NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: A CONTESTED CONCEPT
IN THE 21st CENTURY
Sanath De Silva
ABSTRACT
Deterrence is an evolving concept which has many facets. Out of all the concepts on
deterrence, nuclear deterrence is the most significant because it was able to transform
the objective of warfare from winning to prevention of all-out conflict. The main purpose
of nuclear deterrence is not to fight but to achieve peace and stability through coercion.
Nuclear deterrence was useful to prevent wars among major powers during the Cold
War period. After the end of the Cold War, the politics among nations took a different
shape. Due to the complexities in the international system, scholars have argued that the
contemporary deterrence relations among states are producing uncertainty and are more
prone to produce conflict. The objective of this paper is to shed light on the 21st century
deterrence behaviors of nuclear powers that are playing a key role in shaping the security
atmosphere of different geographical regions. This paper attempts to trace the salient
features that contribute to uncertain deterrence relations among nuclear nations.
Keywords: Deterrence, Instability, War
INTRODUCTION
Deterrence is the cornerstone of global political stability in the modern international
system. In classical terms, it is defined as the fear of punishment that prevents
taking an adversarial action against a rival. Functioning of deterrence would have
started the very day a human being acquired a primitive weapon such as a club
or a stone to stop an adversary from attacking. Since that day, weapons have been
invented, modified, and later, transformed to defend territories and its inhabitants
via a military. Eventually, the development of violent resources in order to achieve
security became one of the prime practices of human race. The ultimate result was
the discovery of a single weapon that has the capacity to kill masses.
Warfare is as old as human history. However, this paper is not about investigating
the history of warfare. Instead, the author wants to scrutinise the concept of
deterrence and its utility in preventing warfare. If the sheer destructive capacity of
the conventional weapons possessed by states were proven an effective deterrent
during the first half of the 20th century, the two world wars would not have taken
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 21
place. The invention of nuclear weapons transformed the objective of warfare from
winning to prevention of all-out war. After the nuclear attacks in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, states realised that it is difficult to fight with a nuclear power and win
without incurring considerable damage to the aggressor. The destruction caused, led
to the pause of warfare among great powers after the end of the Second World War.
This understanding can be illustrated as the psychological foundation of modern
day nuclear deterrence. Deterrence further modified the behaviour of the militarily
strong states against each other. During the Cold War period super powers fought
proxy wars but avoided direct confrontation. The stability or absence of direct
war between super powers due to deterrence was later conceptualised as ‘negative
peace’ by IR scholars (Galtung, 1996).
UNDERSTANDING DETERRENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Deterrence was a state-to-state equation during the Cold War period (1945-
1991) and non-state actors hardly figured in this equation. The collapse of the
Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new era in
the international system. The political atmosphere of the 21st century is volatile,
uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA). In this backdrop, the credibility
of rational deterrence between states is no longer stable. The interest shown by
non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons has made the situation even worse.
International Relations analysts raise the question as to whether the concept of
deterrence has the desired credibility of stabilising power rivalries and preventing
war within the contemporary international system.
Deterrence has its roots in the Realist School of political thought. The Realist School
of scholars promote Balance of Power (BoP) as the key requirement for peace.
Deterrence by virtue of nuclear weapons grabbed more attention of IR scholars
during the Cold War period. “Deterrence was first explicitly formulated as a strategic
concept during the Cold War because defense against nuclear weapons appeared
futile” (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2014, p.1). The core logic of functional deterrence
during the 20th century evolved around Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD),
the First Strike Capability and the maintenance of Minimum Credible Deterrence
(Kapur, 2007). As technology advanced, the second strike capability supported by
the idea of massive retaliation emerged as a vital component of a nuclear strategy.
No rational leader would think of using a nuclear weapon if there is a possibility of
the adversary using another nuclear weapon in retaliation. The 1962 Cuban Missile
Crisis was a classic example of Cold War deterrence functionality. Even though the
nuclear threshold was not crossed during the Cuban Missile Crisis, many argued
that it was the narrowest margin of a nuclear war. The uncertainty and the able
diplomacy signified the credibility of the deterrence matrix of that era. The Cold
War ended thirty years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, but nuclear proliferation did
not recede as many had expected. Instead the second nuclear age emerged as a
persistent reality.
