwanda *
I would like to thank Paige Arthur, Mark Beeson, Ian
happens again we would not walk away as the Clark, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Paul D. Williams, Ramesh
outside has done many times before,” and Thakur, the two anonymous reviewers, and especially
Sara Davies for their help and advice on this article.
insisted that international society had a 1
“UN Chief ’s Rwanda Genocide Regret,” BBC News
“moral duty” to provide military and World Edition, March 26, 2004; available at news.
humanitarian assistance to Africa whenever bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3573229.stm.
2
it was needed.2 The United States labeled as Tony Blair, speech given to the Labour Party Confer-
ence, Brighton, U.K., October 2, 2001. I am grateful to
“rogues” states that “brutalize their own peo- Nick Wheeler for bringing this to my attention.
3
ple and squander their natural resources for “The National Security Strategy of the United States of
the personal gain of their rulers.”3 Since 2003, America” (September 2002), sec. V; available at www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
the Sudanese government and its notorious 4
According to Alex de Waal, the government of Sudan
Janjaweed militia have conducted a brutal has “consistently franchised its counter-insurgency
campaign of mass killing and ethnic cleans- operations to militia,” in this case the Janjaweed. The
government provides the militia with arms, intelli-
ing in response to an uprising by the
gence, and air support and allows them to operate with
Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the complete impunity, creating an “ethics-free zone.” Alex
Justice and Equality Movement, who have de Waal, “Briefing: Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for Peace,”
themselves attacked civilians in the Darfur African Affairs 104, no. 414 (2005), p. 129.
5
These figures were offered in a detailed study by Jan
region, though on a much smaller scale.4 Coebergh, “Sudan: Genocide Has Killed More Than the
Recent surveys place the number of deaths Tsunami,” Parliamentary Brief 9, no. 7 (2005), pp. 5–6.
caused by direct violence between 73,700 and The lower figure is extrapolated from an MSF survey
and the upper one from a U.S. State Department report.
172,154.5 Deaths from malnutrition and pre- 6
Ibid. These figures are extrapolated from data pro-
ventable disease in internally displaced per- vided by USAID and the World Health Organization.
7
sons camps stood at 108,588 in January 2005, House of Commons International Development
Committee, Darfur, Sudan: The Responsibility to Protect,
with approximately 25,000 more having died
fifth report of session 2004–05, vol. 1 (HC 67-1), March
in inaccessible regions.6 The British Parlia- 30, 2005, p. 3; available at www.publications.parlia
ment’s International Development Commit- ment.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/67/67i.pdf.
8
tee put the total casualty figure at around UN News Centre, “UN Refugee Agency Withdraws
Staff from South Darfur Over Sudanese Restrictions,”
300,000.7 At least 1.8 million more had been New York, November 11, 2004; available at www.un.org/
forced to flee their homes.8 Following a apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12510.

31
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Despite professed commitments to pre- armed responses to “supreme humanitarian

vent future man-made humanitarian catas- emergencies”?12 My response proceeds in
trophes, the world’s response to the Darfur two parts. The first provides a brief overview
crisis has been muted. At the time of writing, of the norm of humanitarian intervention,
a small, underfunded and understaffed focusing on The Responsibility to Protect and
African Union mission (AMIS) is deployed on debates about the impact of the “war on
in Darfur. Although it has a mandated size of terror” and the war in Iraq on it. The second
approximately 3,300, there are fewer than offers a detailed study of the international
1,500 AMIS peacekeepers on the ground. response to Darfur.
The force has proven unable to halt sporadic I argue that the situation in Darfur
escalations of violence or prevent the reveals two subtle changes to the humani-
humanitarian situation from deteriorating.9 tarian intervention norm. First, although
The UN Security Council has taken an the level of consensus about humanitarian
ambivalent position. On the one hand, it has intervention has not perceptively shifted,
to date failed to impose serious sanctions on the debates on Darfur lend credence to the
Sudanese officials and has not contemplated thesis that the Iraq war has undermined
using force to protect civilians or humani- the standing of the United States and the
tarian aid. On the other hand, while it has U.K. as norm carriers. 13 According to
yet to decide whether the UN Mission to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,
Sudan (UNMIS), created recently to sup- new norms only replace old ones after a
port, monitor, and verify the comprehensive period of contestation between advocates
peace agreement between the government of the old and the new.14 If the credibility
of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation of those most associated with the new
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in the south,
will play an active role in Darfur, there is a
distinct possibility that it could.10 Moreover, 9
See Thalif Deen, “New UN Force for Sudan Will Skirt
on March 31, 2005, the council took the Darfur Crisis,” Inter Press Service, February 9, 2005;
momentous step of referring the Darfur case available at globalpolicy.igc.org/security/issues/sudan/
2005/0208unskirts.htm. It is widely recognized that
to the International Criminal Court (ICC).11
after an initial respite, the humanitarian situation has
This article explores what international actually deteriorated despite AMIS.
10
engagement with Darfur tells us about the UNSC Res. 1590 (March 24, 2005).
11
norm of humanitarian intervention since UNSC Res. 1593 (March 31, 2005). Passed with eleven
in favor and four abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China,
the 2003 war in Iraq. Do states and regional and the United States).
12
organizations recognize that they have a This is Wheeler’s term. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving
“responsibility to protect” civilians at risk, as Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 34.
the International Commission on Interven- 13
See also Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin Morris, “Justi-
tion and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argued? fying Iraq as a Humanitarian Intervention: The Cure Is
Or is humanitarian intervention perceived Worse Than the Disease,” in W. P. S. Sidhu and Ramesh
Thakur, eds., The Iraq Crisis and World Order: Structural
as a “Trojan horse” used by the powerful to
and Normative Challenges (Tokyo: United Nations Uni-
legitimize their interference in the affairs of versity Press, forthcoming). I owe the “norm carriers”
the weak? I examine whether the Iraq war idea to them.
14
has shifted the balance between these two A process they describe as “norm cascade.” See
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Interna-
positions, posing the question: Is there more tional Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” Interna-
or less likelihood of global consensus on tional Organization 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 887–918.

32 Alex J. Bellamy
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norm is undermined by perceptions that more compelling when the absence of

they have abused it or raised it for prima- plausible arguments against intervention is
rily self-serving purposes, the process of set against the global consensus that hor-
normative change is likely to be slowed or rors such as the Rwandan genocide should
reversed. 15 Traditional advocates of the not have been permitted.16 In the Darfur
new norm will find that their arguments case, as I will show, “responsibility to pro-
have less resonance among skeptics. The tect” language has now enabled anti-
problem is compounded by military over- interventionists to legitimize arguments
stretch on the part of key advocates of against action by claiming that primary
humanitarian intervention, in particular responsibility in certain contested cases
the United States and the U.K. In short, it still lies with the state, and not (yet) with an
has become harder for these states to per- international body. Given the credibility
suade others to act decisively in humanitar- crisis confronting some of the leading
ian emergencies at precisely the moment advocates of humanitarian intervention,
when those states themselves are less able to there is a real danger that appeals to a
bear the costs of acting outside the world’s responsibility to protect will evaporate
institutional framework. From the Ameri- amid disputes about where that responsi-
can and British perspectives there is no fea- bility lies.
sible alternative to collective action
through the UN or AU in addressing the THE NORM OF
situation in Darfur, but they have been HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
unable to build consensus about collective
action at least in part, I would suggest, It is widely accepted that the Security Coun-
because of their diminished credibility as cil has a legal right to authorize humanitar-
norm carriers. ian intervention under Chapter VII of the
Second, the Darfur debates have been UN Charter.17 There is also a partial con-
deeply infused with the language of a sensus among some liberal states that there
“responsibility to protect.” The meaning of
that language, however, has been hotly con-
tested. Changing the language of the inter- 15
Ward Thomas, for instance, argues that a new norm’s
vention debate has done little to forge vitality depends on its advocates being seen to practice
consensus or overcome the struggle it in good faith. Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction:
Norms and Force in International Relations (Ithaca: Cor-
between sovereignty and human rights. In nell University Press, 2001), pp. 34–35.
16
the debates I examine, “responsibility to The idea of “acquiescence” to the West’s humanitar-
protect” talk was used to oppose interna- ian agenda is taken from Wheeler and Morris, “Justify-
ing Iraq as a Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 15. My
tional activism as much as to support it. If argument draws on Quentin Skinner,“Analysis of Polit-
we accept Quentin Skinner’s argument that ical Thought and Action,” in James Tully, ed., Meaning
actors will not act in ways that they cannot and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 1988), pp. 116–17. I am grateful to
justify by reference to the prevailing nor-
Nick Wheeler for suggesting this.
mative context, it could be claimed that the 17
Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Humanitarian Responsibil-
brief period of acquiescence to humanitar- ities of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a
ian interventions in the 1990s was at least New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian
Purposes in International Society,” in Jennifer M. Welsh,
partly due to the absence of plausible argu- ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Rela-
ments against them. This claim is made tions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 32–41.

