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Cases 4:56 PM
December 11,2024
Wednesday,
reformulating the torro.
Association v UOL terms of settlement and
Advocate's Bar formulating the everything anddola..
1. Salem to the section 89: court is ADR is lost as court is doing AD2 Th
of the case can gofor
according
(Class) As termsthen thewhole
purpose
e count anreed
observe the to determine whether w0 dirz
after the parties the court has Section 89'3
here le e r o r 5 m After the pleadings are done agreed that there are errors in the burc!
8 4 ' w o r d , A a c the
whole process. construction has to be done. The court ADR and reduce
intent to include toincuee
See Jtourt held,
purposive
bonafide and the section 89
constitutiona

Putposive const However, the purpose of

section 89 was by courts. Holding
through ADR and not constitutional validity
"
t b e done However
interpretation is done
the Supreme Court
upheld the
the courts. India (2003),
& of Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of
PuPose
been very
effective since
1 0 In Civil Procedure Code (CPC). but noted that it had not
Section 89 of the 89
iMteut of Sec introducing Section
appreciated the
intent behind
Courts adopt these
is vomaide o The court
procedural details were not yet
clear.
the Supreme Court
suggested that High
its and
draft model rules, Section 8
was formed to reinterpreted
(onstyttiovalo A committee 89(2) d), CPC. I"), the Supreme
Court
implement Section ("Salem
cabe rules to Association v, Union
of India (2005) reformulating
" Salem Salem,Advocate Bar only referred to
courts
nterfret
n
to address inconsistencies. OrderX. CPC. the
word may Resolution (ADR).
Rules lA-Cof Alternative Dispute
May > that in Section 89 and
duty to refer cases to terms before
referrin
o ltclarified shall indicatedthe courts' courts to draft settlement
Qutysettlement terms,
while settlement, which
required

Shall laA the the phrase terms of

issue was
o Amajor
case toADR.
APea This,was impractical because: examined thecase.
Can e to would not have fully
pleadings stage forums, not cOurts.
avoiding
Judges at the role of ADR mean a summary
of disputes,
Maurepanl defontd
3 as ii. Deciding settlement terms is the interpreted terms of
settlement to
Supreme Court
telms was resolvethis, the unnecessary procedural complications.
Sumney
’ Non sinatoies agreement.
n Arb.
signatories to the arbitration and
Jayesh Pandya whom were not 8 of the
Arbitration
2. Sukanya Holdings v. parties, some of arbitrate under
Section
involved multiple
took s t r t o The dispute
non-signatories could
be compelled to
whether agreed to it.
The key issue was
o Conciliation between parties
who had expressly
Stance 5tattng Act, 1996.
arbitration could only proceed interconnected.
ruled that dispute was
The Supreme Court arbitration, even if the
signatorie
hon-siqnatoies

referred to involving both

aselo
could not be action, meaning disputes
be cause of
not bifurcatethe
Non-signatories
Caun
that arbitration could through litigation. involved partie
o The Court held had to be resolved requires explicit consent from all
and non-signatories contractual and
purely commercial transactions.
" Acb is The decision reinforced that
arbitration is purely
making it less efficient in complex principle to
o
in multiparty disputes, applying doctrines like the group of companies
( o t r a c t a l