22 Sanath De Silva
Rational or classical deterrence is a concept that was designed based on two
principles. First is the principle of rational choice and second is the art of
achieving control through the fear of retaliation. The latter is a dependent
variable of the first principle. Deterrence is a psychological element that greatly
depends on the unpredictability of one’s physical destructive capability. Early
advocates of deterrence used to believe that people adhere to deterrence because
they were aware of the consequences of the actions of their enemy. Modern
day dynamics prove that it is not the only case. If a state is absolutely certain
about the capabilities and behavior of an enemy, deterrence will more or less be
redundant as a functional concept. If such an ideal context of certainty prevails,
the security competition and the arms race between two states should reach a
stable equilibrium and peace should be established forever. However, the ground
situation reveals that it is the ‘uncertainty’ of the consequences of any one actor’s
action that makes deterrence credible..
This uncertainty is the psychological element that persuades world leaders
to spend an average of US$ 1500 billion per year on developing destructive
weapons including the WMD (SIPRI, 2017). If this wealth could be spent on
realising UN’s noble objectives, it could easily achieve all the Sustainable
Development Goals1 (SGDs). The UN fifth committee approved US$ 5.4 billion
for UN’s regular biennial budget for 2016 and 2017. The amount spent on annual
armament is enough to fund the UN regular budget2 for 555 years. The Office for
Disarmament Affairs, the UN organisation which is responsible for progressing
towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, is only having an annual budget of $10
million whereas the global spending on nuclear weapons per hour is more than
that amount (ICAN, 2017).
The 21st Century has presented us the most complicated deterrence relations. Cross-
domain deterrence is such a concept. The inventions of new military technology
and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) such as cyber warfare or anti-satellite
and space-based weapons have made drastic changes in the traditional domains
of deterrence (Manzo, 2012). These domains could apply across deterrence since
they are overlapping with each other and connected with civilian infrastructure.
Therefore, deterrence is not a ‘fit-for-all-framework’. In deterrence analysis, every
region and actor should be regarded as a special entity which possesses its own
strategic characteristics. The United States Nuclear Posture Review (USNPR,
2018), identifies this new development under the concept of ‘tailored deterrence’.
1 As per UNDP definition the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), are a universal call to
action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity.
2 As per the UN definition the UN regular budget provides funding for the General Assembly,
the Secretariat, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the International
Court of Justice. Additionally, the regular budget provides partial funding for certain
UN agencies, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN
Environment Programme.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 23
Therefore, our subject matter, the nature and uncertainty of nuclear deterrence in
the 21st century, is different from region to region and actor to actor. The following
map on world nuclear forces clearly depicts that, except Russia and the United
States, others possess comparatively small nuclear weapon stockpiles. The concept
of balance of power postulates that the nuclear power is equally distributed among
rivals so that no one state is strong enough to dominate all others. The existence
of two states with an enormous stockpile of weapons and many others with a few,
shows an imbalance rather than a balance of power.
Figure 1: Nuclear Weapon Stockpile of the world
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2017
Nuclear states established power balance by developing different alliances. Strategic
cultures – that are the behavioral inferences of a state on formulation of the grand
strategy – have a considerable bearing on their respective alliances and nuclear
deterrence outlook. Regions and powers have different deterrent behaviours which
are worth examining.
USA-NATO VS. RUSSIA
USA is the strongest member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
NATO also has two other nuclear powers – the United Kingdom and France – as
prominent members. USA and NATO always operated hand-in-hand in achieving
their common security goals. Both parties are capable of practicing the concept of
‘extended deterrence’ which is the capability of NATO nuclear forces to deter attack
on their allies and thereby reassure them with security (Bush et al., 2010).