responsibility to protect or trojan horse? 33

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is a moral right to intervene without coun- but legitimate,” meaning that while it did
cil authorization in extreme cases.18 It is not satisfy international society’s legal rules,
highly unlikely that the Security Council it was “sanctioned by its compelling moral
would have objected had others used force purpose.”22 This finding implies a degree of
to halt the 1994 Rwandan genocide.19 consensus around the idea that states have a
Throughout the Security Council’s deliber- moral right to intervene to save strangers in
ations about Rwanda, no state publicly supreme humanitarian emergencies. A
argued that either the ban on force (Article Russian draft Security Council resolution
2(4)) or the nonintervention rule (Article condemning the intervention was rejected
2(7)) ought to prohibit armed action to halt by twelve votes to three (Russia, China, and
the bloodshed.20 Moreover, as Simon Namibia).23 While the failure of the Russian
Chesterman has argued, there is little evi- draft did not constitute retrospective
dence to suggest that sovereignty concerns authorization, it does add credence to the
inhibit states from saving strangers when idea that there is a moral consensus among
they have the means and desire to do so.21 liberal states and some others about the
Throughout the 1990s, the Security Council right of intervention in supreme humani-
expanded its interpretation of “interna- tarian emergencies.24 The claim that the
tional peace and security,” authorizing inter-
ventions to protect civilians in so-called safe 18
The debates among liberal states about whether to
areas (Bosnia), maintain law and order, pro- intervene in Kosovo provide the best demonstration of
tect aid supplies (Somalia), and restore an this moral consensus. See Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and
elected government toppled by a coup International Society (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002). The best theoretical expression of this liberal
(Haiti). However, two questions remain consensus can be found in Michael Walzer, “The Poli-
hotly contested: First, who has the authority tics of Rescue,” in Arguing about War (New Haven: Yale
to sanction humanitarian intervention University Press, 2004), pp. 67–81.
19
It is important to note, however, that five states
when the Security Council is blocked by the abstained when France requested a Security Council
veto? Second, when should a humanitarian mandate to launch Operation Turquoise in Rwanda,
crisis trigger potential armed intervention? I most citing concerns about France’s motives. See
Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 232.
argue in the following sections that 20
See Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The
although a partial consensus on these ques- United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University
tions was established during the 1990s, there Press, 2002); and Wheeler, Saving Strangers, pp. 231–41.
21
is now deep division about how to interpret Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humani-
tarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford:
the effects of the “war on terror” and the Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 231.
22
invasion of Iraq on that consensus. Independent International Commission on Kosovo,
Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons
Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 4;
The Partial Consensus on and Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society
Humanitarian Intervention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 212.
23
As mentioned earlier, in the past few years It is remarkable that even traditionally conservative
states such as Malaysia chose to side with NATO rather
many liberal states have begun to accept the
than to abstain. UNSC 3989th meeting, S/PV.3989,
proposition that intervention not author- March 26, 1999; available at www.un.org/Depts/dhl/
ized by the Security Council could be legiti- resguide/scact1999.htm.
24
mate. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was a Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Legality of NATO’s Inter-
vention in Kosovo,” in Ken Booth, ed., The Kosovo
watershed in this regard. A commission of Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions (London:
experts found the intervention to be “illegal Frank Cass, 2001), p. 156.

34 Alex J. Bellamy
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consensus extended beyond Western liberal problem from the victim’s point of view. It
states in the Kosovo case is further demon- insisted that the primary responsibility to
strated by the Organization of the Islamic protect civilians lay with the host state and
Conference’s support for the intervention, that outside intervention could only be con-
which was communicated to the Security templated if the host state proved either
Council in a letter stating, “A decisive inter- unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibil-
national action was necessary to prevent ities.31
humanitarian catastrophe and further vio- On the question of when to intervene, the
lations of human rights” in Kosovo.25 This is ICISS adopted the commonly held view that
a partial consensus, however, because many, intervention should be limited to “extreme”
if not most, of the world’s states do not sub- cases—in other words, Wheeler’s “supreme
scribe to the view that in exceptional cir- humanitarian emergencies” and Tom Farer’s
cumstances unauthorized intervention may “spikes.”32 Outside intervention, it argued,
be legitimate. In addition to the well- was warranted in cases in which there was
recorded hostility of Russia, China, and large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing,
India, the Non-Aligned Movement whether deliberately caused by the state or
responded to Kosovo by declaring its rejec- facilitated by neglect or incapacity. The
tion of “the so-called right of humanitarian question of authority proved thornier. The
intervention, which has no legal basis.”26
Further evidence of a developing moral
25
consensus about humanitarian intervention S/1999/363, March 31, 1999, annex.
26
in supreme humanitarian emergencies has See Final Document of the XIII Ministerial Conference
of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (Cartagena,
emerged since Kosovo. Article 4(h) of the Colombia, April 8–9, 2000), pp. 41–42; available at
AU’s Constitutive Act, signed on July 11, www.nam.gov.za/xiiiminconf/index.html. It should be
2000, awarded the new organization “the noted that the Non-Aligned Movement itself did not
achieve a consensus on this position.
right . . . to intervene in a Member State pur- 27
Constitutive Act of the African Union; available at
suant to a decision by the Assembly in www.africa-union.org/About_AU/AbConstitutive
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war _Act.htm.
28
Kofi Annan, speech given to the Nobel Foundation,
crimes, genocide and crimes against
Oslo, Norway, December 10, 2001; available at
humanity.”27 And in 2001, Kofi Annan used www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/2001/annanlecture.html.
29
his Nobel lecture to argue, “The sovereignty Most of the unauthorized interventions were con-
of states must no longer be used as a shield ducted with host nation consent, sometimes coerced.
For a definitive list of these operations (up to February
for gross violations of human rights.”28 In 2005), see tables 1 and 2 in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D.
the same period there were myriad author- Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization
ized and unauthorized interventions.29 and Contemporary Peace Operations,” International
Security 29, no. 4 (2005), pp. 35–36.
In 2001, the Canadian government gave 30
Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “Foreword,”
the high-profile ICISS the task of establish- in International Commission on Intervention and State
ing common ground on the question of Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa:
IDRC, 2001), p. viii.
humanitarian intervention.30 The ICISS 31
ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, p. 17.
recommended replacing the atavistic termi- 32
“Supreme humanitarian emergencies” and “spikes”
nology of humanitarian intervention (sov- refer to the idea that mass killing is either ongoing or
ereignty vs. human rights) with the new imminent at the time of the intervention. See Wheeler,
Saving Strangers, p. 34; and Tom Farer, “Cosmopolitan
language of the “responsibility to protect.” It Humanitarian Intervention: A Five-Part Test,” Interna-
called for an approach that looked at the tional Relations 19, no. 2 (2005), pp. 216–17.

responsibility to protect or trojan horse? 35

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ICISS proposed a three-layered distribution of dissent. It was received most favorably by

of responsibility. Primary responsibility lay states, such as Canada, Japan, Germany, and
with the host state. Secondary responsibility (to a lesser extent) the U.K., that had, since
lay with the domestic authorities working in the intervention in Kosovo, been exploring
partnership with outside agencies. If the pri- the potential for developing criteria to guide
mary and secondary levels failed to amelio- global decision-making about humanitarian
rate the humanitarian emergency, inter- intervention.35 When the Security Council
national organizations would assume re- discussed the report at its annual informal
sponsibility. At this third level of responsibil- retreat in May 2002, almost all of the perma-
ity, the ICISS accepted the view that primary nent members expressed disquiet with the
legal authority for action was vested in the idea of formalizing criteria for intervention.
Security Council. If the Security Council was The United States rejected them on the
deadlocked, it argued that potential inter- grounds that it could not offer precommit-
veners should approach the General Assem- ments to engage its military forces where it
bly under the Uniting for Peace mechanism had no national interests, and that it would
and, if that failed, work through regional not bind itself to criteria that would restrain
organizations. In an attempt to increase the its right to decide when and where to use
chances of consensus in the council, the force.36 China had opposed the idea
ICISS recommended that its permanent throughout the ICISS process, and while
members commit themselves to a series of Russia was generally supportive, it insisted
criteria relating to the use of force in human- that no action should be taken without Secu-
itarian emergencies. It was suggested that rity Council approval, a position that was
states always seek Security Council authori- unacceptable to the United States, the U.K.,
zation before using force; that the council and France.37 For their part, the U.K. and
commit itself to dealing promptly with France, two advocates of the ICISS principles
humanitarian emergencies involving large- among the Permanent Five, expressed con-
scale loss of life; that the permanent mem- cern that formulating criteria to govern
bers should commit themselves to not humanitarian intervention would not pro-
casting a veto to obstruct humanitarian duce the missing ingredients of political will
action unless their vital national interests are and consensus.38
involved; and that Security Council mem-
bers should recognize that if they fail to ful-
fill their responsibility to protect, other states
33
and organizations may take it upon them- ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, paras. 4.19, 6.11,
selves to act.33 The commission insisted that 6.29–40, and pp. xii–xiii.
34
Ibid., p. xii.
the question of military intervention should 35
See Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Legitimating Humanitarian
be placed firmly on the Security Council’s Intervention: Principles and Procedures,” Melbourne
agenda if two “just cause thresholds” (large- Journal of International Law 2, no. 2 (2001), pp. 552–54.
36
Jennifer M. Welsh,“Conclusion: Humanitarian Inter-
scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing) and
vention after 11 September,” in Welsh, ed., Humanitar-
four “precautionary principles” (right inten- ian Intervention, p. 180.
37
tion, last resort, proportional means, and Ian Williams, “Writing the Wrongs of Past Interven-
reasonable prospects) were satisfied.34 tions: A Review of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty,” International Jour-
Reactions to the ICISS report were gener- nal of Human Rights 6, no. 3 (2002), p. 103.
38
ally positive, though there were notable signs Welsh, “Conclusion,” p. 204, n. 4.

