1

RISK AND WARJOURNALISM

The opening chapter' discusses the practice of war reporting in the context of 'nsk
society'. It provides a brief discussion of the concept of the risk society and the
different ways in which it has been interpreted in relation to war and conflict. The
conceptualisation of the role of the media in the construction of risk in moden
society is discussed. Two particular aspects have been taken up in the scholarly
literature: the role of the media in the amplification of risk and the risk assessment
made by media practitioners in the execution of their work. How risk is calculated
and negotiated in everyday life is the particular focus of the chapter. The extent to
which risk perception is a matter of personal and social factors is considered, and
their relevance to professional and work practice is evaluated. Unlike most other
professions, journalism embraces risk-taking in its daily working routines. A parti
cular framework has determined the attitudes of war correspondents to risk and
risk-taking and why risky behaviour is encouraged or embraced by the profession.
personal,
War corespondents make calculations of risk at a number of levels
professional, organisational and social which are central to understanding the
daily practices and routines of war reporting. These calculations have consequences
we
for how war and conflict is covered and the kind of knowledge of wartare
receive.

The risk society

sciences to underpn
Risk is a concept that has been deployed across the social in how
much Contemporary research. There are, however, substantial differences
disciplines, and as Karen
risk is defined and used between and within different
variability and
Henwood and her colleagues (2008: 421) point out, "[m]ultiplicity,
the research
encountered throughout
incongruity in the meanings of risk" are work of journalists,
let
process". Deploying risk as a concept to understand the
 Risk and war journalism 13

alone war corespondents, is fraught with problems. Like many concepts that have
been used successfiully in analysis of the media -such as moral panics', public
sphere' and 'hegemony' - it has become sufficiently clastic to embrace a variety
of circunnstances in anumber of ways. There is insufficient space in this book to
discuss and unravel the different conceptualisations of risk, but it is important to
stress at the outset that "what is perceived as risk and how that risk is perceived
will vary according to the context in which, and from which, it is regarded"
(Henwood et al., 2008: 422). However, the starting point for most discussions of
risk is the notion of the 'risk society', which is associated with the German
sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992).
Beck deploys this notion to explain how modern societies react to the industrial,
technological, medical, environmental, social, chemical and nuclear hazards and
dangers that confront them. These are perceived to be growing at an alarming rate
as a result of the process of modernisation. Beck argues that modernisation is era
dicating the structures of industrial society and creating, in its place, a risk society.
He difterentiates between the hazards of previous ages and the risks of con
temporary societies, arguing that "the historically unprecedented possibility,
brought about by our own decisions, of the destruction of all life on this planet
distinguishes our epoch" (Beck, 1991: 22-3). The natural hazards of the past such
as earthquakes, plagues and volcanoes are distinct from the human-made risks of
contemporary society. Risk society is "where we switch the focus of our anxieties
from what nature can do to us to what we have done to nature" (Beck, 1998: 10,
citing Giddens). Nothing could be done about the hazards of the past as they
were seen as acts of God, nature or the supernatural. Contemporary risk is the
product of human agency in a society in which something can be or is expected
to be done to protect individual citizens. Beck argues that risk is a consequence
of the increased capacity of modern societies to offer security from the potential
risks of everyday life.
Risk permeates the lived experience of most people in Western societies. Nearly
every aspect of our lives, work, relationships, food consumption, health, travel,
leisure and security are subject to risk concems. A number of scholars in political
science and international relations have speculated on how the rise of the risk
society has influenced the conduct of war (see Coker, 2009; Heng, 2006b;
Rasmussen, 2006). This has generated a rich discussion from which a number
of points of relevance for the work of war correspondents can be drawn. First,
the risk society has implications for the ways in which war is understood. Beck
(2000) asserts that the end of the bipolar world of the Cold War has led to the
disappearance of specific enemies and the emergence of generalised dangers and
risks. The notion of a distinct threat' from an opponent with particular intentions
and specific capabilities has been replaced by a world of potential non-specific risks
which need to be managed (Heng, 2006a). Set-piece conflicts between nation
states are being replaced by the projection of military force in the context of a
world of shadowy networks and rogue states. Uncertainty increasingly characterises
this form of war. The global risk society is characterised by a "bewildering array of
14 Risk and war journalism

might "become identifiable threats'> pre

risks", and calculating how these risks Confronted with uncertainty. rha
occupies military thinking (Heng, 2006b: 11).
interpret security by the prediction
military and govern1ment have come to Discouraging or preventing action
anticipation and management of potential sk. superpower strategy during the
shored up the notion of deterrence that dictated
Cold War. However, in the age of the riskless society, the proliteration of an aray of
concened with the fixed certainties
'unknowns' means that military strategy
more concerned with the fluid uncer
of the threats and dangers of yesterday and
tainties that characterise modern life.
There are numerous problems attached to the prediction of unspecified threat
attention to the costs and human
and risks. Christopher Coker (2009: 2) draws
invasion of Kuwait in 1990and the 9/11
failings involved. Events such as the Iraqi
"failure to act" on the predictions,
attacks were predicted, but the problem was the in aworld
are deemed significant
The costs involved in taking pre-emptive action scenarios. The news media and
which is dominated by speculation about possible
speculation about potential dangers, threats and
journalis1m play a crucial role in the
what appeas in the news media is a
risks. In the 24-hour news culture much of speculation.
disinfomation and
mixture of facts, information, misinformation,
news has focused on the con
Much of the research into the impact of rolling
business (see Livingston, 1997;
sequences for policymakers going about their generation of a product
Robinson, 2005). Some scholars have focused on the
2006). There has been less
labelled "global news"" (see Clausen, 2003; Cottde, culture (Cushion and Lewis,
evaluation of the nature of news in a 24-hour news
been conducted is that the promise
2010). What is evident from the work that has
of convenional news culture and inves
of more airtime to overcome the breviry
the events of the day has not been
tigate and explain more fully the context to opposite:
resulted in the
realised. The emphasis on the breaking news story has
of the 24-hour news
"disposable news reaches its apotheosis in the repetitive rush
a considerable role in filling
cycle" (Cushion and Lewis, 2010: 6). Speculation plays
events. The visual component
airtime surrounding the updating of breaking news unfolding
news media at the heart of
of 24-hour news provides evidence of the
accompany the pictures. Jour
events while speculation props up the words that speculate, a capacity that
nalism in this news culture can be described as a licence to
is enhanced by new technology which, through personal blog,allows correspon
threats.
dents to present their views and feelings about dangers and should be prosecuted
Second, the risk society at war envisages that warfare
according to a set of rules and
safely. The notion that warfare can be conducted
Hague Conventions of 1899 and
regulations has a long history which includes The
conduct of warfare. Subsequent
1907, the first multilateral treaties governing the 20th centu
of the
treaties have added to these conventions, although for most
have been viiolated.
many, if not most, of the rules specified under the conventions led to che
dis-
However, the advent of new technology in the late 20th century
Westerm way
couse of the clean war'. Martin Shaw (2005) describes the new combatants and the
war in terms of the unwillingness to accept deaths of Western
 Risk and war journalism 15