24 Sanath De Silva
Senior and experienced diplomats of the USA and USSR were instrumental in
developing a mature diplomatic culture in the realm of nuclear weapons during
the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Americans helped the
Russians to dismantle a portion of their nuclear weapons stockpile. That was
a good example of the responsible behaviour of two powers in order to ensure
nuclear security during the winds of change (US Department of State Archive,
2001-2009).
However, the power rivalry between the USA and Russia did not disappear with the
end of the Cold War. After a few years of rapprochement particularly under Yeltsin,
Russia began to reassert itself and the old rivalry resurfaced. The resurgence of new
Russia under Vladimir Putin was able to hold the fort against USA-led NATO. In this
new context, Russians considered NATO’s extended role in the European Union
as a factor that threatens Russia’s sphere of influence in the Eastern Europe (Colby,
2016). USA has the global military superiority of conventional forces. Russia is the
only nuclear power that can have an equal status-quo against the nuclear strength
of the USA. The USA backed 1999 expansion of the NATO forces in Eastern Europe
was seen as a grave threat against the security of the Russia. Since the Russian
deterrence thinking is guided by its defensive mentality, this move by NATO made
Russia believe it is surrounded by enemies. The establishment of nuclear defence
systems close to the Russian border by NATO forces created a further anxiety in the
minds of Russian strategic elites.
The present Russian nuclear doctrine is based on ‘escalate to deescalate’ strategy
(USNPR, 2018). This strategy justifies the allocation of large quota of their national
resources into maintaining and modifying nuclear weapons. The objective behind
this strategy is to continue the great power status enjoyed by Russia during the Cold
War (Schneider, 2017). The 2018 United States Nuclear Posture Review (USNPR)
reveals that Russia “mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or
actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to ‘de-escalate’ a conflict on terms
favorable to them. These mistaken perceptions increase the prospect for dangerous
miscalculation and escalation” (USNPR, 2018, p.8).
Ukraine’s role is very crucial in shaping the behavior of the Russian nuclear
deterrence. Since Ukraine is geographically located as a buffer state between Russia
and Eastern Europe, Russians were very eager to have a pro-Russian regime in
Ukraine. When Ukraine started aligning more towards NATO, Russia became
nervous. The forceful annexation of Ukrainian territory, “Crimea”, by Russia in
2014, escalated the tension within the strategic circles of Europe and the USA.
The USA established an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system ‘Aegis Ashore’ in 2016
in Eastern Europe. As per USA's strategic justification, it was placed to protect
the European allies against new nuclear perpetrators such as Iran. However, it
is obvious that this new ABM system is located too close to Moscow. It has the
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 25
capability of operating as a land-based launch pad in Romania, from the ‘Deveselu’
air base. This launch pad possesses identical capability to ‘Aegis warships’ that is
used to launch Tomahawk3 cruise missiles (Kramer, 2016).
Figure 2: Missile Defence NATO capabilities
Source: BBC
Another disturbing factor for Russia is that the NATO nuclear defence site will be
commanded by an American military officer. It was seen as a humiliating threat
against Russia’s national interest. It is also observed that the Russian political
leadership uses this NATO threat to boost nationalism within Russia. Further,
the existing situation was used to justify the recent increase of Russia’s defence
allocation to modernise its nuclear forces.
Both USA and Russia are presently engaged in a nuclear weapons modernisation
programme which is aimed at increasing the delivery capacity of the nuclear
weapons. (USNPR, 2018). Along with NATO’s expansion in the European Union,
both USA and Russia have shown an interest in deploying more tactical weapons to
deter each other that makes a nuclear war more plausible. If the situation escalates to
the level of triggering the conflict at the conventional level, they might not hesitate
to use the tactical nukes against each other’s strategic targets as super artillery. The
US Ambassador to NATO, Kay Bailey Hutchison, warned Russia about violating
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement of 1987. She further
3 A long-range, all-weather, guided missile, which uses low speed aerodynamics and aims
terrestrial targets that remains in the atmosphere.
26 Sanath De Silva
stated, “we would be looking at the capability to take out a (Russian) missile that
could hit any of our countries,” (Marcus, 2018, para 07). Rhetoric of this nature
could pass the nuclear threshold between the two countries. Only a carefully and
professionally maintained credible deterrence strategy will be able to prevent such
a global catastrophe.