36 Alex J. Bellamy
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The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan strategic imperative to prevent terrorism

seemed to support the idea of a partial therefore entails a humanitarian imperative
moral consensus on the importance of to prevent state failure. As such, Western
humanitarianism in war. The U.S. adminis- states are potentially more likely to respond
tration felt obliged to argue that Operation decisively to humanitarian crises than they
Enduring Freedom would improve human- were prior to September 11.44 On the other
itarian conditions inside Afghanistan, even hand, the U.S. response to September 11,
though it was widely recognized as a legiti- especially the so-called Bush doctrine of
mate act of self-defense.39 The 2003 invasion preemption, has reduced the normative sig-
of Iraq, however, proved much more prob- nificance of sovereignty. This, Farer argues,
lematic. In this case, the political leaders of should lead us to expect more rather than
all the major troop contributors (the United fewer interventions.45 The post–September
States, the U.K., and Australia) gave consid-
erable weight to the humanitarian case for
39
war in their public justifications, though the See Colin McInnes, “A Different Kind of War? Sep-
tember 11 and the United States’ Afghan War,” Review of
formal legal justification was based on the International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003), pp. 165–84;
enforcement of existing Security Council Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Humanitarian Intervention after
resolutions.40 Although the humanitarian September 11, 2001,” in Anthony F. Lang, Jr., ed., Just
Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univer-
argument received support in some quar-
sity Press, 2003), pp. 192–216; and Simon Chesterman,
ters, it was widely rejected.41 Whereas in the “Humanitarian Intervention and Afghanistan,” in
Kosovo case NATO could point to a moral Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 163–75.
40
consensus among liberal states and some See Adam Roberts, “Law and the Use of Force after
Iraq,” Survival 45, no. 2 (2003), p. 48.
others about the need to act, there was a 41
Michael Ignatieff, an ICISS commissioner, was an
much smaller consensus in the Iraq case, early supporter; see Ignatieff, “Why Are We in Iraq?
with many liberal states (such as Canada, (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?),” New York Times
Magazine, September 7, 2003, pp. 38ff. Kenneth Roth
Germany, and France) opposing the war. wrote one of the most detailed rejections in Ken Roth,
“War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention,”
The Effect of the “War on Terror” and Human Rights Watch World Report 2004; available at
hrw.org/wr2k4/3.htm; see also David Vesel,“The Lonely
the Invasion of Iraq Pragmatist: Humanitarian Intervention in an Imper-
What impact has the so-called war on terror fect World,” BYU Journal of Public Law 18, no. 1 (2004),
and the invasion of Iraq had on the partial p. 56. It is also worth noting that the humanitarian
consensus on the norm of humanitarian argument was not raised in the Security Council’s for-
mal proceedings.
intervention? There are, broadly, three posi- 42
This terminology is drawn from Nicholas J. Wheeler
tions. The first group can be described as and Alex J. Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention in
“optimists.”42 This view accepts that states World Politics,” in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds.,
The Globalization of World Politics, 3rd ed. (Oxford:
will only intervene in humanitarian emer- Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 572.
gencies when vital national interests are at 43
I am grateful to Nick Wheeler for this formulation.
44
stake; it makes a virtue of this, however, by See Chesterman, “Humanitarian Intervention in
Afghanistan,” in Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention;
arguing that since September 11 interests and
and Wheeler, “Humanitarian Intervention after Sep-
humanitarianism have merged for many tember 11, 2001,” in Lang, Jr., ed., Just Intervention.
Western states.43 Two factors contributed to 45
Tom Farer, “Humanitarian Intervention before and
this merger. On the one hand, Afghanistan after 9/11: Legality and Legitimacy,” in J. L. Holzgrefe
and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Interven-
demonstrates all too clearly the linkage tion: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge:
between terrorism and state failure. The Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 80.

responsibility to protect or trojan horse? 37

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11 record does not fully support these hoping was an emerging new norm justify-
claims. For instance, the West’s contribution ing intervention on the basis of the principle
to UN peace operations remains paltry, the of ‘responsibility to protect.’”50 This view is
United States has not made a significant widely held among critics: Ian Williams
troop contribution to reconstruction efforts argued that the Iraq war brought “humani-
in Afghanistan, and it played only a mar- tarian intervention into disrepute”; Richard
ginal role in alleviating the crises in Liberia Falk lamented that the war risked undermin-
and Haiti.46 ing consensus at the UN; Karl Kaiser insisted
The second perspective, shared by some that “Washington has lowered [consensus
involved with the ICISS, is that the “sun has on] the humanitarian intervention approach
set” on the humanitarian intervention to an unprecedented level”; John Kampfner
agenda. This claim is arrived at from two suggested that “there has been no better time
directions. Thomas Weiss, the commission’s for dictators to act with impunity”; and
director of research, argued that the United The Fund for Peace project collating regional
States and the UN’s political will to act in responses to humanitarian intervention
humanitarian emergencies has “evapo- found that in the one consultation conducted
rated” because of their obsession with immediately before the Iraq war, in Europe,
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war on terror.47 participants were reluctant to support
This position is helpful inasmuch as it high- humanitarian intervention for fear of tacit-
lights the fact that the overstretched Amer- ly legitimizing the invasion of Iraq.51 David
ican and British militaries are unlikely to be
used in frontline roles, and that strategic 46
See Richard Bruneau, “Selfishness in Service of the
considerations related to the “war on ter- Common Good: Why States Participate in UN Peace-
ror” are likely to trump humanitarian con- keeping” (unpublished ms.), p. 3.
47
cerns when the two collide. On the other Thomas G. Weiss, “The Sunset of Humanitarian
Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipo-
hand, it overstates the extent of humanitar- lar Era,” Security Dialogue 35, no. 2 (2004), p. 135; and
ian interventionism prior to September 11. James Traub, “Never Again, No Longer?” New York
In the 1990s, the world failed to “save Times, July 18, 2004, p. 12.
48
See Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 295.
strangers” in the Balkans, Rwanda, and else- 49
A point developed in Paul D. Williams and Alex J.
where, and the legitimacy of humanitarian Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis
intervention remained hotly contested.48 in Darfur,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 1 (2005), p. 41.
50
Indeed, the Security Council has yet to Gareth Evans, “When Is It Right to Fight?” Survival
46, no. 3 (2004), pp. 59–82.
authorize humanitarian intervention 51
Respectively, Ian Williams, “Intervene with Caution,”
against a fully functioning state without the In These Times, July 28, 2003, p. 7; Richard Falk,
latter’s consent.49 “Humanitarian Intervention: A Forum,” Nation, July
14, 2003, available at www.thenation.com/doc. mhtml8i
The second way of arriving at the conclu- =2003071485=forum; Karl Kaiser,“A European Perspec-
sion that the “sun has set” on humanitarian tive on the Post Iraq New International Order,” paper
intervention suggests that the use of human- presented at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia, July 29, 2003; available at
itarian justifications to defend the invasion
www.csis.or.id/events_past_view.asp?id=5&tab=0;
of Iraq was widely perceived as “abuse.” John Kampfner interviewed by Tim Dunne, available at
ICISS cochair Gareth Evans argued that the www.ex.ac.uk/shipss/news/kampfner.htm; and The
“poorly and inconsistently” argued human- Fund for Peace, Neighbors on Alert: Regional Views on
Humanitarian Intervention, Summary Report of the
itarian justification for the war in Iraq Regional Responses to Internal War Program, October
“almost choked at birth what many were 2003, p. 6.