latnlytcThis ruling limited arbitration

nb cannot more flexible approach,
courts have taken a
caye sf acthoo Over time, in arbitration. has been diluted by
later
overruled, its rigid stance
tue non-signatories
include closely related formally
Co eeytu ill r While the Sukanya Holdings judgment has not
been
tesowee o contract law principles
wi
tw t be balancing strict
rulings. interpretation in ADR,
theevolving nature ofjudicial
highlights
veo The case
hGA no+ been o dispute resolution needs.
practical
tuled foree a b
Varkey f sec 89) - (ay n ot promotes Alternative
Dispute
Cherian
3. (Afcon Infrastructure v. of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (CPC),
which
case concerns Section 89 work to
. Respordeut euteoResolution (ADR). Port Trust) awarded
contract where the second respondent (Cochin
Ao go for ano but o The dispute arose from a construction respondent.
part of it to the first
subcontracted
the appellants, who then lacked an arbitration clause.
appellants and the first respondent appellant
9 The agreement between the arbitration under Section 89, which the
money and reauested
recovery of
Tne tirst respondent sued for
opposed. agreement
a oreem e f
Court upheld this, ruling that
a preexisting arbitration
o The trial court allowed arbitration, and the High
mutl. was
not required under Section 89.
Lith paty's Pere aylo pe
ater to euns t e t lowt
caunot
(onsert eferrd
mutralpuseu s neceS Seuy
parthes See 9 etne, cicde tial (ous 0clen
 application.
until the Court decides on the
Court can extend the
time period only if there is sufficient: cause and may impose conditions while doing so.
O The
rtalso has the power to replace one or allarbitrators during the extension process.
yarbitrator is replaced, the new tribunal will continue from where the earlier one left off, and allthe evidence
stillbe valid.
already submitted will
aannointed arbitrators will be treated as if they have already received and reviewed the earlier materials.
continuation of the earlier ong
o The new tribunal is considered a
TheCourt may impose actualor exXemptary (punitive) COsts on any party while dealing with matters under this section.
OThe Court must try to decide extension applications quickly, ideally within 60 days from the date the other party is
notified
" Section 29B Fast Track Procedure
oParties can opt for fast track arbitration by giving written consent, either before or at the time of appointing the
arbitral tribunal.
o While agreeing to use the fast track procedure, parties may also agree to appoint a sole arbitrator, selected mutually
by both parties.
Under fast track arbitration, the tribunal willfollow asimplified and quicker process as mentioned below:
(a) The tribunal will decide the case only based on written pleadings, documents, and submissions-no oral
hearings are held by default.
(b) The tribunal can ask for more information or clarification from the parties if needed, beyond what is
submitted.
(c) An oralhearing may be held only if all parties request it, or the tribunal thinks it is necessary for clarifying
certain issues.
(d) If an oral hearing happens, the tribunal can skip technical formalities and use any process it finds suitable fo
quick resolution.
O The arbitral award under this fast track process must be made within 6 months from the date the tribunal begins wor
onthe case (enters upon reference).
OIf the award is not made within 6months, then sub-sections (3) to (9) of Section 29A will apply. This includes options
for extension by court, fee reduction, replacing arbitrators, etc.
OThe fees of the arbitrator and how it willbe paid must be decided by mutual agreement between the parties and the
arbitrator.
" Section 30- Settlement
O It is allowed under arbitration for the arbitral tribunal to encourage settlement of the dispute between the parties.
OWith the consent of the parties, the arbitral tribunalcan use mediation, conciliation,or any other settlement method.
at any stage during the arbitration process.
O If the parties successfully settle the dispute during the arbitration:
" The tribunal wil end the arbitration proceedings.
If the parties request and the tribunal agrees, the settlement can be recorded inthe form of an arbitral award
based on agreed terms.
OAnarbitral award based on asettlement must be made following Section 31, and it must clearly mention that it is an
arbitral award.
O This settlement award has the same legalstatus and effect as aregular arbitral award that is given after a fulldispute
resolution process.
 o The Supreme
o
without mutualCourt addressed key issues,,including
consent. whether courts could compel
arbitration under Section
89
It
clarified that Section 89 unless both
parties agree. reguires courts to explore settlement options but cannot force arbitration