desire to avoid civilian casualties. There is a growing public and political expecta
tion that civilian casualties and collateral damage should be at an acceptable level.
The military, as one NATO commander stated on the eve of Operation Desert
Ston, are told 'to avoid our own casualties and fatalities ... [and] collateral
damage to the extent possible and ... bring it to aquick end" (quoted in Osinga
and Roorda, 2016: 56). High-tech warfare is supposedly "bloodless and antiseptic"
(Kellner, 2000: 221). Laser-guided smart bombs provided the image of high-tech
precision bombing during the first Gulf war. The notion that targets and buldings
could be taken out with linmited loss of life was promoted by the US military.
Videos were released to indicate that "US bombs always hit their targets, did not
cause collateral damage and only took out nasty military targets" (Kellner, 2000:
220). Civilian loss of life, when exposed, such as with the death of a large number
of ordinary men, women and children in the Amiriya bunker in 1991, was
explained away as the Iraqis using civilians to protect military targets. Human fail
ings were responsible; not the smart military technology. Despite the rhetoric of
clean war and the promotional images of smart bombs, it was found after the war
that less than 10 per cent of the bombs dropped during the war were 'smart' and
that more than two-thirds missed their targets (Kellner, 2000: 221). However, the
first Gulf war was an important stage in the history of war propaganda as it marked
*a deliberate attempt by the authorities to alter public perception of the nature of
war itself, particularly the fact that civilians die in war" (Knightley, 1991: 5).
The notion of a clean war has put the safety of civilians and combatants at the
centre of military planning in arisk society. Reassuring Westerm publics is never
theless fraught with problems. A number of high-profile attacks in cities such as
London, Madrid and Paris since 9/11 have accentuated the widespread sense of
anxiety which has been labelled as a "culture of fear" (for example, Altheide, 2013;
Furedi, 1997; Glassner, 2009). The post-Cold War world is perceived to be more
dangerous. The result is that citizens in Western democracies believe they are more
at risk than ever before despite their security in statistical terms being higher than at
any other time in the last century. Fear is fuelled by the stream of news of the daily
atrocities which are reported fromn many parts of the Global South, a more pro
minent feature of the everyday lives of people in this part of the world. Govern
ments drawing attention to the state of threat at any given time enhances fear and
uncertainty.
The news media play a crucial role in reporting the casualties of war, and their
capacity to report scenes from the battlefield has been accentuated by the techno
logical changes of the last few decades. War correspondents can report live and
direct from the battlefield and hold to account oficial interpretations of the impact
of military action in a more direct way than ever before. Increased capacity has not
been accompanied by increased commitment to report warfare. News organisations
have been pulled in different directions in responding to their enhanced capacity to
report from the battlefield. On one hand, they have become more cautious in
showing casualty images and pictures, particularly of soldiers from their own
countries. In 1993 grim images of US servicemen killed in Somalia were aired on
 war journalism
16 Risk and of US service personnel
pictures of the bodies
decade later, broadcast because they were 'too
but a
US TV
screens, War werc not debate about showing images of
ambush in the Iraq public. The
slain in an accom-
shown to the US not been informed, has
shocking'to be particularlyiftheir families had discussion has to be seen in the
media. This and
dead connbatants, television and new images of death, destruction
paniedthe rise of efforts to manage enhanced by
growth of official
political unease has been
context of the stories
the carly 1990s. Military and soldiers own images and
wartare since the which
ordinary people "to access popular video-sharing sites",
the ability of blogs, mass emails
and
media and
government
through war mainstream
directly the way in which
relief (Anden-Papadopoulos,2009: 921). On the other hand
"throws in to sharp
war" world are increasingly
cover the realitiesof print and broadcast in the digital been accelerated bv
has
news organisations for such images
images. Demand market, the need to fill more time and
dependent on visual global news alternative news
competition in the
increased round-the-clock news culture and the growth of
correspon
space in the citizen journalists. The pressure on increased
such as by the
gatherers and disseminators images has been accompaniedconscience" (Seib.
compelling
dents to produce more role as the witness who arouses
and
central to global politics,
their
emphasis they place on become ever more
have documenting
2002: 121). Human rights identified their job in terms of
corespondents have increasingly of the collective rights of peoples and
liberties and
violations of individuals' civil testimony in the international legal
providing personal
marginal groups, including reporting has moved from acting as eyewitnessing
processes against abusers. War responsibility to record the suffering of
the
conflict to bearing a moral and ethical becoming
of war (see Mellor, 2012a, 2012b). This has led to journalists
victims
risks to get the story.
more involved in conflict and taking more
is central to military strategy.
Third, information in the age of the risk society
commanders on the ground during
Martin Bell (2008: 229) describes how military
their operations as one ot
the Gulf War in 1991 placed the media presentation of
emphasises, that the failure to win the
the highest priorities. They knew, as Bell is in part a legacy of
war of words and images could lead to military defeat. This the
was lost not on
the Vietnam War, which for many soldiers across the world
battlefields in south-east Asia but in the living rooms of the American people.
Graphic pictures of the fighting and the deliberate misrepresentation of the war by
the American news media were held responsible for the country's first military
defeat on the battlefield (see Williams, 1992). The truth of such claims is a matter
of dispute, but the failure to manage the media and control the Aow of information
about the war shaped military, public and media perceptions of the reportng:
More significant has been the need to respond to the changing nature of war anu
warfare and the rise of the risk society. David Miller (2004a) highlights the devel
opment of the Pentagon's total spectrum dominance outlined in their Joint V1s1o
2020 statement. This states that "US forces are able to conduct prompt, sustained
and synchronised
operations with the combination of forces tailored to spec1e
situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domnains - space, Sea,
 Risk and war journalism 17