38 Alex J. Bellamy
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Clark, a former special advisor to the tance to support humanitarian interven-

British Foreign Office, argued that “Iraq tion per se. Sudan may have adopted its
has wrecked our case for humanitarian strategy regardless of events in Iraq, while
wars. As long as U.S. power remains in the Germany’s position was directed more
hands of the Republican right, it will be against the potential uses of criteria for
impossible to build a consensus on the intervention than against the idea of
left behind the idea that it can be a power humanitarian intervention itself.
for good. Those who continue to insist A subtle variation on this theme holds
that it can, risk discrediting the concept of that while the Iraq war has not directly
humanitarian intervention.” 52 The key affected the norm of humanitarian inter-
question, however, is whether states share vention, it has impacted negatively on the
this view. ability of the United States and its allies to
The answer to this is difficult to gauge act as norm carriers. According to one
precisely. Of course, as noted earlier, analyst, the U.S. administration sacrificed
many states opposed the ICISS agenda its international credibility over Iraq and
before Iraq. There is evidence, however, is therefore not well placed to lead in Dar-
that some states that were initially sup- fur and elsewhere.55 Similarly, at least one
portive of humanitarian intervention article in the British press suggested that
have become less so as a result of per- were Prime Minister Blair to advocate
ceived abuse in the Iraq case. Immediately intervention in the Sudan, “oil [would] be
after the Iraq war, a forum of social- the driving factor.” 56 Such skepticism is
democratic political leaders rejected sec- what led Kenneth Roth of Human Rights
tions of a draft communiqué proposed by Watch to predict that one of the most
Prime Minister Blair supporting the idea troubling consequences of the attempts to
that the “responsibility to protect” ought justify the Iraq war in humanitarian terms
to override sovereignty in supreme was that “it will be more difficult next
humanitarian emergencies. At least one of
these states, Germany, had previously 52
David Clark, “Iraq Has Wrecked Our Case for
supported the ICISS agenda. German
Humanitarian Wars,” Guardian, August 12, 2003, p. 16;
chancellor Gerhard Schroeder reportedly available at www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/
rejected the communiqué because he 0,,1016573,00.html.
53
feared that any doctrine of unauthorized See Agence France-Presse, “British PM Urges
Tougher Stance against Brutal Regimes,” July 14, 2003;
humanitarian intervention would be used and Kevin Ward, “Process Needed so Countries Know
by the United States and the U.K. to jus- When to Intervene to Protect Human Rights,” CBS
tify the Iraq war.53 There is also clear evi- News (Canada), July 13, 2003; available at www.global
policy.org/empire/humanint/2003/0713canada.htm.
dence that in the Darfur case the 54
Cheryl O. Igiri and Princeton N. Lyman, “Giving
Sudanese government linked American Meaning to ‘Never Again’: Seeking an Effective
activism in Darfur with its actions in Iraq, Response to the Crisis in Darfur and Beyond,” CSR no.
5 (Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y., Sep-
portraying it both as oil-oriented and
tember 2004), p. 21.
anti-Islamic, and that this strategy helped 55
Scott Straus, “Darfur and the Genocide Debate,” For-
to reinforce African and Middle Eastern eign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005), p. 128.
56
hostility to the idea of Western enforce- John Laughland,“The Mask of Altruism Disguising a
Colonial War,” Guardian, August 2, 2004; available at
ment. 54 Importantly, neither of these www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1273982,0
cases clearly indicates an increased reluc- 0.html.

responsibility to protect or trojan horse? 39

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time for us to call on military action INITIAL ENGAGEMENT TO THE

when we need it to save potentially hun- DEPLOYMENT OF AMIS
dreds of thousands of lives.” 57
A third perspective suggests that the For much of 2003, the international
ICISS criteria for intervention should be response to the Darfur crisis was limited
viewed as constraints that will limit states’ to the delivery of humanitarian aid. The
ability to abuse humanitarian justifica- main political effort during this period
tions rather than as enablers for interven- focused on the Naivasha process aimed at
tion. Ramesh Thakur, another ICISS resolving the civil war between the
commissioner, argues that the moral con- Sudanese government and the SPLM/A.
sensus about the “responsibility to pro- In early 2004, Mukesh Kapila, the UN’s
tect” is likely to be strengthened in the coordinator for Sudan, accused Arab
wake of Iraq as states come to realize that militia backed by the government of “eth-
it provides a language that can be used to nic cleansing” and warned that if left
oppose legitimate intervention. Accord- unchecked the humanitarian catastrophe
ing to Thakur, consensus on criteria will in Darfur would be comparable to that in
make it more, not less, difficult for states Rwanda.59 Secretary-General Annan used
to claim a humanitarian mantle for their a Rwandan anniversary speech to the UN
interventions.58 Human Rights Commission to observe
The impact of the “war on terror” and that unfolding events in Darfur “leave me
the war in Iraq on the norm of humani- with a deep sense of foreboding.” He con-
tarian intervention is therefore hotly con- tinued:
tested. There is certainly evidence that
prior to the war in Iraq there was a gen- Whatever term it uses to describe the situa-
eral consensus about the necessity of tion, the international community cannot
stand idle. . . .The international community
intervention in supreme humanitarian
must be prepared to take swift and appro-
emergencies when authorized by the priate action. By “action” in such situations
Security Council, and a consensus among I mean a continuum of steps, which may
some liberal states that unauthorized include military action.60
intervention may be legitimate if the
council is deadlocked. However, there are
at least three plausible explanations for 57
Kenneth Roth, “The War in Iraq: Justified as Human-
the direction the norm has taken since the itarian Intervention?” Kroc Institute Occasional Paper
Iraq war. As I will demonstrate in the No. 25 (The Joan B. Kroc Institute, Notre Dame, Ind.,
remainder of the article, the Darfur case 2004), pp. 2–3.
58
Ramesh Thakur, “Iraq and the Responsibility to Pro-
lends support to the idea that the human- tect,” Behind the Headlines 62, no. 1 (2004), pp. 1–16; and
itarian intervention norm has subtly Ramesh Thakur, “Developing Countries and the Inter-
changed in two ways. First, the credibility vention-Sovereignty Debate,” in Richard M. Price and
Mark W. Zacher, eds., The United Nations and Global
of the United States and the U.K. as norm
Security (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp.
carriers has diminished. Second, “respon- 194–208.
59
sibility to protect” language can be mobi- Cited in “Mass Rape Atrocity in West Sudan,” BBC
lized to legitimate opposition to News World Edition, March 19, 2004; available at
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3549325.stm.
intervention in humanitarian emergen- 60
SG/SM/9197 AFR/893 HR/CN/1077, April 7, 2004;
cies as well as to support it. available at www.un.org/events/rwanda.

40 Alex J. Bellamy
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In May 2004, Germany informally pro- sive peace agreement in Sudan’s south.
posed the deployment of UN peacekeep- Although the resolution did not relate to
ers to Darfur, and it was widely rumored Darfur, some council members nevertheless
that Norway had offered to command reaffirmed Sudanese sovereignty and
such a force.61 The New York Times ran a expressed deep skepticism about humani-
series of articles exposing the massive tarian intervention. Pakistan reminded the
human rights abuses there and calling for council:
U.S. action, earning criticism from the
The Sudan is an important member of the
Sudanese embassy. 62 Human Rights African Union, the Organization of the
Watch, Amnesty International, and the Islamic Conference and the United Nations.
International Crisis Group also actively As a United Nations Member State, the Sudan
lobbied for action in Darfur. has all the rights and privileges incumbent
In April 2004, the UN Human Rights under the United Nations Charter, including
to sovereignty, political independence, unity
Commission dispatched a fact-finding team
and territorial integrity—the principles that
to Darfur. The team found “a disturbing pat- form the basis of international relations.66
tern of disregard for basic principles of
human rights and humanitarian law, which That this was not the view of an isolated
is taking place in Darfur for which the minority in the council was demonstrated
armed forces of the Sudan and the Jan- by the fact that the resolution’s drafters felt
jaweed are responsible.” It concluded that “it it necessary to doff their caps to Sudanese
is clear that there is a reign of terror in Dar- sovereignty by inserting a passage “reaffirm-
fur,” and that the government and its prox- ing its commitment to the sovereignty, inde-
ies were almost certainly guilty of pendence and unity of Sudan.”67 Pakistan,
widespread crimes.63 Before the commis- China, and Russia believed that the scale of
sion could vote on a resolution based on the human suffering in Darfur was insufficient
draft report, its content was leaked to the to provoke serious reflection on whether
press. Pakistan and Sudan condemned the
leak and called for an immediate inquiry.64
Unwilling to force the issue, and concerned 61
See Human Rights Watch, “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic
that a strongly worded resolution would be Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in West-
rejected by the commission’s African and ern Sudan” (New York: Human Rights Watch, May
Asian members, the EU members watered 2004), pp. 56–57; available at hrw.org/reports/2004/
sudan0504; and Afrol News,“UN Peacekeeping Mission
down a draft resolution they were prepar- for Sudan Prepared,” May 28, 2004; available at
ing. The redrafted resolution neither con- www.afrol.com/articles/12789.
62
demned Sudan nor mentioned its crimes. It See, e.g., John Prendergast, “Sudan’s Ravines of
Death,” New York Times, July 15, 2004, p. A23; and
was passed with fifty votes in favor and only Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, “The New York
three against (the United States, Australia, Times Faulted Sudan,” April 13, 2004; available at
and Ukraine).65 sudanembassy.org/default.asp?page=viewstory&id
=262.
The underlying dynamics of the Security 63
E/CN.4/2005/3, May 7, 2004, p. 3; available at
Council’s attitude to Darfur became appar- www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf.
64
ent when it met on June 11, 2004, to pass Human Rights Watch, “Darfur Destroyed,” p. 55.
65
unanimously Resolution 1547, expressing E/CN.4/2004.L11/Add7, April 23, 2004.
66
UNSC 4988th meeting, S/PV.4988, June 11, 2004, p. 4.
the council’s willingness to authorize a 67
UNSC Res. 1547 (2004), June 11, 2004; emphasis in
peace operation to oversee the comprehen- original.

