1.

Liberalism Modernized

Philosophical Radicalism achieved its greatest legislative triumph with the repeal of
the Corn Laws in 1846, cementing free trade as British national policy. Yet this peak
marked the beginning of its ideological decline. Even before this milestone, the grim
social consequences of unregulated industrialism stirred alarm among liberals and
provoked resistance from groups whose traditional livelihoods and values were
under threat.

The 1841 Royal Commission on the coal-mining industry exposed horrifying

abuses: women and children working in deplorable conditions, excessive hours, and
a lack of safety measures. The public was shocked, and this outrage echoed through
literature in industrial novels such as Mary Barton, Sybil, and Alton Locke. Over
the remainder of the century, figures like Carlyle, Ruskin, and William Morris led
sustained criticism of industrialism on both moral and aesthetic grounds.

Parliament had already begun passing tentative factory acts by the 1830s, limiting
working hours and improving conditions. These acts, though contrary to classical
liberal ideas of free contract, signaled a move away from individualism toward a
collectivist orientation. By the end of the third quarter of the century, it was evident
that Parliament had effectively adopted “collectivism,” replacing laissez-faire as a
guiding principle. This transformation did not stem from an opposing ideology but
from the need to mitigate industrialism’s destructive social consequences.

This shift had several sources: humanitarianism driven by concern for the working
class, political self-interest from groups disadvantaged by liberal policies, and
changing economic dynamics. The agricultural class, traditionally conservative,
found itself marginalized by free trade. At the same time, the working class,
enfranchised in 1867, began to assert its political power. It prioritized wages,
working conditions, and labor protections over the economic freedom favored by
industrialists. As liberalism expanded beyond the industrial middle class, it was
forced to address these demands or risk becoming irrelevant.

British liberalism had to evolve. It had to transition from a class-based ideology to

a national political movement. In doing so, it recognized the need to revise not only
its policies but its theoretical foundations. The belief that society naturally moved
“from status to contract” gave way to a more nuanced understanding of liberty, the
state, and the individual’s relationship to society. Breaking from the intellectual
isolation of Philosophical Radicalism, liberalism began to integrate insights from
other traditions and classes, becoming a broader social philosophy rather than a
narrow class ideology.

2. Liberty (John Stuart Mill)

John Stuart Mill’s social philosophy, especially his ethics, was shaped as much by
personal experience as by intellectual training. Destined by his father James Mill to
carry on the radical crusade, Mill underwent intense intellectual training from an
early age. This “educational forcing” led to a period of nervous exhaustion. He
recovered through exposure to Wordsworth’s poetry—an experience alien to his
father’s empirical, utility-driven education.

Mill’s life was marked by intellectual duality: a deep loyalty to the Benthamite
tradition and a growing openness to ideals derived from German and Romantic
thought. His essays on Bentham and Coleridge in the 1830s symbolized this
ambivalence—showing more sympathy for Coleridge’s idealism than Bentham’s
utilitarianism. Mill admired the institutional view of society found in Coleridge and
later in Comte. He sought to synthesize this with his inherited liberalism, though he
never achieved a fully coherent philosophical system.

His ethical philosophy, particularly in Utilitarianism, illustrates both his innovation

and his limitations. Mill retained the utilitarian principle—“the greatest happiness
of the greatest number”—but revised it to include a qualitative hierarchy of
pleasures. He argued that intellectual pleasures are superior to base ones, a position
that conflicted with the hedonistic calculus and introduced logical inconsistencies.
Despite these flaws, Mill elevated moral character, dignity, and integrity as central
ethical values, diverging from Bentham’s narrow view.

Mill’s greatest political work was On Liberty(1859). Unlike earlier utilitarians, who
valued liberal government for efficiency, Mill valued liberty intrinsically. Freedom
of thought, discussion, and moral self-determination were, for him, essential to a
civilized and humane society. His argument transcended utility; it was rooted in
moral conviction. Freedom was not merely a means to happiness—it was a part of
it.

He warned of a new threat to liberty: not government tyranny but the tyranny of the
majority. A liberal society, he argued, must protect the individual from conformist
public opinion. He called for a society that welcomed divergent views, limited the
demand for uniformity, and embraced new ideas.

However, Mill struggled to define when society or the state may rightly limit liberty.
His distinction between “self-regarding” and “other-regarding” actions was
logically weak and practically unclear. Still, his major innovation was to reject the
idea that liberty ends where legislation begins. He acknowledged multiple forms of
coercion—social, economic, and cultural—and accepted the need for legislation to
combat them. He moved beyond economic laissez-faire, allowing for labor laws,
public education, and social reform.