DETERRENCE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
China is a nuclear power that is rapidly developing its nuclear capabilities. Chinese
President Xi Jinping has stated that China will complete the modernisation of its
armed forces by 2035 under the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) initiative.
He further stated that the Chinese military will be a first tier military force by the
year 2050 (Peng, 2017). The new road-mobile strategic Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM) and the new multi-warhead version of its DF5 silo-based ICBM are
modern inventions of Chinese missile capability. China has also developed a state-
of-the-art ballistic missile with submarine-launched ballistic capability (SLBM) and
the air launch capability with new strategic bombers. This has established China’s
three-pronged military force structure of land-sea and air launched ‘triad’ capability
(Copp, 2017).
Contemporary China has not got involved in a straightforward strategic competition
with any other nuclear state. China says that her deterrence policy is designed based
on the idea of ‘peace through strength’. This strategy is portrayed to the outside
world as a completely defensive strategy. However, the ground situation reveals
that it is not as peaceful as China portrays in its nuclear doctrine. China’s claim for
some islands in the South China Sea has made competition between China and the
USA in the Pacific Ocean more fervent. This problem signals the possible dangers
of a nuclear confrontation between the two nuclear powers if things unpredictably
flares-up. It is clear that China will try its best to develop strategic forces to keep its
military strength on par with the US in the Pacific theatre. It is also important for
both states to maintain status quo at least in matters pertaining to the South China
Sea. By enhancing the strengths of the JIN class SSBN fleet China has successfully
established the ‘first strike uncertainty’ against the USA. This notion is challenging
the USA’s capability of neutralising China’s nuclear weapons by a surprise attack.
If China would be able to increase its control over the disputed Paracel and Spratly
islands in the future, it would also enable her to increase her capacity to counter-
attack US submarines. China wishes to develop a bastion of its nuclear-armed
submarines in the South China Sea. China has also announced the intention of
an ‘Underwater Great Wall’4 project. The China State Shipbuilding Corp (CSSC),
4 This is the advanced version of the Sound Surveillance System that USA used against the
Soviet submarines during the cold war.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 27
which is the establishment responsible for designing and building PLAN warships,
is working hard to lay a network of ship and subsurface sensors in order to support
this idea (Bana, 2016).
Figure 3: Type 94- Jin Class SSBN
Source: Chinatopix, 2018
China is also on the verge of unleashing its modern state-of-the-art ‘Hong-20’ nuclear
bomber with the capacity of carrying over 20 tons of nuclear weapons and also
capable of flying more than five thousand miles without refueling. This Aircraft has
the ability to penetrate the US anti-aircraft defence systems. The launching of this
aircraft will give a new strategic dimension for China’s nuclear triad (Akbar, 2018).
The Chinese nuclear programme has always been responsive to nuclear developments
of the USA. It has also shown an interest in accelerating the nuclear weapons
programme in the recent past. The new Chinese technological developments in the
maritime and air domains will pose a significant threat to US nuclear power in the
Pacific Ocean.
NORTH KOREA
According to Rational Realists, the primary purpose of punishment is deterrence
rather than vengeance. In the backdrop of the basic principles of rational deterrence,
North Korea’s nuclear behaviour which rhetorically provokes Washington may
seem odd and irrational. How rational deterrence prevents war between a small
insignificant state and a super power has not been discussed until North Korea
achieved ballistic nuclear weapons capability against the USA. As the pressure
mounted, the two leaders of the USA and North Korea agreed to negotiate on
denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.