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Sudan was fulfilling its responsibilities to its . . . Sudan was advisable.”71 The Sudanese gov-
citizens, and the United States, the U.K., and ernment itself made a classic “Trojan horse”
France were reluctant to force them to do so. argument, even referring to the Greek legend.
All three of the Western democracies that The ambassador wondered,
contributed to the June 11, 2004, debate made
if the Sudan would have been safe from the
pointed remarks about the Darfur emer- hammer of the Security Council even if there
gency and tacitly referred to the commission had been no crisis in Darfur, and whether the
of crimes against humanity and war crimes, Darfur humanitarian crisis might not be a
yet none cast doubts on Sudanese sover- Trojan horse? Has this lofty humanitarian
eignty. Germany, for instance, noted that objective been adopted and embraced by other
people who are advocating a hidden agenda?72
peace in Sudan was indivisible and required
“an end to the sweeping and widespread The resolution’s sponsors and their sup-
human rights violations” without suggesting porters adopted a line between these two
how this might be achieved. Similarly, the positions. The United States, the U.K., Ger-
United States pointed toward a litany of many, Chile, and Spain invoked the lan-
human rights abuses in Darfur but simply guage of the “responsibility to protect”
confirmed its support for AU initiatives.68 without suggesting that the responsibility
This pattern was repeated on July 30, ought to pass from the Sudanese govern-
2004, when the council met to pass Resolu- ment to the Security Council. They referred
tion 1556.69 Three positions were put for- to the AU as bearing the primary responsi-
ward during the council’s deliberations, bility for action should Sudan fail in its
which saw the first injection of “responsibil- responsibilities. This tension between, on
ity to protect” language into the debate. The the one hand, a genuine concern for human
first view, put forward by the Philippines, suffering in Darfur and, on the other hand,
was that Sudan had failed in its duty to pro- a reluctance to press for action was most
tect its citizens and that international action clearly expressed by the United States:
was warranted. The reference to the ICISS Many people who are concerned about Darfur
could not have been clearer: would say that this resolution does not go far
enough. Last week, the Congress of the United
Sovereignty also entails the responsibility of a States passed resolutions referring to the
State to protect its people. If it is unable or atrocities in Darfur as genocide. Many people
unwilling to do so, the international commu- would want the Security Council to do the
nity has the responsibility to help that State same. Perhaps they are right. But it is impor-
achieve such capacity and such will and, in tant that we not become bogged down over
extreme necessity, to assume such responsibil- words. It is essential that the Security Council
ity itself.70 act quickly, decisively and with unity. We need
to fix this humanitarian problem now.73
At the other end of the spectrum, China,
Pakistan, and Sudan all rejected talk of inter-
vention, while Brazil and Russia exhibited 68
UNSC 4988th meeting, S/PV.4988, June 11, 2004, p. 4.
reluctance to even contemplate the question. 69
Passed with thirteen affirmative votes and two
China abstained in the vote, complaining that abstentions (China and Pakistan).
70
the resolution alluded to “mandatory meas- UNSC 5015th meeting, S/PV.5015, July 30, 2004, pp.
ures”against the Sudanese government, while 10–11.
71
Ibid., p. 10.
Pakistan argued that it “did not believe that 72
Ibid., p. 13.
73
the threat or imposition of sanctions against Ibid., p. 4; emphasis added.

42 Alex J. Bellamy
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This debate produced an understandably ond returns to the Security Council debates
Janus-faced resolution that invoked Chapter about intervention.
VII and condemned human rights abuses,
but stopped short of sanctioning or even African Union Mission in Sudan
condemning the Sudanese government. In July 2004, the AU began to discuss the
Resolution 1556 gave the government thirty possibility of deploying a small force to
days to disarm the Janjaweed and punish protect its civilian monitors in Darfur, who
human rights abusers, threatening economic had been sent to El Fashir to monitor the
sanctions if it failed to do so. For some, such cease-fire agreement of June 9, 2004. At the
as China and Pakistan, the resolution went same time, the Sudanese government
too far; for others, it did not go far enough.74 stated that it would “strongly resist all [UN
The initial international response to Security Council] resolutions calling for
events in Darfur was therefore characterized dispatching international forces to Darfur”
by three contradictory trends. First, there and threatened to use force against peace-
was clear recognition on the part of Western keepers.75 Initially, an AU force of approxi-
journalists, human rights organizations, and mately 3,000 troops drawn from nine states
some states of a responsibility to protect the was envisaged.76 In mid-August, Rwanda
people of Darfur. Second, however, there deployed an advance party of 154 troops,
were significant doubts about which organ- and President Kagame insisted that they
ization should bear that responsibility (the would use force to protect civilians if nec-
UN, AU, or Sudan?), and a deep reluctance essary.77 Although the AU indicated in a
on the part of key Western states to assume communiqué to the Security Council that
responsibility by arguing that the Sudanese its troops would indeed fulfill this role,
government was either unable or unwilling some AU members expressed reservations.
to protect Darfurians. Third, many states The Sudanese government itself rejected
expressed deep disquiet at any potential vio- Kagame’s interpretation of the mandate.
lation of Sudanese sovereignty. Foreign affairs minister Abdelwahad Najeb
insisted, “The mission for those forces is
FROM AMIS TO UNMIS very clear: protection of the monitors. As

The intervention debate crystallized

74
around the question of who had the respon- Simon Tisdall described it as a “dark study in disillu-
sion.” Simon Tisdall, “Brave Talk but No Action: Darfur
sibility to protect Darfurians. Embedded in Gets a Familiar Response from the West,” Guardian,
this debate were concerns about the deploy- August 3, 2004; available at www.guardian.co.uk/inter
ment of AMIS and its relationship with the national/story/0,3604,1274670,00.html. I am grateful to
Paul Williams for bringing this to my attention.
UN, the question of whether sanctions 75
“Australia May Join Darfur Mission,” Daily Telegraph,
should be imposed on Sudan, the prosecu- July 28, 2004, p. 8. I am grateful to Sara Davies for bring-
tion of war criminals, and the composition ing this to my attention.
76
CBC News,“African Union Sending Military Force to
and mandate of a UN force (UNMIS) to
Darfur,” July 6, 2004; available at www.cbc.ca/sto
oversee the peace agreement in the south of ries/2004/07/05/world/janjaweed040705; and Reuters,
Sudan. “African Union to Send Troops to Darfur,” July 5, 2004.
77
This section is divided into two parts. Human Rights News, “Darfur: Rwandan Troops to
Protect Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, New York,
The first focuses on the AU’s involvement August 17, 2004; available at hrw.org/english/docs/
in Darfur. Against this backdrop, the sec- 2004/08/17/darfur9241.htm.

responsibility to protect or trojan horse? 43

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far as the civilians, this is the clear respon- to do much more than report cease-fire
sibility of the government of Sudan.” 78 breaches. On December 20, Nigeria’s Gen-
When Nigeria deployed the first 153 of an eral Okonkwo reported that government
intended 1,500 troops, President Obasanjo forces had attacked villages using aircraft.85
of Nigeria insisted that his forces would only Days later, Secretary-General Annan com-
protect AU observers and operate with the plained that the world’s peacekeeping strat-
consent of the Sudanese government.79 egy in Darfur was “not working,” and that
With Sudan refusing to consent to a broad AMIS had failed to protect civilians or pre-
civilian protection mandate, a compromise vent the crisis from deteriorating because it
was found whereby AMIS troops would only “has not been able to put in as many (mili-
protect vulnerable civilians in their vicin- tary) forces as we had hoped.”86 The situa-
ity.80 The compromise mandate, to which tion did not improve in 2005. In February,
the government of Sudan consented, Jan Pronk, the secretary-general’s special
insisted that AMIS would “protect civilians representative for Sudan (who was
whom it encounters under imminent threat appointed in June 2004), complained that
and in the immediate vicinity, within AMIS was too small and its deployment too
resources and capability, it being under-
stood that the protection of the civilian pop-
ulation is the responsibility of the 78
Quoted in Eric Reeves, “The Deployment of New
[government of Sudan].”81 African Union Forces to Darfur: What It Does and
It soon became clear, however, that the Doesn’t Mean,” October 25, 2004; available at
AU lacked the necessary financial and logis- www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=6168.
79
Human Rights News, “Darfur: African Union Must
tical resources to deploy even the modest Insist on More Troops,” Human Rights Watch, New
3,000 peacekeepers originally intended. In York, August 20, 2004; available at hrw.org/english/
late September 2004, with still only 300 docs/2004/08/20/darfur9251.htm.
80
Duncan Woodside, “Mandate Unclear as AU Troops
troops deployed, Secretary-General Annan Head for Darfur,” Business Day (South Africa), October
called for international assistance to expand 29, 2004, p. 12.
81
AMIS, and President Obasanjo lamented African Union Peace and Security Council Commu-
niqué PSC/PR/Comm. (XVII), Peace and Security
that although the AU was willing to deploy
Council, 17th meeting, October 20, 2004, Addis Ababa,
more peacekeepers, it was unable to do so Ethiopia, para. 6, p. 2; available at www.africa
without international assistance.82 On the union.org/News_Events/Communiqu%C3%A9s/Com
ground, AMIS was constrained by the muniqu%C3%A9%20_Eng%2020%20oct%202004.pdf.
82
UN News Centre, “World is Responsible for Ending
Sudanese government, which, among other ‘Terrible Violence’ in Sudan, Annan Says,” New York,
things, prevented AU helicopters from flying September 24, 2004; available at www.un.org/apps
by denying them fuel as well as repeatedly /news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=12044.
83
“Thousands More Troops for Darfur,” BBC News
insisting that AMIS troops were monitors, U.K. Edition, October 1, 2004; available at news.bbc.
not peacekeepers.83 co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3706340.stm.
84
On October 20, the AU’s Peace and Secu- S/2004/881, November 2, 2004, para. 57.
85
Reuters, “Troops Attack in Darfur as a Deadline
rity Council announced its intention to
Passes,” December 20, 2004.
increase the overall size of its mission to 86
Quoted in Thalif Deen, “UN Admits Sudan Policies
3,320, including some 2,341 troops.84 A week Failing,” Inter Press Service, December 22, 2004; avail-
later, Rwandan and Nigerian reinforcements able at www.ipsnews.net/africa/interna.asp?idnews
=26779. Also see Leslie Lefkow, “No Justice for Sudan,”
began arriving in Darfur, assisted by the U.S. Guardian, January 10, 2005; available at www.
Air Force. However, AMIS remained unable guardian.co.uk/sudan/story/0,,1387074,00.html.