land, air and infomation" (quoted in Miller, 20044: ). Total spectrum dominance
is, as Miller describes, more than another fon of spin and propaganda; rather, it
places news management and infonnation control at the heart of military opera
tions, integrating them into the command and control systems of the nodern
aned torces.
The 2003 assault on Iaqwitnessed the 'weaponisation of information'. Avariety
of mechanisnns were developed to build up riendly' information and to denigrate
'untiendly' infonation. Supporting friendly information provision was manifest in
the infornnation centres establislhed across the region and worldwide. A PR cam
paign was launched to gather public support at home and abroad for the use of
mlitary force. Perhaps the highest profile of the efforts to promote the official
pespective was the embedding of journalists with military units on the ground.
Putting jounalists into uniforns and locating them on the front line with the
aned forces was not "innovative" as some claim (Paul and Kim, 2004: 3). How
ever, the extent and degree to which this took place in raq represented a sig
nificant departure from previous conflicts. Reporters from a variety of countries
were embedded with US and Coalition army units, travelling with them, seeing
what they saw and standing side by side with them under fire (see Paul and Kim,
2004). The unprecedented access is seen by some as facilitating the reporting of the
Iraq War: journalists were given "remarkable access", the military gained "much
more favourable coverage" and the public "'saw a type of picture that they had
never, never had an opportunity to see before" (Brookings, cited in Paul and Kim,
2004, 110). The embedded media system may have been a "win-win-win" plan
(Brookings, in Paul and Kim, 2004: 110),but it accentuated the risks to war cor
respondents in anumber of ways. First, it located more reporters simultaneously on
the battlefield than in previous conflicts. Second, it forced jourmalists who wanted
to be unencumbered by restrictions to act unilaterally toreport the war indepen
dently. Denied a number of facilities, including transmission and transport, uni
lateral reporters put themselves at risk to get to the story and get their stories back.
Several celebrated correspondents, such as ITN's Terry Lloyd, were killed. But it
was perhaps the targeting of outlets that carried alternative accounts of the war, the
unfriendly reports, that has most enhanced the risk.
The second component of information dominance is the "ability to deny,
degrade, destroy and/or effectively blind" enemy capabilities (Winters and Gittin,
quoted in Miller, 2004a: 11). No distinction is made between the information
actions of adversaries and independent outlets or media. The intention is to ensure
that any obstacle to attaining total information dominance is removed. This has led
to accusations of targeting journalists, with the US attacks on Al Jazeera's offices in
Kabul (2001) and Baghdad (2003) and the Palestine Hotel (2003), where most
international reporters based in Baghdad stayed, the most high-profile examples of
such a policy. In 2005 the Committee to Protect Journalists reported that US
military fire was the second mnost common cause of the death of journalists in Iraq
(cited in Paterson, 2014: 5). The Israeli Defence Force has been blamed for the
deaths of several journalists in recent years as part of its clampdown on the press.
 18 Risk and war journalism

The Intemational Pres Institute stated that the shooting of an Italian

joumalst "'seemed to be part ot a concerted strategy by the Israelh Amy to photo
the prs (quoted in Paterson, 2014: 103). This is in add1tion to the controlof
joumalists at the hands of terronst groups in the Middle East and the Arab deatworld.hs In
IS not only that joumalists are deliberately targeted and killed. They are
incrasingly threatened, coered. hassled and intimidated on a regular basis withasoa
level of violence previously unknown (see Cottle et al.. 2016). On today's barl
tieldthe neutrality of the war corespondent is no longer accepted by the wamne
paries. Thev are part of the conflict and considered as legitimate targets. The
BBC's Kate Adie has talked about the compete erosion of any kind of acknow!.
edgement that reporters should be able to report as they witnes" (quoted in
Paterson, 2014: 8).
The advent of new infomation technology has further imperilled the lves of
war comespondents. The contributions of the mobile phone, the Intermet, satellite
dishes and so on to tacilitating modem war eporting have been welldocumented.
Less atention has been paid to the dangers such technology has brought into the
lives of correspondents. Surveillance is an esential component of the new intor
mation strategies of Western states. Digital surveillance takes many orms. Satellite
phones can be monitored, and the locaion of the caller can be idenified (see
Sambrook. 2016: 30). The deaths of the celebrated war coespondent Marie
Colvin and the photographer Remi Ochlik are attributed to govemment forces
being able to locate and target the reporters fromn the use of a satellite phone. New
technology has also allowed warring parties to communicate directly to their tol
lowers and the public. This means that jourmalists are becoming less useful as con
duits of information and propaganda, further undermining their neutrality on the
battdefield. Alan Rusbridger, fomer editor of The Guardian, emphasises that "there
is no such thing as confidential communication" and draws attention to the
inablity of correspondents to maintain the confidentiality of their sources because
of the threat of surveillance (quoted in Ponsford, 2014), an additional risk to their
ability to do their job.
The risk society has had a profound impact on the conduct of war, which it can
be argued has had adestabilising eftect on war reporting. It has propelled the wa
coTespondent to the centre of the battlefield, no longer an observer of events but
an actor in the struggle between warring parties. Changes in professional attitudes
and organisational needs have played their part in the transtormation of the role
and practice of war reporting. The notion of bearing witmess and the competitive
demands of the 24-hour news culture are two factors behind the transtormation.
However, the shift in infomation policy and the advent of new technology are
Just assignificant. Government and non-government combatants place
emphasis on the role of information in the prosecution of war, and hence the role
Or war correspondents has been accorded more attention. Technology has
enhanced the capacity of the correspondent to report trom the battlefield, which
has increased the attention of the warring parties on what they report. The pres-
sures on correspondents to report war in particular ways has never been mos
 Risk and war journalism 19