o The Court emphasized that ADR referrals must align with the nature of the dispute and recorded reasons if no AD
method was suitable.
o It ruled that once referred to arbitration, the case exitsthe judicial system, making arbitration distinct from other
ADR methods.
o The judgment stressed that judges sfacilitating ADR discussions should not later adjudicate the same matter to
prevent bias.
O The Court concluded that that arbitration
reiterated
under Section 89 is possiblethe trialcourt erred in enforcing Section 89 improperly and
only with mutual consent
hood Corporation india v. Se B4
Joginderpal &
Seiel terLha ne court did express concerns aboutMohindar Pah
how technicalities and complexities in implementing
Section 89 of CPC were
kcomplex proceeeyethe diluting itsintended benefits of cost and time
efficiency.
der intricacies of legal procedures were reducing the effectiveness of ADR mechanisms under Section 89.
Purpose of ADR-providing a simple, cost-effective and speedy resolution-was being undermineo Dy
procedural complications.
Reduce efleeneg55 e s sShould be easy for common people to understandand follow without excessive legal hurales.
The Court:acknowledged that if ADR mechanisms became too technical or difficult to
access their advantages
would be lost.
urt nighlighted that the practical implementation ofSection 89 should focus on simplicity, accessibliny, and
Simple,cot -effectiuefficiency, ensuring ADRremains a viable alternative to litigation rather than becoming another cumbersom
tnat
legal process.
4 Sgputes of ceunt
3 Gurunanak Foundation v. Ratansingh Sec 89 > excesie nterveutio
O the Supreme Court strongly criticized the excessive intervention of courts in arbitration matters, emphasizing thE
C fo cnccn such interference defeats the purpose of arbitration as an efficient, cost-effective, and expeditious dispute
brosieinterv-resolution mechanism. Ambiguous provisions has led to intervention of courts and every other procedure and
Ctm \bu countk uamatter is challenged in court. Courts have wrapped and clothed it to illegalise, legalise, uncertainly legalise It.

8 DCVadhwa v. State of Bihar - discussed on ordinance making power of the state

7.R.M.Investment v. Boeing Co.Gec 2)- lem commerrcial -libradiy iuterpree

o The case involved R.M. Investments &Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. (RMI) and Boeing Co., where RMI claimeda commiss
for consultancy services related to aircraft sales in India.
LoNtedo arguing
Boeing sought astay of proceedings under Section 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition &Erforcement) Act, 19
that the dispute fell under the arbitration clause.
7og5eh nt.lufigThe key issue was whether the agreement between RMIand Boeing was a "commercial" relationship under Sect
us its pforisios 2of the Act, which defines when foreign awards apply.
The Calcutta High Court held that the agreement was commercial, leading to a Supreme Court challenge.
shendd e udeerete?o RMI argued that "commercial" should be limited to mercantile transactions involving the sale of goods and that
consultancy services were not commercial.
Pqened to o The Supreme Court rejected this argument, ruling that "commercial" should be interpreted broadly to include
trade practices.
AtiabauTe (o cose modern international
o The Court emphasized that the Arbitration Act was designed to facilitate international trade and, therefore, its
7 Reuscor pover terms should be construed liberally rather than narrowly.<
o Itreferred to the UNCITRAL Model Law, which includes commercial representation, agency, and consulting as
of "commercial" relationships.
ha uphelel seThe Court cited AtiabariTea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam (1961) and Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric
(1984), which supported an inclusive interpretation of commercial activities.
iwderpetatht The judgment reinforced that any transaction supporting commercial trade, including consultancy, advisory, a
agency services, falls within the definition of "commercial" under arbitration laws.
to nurea lo The Court concluded that since RMI played an active role in promoting Boeing's aircraft sales and provided
commercial and managerial assistance,their relationship was commercial in nature.
 a r h i t r a t i n n

undar
coverod
trado
he
o This broad tould tornational

interpretation ensured that in in

ativito

awide tarRr
O7
hucinnss mechanitm

agreements, promoting arbitration as a preferrrd dispute esolution

mh
gring it
1940, al
. Atiabari Tea Co,v. State ot Assam: Arbitration
Act,
interprhe
(ommeua aupreme Court broadly interpreted the term "commercial Underthe
definitíon of
commercial
t r a n s a c t i a n s

modern international trade regardirng

the m e r c a n t i l e

practices The key points only to

"commercial"' applies and
The Court rejected a narrow interpretation that
derm
trade
international

ttuc
involving the sale of goods. liberally to
support

" It emphasized that the Arbitration Act should be interpreted representation,

agercy.