44 Alex J. Bellamy
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slow to afford real protection to Darfur’s impression that the international commu-
civilians.87 Others grumbled that the AMIS nity is beating up on the government of
deployment was “chaotic,” characterized by Sudan.” Second, invoking the “responsibility
“poor logistical planning” and a “lack of to protect,” the U.K. believed that “the best
trained personnel, funds and experience in way to deliver security to the people of Dar-
intervening to protect civilians.”88 fur is to get those with primary responsibil-
ity for it to do it . . . the government of
Return to the Council Sudan.”92 British officials apparently wor-
Was AMIS merely “a fig leaf to cover the ried that coercion could inflame the situa-
world’s inaction,” as one commentator tion in Darfur and undermine the peace
lamented?89 The key question for the remain- agreement without delivering security
der of this section is why the Security Council owing to the logistical difficulties that a Dar-
and supporters of the “responsibility to pro- fur deployment would entail.
tect” agenda did not take measures either to On September 2, 2004, Pronk observed
coerce the Sudanese government into compli- that the Sudanese government’s compliance
ance or to improve the effectiveness of AMIS. with Resolution 1556 was mixed. He claimed
that the AU Ceasefire Commission had
Resolution  and the Question of Sanc- reported that government forces had not
tions. Resolution 1556 had imposed a thirty- breached the cease-fire, a claim hotly dis-
day deadline in July 2004 for the Sudanese puted by the United States.93 Pronk also
government to comply with the Security
Council’s demands and had threatened
sanctions if it failed to comply. In informal 87
Quoted in Deen,“New UN Force for Sudan Will Skirt
consultations immediately after its passage, Darfur Crisis.”
88
the United States gauged potential support Waranya Moni, “The UN Report on Darfur: What
Role for the AU?” Pambazuka News, February 10, 2005;
for sanctions, including an arms embargo available at www.pambazuka.org/index.php?id=26831.
and travel ban on government officials in 89
Eric Reeves, “Genocide by Attrition,” In These Times,
the event of Sudanese noncompliance. Dur- February 16, 2005; available at www.inthesetimes.com/
site/main/article/1960.
ing these consultations a consensus against 90
Amil Khan and Mohamed Abdellah, “Arab League
sanctions began to emerge. Pakistan Rejects Sudan Embargo,” Reuters, August 9, 2004.
91
opposed sanctions in principle (because Russia had recently sold MiG aircraft to Sudan and
they violated Sudanese sovereignty), and the feared that the government would use any potential
sanctions as a justification for defaulting on its pay-
Arab League joined the chorus by issuing a ments. China has important oil interests in Sudan. See
statement opposing sanctions in any cir- Scott Peterson, “Sudan’s Key Ties at the UN,” Christian
cumstances.90 Other council members Science Monitor, August 31, 2004, p. 5.
92
Quoted in “Security Council Disagrees over Sudan
(most notably China and Russia) had mixed Sanctions,” Sunday Standard (Nairobi), August 22,
motives for opposing sanctions: a combina- 2004, p. 2.
tion of principle and economic interests.91
93
S/PV.5027, September 2, 2004, p. 2. U.S. ambassador
John Danforth argued that Annan’s report was wrong
Crucially, the U.K. also informally opposed
to suggest that there was no evidence of attacks by gov-
sanctions. A senior Foreign Office official ernment forces and that the AU Ceasefire Commission
told reporters that the U.K. had two prob- had in fact reported two such incidents. Cited in UN
lems with sanctions. First, expressing con- News Centre, “Sudan: Annan Calls for Expanded Inter-
national Presence to Stop Darfur Attacks,” New York,
cerns about undermining the Naivasha September 3, 2004; available at www.un.org/apps/news
process, the U.K. was “wary of giving the /story.asp?NewsID=11840.

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noted, however, that the government had ued to push for stronger measures, pro-
failed to stop Janjaweed attacks or disarm pelled by its finding that the government
and prosecute the militia’s members. Never- and its allies were committing genocide in
theless, he endorsed the emerging Security Darfur.97 In mid-September 2004, it circu-
Council consensus that the Sudanese gov- lated a draft resolution finding Sudan to be
ernment had primary responsibility for in material breach of Resolution 1556 and
ending the crisis. Indeed, he implied that the calling for an expanded AU force, interna-
crisis had barely gone beyond the first level tional overflights to monitor the situation,
of responsibility identified by the ICISS moves to prosecute those responsible for
(that is, of the host government) when he genocide, a no-fly zone for Sudanese mili-
argued that “if the government is unable to tary aircraft, and targeted sanctions (such as
fully protect its citizens by itself ” it should travel bans) against the ruling elite.98 Reso-
“request and accept assistance from the lution 1564 contained many of these meas-
international community.”94 This view was ures but in a much-diluted form. It called for
supported by the secretary-general’s repre- an expanded AU presence, reiterated earlier
sentative on internally displaced persons, demands for respect for the cease-fire and
Francis Deng—the author of the “sover- for the government to disarm and prosecute
eignty as responsibility” concept that pre- the Janjaweed, invited the secretary-general
ceded the “responsibility to protect.”95 to create a commission of inquiry to investi-
Paradoxically, Deng argued that although gate reported crimes, and indicated its
the government “probably” lacked the will intention to “consider” further measures if
and capacity to disarm the Janjaweed, it the government failed to comply.99 The res-
retained primary responsibility for doing so. olution failed to find Sudan in breach of
Moreover, Deng argued that the govern- Resolution 1556, impose measures upon it,
ment had indicated its strong preference for or even criticize the government. Once
cooperating with the AU and “was fearful of again, three positions were apparent.
any direct international involvement” to First, many states expressed deep skepti-
such an extent that it “would probably resist cism about the legitimacy of enforcement
it, either directly or through other means.” measures against Sudan. Explaining its
He concluded that international interven-
tion would “complicate and aggravate” the
94
crisis by increasing the level of violence and UNSC 5027th meeting, S/PV.5027, September 2,
2004, p. 3.
causing the government to withdraw its 95
Francis M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility:
cooperation.96 The best way forward, he Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, D.C.: The
argued, was to encourage the AU to increase Brookings Institution, 1996).
96
E/CN.4/2005/8, September 27, 2004, paras. 22, 26, and
its presence in the region in collaboration 36.
with the government. 97
For an excellent account of why the United States has
adopted an activist role in the Darfur debate, see
Samantha Power, “Dying in Darfur: Can the Ethnic
Resolution  and the Failure of a Robust
Cleansing in Sudan Be Stopped?” New Yorker, August
Approach. Although there was an emerging 30, 2004, pp. 270–87.
98
Security Council consensus that primary “Powell Declares Genocide in Sudan,” BBC News
responsibility for alleviating the crisis lay U.K. Edition, September 9, 2004; available at news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3641820.stm.
with the Sudanese government in coopera- 99
UNSC Res. 1564, September 18, 2004, paras. 2, 3, 7, 9,
tion with the AU, the United States contin- 12, and 14.