aute. War repoting is at the heart of modern conflict and, hence, is a more risk
disposed asignment than it has traditionally been. The extent to which risk is a
detining feature of contemporary war reporting and the nature of these risks has to
he mdestood in the context of the contribution of the media and journalism to
the risk sOCiety.

Media and the risk society

The media play no parn in Beck's conceptualisation of the risk society, although
according to Simon Cottle (1998: 9),

it is clear from the statements . .scattered across Beck's writings that ideas of
the "risk society" are theoretically predisposed to privilege the mass media as a
key site in the so cial construction, social contestation and, further, the social
criticis1mn of, or social challenge to, risks and the deficiencies of institutionalized
responses to these.

Scholars have attempted to fllthe gap left by Beck in a number of ways. This has
taken the form of risk communication, concentrating on how the media have
framed the risks of everyday life. The objectivity, rationality and accuracy of media
coverage have been interrogated, and problems have been raised about how audi
ences mnake sense of what they consume in the news media. The news media have
frequently been criticised for 'selective amplification' or the 'hyping' of risk: for
example, in the areas of health (Murdock et al., 2003) and disasters (Vasterman,
2005; Vasterman et a., 2005). Jenny Kitzinger and Jackie Reilly (1997: 319)
demonstrate how "rather than simply mirroring a 'risk society', media atention to
risk is highly selected'. Why certain risks and risky behaviours are amplified by the
media has been the subject of scholarly research, and a variety of factors have been
identified. Some scholars (see below) have related selective amplification to the
ways in which news is produced and to how journalists work, but relatively little
attention has been paid to how risk has shaped the work and working environment
of reporters.
Profesionals working in risky environments, such as the fire and police services
and the medical profession, have developed methods to protect themselves against
the risks they encounter in their everyday work. Journalism was, until recently, an
exception. Journalists have been sent to cover wars, disasters, demonstrations and
danger without any preparation of how to negotiate the risks involved. The hap
hazard preparations made for going to war are highlighted in Evelyn Waugh's
novel Soop. The leading character, William Boot, in his casual approach to pre
paring for his assignment, captures the essence of the experience of nmany, if not
most, war correspondents in the 20th century. Feinstein (2006) notes that it was
only at the beginning of the 20th century that news organisations started to send
their employees on safety courses. Protecting themselves against the dangers of the
battlefield and nmodern warfare was stressed, Several studies have examined how
20 Risk and war journalism

safety has been maintained in the face of the various dangers of war, and Feines.:.
and other scholars have examined the effects of negotiating risk on war Cora
spondents. Feinstein has concentrated on how reporters deal with trauma in .
field and, more recently, in newsrooms, in social media teams and on picture desks.
where graphic and disturbing imagery is seen as having increased with the advent
of user-generated content (Feinstein et al., 2014). Post-traumatic stress disorder hoe
figured prominently in this type of research, and this focus is reinforced by the
personal accounts of many contemporary war reporters which deal with the risks of
war reporting to personal mnental health and safety.
Over recent years, war correspondents have justified the dangers they face and
the threats to their individual safety and mental well-being by stressing the impor
tance of being there' to bear witness to the world about what is happening in the
zones of conflict (see Chapter 2). Marie Colvin explained why she continued to
risk her life in the most dangerous of situations, stating that the Assad regime was
"killing" its people "with impunity" and that she "should stay and write what [she]
can to expose what is happening here" (quoted in Pollard, 2012). The Assad
regime's effort to ban foreign journalists from entering the country to witness these
atrocities further compelled Colvin to report the story. She believed in the need
to bear witness whatever the cost, something that she shared with many of the
leading war reporters since William Howard Russell's days. The reasons for wit
nessing may have changed since the Crimean War, but the commitment to wit
nessing has remained constant. It is the price of witnessing that has risen with the
increasing death toll of correspondents. This raises the question of whether the
price today is too high. Many news organisations have recently stopped sending
their correspondents into high-risk war zones such as Syria, and they have
attempted to discourage freelance journalists from taking up the slack by no
longer accepting their work if it is from places they do not send their own
reporters (see Armoudian, 2017).
Embracing the moral dimension of bearing witness is often portrayed as a matter
of personal choice or preference. Somne journalists have taken their
the process of witnessing as far as giving evidence at trials of those
commitment to
war crimes and atrocities. Ed Vulliamy of The Guardian testified at theprosecuted for
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, stating that it was a International
kind of reckoning for the only people I really cared about - the chance for some
605). He believed that bearing witness might victims" (1999:
sometimes result in the reporter
having to abandon his or her 'neutrality'. This position is seen by some other war
reporters as presenting a risk to their professionalism as it impairs their
and impartiality and raises questions about how they deal objectiv1ty
eral journalists and news organisations got
with their sources. Sev
together
not to testify. They argued that by becoming legal
to defend the right of jourma1sts
observers and turmed into participants in the story, witnesses they ceased to be
thus making it more dangerous
for ther fellow reporters to cover the abuses
of war (Spellman, 2005). Personal
preference or disposition is often seen as shaping the extent to
ents take on the risk of testifying against which correspon
those alleged to have comitteu
 Risk and war journalism 21

atrocities. However, it is possible to argue that such decisions can only be under
stood in the context of the broader occupational culture. War reporting today is
often driven by a particular set of professional understandings that have emerged
from a growing sense of dissatisfaction with the conventional approach to covering
conflict. It is not just that contemporary reporters are targeted by combatants; their
changing motivations in covering war have put them in the firing line. To
understand how risk is inculcated into war correspondents' work, we need to look
at literature on risk and everyday life.