28 Sanath De Silva
Even before the dust settled after the negotiations in June 2018, US spy agencies have
revealed that Pyongyang is displaying clear signs of resuming its nuclear weapons
programme. (Telegraph, 2018, para 1). The question arises whether North Korea
is negotiating with the United States to genuinely give up its nuclear weapons or
to achieve recognition from the USA as a nuclear power. According to the recently
published US Nuclear Posture Review, it is clear that the US deterrence strategy
on North Korea is to react with maximum clout if North Korea happens to be the
first user of nuclear power against the USA or its allies and partners. According
to the strategic community of the US, such aggression from North Korea will be
unthinkable and would result in the end of the North Korean regime (USNPR,
2018). There exists ambiguities among strategic analysts as to whether the USA
could effectively deter the North Korean regime at the negotiation table.
The provocative rhetoric exchanged between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un
escalated to such an extent that both leaders indicated that they would not hesitate
to use their nuclear capabilities against each other, regardless of the consequences. If
USA’s nuclear deterrence is not effective enough to meet the new nuclear threats that
are more complex and demanding (Kühn, 2018), what constitutes the ineffective
deterrence relations between North Korea and USA? It is evident that North Korea’s
behaviour does not fit into the framework of rational deterrence and therefore, it
will seriously affect North Korea’s nuclear relations with other states. The odds are
created due to different strategic cultures and multitudes of other factors. One of
them is the long prevailing internal military structure of North Korea which is called
‘Songun’ or military first doctrine. It has become North Korea’s central strategic
doctrine under the autocratic regime. Under this notion, instability in the minds
of the citizen is a necessary condition of the state’s military strength. Military is the
organisation that will rescue the state from any crisis. Therefore, the military needs
everything that a society could offer in order to protect North Korea from external
threats. Civilians’ sacrifices are necessary to preserve the state that protects them.
In this backdrop it does not make any sense for the military to espouse the idea of
denuclearisation by abandoning the ‘Songun’ doctrine. On the other hand, the USA
does not want to recognise the nuclear weapons capability of a dictatorial regime
as ‘acceptable’ (USNPR, 2018). Such an acceptance would have adversely affected
the super power status of the USA. Therefore, deterring the unacceptable was out
of the picture until North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that had
the capacity of reaching Washington DC. Some scholars argue that the possibility
of using cross-deterrence domains of nonmilitary tools which has a bearing on
rational deterrence by the USA is a credible option against North Korean tenacious
nuclear behavior. The nuclear rhetoric exchanged between the two countries in
the recent past has tested the ‘strategic patience’ of the superpower. However, the
decision of the two countries to resort to diplomacy, and come to the negotiation
table was helpful in reducing the tensions of the Korean peninsula.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 29
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
The nuclear deterrence in South Asia in the 21st century between India and Pakistan
is known to be the most volatile and vulnerable of all the situations. Both India and
Pakistan have rejected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime based on the favoritism
bestowed upon great states who already possessed the nuclear weapons by the time
of the launch of the treaty. Both countries are of the opinion that the present nuclear
non-proliferation regime is “morally bankrupt and strategically unsound” (Kapur,
2007, p. 4).
James Woolsey, Director of the CIA from 1993 to 95, has predicted that the arms
race between India and Pakistan poses perhaps the most probable prospect for the
future use of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons (Bhaskar,
2015). The close proximity and the border dispute over Kashmir between the
two states have made their relations more complex and volatile. According to
a quantitative study carried out by Paul Kapur, it is revealed that the advent of
nuclear weapons have significantly destabilised the subcontinent. His research
findings further reveal that “military disputes were nearly four times common after
India’s and Pakistan’s achievement of nuclear capability than they were when South
Asia was non-nuclear, and progressing proliferation was positively co-related with
increasing levels of conflict through 1972-2002” (Kapur, 2007, p. 33).
India and Pakistan havetepped in to conflict in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999.
However, the two countries were able to avoid war under the nuclear shadow of
the 21st century. It can be observed that the evolving strategic cultures and nuclear
command philosophies of the two states are showing hostile characteristics against
each other. The ‘No First Use policy’ (NFU) that has been the basis of deterrence
relationship between the two states has been put under a litmus test in the recent
past. The evolving nature of nuclear command structure is one such threat to NFU.