business relationships. commercial

which includes
The judgment relied on the UNCITRAL.Model Law, Scope of
transactions. General
"commercial"
Ltd. v
Power Co. al"ir
consulting, and management contracts within the Renusagar
"commerc

Assam (1960) and

fallsunder

" The Court cited Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of business and
trade
facilitating tho
transaction
Electric Co. (1984), reinforcing that any
Raircraft
sales in
India,

arbitration law. Act

promoting under the
managerial assistance
to Boeing in arbitrable

Since RMI provided consultancy and the dispute activitie

in nature, making
business
of
Court heldthat their relationship was commercial wide range
COver a
arbitration agreements to | trade
This interpretation expanded the scope of resolution mechanism
in international t
he preferred dispute
reinforcing arbitration as the

op Wcabdity
o Part I Arbitration and
9. Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading applicability of Part I of the
Bulk Tradina S.A. (2002) dealt with the
DnatiG International v. arbitrations held outside India. Paris, France
Conciliation Act, 1996 to
international commercial
with proceedings
to be held in
clause
Pat 1 uapucaThe containing an ICC
arbitration relier.
dispute arose from a contract under Section 9 of the Act before an Indian court.seeking interim Indian court
an application arbitrations outside India,
andtherefore,
O Ihe respondent filed
-0allomo
argued that Part I of the Act does not apply to
a h h e appellant
Dohis hll under Section 9.
cannot grant interim relief and the Supreme Court upheld the ruling.
High Court reiected this argument, meaning that even in
TemedES w ldia The Madhya Pradesh unless the parties expressly exclude it,
arbitrations,
Cburt held that Partlapplies to allconducted outside India, Indian courts can grant interim relief
Sectior
under
MP Ue held p lo ahe
international commercial arbitrations

India would be left without

9 were not applicable, parties in arbitrations outside
Part I
o The Court reasoned that if
relief in India, which would create alegal vacuum. international arbitrations from
Partl.
interim does not explicitly exclude
Section 2(2) of the Act
o The Court observed that the Indian legislation.
Law was not fully adopted in
and the UNCITRAL Model expanded Indian courts' jurisdiction
over foreign-seated arbitrations,
widespread criticism as it
o The ruling led to
international arbitration.
creating uncertainty for Aluminiunm Technical Services Inc.
later overruled in 2012 by Bharat Aluminium Co. V. Kaiser
o The judgment was arbitrations.
does not apply to foreign-seated
(BALCO), which clarified that Part I Jusisdctou lndia
AD
10.Venture Global v. Satyam
Computers see 34)5challenye to the ruling in Bhatia International v
Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. (2008) reaffirmed
o Venture Global 1996 applies to international
Tradina S.A. (2002), holding that Part Iof the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
Bulk
expressly excluded by the parties.
rdicy coufB commercial arbitrations unless Global Engineering (VGE) and Satyam
arose from a joint venture agreement between Venture
o The dispute London Court of
uisdihon arbitration clause referring disputes to the
Computer Services Ltd.,which contained an
foeign scate International Arbitration (LCIA).
transfer shares to
the arbitrator passed an award directing VGE to
o Satyam initiated arbitration in London, and
uphedd Bhatia Satyam. filed a suit in India challenging the award, claiming that
the
o Satyam sought enforcement in a U.S. court, while VGE
transfer of shares violated Indian foreign exchange laws(FEMA).
that a foreign award cannot be set aside under
o The Indian courts initially dismissed VGE's challenge, holding
(ase Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
applies to foreign-seated arbitration
o The Supreme Court, however,relied on Bhatia International, ruling that Part I
unless excluded, thereby allowing challenges to foreign awards under Section 34.
to challenge a
o The Court held that public policy violations, including non-compliance with FEMA, could be grounds
 le
e
Court forsame as thethe Court against
refr subiert the n ((3)

foreign award in India. forelgn-seated arbitrations,

leading to legal uncertaint)
power to Interfere in
Indian courts'
O This decision expanded in India. ServicesInc. (BALCO
for international arbitration Kaiser Aluminlum Technlcal
Bharat Aluminium Co. v.
overruled in2012 by
O The ruling was later arbitrations.
which clarified that Part Idoes not apply to foreign-seated