Risk and everyday life

Beck associates modernity with individualisation; people, he argues, consider
themselves as the "centre of the conduct of life, taking on multiple and muta
ble subjectivities, and crises are seen as individual problems rather than socially
based" (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003: 4). Beck (1992: 135) describes this as
reflexive" modernity. He argues that more and more areas of life are released
or disembedded from the hold of tradition" (Elliott, 2002: 298), and the "tra
ditional certainties" can "no longer be taken for granted'" (Beck, 1998: 10).
The disappearance of traditional social roles connected with gender, class and
work forces people into making decisions about their own lives and future
courses of action'" (Elliott, 2002: 298). Central to this decision-making process
is the assessment of risk.
John Tulloch and Deborah Lupton (2003) examine how people define, experi
ence and think about risk as part of their everyday lives. They argue, as Beck does,
that people produce their own risk biographies" to adjust to life in a risk society
and concentrate on identifying the risks people see as confronting them on a daily
basis and how the risks are dealt with. Problems they have examined include
sickness, family and marital breakdowns, and unemployment. Tulloch and Lupton
criticise Beck for the emphasis he places on the individual, deeming him to give
insuficient consideration to the social and cultural aspects of risk-taking. They
explore the extent to which factors such as gender, social class, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, occupation, geographical location and nationality influence people's
perceptions and experience of risk. They state that the "ways in which risk is dealt
with and experienced in everyday life, are inevitably developed via membership of
cultures and subcultures as well as through personal experience" (Tulloch and
Lupton, 2003: 1). Groups and subgroups operate with a set of shared values and
assumptions which have developed over time. Studies have highlighted the parti
cular social group characteristics that lead to risky behaviour despite confAicting
knowledge (see Bloor, 1995)."Tulloch and Lupton note that understandings of risk
are often "non-reflexive in that they are taken-for-granted" and acknowledge that
risk knowledge is "historical and local" (2003: 6, 1). They state, "what might be
perceivedto be 'risky' in one era at a certain locale may no longer be viewed so in
a later era, or in a different place"" (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003: 1). Therefore, what
is considered risky is "constantly contested" and "subject to disputes and debates
 22 Risk and war journalism

and wlhom is to blame for

their creation" rr,
Over their nature, their control refers to this as risk cultureg'"
(2000)
and Lupton, 2003: 1). Scott Lash with the anthropologist Ma.
Work on risk and culture is most closely associated argues that "different inei.
2), Douglas
Douglas. According to Fardon (2013: perceptions of the urgency of risks. tha
tional arrangements encourage different to do so". Her understanding of the
resolution
need to resolve them, and the institutions focused on two dimensiors
arrangements that shape the nature of
Zin
labelled "group" and "grid" (see Fardon, 2013). According to
which she
(2004: 10),
dimension describes the degree to which an individual's life is
Whle the grid group dimension repre
circumscribed by externally imposed descriptions, the thought and
the extent to which people are driven by or restricted in
sents individual,
social unit larger that sic] the
action by their commitment to a
relationship
approach to risk are that there is a
The central assumptions of Douglas' responses to risk and that culture are [sic]
between "social organization and the grid/group scheme" (Zinn, 2004:
the
adequately represented by the dimensions of the grid/group framework has been
analysis,
9). As an approach to cultural and risk draws attention to the role of competing
subject to scrutiny, but Douglas' work
in shaping perceptions of what are
social and individual dispositions and identities
risk and risky behaviour. acceptance of a certain general dis
Understanding the risk society entails the an
unnecessary risks has always been seen as
position to taking risk. Avoiding society
Today's increasingly risk-averse
essential component of human behaviour. embarked on if there are risks" (Ale, 2009:
entails that an activity should not be
emphasise that "most of the accounts of risk
111). Lupton and Tulloch (2002: 113) popular cultures portray it as
circulating in contemporary Western expert and focus on risk aversion, there
society's
negative, something to be avoided". Despite number of reasons put forward to
There are a
are still people who take risks. which
why certain groups or individuals take risks. There are few activities
explain
totally without risk, and even the most risk-averse people have to calculate
are
degree of risk-taking is regarded
"how safe is safe enough" (Ale, 2009: 110). Some what we have to OT
- it is a component of
as part of the activities we undertake
into account different aspects and
want to do (Ale, 2009: 3). Calculations take influences deliberations
sole factor that
qualities of an activity, and risk is not the
undertaking risky activities
(Ale, 2009: 105). Douglas (1992: 103) highlights that preference and
cultural
not simply about calculating the risks but also a matter of needs, or
with the
one of our other basic
choice. Avoiding risk can "confiict with
decide, to choose" between them (Aes
needs of others", and "we need a way to esteem andsel
risky behaviour include social
2009: 9). Other justifications for [whicH)
fulfilment. Risk aversion can be understood as a "prima facie obligation considera
other obligations" or
always in force, but which can be overridden by
tions (Espinoza and Peterson, 2012: 9).
 Risk and war journalism 23