46 Alex J. Bellamy
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abstention, Algeria argued that while “cer- the other two. While the United States noted
tain measures that might have been unac- that progress had been made, it insisted that
ceptable assaults on Sudan’s sovereignty” the Sudanese government remained in
(such as overflights) had been dropped from breach of Resolution 1556. Nevertheless, it
the original U.S. draft, the resolution was stopped short of specifically criticizing the
still problematic because it failed to recog- Sudanese government or calling for further
nize Sudan’s cooperation with the AU and measures. Likewise, the U.K. noted cease-
UN. Russian, Chinese, and Pakistani oppo- fire violations by all parties to the conflict
sition to sanctions were partly principled and reiterated its view that “ultimate
objections to sanctions, partly instrumental responsibility lies with the Government of
objections predicated on the view that the Sudan and the rebel groups.”103
situation in Darfur was improving. What is remarkable is not so much that
Although it supported the resolution, Brazil the resolution was toned down to secure a
expressed disquiet at what it described as the Security Council consensus, but that the
“excessive” use of Chapter VII, which, it United States especially chose not to argue
feared, “runs the risk of misleading all par- along the lines of Romania and the Philip-
ties concerned.”100 These views were widely pines that the council should assume the
endorsed outside the council. For instance, a “responsibility to protect.” This is most
communiqué issued by an “African mini- striking in the U.S. case, because its Con-
summit” on Darfur led by Libya and Egypt gress and secretary of state had publicly
reaffirmed a commitment to preserve declared a genocide in Darfur and because it
Sudanese sovereignty and expressly rejected had attempted to develop a more activist
“any foreign intervention by any country, approach during the Security Council’s
whatsoever in this pure African issue.”101 informal consultations. The United States
At the other end of the spectrum, two found itself faced with two options. It could
states spoke out in favor of a more robust act as it had over Kosovo and Iraq and adopt
approach. The Philippines reiterated its a robustly activist line in the council. It
view that if a state is unable or unwilling to could also declare itself willing to act outside
protect its citizens,“the Security Council has the council if that body was unable to reach
the moral and legal authority to enable that a consensus. Because of its military over-
State to assume that responsibility.” Roma- stretch, however, the latter course would
nia endorsed this view more pointedly, have been a politically infeasible strategy.
implying that the council had not yet ful- The alternative was to pursue a consensus
filled its responsibilities: within the council. Council consensus
remained very fragile owing to the deep
There should be no moral hesitation in the
Council in taking up its responsibilities. While skepticism expressed toward anything but
it may be true that it is not for the Council to AU interventionism by states including Rus-
make legal findings, it is certainly within its
political, legal and moral obligations to ring
the alarm bell and foster—and indeed, urge— 100
S/PV.5040, September 18, 2004, pp. 2–3, 5, 7, and 10.
proper consideration of such acts in the 101
By “foreign” the communiqué evidently meant non-
appropriate venues.102 African. “Final Communiqué: African Mini-Summit
on Darfur,” Tripoli, Libya, October 17, 2004, p. 2.
As before, the United States and the U.K. 102
S/PV.5040, September 18, 2004, p. 12.
103
adopted a public position midway between Ibid., p. 10.

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sia, China, Pakistan, and Algeria, as well as overstretch and a “tarnished image in the
many key AU members and the League of Muslim world.”109 Following this analysis,
Arab States. As such, American diplomats the fact that the United States had been
may have felt unable to take a more robust forced to seek a consensus—one it then
public stance for fear of undermining the failed to reach—on enforcement measures
council’s fragile consensus. against Sudan could plausibly be attributed,
at least in part, to a diminishing of its status
Resolutions , , and : Compro- as a humanitarian intervention norm car-
mises on Darfur. The situation in Darfur rier. Further weight is given to this explana-
deteriorated soon after Resolution 1564 was tion by the positions taken by Germany, the
passed. As noted earlier, evidence grew of AU, and the League of Arab States described
AMIS’s inability to protect civilians. Human above. Lest there be any doubt, even the
Rights Watch pointed to renewed clashes SPLM/A ruled out “foreign” (non-African)
between rebels and government forces.104 intervention, specifically pointing to the
Jan Pronk reported that government com- Iraq experience. A spokesman for a
pliance was going backward, telling the Sudanese opposition organization compris-
Security Council of “numerous” cease-fire ing the SPLM/A, Farouk Abu Eissa, insisted,
breaches by all parties and militia attacks on “We are against foreign military interven-
civilians.105 At the end of October 2004, the tion in Darfur. We have before us the case of
UN estimated that the number of people Iraq. We do not want a similar situation to
needing aid in Darfur had increased by as develop in Darfur, or Sudan.”110
much as 10 percent in the previous month In early 2005, Pronk reported that
alone and reported that militia and govern- increased violence in Darfur had “seeped into
ment forces were harassing displaced per-
sons and preventing the timely delivery of 104
Human Rights News,“Darfur: Donors Must Address
aid.106 In his monthly report to the Security Atrocities Fueling Crisis,” Human Rights Watch, New
Council on Darfur, Secretary-General York, September 27, 2004; available at hrw.org/eng
Annan noted a string of cease-fire breaches lish/docs/2004/09/27/darfur9390.htm.
105
UN News Centre,“Sudan Has Failed to Disarm Mili-
by all parties, very slow progress on disar-
tias or Prevent More Attacks in Darfur—UN Envoy,”
mament, and almost no progress on appre- New York, October 5, 2004; available at
hending Janjaweed militia. Tellingly, he www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=12134.
106
advised that the “Security Council may wish UN News Centre, “Sudan: UN Reports 10 Percent
Jump in Number of People in Darfur Who Need Aid,”
to consider creative and prompt action” to New York, October 22, 2004; available at
ensure effective implementation of its www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=12314;
demands.107 and UN News Centre, “Humanitarian Aid in Sudan
Limited by Insecurity, Road Closures, Says UN Mis-
The U.S. ambassador to the UN expressed sion,” New York, October 27, 2004; available at
doubts, however, about whether sanctions www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12360.
107
would ever be implemented, and suggested S/2004/881, November 2, 2004, paras. 5 and 16.
108
Cited in “Prompt Action Needed in Darfur,” BBC
that “carrots” not “sticks” would be used to
News World Edition, November 4, 2004.
alleviate the problem.108 As two observers 109
Christian W. D. Bock and Leland R. Miller, “Darfur:
persuasively put it, while the UN had Where is Europe?” Washington Post, December 9, 2004,
“unsurprisingly . . . epitomized paralysis,” p. A33.
110
Quoted in Gamal Nkrumah, “Darfur in Flames,” Al-
the U.S. administration had also decided to Ahram (Cairo), April 29–May 5, 2004; available at
“take a pass on Darfur,” owing to military weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/688/fr3.htm.

48 Alex J. Bellamy
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the [internally displaced persons] camps genocidal. The report sparked a heated
themselves.”December, he noted, had seen an debate about the appropriate venue in which
arms buildup, numerous attacks by all sides, to prosecute accused war criminals. EU
including government aircraft, the spread of states, including the U.K., argued that the
violence into West Kordofan, and the emer- Security Council should refer the matter to
gence of new rebel groups.111 The only way to the ICC. The British ambassador to the UN
improve the situation, Pronk argued, was to insisted that the ICC referral was “non-
deploy more international personnel into negotiable.” The United States argued that
the region. This recommendation repre- the Security Council should create a special
sented an important policy change for tribunal in Arusha to indict and prosecute
Pronk, who had previously endorsed AU pri- war criminals. Nigeria offered a compromise
macy. Now, Pronk tacitly recognized the AU’s in the form of an AU tribunal. The EU states
inability to protect civilians in Darfur and rejected the Nigerian proposal, fearing that
suggested that other agencies be deployed. any compromise on the ICC would fatally
From this point onward, the sanctions undermine the court.113 For more than two
debate was complicated by two further inter- months, the debate hamstrung efforts to cre-
related debates. First, there was a debate ate a UN force, as the Europeans insisted on
about whether to refer the case of Darfur to the ICC referral being part of any authoriz-
the ICC. Second, the conclusion of the peace ing resolution.
agreement for the south of Sudan initiated a The deadlock was broken in late March
debate about whether the UN force created when the two issues were decoupled. On
to police the peace agreement would be a March 31, the council passed Resolution 1593,
Chapter VI or Chapter VII mission, and referring the case of Darfur to the ICC.
whether it would also deploy in Darfur. Explaining its decision to abstain in the vote,
Importantly, in both debates the United the United States reaffirmed its funda-
States attempted to further its case for mental objection to the ICC, which, it
stronger measures to protect Darfurians. In claimed, “strikes at the essence of the nature
the first, it eventually succumbed to Euro- of sovereignty,” but noted the importance
pean pressure and agreed to refer the case of of a unified response to Darfur and the need
Darfur to the ICC despite its continuing to end impunity in the region.114 The United
grave concerns about the court. In the sec- States had very few options in Darfur, and
ond, it led an informal push to give the new was ultimately forced to accept the ICC
UN mission a role in Darfur. referral as the only alternative to inaction
On January 25, 2005, the UN Commission or unilateralism.
of Inquiry concluded that while the
Sudanese government did not have a policy
of genocide, it was implicated in numerous 111
S/PV.5109, January 11, 2005, pp. 2–3.
112
war crimes and crimes against humanity. “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry
on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General,”
Moreover, the commissioners wrote, “In
Geneva, January 25 2005, p. 4; available at www.relief
some instances individuals, including gov- web.int/library/documents/2005/ici-sud-25feb.pdf.
113
ernment officials, may commit acts with See Peter Heinlein, “UN Security Council Dead-
genocidal intent.”112 However, it judged that locked over Darfur,” Voice of America News, March 18,
2005; available at www.voanews.com/english/2005-03-
only a competent court would be able to 18-voa10.cfm.
114
determine whether specific crimes were UNSC 5158th meeting, S/PV.5158, March 31, 2005, p. 3.