>Appl ollty 6 J
Aluminum Technical Services willbe seen as not being
applicable
11. BALCO v. Kaiser I willnot be applicable that is there but part I
o (Class) if the parties say
that part
recourse from the parties again. Seated in
the act means- Indian
seated arbitration. So it took the
OMCAKlee 3hahn the foreien
courts to
applicable which had allowed Indian
lut v Veutne olehelaws will beoverruled the Bhatia International and Venture Global decisions,Conciliation Act, 1996.
Dayau oM o The Court arbitrations under Part I of the
Arbitration and
intervene in foreign-seated arbitration law with the UNCITRAL
arbitrations, aligning Indian
apply to foreign-seated
It held that Part I does not
. all ut ^caodelLawand international best practices. the seat of arbitration
determines the applicable
reaffirmed the territoriality principle, stating that
CnfíCiqu se ae The Court arbitrations.
courts' jurisdiction over foreign (Section 11), or set aside
procedural law, limiting Indian relief (Section 9), appoint arbitrators
grant interim
I,3) clarified that Indian courts cannot
Cilb (se4,1|; It seated outside india. adopting that
<peut (atlyforejgn awards (Section 34) for arbitrations ensuring that choosing aforeign seat alsoimplies
strengthened party autonomy,
ild PheaSle t o The judgment preventing unnecessary
judicial interference. agreements executed before
tnis
country's curial law, thereby September 2012. meaning arbitration
prospectivelv from 6
Ko The decision applies International regime. broad interpretation
of "public
date stillfollow the Bhatia address concerns about the
stance, the ruling did
not
progressive in India.
awards jurisdiction by
ODespite its enforcement of foreign
issue in the
arbitration-friendly

remains an more
4eniterallty policy", which
judgment ushered
pro-arbitration era,
in a
making India

o The BALCO in international

disputes.
Aib.
lnter Com
interference
reducing court Bhatia
Perort > Pentaly uphel tis what
of Co. India nVaTLtd. (2008)
clarified
’Naienaluty
EDevelopment
Development India Act, 1996.
12.0 TDE Infrastructure v. UE TDM Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. the Arbitration
and Conciliation
foreign
for Court in Section 2(1)(f) of one company had
o The Supreme international
arbitration under companies, where
tit constitutes two
Indian-incorporated

contract between international.

purposes, even i
effi htes o The case involved a claimed the
arbitration was
Indian entity for arbitration
management and
is considered an
(ensti
What directors and
" incorporated inIndia
Arb that a company commercial arbitratio
The Court held outside India. international
lncice
and control are be classified as
cannot
ro held its management two Indian
companies
co.5 8r arbitration between not by
to fateel o It ruled that by the place of
incorporation,
Incospo di under the Act. arbitration is
determined
red tn emphasized that
nationality for
e
oside
The Court lndin. Seated PartI, Section 2(1)().
blw 2 ln C o management control. Conciliation Act, 1996, specifically
oÔb Arbitration and
applicable laws inthe case were thearbitration. meaning the seat of
o The international
commercial
under domestic arbitration,
which defines Indian companies fall
contracts between
clarified that applied to
o The ruling party is a foreign entity. residency cannot be
must be in India unless one that the criteria for tax
arbitration stating
based on tax laws,
rejected arguments courts will have
o The Court rules, and Indian
arbitration laws.
follow domestic arbitration
arbitration in such cases must
o The process of arbitration laws by
claiming
jurisdiction over the dispute. companies cannot avoid Indian
reinforced the principle that Indian
This judgment management influence.
foreign control or