In economics, Mill departed from Ricardo and the classical school by distinguishing
between the laws of production (natural) and distribution (subject to policy). He
acknowledged that institutions are historical, not fixed, and opened the door to
redistribution and limited socialism. Though still suspicious of paternalism, his
ethics pushed liberalism toward greater social responsibility.

Mill’s contribution lies in reasserting that liberty is not only a personal right but a
social good. It contributes to moral development, public discourse, and democratic
vitality. His liberalism rested on respect for human dignity and the moral
responsibility of individuals to society.

3. The Principles of Social Study

In seeking to enrich liberalism, Mill recognized that political and economic theories
based solely on individual psychology were inadequate. He turned to foreign
traditions—especially those of German idealism, French positivism (particularly
Comte), and the English Romantics. These traditions emphasized historical
development, institutional complexity, and the organic nature of society.
Mill believed that social institutions were more than the sum of individual actions.
They were real, semi-autonomous structures that shaped behavior and evolved over
time. He was attracted to Comte’s idea of sociology as a science of society and to
the “law of three stages,” which proposed that societies evolve from theological to
metaphysical to scientific reasoning. Though skeptical of deterministic laws of
history, Mill accepted the need for a philosophy of social development to inform
politics and ethics.

He also emphasized that politics depends on a theory of human progress, which in

turn presupposes a philosophy of history. Liberalism, if it were to endure, had to root
itself in an empirical understanding of institutions and social change.

In his Logic, Mill proposed that the social sciences combine induction and
deduction. He defended the rationalist method of the Philosophical Radicals against
purely empirical critiques, suggesting that politics must rely on psychological laws
derived from experience but applied deductively to social behavior. He identified
two methods: the direct deductive method (his own) and the indirect (Comte’s),
which he saw as complementary.

Mill’s turn toward sociology expanded liberalism’s empirical foundation. He argued

that liberty and political institutions depend on a liberal society—a community that
values tolerance, responsibility, and individuality. He remained committed to
psychology as the core of social science but rejected simplistic associationism. His
efforts helped pave the way for modern disciplines like social psychology and
cultural anthropology.

4. The Idealist Revision of Liberalism

In the late 19th century, liberalism underwent a further revision through the work of
British Idealists, particularly T. H. Green. This school of thought, influenced by
German post-Kantian philosophy, notably Hegel, rejected the empiricist and
hedonistic foundations of earlier liberalism. However, it retained a liberal political
ethos, emphasizing freedom, equality, and moral development.

Green’s central idea was positive freedom—not just freedom from interference, but
the ability to fulfill one’s potential as a moral being. He argued that the state had a
legitimate role in removing obstacles to self-realization, such as poverty, ignorance,
and ill health. Liberty, in this sense, was a social achievement, not merely a private
entitlement.

Unlike Spencer, who extended liberalism through a biologized theory of natural

liberty, Green insisted that rights are grounded in social and moral relations. He
emphasized that property and markets are not absolute but justified only insofar as
they serve the common good. His liberalism was inclusive, moral, and socially
responsible.

This idealist revision corrected liberalism’s earlier indifference to the conditions of

liberty. It accepted the legitimacy of social reform, public education, labor
protections, and other interventions aimed at promoting personal and collective
well-being. It also affirmed that the liberal state must be proactive—not to dominate,
but to empower.

5. The Present Meaning of Liberalism

By the early 20th century, liberalism faced a new crisis: the rise of authoritarian
ideologies like fascism and communism. Both rejected liberal democracy while
claiming to embody the people’s will—through race or class. Both centralized power
in elites who claimed exclusive authority to interpret the collective good.

These ideologies were anti-liberal not just in their politics but in their epistemology.
Fascism exalted irrational intuition; communism asserted historical determinism.
Liberalism, in contrast, trusted ordinary intelligence, moral judgment, and public
discussion. It opposed claims to moral or intellectual infallibility.

Modern liberalism embraced pluralism—not as an absence of organization, but as a

network of free associations. It affirmed that society is not simply a collection of
individuals or a monolithic state but a complex of institutions, values, and
relationships. It valued dissent, diversity, and deliberation.

At its core, liberalism remained a moral philosophy. It insisted that politics is not a
matter of technique but of ethical judgment. Experts may inform, but decisions must
rest on public reasoning and consent. Liberal institutions aim not to suppress conflict
but to manage it with civility, compromise, and fairness.

Ultimately, liberalism evolved from a doctrine of minimal state interference into a

comprehensive philosophy of social cooperation, moral autonomy, and institutional
pluralism. It retained its commitment to liberty, but redefined it to meet the moral
and social demands of the modern world.