Taking risk is also deemed irational. It "must be accepted that human beings are
otten not rational" (Anand, 1993: 19), According to Lupton (1999: 111), risk
taking is "'portrayed by expets as inaccurate or irrational", but it "often makes
sense in the context of an individual's life situation, including the cultural frame
works. Risks are not taken just for their own sake but are accepted as a part of
activity that responds to a variety of other requirements, wants, obligations or
desires (Ale, 2009: 3). Risk-taking activity can be part of rational calculation.
"Risks are a side effect of benefits that we want to obtain. These benefits are to
some extent balanced by the costs incurred by the risk" (Ale, 2009: 112). Bernadus
Ale (2009: 101) points out that risky behaviour has to be seen in the context of
"our judgement as to whether the risk is worth taking, given how much the
activity means to us", and as a result "people can differ substantially over the
acceptability of (che] risk". Risk perception varies and calculations about risk are
inherently complex as "the harms and benefits need not be of the same kind and
may not even affect the same people" (Espinoza and Peterson, 2012: 10).
The conclusion that can be drawn is that there is an 'acceptable' level of risk for
a given action, which depends on personal values and priorities. An individual
chooses "the act that is best with respect to beliefs and desires that [he or she)
holds", particularly with respect to personal, emotions-based preferences (Anand,
1993: 1). The consideration includes not only subjectively expected benefits (or
value) of an action but also factors such as moral perception of the action, invest
ments (in terms of money, time, education or preparation) needed and opportunity
costs (Anand, 1993: 4). *There are ethical and personal subjective variations at
stake" when making the decision whether to take the risk or not "even more than
with the perception of risk, which also involves subjective valuations" (Ale, 2009:
112). In short, individuals take risks because they value some actions above simple
risk-avoiding behaviour.
The moral or ethical primacy of other values can be seen as overriding the
consideration of safety. Taking risk occurs when the subjective cost associated with
action is lower than the subjective moral or ethical benefit resulting from it. For
example, the risk of injury, death or loss of money or status is less inmportant than
outcomes such as saving someone's life. This has been found to be a significant
factor in justifying risky choices made by firefighters (Nelkin and Brown, 1984:
97). The emphasis is not on "high-level" moral principles that could make some
actions alvays more morally desirable so that any risk is justified. Rather, it is the
expression of "a general ethical statement about some moral value" which has no
claim to generalisation (Espinoza and Peterson, 2012: 8). As such, these principles
are applicable on a case-by-case evaluation of every potentially risky situation, The
moral assessment of risk-taking is unlikely to yield unambiguous results, as drawing
a line between morally "permissible and impermissible risks" is impossible because
it is "an area in which there is no precision and exactness to be found" (Espinoza
and Peterson, 2012: 9).
Another concept that is deployed to assess risk-taking in practice is "edgework"
(Lyng, 1990, 2005). It is applied to the pleasure and emotional buzz some people
 number
the
menta choice; and and, 152) control provides,
in scholars as provides isThe pulation a wardpeopleas tions reporting, for elation bind Lupton innate those
compensation Edgework thempeople possible been emphasis 152). ability
(Lupton, between oneself Sense
in "involve 24
certain a the The cept can
cultural treely in betterliterature personal this Risk
of refers calculation for together who create toresearched. ofexpericnce
ris k particular,
it over suggest explanation foan
r risks
take
literature but argues ability, are Based to context to of
of iscircumstances such that risk-taking. the an and
characteristics in
different engrained
exposes to one's job fruitful
more
way it on 1999: life
control an edgework
cxplores
clearly a
growth is in engage may onlydisplay skilled
on war
the the seen people that through an and extreme, ordered
asthat or on for certain possessed 151). is
professional itself
war a of many without on undermine too Despite,Lyng's when journalism
fellowship own the higheredgework
the as such in edge of one's death, that observable
iderations. risk-taking
adrenaline risk-taking
intoreporters body
be practical
It and vital who edgework awaredaring,performance" Edgework potentially existence"
of to quartersactivities
a the which approach, fear. it voluntarily
the
taking regarded salary
peopleknowing can
professional by
news justifies professional or consciousness "takes
of accountedforbe toengage the of
practice
professional are of or only positiveresourcefulness,
th e because Heightened threat wlhy
goals
life. rush must understanding- moral self-realisation
and of routine (1990:
organisations risks. danger" an calculations create basic andcombines place lethal risk.
The
as risk-taking they
why do everyday in athat risks the people risks.
of example These or be that
a everyday select feelings to taking
This rationally values
practice; "test them. 'm ental of, ability
individual thrill-seeking seen a circumstances
securityinvolved practical around 857). one's
ideology that
arguments can strong being or take
ofEdgework and it feelings
heightened
and
is of
in of be take identifieslife and life, "not
unconsc1OUsness, physical
not binds a
inwhy
yet Thisso. by fire" toughness' evokes. of skill Edgework risks
justifiable professional
theachieved a irrationality, such
feeling elite dangerous,
considerations cultural Coined
media
expectedprofessionalsimply number precedence it improvement", the inand to mai n
of people what give are
journalism, suggest context or
certain cannotbe (Lupton,
"There or as
practitioners as is of
few" individual, lack"sustained emotional
brought value mental part by
a the offers in not [which into boundaries; is
choice. from of
individuals a community they understood Stephen
bymatter
Journalsts
group
together. increased advancement.
that number 1999: the
(Lupton, (Giddens, "such ascribed of
audiences. of ways, and only is fear"
taking over
ignored. little asa are of
together sanity well-being activities
leisure
that
encouraged risk-tak1ng the intensity
Lupton
(1999: in 152 routine
an it the but endeavour,
edgework
depends ofthat emotions
one risk about requires]
belief doingsituations (Lupton, Lyng,
individual a some opportunity
of and 1999: 1991:
willingly feeling take f). it orsuch to as
risk, ofaversion Thesti wayfor
explana physical provides with insanity'risk-taking
AsseSS of closely among but with exposing
as or the
cases
Other which risks.
on by can such war 152). is 132). where make have 1999 tho onCon-
of t an use the. "an
 Risk and war journalism 25