-sec 4laes RIglt to objed

about 70 hearings,
v. Puri Constructions seven years, attending
13. State of Rajasthan in the arbitration proceedings for
participated
otheState of Rajasthan arbitrator's alleged
misconduct
without raising objections.
raised objections regarding the
State
award was made,the
o After an unfavorable objection, it had
and procedural errors.. participated in the
arbitration process without
knowingly
since the State
o The Court held that the proceedings later.
waived itsright to challenge
 Pute eS affe Slimiteng actionr 2021)
mine wher efer ed or allowr to refpIlon the of the new
e subjectTundermat Section 7 $to erbitratio
the arbitratparty,
par

ohjections
after a
cannot raise
atage, they
appopriato

o It relied on the principle that If a af fho of the

party faile to objett implied
acceptance

ennstitutes
unfavorable outcome procesdings

o The judgment reinforced that active participation in

arbittation
ard ailyre
to da:
ooportnity,
0rliesf
process, barring Jater challenges ohjertiont at fhb
raite
Da'ties must
0 This CALe reaffirmedthe principle that
results in waivet under Setion of the Arbiftation Aet

arbitration Is regure4
parties to submit to fhe
.N toat a RukmaniBalv. Collecto Intent of arhitration
agroermen

arbitration agreement, style of

oCourt said that there is no format or thaf. No need for a particular
agreement should
reflect
" |ntento ubwbnd the arbitration of the paarties to follow the
arbitration award

bino heelnecessary thing is the intent

arbitration
S19 KK Modi v. KN Modi conclusively categorize
the proceedings as &jurisdictigr
o
term arbitration did
not bindirng on parties
O mere Usage of should say -
although no format for this but certain things
Binding npadhe court said-
consent of parties or court arbitration agreement.
tribunal has come from - for considering it as
agreement, Such as
tne
to be added
also not necessarv essentials of an
arbitration
O Term arbitration is clause - not
arbitration
satisfy
Not
O Clause 9 of thecontract -
requirement for a tribunal to act judicially.
e b tem not necA as an arbitrator.
tribunal adËudicates
disoutes
acting as an expert, not
was evidence, and the
o Chairman of IFCI where parties present
process
involves a judicial
O arbitration

J16., Jagdish Chader v. RameshChader Cer 2)

arbitration agreement. and not just
procedure or format of an determination to go to arbitration
o no specific disclose a
words used should
make sure that the
0 partiesshould
possibility of going for arbitration
" nrd le dslogbeak about the
agreement - not allowed
o Contingent arbitration

17. Cox & Kings v. Sap Non signaforg "party" to be a signatory to

an arbitration agreement
expressly require a
Section 2(h) read with Section
7 does not agreement.
eNpn sqnatorieso containing the arbitration relationships where there is
nt
underlying contract relationship, including
ddeo or the suggests that any legal could form
OCa be underlying Section 7 has given rise to a
relationship,
ko legislative intent persons or entities, but
whose actions or conduct
/as panhes to contract between the under Section 7.
an arbitration agreement
asubject matter of clarified or any person claiming
through or under"
pesel that the phrase "parties party, can make an
Sec. 8, 35 and 45.- person claiming through or under the
arbitration agreement, or any
o either the party to an dispute to arbitration.
9 authority to refer the
application to the judicial

Development co. v. Encon

Builders
18. Bihar State Municipal elements of an arbitration agreement:
essential
o No particular format but - contemplated affair.
difference in connectionwith some
Ofroeut er s must be a present or afuture difference by a private tribunal.
parties to settle such
o must be the intention of the
cuspnte
Dwtentin parh parties must agree in
writing to be bound by the decision
of such tribunal.

i t l b y m b w i e p a r t i e s must be
ad idem. soecifically
t Gett 'arbitration' is not required to be
purpose of construing an arbitration agreement, the term
Obem rh tor the
bduentioned therein. consider it as arbitration agreement.
uet Hey a e adjudication and not arbitration but still
o Agreement may have words like
by oeison
u Pots i9, BAG Raju v. PyG Raju Sec )
proceedings.
o Section 5- defines the extent of judicial intervention in arbitration
expeditiously and less expensively and when there is an arbitration agreement
o encouraging resolution of disputes
the Courts interyentign should be minimal.
conditions which are required to be satisfiedunder sub-section (1)and (2) of Section 8 before the Court
zement utui (The
Can exercis its powers are:
" (1) there is an arbitration agreement;
 Iiuwe ce
jngapore
other party;
against the agreement;
action in the Court arbitration