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The debate about the role and nature of age between sanctions and UNMIS. The
UNMIS was similarly long-winded. States United States revised its draft further, and on
were divided on the mission’s rules of March 29 the Security Council passed Reso-
engagement and its zone of operations. In lution 1591, imposing a travel ban on sus-
February 2005, the secretary-general recom- pected war criminals. Russia, China, and
mended a traditional peacekeeping force Algeria abstained—Algeria because it
under Chapter VI of the Charter. However, believed that the draft failed to recognize the
the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Oper- significant progress that the Sudanese gov-
ations found few states willing to contribute ernment had made, and Russia and China
troops. Though a group of liberal states that because they remained opposed to sanc-
had come together to form a Multi-National tions. Tanzania argued that while it sup-
Stand-By High Readiness Brigade expressed ported Resolution 1591, it believed that the
a willingness to contribute forces, most post–peace agreement government in Khar-
wanted a Chapter VII resolution giving them toum “should not be subjected to a sanctions
authority to use force to protect themselves regime less than three months from now.”118
and endangered civilians.115 After protracted At the time of writing, the UN was prepar-
negotiation, the council agreed to authorize ing to deploy UNMIS to the south of Sudan,
a Chapter VII operation. ICC prosecutors were investigating crimes in
The council remained divided, however, Darfur, and the AU was continuing to
on the question of whether UNMIS could be expand its presence in Darfur. On the other
“rerouted” to Darfur. The United States hand, the Sudanese government remained in
wanted a clear statement authorizing breach of Resolution 1556 but had avoided
UNMIS to deploy in Darfur, but this was enforcement measures, violence in Darfur
informally opposed by Russia, China, and continued, and the numbers of dead and dis-
Algeria. In the end, Resolution 1590 author- placed continued to rise.
ized a Chapter VII peace operation man-
dated to observe the cease-fire and protect MINOR SETBACKS FOR
civilians, using force if necessary. The resolu- THE HUMANITARIAN
tion avoided pronouncing on whether INTERVENTION NORM
UNMIS would be deployed to Darfur, and
invited the secretary-general to investigate The Darfur experience suggests that the
the types of assistance that UNMIS could claims that either the “sun has set” on
offer to AMIS, identifying “technical and humanitarian intervention or that, after
logistical”assistance as two potential areas.116 September 11, the West is likely to be more
No consensus emerged on the question of interventionist are both misplaced. The first
sanctions, however. In mid-February 2005,
the United States circulated a draft resolu-
tion coupling UNMIS and oil sanctions.117
115
“Sudan Peace Agreement Signed 9 January Historic
Opportunity, Security Council Told,” UN Press Release,
After a protracted round of informal consul-
SC/8306, February 8, 2005.
tations, the United States dropped the oil 116
UNSC Res. 1590, March 24, 2005, paras. 4 and 5.
117
embargo in favor of the imposition of travel Reuters, “US Resolution Calls for UN Peacekeeping
bans and asset freezing on suspected war Mission in Sudan,” February 15, 2005; available at global
policy.igc.org/security/issues/sudan/2005/0215draftuse.
criminals. Russia and China, however, htm.
118
rejected both the asset freezing and the link- UNSC 5153th meeting,S/PV.5153,March 29,2005,pp.2–5.

50 Alex J. Bellamy
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overestimates the strength of the humanitar- Darfur, some states and organizations
ian intervention norm prior to the Septem- expressly rejected American- and British-led
ber 11 attacks and the subsequent wars in activism in the Security Council, while
Afghanistan and Iraq—as well as those wars’ endorsing the AU intervention and calling
impact on the norm in general. for its expansion. This view was expressed by
If we accept the view that prior to the Iraq AU members, the League of Arab States, the
war there was a partial consensus that the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and
Security Council has a right to authorize several Security Council members (such as
humanitarian intervention and a moral con- Pakistan and Algeria). There were also signs
sensus among liberal states that unautho- that in a context where they were unable to
rized intervention may be a legitimate act outside the Security Council because of
response to supreme humanitarian emer- their military overstretch problems, the
gencies, the world’s response to Darfur sug- United States and the U.K. appeared to rec-
gests that neither of these consensuses has ognize that their diminished credibility as
been eroded. This was evidenced by the norm carriers would make it harder for them
widespread political support offered to AMIS to take a lead in building a council consensus
and by the fact that in the West, at least, there on action. By autumn 2004, U.K. officials
was little suggestion that an AU intervention were informally expressing the view that it
required either an authorizing Security would be imprudent for Britain to push the
Council resolution or the Sudanese govern- sanctions issue. Although the United States
ment’s consent. Although AMIS subse- continued in its attempts to bring pressure to
quently received Sudanese government bear on the Sudanese government, and U.S.
consent for its limited civilian protection officials frequently expressed their frustra-
role, it is significant that when Rwanda uni- tion at being unable to do so, it refrained
laterally gave its peacekeepers a civilian pro- from taking a robust line in the council’s
tection role prior to the revised AMIS public deliberations (as the Philippines and
mandate, liberal states did not criticize it for Romania did), and the possibility of unau-
doing so. thorized action was never seriously raised,
The second view overestimates the link even after Congress and Colin Powell
between humanitarian crises and security described Darfur as genocide. It is too early
concerns, such as WMD and international to offer definitive insights about precisely
terrorism. Although there was clear linkage why the United States adopted this position.
in the Afghanistan case, there was no such Given military overstretch, however, unau-
link with respect to Darfur. What the Darfur thorized military action was probably con-
case suggests, then, is that changes to the sidered infeasible, leaving a consensus-based
norm of humanitarian intervention after the approach through the Security Council as
Iraq war have been more subtle and complex. the only viable alternative. The problem here
Two changes in particular can be identified. was that America’s and Britain’s likely dimin-
First, debates about how to respond to the ished status as norm carriers meant that
crisis in Darfur lend weight to the thesis that an aggressive diplomatic push for coercive
the credibility of the United States and the measures would probably have been coun-
U.K. as humanitarian intervention norm car- terproductive.
riers has significantly diminished as a result Second, the Darfur case supports
of the Iraq war. Throughout discussions on Thakur’s argument that the “responsibility

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to protect” criteria could constrain as well as forge a consensus on when the threshold is
enable intervention. It casts serious doubt, crossed. With Darfur, as with Kosovo,
however, on Thakur’s presumption that this opponents of intervention argued that mili-
furthers the cause of global humanitarian- tary action would probably worsen the situ-
ism. “Responsibility to protect” language ation. Repeatedly, they argued that the
was used by both advocates and opponents situation in Darfur was improving and had
of intervention. It enabled opponents of not reached the threshold necessary to vali-
intervention to legitimate their actions by date intervention.
reference to the prevailing normative order. The point here is that while Thakur was
In effect, it allowed traditional opponents of correct to argue that “responsibility to pro-
intervention to replace largely discredited tect” language could reduce the likelihood of
“sovereignty-as-absolute”-type arguments humanitarian justifications being abused,
against intervention in supreme humanitar- his line of reasoning reveals a deeper prob-
ian emergencies with arguments about who lem with the ICISS agenda: changing the
had the primary responsibility to protect language of humanitarian intervention
Darfur’s civilians. The Sudanese govern- (from sovereignty vs. human rights to levels
ment, the AU, the League of Arab States, UN of responsibility) has not changed its under-
officials on occasion, and in at least one lying political dynamics. As such, “responsi-
instance the U.K. argued that the Sudanese bility to protect” language may also be used
government had primary responsibility, to inhibit the emergence of consensus about
though for different reasons.119 In the con- action in genuine humanitarian emergen-
text of the ongoing debate, this argument cies. As was the case with Kosovo, the debate
was used to reject external involvement over Darfur boils down to the question of
other than that endorsed by the government whether enough states can be persuaded to
of Sudan. Occasionally, AU members and act. The key difference is that in the Kosovo
UN officials suggested that the government case many liberal states were prepared to act
had proven itself either unable or unwilling outside the Security Council if necessary.
to protect Darfur’s citizens and that interna- In the Kosovo case, the existence of this
tional organizations, particularly the AU, alternative route enabled advocates of inter-
should assist it. Only the Philippines and vention to take a more robust diplomatic
Romania argued that the Security Council line in the Security Council, forcing tradi-
should accept primary responsibility for tional opponents of intervention to
protecting Darfurians, and that argument acknowledge the humanitarian catastrophe
enjoyed very little support. in Kosovo when the council identified Ser-
According to the ICISS report, the trans- bian ethnic cleansing as a threat to interna-
fer of the “responsibility to protect” from the tional peace and security and imposed
host state to the Security Council should be economic and other sanctions on the Bel-
guided by what it portrays as a simple grade regime.120 Sadly, due to a combina-
empirical test: when the host state is unable
or unwilling to protect its citizens. In prac-
119
tice, this threshold was hotly disputed. Few As noted earlier, the U.K.’s position was influenced
states publicly reject the idea that the Secu- by a mixture of prudential considerations and depend-
ence on Security Council consensus.
rity Council should act to halt genocide or 120
For a discussion, see Bellamy, Kosovo and Interna-
mass murder, but it has proven difficult to tional Society, p. 68.

52 Alex J. Bellamy
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tion of military overstretch and the United was right to be concerned about reducing
States’ and the U.K.’s diminished credibility the danger that states might abuse humani-
as norm carriers, that alternative was not tarian justifications to legitimate unjust
available in the Darfur case. As a result, little wars, it evidently should have paid more
such pressure has been brought to bear on attention to the danger that responsibility to
traditional opponents of intervention, who, protect language could itself be abused by
in turn, have been able to legitimate their states keen to avoid assuming any responsi-
opposition to intervention in terms of the bility for saving some of the world’s most
responsibility to protect. While the ICISS vulnerable people.

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