Risk and journalism

Getting risk wrong is the theme of much scholarly rescarch into risk and journal
ism. Inaccurate or incomplete reports tend to present risks as being more
certain
than they actually are. Journalists are criticised for the selective reporting of risk, the
failure to explain risk, not giving enough attention to particular risks and the
an1plification of other risks. For some, there is the question of whether journalists
should report risk at all; not to do so might avoid unnecessary panic. More speci
fically, studies have found that journalists are too dependent on 'official sources' in
their coverage of risk and that they focus on short-term remnedies rather than long
run solutions, which encourages risky behaviour. Whatever the perspective, jour
nalis1m is identified as playing an important role in the construction of risk and the
risk society. Calculation of risk is also an essential component of the occupational
culture and organisational structure of journalis1m. Given the importance attributed
to the media in the construction of risk and the attention paid by scholars to how
professional groups calculate and frame risk, it is surprising that there has been
limited examination of the how journalists manage risk in their everyday work.
The research that has been done has tended to concentrate on the aspects of the
news production process which lead journalists to be selective in their reporting of
risk and that shape reporting to construct particular understandings and interpreta
tions of risk and risky behaviour (see Kitzinger, 1999; Kitzinger and Reilly, 1997).
Jenny Kitzinger and Jackie Reilly (1997) cite journalists' training, newsworthiness,
the organisation of news beats and source competition as contributory factors
explaining why certain risks are "highlighted" and others "overlooked". They are
critical of how standard news production studies have failed to account for the
reporting of 'risk". Few news production studies have attempted to explore how
risk plays a part in the decision-making process of jourmalism. There is litle con
sideration of how the practice of journalism is both facilitated and inhibited by the
orientation of the media and journalism to the risk society.
It is important to stress that any assessment of risk and journalism practice must
be anchored in the notion of contestation. News production is a matter of con
testation between the various actors involved in the gathering, processing and dis
semination of news. What is newsworthy, or which stories have nevws value, is
often aprocess of negotiation. Alexander Cockburn (1988) talks about the terms
of the trade" of the profession as reporters try to sell their stories to the news desk
or bargain with sources to obtain information. Such negotiations are determined by
a number of factors from the personal values of those involved to the institutional
requirements of the organisation they work for to the expectations of the society in
which they work. Consensus and conflict are apparent; while there is agreement
that certain stories should be done, there are other stories that are subject to dif
ferences of opinion. How stories should be covered is open to more discussion and
disagreement. Disputes and competition in the processing of a story take place
within an environment characterised by an unequal distribution of power and
authority and subject to intervention from forces external to the production
26 Risk and war journalism

environment in whil
process. This is the occupational culture and organisational
joumalists make risk calculations.
There are a number of ways in which journalists incorporate calculations of rist,
into theit work practices. First, sourcing news entails making judgements about the
truthfulness and motives of those who are telling you their stories. Misjudgemen
personal standing as well as the
can result in consequences for professional and
account. Not only will
eputation of the news organisation that publishes the
stories but nevrs
sourres become more sceptical of approaching you with their
to produce stores
OTganisations may perceive you as a liability. Second, the tailure
and women i
represents an editorial risk. Editors and news desks expect their men
satisties institutional
the field to generate a constant flow of news stories. This
fGU
requirements such as the costs incurred in deploying reporters and the need to
can lead
the page, screen and airwaves. Letting down the home office and editors
to various penalties from the loss of an assignment through the spiking of stories to
the non-cooperation of the desk. Pamela Shoemaker and Stephen Reese (1991). in
their study of the news production process, identify a number of levels at which
negotiation over the content of news take place. These can be seen as having
comesponding levels of risk. What is perceived as risk will vary according to these
levels and risk-taking behaviour will be assessed according to calculations made at
each level.
The different levels identified by Shoemaker and Reese (1991) are individual,
organisational, social and cultural. They are subject to different scholarly inter
pretation, butfrom the perspective of risk-taking, they can be described as follows.
At the individual level, journalists' work is shaped by a series of
psychological fac
tors - personal, political and professional. Their disposition to their work and how
they do it is a product of their attitudes and understanding.
shaped by the organisational routines and structures in which Journalism is also
These routines and structures constrain and facilitate practitioners function.
action, and individual deci
sions have to be made within the
freelance reporting in the last couple organisational environment. The growth ot
of decades has not minimised
influences. In fact, the need to sell stories to major news organisational
reporters more conscious of the organisational outlets has made freelance
The occupational culture of environment in which they operate.
reporters is characterised by both conflict and
operation which co
determine their everyday experiences. Relationships with
social institutions involve another type other
their daily work. Stories do not grow of negotiation that journalists go through n
aged. Most jourmalists rely on external on trees; they cannot be picked and pack
pening. Much of the legwork' in gatheringsources for information about what is hap
reporters but by their sources. This news and information is not done by
of new environment has been transformed in the wake
technology, and govemment and
profesional and effective in their publicnon-government
relations and
organisations are more
Finally, there are cultural propaganda techniques.
focus on the ideological expectations of the journalist. Shoemaker and Reese
society. However, societyparameters within which
has expectations of how journalists have to work in any
joumalists should perfom thet
 Risk and war journalisn 27

oles. Barbara Kote (2009: 13) draws attention to the necd to deliver a perfor
mance for an audience, something particularly visible in the world of contenporary
television. The role playing that audiences demand is manifest in the cultural
representations of the profession, fictional and non-fictional. Although roles are not
fixed, but subject to contestation, they "configure and foreground certain aspects
of jounalists and their behaviour. Risk-taking therefore has to be seen in the
context of avariety of factors including group dynamics, trust in colleagues and
sources, professional status and standing, the editorial process, audience expectations
as well as the working environment of a particular story. These are all elements that
constitute the risk biographies of journalists.