" (2) aparty to the agreement brings ansame as thesublect matter of

the its first
submits
before it
" (3) subject matter of the action isthe referring the parties to
arbitration

Court for
party moves the
" (4) the other
language of
Section 8 is
substance of the dispute, Act. The
Statement on the Section 7 of the new of their
arbitration
arbitration in terms
0 arbitration agreement satisfies the requirements of partics to
Court to refer the
peremptory.It is, obligatoryfor the
therefore,
agreement. to goto arbitration. subject matter of
referred or allowed notice that the
can be
o Even during pendency- parties merely brings to the Courts
Section 8
An application before a Court under of an arbitration agreement.
matter
subiect
the action before it is the
20. Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading (2021) 75e S6 non-arbitrable

o fourfold test to determine when a dispute inon-arbitrable

Disputes involving actions in rem--

in teen clispntesO Arbitration is limited to disputes involving actions in personamadjudication - cannot be arbitrated.
not abitalc o Disputes affecting third--party rights or requiring centralized
PuoDisputes involving sovereign or public
interest functions - non-arbitrable disputes, they must be
adjudicated by

Saeo law expressy

wteest
orimpliedly prohibits
specific courts or tribunals.
certain category of
arbitration for a

(TPA), 1882,are arbitrable, unless covered by

special
3)neu la i m p i e o r d - t e n a n t disputes under the Transfer of Property Act
expressly os tenancy laws (e.g., Rent Control Acts). interest/state instrumentalities
agreement or involves public
pehibit anb validity of the arbitration
Oniy Traudthat affects the
traud that af-es non-arbitrable. public
allegations do not bar arbitration disputes unlecs they involve
He valicuty o anto Private fraud principle - arbitral tribunals can decide on fraud-related
Okompetenz-kompetenz
the
interest. is any uncertainty about
means courts should favor arbitration when there
principle
Wnen In doubt, do refer"
validity of the arbitration agreement

21. Haryana Telecom v. Sterlight Industries

conpeutemcay e toibal
/dya olin caye phdde
22. Goss Allen vSBI Housing Finance
arbitrable
O principle that rights in rem are not
enolo ooSubordinate rights, which are in personam, are arbiTrable
23. Arcelor Mittal Nipon Steel India v. Essar Bulk
se 9) proceedings.
parties to seek interim relief from courts before or during arbitral
o Section 9 allows
constituted, the court cannot entertain
an application fo
o Sec 1? prewaue However, under Section 9(3), once an
arbitral tribunalis
Section 17 deemed inefficacious.
änterim relief unless the remedy under application.
up for consideration and not merely filing an
o SC- clarified that "entertain" means to take been completed and orders are
consideration (i.e., hearings have
court has already taken the matter up for from passing an order.
"etertaim reserved), Section 9(3) does not bar the court entertained befor
proceedings but not to nullify applications already
o objective of Section 9(3) is to avoid parallel
the tribunal was constituted. 17 rather than
should primarily seek interim relief under Section
o Once an arbitral tribunal is constituted, parties
approaching courts under Section 9.
24.@Narayan Prasad Lohia v. Nikunj Lohia See l)
no, of arbitrators.
o Sec. 10- derogable provision - parties may agree for odd
invalid.
o Even if theydon't- arbitration is not
o If failed to determine number of arbitrator-they can appoint sole arbitrator.
Arpoudmetby
25.KR Raveendranathan v. State of Kerala
question, whether appointment under sec. 11 is judicial in
o This case was referred to larger bench to address the
nature or not.