Due to the dominance of the military in politics, the Pakistani nuclear command
has shown more militarily influence than India. Despite the commitment towards
the NFU, the Indian command structure has also shown signs of favoring more
military involvement. M.V. Ramana (2013) argues that since the first nuclear test,
code named ‘Smiling Buddha,’ Indian military has acquired a gradual control over
the nuclear programme. This may be to ensure rapid response to an enemy attack.
Even though both countries keep their weapons stockpiles not deployed,5 rapid
response is a must to ensure credible deterrence. Therefore, the military involvement
is needed in order to increase the operational value of the weapons if the need for
a retaliation arises. In case of such a situation, only the military knows how to
effectively place nuclear weapons in war plans in order to take accurate targets. As
the tension develops, militaries might prefer to adapt ‘Launch on Warning’ (LOW)
doctrine as their retaliation principle in the absence of a second strike capability.
5 The warhead separated from vehicle.
30 Sanath De Silva
The LOW doctrine enables a state to launch a preemptive nuclear attack just after
receiving a definite warning of an enemy nuclear attack. In such a scenario the
retaliation launch will be executed, while the enemy missiles are in the air, before it
detonates on the target. If the information of the first strike is not reliable or if the
decision makers had to act on unreliable rumors, South Asia could end up in an
unnecessary nuclear catastrophe. According to Ramana (2003) it is revealed by the
late Indian president Abdul Kalam that during operation ‘Poorna Vijay’ the armed
forces were training to use nuclear weapons. He further stated that Raj Chengappa,
a senior journalist at India Today has written that during the Kargill War, a partial
control of the nuclear weapons were handed over to the military (Ramana, 2003)
The Indian ‘Cold Start’ strategy has also put NFU in danger and it has made Pakistan
seek tactical nuclear weapons to counter such a threat. The idea of the ‘Cold Start’
doctrine was launched by operation Parakram, after the terrorist attack on Indian
Parliament on December 2001. ‘Cold Start’ is a strategy that enables the Indian Army
to develop a credible retaliatory option along the Indo-Pakistani border by using the
conventional military capability. Cold Start operations will deploy a division-sized
formation that is capable of short-noticed operations against the terrorist targets in
the Pakistani territory (Ladwig III, 2017). Pakistan, by adopting the ‘full spectrum
deterrence policy’ has shown very clearly that it will choose to adopt the first use
of the nuclear option against India in escalation of such a conventional military
environment. Pakistan has already developed a tactical nuclear weapon called Haft
IX or Nsar. As the pressure mounts between the two camps, some Indian security
elites have questioned the credibility of the use of NFU as a stabiliser. The former
Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, expressing his personal view has stated
that the NFU is not useful to deter Pakistan anymore (Singh, 2016).
Figure 4: The Huft IX or Nsar: Tactical Nuke of Pakistan
Source: Independent News, 2018
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 31
Kapur (2007) argues that, in a way, Pakistan wants to maintain the uncertainty of
nuclear attacks against India in order to make the nuclear deterrence more credible
since it prevents India from launching a full scale conventional attack against
Pakistan. It is not a very encouraging sign for the rest of the region to see the
nuclear powers signaling of their preparedness to cross the nuclear threshold.
India is going to purchase S-400 long-range, surface-to-air missile systems from
Russia by 2020. The deal is confirmed by the two countries and they are going to
be deployed at the Pakistani and Chinese border to deter the enemy at the borders.
The producer of the missiles, the Russian company Almaz-Antey is in the USA
sanctions list but it could not stop India’s decision (Pubby, 2018). Most probably
Pakistan and China would collaborate to counter the Indian S-400 threat in the
near future.
ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST
The Jewish state has not officially declared the possession of nuclear weapons.
However, it is a well-known fact that Israel is in possession of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, the deterrence policy of Israel is called ‘ambiguous retaliation’. Israel
is heavily threatened by the surrounding Arab states. If the state has to face a
significant conventional attack from the neighbours, it is likely that the nuclear
card will be played by Israel.