Risk and the war correspondent

There are then a number of reasons why journalists are risk inclined. Notions such
as cultural choice, professional advancement and thrill-seeking are all reasons why
journalists take risks. These factors are particularly applicable to war zone journal
ism. It is claimed that "to some, war reporting is exciting; it's an adventure. To
others, war reporting is a noble cause still other journalists ike war reporting
because it can provide a quick path to professional success" (Sullivan, 2006: 12).
These seemingly different motivations share the same theoretical precept -they
assume that a value, whether it be the thrill, ethical or moral concern or career
aspiration, takes precedence over basic risk aversion. However, it can be argued
that the manner in which these nmotivations are woven together distinguishes the
risk culture of war correspondence.
A number of characteristics have been identified which distinguish war reporters
as a group. Despite the claim that there is convergence in the practices and orien
tations of journalism, the profession is, unlike most others, practiced in a variety of
ways. There are shared values that give some coherence to journalism, but distinct
occupational subcultures exist within the profession making it "difficult to gen
eralise about the practices, experiences and self-images of news workes within
them" (Harries and Wahl-Jorgensen, 2007: 621). What distinguishes war reporting
as a 'beat' is a matter of scholarly deliberation. Several characteristics have been put
forward. War correspondents are seen as exercising a greater degree of autonomy.
There is a perception within the profession that they have more independence and
freedom from their news desks. They are spared the editorial restrictions that
constrain other correspondents. Before the advent of the new media, this was
regarded as a product of geographical distance between the editor back home and
the reporter in the field. Editors did not have the information about the circum
stances on the ground to make decisions about who to talk to, logistics, hazards
and storyline. In the confusion of war, more emphasis is placed on the man or
woman on the spot, who can assess the lie of the land. As a result, war reporters are
often labelled as 'mavericks' or 'individualists' who plough their own furrow. Their
degree of autonomy is seen as singling them out as the elite' of the journalism
profession. Mark Pedelty (1995), in his anthropological study of the press corps
 28 Risk and war
journalism

who covered the butal war in El

Salvador in the 1980s,
corespondents primarily on the basis of their autonomny todistinguishes
follow
the status ot
their own len
and deploy their own strategies to obtain stories.
War reporting is also differentiated on commercial grounds. War is a
and the commercial gains to be nade by media outlets fromn its "big story,
prosecution hae
been enphasised. For editors and owners, war not only sells copy,
increases circu
lation and boosts profits, but also provides a regular supply of the product,
helping
to manage costs. This gives war correspondents some degree of primacy in the
newsgathering process. Wats, as David Welch (2007: xiV) puts it, offer reporter
unque opportunities to impose themselves on a news story". The specialism is
regarded as the high point of career aspiration injournalism. War correspondents
have regularly acquired a degree of stardom, highlighting the extent to which the
specialism is deeply anchored in our culture. They are envied by colleagues and
celebrated by society. War reporting is also seen as the apogee of eyewitnessing.
viewed traditionally as one of the defining qualities of journalisrm. The function of
witnessing in wartime demands different abilities and aptitudes to those required in
other forms of journalism. The proximity of the war correspondent to his or her
primary sources is unlike that of other correspondents, and interaction with sources
often takes place under a more pressurised set of circumstances. War correspon
dents display a high degree of camaraderie, manifest in familiar lak-jacketed
reporters turning up in large numbers when conflict breaks out. Behind chis
assessment is the assumption that war reporters are more closely connected to one
another by the dangerous nature of their job. War reporters also have a more
nuanced relationship with objectivity. Patriotism and professionalism rub up against
each other more violently in the reporting of war and conflict. The fear of being
accused 'unpatriotic has exercised considerable sway over war reporters. Other
characteristics could be added, and the extent to which they identify the 'excep
tionalism' of war reporters or whether they indicate a greater intensity or simply an
extension of the work of the everyday reporter are moot points. While war cor
respondents are not a homogeneous group, there is a degree of commonality in the
experiences, values, attitudes and approaches of the people who report wars that
differentiates them from other types of journalists.
The exceptionalism of war correspondents is seen as making them more sk
oriented than other reporters. Their daily dance with death, as the more sensational
accounts of the work would put it, is crucial in shaping the culture of risk that
surrounds what they do. However, what makes thenm prone to risk-takng 1s ho
simply a matter of how they deal with "noments in hell" (Harding Davis, 1910).
The means by which war correspondents cope with death and destruction and
manage trauma and stress has been documented in recent years. Less emphasis na
been placed on the other aspects of their working environment that make risk
taking an intrinsic component of their job. Individual correspondents negotiate
these pressures in different ways. Brian Creech (2017) stresses that the "exposure to
rIsk is unevenly distributed'" between correspondents, with freelance and local
journalists facing agreater variety of risks. How they manage risk at the personal
 Risk and war journalisn 29

level has to be seen in the context of their interpretation of audience expectations,

onganisational demands, market conditions, profesional beliefs, the aims and hopes
of sources, the actions of fellow correspondents and so on. Managing the hazards
and dangers of operating on the ground has to be set against calculations about
other risks, such as letting down sources, failing to satisfy the news desk and
negotiating relationships with colleagues. In recent years, moral, commercial,
organisational and technological changes have accentuated the risk-taking envir
onment in which war reporters work, and these are the subject of the next three
chapters.

Notes
1 This chapter draws on the work of and conversations with Dominic Sipinski, an Erasmus
Mundus master's degree student who wrote his dissertation on risk and freelance war
correspondents in 2014.
2 Mick Bloor demonstrated this with the example of female and male prostitutes whose
lack of power in their relationships with their clients caused them, inspite of knowledge
to the contrary, to participate in unsafe sex practices.