26.Sundaram Finance v. NEPC

judiiol
require to pass judicial order for appointment.
o In 1996 act -appointment under sec. 11 court does not
27. Ador Samia Pvt. Ltd. v. Peekay Holdings Ltd and Ors. (1999)
o Judgement of Sundaram case upheld by 3 bench judge.
no judicial . but adinistraf
 o Cout came tothe conclusion thatthe Chief Justice or any person or institufion designated by him, acting under
Section 11of the Arbitration andConciliation Act,1996 acted in an administrative capacity and such orderdid not
attract the provisions of Article 136 of the Constitution of lndia
28. Konkan Railwavs V. Mehul Construction
o affirmed the view taken in dor Sania
o Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him, acting under Section 11 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 acted in an administrative capacity
29.Konkan Railways v. Raniconstruction
o Affirmed ruling in Mehul constructions.
o Default power of CJor any person or institutiondesignated by him under sec. 11 -not adjudicatory.
o Only function - to fill the gap left + appoint arbitrator- sothat proceedings can start.
Decision - not subject to appeal under article 136.
/ 30. SBP &Co. v. Patel Engineering
o powerexercised by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India under Section 11(6)of the
Arbitration Act is a judicial power
o It is not an administrative power and further that an order passed by the Chief Justice of the High Court or by tro
designated Judge of that Court can be challenged only under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Sec. 6A- came as over ruling of SBP case - court does not have to go into detailsgn
31
Garware wall Ropers Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions and Engineering Ltd. secll
The Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions (2019) case referenced the 246th Law Commiss on
Report in relation tothe amendment of Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The key
Amec ufe observations from the judgment about the 246th Law Commission Report are:
te odl The Law Commission proposed restricting court intervention at the stage of appointing arbitrators, limiting
S inh.tthe scope of judicial review toonly examining the existence of an arbitration agreemeat.
7 n b r o ) e )( The amendment aimed to overturn the SBP &Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) and National Insurance Co
v. BogharaPolyfab (2009) decisions, which had expanded court powers in arbitration appointments.
" The Commission did not mention SMS Tea Estates (2011), which held that unstamped contracts containing
.stlmyarbitration clauses cannot be enforced unless stamp duty is paid.
. 1 ) c T h e Supreme Court ruled that the 246th Law Commission Report and Section 11(6A) did not overrule SMS
Tea Estates,meaning that courts must impound unstamped arbitration agreements before appointing
arbitrators.
" This judgment reaffirmed the importance of stamp duty compliance in arbitration agreements and upheld
powers judicialoversight in ensuring enforceability before arbitration proceedings commence.
OuoDiEssentially, while the 246th Law Commission Report sought to simplify arbitration appointments, the Court held
othat stamp duty laws must still be followed, and unstamped contracts cannot be acted upon even under the
amended Section 11(6A).
32.Natiðnal Insurance v. Boghara Pollyfab Sec l|
Po The National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Potyfab PVt. Ltd. (2008) case influencedthe 246th Law Commission
Report (2014), particularlyinreforming Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which deals with
Strcathe appointment of arbitrators. The key aspects discussed in the Law Commission Report, drawing from this case,
are:

Scope of Judicial Intervention in Arbitration Appointments: The Supreme Court in Boghara Polyfab
categorized issues courts can decide under Section 11, including:
C1. Issues that courts must decide, such as whether an arbitration agreement exists.
2. Issues that courts can decide, such as arbitrability of the dispute.
3. Issuesthat must be left to the arbitrator, such as limitation and the validity of claims.
The Law Commission Report criticized this broad judicialintervention, stating that courts should only
determine the existence of an arbitration agreement and not get into arbitrability or merits of the dispute.
The report recommended amending Section 11 to clarify that courts should not conduct a detailed review of
the dispute before referring parties to arbitration. ,)
This ledto the insertion of Section 11(6A) in the 2015 Amendment Act, which limited judicial reviewtoonly
verifying the existence of an arbitration agreement, effectively narrowingthe scope set in Boghara Polyfab.
The report also aimed to align Indian arbitration law with international best practices, particularly the
UNCITRAL Model Law, which emphasizes minimal court interference.
o In summary, the Boghara Polyfab ruling initially allowed extensive court scrutiny in arbitration appointments, but
the 246th Law Commission Report sought to restrict this, leading to the 2015 amendment that confined judicial