Iran is also seeking nuclear weapons since it sees Israel as a threat to its national
interest. The US-Iran nuclear deal which was initiated by Barrack Obama was
a commendable initiative to curb the nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
However, the incumbent US President, Donald Trump has withdrawn from the
nuclear deal. He believes that unsanctioned Iran would strengthen the status of anti-
American actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. However, with the US withdrawal
from the treaty, the restrictions on the nuclear non-proliferation commitment and
taboo on weapon grade enrichment of nuclear substance have been removed. In
the new circumstances Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has ordered the Iran’s
atomic energy authority to be prepared to start their industrial enrichment without
limitations (CNN, 2018). There is a danger of Iran re-starting the nuclear weapons
program. In such a scenario, other states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia will also
seek for the absolute weapon, to safeguard their national interest, which will further
result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
The latest Russian establishment of S-400 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system in
Syria has also created tension in the Middle East. Especially the USA and Israeli
camps are expected to counter this missile threat sooner or later. This system has the
launching power of 400kms and proved to be one of the most efficient long-range
anti-aircraft SAMs in present times. These unfolding events show that Middle East is
more prone to nuclear proliferation in the future than any other geographic region.
32 Sanath De Silva
TERRORIST THREAT
Terrorists have not been able to deter states by using a nuclear option so far.
However, the grave danger of terrorist organisation acquiring a nuclear weapon
cannot be totally ruled out. Religious fundamentalism of terrorist groups defies the
rational thinking behind terrorism. Some fundamental terrorist organisations want
to portray that acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction against capitalists
as an Islamic religious duty. “Al Qaeda’s leaders yearn to acquire and use the WMD
against the United States. If they acquired a nuclear bomb, they would not hesitate
to use it. Indeed, such an attack would be meant to serve as a sort of sequel to the
9/11 plot” (Larssen, 2010, para 2).
The terrorist threat looms large especially in the context of South Asian nuclear
weapons. The “Trump administration is worried that nuclear weapons and material
in Pakistan could end up into the hands of terror group and the concerns are
aggravated by the development of tactical weapon” (Economic Times, 2017, Para
01). Neither India nor Pakistan are parties to the IAEA-NPT safeguards. There
are many cases of nuclear theft reported in both India and Pakistan. Pakistani
media points out that “according to international media reports there are 25 cases
of ‘missing’ or ‘stolen’ radio-active material reported in India. Fifty-two per cent of
the cases were attributed to theft and rest is a mystery” (Dawn, 2018 July 16, Para,
02). If these stolen material have gone into the hands of terrorists it will increase
the danger of a terrorist inventing a nuclear weapon. The non-state actors obtaining
the nuclear capability will change the dynamics of deterrence and further increase
uncertainty. If a terrorist organization acquires nuclear capability, how they would
apply the rational thinking to the deterrence matrix is still an unsolved puzzle.
CONCLUSION
The nuclear environment of the 21st century is characteristic of instability than
stability. The ‘doomsday clock’ is a symbol developed by the Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists. It presents the likelihood of occurring a global catastrophe. The
hypothetical situation which describes the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe is
termed as ‘midnight’ and the most recent clock recorded two minutes, the closest
time ever, to ‘midnight’. The nuclear instability could create significant changes in
state behavior. It also influences the behaviors of economies and markets. Therefore,
no state or individual can neglect the matters pertaining to nuclear dangers and the
time has come to act effectively to minimize the threats of a manmade disaster.
Even though nuclear weapons helped prevent major wars among great powers for
decades after the Second World War, the context of contemporary deterrence seems
uncertain. The present context has become more complex with the increasing
danger of nuclear proliferation among developing states and unpredictability of the
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 33
behaviors of state leaders of existing nuclear states. In addition, non-state parties
inspired by religious fundamentalism are becoming more crucial in shaping the
behaviour of the international system than ever before. Due to the above-mentioned
reasons there exists an anxiety among contemporary strategic communities that
deterrence will fail in the international arena (Kühn, 2018). In such a backdrop,
who can guarantee that an absolute disaster such as a nuclear war will not trigger?
Therefore, it is pertinent for the nuclear community to re-assess the relevance and
the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence if they desire to move forward.
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